the answer is from several aspects first your statement he knows himself as a principle is an arbitrary statement rather he should know the existence of hisself only. as for knowledge of his being a principle it is more than knowledge of existence because the principle is an addition to the essence and it is permissible for him to know the essence and not know its addition. if the principle were not an addition his essence would be multiple and he would have existence and principle and they are two things. and just as it is permissible for a person to know himself and not know that he is an effect until he knows because his being an effect is an addition to his cause so too his being a cause is an addition to his effect. so the obligation is based on their mere statement he knows that he is a principle since in him is knowledge of the essence and of the principle which is the addition and the addition is not the essence. so knowledge of the addition is not knowledge of the essence according to the proof we mentioned which is that it is possible to imagine knowledge of the essence without knowledge of the principle and it is not possible to imagine knowledge of the essence without knowledge of the essence because the essence is one.
والجواب من وجوه الأول أن قولكم إنه يعلم ذاته مبدأ، تحكم، بل ينبغي أن يعلم وجود ذاته فقط. فأما العلم بكونه مبدأ يزيد على العلم بالوجود لأن المبدئية إضافة للذات ويجوز أن يعلم الذات ولا يعلم إضافته، ولو لم تكن المبدئية إضافة لتكثر ذاته وكان له وجود ومبدئية وهما شيئان. وكما يجوز أن يعرف الإنسان ذاته ولا يعلم كونه معلولا إلى أن يعلم، لأن كونه معلولا إضافة له إلى علته، فكذلك كونه علة إضافة له إلى معلوله. فالإلزام قائم في مجرد قولهم إنه يعلم كونه مبدأ إذ فيه علم بالذات وبالمبدئية، وهو الإضافة والإضافة غير الذات، فالعلم بالإضافة غير العلم بالذات بالدليل الذي ذكرناه وهو أنه يمكن أن يتوهم العلم بالذات دون العلم بالمبدئية ولا يمكن أن يتوهم العلم بالذات دون العلم بالذات لأن الذات واحدة.