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Mishnah Yevamot
משנה יבמות
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Mishnah Yevamot



Chapter 1

The Torah law obligating a man whose brother died without children [<i>yavam</i>] to marry his deceased brother’s widow [<i>yevama</i>] or to free her from her levirate bonds through the act of <i>ḥalitza</i> applies only when it is permitted for the widow to marry her surviving brother-in-law. However, in cases where the <i>yevama</i> is forbidden to her <i>yavam</i> due to her status as a close family relative, the mitzva of levirate marriage is not applicable, and she is exempt from both levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i>.<br>The Sages further taught that the exemption of a <i>yevama</i> from levirate marriage also exempts her rival wife. In other words, if the deceased brother had two wives, each a so-called rival of the other, and only one wife is a relative of the surviving brother, then the rival wife is also exempt from both levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i>. Moreover, if that same rival wife entered into levirate marriage with a different brother of the deceased, one to whom she is not forbidden, then were this third brother also to die childless, so that the obligation of levirate marriage would again be incurred by the second brother, not only is the forbidden rival wife exempt from levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i>, her new rival wives from her second marriage are also exempt.<br>That is to say, any other wife of the third brother is exempt from the mitzva of levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of that first rival wife, who was exempted from levirate marriage following her first husband’s death due the exemption of her original rival wife. The same principle applies if that second rival wife subsequently enters into levirate marriage with another permitted brother, and so on. In summary, every widow who is exempt from marrying her brother-in-law due to her status as rival wife of a forbidden relative is treated as a forbidden relative herself and is therefore exempt from both <i>ḥalitza</i> and levirate marriage and causes exemption for future rival wives as well.<br><br>The mishna describes various cases that invoke the principles above. <b>Fifteen</b> categories of <b>women</b> constitute familial relations that are forbidden as incestuous, and consequently, these women <b>exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from <i>ḥalitza</i> and from levirate marriage forever,</b> i.e., they also exempt rival wives of rival wives of rival wives, and so on. <b>And these</b> women <b>are: The daughter</b> of the <i>yavam</i>, i.e., the deceased brother had married a daughter of his brother, which means that when he died childless, his brother’s own daughter came before her father for levirate marriage, and therefore she is exempt. <b>And</b> the same applies if the deceased brother’s widow is <b>the daughter of</b> the <b>daughter of</b> the <i>yavam</i>, <b>or</b> if she is <b>the daughter of his son,</b> or <b>the daughter of</b> his <b>wife.</b> <b>And</b> similarly, if the <i>yevama</i> is <b>the daughter of</b> the <b>son</b> of the wife of her <i>yavam</i> <b>or the daughter of</b> his wife’s <b>daughter, or</b> if she is the <b>mother-in-law</b> of her <i>yavam</i>, <b>or his mother-in-law’s mother, or his father-in-law’s mother,</b> then she is exempt from <i>ḥalitza</i> and levirate marriage. The mishna continues its list of close relatives. If the <i>yevama</i> is the <b>maternal</b> half <b>sister</b> of the <i>yavam</i>, <b>or</b> if she is the <b>sister of his mother, or his wife’s sister,</b> then she is exempt from both <i>ḥalitza</i> and levirate marriage <b>Or</b> if she was <b>the wife of his maternal</b> half <b>brother,</b> and after this brother died or divorced his wife, she married another of his father’s brothers, who was not her relative, and this brother died, she is exempt. In this case, the obligation to enter into levirate marriage should be incurred by the surviving brother, but since she was previously the wife of his maternal brother, she is exempt. <b>And</b> the same applies to the <b>wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist,</b> i.e., the wife of a man who died before his brother was born. As will be explained, the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply to the <i>yavam</i> in this case. Since levirate marriage does not apply to him, the <i>yevama</i> remains forbidden to him as his brother’s wife. <b>And</b> the last case is if one’s <i>yevama</i> had previously been <b>his daughter-in-law,</b> and after his son had died one’s brother married her, before he too passed away. <b>These</b> fifteen women <b>exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from <i>ḥalitza</i> and levirate marriage forever.</b> § <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of these</b> women listed as prohibited relations, these <i>halakhot</i> apply only if they were married to the deceased brother until the time of his death. However, this is not the case <b>if they died</b> during the deceased brother’s lifetime, <b>or</b> if <b>they refused</b> their husbands when they were minors. This refusal is referring to the decree of the Sages that a girl under the age of twelve whose father is no longer alive may be married off by her mother or brothers. However, this marriage is not final, as she can terminate it by performing an act of refusal, i.e., by declaring, while still a minor, that she does not desire this marriage. In this case, the marriage is annulled retroactively and she is considered as though she were never married at all. <b>Or</b> if those women <b>were divorced</b> by their husband, the deceased brother, <b>or were found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [<i>aylonit</i>],</b> i.e., a woman who is so underdeveloped that she is not considered a woman in the full sense, these <i>halakhot</i> do not apply. Her marriage is considered a mistaken marriage and is null and void. In all these cases <b>their rival wives are permitted,</b> as the exemption for rival wives of forbidden relatives applies only when the forbidden relative was the brother’s wife at the time of his death, when the <i>halakhot</i> of levirate marriage came into effect. § <b>And</b> the mishna comments that the language of this principle is imprecise, as <b>you cannot say with regard to his mother-in-law and with regard to his mother-in-law’s mother and with regard to his father-in-law’s mother that they were found to be an <i>aylonit</i>,</b> as an <i>aylonit</i> is sterile and therefore cannot become a mother or a mother-in-law. <b>Nor</b> is the mishna precise when it states: <b>Or refused,</b> as refusal applies only to minors, who cannot give birth.
The mishna explains: <b>How do</b> these women <b>exempt their rival wives?</b> If, for example, <b>his daughter or any one of those</b> women <b>with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother and</b> this brother <b>had another wife, and</b> the brother <b>died,</b> then <b>just as his daughter is exempt</b> from levirate marriage, <b>so too her rival wife is exempt.</b> If <b>his daughter’s rival wife</b> subsequently <b>went and married his second brother,</b> to whom she is permitted, <b>and he had another wife, and he died</b> childless as well, which means that his wife comes before the first <i>yavam</i>, the daughter’s father, for levirate marriage, then <b>just as his daughter’s rival wife is exempt, so too the rival wife of her rival wife is exempt.</b> The mishna adds: <b>Even if they are one hundred</b> brothers, the same logic applies. If a woman is exempt from levirate marriage because she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative or the rival wife of a rival wife of this kind, and she herself has an additional rival wife, this rival wife is also exempt and in turn exempts her own rival wives from levirate marriage. <b>How so?</b> What are the cases in which <b>if they died their rival wives are permitted?</b> If, for example, <b>one’s daughter or any one of those</b> women <b>with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother, and</b> this brother <b>had another wife,</b> and then <b>his daughter died or was divorced and afterward his brother died, her rival wife is permitted</b> to him. § The mishna states another principle: <b>And</b> if <b>any</b> of these forbidden relatives was a minor <b>who could refuse</b> her husband, then even if <b>she did not refuse, her rival wife performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and does not enter into levirate marriage.</b> The rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative. However, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage and must be released by <i>ḥalitza</i> because the marriage of the forbidden relative was not a fully valid marriage, and therefore, by Torah law, the other woman is not considered a rival wife of a forbidden relative.
<b>Six</b> women <b>with whom relations are forbidden</b> who were not enumerated in the first mishna <b>are</b> forbidden by prohibitions that are <b>more severe than those</b> listed in that mishna <b>because they may be married</b> only <b>to others</b> and may never be married to any of the brothers, due to the closeness of their relationship. However, this stringency entails a corresponding leniency: Since the <i>halakha</i> of levirate marriage is entirely inapplicable in these cases, <b>their rival wives are permitted.</b> The rival wife of a forbidden relative is forbidden herself only if the mitzva of levirate marriage is applicable, but where it is not in effect she is permitted. The six women with whom relations are forbidden are as follows: <b>His mother, and his father’s wife, and his father’s sister, and his paternal</b> half <b>sister, and the wife of his father’s brother, and the wife of his paternal</b> half <b>brother.</b> Each of these women with whom relations are forbidden is forbidden equally to all of the brothers, and the mitzva of levirate marriage is inapplicable. Therefore, her rival wife is permitted.
Up to this point, the discussions were based on the assumption that not only may a forbidden relative not enter into levirate marriage, but her rival wife is also exempt. However, this issue is subject to a long-standing dispute. <b>Beit Shammai permit the rival wives to the brothers,</b> as they did not accept the interpretation of the verses that indicates that rival wives are prohibited. <b>And Beit Hillel forbid</b> them. The previous <i>mishnayot</i> are in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. If any of the rival wives of the brother <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, Beit Shammai disqualify</b> her <b>from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood,</b> as in their opinion these rival wives were fit for levirate marriage, which means that the <i>ḥalitza</i> was fully valid. Consequently, they are disqualified from marrying a priest, like all other women who perform <i>ḥalitza</i>. <b>And Beit Hillel deem</b> them <b>fit,</b> as they maintain that no legal act of <i>ḥalitza</i> was performed here at all. If <b>they entered into levirate marriage, Beit Shammai deem</b> them <b>fit</b> for the priesthood, as in their opinion, this is a fully legal levirate marriage. <b>And Beit Hillel disqualify them,</b> because they engaged in licentious sexual relations as the rival wives of a forbidden relative. § The mishna comments: <b>Although</b> Beit Hillel <b>prohibit</b> the rival wives to the brothers <b>and</b> Beit Shammai <b>permit</b> them, and although <b>these disqualify</b> these women <b>and those deem</b> them <b>fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel</b> refrain from marrying women <b>from Beit Shammai.</b> Furthermore, with regard to <b>all of the</b> disputes concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>ritual purity and impurity, where these</b> rule that an article is <b>ritually pure and those</b> rule it <b>ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure</b> objects <b>each with the other,</b> as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel frequently used each other’s vessels.

Chapter 2

Each of the women enumerated in the first chapter causes exemption from levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i> for her rival wives. This is due to the close family relationship she has with her brother-in-law, making her forbidden to him. The single exception is the case explained in this mishna. <b>What</b> is the case of <b>the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist?</b> For example: If there were <b>two brothers, and one of them died</b> childless, <b>and</b> subsequently <b>a brother of theirs was born, after which the second brother,</b> the elder, <b>took his</b> deceased <b>brother’s wife in levirate marriage, and</b> then <b>died</b> as well. Consequently, two women require levirate marriage: The widow of the first brother who had been taken in levirate marriage by the second brother, and the widow of the second brother, the first widow’s rival wife. <b>The first</b> widow, who had been the wife of the first brother to die, <b>goes out</b> without any obligation to be taken in levirate marriage by the youngest brother who was born later, <b>since</b> she is <b>the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.</b> The first deceased brother never lived at the same time as the newly born brother. <b>The second</b> widow, who had been married to the second brother, is exempt <b>due to her rival wife.</b> The mishna discusses an additional situation: If the second brother had <b>performed</b> only <b>levirate betrothal with her,</b> meaning that he had not yet consummated the marriage, <b>and</b> then <b>died,</b> both the wife betrothed by a levirate betrothal to the second brother and the wife of the second brother fall before the youngest brother born after the death of the first brother. In that case, the first wife certainly goes out and is exempt from both <i>ḥalitza</i> and levirate marriage, since she is to him the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. <b>The second,</b> however, was never effectively the rival wife of the first brother’s wife, as the first brother’s wife had only been betrothed by levirate betrothal and was not fully married to the second brother. Therefore, <b>she performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b>
If there were <b>two brothers, and one died, and the second entered into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife</b> while he was already married to another woman, <b>and subsequently</b> a third <b>brother was born to them, and</b> the second brother then <b>died,</b> whereby both of his wives happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, then <b>the first woman,</b> who was the wife of the first brother, <b>is exempt due to</b> the fact that she is <b>the wife of a brother with whom</b> the third brother <b>did not coexist, and the second</b> woman, who was the first wife of the second brother, is exempt <b>due to her rival wife.</b> If the second brother had <b>performed</b> only <b>levirate betrothal with her and</b> then <b>died</b> before fully marrying her, <b>the second</b> woman <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage,</b> as the levirate betrothal is not considered a sufficiently valid marriage so as to render her the rival wife of a relation forbidden to the third brother. <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> with regard to the first clause of the mishna: The third brother either <b>enters into levirate marriage with whichever one he wishes, or he performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with whichever one he wishes.</b> Since he was born after his second brother had already entered into levirate marriage with the first brother’s widow, she is considered the wife of a brother with whom he did coexist, not the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Therefore, he may enter into levirate marriage with her.
The Sages <b>stated a principle about a <i>yevama</i>: Whoever is</b> forbidden <b>by a prohibition of forbidden relations</b> to her <i>yavam</i> <b>neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor enters into levirate marriage</b> and is completely exempt. If she is forbidden by <b>a prohibition</b> resulting from <b>a mitzva</b> or by <b>a prohibition</b> stemming from <b>sanctity,</b> as will be explained later, then since in these cases the obligation of levirate marriage is not fundamentally nullified <b>she performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> in order to become free of the levirate bond, <b>and</b> due to her prohibition <b>she does not enter into levirate marriage.</b> The Sages stated another principle: If two sisters who had been married to two brothers who subsequently died happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, and one of those sisters is a close relation to this third brother and is therefore forbidden to him, she is exempt from levirate marriage. But the other, <b>her sister who is her <i>yevama</i>,</b> i.e., her sister-in-law, <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage.</b> In this case, they are not ruled to be two sisters who happened before him simultaneously for levirate marriage, since one of them is prohibited to him as a forbidden relation, and therefore she never actually happened before him at all.
The mishna explains: <b>A prohibition</b> resulting from <b>a mitzva</b> is referring to <b>secondary</b> forbidden <b>relationships,</b> which are prohibited <b>by rabbinic law.</b> The Sages prohibited marriage to certain women who were not forbidden by the Torah but were nevertheless deemed forbidden incestuous relations. <b>A prohibition</b> stemming from <b>sanctity</b> is referring to marriage of <b>a widow to a High Priest, a divorcée or a woman who has performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>] to a common priest, a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzeret</i>]</b> or a <b>Gibeonite woman to an Israelite, and</b> also <b>an Israelite woman to a Gibeonite or</b> to <b>a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzer</i>].</b>
In the case of <b>anyone who has a brother of any kind,</b> that brother <b>creates a levirate bond</b> causing his <b><i>yevama</i> to</b> be required to <b>perform levirate marriage</b> if the first brother dies childless. <b>And he is his brother in all respects, except for one who has a brother</b> born <b>from</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant or from a gentile woman,</b> as these do not have the legal status of brothers. Similarly, in the case of <b>anyone who has a child of any kind,</b> that child <b>exempts his father’s wife from levirate marriage,</b> since his father did not die childless. <b>And</b> that child <b>is liable</b> to receive capital punishment <b>if he strikes</b> his father <b>or curses him. And he is his child in all respects, except for whoever has a child</b> born <b>from</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant or from a gentile woman,</b> as these do not have the halakhic status of children.
In the case of <b>one who betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he betrothed,</b> so that both are forbidden to him, he <b>gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one</b> due to the uncertainty. If the man who had betrothed one of these women <b>died</b> before he could give a bill of divorce, <b>and he had one brother,</b> that brother <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with both of them,</b> but he may not take either in levirate marriage. This is because he does not know which woman is his <i>yevama</i> and which is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. If the man who betrothed one of these women <b>had two</b> brothers, <b>one</b> of them <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one of the sisters, but he may not enter into levirate marriage with her due to the possibility that she is the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. <b>And one takes</b> the other <b>in levirate marriage</b> if he so desires. If the two brothers <b>married</b> the two sisters <b>before</b> consulting the court, the court does not <b>remove them</b> from their marriage and they are permitted to remain married. The couple who performed levirate marriage second was even permitted to do so, since there was no longer any doubt about the levirate bond.
Furthermore, in the case of <b>two</b> unrelated men <b>who betrothed two sisters:</b> If <b>this one does not know which</b> sister <b>he betrothed and that one does not know which</b> sister <b>he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce,</b> one to each of the women, <b>and that one gives two bills of divorce.</b> If the two men <b>died</b> before they divorced, and <b>this one had a brother and that one had a brother,</b> then <b>this</b> brother <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with both of them, and that</b> brother <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with both of them.</b> If <b>this one had one</b> brother <b>and that one had two</b> brothers, <b>the single</b> brother <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with both of them, and</b> of <b>the two</b> brothers, <b>one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and one performs levirate marriage</b> if he so desires. If <b>they married</b> the sisters <b>before</b> consulting the court, the court <b>does not remove them</b> from the marriage and they are not told to divorce them. If <b>this one had two</b> brothers <b>and that one had two</b> brothers, <b>the brother of this one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with one</b> sister, <b>and the brother of that one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with one</b> sister. <b>The brother of this</b> one who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>may take the woman who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>] of that</b> other’s brother <b>in levirate marriage, and the brother of that</b> second one who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>may take the <i>ḥalutza</i> of that</b> other’s brother <b>in levirate marriage.</b> If the two brothers <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with both wives <b>before</b> consulting the court, <b>the</b> two brothers of the second man <b>may not take</b> sisters <b>in levirate marriage</b> lest one marry the sister of a woman who with whom he had a levirate bond. <b>Rather, one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and one performs levirate marriage</b> if he so desires. If <b>they married</b> their wives <b>before</b> consulting the court, the court <b>does not remove them</b> from the marriage.
<b>It is a mitzva for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage,</b> i.e., the eldest takes precedence over the other brothers, though they too are obligated. <b>But if the younger</b> brother consummated the levirate marriage <b>first, he acquires</b> the <i>yevama</i> as his wife. <b>One suspected</b> by others of engaging in sexual relations <b>with a</b> Canaanite <b>maidservant and she was</b> later <b>set free, or</b> one suspected of relations <b>with a gentile woman and she</b> subsequently <b>converted, may not marry</b> that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. <b>But if he did marry her, they,</b> the judges of the court, <b>do not remove</b> her <b>from him,</b> i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. With regard to <b>one who is suspected of</b> illicit relations with <b>a married woman and they,</b> the judges of the court, <b>removed her from</b> her husband, i.e., required them to divorce due to this, <b>even if</b> the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently <b>married</b> her, <b>he must divorce</b> her.
An agent <b>who brought a bill of divorce from a country overseas and said: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,</b> as required in order to establish the bill of divorce as valid, <b>may not marry</b> the <b>wife,</b> i.e., the divorcée. Since the validity of the bill of divorce is based upon his testimony, marrying the divorcée creates the impression that he had an ulterior motive for his testimony. Similarly, a witness who testified that a certain man <b>died,</b> or testified: <b>I killed him,</b> or: <b>We killed him, may not marry</b> that man’s <b>wife. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If he testified: <b>I killed him, his wife may not be married</b> at all based on that evidence, as his testimony is unreliable, but if he said: <b>We killed him, his wife may be married</b> to anyone other than those witnesses.
A <b>Sage who</b> refused to release a woman from a vow that <b>rendered the wife forbidden to her husband by</b> that <b>vow,</b> resulting in her being divorced from her husband, <b>may not marry her,</b> so as to avoid suspicion that he rendered her forbidden to her husband in order to marry her himself. However, a judge before whom a woman <b>performed refusal</b> when she was a minor, declaring that she did not desire the husband chosen for her by her family, <b>or before whom</b> she <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, may marry her because</b> he was only one member of <b>the court,</b> thereby alleviating suspicion. <b>And</b> for <b>all of these</b> who were involved in permitting the wife to remarry, i.e., the judge, the agent who brought a bill of divorce, and the one who testified for a woman that her husband died, if <b>they had wives</b> at the time of the ruling or the testimony <b>and</b> their wives <b>died</b> thereafter, then those women they had set free <b>are permitted to be married to them.</b> There is no concern that while their wives were still alive these individuals set their eyes upon another woman. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of these</b> women who were prohibited from marrying a certain man due to some suspicion, if <b>they were</b> subsequently <b>married to others and</b> then <b>were divorced or widowed</b> from the second husband, <b>they are permitted to be married to them,</b> i.e., to the judge, messenger, or witness who permitted her to remarry. <b>And all of these</b> women who were prohibited from marrying due to some suspicion <b>are permitted to the sons or to the brothers</b> of those who set them free.

