json/Mishnah/Seder Nezikin/Mishnah Bava Metzia/English/merged.json

{
    "title": "Mishnah Bava Metzia",
    "language": "en",
    "versionTitle": "merged",
    "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia",
    "text": [
        [
            "The early commentaries ask why this chapter, which discusses details of the <i>halakhot</i> of found items, precedes the second chapter, which discusses the fundamental <i>halakhot</i> of found items.<br><i>Tosafot</i> explain that as tractate <i>Bava Metzia</i> follows tractate <i>Bava Kamma</i>, the <i>halakhot</i> of found items are elucidated in this chapter as a continuation of the topics discussed in the last chapter of <i>Bava Kamma</i>, which discussed the division of items between litigants by means of an oath, which is also the ruling in the mishna here (see <i>Shita Mekubbetzet</i>). The Rosh explains that because there is a suspicion of theft in this case, these matters are juxtaposed with the <i>halakhot</i> of theft, which are described at length in <i>Bava Kamma</i>.<br><br>If <b>two</b> people came to court <b>holding a garment,</b> and <b>this</b> one, the first litigant, <b>says: I found it, and that</b> one, the second litigant, <b>says: I found it; this</b> one <b>says: All of it is mine, and that</b> one <b>says: All of it is mine;</b> how does the court adjudicate this case? <b>This</b> one <b>takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than half of it, and that</b> one <b>takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than half of it, and they divide</b> it. If <b>this</b> one <b>says: All of it is mine, and that</b> one <b>says: Half of it is mine,</b> since they both agree that half of the cloak belongs to one of them, the conflict between them is only about the other half. Therefore, <b>the one who says: All of it is mine, takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than three parts,</b> i.e., three-fourths, <b>of it, and the one who says: Half of it is mine, takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than one-quarter of it. This</b> one <b>takes three parts, and that</b> one <b>takes one-quarter.</b>",
            "If <b>two</b> people <b>were sitting</b> in a riding position <b>on</b> the back of <b>an animal,</b> e.g., a donkey or camel, <b>or one was sitting</b> in a riding position on the animal <b>and one was leading</b> it by its halter, and <b>this</b> one <b>says: All of it is mine, and that</b> one <b>says: All of it is mine,</b> how does the court adjudicate this case? <b>This</b> one <b>takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than half of it, and that</b> one <b>takes an oath that he does not have</b> ownership of <b>less than half of it, and they divide</b> it. <b>When they admit</b> to the validity of each other’s claims <b>or when they</b> each <b>have witnesses</b> attesting to their claims, <b>they divide</b> the disputed item <b>without</b> taking <b>an oath,</b> as an oath is administered only in a case where the parties have no other way to prove their claims.",
            "If one <b>was riding on an animal and saw a found item, and said to another</b> person who was walking beside him: <b>Give</b> it <b>to me,</b> if the pedestrian <b>took it and said: I have acquired it</b> for myself, <b>he has acquired it</b> by means of lifting it, even though he did not see it first. But <b>if, after giving it to</b> the one riding the animal, <b>he said: I acquired it</b> for myself <b>at the outset, he has said nothing</b> and the rider keeps the item.",
            "If one <b>saw a found item and fell upon it,</b> intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, <b>and</b> then <b>another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it</b> because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition. If one <b>saw</b> people <b>running after a found</b> ownerless animal, e.g., <b>after a deer</b> crippled by <b>a broken</b> leg, or <b>after young pigeons that</b> have <b>not</b> yet learned to <b>fly,</b> which can be caught easily, <b>and he said: My field has effected acquisition</b> of this animal <b>for me, it has effected acquisition</b> of it <b>for him.</b> If the <b>deer were running in its</b> usual <b>manner, or</b> the <b>young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition</b> of this animal <b>for me, he has said nothing,</b> as one’s courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.",
            "With regard to <b>the found item of</b> one’s <b>minor son or daughter,</b> i.e., an ownerless item that they found; <b>the found item of his Canaanite slave or maidservant;</b> and <b>the found item of his wife, they are his.</b> By contrast, with regard to <b>the found item of</b> one’s <b>adult son or daughter; the found item of his Hebrew slave or maidservant;</b> and <b>the found item of his</b> ex-<b>wife, whom he divorced, even if he has not</b> yet <b>given</b> her payment of the <b>marriage contract</b> that he owes her, <b>they are theirs.</b>",
            "With regard to one who <b>found promissory notes, if they include a property guarantee</b> for the loan <b>he may not return</b> them to the creditor, <b>as,</b> if he were to return them, <b>the court</b> would then <b>use them to collect repayment</b> of the debts from land that belonged to the debtor at the time of the loan, even if that land was subsequently sold to others. If <b>they do not include a property guarantee, he returns</b> them to the creditor, <b>as</b> in this case <b>the court</b> will <b>not use them to collect repayment</b> of the debt from purchasers of the debtor’s land. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> In <b>both this</b> case <b>and that</b> case <b>he should not return</b> the promissory notes to the creditor, <b>as,</b> if he were to return them, <b>the court</b> would in any event <b>use them to collect repayment</b> of the loan from purchasers of the debtor’s land.",
            "If <b>one found bills of divorce, or</b> bills of <b>manumission of slaves,</b> or <b>wills,</b> or deeds of <b>a gift, or receipts, he may not return</b> these items to the one who is presumed to have lost them, <b>as I say</b> it is possible that <b>they were written and</b> then the writer <b>reconsidered about them</b> and decided <b>not to deliver them.</b>",
            "If one <b>found documents of appraisal</b> of a debtor’s property for the purpose of debt collection; <b>or documents concerning food,</b> which were drawn up when one accepted upon himself to provide sustenance for another; <b>documents of <i>ḥalitza</i>; or</b> documents of <b>refusal</b> of a girl upon reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father; <b>or documents of <i>beirurin</i>,</b> a concept that will be explained in the Gemara; <b>or any court enactment,</b> e.g., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, in all of these cases, the finder <b>must return</b> the document to its presumed owner. If one <b>found</b> documents <b>in a <i>ḥafisa</i> or in a <i>deluskema</i>,</b> both of them types of containers, or if he found <b>a roll of documents or a bundle of documents, he must return</b> them. <b>And how many</b> documents are considered to be <b>a bundle of documents?</b> It is <b>three</b> that are <b>tied together. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> If the documents make reference to loans of <b>one</b> person <b>who borrowed</b> money <b>from three</b> people, the finder <b>must return</b> them <b>to the debtor,</b> as they were presumably in his possession before being lost. If the documents make reference to loans of <b>three</b> people <b>who borrowed</b> money <b>from one</b> person, <b>he must return</b> them <b>to the creditor,</b> as they were presumably in his possession before being lost. If one <b>found a document among his documents</b> that were given to him by other people as a trustee, <b>and he does not know what its nature is,</b> i.e., he does not remember who gave it to him or whether the debt mentioned in it has been paid, the document <b>is placed</b> aside <b>until Elijah</b> the prophet <b>comes</b> and clarifies the issue through his prophecy. <b>If there are cancellations of contracts [<i>simponot</i>] among them, he should do what</b> is stated <b>in the <i>simponot</i>.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "In a case where one discovers lost items, <b>which found items</b> belong <b>to him, and</b> for <b>which</b> items is <b>one obligated to proclaim</b> his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them? <b>These found items</b> belong <b>to him:</b> If one <b>found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles</b> of grain <b>in a public area, round cakes</b> of pressed <b>figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat,</b> unprocessed <b>wool fleeces that are taken from their state</b> of origin directly after shearing, bound <b>flax stalks, or</b> bound <b>strips of</b> combed <b>purple wool, these</b> belong <b>to him,</b> as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If one finds <b>any</b> lost item <b>in which there is an alteration,</b> he is <b>obligated to proclaim</b> his find. <b>How so?</b> If he <b>found a round</b> cake of pressed figs with an <b>earthenware</b> shard <b>inside it</b> or <b>a loaf</b> of bread <b>with coins inside it,</b> he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost. <b>Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says:</b> If one finds <b>any <i>anpurya</i> vessels,</b> since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is <b>not obligated to proclaim</b> his find.",
            "<b>And</b> for <b>these</b> found items, one is <b>obligated to proclaim</b> his find: If <b>one found produce inside a vessel, or a vessel by itself; coins inside a pouch, or a pouch by itself; piles of produce; piles of coins,</b> <b>three coins</b> stacked <b>one atop another; bundles</b> of grain <b>in a secluded area; loaves of a homeowner,</b> as each shapes his loaves in his own unique manner; <b>wool fleeces that are taken from the house of a craftsman,</b> as each craftsman processes the wool in his own unique manner; <b>jugs of wine; or jugs of oil.</b> If one finds any of <b>these,</b> he is <b>obligated to proclaim</b> his find.",
            "If one <b>found, behind</b> a wooden <b>fence or behind</b> a stone <b>fence, bound fledglings, or</b> if he found them <b>in the paths that</b> run <b>through fields, he may not touch them,</b> as they were certainly placed there intentionally. In a case where <b>one found a vessel in a garbage dump, if</b> it is <b>concealed, he may not touch it,</b> as a person certainly concealed it there. <b>If</b> it is <b>exposed,</b> the finder <b>takes</b> the item <b>and proclaims</b> his find. If one <b>found</b> lost items <b>in a heap</b> of stone rubble <b>or in an old wall, these</b> belong <b>to him.</b> If <b>one found</b> lost items <b>in a new wall from its midpoint and outward,</b> they belong <b>to him.</b> If he found the items <b>from its midpoint and inward,</b> they belong <b>to the homeowner. If</b> the homeowner <b>would rent</b> the house <b>to others</b> on a regular basis and there was a steady turnover of residents, <b>even</b> if one found lost items <b>inside the house, these</b> belong <b>to him.</b> Since the owner of the lost items cannot be identified based on location, he will certainly despair of recovering his lost items.",
            "If one <b>found</b> items without a distinguishing mark <b>in a store, those</b> items belong <b>to him,</b> as, since the store is frequented by the multitudes, the owner despairs of its recovery. If the items were found <b>between the</b> storekeeper’s <b>counter and the storekeeper,</b> the items belong <b>to the storekeeper;</b> since his customers do not typically have access to that area, presumably the items are his. If one found coins <b>before a money changer, those</b> coins belong <b>to him.</b> If the coins were found <b>between the</b> money changer’s <b>chair and the money changer, those</b> coins belong <b>to the money changer,</b> because his clients do not typically have access to that area. In the case of <b>one who purchases produce from another or</b> in a case <b>where another sent him produce</b> as a gift, <b>and he found coins</b> intermingled <b>with</b> the produce, <b>those</b> coins belong to <b>him. If</b> the coins <b>were bundled,</b> this serves as a distinguishing mark and the finder <b>takes</b> the coins <b>and proclaims</b> his find.",
            "This mishna is an excerpt from a halakhic midrash concerning lost items, based on the verse: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering, and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother…And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it” (Deuteronomy 22:1, 3). <b>The garment was also</b> included <b>in the generalization</b> that one must return <b>all of these</b> items. <b>And why did it emerge</b> from the generalization that is should be specified? <b>To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What</b> is notable <b>about a garment?</b> It is notable <b>in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants</b> asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. <b>So too</b> with regard to <b>any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants</b> asserting ownership, its finder is <b>obligated to proclaim</b> his find.",
            "<b>And until when</b> is one who finds a lost item <b>obligated to proclaim</b> his find? He is obligated to do so <b>until</b> the moment <b>that the neighbors will know of its</b> existence; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> He is obligated to proclaim his find for <b>three pilgrimage Festivals and</b> for <b>seven days after the last</b> of the three <b>pilgrimage Festivals, so that</b> its owner <b>will</b> have time to <b>go to his home,</b> a trip lasting up to <b>three</b> days, and ascertain that he in fact lost the item, <b>and</b> he <b>will return</b> to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to <b>three</b> days, <b>and proclaim</b> his loss for <b>one day.</b>",
