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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
By profession, Judah was a doctor, one who had a very good reputation and who served the royal court. In 1483, his father was implicated in a political conspiracy against Joao II, the Duke of Braganza, and was forced to flee to Seville, in Spain, with his family. Shortly after his arrival, undoubtedly on account of his impressive connections and diplomatic skills, Isaac was summoned to the court of Ferdinand and Isabella, where he was to become a financial advisor to the royal family. Despite his favorable relationship with them, Isaac was unable to influence them to rescind their famous edict of expulsion—calling on all Jews who refused to convert to Christianity—to depart from the Iberian Peninsula.
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Judah seems also to have been well connected at the Spanish court and was one of the physicians who attended the royal family. After the edict of expulsion had been issued, Ferdinand and Isabella requested that he remain in Spain. To do this, however, he still would have had to convert to Christianity. Yet, in order to try and keep Judah in Spain, a plot was hatched to kidnap his firstborn son, Isaac ben Judah. Judah, however, discovered the plot and sent his son, along with his Christian nanny, on to Portugal, where he hoped to meet up with them. Upon hearing that a relative of Isaac Abrabanel had re-entered Portugal, Joao II had the young boy seized and forcefully converted to Christianity. It is uncertain whether or not Judah ever saw or heard from his son again. In a moving poem, entitled Telunah ‘al ha-zeman (“The Travails of Time”), he writes:
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Time with his pointed shafts has hit my heart and split my guts, laid open my entrails, landed me a blow that will not heal knocked me down, left me in lasting pain… He did not stop at whirling me around, exiling me while yet my days were green sending me stumbling, drunk, to roam the world… He scattered everyone I care for northward, eastward, or to the west, so that I have no rest from constant thinking, planning— and never a moment’s peace, for all my plans.[5]
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Like many of those Jews who refused to convert, Judah and his immediate family, including his father, made their way to Naples. There, Ferdinand II of Aragon, the king of Naples, warmly welcomed the Abrabanel family, owing to its many contacts in international trade. In 1495, however, the French took control of Naples, and Judah was again forced to flee, first to Genoa, then to Barletta, and subsequently to Venice. It seems that he also traveled around Tuscany, and there is some debate as to whether or not he actually met the famous Florentine Humanist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (it seems unlikely that he did). In 1501, after the defeat of the French in Naples, he was invited back to be the personal physician of the Viceroy of Naples, Fernandez de Córdoba. Among all of these peregrinations, Judah found the time to write (but not publish) his magnum opus, the Dialoghi d’amore. He seems to have died sometime after 1521. Other than these basic facts, we know very little of the life of Judah Abrabanel.
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Especially enigmatic are the last years of his life, between 1521 when he was requested to give medical attention to Cardinal San Giorgio until 1535 when Mariano Lenzi published the Dialoghi posthumously in Rome. There is some evidence that Judah moved to Rome near the end of his life; some suggest that he fell in with a Christian group of Neoplatonists. Indeed, the 1541 edition of the work mentions that Judah converted to Christianity (dipoi fatto christiano). This, however, seems highly unlikely as (1) it is not mentioned in the first edition, the one on which all subsequent editions and translations were based, and (2) there is no internal evidence in the Dialoghi to suggest this. In fact, one of the characters in the work implies the exact opposite, stating that “all of us believe in the sacred Mosaic law” (noi tutti che crediamo la sacre legge mosaica).[6] It seems, then, that either a careless or over-zealous editor inserted the phrase “dipoi fatto christiano” into a later edition of the Dialoghi.
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The only major work that we possess of Judah Abrabanel is the Dialoghi d’amore. There is some debate as to when the work was actually written. Many point to the year 1501–1502 owing to a phrase in the third book: “According to the Jewish tradition, we are in the year 5262 from the beginning of creation” (Siamo, secondo la veritá ebraica, a cinque milia ducento sessanta due del principio de la creazione).[7] The year 5262 of the Jewish calendar corresponds to 1501–1502 of the Gregorian calendar. Yet, manuscripts other than that based on the 1535 edition have the date of 5272 (i.e., 1511–1512). This is significant because many who argue that the Dialoghi could not possibly have been written in Italian point to the fact that Judah would not have been fluent in Italian. Yet, if we assume the 1511–1512 date to be correct this would place him in Italy for close to twenty years, more than enough time to gain proficiency in Italian (especially given the fact that he would have already known at least one Spanish vernacular and, as a physician, Latin).