Chapter 3

In the case of <b>four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and the ones married to the sisters died, then those</b> sisters must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b> Since both sisters require levirate marriage with each of the surviving brothers, a levirate bond exists between each sister and the brothers. Each of them is considered the sister of a woman with whom each brother has a levirate bond and is therefore forbidden to him by rabbinic law. <b>And if they married</b> the sisters <b>before</b> consulting the court, <b>they should divorce</b> them, for the Sages decreed that in this situation they may not remain married. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says</b> that there is a dispute in this matter: <b>Beit Shammai say: He may maintain</b> her as his wife, <b>while Beit Hillel say: They</b> must <b>divorce</b> them.
If <b>one of</b> the sisters <b>was forbidden to one</b> of the brothers due to <b>a prohibition against forbidden relations</b> because she was a relative of his wife or a relative on his mother’s side, then <b>he is forbidden to</b> marry <b>her but permitted to</b> marry <b>her sister.</b> Because she is his close relative, she is exempt from levirate marriage with him, and therefore she is not bound to him with a levirate bond. Consequently, her sister is not considered the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond, and he is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her. But <b>the second</b> brother, who is not a close relative of either sister, <b>is forbidden to</b> marry <b>both of them.</b> Indeed, for him each woman remains the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. If <b>a prohibition</b> resulting from <b>a mitzva</b> or <b>a prohibition</b> stemming from <b>sanctity</b> will be transgressed when one of the women marries one of the brothers, then her sister must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage,</b> as she is considered the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. In this case, the sister who is forbidden to the brother due to a mitzva or due to sanctity is bound to the brother for the purpose of <i>ḥalitza</i>.
If <b>one of those</b> women <b>was forbidden to this</b> one brother due to <b>a prohibition against forbidden relations and the second</b> woman <b>was forbidden to that</b> second brother due to <b>a prohibition against forbidden relations,</b> then <b>she who is forbidden to this</b> brother <b>is permitted to that</b> brother, <b>and she who is forbidden to that</b> brother <b>is permitted to this</b> one. <b>And this is</b> the case that was referred to when <b>they said: When her sister is</b> also <b>her <i>yevama</i>,</b> i.e., in a case where two sisters are also <i>yevamot</i> and therefore happened for levirate marriage before two brothers, <b>she either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage.</b> This must be referring to a case where each sister is forbidden to one of the brothers due to a prohibition concerning forbidden relatives. In this case, each sister has a levirate bond only with the one brother to whom she is permitted, and the prohibition against marrying the sister of a woman with whom one has a levirate bond does not apply. Therefore, each brother can either perform the act of <i>ḥalitza</i> or consummate the levirate marriage with the sister to whom he is not related.
In the case of <b>three brothers, two of whom were married to</b> close relatives, e.g., <b>two sisters; or a woman and her daughter; or a woman and her daughter’s daughter; or a woman and her son’s daughter,</b> if the two brothers who were married to two close relatives died and their wives happened before a third brother for levirate marriage, <b>then these</b> two women must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage,</b> as each of them is a relative of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. <b>And Rabbi Shimon exempts</b> them even from the obligation to perform <i>ḥalitza</i>. If <b>one of them was forbidden to him,</b> the third brother, due to <b>a prohibition against forbidden relatives,</b> then <b>he is prohibited from</b> marrying <b>her but is permitted to</b> marry <b>her sister.</b> Because the woman who is forbidden to him is not considered to be a woman who requires him for levirate marriage, there is only one woman who happens before him for levirate marriage. However, if one of the women was forbidden due to <b>a prohibition</b> resulting from <b>a mitzva or a prohibition</b> stemming from <b>sanctity,</b> then <b>they</b> must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b> This is because these prohibitions do not completely cancel the levirate bond.
In the case of <b>three brothers, two</b> of whom <b>were married to two sisters, and one who was single,</b> the following occurred: <b>The husband of one of the sisters died</b> childless, leaving behind his wife, <b>and the single</b> brother <b>performed levirate betrothal [<i>ma’amar</i>]</b> to this wife. The single brother performed an act of betrothal to the <i>yevama</i> but did not yet consummate the marriage by engaging in sexual intercourse. <b>Afterward, the second brother died,</b> and therefore the second brother’s wife, the sister of the betrothed, happened before the single brother for levirate marriage as well. In this case, <b>Beit Shammai say: His wife remains with him.</b> The woman he betrothed is considered like his wife, and he is not required to divorce her. <b>And this other</b> woman <b>leaves</b> the <i>yavam</i> and is exempt from levirate marriage <b>as the sister of a wife. Beit Hillel say:</b> Being as he had not yet entered into marriage with the first woman, he is required to perform levirate marriage with both women. Therefore, <b>he divorces his wife,</b> i.e., the woman to whom he performed levirate betrothal, <b>with a bill of divorce,</b> which nullifies levirate betrothal, <b>and by <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> which nullifies the levirate bond. <b>And,</b> he sends away <b>the wife of his</b> second <b>brother with <i>ḥalitza</i></b> as well. They comment: <b>This is</b> the case <b>that</b> was referred to when the Sages <b>said: Woe unto him for his wife and woe unto him for the wife of his brother.</b> Due to the combination of circumstances, he loses them both.
In the case of <b>three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman,</b> the following occurred: <b>The husband of one of the sisters died</b> childless, <b>and</b> the brother <b>who was married to the unrelated woman married,</b> i.e., performed lev irate marriage with, the deceased brother’s <b>wife and</b> later <b>died</b> himself, childless. In this situation, both women happen for levirate marriage before the other, remaining, brother. <b>The first</b> woman <b>is dismissed due to</b> the prohibition proscribing <b>the sister of one’s wife,</b> as she is the sister of this brother’s wife, <b>and the second</b> woman is dismissed <b>due to</b> her status as the first woman’s <b>rival wife.</b> Following the first levirate marriage, this second woman became the rival wife of the sister, and is therefore exempt from levirate marriage as well. If, however, the brother married to the unrelated woman <b>performed</b> only <b>levirate betrothal,</b> but had not yet consummated the levirate marriage with the sister, <b>and he died, the unrelated woman,</b> whose halakhic status with regard to <i>yibbum</i> is similar to that of a sister’s rival wife, must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b> In the case of <b>three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman,</b> the following occurred: <b>One of the husbands of the sisters died, and he who was married to the unrelated woman married</b> the deceased husband’s <b>wife, and</b> then <b>the wife of the second</b> brother, the other one of the sisters, <b>died. Afterward,</b> the brother <b>who was married to the unrelated woman died,</b> leaving two women for levirate marriage before the remaining brother: The unrelated woman and the woman who was previously prohibited as the sister of his deceased wife. In this case, the sister <b>is forbidden to him forever.</b> She is not forbidden due to her status as his wife’s sister, as his wife already died and one’s wife’s sister is permitted after the wife’s death. However, <b>since she was</b> already <b>forbidden to him at one time,</b> she is forbidden to him forever. When she first happened before the brothers for levirate marriage, before the third brother married her, she was forbidden to the second brother as his wife’s sister. Therefore, she is forbidden to him forever. In addition, she exempts her rival wife, the unrelated woman, from levirate marriage.
In the case of <b>three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman,</b> the following occurred: Shimon, <b>the husband of one of the sisters, divorced his wife, and</b> then Levi, <b>who was married to the unrelated woman, died, and</b> Shimon, <b>the man who divorced</b> his wife, <b>married,</b> i.e., performed levirate marriage with, <b>her,</b> i.e., this unrelated woman. <b>And</b> then Shimon himself later <b>died,</b> so that the unrelated woman happened for levirate marriage before Reuven, the third brother, who is married to the second sister. In this scenario, Reuven is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with the unrelated woman. <b>This is</b> the case that was referred to when <b>they said: And</b> with regard to <b>all those</b> fifteen forbidden relatives <b>who died or were divorced, their rival wives are permitted</b> to enter into levirate marriage. This is because at the time that they happened before the <i>yavam</i> for levirate marriage they were no longer the rival wives of a forbidden relative. 
<b>And</b> if <b>any of these</b> fifteen women who are prohibited as forbidden relatives <b>had undergone a betrothal or divorce</b> whose status <b>is uncertain</b> with the deceased brother, <b>then those</b> women who were their <b>rival wives</b> must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage</b> since they are possibly the rival wives of forbidden relatives. The mishna elaborates: <b>How</b> could there be a situation of <b>uncertainty</b> with regard to <b>betrothal?</b> If in the public domain <b>he threw her</b> an item for the purpose of <b>betrothal</b> and there were eight cubits between them, and the item <b>was possibly closer to him</b> and did not enter into her domain, and <b>possibly closer to her,</b> i.e., within four cubits of her, whereby she could acquire the object, <b>this is</b> a case of <b>uncertainty</b> with regard to <b>betrothal.</b> <b>Uncertainty</b> with regard to <b>divorce</b> occurs when, for instance, <b>he wrote a</b> bill of divorce <b>in his handwriting but there are no</b> signatures of <b>witnesses on</b> the document, or <b>there are</b> the signatures of <b>witnesses</b> on the document <b>but there is no date</b> written <b>in it,</b> or <b>the date is</b> written <b>in it but there is only</b> the signature of <b>a single witness.</b> Since there is doubt as to whether these three kinds of bills of divorce are valid, a woman who was divorced through them is only possibly divorced, and so <b>this</b> case <b>is</b> called <b>uncertainty</b> with regard to <b>divorce.</b>
In the case of <b>three brothers</b> who <b>were married to three unrelated women, and one of</b> the brothers <b>died,</b> the following occurred: <b>The second</b> brother <b>performed levirate betrothal with</b> the wife of the deceased brother <b>and</b> before he was able to consummate the levirate marriage <b>he died</b> as well, leaving behind two women who happen before the third brother for levirate marriage. <b>Then those</b> two women must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b> <b>As it is stated:</b> “If brothers dwell together <b>and one of them dies</b> and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; <b>her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:5). This teaches that a woman eligible for levirate marriage is one <b>who has one levirate relationship and not one who has a double levirate relationship.</b> In this case, the wife of the first deceased brother requires levirate marriage due to both the marriage with her first husband as well as the levirate betrothal with the second brother. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: He</b> may <b>consummate the levirate marriage with whichever</b> woman <b>he wishes and</b> then <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with the second.</b> In the case where <b>two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of</b> the brothers <b>died,</b> the widow at this point would be exempt from levirate marriage as the sister of his wife. <b>And afterward the wife of the second</b> brother <b>died.</b> Although the <i>yevama</i> is no longer the sister of his wife, <b>this</b> woman <b>is nevertheless forbidden to him forever, since she had</b> already <b>been forbidden to him at one time.</b>
In the case of <b>two</b> men <b>who betrothed two women, and at the time that they entered the wedding canopy,</b> after the betrothal, the men <b>switched this</b> wife <b>with that</b> wife <b>and that</b> one <b>with this</b> one, <b>then these</b> two men <b>are liable for</b> engaging in forbidden sexual relations with <b>a married woman,</b> since each of them had intercourse with his fellow’s wife. The act of betrothal is sufficient to prohibit a woman to all other men as a married woman. Therefore, when the women were switched, both men transgressed this violation. <b>And if they were brothers,</b> then they are also liable <b>for</b> forbidden sexual relations with <b>a brother’s wife. And if</b> these women <b>were sisters,</b> then they are liable <b>for</b> taking <b>a wife and her sister</b> as well. <b>And if they were menstruating women,</b> they would be liable <b>for</b> intercourse with <b>a menstruating woman</b> as well. <b>And</b> following these forbidden sexual relations, <b>we separate</b> these women from their husbands <b>for three months, lest they were impregnated</b> by that forbidden act of intercourse. Doing so makes it possible to distinguish a child born of these relations, so that he could be rendered a <i>mamzer</i>. <b>And if they were female minors and unable to bear children, then we immediately return them</b> to their original husbands. <b>And if they were daughters of priests, they are</b> thereby <b>disqualified from eating of <i>teruma</i>.</b> By engaging in illicit sexual acts, they were rendered forbidden to priests and disqualified from eating <i>teruma</i>.