            "If a claimant accurately <b>stated</b> what type of item <b>the lost item</b> that was found by another is, <b>but did not state,</b> i.e., describe, <b>its distinguishing marks,</b> the finder <b>shall not give</b> it <b>to him. And</b> in the case of <b>a swindler, even though he stated its distinguishing marks,</b> the finder <b>shall not give</b> the lost item <b>to him, as it is stated:</b> “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you <b>until your brother claims [<i>derosh</i>] it [<i>oto</i>],</b> and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that the finder would give it to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb <i>derosh</i> is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. You shall not return the lost item <b>until</b> you <b>scrutinize [<i>shetidrosh</i>] your brother</b> to determine <b>whether</b> he, the claimant, <b>is a swindler</b> or <b>whether he is not a swindler.</b> If one finds <b>any</b> living <b>being that works and</b> generates enough revenue to cover the costs of the food that it <b>eats,</b> it <b>shall work and eat</b> while in the finder’s possession. <b>And any</b> living <b>being that does not work but</b> it does <b>eat shall be sold, as it is stated:</b> “Then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims it, <b>and you shall return it to him”</b> (Deuteronomy 22:2), indicating that the finder must <b>see how</b> best <b>to return it to him.</b> Since the owner must repay the finder for his expenditures, if feeding the animal costs more than its value, the finder’s keep-ing the animal in his possession will prevent the owner from recovering it. <b>What shall be</b> done <b>with the money</b> received from the sale of the animal? <b>Rabbi Tarfon says:</b> The finder <b>may use it; therefore, if</b> the money <b>is lost,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>restitution</b> for <b>it. Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use</b> the money; <b>therefore, if it is lost,</b> he is <b>not liable</b> to pay <b>restitution</b> for <b>it.</b>",
            "If one <b>found scrolls, he reads them once in thirty days</b> in order to ventilate them and prevent mold. <b>And if he does not know</b> how <b>to read, he rolls</b> and unrolls <b>them</b> in order to ventilate them. <b>But he shall not study</b> passages <b>in them for the first time,</b> as he would leave the scroll exposed to the air for a lengthy period, thereby causing damage. <b>And another</b> person <b>shall not read</b> the scroll <b>with him,</b> as each might pull it closer to improve his vantage point, which could cause the scroll to tear. If one <b>found a garment, he shakes it once in thirty days, and he spreads it</b> out <b>for its sake,</b> to ventilate it, <b>but</b> he may <b>not</b> use it as a decoration <b>for his</b> own <b>prestige.</b> If one found <b>silver vessels or copper vessels,</b> he <b>may use them for their</b> own <b>sake</b> to prevent tarnish and rust, <b>but</b> he may <b>not</b> use them <b>to</b> the extent that he will <b>erode them.</b> If he finds <b>gold vessels or glass vessels,</b> which are not ruined by neglect, <b>he may not touch them until Elijah will come</b> and identify the owner. If a person <b>found a sack or a basket or any</b> other <b>item that</b> it <b>is not his</b> typical <b>manner to take</b> and carry because it is beneath his dignity, <b>he</b> shall <b>not take</b> it, as one need not demean himself in order to return a lost item.",
            "<b>Which is</b> the item that is considered <b>lost property?</b> If <b>one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property,</b> as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found <b>a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow</b> that <b>ran through the vineyards, that is lost property.</b> In a case where <b>one returned</b> the lost animal <b>and it fled,</b> and he again <b>returned it and it fled, even</b> if this scenario repeats itself <b>four or five times,</b> he is <b>obligated to return it</b> each time, as it <b>is stated:</b> “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; <b>you shall return them</b> to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder <b>was idle from</b> labor that would have earned him <b>a <i>sela</i>, he shall not say to</b> the owner of the item: <b>Give me a <i>sela</i></b> to compensate me for my lost income. <b>Rather,</b> the owner <b>gives him his wage as</b> if he were <b>a laborer,</b> a payment that is considerably smaller. <b>If there are</b> three men <b>there</b> who can convene as <b>a court,</b> he <b>may stipulate before the court</b> that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. <b>If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate</b> his condition, <b>his</b> financial interests <b>take precedence</b> and he need not return the lost item.",
            "If <b>one found</b> an animal <b>in a stable</b> belonging to its owner, he is <b>not obligated</b> to return <b>it</b> to its owner. If he found it <b>in a public area,</b> he is <b>obligated</b> to return <b>it. And if</b> the animal <b>was</b> lost <b>in a graveyard</b> and a priest found it, <b>he may not become impure to</b> return <b>it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or</b> in a case <b>where</b> one was obligated to return the animal and his father <b>said to him: Do not return</b> it, <b>he may not listen to</b> his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father. If <b>one unloaded</b> a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight <b>and</b> then later <b>loaded</b> it onto the animal, and later <b>unloaded and loaded</b> it again, <b>even</b> if this scenario repeats itself <b>four or five times,</b> he is <b>obligated</b> to continue unloading and loading, <b>as it is stated:</b> “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; <b>you shall release it [<i>azov ta’azov</i>]</b> with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times. If the owner <b>went, and sat, and said</b> to a passerby: <b>Since</b> there is <b>a mitzva</b> incumbent <b>upon you</b> to unload the burden, <b>if it is your wish to unload</b> the burden, <b>unload</b> it, in such a case the passerby is <b>exempt, as it is stated:</b> “You shall release it <b>with him,”</b> with the owner of the animal. <b>If</b> the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact <b>he was old or infirm,</b> the passerby is <b>obligated</b> to unload the burden alone. There is <b>a mitzva by Torah law to unload</b> a burden, <b>but</b> there is <b>no</b> mitzva <b>to load</b> it. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> There is <b>even</b> a mitzva <b>to load</b> the burden. <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was</b> a burden <b>upon</b> the animal <b>greater than</b> its typical <b>burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,”</b> i.e., the obligation is with regard to <b>a burden that</b> the animal <b>can bear.</b>",
            "If one finds <b>his lost item and his father’s lost item,</b> tending to <b>his</b> own <b>lost item takes precedence.</b> Similarly, if one finds <b>his lost item and his teacher’s lost item,</b> tending to <b>his</b> own lost item <b>takes precedence.</b> If one finds <b>his father’s lost item and his teacher’s lost item,</b> tending to <b>his teacher’s</b> lost item <b>takes precedence, as his father brought him into this world, and his teacher, who taught him</b> the <b>wisdom</b> of Torah, <b>brings him to life in the World-to-Come. And if his father is</b> a Torah <b>scholar,</b> then <b>his father’s</b> lost item <b>takes precedence.</b> If <b>his father and his teacher were</b> each <b>carrying a burden</b> and he wants to assist them in putting down their burdens, he first <b>places his teacher’s</b> burden down <b>and thereafter places his father’s</b> burden down. If <b>his father and his teacher were in captivity,</b> he first <b>redeems his teacher and thereafter redeems his father. And if his father is</b> a Torah <b>scholar,</b> he first <b>redeems his father and thereafter redeems his teacher.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>one who deposits an animal or vessels with another,</b> who is acting as an unpaid bailee, <b>and they were stolen or they were lost,</b> and the bailee <b>paid</b> the owner the value of the deposit, <b>and did not wish to take an oath</b> that he did not misappropriate the item and that he was not negligent in safeguarding it, that will effect who keeps the deposit if it is found or returned. The bailee may also choose to take the oath, <b>as</b> the Sages <b>said: An unpaid bailee takes an oath, and he is</b> thereby <b>released</b> from the liability to pay the owner. If <b>the thief is</b> later <b>found,</b> the thief <b>pays</b> the <b>double payment.</b> If the deposited item was a sheep or an ox and the thief <b>slaughtered or sold</b> it, <b>he pays</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment. To whom does</b> the thief <b>pay?</b> He gives the payment <b>to the one who</b> had <b>the deposit in his</b> possession when it was stolen, i.e., the bailee. When the bailee paid the owner for the stolen item, the owner granted the rights to the item to the bailee. Therefore, the bailee is entitled to any payment the thief presents for the item, be it compensation for the item’s value or a fine. In the case of a bailee who <b>took an oath and did not wish to pay,</b> if <b>the thief is</b> then <b>found</b> and required to <b>pay</b> the <b>double payment,</b> or if he <b>slaughtered or sold</b> the animal and is required to <b>pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, to whom does</b> the thief <b>pay?</b> He gives the payment <b>to the owner of the deposit,</b> not the bailee.",
            "In the case of <b>one who rents a cow from another, and</b> this renter then <b>lends it to another</b> person, <b>and</b> the cow <b>dies in its</b> typical <b>manner,</b> i.e., of natural causes, in the possession of the borrower, <b>the renter takes an oath</b> to the owner of the cow <b>that</b> the cow <b>died in its</b> typical <b>manner, and the borrower pays the renter</b> for the cow that he borrowed. A renter is exempt in a case of damage due to circumstances beyond his control, including death, but a borrower is liable to compensate the owner even for damage due to circumstances beyond his control. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other</b> party, i.e., the renter, <b>do business with</b> and profit from <b>another’s cow? Rather,</b> the value of the <b>cow should be returned to</b> the <b>owner.</b> The renter need not take an oath, but the borrower must compensate the owner of the cow.",
            "If <b>one said to two</b> people: <b>I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars, but I do not know</b> from <b>which of you</b> I took the money, <b>or</b> if one said to two people: <b>The father of one of you deposited one hundred dinars with me, but I do not know</b> the father of <b>which</b> of you <b>he is,</b> then he <b>gives one hundred dinars to this</b> person <b>and one hundred dinars to that</b> person. This is <b>because</b> there is no way to determine which of them is entitled to the money, and <b>he admitted</b> his obligation <b>at his own</b> initiative.",
            "In the case of <b>two</b> people <b>who deposited</b> money <b>with one</b> person, and <b>this</b> one deposited <b>one hundred dinars and that</b> one deposited <b>two hundred</b> dinars, and when they come to collect their deposit, <b>this</b> one <b>says: My</b> deposit was <b>two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and that</b> one <b>says: My</b> deposit was <b>two hundred</b> dinars, the bailee <b>gives one hundred dinars to this</b> one <b>and one hundred dinars to that</b> one. <b>And the rest</b> of the money, i.e., the contested one hundred dinars, <b>will be placed</b> in a safe place <b>until Elijah comes</b> and prophetically determines the truth. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: If so, what did the swindler lose?</b> He lost nothing by claiming the one hundred dinars that belongs to another, and he has no incentive to admit the truth. <b>Rather, the entire</b> deposit <b>will be placed</b> in a safe place <b>until Elijah comes. As</b> his fraud will cause him to lose even the one hundred dinars that he deposited, perhaps he will be discouraged from making a fraudulent claim.",
            "<b>And likewise,</b> if two people deposited <b>two vessels, one worth one hundred dinars and one worth one thousand dinars,</b> and <b>this</b> one <b>says: The expensive</b> vessel <b>is mine, and that</b> one <b>says: The expensive</b> vessel <b>is mine,</b> the bailee <b>gives the small</b> vessel <b>to one of them, and from the</b> proceeds of the sale of <b>the large</b> vessel <b>he gives the value of the small</b> vessel <b>to the other, and the rest</b> of the money <b>is placed</b> in a safe place <b>until Elijah comes. Rabbi Yosei said: If so, what did the swindler lose? Rather, the entire</b> deposit, i.e., both vessels, <b>are placed</b> in a safe place <b>until Elijah comes</b> or one of them admits his deceit.",
            "In the case of <b>one who deposits produce with another, even if it is lost</b> due to spoilage or vermin, the bailee <b>may not touch it,</b> as it is not his. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He sells it before</b> the <b>court, as</b> by doing so <b>he is like</b> one <b>returning a lost item to the owner,</b> since through its sale he prevents the owner from losing the value of his produce.",
            "In the case of <b>one who deposits produce with another,</b> and the bailee provides him with different produce in return, <b>that</b> bailee <b>deducts</b> from the produce that he returns an amount equal to the standard <b>decrease</b> of the produce. The decrease is calculated according to this formula: <b>For wheat and for rice,</b> he deducts <b>nine half-<i>kav</i> per <i>kor</i>,</b> which is 180 <i>kav</i>; <b>for barley and millet,</b> he deducts <b>nine <i>kav</i> per <i>kor</i>; for spelt and flaxseed,</b> he deducts <b>three <i>se’a</i>,</b> which total eighteen <i>kav</i>, <b>per <i>kor</i>. The entire</b> calculation is <b>according to the measure, and the entire</b> calculation is <b>according to the time</b> elapsed. This is the amount of produce that the bailee deducts per one <i>kor</i> of produce over the course of one year. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: And what do the mice care</b> how much produce the bailee is safeguarding? <b>Don’t they eat the same</b> amount <b>whether</b> it is <b>from much</b> produce <b>and whether</b> it is <b>from little</b> produce? <b>Rather, he deducts</b> an amount equal to the standard <b>decrease of just one <i>kor</i></b> of produce. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the deposit <b>was a large measure,</b> the bailee <b>does not deduct</b> the <b>decrease</b> from <b>it, due to</b> the fact <b>that</b> for different reasons <b>it increases.</b> Therefore, he returns the measure of produce that was deposited with him, because the increase offsets the decrease.",