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We also know that Judah wrote poetry (see the poem quoted above). In addition to his biographical poem, he also composed poetic introductions to three of his father’s last works: Rosh Amanah, Zevach Pesach, and Nachalat Avot.
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Finally, we possess a letter dating to 1566 from one Amatus Lusitanus, a physician who wrote that he attended to a patient by the name of Judah “who was the grandson of the great Platonic philosopher, known as Judah or Leon Abrabanel, who gave to us the most beautiful dialogues on love.” Further in this letter, he mentions that Judah also composed a work entitled De Coeli Harmonia (“On the Harmony of the Spheres”) and that, according to the introduction, he dedicated it to the “divine Pico della Mirandola.” Unfortunately, this work has not survived. If he dedicated to Pico as the letter indicates, it would most likely have been composed before the Dialoghi and also, based on the title, it would have been composed in Latin.
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The central question concerning the language of the Dialoghi’s composition is: How could a Jewish refugee from Portugal show such facility with Italian, let alone the Tuscan dialect, since Judah seems to have spent very little time in Tuscany?[8] Those who argue for a Latin original point to the fact that (1) he was a physician and would have known Latin, and (2) a phrase by Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo (1591–1655) in his Mikhtav Ahuz suggesting that he was going to translate Judah’s work from Latin. Those who argue for a Hebrew original point to another phrase, this time by Claudio Tolemei (1492–1556), a non-Jew, which states that Judah composed his treatise in sua lingua (“his own language”). Although, as others have pointed out, such a phrase could quite easily refer to “his own style.”
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However, given the evidence, an Italian original for the work seems most likely since (1) all the manuscripts, including Mariano Lenzi’s edition of 1535, are in Italian; (2) it seems that Judah had lived in Italy for close to twenty years by the time that he wrote the Dialoghi (more than enough time for someone to gain an intimate knowledge of Italian, especially someone proficient in Latin and Spanish vernaculars); (3) neither later Jewish authors, e.g., Azaria de’Rossi,[9] nor non-Jewish authors, e.g., Tullia d’Aragona,[10] had any reason to suspect that it was written in a language other than Italian; (4) if we assume the later date of 1511–1512, many non-Tuscan Italian authors of this period called for the adoption of Tuscan as a literary language, owing primarily to the fact that this was the language of Petrarch (1304–1374) and Boccaccio (1313–1375);[11] and, (5) as for the question of the Tuscan dialect of the work, many Italian printers of the early sixteenth century “Tuscanized” Italian according to set criteria.[12]
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Moreover, many Jewish authors in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries increasingly resorted to Romance vernaculars in order to attract a Jewish audience (including conversos and ex-conversos), which no longer understood Hebrew. In sixteenth-century Italy, larger trends in rhetoric and the use of language increasingly led to the creation of the ideal of a pure Italian language. In this regard, Judah becomes an important transitional thinker in the encounter between Judaism and the Italian Renaissance. Whereas his father, Don Isaac, could still adapt humanistic themes to his Hebrew writings, which were still primarily in conversation with medieval thought,[13] increasingly in Judah’s generation the only way to engage in a full-scale examination of the universal tendencies associated with Humanism was to write in the vernacular.
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Finally, the very genre of the Dialoghi, that of the trattato d’amore (“treatise on love”), was the product of the Italian vernacular of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. When, for example, Judah discusses the concept of love as a universal or cosmic principle he draws upon, as will be clearer below, a particular vocabulary and set of concepts that only make sense when contextualized within this already existing discourse.[14]
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Two features that are new in Judah’s work and, thus, serve to differentiate his thought from that of his Jewish and Islamic predecessors are: (1) his almost complete lack of concern with the venerable antagonism between faith and reason, and (2) his interest in elucidating the concomitant intersection between Greek myth and Judaism.