Chapter 4

When a man who has a brother dies childless, his widow [<i>yevama</i>] and one of his brothers [<i>yavam</i>] may perform a ritual through which she is freed of her levirate bonds [<i>ḥalitza</i>]. It is then considered, with regard to forbidden relationships, as though they had been married and divorced. Therefore, he is forbidden to her relatives, and she to his. However, with regard to <b>one who performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with his <i>yevama</i> and</b> then <b>she is found</b> to have been <b>pregnant</b> at the time of the <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable,</b> the deceased husband has been survived by offspring and so there was never any levirate bond; consequently, the <i>ḥalitza</i> that was performed was entirely unnecessary and a meaningless act. As such, <b>he</b> remains <b>permitted to her relatives and she</b> remains <b>permitted to his relatives.</b> Furthermore, since the <i>ḥalitza</i> was meaningless, she is not afforded the status of a <i>ḥalutza</i>, i.e., a <i>yevama</i> who performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, a status akin to that of a divorcée. Therefore, the <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>does not disqualify her from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood.</b> If <b>the offspring is not viable,</b> then it emerges that the <i>ḥalitza</i> was indeed necessary. Therefore, <b>he is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with her relatives and she is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with his relatives,</b> as though they had been married and divorced, <b>and</b> the <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>disqualifies her from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood,</b> as she is afforded the status of a <i>ḥalutza</i>.
With regard to <b>one who consummates</b> the levirate marriage with <b>his <i>yevama</i>,</b> i.e., he had intercourse with her under the assumption that there is a levirate bond and so there is a mitzva to do so, <b>and</b> then <b>she is found to</b> have been <b>pregnant</b> at the time of the intercourse <b>and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable</b> the deceased brother has been survived by offspring and it is evident that there was never any levirate bond. In that case, the relations they had, rather than being a mitzva, were a violation of the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife. Therefore, the <i>yavam</i> <b>must send</b> her <b>out,</b> i.e., they must separate, as she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, <b>and</b> to atone for the forbidden relations that they had, <b>they are</b> each <b>obligated</b> to bring a sin-<b>offering,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> for all who inadvertently transgress a prohibition that, when performed intentionally, is punishable by <i>karet</i>. <b>And if the offspring is not viable,</b> and therefore there was in fact a levirate bond, <b>he may maintain</b> her as his wife since his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. If they consummated the levirate marriage and seven months later she gave birth, there is <b>uncertainty whether</b> the child <b>is nine</b> months <b>old,</b> i.e., counting from conception, and is the offspring <b>of the first</b> husband, and as such there was no levirate bond, or <b>whether</b> the child is only <b>seven</b> months <b>old</b> and is the offspring <b>of the latter</b> husband, i.e., the <i>yavam</i>, and not of the deceased, in which case there was a levirate bond. In that case, due to the possibility that she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, <b>he must send</b> her <b>out.</b> However, the lineage of <b>the child is unflawed,</b> since regardless of whether it was born of the first or second husband, there was no transgression involved in its conception. Furthermore, to atone for the possibility that they had forbidden relations <b>they are</b> both <b>obligated to bring a guilt-</b>offering for <b>uncertainty,</b> as is the <i>halakha</i> for anyone who is uncertain whether they inadvertently transgressed a prohibition that would require one to bring a sin-offering.
With regard to <b>a widow waiting for her <i>yavam</i></b> to either consummate a levirate marriage or perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, i.e., a <i>yevama</i>, <b>to whom property was bequeathed: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel</b> both <b>agree that she may sell or give</b> away that property <i>ab initio</i>, <b>and</b> that if she did, the transfer <b>is valid.</b> Since she has only a levirate bond with the <i>yavam</i>, she retains total control of the property. This is in contrast to a betrothed woman, concerning whom Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell such property because her betrothed also has rights to it (<i>Ketubot</i> 78a). If she <b>died, what should be done with</b> the money assured to her in <b>her marriage contract</b> by her deceased husband <b>and with</b> her <b>property that enters and leaves</b> the marriage <b>with her,</b> in which a husband only ever has a usufructuary interest? <b>Beit Shammai say: The husband’s heirs,</b> i.e., the <i>yavam</i>, who stands to inherit from the husband when he consummates the levirate marriage, <b>should divide up</b> the property <b>together with</b> her <b>father’s heirs,</b> i.e., the woman’s family. <b>And Beit Hillel say:</b> The <b>property</b> retains <b>its</b> previous ownership <b>status.</b> Therefore, money assured to her in her <b>marriage contract</b> remains <b>in the possession of the husband’s heirs.</b> Since it was to be paid from the husband’s own property, the money is retained by his estate and passes to his heirs. And her <b>property that enters and leaves</b> the marriage <b>with her</b> remains <b>in the possession of the father’s heirs.</b> Since those properties belonged to her, upon her death they are inherited by her father or his heirs.
If the <i>yavam</i> <b>consummated the levirate marriage with her, then</b> her legal status is <b>that of his wife in every sense,</b> and therefore the <i>yavam</i> has the same rights to her property as in a regular marriage. <b>And</b> the <b>only</b> exception to this is <b>that</b> her <b>marriage contract will</b> still <b>be</b> payable <b>from the property of her first husband</b> and not from the property of the <i>yavam</i>.
The <b>mitzva</b> of levirate marriage <b>is for the eldest</b> of the brothers <b>to consummate the levirate marriage.</b> If the eldest <b>does not want</b> to do so, the court <b>goes to each of the</b> other <b>brothers</b> and requires them to do so. <b>If they do not want</b> to do so, the court <b>returns to</b> the <b>eldest</b> brother <b>and says to him:</b> The <b>mitzva is</b> incumbent <b>upon you; either perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or consummate the levirate marriage.</b>
If a brother <b>made</b> his decision <b>dependent</b> upon the possibility that one of his other brothers will eventually consummate the levirate marriage, saying that he will do so only if they do not, then whether he makes it dependent <b>upon</b> a brother who is currently <b>a minor,</b> meaning that the <i>yevama</i> should wait <b>until he matures, or upon</b> his <b>eldest brother,</b> who is not currently present, meaning the <i>yevama</i> should wait <b>until he comes from overseas, or</b> upon a brother who is <b>a deaf-mute or an imbecile,</b> as perhaps they will recover from their disability, the court <b>does not listen to him; rather,</b> the judges of the court <b>say to him:</b> The <b>mitzva is</b> incumbent <b>upon you; either perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or consummate the levirate marriage.</b>
<b>One who performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with his <i>yevama</i> is like</b> any <b>one of the</b> other <b>brothers with respect to</b> the <b>inheritance</b> of the deceased brother’s estate, i.e., each of the brothers takes an equal share of the inheritance. <b>And if there is a father</b> of the deceased, who is still alive, <b>the property</b> of the deceased <b>belongs to the father. One who consummates</b> levirate marriage with <b>his <i>yevama</i></b> thereby <b>acquires his</b> deceased <b>brother’s property</b> solely for himself. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: In either</b> case, whether he consummated the levirate marriage or performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, <b>if there is a father</b> who is still alive, <b>the property belongs to the father.</b> In the case of <b>one who performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with his <i>yevama</i>,</b> by rabbinic decree it is as though she had been married to him and then he divorced her. Consequently, <b>he is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with her relatives and she is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with his relatives.</b> Accordingly, <b>he is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with her mother, and with her mother’s mother, and with her father’s mother, and with her daughter, and with her daughter’s daughter, and with her son’s daughter, and with her sister while</b> his <i>yevama</i> <b>is</b> still <b>alive.</b> However, <b>the</b> other <b>brothers</b> who did not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>are permitted</b> to her relatives. <b>And she is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with his father, and with his father’s father, and with his son, and with his son’s son, and with his brother, and with his brother’s son.</b> The mishna states an additional principle: <b>A man is permitted</b> to engage in relations <b>with a relative of a rival wife of his <i>ḥalutza</i>,</b> i.e., his <i>yevama</i> with whom he performed <i>ḥalitza</i>. Since he did not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, she is not regarded as though she had actually been married to him. However, <b>he is forbidden</b> to engage in relations <b>with a rival wife of a relative of his <i>ḥalutza</i>,</b> i.e., in addition to being forbidden to the relatives of his <i>ḥalutza</i>, he is also forbidden to their rival wives.
In the case of a <i>yavam</i> <b>who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with his <i>yevama</i> and</b> then <b>his brother married her sister and died,</b> the sister <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with the <i>yavam</i>, <b>but she may not enter into levirate marriage</b> with him, since as a sister of his <i>ḥalutza</i> she is forbidden to him. <b>And similarly,</b> in the case of <b>one who divorced his wife and his brother married her sister and died, then that</b> woman <b>is exempt</b> both from <i>ḥalitza</i> and from consummating levirate marriage, since as the sister of his former wife she is forbidden to him.
In the case of <b>a widow waiting for her <i>yavam</i></b> to consummate levirate marriage or perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, and the <b>brother of</b> the <i>yavam</i> <b>betrothed her sister, they said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: They say to</b> the brother: <b>Wait</b> and do not marry the woman you betrothed <b>until your brother performs an act,</b> either of <i>ḥalitza</i> or of consummating the levirate marriage, as until he does there remains a levirate bond between the <i>yevama</i> and each of the brothers, and it is prohibited to marry the sister of a woman to whom one is bound by a levirate bond. If <b>a brother of</b> the one who betrothed the sister of the <i>yevama</i> <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with</b> the <i>yevama</i> <b>or consummated a levirate marriage with her,</b> since by doing so the levirate bond between the <i>yevama</i> and the one who betrothed her sister is dissolved, <b>he may</b> then <b>enter into marriage</b> with <b>his wife,</b> who until that point was only betrothed to him, as she is no longer the sister of a woman to whom he is bound by a levirate bond. Similarly, if <b>the <i>yevama</i> died,</b> since his levirate bond to her is dissolved upon her death, <b>he may</b> proceed to <b>enter into marriage</b> with <b>his</b> betrothed <b>wife.</b> However, if the <b><i>yavam</i> died</b> without performing an act that would have dissolved the levirate bond, <b>he must divorce his wife with a bill of divorce,</b> as she is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman to whom he is bound by a levirate bond, <b>and his brother’s wife</b> he must send out <b>with <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> as she is forbidden to him as the sister of his divorcée.
<b>A <i>yevama</i> may neither perform <i>ḥalitza</i> nor enter into levirate marriage until she has</b> waited <b>three months</b> from the time of her husband’s death. <b>And similarly, all other women may not be betrothed and may not marry until they have</b> waited <b>three months</b> since their previous marriage ended. This waiting period is necessary so that, should a woman give birth shortly after remarrying, it will be obvious who the father of the child is. This applies <b>both to virgins and non-virgins, both to divorcées and widows,</b> and <b>both to women</b> who were <b>married</b> to their previous husbands <b>and women</b> who were only <b>betrothed.</b> All of these women must wait three months before remarrying even though for some of them the reason for doing so does not apply. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: The women</b> who were <b>married</b> to their previous husbands <b>may be betrothed, and the women</b> who were only <b>betrothed</b> to their previous husbands <b>may marry</b> without waiting three months. This is true <b>except for the betrothed women that are in</b> the area of <b>Judea, due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> the groom <b>is familiar with her.</b> The custom in Judea was for the couple to be secluded together before the marriage so that they would become familiar with each other. This led to the possibility that they might cohabit even during their betrothal period. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one does not need to wait three months whenever the reason for doing so does not apply. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: All of the women may be betrothed</b> within three months even if they were previously married, <b>except for a widow,</b> <b>due to the mourning</b> period she must observe for her deceased husband.
In a case of <b>four brothers married to four women and</b> some of the brothers <b>died</b> childless, their wives thereby become <i>yevamot</i>. <b>If the eldest of</b> the brothers who survived <b>wished to consummate the levirate marriage with all of</b> his <i>yevamot</i>, <b>he has permission</b> to do so. In the case of <b>one who was married to two women and died</b> childless, the <b>intercourse or <i>ḥalitza</i> of</b> either <b>one of</b> the wives with the <i>yavam</i> <b>releases her rival wife</b> from the levirate bond, and the rival wife need not enter into levirate marriage or perform <i>ḥalitza</i>. If <b>one</b> of these women <b>was fit</b> to marry into the priesthood <b>and one was unfit,</b> then <b>if he performs <i>ḥalitza</i>, he should perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with the unfit</b> woman rather than with the one who is fit for the priesthood, since doing so with the woman who is fit would needlessly disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. <b>But if he consummates the levirate marriage, he may consummate the levirate marriage with</b> the one who is <b>fit.</b>
With regard to <b>one who remarries his divorcée</b> after she had been married to another man from whom she was then widowed or divorced, <b>or one who marries the woman with whom he performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>], or one who marries a relative of his <i>ḥalutza</i>,</b> since all such marriages are forbidden he <b>must divorce</b> her, <b>and the offspring</b> born from such unions <b>is a <i>mamzer</i>;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva.</b> He holds that even the offspring from relations forbidden by a prohibition punishable by lashes is a <i>mamzer</i>. <b>The Rabbis say: The offspring</b> in those cases <b>is not a <i>mamzer</i>, but they concede with regard to one who marries a relative of his divorcée,</b> a union forbidden by a prohibition entailing <i>karet</i>, <b>that the offspring is a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> They hold that only the offspring from relations forbidden by a prohibition entailing <i>karet</i> is a <i>mamzer</i>.
<b>Which</b> offspring of forbidden relations have the status of <b>a <i>mamzer</i>?</b> It is the offspring of a union with <b>any next of kin that is subject to</b> a Torah prohibition that <b>he should not engage in sexual relations</b> with them; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Shimon HaTimni says:</b> It is the offspring of a union with <b>any</b> forbidden relation <b>for which one is liable to</b> receive <b><i>karet</i> at the hand of Heaven. And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his statement. Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> It is the offspring of a union with <b>any</b> forbidden relation <b>for which one is liable to</b> receive <b>court-</b>imposed <b>capital punishment.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: I found a scroll</b> recording people’s <b>lineages in Jerusalem, and it was written in it</b> that <b>so-and-so is a <i>mamzer</i> from</b> an adulterous union with <b>a married woman,</b> a sin punishable by court-imposed capital punishment. The only reason for the scroll to state the reason that this individual is a <i>mamzer</i> is in order <b>to support the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua.</b> The mishna delineates the circumstances in which it is prohibited to engage in relations with the sister of one’s wife and the sister of one’s <i>yevama</i>: If a man’s <b>wife died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> If <b>he divorced her and</b> then <b>she died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> If he divorced his wife and then <b>she was married to another and</b> then <b>died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> If <b>his <i>yevama</i> died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> If <b>he performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with her and</b> then <b>she died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> If after <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>she was married to another and</b> then <b>died, he is permitted to her sister.</b> The principle underlying all these cases is that the prohibition against engaging in relations with her sister only applies while the wife or <i>yevama</i> remain alive, irrespective of their current relationship to the man.

Chapter 5

<b>Rabban Gamliel says: A bill of divorce [<i>get</i>] is not</b> effective when given <b>after a bill of divorce</b> was previously given to a <i>yevama</i>. Once a <i>yevama</i> receives a bill of divorce from a <i>yavam</i>, no bill of divorce given by that <i>yavam</i> to her rival wife or a bill of divorce given to her by a different <i>yavam</i> is of any effect. <b>And levirate betrothal is not</b> effective <b>after</b> a previous <b>levirate betrothal</b> was performed, <b>and intercourse</b> with a second <i>yevama</i> <b>is not</b> effective <b>after intercourse</b> with the first one, <b>and <i>ḥalitza</i> is not</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i></b> was previously performed. <b>But the Rabbis say: A bill of divorce is</b> effective when given <b>after a bill of divorce, and levirate betrothal is</b> effective <b>after levirate betrothal, but nothing is</b> effective <b>after intercourse or after <i>ḥalitza</i>.</b> If a <i>yavam</i> has relations with the <i>yevama</i> or performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, no other action performed afterward is effective, whether performed by that <i>yavam</i> toward a different <i>yevama</i> or by any <i>yavam</i> with the original <i>yevama</i>.
The mishna elaborates: <b>How</b> do these laws work in practice? If a <i>yavam</i> <b>performed levirate betrothal with his <i>yevama</i>, and he</b> later <b>gave her a bill of divorce, she</b> nevertheless <b>requires <i>ḥalitza</i> from him.</b> The bill of divorce does not fully exempt her from levirate marriage, as the levirate bond remains intact. If <b>he performed levirate betrothal and</b> then <b><i>ḥalitza</i>, she requires a bill of divorce from him</b> in order to cancel the levirate betrothal. If the <i>yavam</i> <b>performed levirate betrothal and</b> then engaged in <b>intercourse</b> with the <i>yevama</i>, <b>this is</b> the way to perform levirate marriage <b>in accordance with its mitzva,</b> as the Sages instituted this as the proper procedure for a <i>yavam</i> to perform levirate marriage.
If the <i>yavam</i> <b>gave</b> the <i>yevama</i> <b>a bill of divorce and</b> afterward <b>performed levirate betrothal</b> with her, <b>she requires</b> another <b>bill of divorce</b> to cancel the levirate betrothal, as well as <b><i>ḥalitza</i></b> to nullify the levirate bond. If <b>he gave</b> her <b>a bill of divorce and</b> then <b>engaged in intercourse</b> with her, <b>she requires a bill of divorce</b> to cancel the betrothal that took place via intercourse, <b>and <i>ḥalitza</i></b> to nullify the levirate bond; the intercourse did not affect the levirate bond because once he gave her a bill of divorce she was forbidden to him. If <b>he gave</b> her <b>a bill of divorce and performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, nothing is</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> as the levirate bond was completely nullified. Similarly, if he <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with her <b>and</b> then either <b>performed levirate betrothal,</b> or <b>gave a bill of divorce, or engaged in intercourse</b> with her; <b>alternatively,</b> if he <b>engaged in intercourse</b> with her <b>and</b> then either <b>performed levirate betrothal,</b> or <b>gave a bill of divorce, or performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> after they engaged in relations, <b>nothing is</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i></b> or intercourse. Any action performed afterward is unrelated to the levirate bond. The above principles apply <b>both</b> in cases of <b>one <i>yevama</i> to one <i>yavam</i>, as well as</b> in cases of <b>two <i>yevamot</i> to one <i>yavam</i>. </b>
How so? If <b>he performed levirate betrothal with this</b> <i>yevama</i> <b>and levirate betrothal with that</b> one, i.e., her rival wife, <b>they require two bills of divorce,</b> each for her own levirate betrothal, <b>and <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one of them, to release them both from the levirate bond. If he performed <b>levirate betrothal with this</b> one <b>and</b> gave <b>a bill of divorce to that</b> one, the first woman <b>requires a bill of divorce</b> to cancel the levirate betrothal, <b>and</b> one of them must receive <b><i>ḥalitza</i>.</b> If he performed <b>levirate betrothal with this</b> one <b>and engaged in intercourse with that</b> one, <b>they require two bills of divorce and</b> he must perform <b><i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one of them. If the <i>yavam</i> performed <b>levirate betrothal with this</b> one <b>and performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with that</b> one, <b>the first</b> woman <b>requires a bill of divorce.</b> If the <i>yavam</i> gave <b>a bill of divorce to this</b> <i>yevama</i> <b>and a bill of divorce to that</b> one, <b>they require <i>ḥalitza</i> from him.</b> If he gave <b>a bill of divorce to this</b> one <b>and engaged in intercourse with that</b> one, the latter <b>requires a bill of divorce and <i>ḥalitza</i>.</b> If he gave <b>a bill of divorce to this</b> one <b>and</b> performed <b>levirate betrothal with that</b> one, the latter <b>requires a bill of divorce and</b> he must perform <b><i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one of them. If the <i>yavam</i> gave <b>a bill of divorce to this</b> woman <b>and performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with that</b> one, <b>nothing is</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> and he cannot betroth the rival wife.
If <b>he performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> then <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with a second <i>yevama</i>, <b>or he performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> then proceeded to either <b>perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse</b> with a second; <b>alternatively, he engaged in intercourse</b> with one <i>yevama</i> and <b>engaged in intercourse</b> with the second <i>yevama</i>, <b>or he engaged in intercourse</b> with one <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> proceeded to either <b>perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with the second, <b>nothing is</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i></b> or intercourse. These <i>halakhot</i> apply <b>both</b> in cases of <b>one <i>yavam</i> to two <i>yevamot</i>, as well as two <i>yevamin</i> to one <i>yevama</i>.</b>
If <b>he performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with one <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> then proceeded to either <b>perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse</b> with a second <i>yevama</i>; <b>alternatively, he engaged in intercourse</b> with one <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> then proceeded to <b>perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with a second <i>yevama</i>, <b>nothing is</b> effective <b>after <i>ḥalitza</i>, whether</b> the <i>ḥalitza</i> took place <b>at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.</b> All of these <i>halakhot</i> accord with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains betrothal does not take effect on a woman who is forbidden due to the prohibition against betrothing a <i>yevama</i> after <i>ḥalitza</i>. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>intercourse, when it is at the beginning,</b> i.e., the first act the <i>yavam</i> performed with his <i>yevama</i>, <b>nothing is</b> effective <b>after it</b> and any subsequent action is void. However, if it was performed <b>in the middle, and</b> similarly if it was performed <b>at the end,</b> i.e., after some other action that impairs the validity of his intercourse, <b>something is</b> effective <b>after it. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Both</b> with regard to <b>intercourse and <i>ḥalitza</i>, whether</b> performed <b>at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, nothing is</b> effective <b>after it.</b> If the <i>yavam</i> performed a valid action according to Torah law, any subsequent action is of no consequence according to <i>halakha</i>.

