 other than his knowledge of himself. it has been said the definition of a single thing is that it is impossible in imagination to combine negation and affirmation in it. since knowledge of a single thing is a single thing it is impossible to imagine in one state that it exists and does not exist. since it is not possible in imagination to estimate a persons knowledge of himself without his knowledge of others it has been said his knowledge of others is not his knowledge of himself because if he were himself then his negation would be a negation of him and his affirmation would be an affirmation of him since it is impossible for zayd to exist and zayd to be nonexistent i mean he himself in one state. the same is not impossible in knowledge of others with knowledge of himself. and likewise in the knowledge of the first of himself with his knowledge of others since it is possible to imagine the existence of one without the other so they are two things. and it is not possible to imagine the existence of his self without the existence of his self. if all were like this then this imagination would be impossible. so whoever among the philosophers has acknowledged that the first knows other than himself has inevitably established multiplicity.
 غير علمه بذاته وقيل حد الشيء الواحد أن يستحيل في الوهم الجمع فيه بين النفي والإثبات. فالعلم بالشيء الواحد لما كان شيئا واحدا استحال أن يتوهم في حالة واحدة موجودا ومعدوما، ولما لم يستحل في الوهم أن يقدر علم الإنسان بنفسه دون علمه بغيره قيل إن علمه بغيره غير علمه بنفسه، إذ لو كان هو هو لكان نفيه نفيا له وإثباته إثباتا له، إذ يستحيل أن يكون زيد موجودا وزيد معدوما، أعني هو بعينه في حالة واحدة، ولا يستحيل مثل ذلك في العلم بالغير مع العلم بنفسه. وكذى في علم الأول بذاته مع علمه بغيره إذ يمكن أن يتوهم وجود أحدهما دون الآخر، فهما إذن شيئان. ولا يمكن أن يتوهم وجود ذاته دون وجود ذاته. فلو كان الكل كذلك لكان هذا التوهم محالا. فكل من اعترف من الفلاسفة بأن الأول يعرف غير ذاته فقد أثبت كثرة لا محالة.