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The tension between faith and reason had been at the heart of medieval Jewish philosophy. This became especially pronounced in post-Maimonidean philosophy, which witnessed the radicalization of a number of principles (e.g., eternality of the universe, denial of bodily resurrection), and which threatened to undermine traditional religious belief. This led to a Kulturkampf between those who thought that non-Jewish learning (i.e., philosophy) had a valid role to play in the Jewish curriculum versus those who claimed that such “foreign” works led to apostasy. The reverberations of these conflicts, known collectively as the “Maimonidean controversies,” were severe.
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The antagonism between faith and reason is immediately palpable in the thought of Judah’s father, who constantly tried to uphold traditional Jewish belief against what he considered to be the onslaught of philosophical radicalism. Yet, in the thought of Judah this “conflict” between the hitherto venerable antagonists virtually disappears. The question we have to ask, then, is why? The most likely reason is to be located in the notion of sophia perennis, which played an important role in the thought of Florentine humanists. According to this doctrine, there exists a unity to all knowledge irrespective of its source. As a result, the rationalism of philosophy could quite easily be reconciled with that of revelation because both were regarded as articulating the same truth. Evidence of this may be seen in Judah’s frequent citation of biblical passages to support philosophical principles and vice versa. Furthermore, because Judah is primarily unconcerned with the antagonism between faith and reason, he becomes one of the first Jewish philosophers to ignore esotericism (viz., that philosophical truths must be kept from the unenlightened) as a philosophical principle. For him, traditional esoteric topics, such as metaphysics, now become part and parcel of the beautiful and dramatic unfolding of God’s beauty in the universe, and such topics are open to all (including women, as the character of Sophia demonstrates).
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Further evidence of Judah’s use of the concept of sophia perennis may be witnessed in his orientation towards ancient Greek myth. The “rediscovery” of ancient Greek and Roman literature was one of the hallmarks of the Renaissance, and in the thought of Judah we certainly see this, only now with a distinctly Jewish “twist.” On one level, he wants to show that there exists a fundamental identity between Greek myth and the teachings of the Torah. Yet, on a deeper level he wants to argue that the Greeks ultimately derived their teachings from the ancient Israelites and subsequently corrupted them.[15] For instance, Judah argues that Plato studied among the ancient Israelites in Egypt,[16] and that Plato’s myth of the Androgyne, found in the Symposium, is actually a Greek plagiarism of a Jewish source:
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Sophia: The story is beautiful and ornate (la favola è bella e ornata), and it is impossible not to believe that it signifies some philosophical beauty (bella filosofia), more especially since it was composed by Plato himself, in the Symposium, in the name of Aristophanes. Tell me, therefore, Philo what is the allegory?