Chapter 6

<b>One who had intercourse with his <i>yevama</i>, whether unwittingly,</b> i.e., he thought he was having intercourse with someone else, <b>or intentionally,</b> i.e., he knew she was his <i>yevama</i> and nevertheless had intercourse with her without intent to perform levirate marriage; <b>whether</b> due to <b>coercion or willingly; even if he</b> was <b>unwitting and her</b> participation was <b>intentional, his</b> participation was <b>intentional and she</b> was <b>unwitting, he was coerced and she was not coerced,</b> or <b>she was coerced and he was not coerced; both one who</b> merely <b>engages in the initial stage of intercourse and one who completes</b> the act of intercourse <b>has</b> thereby <b>acquired</b> his <i>yevama</i>. <b>And</b> similarly, the Torah <b>did not distinguish between</b> an act of <b>intercourse</b> in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, <b>and intercourse</b> in a typical manner.
<b>And so too,</b> with regard to a man <b>who had intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden [<i>arayot</i>]</b> by <b>the Torah or</b> with those who are <b>unfit for him</b> even though they are not in the category of <i>arayot</i>, <b>for example, a widow with a High Priest; a divorcée and a <i>yevama</i> who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>] with a common priest; a <i>mamzeret</i>,</b> i.e., a woman born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, <b>or a Gibeonite woman with an Israelite; the daughter of an Israelite with a <i>mamzer</i> or a Gibeonite; he has disqualified her</b> from marrying into the priesthood through this act no matter how it was performed, <b>and</b> the Torah <b>did not distinguish between</b> the act of <b>intercourse</b> in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, <b>and intercourse</b> in a typical manner.
<b>A widow to a High Priest, a divorcée, or a <i>ḥalutza</i> to a common priest,</b> even if they had only engaged in <b>betrothal</b> and had not yet had intercourse, <b>may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> Since they are forbidden to the men who betrothed them, the betrothal itself disqualifies them from the privileges of priesthood even if they are the daughters of priests. <b>Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare them fit</b> to partake of <i>teruma</i>. Since the prohibition is violated through the act of intercourse and not betrothal, the women are disqualified only once they have intercourse. In a case where these women <b>were widowed or divorced,</b> if it was <b>from marriage, they are disqualified</b> from the priesthood and may not partake of <i>teruma</i>. This is because a woman prohibited from marrying a priest who has intercourse with a priest becomes a <i>ḥalala</i>, and is thereby disqualified from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. However, if they were widowed or divorced <b>from</b> their state of <b>betrothal,</b> they are once again <b>fit</b> to partake of <i>teruma</i> according to all opinions.
<b>A High Priest may not marry a widow, whether</b> she is <b>a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. And he may not marry a grown woman.</b> He may marry only a minor or a young woman. <b>Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare a grown woman fit</b> to marry a High Priest. <b>And he may not marry a woman whose hymen was torn accidentally.</b> If a priest <b>betrothed a widow and was</b> subsequently <b>appointed to be High Priest, he may marry</b> her. <b>And</b> there was <b>an incident with Yehoshua ben Gamla, who betrothed Marta bat Baitos,</b> a widow, <b>and the king</b> subsequently <b>appointed him to be High Priest, and</b> he nevertheless <b>married her.</b> Conversely, in the case of <b>a widow waiting for her <i>yavam</i> who happened before a common priest,</b> i.e., the priest was her <i>yavam</i>, <b>and he was</b> subsequently <b>appointed to be High Priest,</b> then <b>even if he</b> had already <b>performed levirate betrothal with her, he may not marry her,</b> because she is a widow. <b>A High Priest whose brother died</b> without children <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and he does not perform levirate marriage,</b> as he may not marry a widow.
<b>A common priest may not marry a sexually underdeveloped woman [<i>aylonit</i>],</b> who is incapable of bearing children, <b>unless he</b> already <b>has a wife and children. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even</b> if <b>he has a wife and children, he may not marry a sexually underdeveloped woman, as she is the <i>zona</i></b> about whom it is <b>stated in the Torah</b> that a priest may not marry her. Intercourse with her is considered a licentious act because she is incapable of bearing children. <b>And the Rabbis say: The only</b> women in the category of <b><i>zona</i>,</b> who are therefore forbidden to a priest, are <b>a female convert, a freed</b> maidservant, <b>and</b> any woman <b>who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse</b> with a man she is prohibited from marrying.
<b>A man may not neglect</b> the mitzva to <b>be fruitful and multiply unless he</b> already <b>has children. Beit Shammai say:</b> One fulfills this mitzva with <b>two males, and Beit Hillel say: A male and a female, as it is stated: “Male and female He created them”</b> (Genesis 5:2). If a man <b>married a woman and stayed with her</b> for <b>ten years and she did not give birth, he is no</b> longer <b>permitted to neglect</b> the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. Consequently, he must either divorce her and marry someone else, or take another wife while still married to her. If <b>he divorced her she is permitted to marry another</b> man, as it is not necessarily on her account that she and her first husband did not have children, <b>and the second</b> husband <b>is permitted to stay with her</b> for <b>ten years. And if she had a miscarriage, he counts</b> the ten years <b>from the time of the miscarriage.</b> <b>A man is commanded with regard to</b> the mitzva to be <b>fruitful and multiply, but not a woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says</b> that a woman is also commanded, as the verse <b>states with regard to both of them: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply”</b> (Genesis 1:28).

Chapter 7

<b>A widow</b> married <b>to a High Priest,</b> and <b>a divorcée or a <i>yevama</i> who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>]</b> married <b>to a common priest</b> are all unions prohibited by Torah law. If one of these women <b>brought</b> with her <b>into</b> the marriage <b>slaves of usufruct [<i>melog</i>]</b> property <b>or slaves of guaranteed investment,</b> then the <b>slaves of usufruct</b> property <b>do not partake of <i>teruma</i></b> but the <b>slaves of guaranteed investment do partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. <b>And these are slaves of usufruct</b> property: They are those with regard to whom the couple stipulated that <b>if</b> the slaves <b>die, their death</b> is <b>her</b> loss, <b>and if they increase</b> in value, <b>their increase</b> is <b>her</b> gain. <b>Although</b> the husband <b>is obligated in their sustenance, they do not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as they belong to her, not to him. He owns only the right of their use while he is married to her. <b>And these are slaves of guaranteed investment:</b> They are those with regard to whom the couple stipulated that <b>if they die, their death</b> is <b>his</b> loss, <b>and if they increase</b> in value, <b>their increase</b> is <b>his</b> gain. <b>Since he bears</b> financial <b>responsibility</b> for compensating her in the event of <b>their</b> loss, <b>they partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as they are considered his property.
In the case of <b>an Israelite woman who married a priest</b> in a halakhic marriage <b>and</b> who <b>brought slaves</b> with her <b>into</b> the marriage, <b>whether</b> they are <b>slaves of usufruct</b> property <b>or slaves of guaranteed investment, they partake of <i>teruma</i>. And</b> in the case of <b>the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and</b> who <b>brought slaves</b> with her <b>into</b> the marriage, <b>whether</b> they are <b>slaves of usufruct</b> property <b>or slaves of guaranteed investment, they do not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> although, as she is the daughter of a priest, it is permitted for her and her slaves to partake of <i>teruma</i> beforehand.
With regard to <b>an Israelite woman who married a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves</b> of guaranteed investment <b>may not partake of <i>teruma</i></b> during her pregnancy, <b>due to the share of the fetus,</b> as an inheritor of his father, in the ownership of the slaves. In the opposite case, <b>where</b> the Israelite husband of a priest’s daughter died and left her pregnant, <b>the fetus disqualifies</b> her from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. However, in the current case, the fetus <b>does not enable</b> its mother or the slaves <b>to partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, despite the fact that it is the child of a priest. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yosei.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him: Since you testified before us about</b> the case of <b>an Israelite woman</b> who was married <b>to a priest,</b> in the case of <b>the daughter of a priest</b> who was married <b>to a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves should not partake of <i>teruma</i> either, due to the fetus’s share.</b> The same <i>halakha</i> should apply whether the woman is an Israelite or the daughter of a priest.
With regard to <b>the fetus</b> of a divorcée or a widow whose husband left her pregnant; <b>and a man whose married brother died childless [<i>yavam</i>]; and betrothal; and</b> a married <b>deaf-mute; and a nine-year-and-one-day-old</b> boy who engaged in intercourse with a woman; if any of these men are Israelites and the woman is the daughter of a priest, they <b>disqualify</b> her from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. <b>But</b> if she is an Israelite and they are priests, they <b>do not enable</b> her <b>to partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. Likewise, in the case of a boy with regard to whom there is <b>uncertainty</b> as to <b>whether he is nine years and one day old</b> and <b>uncertainty</b> whether <b>he is not,</b> who engaged in intercourse with a woman; and in the case of a boy who betrothed a woman, with regard to whom there is <b>uncertainty</b> as to <b>whether he has grown two</b> pubic <b>hairs</b> and is considered an adult <b>and uncertainty whether he has not grown,</b> they too can disqualify the woman from partaking of <i>teruma</i> and cannot enable her to partake, as in the previous cases. If <b>the house fell upon</b> a man <b>and upon his brother’s daughter,</b> to whom he was married, <b>and it is unknown which</b> of them <b>died first, her rival wife performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and does not enter into levirate marriage.</b> Entering into levirate marriage is not possible, as, if the wife died after her husband, the surviving wife would be rendered the rival wife of a forbidden relative, since the <i>yavam</i> is the father of the wife who died. This status prevents the creation of a levirate bond between him and the surviving wife as well. On the other hand, <i>ḥalitza</i> is necessary in case the wife died before her husband, thereby allowing the creation of a levirate bond between her rival wife and her father, the <i>yavam</i>.
In the case of <b>one who rapes</b> a woman without marrying her; <b>or one who seduces</b> a woman without marrying her; <b>or an imbecile</b> who engages in intercourse with a woman, even if he did marry her, if they are non-priests <b>they do not disqualify</b> the daughter of a priest from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, <b>and</b> if they are priests <b>they do not enable</b> an Israelite woman <b>to partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. <b>And if they are not fit to enter</b> the assembly of <b>Israel</b> through marriage, <b>they disqualify</b> the daughter of a priest from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. <b>How so?</b> If <b>it was an Israelite who engaged in</b> extramarital <b>intercourse with the daughter of a priest, she may partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as this act of intercourse does not disqualify her. If <b>he impregnated her, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as she is carrying an Israelite fetus. If <b>the fetus was cut in her womb,</b> i.e., she miscarried, <b>she may partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. If the man <b>was a priest who engaged in</b> intercourse <b>with an Israelite woman, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If <b>he impregnated her, she</b> still <b>may not partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, as a fetus does not enable its mother to partake. If <b>she gave birth she may partake</b> due to her child, a priest. It is therefore <b>found</b> in this case that <b>the power of the son is greater than</b> that <b>of the father,</b> as the father of this child does not enable the woman to partake of <i>teruma</i>, but the son does. <b>A slave disqualifies</b> a woman from partaking of <i>teruma</i> <b>due to</b> his engaging in <b>intercourse</b> with her, <b>and he does not disqualify</b> a woman <b>because</b> he is her <b>offspring. How so?</b> In what case would a slave theoretically disqualify a woman because he is her offspring? If <b>an Israelite woman</b> was married <b>to a priest,</b> or <b>the daughter of a priest</b> was married <b>to an Israelite; and she a bore him a son; and the son went and pressed himself onto a maidservant,</b> an epithet for intercourse used in this context due to the shame involved in having intercourse with a maidservant; <b>and she bore him a son,</b> then <b>this</b> son <b>is a slave.</b> If the latter’s <b>father’s mother was an Israelite</b> who was married <b>to a priest,</b> and her husband died, <b>she may not partake of <i>teruma</i></b> due to her grandson, as he is not a priest but a slave. On the other hand, if <b>she was the daughter of a priest</b> married <b>to an Israelite,</b> and he died, leaving only this grandson, <b>she may partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as the grandson is not considered his father’s offspring. <b>A <i>mamzer</i> disqualifies</b> a woman from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, <b>and</b> he also <b>enables</b> a woman <b>to partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>. <b>How so?</b> If <b>an Israelite woman</b> was married <b>to a priest, or the daughter of a priest</b> was married <b>to an Israelite, and she bore him a daughter, and the daughter went and married a slave or a gentile and bore him a son, this</b> son <b>is a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> If <b>his mother’s mother was an Israelite woman</b> married <b>to a priest,</b> even if her husband died, <b>she may partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as she has surviving offspring from a priest. Conversely, if she is <b>the daughter of a priest</b> married <b>to an Israelite, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> even after her Israelite husband’s death, as she has offspring from him.
Even with regard to <b>a High Priest, sometimes he disqualifies</b> his grandmother from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. <b>How so?</b> If <b>the daughter of a priest</b> was married <b>to an Israelite, and she bore him a daughter, and the daughter went and married a priest and bore him a son, this</b> son <b>is fit to be a High Priest,</b> who <b>stands and serves on the altar.</b> This son <b>enables his mother to partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, as he is a priest. <b>And</b> yet, <b>he disqualifies his mother’s mother</b> from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, as he is her offspring from her Israelite husband. <b>This</b> grandmother can <b>say</b> in disapproval: Let there <b>not</b> be many <b>like my</b> daughter’s <b>son,</b> the <b>High Priest, as he disqualifies me from</b> partaking of <b><i>teruma</i>.</b>

Chapter 8

<b>An uncircumcised</b> priest, e.g., one for whom circumcision was considered too dangerous, <b>and all</b> those <b>who are ritually impure</b> with any type of impurity, <b>may not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> the portion of produce that must be set aside for the priests. However, <b>their wives and their slaves may partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> With regard to both <b>a man with crushed testicles</b> or with other wounds to his genitals <b>[<i>petzua dakka</i>] and one whose penis has been severed [<i>kerut shofkha</i>],</b> it is prohibited for them to marry a woman who was born Jewish. If they are priests <b>they and their slaves may partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, as this condition does not disqualify them or their property. However, <b>their wives may not partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, because if a priest has relations with his wife after suffering his injury, he renders her a <i>ḥalala</i>, a woman who is disqualified from marrying a priest, as he has engaged in forbidden sexual relations with her. <b>If</b> such a priest <b>did not know</b> his wife, i.e., did not engage in sexual relations with her, <b>after his testicles were crushed or his penis was severed, she may partake</b> of <i>teruma</i>, as she had married the priest in a permitted manner.
<b>And who is</b> deemed <b>a man with crushed testicles?</b> It is <b>anyone whose testicles have been wounded, even one of them. And one whose penis has been severed</b> is <b>anyone whose</b> sexual <b>member has been cut off.</b> As for the measure that renders him unfit, <b>if there remains</b> a portion <b>of the corona, even</b> as much <b>as a hairsbreadth,</b> he is still <b>fit.</b> However, if nothing at all is left of the corona, he is considered as one with a severed penis, for whom it is prohibited by Torah law to marry a Jewish woman. <b>A man with crushed testicles</b> or with other wounds to his genitals <b>and one whose penis has been severed are permitted</b> to marry a female <b>convert or an emancipated</b> maidservant, <b>and they are prohibited only from entering into the congregation</b> and marrying a woman who was born Jewish, <b>as it is stated: “A man wounded with crushed testicles or a severed penis shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord”</b> (Deuteronomy 23:2).
<b>Ammonite and Moabite</b> converts <b>are prohibited</b> from entering into the congregation and marrying a woman who was born Jewish, <b>and their prohibition is eternal,</b> for all generations. <b>However, their female</b> counterparts, even the convert herself, <b>are permitted immediately.</b> <b>Egyptian and Edomite</b> converts <b>are prohibited</b> from entering into the congregation <b>only for three generations, both males and females. Rabbi Shimon renders permitted</b> Egyptian and Edomite <b>females immediately. Rabbi Shimon said: The matter</b> may be derived by way of <b>an <i>a fortiori</i></b> inference: <b>If in a place where</b> the Torah rendered <b>prohibited the males with an eternal prohibition,</b> i.e., Ammonites and Moabites, it <b>rendered permitted the females immediately,</b> then in <b>a place where it rendered prohibited the males for only three generations,</b> i.e., Egyptians and Edomites, <b>is it not right that we should render permitted the females immediately?</b> Rabbi Shimon’s colleagues <b>said to him: If</b> you are reporting a <b><i>halakha</i></b> that you received from your teachers, <b>we will accept</b> it from you. <b>But if</b> you merely wish to prove your case with an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference</b> based on your own reasoning, <b>there is a refutation</b> of your argument. Rabbi Shimon <b>said to them:</b> That is <b>not so.</b> I disagree with your claim that the <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be refuted, but in any case <b>I am stating a <i>halakha</i></b> handed down to me by my teachers. <b><i>Mamzerim</i> and</b> the <b>Gibeonites</b> who converted to Judaism in the days of Joshua <b>are prohibited</b> from entering into the congregation and marrying a woman who was born Jewish. <b>Their prohibition is eternal,</b> for all generations, and it applies to <b>both males and females.</b>
<b>Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard</b> two rulings from my teachers. One ruling is <b>that a eunuch performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i>, <b>and</b> his brothers <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife, and</b> the other ruling is that <b>a eunuch does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i>, <b>and</b> his brothers <b>do not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife. And I cannot explain</b> these two rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. <b>Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain. A eunuch</b> caused <b>by man,</b> i.e., one who became emasculated after birth, <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> his brothers <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife, because he had an hour of fitness,</b> a time when he was fertile. On the other hand, <b>a eunuch by natural causes,</b> i.e., who was entirely lacking in sexual capacity from birth, <b>does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> his brothers <b>do not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife, because he did not have an hour of fitness,</b> as he never had the potential to father children. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: No; rather,</b> the opposite is the case: <b>A eunuch by natural causes performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> his brothers <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife because he can be cured,</b> whereas <b>a eunuch</b> caused <b>by man does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his <i>yevama</i> <b>and</b> his brothers <b>do not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife because he cannot be cured.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira testified about</b> a man named <b>ben Megusat, who</b> lived <b>in Jerusalem</b> and <b>was a eunuch</b> caused <b>by man,</b> that his brothers nevertheless <b>entered into levirate marriage with his wife,</b> in order <b>to fulfill</b> and confirm <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva.</b>
<b>A sexually underdeveloped man does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or enter into levirate marriage</b> with his <i>yevama</i>. <b>And similarly, a sexually underdeveloped woman</b> [<b><i>aylonit</i></b>], who is incapable of bearing children, <b>does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or enter into levirate marriage</b> with her <i>yavam</i>.  If <b>a sexually underdeveloped man performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with his <i>yevama</i>, he has not</b> thereby <b>disqualified her</b> from marrying into the priesthood, as his <i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid. However, if <b>he had intercourse with her, he has disqualified her.</b> This is <b>because it is</b> considered <b>licentious sexual intercourse,</b> since such intercourse does not fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage and is therefore categorized as forbidden relations with one’s sister-in-law. <b>And similarly,</b> with regard to <b>a sexually underdeveloped woman,</b> if one of <b>the brothers performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with her he <b>has not</b> thereby <b>disqualified her</b> from marrying into the priesthood. However, if he <b>had intercourse with her,</b> he <b>has disqualified her because the intercourse is</b> considered <b>licentious sexual intercourse.</b>
If <b>a priest who is a eunuch by natural causes married an Israelite woman,</b> he <b>enables her to eat <i>teruma</i>. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say:</b> If <b>a priest who is a hermaphrodite,</b> possessing both male and female genitals, <b>married an Israelite woman,</b> he <b>enables her to eat <i>teruma</i>.</b>  <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If <b>a <i>tumtum</i>,</b> whose external sexual organs are indeterminate, <b>was torn</b> open so that his genitals were exposed, <b>and he was found</b> to be <b>a male,</b> he <b>must not perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, because he is</b> treated <b>like a eunuch. A hermaphrodite may marry</b> a woman <b>but he may not be married</b> by a man, as he is considered a man. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> If one had intercourse with <b>a hermaphrodite,</b> he <b>is liable to</b> receive the punishment of <b>stoning on his account as if</b> he had had relations with <b>a male.</b>