            "When the bailee returns liquids that were deposited with him, <b>he deducts one-sixth</b> of the amount <b>for wine,</b> to offset the decrease in volume due to absorption into the cask and evaporation. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> He deducts <b>one-fifth. He deducts three <i>log</i> of oil for one hundred</b> <i>log</i>: <b>A <i>log</i> and a half for sediment</b> that sinks to the bottom of the cask, <b>and a <i>log</i> and a half</b> for <b>absorption</b> into the cask. <b>If it was refined oil, he does not deduct</b> any of the oil <b>for sediment</b> because it was filtered. <b>If</b> the oil <b>was</b> stored in <b>old casks</b> that are already saturated, <b>he does not deduct</b> any of the oil for <b>absorption. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even</b> in a case of <b>one who sells refined oil to another all the days of the year, this</b> buyer <b>accepts upon himself</b> that the seller will deduct <b>a <i>log</i> and a half of sediment for one hundred</b> <i>log</i>, as that is the standard measure of sediment.",
            "In the case of <b>one who deposits a barrel with another, and the owners did not designate</b> a specific <b>place for</b> the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house, and the bailee <b>moved it and it broke, if it broke while</b> still <b>in his hand,</b> there is a distinction: If he moved the barrel <b>for his purposes,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay for the damage. If he moved the barrel <b>for its</b> own <b>purposes,</b> to prevent it from being damaged, he is <b>exempt. If, after he replaced</b> the barrel <b>it broke, whether</b> he initially moved it <b>for his purposes</b> or <b>whether</b> he moved it <b>for its</b> own <b>purposes,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b> But if <b>the owners designated</b> a specific <b>place for</b> the barrel, <b>and</b> the bailee <b>moved it and it broke, whether</b> it broke <b>while</b> still <b>in his hand or whether</b> it broke <b>after he replaced</b> the barrel, if he moved it <b>for his purposes</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay, and if he moved it <b>for its</b> own <b>purposes,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who deposited coins with another,</b> and that bailee <b>bound it</b> in a cloth <b>and slung it behind him,</b> or <b>conveyed them to his minor son or daughter</b> for safeguarding, <b>or locked</b> the door <b>before them in an inappropriate,</b> i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is <b>liable</b> to pay for the coins, <b>as he did not safeguard</b> the coins <b>in the manner</b> typical <b>of bailees. But if he safeguarded</b> the money <b>in the manner</b> that <b>bailees</b> safeguard items and it was nevertheless stolen, he is <b>exempt.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who deposits money with a money changer, if</b> the money <b>is bound,</b> the money changer <b>may not use it. Therefore, if it is lost he does not bear responsibility for it.</b> If the money <b>was unbound,</b> the money changer <b>may use it. Therefore, if it is lost he bears responsibility for it.</b> If he deposited money <b>with a homeowner, whether</b> it <b>is bound or whether</b> it <b>is unbound,</b> the homeowner <b>may not use it,</b> as it never entered the mind of the depositor that the homeowner might use the money. <b>Therefore, if</b> the homeowner <b>lost</b> the money, <b>he does not bear responsibility for it.</b> If the bailee is <b>a storekeeper,</b> his status <b>is like</b> that of <b>a homeowner;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> If the bailee is <b>a storekeeper,</b> his status <b>is like</b> that of <b>a money changer.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who misappropriates a deposit, Beit Shammai say: He is penalized for</b> its <b>decrease and</b> its <b>increase.</b> If the value of the deposit decreases, the bailee is liable to pay in accordance with its value at the time of the misappropriation. If it increases in value, he is liable to pay in accordance with its value at the time of repayment. <b>And Beit Hillel say:</b> He pays <b>in accordance with</b> its value at <b>the time of removal. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> He pays <b>in accordance with</b> its value at <b>the time of the claim.</b> With regard to <b>one who intends to misappropriate a deposit</b> and voices that intent in the presence of witnesses, <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> He is <b>liable</b> to pay for any damage to the deposit from that point forward, <b>and Beit Hillel say:</b> He is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>only</b> if <b>he</b> actually <b>misappropriates</b> the deposit, <b>as it is stated</b> concerning a bailee: <b>“Whether he has misappropriated his neighbor’s goods”</b> (Exodus 22:7). If <b>he tilted the</b> deposited <b>barrel and took from it a quarter</b>-<i>log</i> of wine for his own use, <b>and</b> the barrel <b>broke,</b> then <b>he pays only</b> for that <b>quarter</b>-<i>log</i><b>.</b> If <b>he lifted</b> the barrel <b>and took from it a quarter</b>-<i>log</i> of wine, <b>and</b> the barrel <b>broke,</b> since he acquired the barrel by lifting it, <b>he pays the value of</b> the <b>entire</b> barrel."
        ],
        [
            "There is a halakhic principle that when one purchases an item, the payment of the money does not effect the transaction. The transaction is effected only by means of the buyer’s physically taking the item into his possession, e.g., by pulling the item. Payment of money by the buyer creates only a moral obligation for the seller to sell him the item. When two types of currency are exchanged for each other, one of the types will have the status of the money being paid, and the other will have the status of the item being purchased. Handing over the former will not effect the transaction, while handing over the latter will. The mishna teaches: When one purchases gold coins, paying with silver coins, the gold coins assume the status of the purchased item and the silver coins assume the status of money. Therefore, when one party takes possession of <b>the gold</b> coins, the other party <b>acquires the silver</b> coins. <b>But</b> when one party takes possession of <b>the silver</b> coins, the other party <b>does not acquire the gold</b> coins. In an exchange of silver coins for copper coins, when one party takes possession of <b>the copper</b> coins, the other party <b>acquires the silver</b> coins. <b>But</b> when one party takes possession of <b>the silver</b> coins, the other party <b>does not acquire the copper</b> coins. In an exchange of flawed coins for unflawed coins, when one party takes possession of <b>the flawed coins,</b> the other party <b>acquires the unflawed</b> coins. <b>But</b> when one party takes possession of <b>the unflawed</b> coins, the other party <b>does not acquire the flawed</b> coins. In an exchange of an unminted coin for a minted coin, when one party takes possession of <b>an unminted coin [<i>asimon</i>],</b> the other party <b>acquires</b> a minted <b>coin.</b> But when one party takes possession of a minted <b>coin,</b> the other party <b>does not acquire an unminted coin.</b> In an exchange of a coin for movable property, when one party takes possession of the <b>movable property</b> the other party <b>acquires the coin.</b> But when one party takes possession of the <b>coin,</b> the other party <b>does not acquire the movable property.</b> <b>This is the principle:</b> With regard to those who exchange <b>all</b> forms of <b>movable property, each acquires</b> the property of <b>the other,</b> i.e., the moment that one of the parties to the exchange takes possession of the item that he is acquiring, e.g., by means of pulling, the other party acquires the item from the first party. ",
            "<b>How</b> so? If the buyer <b>pulled produce from</b> the seller, <b>but</b> the buyer <b>did not</b> yet <b>give</b> the seller their value in <b>money, he cannot renege</b> on the transaction, but if the buyer <b>gave</b> the seller <b>money but did not</b> yet <b>pull produce from him, he can renege</b> on the transaction, as the transaction is not yet complete. <b>But</b> with regard to the latter case, the Sages <b>said: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the generation of the dispersion,</b> i.e., that of the Tower of Babel, <b>will</b> in the future <b>exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement.</b> Just as the people of those generations were not punished by an earthly court but were subjected to divine punishment, so too, although no earthly court can compel the person who reneged to complete the transaction, punishment will be exacted at the hand of Heaven for any damage that he caused. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: Anyone who has the money in his possession has the advantage.</b> The Sages said it is only with regard to the seller that payment of money does not effect a transaction, so that if the buyer paid for the item and did not yet take possession of the purchase item, the seller can renege on the sale and return the money. By contrast, once the buyer paid for the item he cannot renege on his decision and demand return of his money, even if he did not yet take possession of the purchase item. ",
            "<b>The</b> measure of <b>exploitation</b> for which one can claim that he was exploited is <b>four silver</b> <i>ma’a</i> <b>from</b> the <b>twenty-four silver</b> <i>ma’a</i> <b>in a <i>sela</i>,</b> or <b>one-sixth of the transaction. Until when</b> is it <b>permitted</b> for the buyer <b>to return</b> the item? He may return it only <b>until a period</b> of time has passed <b>that</b> would allow him to <b>show</b> the merchandise <b>to a merchant or to his relative</b> who is more familiar with the market price of merchandise. If more time has elapsed he can no longer return the item, as the assumption is that he waived his right to receive the sum of the disparity. The mishna continues: <b>Rabbi Tarfon ruled in Lod: Exploitation</b> is a measure of <b>eight silver</b> <i>ma’a</i> <b>from</b> the <b>twenty-four silver</b> <i>ma’a</i> <b>of a <i>sela</i>, one-third of the transaction. And the merchants of Lod rejoiced,</b> as this ruling allowed them a greater profit margin and rendered the nullification of a transaction less likely. Rabbi Tarfon <b>said to them:</b> Throughout <b>the entire day</b> it is permitted <b>to renege</b> on the transaction and not merely for the period of time it takes to show the purchase item to a merchant or a relative. The merchants of Lod <b>said to him: Let Rabbi Tarfon leave us as we were,</b> with the previous ruling, <b>and they reverted to</b> following <b>the statement of the Rabbis</b> in the mishna with regard to both rulings.",
            "<b>Both the buyer and the seller are</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation. Just as</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation</b> apply <b>to a layman, so</b> do the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation</b> apply <b>to a merchant. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no exploitation for a merchant,</b> as he is an expert in the market price of merchandise. <b>The one upon whom</b> the exploitation <b>was imposed has the advantage.</b> If he <b>wishes,</b> he can <b>say to</b> the other: <b>Give me</b> back <b>my money</b> and nullify the transaction, <b>or</b> he can say: <b>Give me</b> back the sum <b>that you</b> gained by <b>exploiting me.</b>",
            "<b>How much can the <i>sela</i></b> coin <b>be eroded</b> through usage, <b>and</b> its use in a transaction at its original value <b>will</b> still <b>not constitute exploitation? Rabbi Meir says:</b> The accepted depreciation is <b>four <i>issar</i>,</b> which is a rate of one <b><i>issar</i> per dinar,</b> or one twenty-fourth of a dinar. <b>And Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The accepted depreciation is <b>four <i>pundeyon</i>,</b> which is a rate of one <b><i>pundeyon</i> per dinar,</b> or one-twelfth of a dinar. <b>And Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The accepted depreciation is <b>eight <i>pundeyon</i>,</b> which is a rate of <b>two <i>pundeyon</i> per dinar,</b> or one-sixth of a dinar.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>Until when</b> is it <b>permitted</b> for one <b>to return</b> a worn coin once he realizes that it is defective? <b>In the cities [<i>bakerakim</i>],</b> one may return it only <b>until a period</b> of time has passed <b>that</b> would allow him to <b>show</b> it <b>to a money changer,</b> who is an expert in matters of coins. <b>In the villages,</b> where there is no money changer, one may return it only <b>until Shabbat eves,</b> when people purchase their Shabbat needs. Although these are the limits of how much a coin must be eroded in order for there to be exploitation, <b>if</b> the one who gave the coin to the aggrieved party <b>recognized it, he must accept it</b> back <b>from him even after twelve months</b> have passed no matter how little the erosion affected its value. <b>And he has only a grievance against him,</b> as the Gemara will explain. <b>And</b> one <b>may give</b> the slightly eroded coin <b>for</b> use in the desacralizing <b>of second-tithe</b> produce <b>and he</b> need <b>not be concerned, as</b> one who would refuse to accept a slightly eroded coin <b>is merely a miserly soul,</b> while the coin is in fact valid for any use.",
