if it becomes clear that they are compelled to permit the distinction of a thing from its like in its occurrence by a cause then permitting it without a cause is like permitting it with a cause since there is no difference between the question being directed at the thing itself and it being said why was it distinguished by this amount? and it being directed at the cause and it being said why did he distinguish it by this amount from its like? if it is possible to refute the question about the cause by saying that this amount is not like any other since the system is connected to it and not to any other then it is possible to refute the question about the thing itself and it does not require a cause. there is no way out of this since if this specific amount that occurred is like what did not occur then the question is directed at how the thing was distinguished from its like especially according to their principle and they deny the distinguishing will. if it is not like it then the permissibility is not proven but rather it is said it occurred thus in the past just as the ancient cause occurred according to their claim.
فإذا بان أنهم مضطرون إلى تجويز تميز الشيء عن مثله في الوقوع بعلة فتجويزه بغير علة كتجويزه بعلة إذ لا فرق بين أن يتوجه السؤال في نفس الشيء فيقال لم اختص بهذا القدر؟ وبين أن يتوجه في العلة فيقال ولم خصصه بهذا القدر عن مثله؟ فإن أمكن دفع السؤال عن العلة بأن هذا المقدار ليس مثل غيره إذ النظام مرتبط به دون غيره أمكن دفع السؤال عن نفس الشيء ولم يفتقر إلى علة، وهذا لا مخرج عنه فإن هذا المقدار المعين الواقع إن كان مثل الذي لم يقع فالسؤال متوجه أنه كيف ميز الشيء عن مثله، خصوصا على أصلهم وهم ينكرون الإرادة المميزة، وإن لم يكن مثلا له فلا يثبت الجواز بل يقال وقع كذلك قديما كما وقعت العلة القديمة بزعمهم.