Chapter 9

<b>There are</b> women <b>who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their <i>yevamin</i>,</b> while others <b>are permitted to their <i>yevamin</i> and forbidden to their husbands.</b> Certain women <b>are permitted</b> both <b>to these and to those, and</b> others <b>are forbidden to</b> both <b>these and to those.</b> The mishna elaborates: <b>And these are</b> cases of women who are <b>permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their <i>yevamin</i>:</b> In the case of <b>a common priest who married a widow, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is</b> the <b>High Priest,</b> the widow, who was permitted to her husband, is forbidden to her <i>yavam</i>, as it is prohibited for the High Priest to marry a widow. The same is true in the case of <b>a priest disqualified due to flawed lineage</b> [<b><i>ḥalal</i></b>], e.g., the son of a priest and a divorcée, <b>who married</b> a woman <b>fit</b> to marry a priest, <b>and he has a brother</b> who <b>is</b> a priest <b>fit</b> for service. That woman was permitted to marry the <i>ḥalal</i> but is forbidden to his brother. Having engaged in intercourse with the <i>ḥalal</i>, she is rendered a <i>ḥalala</i>, a woman disqualified from marrying a priest. Another example is the case of <b>an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage <b>who married an Israelite woman</b> of similar lineage, <b>and he has a brother</b> who is <b>a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzer</i>];</b> or <b>a <i>mamzer</i> who married a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzeret</i>], and he has a brother</b> who <b>is an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage. A <i>mamzer</i> is permitted to marry a <i>mamzeret</i>, but neither is per-mitted to a Jew of unflawed lineage. In each of these cases, these women <b>are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their <i>yevamin</i>.</b>
<b>And these</b> are cases of women who <b>are permitted to their <i>yevamin</i> and forbidden to their husbands:</b> For example, there is the case of <b>a High Priest who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is a common priest,</b> whom she is permitted to marry. This is true only if the High Priest merely betrothed her. However, if he consummated the marriage, he rendered her a <i>ḥalala</i> forbidden to all priests, including her <i>yavam</i>. The additional cases are a priest <b>fit</b> for service <b>who married a <i>ḥalala</i> and he has a brother</b> who <b>is a <i>ḥalal</i>; an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage <b>who married a <i>mamzeret</i>, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is a <i>mamzer</i>;</b> and <b>a <i>mamzer</i> who married an Israelite woman</b> of unflawed lineage, <b>and he has a brother</b> who <b>is,</b> similarly, <b>an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage. All of these women <b>are permitted to their <i>yevamin</i> and forbidden to their husbands.</b> <b>And these</b> are cases where women <b>are forbidden</b> both <b>to these and to those: A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is a High Priest or a common priest;</b> a priest <b>fit</b> for service <b>who married a <i>ḥalala</i>, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is</b> a priest <b>fit</b> for service; <b>an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage <b>who married a <i>mamzeret</i>, and he has a brother</b> who <b>is</b> similarly an ordinary <b>Israelite,</b> or <b>a <i>mamzer</i> who married an Israelite woman</b> of unflawed lineage, <b>and he has a brother</b> who <b>is a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> All of these women <b>are forbidden</b> both <b>to these and to those. And all other women are permitted to their husbands and to their <i>yevamin</i>.</b>
With regard to <b>secondary relatives,</b> who are forbidden <b>by rabbinic law,</b> if the woman is <b>a secondary relative to the husband but not a secondary relative to the <i>yavam</i>,</b> she <b>is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the <i>yavam</i>.</b> Conversely, if she is <b>a secondary relative to the <i>yavam</i> but not a secondary relative to the husband,</b> she <b>is forbidden to the <i>yavam</i> and permitted to the husband.</b> If she is <b>a secondary relative</b> both <b>to this</b> man <b>and to that</b> man, she <b>is forbidden to this</b> one <b>and to that</b> one. Furthermore, if a man marries a woman forbidden to him as a secondary relative, <b>she does not have</b> the right to receive payment for her <b>marriage contract</b> if divorced or widowed, <b>nor</b> is she entitled to payment from her husband for the <b>produce</b> of her property that he used, <b>nor</b> is she entitled to provisions for her <b>sustenance</b> from his estate, <b>nor</b> does she get back her <b>worn clothes</b> or other objects she brought with her to her marriage. <b>And</b> the lineage of <b>the offspring is unflawed, and</b> the court <b>forces him to divorce</b> her. In contrast, <b>a widow</b> married <b>to a High Priest, a divorcée or a <i>yevama</i> who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> [<i>ḥalutza</i>]</b> married <b>to a common priest, a <i>mamzeret</i> or a Gibeonite woman</b> married <b>to an Israelite</b> of unflawed lineage, and <b>an Israelite woman</b> of unflawed lineage married <b>to a Gibeonite or to a <i>mamzer</i></b> all <b>have</b> the right to receive payment for their <b>marriage contract,</b> although it was prohibited for them to marry.
If there is <b>an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest</b> or <b>pregnant from a priest,</b> and he died; and <b>a widow awaiting her <i>yavam</i>,</b> who is <b>a priest; and similarly,</b> the <b>daughter of a priest</b> who is betrothed, pregnant from, or is a widow waiting <b>for</b> her <i>yavam</i>, who is <b>an Israelite, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If there is <b>an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite or pregnant from a Levite;</b> and <b>a widow awaiting her <i>yavam</i>, who is a Levite; and similarly</b> the <b>daughter of a Levite</b> who is betrothed, pregnant from, or a widow waiting <b>for</b> her <i>yavam</i>, who is <b>an Israelite, she may not partake of tithes.</b> If there is a <b>daughter of a Levite betrothed to a priest</b> or <b>pregnant from a priest;</b> and <b>a widow awaiting her <i>yavam</i>, who is a priest; and similarly a daughter of a priest</b> who is betrothed <b>to</b> or pregnant from a Levite, or is a widow waiting for her <i>yavam</i>, who is <b>a Levite, she may partake of neither <i>teruma</i> nor tithes.</b> This follows the <i>halakha</i> that betrothal, pregnancy, and waiting for a <i>yavam</i> disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating <i>teruma</i>, but they do not enable an Israelite woman to partake of <i>teruma</i>.
<b>An Israelite woman married to a priest may partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If the priest <b>died and she has a child from him, she may</b> continue to <b>partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If she subsequently <b>married a Levite,</b> she may no longer partake of <i>teruma</i> but <b>she may partake of</b> the first <b>tithe</b> on his account. If he, too, <b>died and she</b> had <b>a child from him, she may</b> continue to <b>partake of tithe</b> on account of the child. If she then <b>married an Israelite, she may partake of neither <i>teruma</i> nor tithe.</b> If her Israelite husband <b>died and she</b> had <b>a child from him, she</b> still <b>may partake of neither <i>teruma</i> nor tithe.</b> If <b>her child from the Israelite</b> also <b>died,</b> while her son from the Levite remained alive, <b>she may partake of tithe</b> on account of the Levite’s child. If <b>her child from the Levite died,</b> leaving her with a son from the priest, <b>she may</b> once again <b>partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If <b>her child from the priest died</b> as well, <b>she may no</b> longer <b>partake of either <i>teruma</i> or tithe.</b>
The <b>daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If the Israelite <b>died and she</b> has <b>a son from him, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i></b> as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently <b>married a Levite she may partake of tithe.</b> If he <b>died, and she</b> had <b>a son from him, she may</b> still <b>partake of tithe.</b> If she subsequently <b>married a priest, she may partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If the priest <b>died and she</b> had <b>a son from him, she may partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> If <b>her son from the priest</b> also <b>died, she may not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If <b>her son from the Levite died, she may no</b> longer <b>partake of tithe.</b> If <b>her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father’s house</b> and may once again partake of <i>teruma</i>. <b>And with regard to this</b> woman, it <b>is stated: “And she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father’s bread”</b> (Leviticus 22:13).

Chapter 10

With regard to <b>a woman whose husband went overseas, and</b> witnesses <b>came and</b> they <b>said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married</b> another man on the basis of this testimony, <b>and afterward her husband came</b> back from out of the country, <b>she must leave</b> both <b>this</b> man <b>and that</b> one, as they are both forbidden to her. <b>And she requires a bill of divorce from this</b> one <b>and that</b> one. <b>And</b> furthermore, <b>she has</b> a claim to <b>neither</b> payment of her <b>marriage contract, nor</b> the <b>profits</b> of her property used by either of them, <b>nor sustenance, nor</b> the <b>worn clothes</b> she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims <b>neither against this</b> man <b>nor against that</b> one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. <b>And if she took</b> any of these items <b>from this</b> man <b>or from that</b> one, she must <b>return</b> them to him. <b>And the offspring is a <i>mamzer</i> from this</b> one <b>and from that</b> one. Her child from the second husband is a definite <i>mamzer</i>, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a <i>mamzer</i>. <b>And neither this</b> man <b>nor that</b> man <b>may become impure for her</b> upon her death, if they are priests. <b>And neither this</b> one <b>nor that one is entitled</b> to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: <b>Neither to her found</b> articles, <b>nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows.</b> If she <b>was</b> a regular <b>Israelite woman, she is disqualified from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood,</b> as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, <b>and</b> the <b>daughter of a Levite</b> is disqualified <b>from</b> partaking of the first <b>tithe, and</b> the <b>daughter of a priest</b> is disqualified <b>from</b> partaking of <b><i>teruma</i>. And neither</b> the <b>heirs of this</b> man nor the <b>heirs of that</b> one <b>inherit her marriage contract,</b> as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. <b>And if they</b> both <b>died</b> childless, <b>the brothers of this</b> one <b>and the brothers of this</b> one must <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and they do not enter into levirate marriage.</b> <b>Rabbi Yosei</b> disagrees with the first <i>tanna</i> and <b>says</b> that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of <b>her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first</b> husband <b>is entitled to her found</b> articles, <b>to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows.</b> Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> an even more far-reaching ruling: <b>Her sexual relations or her <i>ḥalitza</i> with the brothers of the first</b> husband <b>exempts her rival wife,</b> as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i>, and certainly she does not require <i>ḥalitza</i> from the brother of the second husband. <b>And</b> if she returns to her first husband, <b>the child from him is not a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> All these <i>halakhot</i> refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. <b>But if she married without</b> the <b>consent</b> of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is <b>permitted</b> for her <b>to return to</b> her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If <b>she married by</b> permission of <b>the court, she must leave</b> both of them <b>and she is exempt from</b> bringing <b>the offering,</b> i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress.
If, however, <b>she did not marry by</b> permission of <b>the court, she must leave</b> her second husband <b>and is liable to</b> bring <b>an offering</b> for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the <b>power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from</b> bringing <b>an offering.</b> If the <b>court instructed her to marry</b> on the basis of inaccurate testimony, <b>and she went and ruined</b> herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, <b>she is liable to</b> bring <b>an offering, as they permitted her only to marry,</b> and not to engage in licentious relations.
With regard to <b>a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and</b> witnesses <b>came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died,</b> she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. <b>And</b> for this reason she <b>married</b> another man. <b>And</b> if <b>afterward they said to her</b> that <b>the matters were reversed,</b> i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a <i>yevama</i> who married a stranger without <i>ḥalitza</i> and <b>she must</b> consequently <b>leave</b> her second husband. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>the first child,</b> the one born before they heard about the reversal, <b>and the last one,</b> born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is <b>a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> Conversely, if <b>they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she</b> therefore <b>entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her</b> that <b>the matters were reversed,</b> which means she married her husband’s brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, <b>she must leave</b> her husband, <b>and the first child and the last one</b> are each <b>a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> If <b>they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her</b> that <b>he was alive</b> at the time of her marriage <b>and he</b> later <b>died, she must leave</b> the second husband. <b>And the first child,</b> born when her original husband was still alive, is <b>a <i>mamzer</i>, and the last one,</b> born after his death, <b>is not a <i>mamzer</i>.</b> If <b>they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed</b> to another man, <b>and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him,</b> as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, <b>although</b> the <b>last</b> man, i.e., her betrothed, <b>gave her a bill of divorce,</b> he has <b>not</b> thereby <b>disqualified her</b> from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. <b>This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya:</b> The verse states with regard to priests: <b>“Neither</b> shall they take <b>a woman divorced from her husband”</b> (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: <b>And not</b> one who was divorced <b>from a man who is not her husband,</b> e.g., the second man in this case.
In the case of <b>one whose wife went overseas</b> and people <b>came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came</b> back from overseas, the original wife <b>is permitted to return</b> <b>to him,</b> as his erroneous marriage to her sister is considered licentious sexual relations, and one who has intercourse with his wife’s relatives has not rendered his first wife forbidden to himself. <b>And he is permitted to the relatives of the second</b> woman, e.g., her daughter, <b>and</b> this <b>second</b> woman <b>is permitted to his relatives,</b> e.g., his son, as the marriage was entirely invalid. <b>And if the first</b> woman <b>died</b> he is <b>permitted to the second</b> woman, despite the fact that he has already engaged in forbidden relations with her. If <b>they said to him</b> that <b>his wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward they said to him</b> that <b>she was alive</b> when he married the sister <b>and</b> only later <b>died,</b> in this case <b>the first child,</b> born to the sister while his wife was still alive, is <b>a <i>mamzer</i>,</b> as he was born from the union of a man and his sister-in-law, <b>and the last one is not a <i>mamzer</i>. Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others</b> also <b>disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself</b> either. Rabbi Yosei’s obscure statement will be explained by the Gemara.
Witnesses <b>said to</b> a husband: <b>Your wife is dead, and he married her paternal sister,</b> and witnesses subsequently told him that his second wife <b>was dead and he married her maternal sister;</b> afterward witnesses said that this one too <b>was dead and he married her paternal sister;</b> finally they told him that she <b>was dead and he married</b> the last woman’s <b>maternal sister, and</b> then <b>they were all discovered to be alive.</b> In this case he is <b>permitted to</b> his <b>first</b> wife, <b>and to the third and to the fifth.</b> Since these women are not sisters, his betrothal to them is effective. Consequently, if he died <b>and</b> one of them entered into levirate marriage, <b>they exempt their rival wives.</b> <b>But</b> he is <b>forbidden to the second and fourth</b> wife, each of whom is the sister of his original wife. Therefore, if he passed away <b>and</b> the <i>yavam</i> had relations with one of them, his <b>relations with</b> any <b>one of them does not exempt her rival wife,</b> as she was forbidden to his brother, which means there was no mitzva of levirate marriage here at all. <b>And if he had relations with the second</b> woman in the aforementioned list <b>after the death of the first,</b> i.e., the first one indeed died but the other rumors were all false, in that case he is <b>permitted to the second and the fourth,</b> who are his lawful wives, <b>and they exempt their rival wives, and</b> he is <b>forbidden to the third and the fifth,</b> the sisters of the women married to him, <b>and the sexual relations</b> of the brother <b>with</b> any <b>one of them does not exempt her rival wife.</b>
The mishna addresses a different issue: If a boy <b>aged nine years and one day</b> had relations with his <i>yevama</i> <b>he</b> thereby <b>disqualifies</b> his <b>brothers</b> from levirate marriage, despite the fact that as a minor he has not acquired the <i>yevama</i> through this act of intercourse, <b>and the brothers</b> likewise <b>disqualify</b> the woman from <b>him</b> if they have intercourse with the <i>yevama</i>. <b>However,</b> there is a difference between them, as <b>he disqualifies</b> them only if he engaged in relations with her <b>first, and the brothers disqualify</b> him whether they had relations <b>first or last.</b> The mishna explains: <b>How so?</b> A boy <b>aged nine years and one day who had relations with his <i>yevama</i> has disqualified his brothers,</b> as they are no longer eligible to marry her. If his <b>brothers had relations with her,</b> or <b>performed levirate betrothal with her,</b> or <b>gave</b> her <b>a bill of divorce, or performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, they</b> permanently <b>disqualify him</b> from engaging in relations with her.
If a boy <b>aged nine years and one day had</b> sexual <b>relations with his <i>yevama</i>, and afterward his brother, who is</b> also <b>nine years and one day old, had relations with her,</b> the second brother <b>disqualifies</b> her <b>to</b> the first one. <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> he does <b>not disqualify</b> her. 
If a minor <b>aged nine years and one day had relations with his <i>yevama</i>, and afterward</b> that same boy <b>had relations with her rival wife,</b> he thereby <b>disqualifies her to himself,</b> and both women are now forbidden to him. <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> he does <b>not disqualify</b> her. If a boy <b>aged nine years and one day had relations with his <i>yevama</i> and died,</b> that <i>yevama</i> <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage.</b> If the minor <b>married a woman</b> in a regular manner <b>and died, she is exempt</b> from levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i>, as by Torah law a minor cannot marry.
If a boy <b>aged nine years and one day had relations with his <i>yevama</i>, and after he matured he married a different woman and</b> then <b>died</b> childless, <b>if he did not</b> carnally <b>know the first</b> woman <b>after he matured,</b> but only when he was a minor, <b>the first one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and may not enter into levirate marriage,</b> as she is in essence a <i>yevama</i> who had relations with a minor, <b>and the second</b> woman <b>either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage,</b> as she is his full-fledged wife. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The brother <b>consummates levirate marriage with whichever</b> woman <b>he chooses, and performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with the second one.</b> The mishna comments: This is the <i>halakha</i> <b>both</b> for a boy <b>who is nine years and one day old, and also</b> for one <b>who is twenty</b> years <b>old who has not developed two</b> pubic <b>hairs.</b> He has the status of a nine-year-old boy in this regard, as his intercourse is not considered a proper act of intercourse.