            "<b>The</b> measure of <b>exploitation</b> is <b>four silver</b> <i>ma’a</i> from the twenty-four silver <i>ma’a</i> of a <i>sela</i>. <b>And the</b> smallest monetary <b>claim</b> in court for which a plaintiff can obligate a respondent to take an oath is <b>two silver</b> <i>ma’a</i>. <b>And the</b> smallest monetary <b>admission</b> for which that respondent takes the oath is an admission that one owes at least <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i>.</b> On a related note, the <i>tanna</i> adds that <b>there are five</b> halakhic situations involving <b><i>perutot</i>: The admission</b> to part of a claim must be that one owes at least <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i>, and a woman is betrothed with the value of one <i>peruta</i>. And one who derives benefit</b> of <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i> from consecrated</b> property has <b>misused</b> consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, <b>and one who finds</b> an item that has <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i> is obligated to proclaim</b> that he found it. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>one who robs from another</b> an item that has <b>the value of one <i>peruta</i> and took an oath to him</b> that he robbed nothing, when he repents and seeks to return the stolen item <b>he must take</b> it and <b>follow</b> its owner <b>even to Medea.</b> In that case, he may not return the item by means of a messenger; he must give it directly to its owner.",
            "In this mishna, as in the previous one, the <i>tanna</i> enumerates several <i>halakhot</i> that share a common element. <b>There are five</b> halakhic situations where <b>one-fifth</b> is added to the value of the principal, and <b>these are they:</b> A non-priest <b>who eats</b> either <b><i>teruma</i>, or <i>teruma</i> of the tithe,</b> which the Levite separates from the first tithe and gives to a priest, <b>or <i>teruma</i> of the tithe of <i>demai</i>, or <i>ḥalla</i>, or first fruits;</b> in each of these cases, <b>he adds one-fifth</b> when paying restitution to the priest who owned the produce. <b>And one who redeems his</b> own fruit of <b>a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe</b> produce <b>adds one-fifth. One who redeems his</b> own <b>consecrated</b> property <b>adds one-fifth. One who derives benefit worth one <i>peruta</i> from consecrated</b> property <b>adds one-fifth. And one who robs the value of one <i>peruta</i> from another and takes</b> a false <b>oath</b> in response <b>to his</b> claim <b>adds one-fifth</b> when paying restitution.",
            "<b>These are matters that are not</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation</b> even if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth or greater: <b>Slaves, and documents, and land, and consecrated</b> property. In addition, if they are stolen, these items are subject <b>neither</b> to <b>payment of double</b> the principal for theft <b>nor</b> to <b>payment of four or five</b> times the principal, if the thief slaughtered or sold a stolen sheep or cow, respectively. <b>An unpaid bailee does not take an oath and a paid bailee does not pay</b> if these items were stolen or lost. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> With regard to <b>sacrificial animals for which one bears responsibility</b> to replace <b>them, they are</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation,</b> as this responsibility indicates a certain aspect of ownership. <b>And</b> those <b>for which one does not bear responsibility</b> to replace <b>them, they are not</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even</b> in the case of <b>one who sells a Torah scroll, an animal, or a pearl,</b> these items <b>are not</b> subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>exploitation,</b> as they have no fixed price. The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> The early Sages <b>stated</b> that <b>only these</b> items listed above are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation.",
            "<b>Just as</b> there is a prohibition against <b>exploitation [<i>ona’a</i>] in buying and selling, so is there <i>ona’a</i> in statements,</b> i.e., verbal mistreatment. The mishna proceeds to cite examples of verbal mistreatment. <b>One may not say to</b> a seller: <b>For how much</b> are you selling <b>this item, if he does not wish to purchase</b> it. He thereby upsets the seller when the deal fails to materialize. The mishna lists other examples: <b>If one is a penitent,</b> another <b>may not say to him: Remember your earlier deeds. If one is the child of converts,</b> another <b>may not say to him: Remember the deeds of your ancestors, as it is stated: “And a convert shall you neither mistreat, nor shall you oppress him”</b> (Exodus 22:20).",
            "<b>One may not intermingle produce</b> bought from one supplier <b>with</b> other <b>produce, even</b> if he intermingles <b>new</b> produce <b>with</b> other <b>new</b> produce and ostensibly the buyer suffers no loss from his doing so. <b>And needless to say,</b> one may not intermingle <b>new</b> produce <b>with old</b> produce, in the event that the old produce is superior, as with grains, since intermingling lowers its value. <b>Actually, they said: With regard to wine, they permitted one to mix strong</b> wine <b>with weak</b> wine, <b>because one</b> thereby <b>enhances it. One may not</b> intentionally <b>mix wine sediment with the wine, but one may give</b> the buyer wine with <b>its sediment;</b> the seller is not required to filter the wine. <b>One who</b> had <b>water mix with his wine may not sell it in the store, unless he informs</b> the buyer that it contains water. <b>And he may not</b> sell it <b>to a merchant, even if he informs him</b> of the mixture, <b>as,</b> although he is aware that there is water mixed with the wine, <b>it</b> will be used <b>for nothing other than deceit</b> because the merchant will likely not inform the buyer that it is diluted. In <b>a place where they are accustomed to place water into the wine</b> to dilute it and everyone is aware of that fact, <b>one may place</b> water in the wine.",
            "The prohibition against mixing different types of produce applies only to an individual selling the produce of his field. By contrast, <b>a merchant may take</b> grain <b>from five threshing floors</b> belonging to different people, <b>and place</b> the produce <b>in one warehouse.</b> He may also take wine <b>from five winepresses and place</b> the wine <b>in one large cask [<i>pitom</i>], provided that he does not intend to mix</b> low-quality merchandise with high-quality merchandise. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: A storekeeper may not hand out toasted grain and nuts to children</b> who patronize his store, <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that he</b> thereby <b>accustoms them to come to him</b> at the expense of competing storekeepers. <b>And the Rabbis permit</b> doing so. <b>And one may not reduce</b> the price of sale items below <b>the</b> market <b>rate. And the Rabbis say:</b> If he wishes to do so, he should be <b>remembered positively.</b> One <b>may not sift ground beans</b> to remove the waste, lest he charge an inappropriately high price for the sifted meal, beyond its actual value; this is <b>the statement of Abba Shaul. And the Rabbis permit</b> doing so. <b>And</b> the Rabbis <b>concede that one may not sift</b> the meal only <b>from</b> the beans that are close to <b>the opening of the bin</b> to create the impression that the contents of the entire bin were sifted, <b>as this is nothing other than deception. One may neither adorn a person</b> before selling him on the slave market, <b>nor an animal nor vessels</b> that he seeks to sell. Rather, they must be sold unembellished, to avoid deceiving the buyer."
        ],
        [
            "The Torah states the prohibition against taking interest: “And if your brother becomes impoverished, and his hand falters with you, then you shall support him; whether a stranger or a native, he shall live with you. You shall not take from him interest [<i>neshekh</i>] or increase [<i>tarbit</i>]; you shall fear your God and your brother shall live with you. You shall not give him your money with <i>neshekh</i> and with <i>marbit</i> you shall not give him your food” (Leviticus 25:35–37). The mishna asks: <b>Which is <i>neshekh</i>, and which is <i>tarbit</i>?</b> <b>Which is</b> the case in which there is <b><i>neshekh</i>?</b> With regard to <b>one who lends</b> another <b>a <i>sela</i>,</b> worth four dinars, <b>for five dinars</b> to be paid later, or one who lends another <b>two <i>se’a</i> of wheat for three</b> <i>se’a</i> to be returned later, this is <b>prohibited, as it is taking interest [<i>noshekh</i>].</b> <b>And which is</b> the case in which there is <b><i>tarbit</i>?</b> It is the case of <b>one who</b> enters into a transaction that yields <b>an increase in the produce</b> beyond his investment. <b>How so?</b> For example, <b>one acquired wheat from</b> another at the price <b>of</b> one <b><i>kor</i></b> of wheat <b>for</b> one <b>gold dinar,</b> worth twenty-five silver dinars, with the wheat to be supplied at a later date, <b>and such</b> was <b>the</b> market <b>price</b> of wheat at the time he acquired it. The price of one <i>kor</i> of <b>wheat</b> then increased and <b>stood at thirty dinars.</b> At that point, the buyer <b>said to</b> the seller: <b>Give me</b> all of <b>my wheat</b> now, <b>as I wish to sell it and purchase wine with it.</b> The seller <b>said to him:</b> Since it is ultimately wine that you want, not wheat, each <i>kor</i> of <b>your wheat is considered by me</b> to be worth <b>thirty</b> dinars, <b>and you have</b> the right to collect <b>its</b> value in <b>wine from me. And</b> in this case, the seller <b>did not have wine</b> in his possession. If wine then appreciates in value, the result will be an interest-bearing transaction, as the buyer collects from the seller wine worth more than the wheat for which he paid.",
            "<b>One who lends another</b> money <b>may not reside in</b> the borrower’s <b>courtyard free</b> of charge, <b>nor may he rent</b> living quarters <b>from him at less</b> than the going rate, <b>because this is interest.</b> The benefit he receives from living on the borrower’s property constitutes the equivalent of an additional payment as interest on the loan. <b>One may increase</b> the price of <b>rent</b> to be received at a later date instead of at an earlier one, <b>but one may not</b> similarly <b>increase</b> the price of <b>a sale. How so?</b> If a courtyard owner <b>rented his courtyard to</b> a renter, <b>and</b> the owner <b>said to</b> the renter: <b>If you give me</b> the payment <b>now,</b> the rental <b>is yours for ten <i>sela</i> a year, but if</b> you pay <b>on a monthly</b> basis it will cost <b>a <i>sela</i> for</b> each <b>month,</b> equaling twelve <i>sela</i> a year. Such a practice is <b>permitted,</b> despite the fact that he charges more for a monthly payment. If a field owner <b>sold his field to</b> a buyer <b>and said to him: If you give me</b> the payment <b>now, it is yours for one thousand dinars,</b> but <b>if</b> you wait and pay me <b>at</b> the time of <b>the harvest,</b> it is yours <b>for twelve hundred</b> dinars, this transaction is <b>prohibited</b> as interest.",
            "If one <b>sold</b> another <b>a field and</b> the buyer <b>gave him some of</b> the <b>money, and</b> the seller <b>said to him: Whenever you wish, bring</b> the outstanding <b>money and take your</b> field at that point, this is <b>prohibited.</b> If one <b>lent</b> money <b>to</b> another <b>on</b> the basis of the borrower’s <b>field</b> serving as a guarantee, <b>and said to him: If you do not give me</b> the money now and instead delay your payment <b>from now until three years</b> have passed, the field <b>is mine,</b> then after three years, the field <b>is his.</b> This is permitted even if the field is worth more than the amount of the loan. <b>And this is what Baitos ben Zunin would do, with the consent of the Sages,</b> when he lent money.",
            "<b>One may not establish</b> a deal with <b>a storekeeper for half the profits.</b> It is prohibited for one to provide a storekeeper with produce for him to sell in his store, with half the profits going to the lender. In such an arrangement, the storekeeper himself is responsible for half of any loss from the venture, effectively rendering half of the produce as a loan to the storekeeper. The lender remains responsible for the other half of any loss, and the storekeeper provides a service by selling his produce for him. This service, if provided free of charge, is viewed as interest paid for the loan, and is prohibited. <b>And</b> similarly, <b>one may not give</b> a storekeeper <b>money with which to acquire produce</b> for the storekeeper to sell <b>for half the profits.</b> These activities are both prohibited <b>unless</b> the owner <b>gives</b> the storekeeper <b>his wages as</b> a salaried <b>laborer</b> hired to sell the produce, after which they can divide the remaining profits. <b>One may not</b> give eggs to another to <b>place chickens</b> on them in exchange <b>for half</b> the profits, <b>and one may not appraise calves or foals</b> for another to raise them <b>for half</b> the profits. These activities are both prohibited <b>unless</b> the owner <b>gives</b> the other <b>wages for his toil and</b> the cost of the <b>food</b> he gives to the animals in his temporary care. All this applies when the lender establishes a fixed minimum profit he insists on receiving regardless of what happens to the animals. <b>But one may accept calves or foals</b> to raise as a joint venture <b>for half</b> of the earnings, with one side providing the animals and taking full responsibility for losses, and the other providing the work and the sustenance, <b>and</b> the one raising them <b>may raise them until they reach one-third</b> of their maturation, at which point they are sold and the profits shared. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>a donkey,</b> it can be raised in this manner <b>until it is</b> large enough <b>to bear a load.</b> ",
            "<b>One may appraise a cow or a donkey or any item that generates</b> revenue <b>while it eats</b> and give it to another to feed it and take care of it in exchange <b>for one-half</b> the profits, with the one who cares for the animal benefiting from the profits it generates during the period in which he raises it. Afterward, they divide the profit that accrues due to appreciation in the value of the animal and due to the offspring it produces. In <b>a place where it is customary to divide the offspring immediately</b> upon their birth, <b>they divide</b> them, and in <b>a place where it is customary</b> for the one who cared for the mother <b>to raise</b> the offspring for an additional period of time before dividing them, he shall <b>raise</b> them. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may appraise a calf</b> together <b>with its mother or a foal with its mother</b> even though these young animals do not generate revenue while they eat. The costs of raising the young animal need not be considered. <b>And</b> one <b>may inflate [<i>umafriz</i>]</b> the rental fee paid <b>for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to</b> the prohibition of <b>interest,</b> as the Gemara will explain. ",
            "<b>One may not accept from a Jew</b> sheep to raise or other items to care for as <b>a guaranteed investment,</b> in which the terms of the transaction dictate that the one accepting the item takes upon himself complete responsibility to repay its value in the event of depreciation or loss, but receives only part of the profit. This is <b>because it</b> is a loan, as the principal is fixed and always returned to the owner, and any additional sum the owner receives <b>is interest. But one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles,</b> as there is no prohibition of interest in transactions with them. <b>And one may borrow</b> money <b>from them and one may lend</b> money <b>to them with interest. And similarly, with regard to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [<i>ger toshav</i>],</b> one may borrow money from him with interest and lend money to him with interest, since he is not a Jew. Also, <b>a Jew may</b> serve as a middleman and <b>lend a gentile’s money</b> to another Jew <b>with the knowledge of the gentile, but not with the knowledge of a Jew,</b> i.e., the middleman himself, as the Gemara will explain.",
            "<b>One may not set</b> a price with a buyer <b>for</b> the future delivery of <b>produce until the</b> market <b>rate is publicized,</b> as, if he is paid for supplying produce at a later date in advance of the publication of the market rate for that type of produce, he may set a price that is too low. The money paid in advance is deemed a loan, and if the initial payment was lower than the later market value, delivery of the produce will constitute interest on the loan. Once <b>the</b> market <b>rate is publicized,</b> the seller <b>may set</b> a price, even if the produce is not yet in his possession. The reason for this is that <b>even though this one,</b> i.e., the seller, <b>does not have</b> any of the produce, <b>that one,</b> someone else, <b>has</b> it, and the seller could theoretically acquire the produce now at the price he set. If the seller <b>was first among the reapers,</b> having harvested his crop before the market rate was set, he <b>may set</b> a price <b>with</b> a buyer as he wishes <b>for a stack</b> of grain that is already in his possession, <b>or for</b> a large <b>basket of grapes</b> prepared for pressing into wine, <b>or for a vat [<i>hama’atan</i>] of olives</b> prepared for pressing into oil, <b>or for the clumps [<i>habeitzim</i>]</b> of clay prepared for use <b>by a potter, or for plaster</b> nearing the end of the manufacturing process at the point <b>after he has sunk it,</b> i.e., baked it, <b>in the kiln.</b> Although the market rate has yet to be set, the seller may nevertheless set a price now for their eventual delivery. The mishna continues: <b>And he may set</b> a price <b>with</b> a buyer <b>for manure</b> on <b>any</b> of <b>the days of the year,</b> as the manure will certainly be available and it is therefore viewed as if it is ready. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: One may set</b> the price <b>of manure only if he</b> already <b>had</b> a pile <b>of manure in</b> his <b>dunghill</b> to which the sale can immediately be applied, <b>but the Rabbis permit it</b> in all cases. <b>And one may</b> also <b>set</b> a price <b>with</b> a buyer <b>at the highest rate,</b> i.e., a large amount of produce sold for the lowest price, stipulating with the seller that the sale price match the lowest market rate for this product during the course of the year. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he did not set</b> a price <b>with him</b> beforehand <b>at the highest rate,</b> the buyer <b>may say</b> to the seller: <b>Give me</b> the produce <b>at this</b> rate <b>or give me</b> back <b>my money.</b> Since he did not formally acquire the produce, if the price changed he may withdraw from the transaction. ",
            "<b>A person may lend wheat to his sharecroppers</b> in exchange <b>for wheat,</b> for the purpose <b>of seeding,</b> meaning that he may lend them a quantity of wheat with which to seed the field, and at harvest time the sharecropper will add the amount of grain that he borrowed to the landowner’s portion of the yield. <b>But he may not</b> lend wheat for the sharecroppers <b>to eat</b> and be paid back with an equivalent quantity because this creates a concern about interest, as the price of wheat may rise. <b>As Rabban Gamliel would lend wheat to his sharecroppers</b> in exchange <b>for wheat,</b> for purposes <b>of seeding,</b> and if he lent it <b>at a high price and the price</b> then <b>fell, or</b> if he lent it <b>at an inexpensive price and the price</b> subsequently <b>rose,</b> in all cases <b>he would take</b> it back <b>from them at the inexpensive price. But</b> this was <b>not because this is</b> the <b><i>halakha</i>; rather, he wanted to be stringent with himself.</b>",
            "<b>A person may not say to another: Lend me a <i>kor</i> of wheat and I will give</b> it back <b>to you at</b> the time the wheat is brought to <b>the granary,</b> as the wheat may increase in value, which would mean that when he gives him back a <i>kor</i> of wheat at the time the wheat is brought to the granary it is worth more than the value of the loan, and he therefore will have paid interest. <b>But he may say to him: Lend me</b> a <i>kor</i> of wheat for a short period of time, e.g., <b>until my son comes or until I find</b> the <b>key,</b> as there is no concern about a change in price during such a short interval of time. <b>And Hillel prohibits</b> the practice even in this case. <b>And Hillel would similarly say: A woman may not lend a loaf</b> of bread <b>to another unless she establishes its monetary</b> value, <b>lest the wheat appreciate</b> in value before she returns it, <b>and they will</b> therefore <b>have come to</b> transgress the prohibition of <b>interest.</b> ",
            "<b>A person may say to another: Weed</b> the wild growths from my field <b>with me</b> now, <b>and I will weed</b> your field <b>with you</b> at a later stage, or: <b>Till</b> my field <b>with me</b> today <b>and I will till with you</b> on a different day. <b>But he may not say to him: Weed with me</b> today <b>and I will till with you</b> a different day, or: <b>Till with me</b> today <b>and I will weed with you,</b> as due to the different nature of the tasks it is possible that one of them will have to work harder than the other did, which is a type of interest, since he repaid him with additional labor. <b>All</b> the <b>dry days</b> during the summer, when it does not rain, are viewed as <b>one</b> period, meaning that if they each agreed to work one day, the dry days are viewed as though they were all exactly equal in length, despite the slight differences between them. Similarly, <b>all</b> the <b>rainy days</b> are treated as <b>one</b> period. But <b>he may not say to him: Plow with me in the dry</b> season <b>and I will plow with you in the rainy</b> season. <b>Rabban Gamliel says: There is</b> a case of <b>pre</b>-paid <b>interest, and there is</b> also a case of <b>interest</b> paid <b>later,</b> both of which are prohibited. <b>How so?</b> If he <b>had hopes of borrowing</b> money <b>from him</b> in the future, <b>and he sends him</b> money or a gift <b>and says:</b> I am sending you this gift <b>in order that you will lend to me, this is pre</b>-paid <b>interest.</b> Similarly, if he <b>borrowed</b> money <b>from him and</b> subsequently <b>returned his money, and he</b> later <b>sends</b> a gift <b>to him and says:</b> I am sending you this gift in order to repay you <b>for your money, which was idle with me,</b> preventing you from earning a profit from it, <b>this is interest</b> paid <b>later.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Not only is there interest consisting of payment of money or items, but <b>there is</b> also <b>verbal interest.</b> For example, the borrower <b>may not say to</b> the lender: You should <b>know that so-and-so has come from such and such a place,</b> when he is aware that this information is of significance to his creditor. Since his intention is to provide a benefit to the lender, he has effectively paid him an extra sum for the money he lent him, which constitutes interest. ",
            "<b>And these</b> people <b>violate a prohibition</b> of interest: <b>The lender, and the borrower, and the guarantor, and the witnesses. And the Rabbis say: Also the scribe</b> who writes the promissory note violates this prohibition. These parties to the transaction <b>violate</b> different prohibtions. Some are in violation of: <b>“You shall not give</b> him your money with interest” (Leviticus 25:37), <b>and of: “Do not take from him</b> interest or increase” (Leviticus 25:36), <b>and of: “Do not be to him as a creditor”</b> (Exodus 22:24), <b>and of “Do not place interest upon him”</b> (Exodus 22:24), <b>and of: “And you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind, and you shall fear your God; I am the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 19:14)."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>one who hires artisans</b> or laborers, <b>and they deceived one another, they have nothing but a grievance against one another,</b> and they have no financial claim against the deceptive party. If one <b>hired a donkey driver or a potter to bring posts [<i>piryafarin</i>]</b> for a canopy <b>or flutes</b> to play in honor <b>of a bride or the dead, or</b> if he hired <b>laborers to bring up his flax from the retting tub,</b> i.e., the container of water in which flax is placed in the first stage of the manufacture of linen, <b>and</b> likewise <b>any matter that</b> involves financial <b>loss</b> if not performed on time <b>and</b> the laborers <b>reneged,</b> if this occurred in <b>a place where there is no</b> other <b>person</b> to perform the task, <b>he may hire</b> replacements for a large fee <b>at</b> the expense of the first workers, <b>or deceive them</b> to get them to return to work.",
            "The mishna states a related <i>halakha</i>: With regard to <b>one who hires artisans</b> or laborers to perform work <b>and they reneged</b> on the agreement midway through the work, <b>they are at a disadvantage.</b> They must ensure that the employer does not suffer a loss. Conversely, <b>if the employer reneges, he is at a disadvantage.</b> These two rulings are in accordance with the principle that <b>whoever changes</b> the terms accepted by both parties <b>is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges</b> on an agreement <b>is at a disadvantage.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley,</b> or one who rents a donkey to lead it <b>in a valley but he led it on a mountain, even</b> if <b>this</b> path <b>is ten <i>mil</i> and that one is</b> also <b>ten <i>mil</i>, and</b> the animal <b>dies,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> With regard to <b>one who rents a donkey and it became ill or was seized for public service [<i>angarya</i>],</b> the owner can <b>say to</b> the renter: <b>That which is yours is before you,</b> and he is not required to reimburse the renter or to supply him with another donkey. If the animal <b>died or</b> its leg <b>broke,</b> the owner <b>is obligated to provide</b> the renter with another <b>donkey.</b> With regard to <b>one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, if it slipped</b> and injured itself he is <b>exempt, but if it</b> died of <b>heatstroke</b> he is <b>liable,</b> as it was the walk in the hotter valley that caused its death. With regard to one who rents a donkey <b>to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, if it slipped</b> he is <b>liable,</b> because this was caused by the mountainous terrain, <b>but if it</b> died of <b>heatstroke</b> he is <b>exempt. If</b> it suffered from heatstroke <b>due to the ascent,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> ",
            "With regard to <b>one who rents a cow</b> and a plow in order <b>to plow on the mountain but he plowed in the valley, if the plowshare,</b> the cutting tool on the bottom part of the plow, <b>breaks,</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> as it was even more likely to break on mountainous terrain. In a case where he rents the cow and a plow to plow <b>in the valley but he plowed on the mountain, if the plowshare breaks</b> he is <b>liable.</b> If he hired the cow <b>to thresh legumes but it threshed grain,</b> and the cow slipped and broke its leg, he is <b>exempt.</b> If he hired it <b>to thresh grain but it threshed legumes he is liable, because legumes are slippery.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who rents a donkey</b> in order <b>to bring wheat on it,</b> to transport it on its back, <b>and he brought upon it</b> an identical weight of <b>barley,</b> which is lighter than wheat, and the donkey was injured, he is <b>liable.</b> Similarly, if he hired it for transporting <b>grain, and he brought straw</b> of the same weight <b>upon it,</b> he is <b>liable, because the</b> extra <b>volume is as difficult</b> for the animal <b>as the load</b> itself. If he rented a donkey in order <b>to bring</b> on it <b>a <i>letekh</i>,</b> i.e., a measurement of volume, <b>of wheat, but he brought a <i>letekh</i> of barley,</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> as he brought the same volume of a lighter substance. <b>And</b> one <b>who adds to a load</b> a greater volume than he stipulated is <b>liable. And how much</b> must <b>he add to the load for him to be liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A <i>se’a</i> on a camel</b> and <b>three <i>kav</i> on a donkey.</b>",