Chapter 11

<b>One may marry</b> a relative, e.g., the sister or the mother, <b>of the woman he raped and of the woman he seduced.</b> However, <b>one who rapes and one who seduces</b> a relative <b>of the woman who is married</b> to him <b>is liable</b> to receive capital punishment or <i>karet</i> for engaging in prohibited sexual intercourse, depending on the particular family relationship. <b>A man may marry a woman raped by his father, or a woman seduced by his father,</b> or <b>a woman raped by his son, or a woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits</b> marriage <b>in</b> the case of <b>a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father.</b>
With regard to <b>a female convert whose sons converted with her, they do not perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> for each other’s wives, <b>and they do not perform levirate marriage</b> with them, as their conversions are considered rebirth, and they are considered unrelated. This is so <b>even</b> if <b>the conception of the first</b> son <b>was not in</b> the <b>sanctity</b> of Israel, i.e., the mother had not yet converted when she conceived of him, <b>but his birth was in</b> the <b>sanctity</b> of Israel, as his mother had converted by the time she gave birth to him, <b>whereas the second</b> son was both <b>conceived and born in sanctity.</b> The first son is considered a convert, who is unrelated to his brother. <b>And</b> this <i>halakha</i> <b>similarly</b> applies to <b>a maidservant whose sons were freed with her,</b> as they too are not considered relatives.
With regard to <b>five women whose offspring were mixed,</b> i.e., their lineage became indeterminate, and they had other sons as well who were not mixed, and <b>the mixed</b> sons <b>matured and married women and</b> subsequently <b>died,</b> then <b>four</b> sons who were not mixed, each one from a different mother, <b>must perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with one</b> of the widows, as she might be the sister-in-law of any of them. <b>And one</b> son of the mother whose sons did not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>may perform levirate marriage with her</b> instead of <i>ḥalitza</i>; even if she is not his sister-in-law, once she has received <i>ḥalitza</i> from the others she may marry any man. Subsequently, <b>he and three</b> of the four other sons <b>must perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with one</b> of the remaining widows, <b>and</b> the other <b>one may perform levirate marriage.</b> When this process has been completed for all the widows, <b>four <i>ḥalitzot</i> and a levirate marriage are found</b> altogether <b>for each and every</b> widow.
With regard to <b>a woman whose offspring was mixed with the offspring of her daughter-in-law,</b> and their lineage was consequently indeterminate, and <b>the mixed</b> sons <b>matured and married women, and</b> subsequently <b>they died, the</b> certain <b>sons of the daughter-in-law perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with the wives, <b>but not levirate marriage, as</b> with regard to each wife <b>it is uncertain</b> whether she is <b>his brother’s wife,</b> and therefore his <i>yevama</i>, and <b>uncertain</b> whether she is <b>his father’s brother’s wife,</b> who is forbidden to him. However, <b>the</b> certain <b>sons of the elder woman,</b> i.e., the mother-in-law, <b>perform either <i>ḥalitza</i> or levirate marriage, as</b> with regard to each wife <b>it is uncertain</b> whether she is <b>his brother’s wife,</b> in which case levirate marriage is valid, <b>or his brother’s son’s wife,</b> in which case she is permitted to him, after having performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with a son of the daughter-in-law. If <b>the</b> sons of certain, <b>unflawed</b> lineage were the ones who <b>died,</b> then <b>the mixed</b> sons <b>perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with</b> the widows of <b>the elder woman’s sons but not levirate marriage, as it is uncertain</b> whether she is <b>his brother’s wife or his father’s brother’s wife. With</b> the widows of <b>the</b> certain <b>sons of the daughter-in-law, one</b> of the mixed sons <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> in case she is his brother’s wife. <b>And</b> the other <b>one performs levirate marriage,</b> as even if she is his brother’s son’s wife, she is permitted to him.
In the case of <b>a priestess whose offspring was mixed with her maidservant’s offspring, they may partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as both a priest and the slave of a priest partake of <i>teruma</i>. <b>And they receive one share</b> of <i>teruma</i> <b>in the granary.</b> <b>And they may not become ritually impure</b> with impurity imparted <b>by a corpse,</b> as each of them might be a priest. <b>And they may not marry women, whether unflawed</b> women, who may not marry a slave, <b>or</b> women <b>unfit</b> to marry into the priesthood, as with regard to each of them it is uncertain whether he is a priest or a slave. If <b>the mixed</b> sons <b>matured and freed each other, they may marry women fit</b> to marry <b>into the priesthood,</b> as a freed slave may marry such women. However, neither may marry a woman unfit for the priesthood, in case he is a priest. <b>And they may not become ritually impure</b> with impurity imparted <b>by a corpse,</b> since they are uncertain priests. <b>However, if they became impure, they do not receive the forty</b> lashes, as each of them might not be priest. <b>And they may not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as one of them is not a priest. <b>However, if they ate</b> <i>teruma</i> unwittingly <b>they do not pay</b> the <b>principal and the</b> additional <b>fifth,</b> as each of them might be a priest. <b>And they do not receive a share</b> of <i>teruma</i> <b>in the granary,</b> as neither can prove that he is a priest. <b>However, they may sell the <i>teruma</i></b> that they remove from their own produce, <b>and</b> although they may not eat it, <b>the money is theirs.</b> Since it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest, <i>teruma</i> cannot be appropriated from them. <b>And they do not receive a share of the consecrated</b> offerings <b>of the Temple,</b> as each of them might not be a priest. <b>And one may not give them consecrated</b> offerings to sacrifice for the same reason. <b>However,</b> the hides of <b>their own</b> offerings <b>may not be appropriated from their possession,</b> as it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest. <b>And they are exempt from</b> giving a priest <b>the foreleg, and from</b> giving him <b>the jaw, and from</b> giving him <b>the maw</b> of their non-consecrated kosher animals. <b>And</b> with regard to either of them, the <b>firstling of his</b> kosher animal <b>should graze until it becomes unfit</b> to be sacrificed, i.e., until it gets a blemish. It is against his interest to sacrifice the animal before it gets a blemish, thereby letting it be eaten by the priests. Once it gets a blemish, it cannot be appropriated from him. Since he is possibly a priest, he may claim that the animal is the property of a priest. The animal then becomes his private property, and he may eat it if he wishes. <b>And</b> in general, <b>we place upon him</b> both <b>the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites.</b>
With regard to a woman <b>who did not wait three months after</b> separating from <b>her husband, and remarried and gave birth</b> to a son, <b>and it is not known if he was born after nine</b> months of pregnancy <b>to the former</b> husband or <b>if he was born after seven</b> months <b>to the latter</b> husband, if <b>she had sons</b> of certain patrilineage <b>from the first</b> husband <b>and sons</b> of certain patrilineage <b>from the second</b> one, and the son of uncertain patrilineage married and died childless, then the brothers from both husbands <b>must perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his wife, as they might be his paternal brothers. <b>But they may not perform levirate marriage</b> with her, in case he is only their maternal half brother, and his wife is forbidden to them. <b>And similarly,</b> with regard to <b>him and their</b> wives, if one of them dies childless, <b>he performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and not levirate marriage.</b> If <b>he had</b> half <b>brothers from the first</b> husband <b>and</b> half <b>brothers from the second, not from the same mother</b> but from the same father, <b>he performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or levirate marriage</b> with their widows. If he is indeed their paternal half brother, then the widows are his <i>yevamot</i>; if not, he may marry them like any other man. <b>And</b> similarly, with regard to <b>them</b> and his wife, <b>one</b> half brother from one father <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and one</b> from the other father <b>performs levirate marriage.</b>
If <b>one</b> of his two uncertain fathers <b>was an Israelite and one</b> was <b>a priest, he may marry</b> only <b>a woman fit to</b> marry <b>a priest,</b> due to the possibility that he is a priest. <b>And he may not become ritually impure</b> with impurity imparted <b>by a corpse</b> because he might be a priest. <b>But if he became impure, he does not receive the forty</b> lashes, as he might be a non-priest. Likewise, <b>he does not partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> in case he is a non-priest. <b>However, if he ate</b> <i>teruma</i> <b>he does not pay</b> the <b>principal and the</b> additional <b>fifth,</b> as he might be a priest. <b>And he does not receive</b> <i>teruma</i> <b>at the granary. However, he may sell the <i>teruma</i></b> of his own produce <b>and the money is his.</b> It cannot be taken away from him due to the uncertainty with regard to his status. <b>And he does not receive a share of the sacred of the consecrated</b> offerings, <b>and one may not give him the consecrated</b> offerings to sacrifice. <b>However,</b> the hides of <b>his own</b> offerings <b>may not be appropriated from his possession. And he is exempt from</b> giving a priest <b>the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw</b> of his non-consecrated animals. <b>And the firstling of his</b> animal <b>should graze until it becomes unfit</b> to be sacrificed because it gets a blemish. <b>And</b> in general, <b>we place upon him the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites.</b> If <b>both</b> uncertain fathers <b>were priests,</b> then if they die <b>he is in</b> a state of <b>acute mourning over</b> each of <b>them,</b> in case the deceased is his father. <b>And</b> if he dies, <b>they are</b> both <b>in a</b> state of <b>acute mourning over him,</b> as one of them is his father. <b>He may not become ritually impure to</b> bury <b>them,</b> as each one may not be his relative, <b>and they may not become ritually impure to</b> bury <b>him</b> for the same reason. <b>He does not inherit</b> from <b>them,</b> as the heirs of both husbands can reject his claims. <b>However, they inherit</b> from <b>him</b> if he has no sons and split his inheritance equally. <b>And he is exempt</b> from capital punishment <b>for striking and for cursing</b> both <b>this</b> father <b>and that one.</b> Although one who strikes or curses his father or mother is liable to receive the death penalty, he cannot be held liable, as it is unknown which of the men is his father. <b>He must ascend</b> to the Temple service <b>with the priestly watch of this</b> father <b>and of that one,</b> as he belongs to one of these watches and is obligated to serve with them. <b>However, he does not receive a share</b> of the portion of the offerings that gets eaten, as the members of each watch can claim that he is a member of the other watch. <b>If both</b> uncertain fathers <b>were in one priestly watch, he receives one share,</b> as he certainly belongs to that watch.

Chapter 12

<b>The mitzva of <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> the ritual through which the <i>yavam</i> frees the <i>yevama</i> of her levirate bonds, <b>must be</b> performed before <b>three judges, and</b> the ritual does not require the judges to be experts fit to adjudicate other matters, as <b>even if all three are laymen,</b> it is acceptable. <b>If she performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> while he was wearing <b>a shoe</b> made of soft leather that covers the whole foot, <b>her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid,</b> but if she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> while he was wearing <b>a soft shoe [<i>anpileya</i>]</b> made of cloth, <b>her <i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid,</b> as it is not considered a real shoe. If <i>ḥalitza</i> was performed while he was wearing <b>a sandal,</b> i.e., footwear made of hard leather, <b>that has a heel,</b> it is <b>valid; but</b> if performed with a sandal <b>without a heel, it is invalid</b> <i>ḥalitza</i>. If the leg of the <i>yavam</i> was amputated anywhere <b>from the knee down</b> and she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, <b>it is valid <i>ḥalitza</i>.</b> If, however, the leg was amputated anywhere <b>from the knee and above,</b> and she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, <b>it is invalid <i>ḥalitza</i>. </b>
If she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> while the man was wearing <b>a sandal that did not belong to him, or a sandal made of wood, or on the left</b> shoe, <b>which was</b> being worn <b>on his right</b> foot, <b>it is valid <i>ḥalitza</i>. If she performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> as the man was wearing a shoe that was too <b>large</b> for him but <b>which he can</b> still <b>walk in, or</b> a shoe that was too <b>small</b> but <b>that covered most of his foot, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid.</b> If a woman <b>performed <i>ḥalitza</i> at night, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it.</b> If she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>on</b> the <b>left foot, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar validates it.</b> 
If she, i.e., the <i>yevama</i>, <b>removed</b> the shoe <b>and spat</b> in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> <b>but did not recite</b> the necessary text, <b>her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid.</b> If <b>she recited</b> the text <b>and spat but did not remove</b> the shoe, <b>her <i>ḥalitza</i> is disqualified.</b> If <b>she removed</b> the shoe <b>and recited</b> the text <b>but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her <i>ḥalitza</i> is disqualified,</b> while <b>Rabbi Akiva says: Her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid.</b> <b>Rabbi Elazar said to him:</b> The verse states: <b>“So shall it be done</b> to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). “So” is an exclusionary term indicating that only precisely in this fashion is <i>ḥalitza</i> valid. Therefore, <b>any term that constitutes an action</b> for <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>is indispensable. Rabbi Akiva said to him:</b> You derive <b>proof from there?</b> But it states: <b>“So shall it be done to the man”</b> indicating that only <b>a term constituting an action toward the man,</b> namely any aspect of <i>ḥalitza</i> that concerns the man’s body, such as removal of his shoe, is indispensable. But spitting, which does not involve the man, although it takes place in his presence, is not indispensable.
The mishna lists additional <i>halakhot</i> with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>. <b>If a deaf-mute man underwent <i>ḥalitza</i>, or a deaf-mute woman performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, or if an</b> adult <b>woman performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with a male minor, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid</b> and the woman may not marry. <b>If a female minor performed <i>ḥalitza</i>, she must perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> a second time <b>once she becomes an adult, and if she does not perform</b> the second <b><i>ḥalitza</i>, her</b> first <b><i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid.</b>
 If she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> before two or three judges <b>and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified</b> as a judge for some other reason, <b>her <i>ḥalitza</i> is invalid. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler validate</b> the <i>ḥalitza</i> in this case. <b>And an incident</b> occurred <b>involving a certain</b> person <b>who performed <i>ḥalitza</i> between him and her alone in prison,</b> i.e., not in the presence of others, <b>and the case came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated</b> it.
<b>The mitzva of <i>ḥalitza</i></b> is performed as follows: <b>He and his <i>yevama</i> come to the court, and</b> the scholars of the court <b>give him advice appropriate for him,</b> whether to enter levirate marriage or to perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, <b>as it is stated: “And the Elders of his city shall call him and speak to him”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:8). If they decide to perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, <b>she says: “My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:7), <b>and</b> afterward <b>he says: “I do not wish to take her”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:8). <b>And they would say</b> these statements <b>in the sacred</b> Hebrew <b>language</b> and not in any other language. Afterward, the shoe is removed and she spits before him, as is written: <b>“His <i>yevama</i> shall approach him, before the Elders, and remove his shoe from on his foot and spit before him”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:9), which indicates that <b>this spittle</b> must be <b>visible to the judges. “And</b> she shall <b>respond and say: So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:9). <b>Up until this point</b> the judges <b>would prompt</b> the parties <b>to recite</b> the text that they are required to say. <b>And when Rabbi Hyrkanus once prompted</b> the participants in <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>under the <i>ela</i> tree in the village</b> of <b>Eitam, he</b> prompted them to <b>finish reciting the whole</b> Torah <b>passage,</b> after which <b>they established the custom of completing the whole</b> Torah <b>passage.</b> Therefore, they continue and say the following verse: <b>“And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of he who had his shoe removed”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:10). <b>This mitzva</b> of saying: The house of he who had his shoe removed, applies <b>to the judges, but not to the students,</b> i.e., the students of the judges and other onlookers who are present. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a mitzva upon all those present to say: He who had his shoe removed.</b>