            "<b>All artisans</b> and laborers who take raw materials to their homes <b>are</b> considered <b>paid bailees</b> for those items until they return them to the owner. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all those who said</b> to the owner: I finished the work, and therefore <b>take</b> what is <b>yours,</b> i.e., this item, <b>and bring money</b> in its stead, from that point on each of them is considered <b>an unpaid bailee.</b> If one person says to another: <b>Safeguard</b> my property <b>for me and I will safeguard</b> your property <b>for you,</b> each of them is a <b>paid bailee,</b> as each receives the services of the other as payment for his safeguarding. If one says: <b>Safeguard for me, and</b> the other <b>says to him: Place it before me,</b> the second individual is <b>an unpaid bailee.</b>",
            "<b>One who lent to</b> another based <b>on collateral</b> is <b>a paid bailee</b> for the collateral. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent</b> another <b>money</b> is <b>an unpaid bailee</b> for the collateral, whereas <b>one who lent</b> another <b>produce</b> is <b>a paid bailee. Abba Shaul says:</b> It is <b>permitted</b> for <b>a person to rent out a poor person’s collateral</b> that was given to him for a loan, <b>so that by setting</b> a rental price <b>for it</b> he will thereby <b>progressively</b> reduce the debt, i.e., the lender will subtract the rental money he receives from the amount owed by the borrower, <b>because this is</b> considered <b>like returning a lost item.</b> The borrower profits from this arrangement, whereas if the lender does not use the collateral in this manner it provides benefit to no one.",
            "With regard to <b>one who was transporting a barrel from one place to another and he broke it, whether</b> he was <b>an unpaid bailee or a paid bailee,</b> if <b>he takes an oath</b> that he was not negligent he is exempt from payment. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> Both <b>this</b> one, an unpaid bailee, <b>and that</b> one, a paid bailee, must <b>take an oath</b> to exempt themselves from payment, <b>but I wonder whether</b> both <b>this</b> one <b>and that</b> one <b>can take an oath.</b> In other words, this is the <i>halakha</i> that I heard from my teachers, but I do not understand their ruling."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>one who hires laborers and tells them to rise</b> exceptionally <b>early and to continue</b> working until exceptionally <b>late,</b> if this is in <b>a locale where</b> laborers <b>are not accustomed to rising</b> so <b>early or to continuing</b> to work until so <b>late,</b> the employer is <b>not permitted to compel them</b> to do so. In <b>a locale where</b> employers <b>are accustomed to feeding</b> their laborers, the employer <b>must feed</b> them. If they are in a locale where an employer is accustomed <b>to providing</b> their laborers <b>with sweet</b> foods, <b>he must provide</b> such food. <b>Everything is in accordance with the regional custom</b> in these matters. There was <b>an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya, who said to his son: Go out</b> and <b>hire laborers for us.</b> His son <b>went,</b> hired them, <b>and pledged</b> to provide <b>sustenance for them</b> as a term of their employment, without specifying the details. <b>And when he came</b> back <b>to his father</b> and reported what he had done, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya <b>said to him: My son, even if you were to prepare a feast for them like that of</b> King <b>Solomon in his time, you would not have fulfilled your obligation to them, as they are the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Rather, before they begin</b> engaging <b>in</b> their <b>labor, go out and say to them:</b> The stipulation that food will be provided is <b>on the condition that you have</b> the right to claim <b>from me only</b> a meal of <b>bread and legumes,</b> which is the typical meal given to laborers. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya’s son <b>did not need to state</b> this condition, as the principle is that <b>everything is in accordance with the regional custom.</b>",
            "This mishna details the <i>halakha</i> that a laborer is permitted to eat from the produce with which he is working. <b>And these</b> laborers <b>may eat by Torah law:</b> A laborer <b>who works with</b> produce <b>attached to the ground at the time of the completion of</b> its <b>work,</b> e.g., harvesting produce; <b>and</b> a laborer who works <b>with</b> produce <b>detached from the ground before the completion of its work,</b> i.e., before it is sufficiently processed and thereby subject to tithes. <b>And</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> provided that they are working <b>with an item whose growth is from the land. And these</b> are laborers who <b>may not eat:</b> A laborer who <b>works with</b> produce <b>attached to the ground</b> <b>not at the time of the completion of</b> its <b>work,</b> i.e., while it is still growing; <b>and</b> a laborer who works <b>with</b> produce <b>detached from the ground after the completion of its work,</b> when it is sufficiently processed and therefore subject to tithes; <b>and</b> a laborer who works <b>with an item whose growth is not from the land.</b>",
            "If a laborer <b>was performing</b> labor <b>with his hands but not with his feet,</b> or <b>with his feet but not with his hands,</b> e.g., pressing grapes, or <b>even</b> if he was performing labor only <b>with his shoulder, this one may eat</b> the produce of the field. <b>Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:</b> A laborer may not eat <b>unless he performs</b> labor <b>with his hands and with his feet.</b>",
            "If a laborer <b>was performing</b> labor <b>with figs he may not eat grapes;</b> if he was performing labor <b>with grapes he may not eat figs,</b> as he may eat only the type of food with which he is working. This is the <i>halakha</i> even if he was employed to perform labor with both types of produce but is currently performing labor with only one of them. <b>But</b> he <b>may hold himself back</b> from eating <b>until he reaches a place of good</b>-quality grapes or figs <b>and eat</b> from these, as they are the same type of food. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all of these</b> cases the Sages <b>said</b> that he may eat <b>only at the time of work. But due to</b> the obligation to <b>restore lost property to its owners,</b> i.e., so that workers would not neglect their task, <b>they said</b> that <b>laborers may eat as they walk from</b> one <b>row</b> of a vineyard or plantation <b>to</b> another <b>row, and upon their return from the winepress. And with regard to a donkey,</b> it is permitted to eat <b>when it is being unloaded.</b> This statement will be explained in the Gemara.",
            "<b>A laborer may eat cucumbers</b> while he works, and this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even</b> if the amount he eats is equal in value <b>to a dinar;</b> or he may eat <b>dates, and</b> this is the <i>halakha</i> <b>even</b> if the amount he eats is equal in value <b>to a dinar. Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma says: A laborer may not eat more than</b> the value of <b>his wages, but the Rabbis permit</b> it, according to the strict letter of the law. <b>But one teaches a person not to be a glutton and thereby close the opening</b> to other job offers <b>in his face.</b> When people hear of his greed they will be reluctant to hire him.",
            "<b>A man can stipulate on his own behalf</b> that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this <b>on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult</b> Canaanite <b>slave or</b> Canaanite <b>maidservant, or on behalf of his wife,</b> with their agreement, <b>because they have</b> the basic level of mental <b>competence,</b> i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. <b>But he cannot stipulate</b> this <b>on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor</b> Canaanite <b>slave or</b> Canaanite <b>maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not</b> have the basic level of mental <b>competence.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who hires a laborer to perform</b> labor <b>with his fourth-year fruit,</b> such laborers <b>may not eat</b> the fruit. And <b>if he did not inform them</b> beforehand that they were working with fourth-year fruit, he must <b>redeem</b> the fruit <b>and feed them.</b> If <b>his</b> fig <b>cakes broke apart</b> and crumbled, so that they must be preserved again, or if <b>his barrels</b> of wine <b>opened</b> and he hired workers to reseal them, <b>these</b> laborers <b>may not eat,</b> as the work of the figs or wine had already been completed with regard to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And <b>if he did not inform them, he must tithe</b> the food <b>and feed them.</b>",
            "The mishna adds: <b>Watchmen of produce may eat</b> the produce of the field or vineyard <b>by local regulations,</b> i.e., in accordance with the ordinances accepted by the residents of that place, <b>but not by Torah law.</b> <b>There are four</b> types of <b>bailees,</b> to whom different <i>halakhot</i> apply. They are as follows: <b>An unpaid bailee,</b> who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item; <b>and the borrower</b> of an item for his own use; <b>a paid bailee,</b> who is provided with a salary for watching over an item; <b>and a renter,</b> i.e., a bailee who pays a fee for the use of a vessel or animal. If the item was stolen, lost, or broken, or if the animal died in any manner, their <i>halakhot</i> are as follows: <b>An unpaid bailee takes an oath over every</b> outcome; whether the item was lost, stolen, or broken, or if the animal died, the unpaid bailee must take an oath that it happened as he described, and he is then exempt from payment. <b>The borrower</b> does not take an oath, but <b>pays</b> for <b>every</b> outcome, even in a circumstance beyond his control. <b>And</b> the <i>halakhot</i> of <b>a paid bailee and a renter</b> are the same: They <b>take an oath over an injured</b> animal, <b>over a captured</b> animal, <b>and over a dead</b> animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt, <b>but they must pay</b> for <b>loss or theft.</b>",
            "<b>One wolf</b> that approaches a flock and attacks <b>is not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control,</b> as the shepherd can drive it away, but an attack by <b>two wolves</b> is considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control. Rabbi Yehuda says: At a time of wolf attacks,</b> when many wolves come out of hiding and pounce on animals at every corner, <b>even</b> an attack by <b>one wolf is</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> An attack by <b>two dogs is not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control. Yadua the Babylonian says in the name of Rabbi Meir:</b> If the two dogs came and attacked <b>from one direction it is not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control,</b> but if they attacked <b>from two directions,</b> this is considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control,</b> as the shepherd cannot protect his flock from both of them at once. If <b>bandits</b> came, <b>this is</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> Likewise, with regard to an attack by <b>a lion, a bear, a leopard, a cheetah, and a snake, these are</b> each considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> <b>When</b> is an attack by one of the above considered beyond his control, which means that a paid bailee is exempt? It is <b>when</b> the dangerous beasts or bandits <b>came of their own accord</b> to the usual grazing spot. <b>But</b> if the shepherd <b>led</b> his flock <b>to a place of groups of beasts or bandits,</b> this <b>is not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control,</b> as he is at fault.",
            "If the animal <b>died in its normal manner, this is</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control;</b> if <b>he afflicted it</b> by overworking it or by negligent treatment <b>and it died,</b> this <b>is not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> If the animal <b>ascended to the top of a cliff and fell</b> down and died, <b>this is</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> If the shepherd himself <b>brought it up to the top of a cliff and it fell</b> down <b>and died,</b> this is <b>not</b> considered <b>a circumstance beyond one’s control.</b> The <i>halakhot</i> of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The <i>halakha</i> is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, <b>an unpaid bailee may stipulate</b> with the owner <b>that</b> he will <b>be exempt from</b> taking <b>an oath</b> if the item is lost, <b>and</b> similarly, <b>a borrower</b> may stipulate <b>that</b> he will <b>be exempt from</b> having <b>to pay,</b> and <b>a paid bailee or a renter</b> can stipulate <b>that</b> he will <b>be exempt from</b> taking <b>an oath and from</b> having <b>to pay,</b> as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, <b>anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.</b>",
            "<b>And any condition that is preceded by an action,</b> i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, <b>the condition is void</b> and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. <b>And</b> with regard to any condition <b>that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially,</b> i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, <b>his condition is valid.</b> If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void."