Chapter 13

The Sages decreed that in the case of a minor girl whose father died, her mother or brothers may marry her off. However, such a marriage does not have the same legal status as the marriage of an adult. Therefore, if the minor regrets having married, she is allowed to make a declaration of refusal to her husband, thereby annulling the marital bond. The Sages disagreed with regard to the details of this <i>halakha</i>: <b>Beit Shammai say: Only betrothed girls may refuse.</b> A girl may refuse, upon reaching adulthood, to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father. <b>But Beit Hillel say</b> that both <b>betrothed and fully married</b> girls may refuse. <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> Refusal may be directed only <b>at</b> her <b>husband and not at</b> her <b><i>yavam</i>.</b> In such a situation, she must perform <i>ḥalitza</i> in order to dissolve the levirate bond. <b>But Beit Hillel say:</b> It may be directed <b>at</b> her <b>husband or</b> her <b><i>yavam</i>.</b> <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> The refusal must take place specifically <b>in the presence of</b> the husband. <b>But Beit Hillel say:</b> It may take place <b>either in his presence or in his absence. Beit Shammai say:</b> The refusal must take place specifically <b>in court. But Beit Hillel say:</b> It may take place <b>either in court, or not in court.</b> <b>Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: She may refuse as long as she is a minor, even four or five times</b> if her relatives married her off again to another man after each refusal. <b>Beit Shammai said to them: The daughters of Israel are not to be treated with disregard</b> and should not be passed from one man to another. <b>Rather, she refuses</b> once. <b>And</b> then <b>she must wait until she reaches majority, and refuse, and marry.</b>
<b>Who is a minor girl who needs to perform refusal</b> in order to annul her marriage? <b>Any</b> minor <b>whose mother or brother married her off with her consent. If they married her off without her consent, she need not refuse</b> her husband at all and may leave her husband without a declaration of refusal. <b>Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any girl who</b> is so young that she <b>cannot keep her betrothal,</b> i.e., the money or document of betrothal, <b>safe does not need to refuse,</b> as the Sages instituted marriage only for a girl old enough to understand what she is doing. <b>Rabbi Elazar says: The act of a minor girl is nothing,</b> so that if a minor girl’s mother or brothers marry her off, the marriage is essentially invalid. <b>Rather,</b> her status is <b>as though she were</b> a <b>seduced</b> unmarried woman. Therefore, a minor <b>daughter of a non-priest married to a priest may not eat <i>teruma</i>,</b> and <b>the</b> minor <b>daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may eat <i>teruma</i>.</b>
<b>Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says</b> otherwise: If there is <b>any obstruction</b> in the matter <b>due to the man, it is as if she were his wife.</b> If there is <b>any obstruction in the matter that is not due to the man, it is as if she were not his wife.</b> This statement will be explained in the Gemara.
If a minor girl <b>refuses a man, he is permitted to</b> marry <b>her close relatives,</b> such as her mother or her sister, <b>and she is permitted to</b> marry <b>his close relatives,</b> such as his father or brother, <b>and he has not disqualified her from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood,</b> as she is not considered divorced. However, if <b>he gave her a bill of divorce,</b> then even though the marriage was valid according to rabbinic law and not Torah law, <b>he is prohibited from</b> marrying <b>her close relatives, and she is prohibited from</b> marrying <b>his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from</b> marrying into <b>the priesthood.</b> <b>If he gave her a bill of divorce but</b> afterward <b>remarried her, and</b> she subsequently <b>refused him and married another</b> man, <b>and then she was widowed or divorced</b> from her second husband, <b>she is permitted to return to him.</b> Since she left him the last time by means of refusal, the refusal cancels the bill of divorce that he gave her previously, and her status is that of a minor girl who refused her husband, who is not forbidden to her first husband after a second marriage. However, if the order was different, and <b>if she refused him and he</b> subsequently <b>remarried her, and</b> this time <b>he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another</b> man, <b>and she was widowed or divorced, she is forbidden to return to him,</b> like any divorced woman who married another man. <b>This is the principle</b> concerning a minor girl who refused her husband and then married several times: <b>If the bill of divorce followed the refusal</b> and she remarried, <b>she is forbidden to return to him. If the refusal followed the bill of divorce, she is permitted to return to him.</b> Since the refusal followed the bill of divorce it is clear that she was a minor and neither the marriage nor the divorce were valid by Torah law. However, when the ultimate separation is by means of a bill of divorce, there is no indication that she was a minor at the time and there is potential for confusion with an adult divorcée.
If a minor girl <b>refuses</b> one <b>man and marries another, and he divorces her,</b> and then she marries <b>another</b> man <b>and refuses him, and</b> then she marries <b>another</b> man <b>and he divorces her, this is the principle</b> for this case: With regard to <b>anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, it is prohibited for her to return to him.</b> With regard to anyone she leaves <b>by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him.</b>
With regard to <b>one who divorces a woman and remarries her</b> and then dies childless, his wife <b>is permitted to</b> enter into levirate marriage with her <b><i>yavam</i>,</b> <b>but Rabbi Elazar prohibits</b> this. <b>Likewise,</b> with regard to <b>one who divorces an orphaned</b> minor <b>girl</b> whose mother and brothers married her off <b>and remarries her</b> and subsequently dies, <b>she is permitted to the <i>yavam</i></b> in levirate marriage, <b>and Rabbi Elazar prohibits</b> it. <b>A minor girl whose father married her off,</b> in which case the marriage is valid by Torah law, <b>and who was</b> subsequently <b>divorced</b> while she was still a minor <b>is like an orphan during the lifetime of</b> her <b>father,</b> as he no longer has the right to marry her off, and she cannot become fully married because she is a minor. <b>And if</b> the husband <b>remarries her</b> while she is still a minor and then dies childless, <b>everyone agrees</b> that <b>she is forbidden to the <i>yavam</i></b> and may not enter into levirate marriage.
If <b>two brothers are married to two minor sisters, and the husband of one of them dies</b> childless, <b>this</b> widowed girl <b>shall be exempt</b> from levirate marriage <b>due to</b> her status as a forbidden relative, <b>as</b> one is prohibited from marrying the <b>sister</b> of <b>his wife. The same</b> <i>halakha</i> applies to <b>two deaf-mute women,</b> whose status is like that of two minors in this matter, as their marriages are valid by rabbinic law. And if two brothers were married to two sisters, one of them <b>an adult and</b> the other <b>a minor,</b> and <b>the husband of the minor dies, the minor shall leave due to</b> her status as the <b>sister</b> of <b>a wife,</b> as in the first case in the mishna. But <b>if the husband of the adult dies,</b> it generates a Torah obligation of levirate marriage, which is not abrogated by the rabbinic prohibition proscribing the <i>yevama</i> as his wife’s sister. This prohibition is by rabbinic law, because marriage to a minor is rabbinic in origin. What does one do under such circumstances? <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: We instruct the minor,</b> i.e., his wife, <b>to refuse him,</b> so that her marriage is dissolved and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. <b>Rabban Gamliel says: If</b> the minor <b>refuses</b> of her own accord, <b>her refusal is valid. And if not, she should wait until she reaches majority,</b> whereupon her marriage is valid by Torah law, <b>and that</b> widowed adult sister <b>shall be exempt</b> from levirate marriage <b>due to</b> her status as the <b>sister</b> of <b>a wife.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> When the brother married to the adult sister dies, leaving the brother married to the minor, <b>woe [<i>ee</i>] to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife.</b> Under these circumstances, he loses both women: <b>He must release his own wife with a bill of divorce</b> and <b>his brother’s wife by</b> performing <b><i>ḥalitza</i>.</b> He cannot stay married to his wife because she is the sister of his <i>yevama</i>, and he cannot enter into levirate marriage with the <i>yevama</i> even after divorcing his wife, because the <i>yevama</i> is his wife’s sister. The principle that one is completely absolved from levirate marriage when the potential <i>yevama</i> is a forbidden relative does not apply because Torah law does not recognize his marriage to his minor wife. That marriage’s rabbinic sanction does not suffice to render the <i>yevama</i>, his wife’s sister, a forbidden relative who is not a candidate for levirate marriage.
If <b>a man was married to two orphaned minors and died, consummation</b> of levirate marriage <b>or <i>ḥalitza</i> with one of them exempts her rival wife</b> from either levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i>, rendering her free to remarry. <b>Likewise,</b> if <b>two deaf-mutes</b> were married to one man who died, consummation of levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i> with one of them exempts her rival wife. In both of these cases, both women are married by rabbinic law and consequently become <i>yevamot</i> by rabbinic law. Since their statuses are equal, one can exempt the other. If one wife is a <b>minor and</b> the other is <b>a deaf-mute, consummation</b> of levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i> <b>with one of them does not exempt her rival wife.</b> Although both women are married by rabbinic law, their statuses are not the same and one cannot exempt the other. If one of them <b>was</b> halakhically <b>competent and</b> one was <b>a deaf-mute, consummation</b> of levirate marriage <b>with the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> wife <b>exempts the deaf-mute,</b> as the halakhically competent women’s marriage and levirate marriage are by Torah law. <b>But consummation</b> of levirate marriage <b>with the deaf-mute does not exempt the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> wife. Likewise, if one was <b>an adult woman and one a minor girl, consummation</b> of levirate marriage <b>with the adult exempts the minor but consummation</b> of levirate marriage <b>with the minor does not exempt the adult.</b>
If <b>a man was married to two minor orphans and he died, and a <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the first</b> of them to consummate the levirate marriage, <b>and then engaged in intercourse with the second, or if his brother</b> who is also their <i>yavam</i> <b>engaged in intercourse with the second,</b> the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>did not disqualify the first</b> girl from staying married to him, as her levirate marriage was consummated. <b>Likewise,</b> if the two wives were <b>two female deaf-mutes,</b> the first wife may remain married to the <i>yavam</i>. Intercourse with the second wife, though prohibited, has no effect: If the marriage was of uncertain status, then either the levirate marriage was concluded when he engaged in intercourse with the first, or neither wife was really married to the first husband, and they are therefore not rival wives. If the initial marriage was partial, then since both wives have the same standing, the levirate marriage with the first wife fully realizes whatever degree of levirate marriage is available. If one wife was <b>a minor and</b> the other <b>a deaf-mute,</b> and <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the minor and then engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute,</b> then the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>disqualified the minor</b> from staying married due to the Sages’ decree, lest it be confused with a situation where the intercourse with the deaf-mute was first. If <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute and then engaged in intercourse with the minor, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the minor,</b> then the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>disqualified the deaf-mute</b> from staying married. The marriage to the deaf-mute creates a partial acquisition that does not exempt the second wife from levirate marriage, as she, as a minor, has a different standing. Accordingly, intercourse with the second wife also creates a partial acquisition and thereby both women are prohibited to the <i>yavam</i>, as it is prohibited to consummate levirate marriage with more than one wife.
If one widow was halakhically <b>competent and</b> one widow was <b>a deaf-mute,</b> and <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman and then engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, or</b> if <b>his brother</b> then <b>engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute,</b> the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>did not disqualify the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman</b> from staying married. Since the <i>yavam</i> consummated the levirate marriage with her first, the levirate bond was entirely dissolved and the intercourse with the deaf-mute, though forbidden, had no effect. If <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute and then engaged in intercourse with the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman,</b> the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>disqualified the deaf-mute</b> from staying married. Consummation of the levirate marriage with the deaf-mute creates only a partial acquisition that does not fully dissolve the levirate bond.
If the deceased brother had two wives, <b>an adult and a minor,</b> and <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in sexual intercourse with the adult, then engaged in intercourse with the minor, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the minor,</b> the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>did not disqualify the adult</b> from staying married, as the consummation of the levirate marriage with the adult completely dissolves the levirate bond. If <b>the <i>yavam</i> engaged in intercourse with the minor, and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the adult,</b> the <i>yavam</i> or his brother <b>disqualified the minor</b> from staying married. <b>Rabbi Elazar says:</b> The court <b>instructs the minor to refuse him</b> thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and then the minor is permitted to marry any man.
If <b>a minor <i>yavam</i> engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor <i>yevama</i>, they should grow up together,</b> living as a married couple. He may not divorce her, as he is a minor. <b>If he engaged in sexual intercourse with an adult <i>yevama</i>, she should raise him,</b> i.e., they must stay married, as there is no way for him to divorce her until he reaches majority. When a <b><i>yevama</i> said within thirty days</b> of her marriage: <b>I have not engaged in sexual intercourse</b> with him, the court <b>forces him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her.</b> If she said this <b>after thirty days</b> but he claimed that he had engaged in sexual intercourse, the court <b>asks him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her,</b> as there are grounds to believe him. <b>And when he admits</b> that he did not engage in intercourse with her, <b>even after twelve months,</b> the court <b>forces him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her.</b>
If a woman <b>vows during her husband’s lifetime</b> to derive no <b>benefit from her <i>yavam</i>,</b> the court <b>forces him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her</b> as it is forbidden for her to engage in sexual intercourse with him to consummate the levirate marriage. If she vowed <b>after the death of her husband</b> to derive no benefit from her <i>yavam</i>, the court <b>asks him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her. And if she intended to do so,</b> i.e., she had an ulterior motive of avoiding levirate marriage when she vowed, <b>even</b> if she made the vow <b>during her husband’s lifetime,</b> the court merely <b>asks him to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her.</b>

Chapter 14

With regard to <b>a deaf-mute who married</b> a halakhically <b>competent woman, and</b> a halakhically <b>competent man who married a deaf-mute: If</b> either man <b>wants</b> to divorce his wife, <b>he may divorce</b> her, <b>and if he wants to maintain</b> her as his wife, <b>he may maintain</b> her. The reason why a deaf-mute man can divorce his wife is that <b>just as he marries</b> her <b>by intimation,</b> i.e., his marriage is not performed by explicit speech, as deaf-mutes rely on gestures, <b>so too, he divorces</b> her <b>by intimation.</b> Likewise, in the case of a halakhically <b>competent man who married a</b> halakhically <b>competent woman, and she</b> later <b>became a deaf-mute: If he wants</b> to divorce his wife, <b>he may divorce</b> her, as a wife does not have to have intellectual capacity to receive a bill of divorce, <b>and if he wants</b> to maintain her as his wife, <b>he may maintain</b> her. <b>If she became an imbecile, he may not divorce</b> her, i.e., a bill of divorce is ineffective in this case. If <b>he became a deaf-mute or an imbecile</b> after they were married, <b>he may never divorce her,</b> as he does not have the legal competence to give a bill of divorce. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what</b> reason is the <i>halakha</i> that in the case of <b>the woman who becomes a deaf-mute,</b> her husband <b>may divorce her, but</b> in the case of <b>the man who becomes a deaf-mute, he may not divorce</b> his wife? If the bill of divorce written by someone who formerly possessed all his senses and later became a deaf-mute is invalid, it stands to reason that it should not be valid when she becomes a deaf-mute either. <b>They said to him: The man who divorces</b> his wife <b>is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced</b> whether <b>she is willing or unwilling.</b> Since the woman’s consent is not required, she may be divorced even if she is a deaf-mute. <b>And,</b> conversely, <b>the man divorces</b> his wife <b>only willingly,</b> and therefore the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, is ineffective.
<b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off</b> when she was a minor, which means her marriage was valid by Torah law, <b>that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce</b> even when she matures and is no longer under her father’s authority, despite the fact that she is not legally competent. <b>They said to him: This</b> woman, <b>too,</b> has <b>a similar</b> status. In other words, a woman who possessed all her faculties and later became a deaf-mute is comparable to a minor whose marriage was valid by Torah law and later, when she matured and was no longer under the authority of her father, received a bill of divorce. Both of these women can receive a bill of divorce, in accordance with the principle stated in the previous paragraph.
The mishna continues: In a case where there were <b>two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters or to two</b> halakhically <b>competent sisters, or to two sisters, one</b> of whom was <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent; or</b> in a case where there were <b>two deaf-mute sisters married to two</b> halakhically <b>competent brothers or to two deaf-mute brothers or to two brothers, one</b> of whom was <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent,</b> all <b>these</b> women <b>are exempt from <i>ḥalitza</i> and from levirate marriage.</b> Each of them is forbidden to her <i>yavam</i> because he is married to her sister. <b>And if they were unrelated women,</b> i.e., the women are not sisters, the men <b>may marry</b> them in levirate marriage, <b>and if they want to divorce</b> them later, <b>they may divorce</b> them.
However, if <b>two brothers, one</b> of whom is a <b>deaf-mute and</b> other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent,</b> were <b>married to two</b> halakhically <b>competent sisters,</b> and <b>the deaf-mute married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>do?</b> His brother’s wife is <b>released</b> without levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i>, <b>due to</b> the prohibition with regard to <b>a wife’s sister.</b> If the halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>died, what should the deaf-mute</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce,</b> as his wife’s sister came before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and the legal status of her marriage and her levirate marriage is higher than his own marriage, which applies only by rabbinic law. <b>And his brother’s wife is forbidden</b> to him <b>forever,</b> and there is no remedy for her. He cannot marry her, as by rabbinic law she is the sister of his ex-wife, nor can he exempt her by means of <i>ḥalitza</i>, as he is a deaf-mute.
If <b>two</b> halakhically <b>competent brothers</b> were <b>married to two sisters, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent, and the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute</b> sister <b>died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>do?</b> The deaf-mute sister is <b>released due to</b> the prohibition with regard to <b>a wife’s sister.</b> If <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute</b> sister <b>do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce,</b> as the halakhically competent sister came before him for levirate marriage, and the status of her levirate bond is higher than the status of his marriage to his wife, a deaf-mute. <b>And he</b> releases <b>his brother’s wife,</b> who is not a deaf-mute, <b>by means of <i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> as they are both legally competent and can therefore perform <i>ḥalitza</i>.
If <b>two brothers, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent,</b> were <b>married to two sisters, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent, and the deaf-mute</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute</b> sister <b>died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>do?</b> The deaf-mute woman is <b>released due to</b> the prohibition with regard to <b>a wife’s sister.</b> If <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> sister <b>died, what should the deaf-mute</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute</b> sister <b>do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce,</b> which is as valid as their original marriage. <b>And his brother’s wife is forbidden</b> to him <b>forever.</b> There is no remedy for her, as he may not consummate levirate marriage with her because she is the sister of his ex-wife by rabbinic law, and he cannot perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her either, as he is a deaf-mute.
If <b>two brothers, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent,</b> were <b>married to two unrelated,</b> halakhically <b>competent women, and the deaf-mute married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman do?</b> He <b>either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage.</b> If <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute</b> brother <b>married to the</b> other halakhically <b>competent woman do?</b> He cannot perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, as he is a deaf-mute. Rather, <b>he marries</b> her, <b>and he may never divorce</b> her, as sexual intercourse between a <i>yavam</i> and his <i>yevama</i> creates a valid marriage that cannot be broken by the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute.
If <b>two</b> halakhically <b>competent brothers</b> were <b>married to two unrelated women, one</b> of whom is halakhically <b>competent and</b> the other <b>one a deaf-mute, and the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute</b> woman <b>died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman do?</b> The brother cannot perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her, as she is a deaf-mute. Rather, <b>he marries</b> the deaf-mute, <b>and if he wishes to divorce</b> her, <b>he may</b> subsequently <b>divorce</b> her with a bill of divorce. If <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent sister died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute do? Either he performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or he enters into levirate marriage.</b>
If <b>two brothers, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent,</b> were <b>married to two unrelated women, one</b> of whom is <b>a deaf-mute and</b> the other <b>one</b> halakhically <b>competent, and the deaf-mute</b> brother who was <b>married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman do? He may marry her</b> if he desires the deaf-mute woman, <b>and if he wishes</b> afterward <b>to divorce</b> her, <b>he may divorce</b> her. If <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> brother <b>married to the</b> halakhically <b>competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute</b> brother <b>married to the deaf-mute woman do? He marries</b> his <i>yevama</i> <b>and may never divorce her,</b> as he does not have the legal capacity to end a valid marriage.

Chapter 15

With regard to <b>a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas,</b> if there was <b>peace between him and her,</b> i.e., the couple were not fighting at the time, <b>and</b> there was also <b>peace in the world,</b> i.e., there was no war at that time, <b>and</b> the woman <b>came</b> back by herself <b>and said: My husband died, she may marry</b> on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she said: <b>My husband died,</b> and they did not have children, but her husband had a brother, <b>she may enter into levirate marriage.</b> If there was <b>peace between him and her</b> when they left <b>but</b> there was <b>war in the world,</b> or if there was <b>a quarrel between him and her and peace in the world, and she came and said: My husband died, she is not deemed credible,</b> as she may be mistaken or lying. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never deemed credible</b> when she testifies that her husband died, <b>unless she came crying and her clothing was torn,</b> in which case it is apparent that she is speaking the truth. <b>They said to him:</b> This is an incorrect distinction. Rather, <b>both this</b> woman who cries <b>and this</b> woman who does not cry <b>may marry</b> on the basis of their own testimony.
<b>Beit Hillel say: We heard</b> that one may accept the testimony of a woman concerning the death of her husband <b>only when she comes from the grain harvest, and</b> when she testified <b>in the same country</b> where he died, <b>and</b> in circumstances <b>similar to the incident that occurred,</b> in which a lenient ruling was issued, as will be explained. <b>Beit Shammai said to</b> Beit Hillel: The <b>same</b> <i>halakha</i> applies to a wife <b>who comes from the grain harvest, and one who comes from the olive</b> harvest, <b>and</b> also <b>one who comes from the grape harvest, and</b> even <b>one who comes from one country to</b> another <b>country.</b> Although the incident in question took place during the grain harvest, <b>the Sages spoke of the grain harvest only</b> because it was the <b>present</b> occurrence, i.e., that is what happened in practice, but this is no proof that she is deemed credible only when she arrived specifically from the grain harvest. The mishna comments: <b>Beit Hillel retracted</b> their opinion, and decided <b>to teach in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Beit Shammai</b> on this issue.
<b>Beit Shammai say:</b> A woman who testifies that her husband died <b>may marry, and take</b> the money guaranteed in <b>her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: She may marry, but she may not take her marriage contract,</b> as qualified witnesses are required for monetary matters. <b>Beit Shammai said to them:</b> If <b>you have permitted</b> a <b>woman</b> potentially <b>forbidden to him, which is</b> a relatively <b>stringent</b> prohibition, based merely upon her own testimony, <b>will we not permit a monetary matter,</b> which is more <b>lenient,</b> as the money can be returned and this sin does not entail such a severe punishment? <b>Beit Hillel said to them:</b> This is no proof, as <b>we find</b> <b>that the brothers do not come into</b> the <b>inheritance</b> from the deceased brother <b>based on her</b> testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters. <b>Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>from the scroll of the marriage contract, as</b> every husband <b>writes for her that: If you marry another</b> man, <b>take what is written for you</b> in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. <b>And Beit Hillel</b> again <b>retracted</b> their opinion, and decided <b>to teach in accordance with</b> the opinion of <b>Beit Shammai.</b>
<b>All are deemed credible</b> when they come <b>to give testimony with regard to</b> the death of a woman’s husband, <b>apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her <i>yavam</i>, and her husband’s daughter,</b> her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment. The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. <b>What,</b> then, <b>is the difference between a bill of divorce and death?</b> The mishna answers: The difference is <b>that</b> in the case of a bill of divorce <b>the writing proves</b> the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself. If one <b>witness says:</b> The man <b>died, and</b> the wife <b>married</b> based on this testimony, <b>and one</b> other witness <b>came and said:</b> He did <b>not die, she</b> need <b>not leave</b> her new husband due to this testimony. However, if one <b>witness</b> comes and <b>says:</b> The husband <b>died, and two</b> witnesses <b>say:</b> He did <b>not die,</b> then <b>even though she married</b> based on the first witness <b>she must leave</b> her new husband. If <b>two</b> witnesses <b>say: He died, and</b> one <b>witness says:</b> He did <b>not die,</b> the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted, and <b>even though she did not</b> yet <b>marry, she may marry.</b>
If two women who were married to the same man come forward, and <b>one</b> of them <b>says</b> that the husband <b>died, and</b> the other <b>one says he did not die, the one who says he died may marry</b> on the basis of her own testimony, <b>and she takes</b> the money of <b>her marriage contract. And the one who said he did not die may not marry, and does not take</b> the money of <b>her marriage contract.</b> If <b>one</b> wife <b>says: He died</b> in a normal manner, <b>and</b> the other <b>one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these</b> women <b>may not marry. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Since they both agree that he is not alive they may marry,</b> despite the fact that they dispute the circumstances of his demise. If <b>a witness says: He died, and a witness says: He did not die,</b> or one <b>woman says: He died, and</b> another <b>woman says: He did not die, this</b> woman <b>may not marry.</b>
In the case of <b>a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract</b> based on her own testimony. <b>And it</b> remains <b>prohibited for her rival wife</b> to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife <b>was an Israelite woman</b> married <b>to a priest, she may</b> continue to <b>partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.</b> <b>Rabbi Akiva says: This is not</b> the <b>way to spare</b> someone <b>from transgression.</b> According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating <i>teruma</i> unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation <b>unless it is prohibited</b> for the rival wife <b>to marry,</b> as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, <b>and it is</b> also <b>prohibited</b> for her <b>to partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the <i>halakha</i> is stringent on both counts.
The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman <b>said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited</b> for <b>her mother-in-law</b> to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law <b>was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of <i>teruma</i>;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not</b> the <b>way to spare</b> her <b>from transgression;</b> there is no remedy <b>unless it is prohibited</b> for the mother-in-law <b>to marry and</b> also <b>prohibited</b> for her <b>to partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who <b>betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which</b> of them <b>he betrothed,</b> and <b>each one</b> of them <b>says: He betrothed me,</b> if he does not want to marry any of them <b>he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one</b> of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. <b>And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs.</b> The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.</b> <b>Rabbi Akiva says: This is not</b> the <b>way to spare</b> someone <b>from transgression,</b> as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy <b>unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract</b> payment <b>to each and every one.</b> And likewise, in the case of one who <b>stole</b> money <b>from one of five</b> people <b>and does not know from which</b> of them <b>he stole,</b> and <b>each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen</b> money <b>among them and departs,</b> and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not</b> the <b>way to spare</b> him <b>from transgression;</b> there is no remedy <b>unless he pays each and every one of them.</b>
In the case of <b>a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son</b> was <b>with them, and</b> later <b>she came</b> back <b>and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible.</b> It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: <b>My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible,</b> i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. <b>And</b> yet <b>we are concerned</b> and give some credence <b>to her statement,</b> in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore <b>she performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> to exempt her from the levirate bond with her <i>yavam</i>, <b>and she does not enter into levirate marriage.</b>
If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: <b>A son was born to me overseas, and she</b> further <b>said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible</b> and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: <b>My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible</b> for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, <b>but</b> the court is <b>concerned about her statement. And</b> therefore <b>she must perform <i>ḥalitza</i> and she does not enter into levirate marriage.</b>
If she said: <b>A <i>yavam</i> was born for me overseas,</b> i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and <b>she</b> also <b>said: My husband died and afterward my <i>yavam</i> died,</b> or: <b>My <i>yavam</i></b> died <b>and afterward my husband</b> died, in either case <b>she is deemed credible.</b> This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony. However, if <b>she went, she and her husband and her <i>yavam</i>, overseas, and</b> upon her return she <b>said: My husband died and afterward my <i>yavam</i></b> died, or: <b>My <i>yavam</i></b> died <b>and afterward my husband</b> died, <b>she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible</b> if she <b>says: My <i>yavam</i> died,</b> in order <b>that she may marry</b> another man. <b>And</b> she is <b>not</b> deemed credible if she says that <b>her sister died,</b> in order <b>that she may enter the house</b> of her sister’s husband. <b>And a man is not deemed credible</b> if he <b>says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his</b> brother’s <b>wife, and</b> he is <b>not</b> deemed credible when he says that <b>his wife died,</b> in order <b>that</b> he <b>may marry</b> his wife’s <b>sister.</b> The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

Chapter 16

In the case of <b>a woman whose husband and rival</b> wife <b>traveled to a country overseas, and</b> witnesses <b>came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry</b> any other man, in case she requires levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, i.e., <i>yavam</i>, in which case she is prohibited from marrying anyone else. <b>And she</b> also <b>shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether she,</b> i.e., <b>her rival wife, is pregnant.</b> If her rival wife bears a child to her late husband, she does not have a levirate bond with her brother-in-law, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying him. <b>If she had a mother-in-law</b> overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, <b>she need not be concerned</b> that a brother to her husband may have been born. But if her mother-in-law <b>departed</b> from her town <b>pregnant,</b> this widow <b>should be concerned</b> that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> Even in such a case <b>she need not be concerned</b> and may marry whomever she wishes.
If there are <b>two sisters-in-law</b> married to two childless brothers who testify about their marital status, and <b>this one says: My husband died, and that one says: My husband died,</b> although each one of them is deemed credible with regard to her own status as a widow, <b>this one is prohibited</b> from marrying <b>due to</b> the possibility that <b>the husband of that</b> other sister may be alive, obligating her in levirate marriage, <b>and that one is prohibited</b> from marrying <b>due to the husband of this</b> sister, according to the same rationale. Although each is accorded credibility as to her own husband’s death, the <i>halakha</i> is that sisters-in-law are among the five types of women not accorded credibility with regard to each other’s permissibility to marry because of possible conflicts of interest. If <b>this one has witnesses</b> to her husband’s death, <b>and that one does not have witnesses,</b> then <b>the one who has witnesses is prohibited</b> from marrying, as there are no witnesses to the death of her <i>yavam</i> to exempt her from levirate marriage; <b>but the one who has no witnesses is permitted</b> to marry based on her own testimony that her husband died combined with the witnesses’ testimony exempting her from levirate marriage. If <b>this one has children and that one has no children,</b> then <b>the one with children is permitted</b> to marry, as she herself is deemed credible with regard to her husband’s death, and her children exempt her from levirate marriage. <b>But the one without children is prohibited</b> from marrying, as the death of her <i>yavam</i> has not been corroborated independently of her sister-in-law’s testimony. If there were two additional <i>yevamin</i> with whom these two widows <b>entered into levirate marriage, and</b> then <b>the <i>yevamin</i> died</b> childless, the women <b>are prohibited from marrying,</b> since the concern about an additional living <i>yavam</i> still remains. <b>Rabbi Elazar says: Since</b> these women <b>were permitted to</b> marry <b>the</b> living <b>brothers-in-law,</b> as the testimony of each was deemed credible with regard to her own status, <b>they are permitted,</b> from then on, <b>to</b> marry <b>any man</b> because their statements, taken together, indicate that neither one is obligated to enter into levirate marriage.
<b>One may testify</b> that a man died <b>only</b> if he can testify <b>about</b> seeing <b>the countenance [<i>partzuf</i> ] of</b> the <b>face with the nose,</b> as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. <b>Although there are distinguishing marks [<i>simanim</i>] on his body and his personal belongings,</b> which appear to indicate his identity, one may not rely on these as identification. Furthermore, <b>one may not testify</b> that a person died <b>until his soul</b> actually <b>departs. And even if one saw him cut open</b> and severely wounded, <b>or crucified, or</b> with a wild <b>animal eating</b> parts <b>of him,</b> he may not testify that he died. Additionally, <b>one may testify</b> to someone’s death <b>only</b> when the body was witnessed <b>up to three days</b> following death and not after that, since the appearance may change due to decomposition. <b>Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says:</b> One cannot establish general guidelines for this matter because <b>not every person, nor every place, nor every hour is identical.</b> Decomposition is not uniform. It occurs at different rates in different situations.
If a man <b>fell into the water</b> and did not come out, <b>whether</b> the body of water <b>has</b> a visible <b>end or does not have</b> a visible <b>end, his wife is prohibited</b> from remarrying. There is no absolute proof that the man died, as it is possible that he emerged from the water some distance away. <b>Rabbi Meir said: An incident</b> occurred <b>involving a certain</b> person <b>who fell into the Great Cistern and emerged</b> only <b>after three days.</b> This is evidence that sometimes one may survive a fall into water, even when everyone assumes he is dead. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: An incident</b> occurred <b>involving a blind man who descended to immerse</b> for ritual purity <b>in a cave, and his guide descended after him,</b> and they disappeared there, <b>and they remained there long enough for their souls to have departed, and</b> the Sages <b>permitted their wives to marry</b> because they had disappeared into the water and not emerged. <b>And</b> there was <b>another incident in Asya in which they lowered a certain</b> man <b>into the sea</b> on a rope, <b>and</b> when they pulled the rope back to land <b>only his leg came up in their hands,</b> and they were not certain whether he was alive or dead. <b>The Sages said:</b> If his leg was cut <b>from the knee and above,</b> his wife <b>may marry,</b> as he did not survive such a wound; if his leg was cut only <b>from the knee and below, she may not marry.</b>
<b>Even</b> if one <b>heard from the women,</b> who were <b>saying: So-and-so died, this is sufficient</b> in order to testify to his death. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one heard from the children,</b> who were <b>saying: We are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so,</b> that is also sufficient. Furthermore, one may rely upon someone mentioning that a man died, regardless of <b>whether</b> the speaker <b>intends</b> to testify and thereby allow the man’s wife to remarry <b>or whether he does not intend</b> to offer formal testimony. <b>Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: With regard to a Jew</b> who offers this information, it may be relied upon <b>even if he intends</b> for his statement to be considered formal testimony. However, <b>with regard to a gentile, if he intended</b> to testify, <b>his testimony is not</b> considered valid <b>testimony.</b> His statement is relied upon only when he does not intend to state it as formal testimony.
Witnesses <b>may testify</b> that an individual died even if they saw his corpse only <b>by candlelight or by moonlight. And</b> the court <b>may allow</b> a woman <b>to marry based on</b> the statement of <b>a disembodied voice</b> proclaiming that her husband died. There was <b>an incident with regard to a certain</b> individual <b>who stood at the top of a mountain and said: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, from such and such a place died. They went and found no person there, but</b> even so <b>they</b> relied upon the statement and <b>allowed the wife of</b> the individual declared dead <b>to marry.</b> And there was <b>another incident in Tzalmon,</b> a city in the Galilee, <b>where a particular</b> man <b>said: I am so-and-so, son of so-and-so. A snake bit me and I am dying. And they went</b> and found his corpse <b>but could not recognize him,</b> yet <b>they went</b> ahead <b>and allowed his wife to marry</b> based on what he said in his dying moments.
<b>Rabbi Akiva said: When I descended to Neharde’a,</b> in Babylonia, <b>to intercalate the year, I found</b> the Sage <b>Neḥemya of Beit D’li. He said to me: I heard that</b> the Sages <b>in Eretz Yisrael do not allow a woman to remarry based on</b> the testimony of <b>a single witness, except for Yehuda ben Bava. And I told him: That is so. He said to me: Tell</b> the Sages <b>in my name: You know that the country is confounded by</b> army <b>troops,</b> and I cannot come myself. I declare that <b>I received this tradition from Rabban Gamliel the Elder, that</b> the court <b>may allow a woman to remarry based on</b> the testimony of <b>a single witness.</b> Rabbi Akiva continues: <b>And when I came and presented the matter before Rabban Gamliel</b> of Yavne, the grandson of Rabban Gamliel the Elder, <b>he rejoiced at my words and said: We have found a companion</b> who agrees <b>with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava,</b> and since his lenient opinion is no longer the opinion of a lone Sage, it may now be relied upon. <b>As a result of this event, Rabban Gamliel remembered that people were murdered in Tel Arza, and Rabban Gamliel</b> then <b>allowed their wives to remarry based on</b> only <b>one witness. And</b> from then onward <b>they established</b> as protocol <b>to allow</b> a woman <b>to remarry based on hearsay testimony, a slave’s testimony, a woman’s testimony,</b> or <b>a maidservant’s testimony. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua say:</b> The court <b>may not allow a woman to remarry based on</b> only <b>one witness. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The court may <b>not</b> allow a woman to marry <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>a woman, nor based on</b> the testimony of <b>a slave, nor based on</b> the testimony of <b>a maidservant, nor based on</b> the testimony of <b>close relatives. They said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: Do we not rely upon a woman’s testimony? After all, <b>an incident occurred involving Levites who traveled to Tzoar, the city of date palms. And one of them became ill, and they brought him to an inn [<i>pundak</i>]</b> to rest, while they continued on their travels. <b>Upon their return</b> to the inn <b>they said to the innkeeper,</b> who was a woman: <b>Where is our friend? She told them: He died, and I buried him. And</b> based on her testimony <b>they allowed his wife to remarry. And shouldn’t a priestess,</b> or any Jewish woman who testifies that a man died, <b>be</b> deemed as credible <b>as an innkeeper?</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>said to them: When</b> a woman <b>will be as</b> convincing as <b>the innkeeper,</b> then <b>she shall</b> also <b>be deemed credible. The innkeeper brought them his staff, and his bag, and the Torah scroll that was in his possession,</b> thereby providing supporting evidence to reinforce her claim.