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>one who borrowed a cow and borrowed</b> the services of <b>its owner with it, or</b> he borrowed a cow and <b>hired its owner with it,</b> or he <b>borrowed</b> the services of <b>the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow;</b> in all such cases, if the cow <b>died,</b> the borrower is <b>exempt</b> from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, <b>as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay”</b> (Exodus 22:14). <b>But</b> if one first <b>borrowed the cow and</b> only <b>afterward borrowed</b> the services of <b>the owner or hired him, and</b> the cow <b>died,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay the owner for the cow. This is the <i>halakha</i> even if the owner was working for the borrower at the time, <b>as it is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay”</b> (Exodus 22:13).",
            "There is <b>one who borrowed a cow. He borrowed it</b> for <b>half</b> of the <b>day and rented it</b> for the other <b>half</b> of the <b>day;</b> or <b>he borrowed it</b> for <b>today and rented it</b> for <b>tomorrow;</b> or <b>he rented one</b> cow <b>and borrowed</b> another <b>one</b> from the same person. <b>And</b> in one of the first two cases, the cow <b>died</b> and it is not clear during which period the cow died. Or in the last case, one of the cows died and it is not clear whether it had been the borrowed cow or the rented cow. If <b>the lender</b> then <b>says:</b> The <b>borrowed</b> cow is the one that <b>died;</b> or: <b>It died on the day that it was</b> being <b>borrowed;</b> or: <b>It died during the period in which it was</b> being <b>borrowed,</b> so that, according to his claim, the borrower is liable to pay for the cow, <b>and the other</b> one, the borrower, <b>says: I do not know</b> what happened, the borrower is <b>liable</b> to pay. If <b>the renter says:</b> The <b>rented</b> cow is the one that <b>died;</b> or: <b>It died on the day that it was</b> being <b>rented;</b> or: <b>It died during the period in which it was</b> being <b>rented, and the other</b> one, the owner of the cow, <b>says: I do not know</b> what happened, the renter is <b>exempt.</b> If <b>this</b> owner <b>says</b> with certitude: The <b>borrowed</b> cow is the one that died, <b>and that</b> renter <b>says</b> with certitude: The <b>rented</b> cow is the one that died, then <b>the renter takes an oath that the rented</b> cow is the one that <b>died,</b> and he is then exempt from liability. If <b>this</b> one <b>says: I do not know</b> what happened, <b>and that</b> one <b>says: I do not know</b> what happened, then <b>they divide</b> the disputed amount. The bailee is liable to pay for only half the value of the cow.",
            "In the case of <b>one who borrowed a cow, and</b> the lender <b>sent it to</b> the borrower <b>by the hand of</b> his <b>son,</b> or <b>by the hand of his slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of his agent, or by the hand of</b> the borrower’s <b>son,</b> or <b>by the hand of his slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of</b> the <b>agent of</b> the <b>borrower; and it died</b> on the way, the borrower <b>is exempt,</b> because the period of borrowing begins only once the cow reaches his domain. <b>The borrower said to</b> the lender: <b>Send it to me by the hand of my son,</b> or <b>by the hand of my slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of my agent, or by the hand of your son,</b> or <b>by the hand of your slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of your agent. Or,</b> in a case <b>where the lender said</b> explicitly <b>to</b> the borrower: <b>I am sending it to you by the hand of my son,</b> or <b>by the hand of my slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of my agent, or by the hand of your son,</b> or <b>by the hand of your slave,</b> or <b>by the hand of your agent; and the borrower said to him: Send</b> it as you have said, <b>and he</b> then <b>sent it, and it died</b> on the way, then the borrower <b>is liable</b> to pay the lender the value of his cow. Since the borrower agreed to the cow’s being brought to him by the hand of another, he bears liability from the moment the cow was transferred into that person’s possession.",
            "With regard to <b>one who exchanges a cow for a donkey,</b> such that by virtue of the cow owner’s act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey’s erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, <b>and</b> afterward the cow is found to have <b>calved; and similarly,</b> with regard to <b>one who sells his</b> Canaanite <b>maidservant,</b> with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, <b>and</b> afterward <b>she</b> is found to have <b>given birth</b> to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother’s master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction. If <b>this</b> seller <b>says:</b> The birth occurred <b>before I sold</b> the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, <b>and that</b> buyer <b>says:</b> The birth occurred <b>after I purchased</b> the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, <b>they divide</b> the value of the offspring between them. The mishna continues: There is a case of <b>one</b> who <b>had two</b> Canaanite <b>slaves, one large,</b> worth more on the slave market, <b>and one small,</b> worth less on the slave market, <b>and similarly, one</b> who <b>had two fields, one large and one small.</b> He sold one of them, and there was a dispute between the buyer and the seller concerning which one was sold. If <b>the buyer says: I purchased</b> the <b>large</b> one, <b>and the other one,</b> i.e., the seller, <b>says: I do not know</b> which I sold; the buyer is <b>entitled to</b> take the <b>large</b> one. If <b>the seller says: I sold</b> the <b>small</b> one, <b>and the other one,</b> i.e., the buyer, <b>says: I do not know</b> which one I purchased; the buyer <b>is</b> entitled <b>to</b> take <b>only</b> the <b>small</b> one. If <b>this</b> one <b>says:</b> The <b>large</b> one was sold, <b>and that</b> one <b>says:</b> The <b>small</b> one was sold, then <b>the seller takes an oath that</b> it was <b>the small</b> one that <b>he sold,</b> and then the buyer takes the small one. If <b>this</b> one <b>says: I do not know</b> which one was sold, <b>and that</b> one <b>says: I do not know</b> which one was sold, <b>they divide</b> the disputed amount between them.",
            "In the case of <b>one who sells his olive trees</b> to another so he can chop them down and use them <b>for</b> their <b>wood, and</b> before he chopped them down <b>they yielded</b> olives, if the olives are of a quality that could provide the value of <b>less than a quarter</b>-<i>log</i> of oil <b>per <i>se’a</i></b> of olives, <b>these</b> olives are the property <b>of</b> the new <b>owner of the olive trees,</b> i.e., the buyer. If <b>they yielded</b> olives that could provide the value of <b>a quarter</b>-<i>log</i> or more of oil <b>per <i>se’a</i></b> of olives, and <b>this</b> one, the buyer, <b>says: My olive trees yielded</b> the olives and so I have a right to them, <b>and that</b> one, the seller, <b>says:</b> The nourishment from <b>my land yielded</b> the olives and so I have a right to them, then <b>they divide</b> the olives between them. In the event that <b>a river swept away one’s olive trees and deposited them in</b> the <b>field of another,</b> and they took root there and yielded olives, <b>this</b> one, i.e., the owner of the trees, <b>says: My olive trees yielded</b> the olives and so I have a right to them, <b>and that</b> one, i.e., the owner of the field, <b>says:</b> The nourishment from <b>my land yielded</b> the olives and so I have a right to them, then <b>they divide</b> the olives between them.",
            "In the case of <b>one who rents out a house</b> in a town <b>to another in the rainy season,</b> the owner <b>cannot evict</b> the renter from the house <b>from the festival</b> of <i>Sukkot</i> <b>until Passover.</b> If the rental was <b>in the summer,</b> he must give <b>thirty days’</b> notice before he can evict him. <b>And</b> for a house located <b>in the cities [<i>uvakerakim</i>], both in the summer and in the rainy season</b> he must give <b>twelve months’</b> notice. <b>And for shops</b> that he rented out, <b>both in towns and in cities,</b> he must give <b>twelve months’</b> notice. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> For <b>a baker’s shop or a dyer’s shop,</b> one must give <b>three years’</b> notice.",
            "If <b>one rents out a house to another, the landlord bears the responsibility for</b> providing <b>the door, for</b> providing <b>the bolt, for</b> providing <b>the lock, and for</b> providing <b>every item</b> in the house <b>that</b> is essential for normal living and requires <b>the work of a craftsman</b> to provide it. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>an item that does not</b> require <b>the work of a craftsman, the renter</b> is responsible to <b>make it.</b> <b>The manure</b> found in the courtyard of a rented house is the property <b>of the landlord, and the renter has</b> rights <b>only</b> to the ashes <b>that come out of the oven and the stove,</b> which can also be used as a fertilizer.",
            "In the case of <b>one who rents out a house to another for a year</b> and then <b>the year was intercalated,</b> adding an additional month to that year, the fact that <b>it was intercalated</b> is <b>to</b> the benefit of <b>the renter.</b> Since the rental was defined in terms of a year, the additional month is automatically included, and the renter need not pay additional rent for it. If a landlord <b>rented out</b> a house <b>to</b> another for a year, with the price set as a certain sum <b>for</b> each of the <b>months,</b> and then <b>the year was intercalated,</b> the fact that <b>it was intercalated</b> is <b>to</b> the benefit of <b>the landlord.</b> <b>An incident</b> occurred <b>in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another</b> where they stated that the rent would be: <b>Twelve gold</b> dinars <b>per year, a gold dinar per month,</b> and then the year was intercalated. <b>And</b> this <b>incident came</b> to court <b>before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said:</b> The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter <b>should divide the intercalary month</b> between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.",
            "In the case of <b>one who rented out a house to another, and</b> then the house <b>fell,</b> the landlord is <b>obligated to provide</b> the renter with another <b>house.</b> If the original house <b>was small,</b> the landlord <b>may not construct a large</b> house as a replacement, and if the original <b>was large,</b> he <b>may not construct a small</b> house as a replacement. If the original had <b>one</b> room, <b>he may not construct</b> the replacement with <b>two</b> rooms, <b>and</b> if the original had <b>two</b> rooms, <b>he may not construct</b> the replacement with <b>one. He may not reduce</b> the number <b>of windows, nor add to them, except with the agreement</b> of <b>both of them.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>one who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate, either as a tenant farmer, who, in exchange for the right to farm the land, gives a set amount of the produce to the owner, or as a sharecropper, who cultivates the land and receives a set proportion of the produce, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: In <b>a location where</b> those cultivating the land <b>were accustomed to cut</b> the produce, this one <b>must cut</b> it as well. In a location where they were accustomed <b>to uproot</b> the produce, not to cut it with a sickle or a scythe, this one <b>must uproot</b> it as well. If they were accustomed <b>to plow</b> the land <b>after</b> harvesting the produce, this one <b>must plow</b> as well. <b>All</b> farming of the land shall be conducted <b>in accordance with regional custom. Just as</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the owner of the field and the one cultivating it <b>divide the produce, so</b> too the <i>halakha</i> is that <b>they divide the stubble and the straw. Just as</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the owner of the field and the one cultivating it <b>divide the wine, so</b> too the <i>halakha</i> is that <b>they divide</b> <b>the branches</b> pruned from the vines <b>and the poles. And the two of them,</b> i.e., the landowner and the one cultivating the field, both <b>supply the poles.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>and it is an irrigated</b> field <b>or a field with trees,</b> if <b>the spring</b> that irrigated the field <b>dried up or the trees were cut down,</b> he does <b>not subtract from</b> the produce <b>he</b> owes the owner as part of <b>his tenancy,</b> despite the fact that he presumably considered these factors when agreeing to cultivate the field. But <b>if</b> the cultivator <b>said to</b> the landowner explicitly: <b>Lease me this irrigated field, or</b> he said: Lease me <b>this field with trees,</b> and <b>the spring dried up or the trees were cut down, he</b> may <b>subtract from</b> the produce <b>he</b> owes as part of <b>his tenancy.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who receives a field from another</b> as a contractor <b>and</b> then <b>lets it lie fallow</b> and does not work the land at all, the court <b>appraises it</b> by evaluating <b>how much it was able to produce</b> if cultivated, <b>and he gives</b> his share of this amount <b>to</b> the owner. The reason is <b>that this</b> is what a cultivator <b>writes to</b> the owner in a standard contract: <b>If I let</b> the field <b>lie fallow and do not cultivate</b> it, <b>I will pay with best</b>-quality produce.",
            "With regard to <b>one who received a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>and did not want to weed</b> it, <b>and</b> he then <b>said to</b> the owner: <b>What do you care</b> if I neglect the land? You will not suffer a loss <b>since I</b> will <b>give you</b> the amount of produce I owe you for <b>your</b> granting me <b>tenancy,</b> regardless of the state of the field. Nevertheless, <b>they do not listen to him.</b> The reason is <b>because</b> the owner of the land <b>can say to him: Tomorrow you</b> will <b>depart from</b> the field, <b>and it</b> will <b>grow weeds for me,</b> which will remain there and disrupt the yield of the field for years to come.",
            "With regard to <b>one who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>and it did not produce</b> a sufficient crop to cover the expenses of its upkeep, <b>if it has</b> enough produce <b>to form a pile</b> he is <b>obligated to take care of it</b> and give the owner his share. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: What fixed</b> measure is <b>a pile?</b> There is no inherent measure of produce that is considered significant, as it all depends on the size of the plot of land in question. <b>Rather,</b> the relevant issue is <b>whether it has</b> a crop <b>equivalent to</b> the measure of seeds for <b>dropping</b> in a field in order to sow it.",
            "In the case of <b>one who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>and grasshoppers consumed it or</b> it <b>was wind blasted, if it is a regional disaster</b> which affected all the fields in the area, the cultivator <b>subtracts from</b> the produce <b>he</b> owes as part of <b>his tenancy. If it</b> is <b>not a regional disaster,</b> the cultivator does <b>not subtract from</b> the produce <b>he</b> owes as part of <b>his tenancy. Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the cultivator <b>received it from</b> the owner <b>for</b> a fixed sum of <b>money, whether this</b> way, i.e., there is a regional disaster, or <b>whether that</b> way, i.e., there was no regional disaster, <b>he does not subtract</b> the produce he owes as part of <b>his tenancy.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate in return <b>for</b> the payment of <b>ten <i>kor</i> of wheat per year, and</b> its produce <b>was blighted</b> by a crop disease or the like, the cultivator <b>gives</b> the owner the ten <i>kor</i> of wheat <b>from it</b> but does not have to provide him with high quality wheat. If the wheat stalks produced by the field <b>were</b> particularly <b>good</b> stalks of <b>wheat,</b> the cultivator <b>may not say to</b> the owner: <b>I will buy</b> regular wheat <b>from the market; rather,</b> he <b>gives him from inside</b> the field itself.",
            "With regard to <b>one who receives a field from another</b> in order <b>to plant it</b> with <b>barley,</b> he may <b>not plant it</b> with <b>wheat,</b> as wheat weakens the field more than barley does. But if he receives it in order to plant <b>wheat,</b> he may <b>plant it</b> with <b>barley</b> if he wishes, but <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids</b> it. Similarly, if he receives it to plant <b>it with grain</b> he may <b>not plant it</b> with <b>legumes,</b> as they weaken the field more than grains do, but if he receives it in order to plant <b>legumes</b> he may <b>plant it</b> with <b>grain, but Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids</b> it.",
            "One <b>who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>for a few years,</b> i.e., fewer than seven, <b>may not plant flax in it,</b> as flax greatly weakens the soil, <b>and</b> if a sycamore tree was growing in the field, <b>he does not have</b> rights <b>to</b> the <b>beams</b> fashioned from the branches of the <b>sycamore</b> tree. Therefore, he may not cut down its branches for his own use, as it takes many years for new ones to grow. If <b>he received</b> the field <b>from him for seven years,</b> in <b>the first year he</b> may <b>plant flax in it, and he does have</b> rights <b>to</b> the <b>beams</b> fashioned from the branches of the <b>sycamore</b> tree.",
            "In the case of one <b>who receives a field from another</b> to cultivate <b>for one</b> Sabbatical <b>cycle</b> of seven years culminating with the Sabbatical Year <b>for seven hundred dinars, the Sabbatical</b> Year is included <b>in the tally,</b> despite the fact that he is unable to work the land during that year. If he <b>received it from him</b> to cultivate for <b>seven years for seven hundred dinars, the Sabbatical</b> Year is <b>not</b> included <b>in the number,</b> and he may keep the field for an additional year to take the place of the Sabbatical Year, during which he could not work the land.",
            "The <i>tanna</i> addresses a different issue, the <i>halakha</i> of the payment of workers. <b>A day laborer collects</b> his wages from his employer <b>all night</b> following his work shift. <b>A night laborer collects</b> his wages <b>all the</b> following <b>day,</b> while <b>an hourly laborer collects</b> his wages <b>all night and all day.</b> With regard to <b>a weekly laborer, a monthly laborer, a yearly laborer,</b> or <b>a laborer</b> for a Sabbatical <b>cycle</b> of seven years, if he <b>left</b> upon the completion of his work <b>in the day, he collects</b> his wages <b>all day;</b> if he <b>left at night, he collects</b> his wages <b>all night and all day.</b>",
            "<b>Whether</b> referring to <b>a person’s wages</b> that he receives <b>or the renting of an animal or the renting of utensils,</b> are all <b>subject to</b> the prohibition <b>of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages”</b> (Deuteronomy 24:15), <b>and</b> are <b>subject to</b> the prohibition <b>of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning”</b> (Leviticus 19:13). <b>When</b> does he transgress these prohibitions? He transgresses them <b>when</b> the one owed the money <b>claimed</b> the payment from <b>him.</b> If he <b>did not claim</b> his payment from <b>him</b> the other <b>does not transgress</b> the prohibitions. <b>If</b> the one who owes the money <b>transferred his</b> payment by leaving instructions <b>with a storekeeper or with a money changer</b> to pay him, <b>he does not transgress</b> the prohibitions. The mishna discusses other related <i>halakhot</i>: If <b>a hired laborer</b> requests payment <b>at</b> the proper <b>time</b> and the employer claims he already paid him, the laborer <b>takes an oath</b> that he did not receive his wages <b>and</b> then <b>takes</b> the wages from the employer. If <b>the time had passed,</b> he does <b>not take an oath and take</b> the wages. <b>If there are witnesses</b> who testify <b>that he claimed</b> the money from <b>him at</b> the proper <b>time, he takes an oath and takes</b> the money. One who hires <b>a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [<i>ger toshav</i>] is subject to</b> the prohibition <b>of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages,” but is not subject to</b> the negative mitzva <b>of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning.”</b>",
            "With regard to one <b>who lends</b> money to <b>another</b> and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor <b>may take collateral from him</b> to ensure payment <b>only by means of</b> an agent of <b>the court,</b> not of his own accord. <b>And he may not enter</b> the debtor’s <b>house to take his collateral, as it is stated:</b> “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. <b>You shall stand outside,</b> and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor <b>had two utensils</b> of the same kind, the creditor <b>takes one and leaves</b> the other <b>one</b> in the debtor’s possession. <b>And</b> in addition, the creditor <b>must return a pillow at night,</b> as the debtor requires it for sleeping, <b>and a plow,</b> which is needed for his daytime work, <b>by day. If</b> the debtor <b>died,</b> he is <b>not</b> required to <b>return</b> it <b>to</b> the debtor’s <b>heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to</b> the debtor <b>himself</b> he needs to <b>return</b> the collateral each day <b>only until thirty days</b> have passed, <b>and from thirty days onward,</b> the creditor can <b>sell them in court,</b> with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt. With regard to <b>a widow, whether she is poor</b> or <b>whether she is wealthy,</b> one <b>may not take collateral from her, as it is stated: “And you may not take the garment of a widow as collateral”</b> (Deuteronomy 24:17). One <b>who takes a millstone as collateral violates a prohibition, and</b> he is <b>liable for</b> taking <b>two vessels,</b> i.e., both millstones in the pair, <b>as it is stated: “He shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral”</b> (Deuteronomy 24:6). The <i>tanna</i> adds: <b>Not only</b> did the Sages <b>say</b> that it is prohibited to take <b>the lower or upper millstone</b> as collateral, <b>but</b> they also said that one may not take <b>anything that</b> people <b>use in the preparation of food [<i>okhel nefesh</i>], as it is stated: “For he takes a man’s life [<i>nefesh</i>] as collateral”</b> (Deuteronomy 24:6)."
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>the house and the upper story belonging to two</b> people, i.e., the lower story was owned by one individual, while the upper story belonged to someone else, <b>that collapsed, the two of them divide the timber and the stones and the earth</b> of the collapsed structure. <b>And</b> the court <b>considers which stones were likely to break,</b> those of the lower or upper story, and gives those broken stones to the one who presumably owned them. <b>If one of them recognized some of his stones</b> he may <b>take them</b> for himself, <b>and they count toward his amount</b> of stones, and the other party takes other stones accordingly. They do not divide the remaining stones equally.",
            "If there was <b>a house and an upper story</b> owned by one person, and the upper story was rented out to another, if the floor of <b>the upper story was broken,</b> i.e., it fell in or collapsed, <b>and the owner of the house does not want to repair</b> it, <b>the resident of the upper story can go down and live</b> in the house <b>below until the</b> owner <b>repairs the upper story for him.</b> <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> With regard to a house of two stories owned by two people, i.e., the lower level was owned by one and the upper level by the other, in which the ceiling collapsed; the owner of <b>the lower</b> story <b>provides the ceiling</b> of beams or stones, <b>and</b> the owner of <b>the upper</b> story provides <b>the plaster.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>the house and the upper story belonging to two</b> different people, and <b>that</b> house and upper story <b>collapsed,</b> and <b>the owner of the upper story told the owner of the house to build</b> the lower story in order to enable him to rebuild the upper story, <b>and he does not want to build</b> it, <b>the owner of the upper story</b> may <b>build the house and reside in it, until</b> the other <b>gives him his expenses</b> for the construction of the house, and he then rebuilds his upper story. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: This</b> one <b>too,</b> i.e., the owner of the upper story, who is meanwhile <b>residing inside</b> the property <b>of the other, must pay him rent.</b> Since he derived benefit by living in the house of the other, as he had no other place in which he could live, he must pay rent. This solution is therefore flawed. <b>Rather, the owner of the upper story builds the house and the upper story,</b> and he <b>roofs the upper</b> story, i.e., he completes the entire construction of the upper story, <b>and he</b> may then <b>sit in the house,</b> i.e., the lower story, <b>until</b> the other <b>gives him his expenses</b> for the building of the house, at which point he returns to his upper story. Since in any event he could have lived in the upper story, he is not considered to have derived any benefit by living in the lower story, and is not obligated to pay rent.",
            "<b>And likewise,</b> in the case of <b>an olive press that is built</b> inside a cave <b>in a rock, and one garden,</b> belonging to another person, was planted <b>on top of it, and</b> the roof of the olive press <b>broke,</b> which caused the garden to collapse inward, in such a case, <b>the owner of the garden</b> may <b>descend and sow below until</b> the other one <b>constructs for his olive press</b> sturdy <b>arches</b> to support the roof, so that the owner of the garden can once again sow above him. The mishna continues: In the case of <b>a wall or a tree that fell into the public domain and caused damage,</b> the owner is <b>exempt from</b> having <b>to pay,</b> as it was an accident. If the court saw that the wall was shaky, or that the tree was tilting, and <b>they gave him time to cut down the tree or to dismantle the wall, and</b> then <b>they fell</b> down, if this occurred <b>during the</b> allotted <b>time,</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> but if they collapsed <b>after the time</b> given to him had elapsed, he is <b>liable</b> to pay, since he was warned against this very occurrence.",
            "In the case of <b>one whose wall was adjacent to another’s garden, and</b> the wall <b>fell, and</b> the owner of the garden <b>said to him: Clear</b> away <b>your stones, and</b> the owner of the stones <b>said to him:</b> <b>They are yours,</b> as I hereby declare them ownerless, and you can take them for yourself; the court <b>does not listen to him,</b> since he cannot force the other to acquire the stones. If <b>after</b> the owner of the garden voluntarily <b>accepted</b> ownership of the stones <b>upon himself,</b> the owner of the wall <b>said to him: Here you are,</b> take <b>your expenditures</b> for the removal of the stones, <b>and I will take</b> the stones that are <b>mine;</b> the court <b>does not listen to him,</b> as they had already been acquired by the owner of the garden. The mishna continues: In the case of <b>one who hires a laborer to do</b> work <b>with him with hay or with straw, and</b> after he finished the task, the laborer <b>said to</b> the employer: <b>Give me my wages, and</b> the employer <b>said to him: Take what you have worked with as your wages,</b> i.e., take some of the hay or straw as payment, the court <b>does not listen to him.</b> Although debts can be paid with any item of value, even hay or straw, the wages of a laborer must be paid in accordance with the initial agreement between the laborer and the employer. But if <b>after</b> the laborer <b>accepted upon himself</b> to keep the hay or straw as payment, the employer changed his mind <b>and said to him: Here you are,</b> take <b>your wages and I will take</b> what is <b>mine;</b> the court <b>does not listen to him,</b> since the laborer had already acquired the hay. In the case of <b>one who takes manure out to the public domain,</b> in order for it to be transported to fertilize a field, he <b>who takes it out</b> from his property <b>takes it out, and</b> immediately, he <b>who</b> takes it to <b>fertilize</b> the field takes it to <b>fertilize</b> the field. They must relocate the manure immediately without allowing it to sit around in the public domain. Similarly, <b>one may not soak clay in the public domain</b> before it is kneaded, <b>and one may not mold bricks</b> in the public domain since this takes a long time and inhibits use of the public domain by others. <b>But one may knead clay in the public domain,</b> as this process does not take long, <b>but not bricks.</b> With regard to <b>one who builds</b> a structure, keeping the building materials <b>in the public domain,</b> he <b>who brings</b> the <b>stones brings</b> them, <b>and</b> immediately, he <b>who builds</b> the structure <b>builds</b> with them, and may not leave them there. <b>And</b> if the stones <b>cause damage</b> before he had a chance to build them into the structure, <b>he</b> must <b>pay</b> for <b>what he damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> One may <b>even prepare his work thirty days beforehand;</b> he may keep the building materials in the public domain for that duration.",
            "In the case of <b>two gardens</b> that were located <b>one above the other,</b> i.e., a garden on a plateau that borders another garden below, <b>and vegetables</b> grew <b>in-between,</b> out of the wall of soil resulting from the difference in height between the two gardens, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> These vegetables belong <b>to</b> the owner of the <b>upper</b> garden. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> They belong <b>to</b> the owner of the <b>lower</b> one. <b>Rabbi Meir said</b> in explanation of his ruling: <b>If the</b> owner of the <b>upper</b> garden would <b>want to</b> dig and <b>take his dirt</b> and does so, <b>no vegetables</b> would grow <b>here,</b> as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. In response, <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: If the</b> owner of the <b>lower</b> garden would <b>want to fill his garden</b> with dirt and does so, thereby raising its level, <b>no vegetables</b> would grow <b>here,</b> as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. <b>Rabbi Meir said: Since the two of them can object to each other,</b> as they each have the ability to prevent the vegetable growth, nothing can be decided based on such considerations. Instead, the court <b>considers from where this vegetable lives</b> and derives nourishment, whether from above or from below. <b>Rabbi Shimon said: Any</b> vegetables <b>that the</b> owner of the <b>upper</b> garden <b>can stretch out his hand and take, those</b> vegetables <b>are his, and the rest</b> belong <b>to</b> the owner of the <b>lower</b> garden."
        ]
    ],
    "versions": [
        [
            "William Davidson Edition - English",
            "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1"
        ]
    ],
    "heTitle": "משנה בבא מציעא",
    "categories": [
        "Mishnah",
        "Seder Nezikin"
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Chapter",
        "Mishnah"
    ]
}