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Philo: The myth was handed down by earlier writers than the Greeks—in the sacred writings of Moses, concerning the creation of the first human parents, Adam and Eve…it was from [Moses] that Plato took his myth, amplifying and polishing it after Greek oratory, thus giving a confused account of Hebrew matters (facendo in questo una mescolanza inordinate de le cose ebraiche).[17]
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Judah seeks to accomplish at least two things with passages such as this. First, he claims, polemically, that the Jewish tradition, especially its mythopoeic tradition, is the source of all subsequent literary and philosophical streams of western civilization. Secondly (and this is less evident in the above passage than in other ones), he tries to wrest Christian-centric interpretations of biblical passages (e.g., the Garden of Eden and the concept of original sin), including those offered by thinkers such as Ficino and Pico della Mirandola,[18] away from what he considers to be the original intentionality of the text. Rather, he claims that the Jewish version or interpretation of such texts is actually more in keeping with the spirit of the Renaissance than those offered by Christians. The corollary of this is that any individual, Jewish or Gentile, should quite easily be able to accept equally the truths of Judaism and those of philosophy.[19]
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In the thought of Judah Abrabanel, the concepts of beauty (bellezza) and love (amore) become technical terms through which he examines virtually every traditional philosophical issue. Frequently, however, his discussion of one of these terms is predicated on the existence of the other; as a result, beauty and love are inseparable in the Dialoghi, undoubtedly mirroring Judah’s understanding of the way in which these two principles operate in the universe. The intimate relationship between these two principles may be witnessed in his definition of beauty as that “which delights the mind that recognizes it and moves it to love” (dilettando l’animo col suo conoscimento, il muove ad amare).[20] Without Beauty, in other words, the intellect is unable to desire something outside of itself and, thus, it is effectively unable to cognize. Judah subsequently argues that the lower senses (i.e., taste, smell or touch) cannot grasp Beauty; only the higher senses (e.g., sight and hearing) can—in addition, of course, to the imagination and the intellect.[21] Moreover, since Beauty is mirrored throughout the universe, physical objects (notes, melodies, etc.) both participate in and point the way towards this incorporeal Beauty:
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Beauty is only found in the objects of sight (oggetti del viso), such as beautiful forms and shapes and beautiful pictures, the perfect symmetry of the parts with the whole, well-proportioned limbs, beautiful colors and clear light, the sun, the moon and the stars, and the heavens in all their splendor. This grace exists in objects of sight by reason of their spiritual nature, and it is the custom to enter through the clear and spiritual eyes, to delight our soul and move it to a love of such an object; and this is what it is that we call beauty. It is also found in objects of hearing, such as beautiful oratory, voices, speech, song music, consonance, proportion and harmony. For in the spiritual nature of these things is found grace which moves the soul to delight and to love through the medium of the spiritual sense of hearing. Thus grace and beauty are found among beautiful things that are endowed with a spiritual nature (sensi spirituali).[22]
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Based on this and other passages, Judah argues that it is primarily by means of the beauty of created things that the individual is able to apprehend and move towards incorporeal or spiritual Beauty. Love is what is ultimately responsible for directing the soul and the intellect of the individual to increasingly spiritual matters.
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We witness the further departure of Judah’s thought from that of his predecessors when we examine his discussion of rhetoric and aesthetics. Medieval Aristotelians tended to locate rhetoric in the trivium (which also included logic and dialectic), and, thus, as propaedeutic to “higher” sciences such as metaphysics. In the Renaissance, however, eloquence was equated with wisdom, and the good rhetorician had to be proficient in all branches of human knowledge. This led many Jewish Renaissance thinkers to examine not only the classical authors (e.g., Cicero and Quintilian), but also to mine the Bible for its use of language and style. Whereas Maimonides and other Jewish Aristotelians had been interested in biblical rhetoric as a means to reproduce imaginative representations of philosophical truths to those unlearned in philosophy, Renaissance thinkers held that rhetoric was the art form par excellence, one that enabled the individual to command respect in public life.[23]
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Furthermore, following Maimonides (e.g., Guide I.2), many medieval thinkers envisaged beauty as contingent upon consensus and not a matter of the intellectual faculty. In the Renaissance, by contrast, beauty was elevated to an ideal that, inter alia, moved the intellect, by means of desire, to either perfect that which exists below it or to be perfected by that above. This principle was subsequently shared by philosophers, poets, and visual artists, and, quite frequently, there existed a fluid line separating these professions.
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Although there exists an intimate connection between sensual and cosmic beauty it is by means of the latter that Judah frames his discussion of cosmology, ontology, and psychology. Beauty, to reiterate, is what inspires love and desire, and thereby connects all levels of the universe into an interlocking and organic relationship. The result is that everything, both sensual and intelligible, has the potential to image and reflect God’s beauty.
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Judah’s cosmology is a case in point. In the Dialoghi he presents two distinct accounts of the origin of the universe. This issue—viz., was the universe created or is it eternal—was one of the touchstones in the debate not only between philosophers and non-philosophers, but also among philosophers. At stake in these debates was God’s omnipotence and omniscience: If the world was created, then clearly God is transcendent to the world as both its Creator and Sustainer; if not, then God’s power to act is potentially curtailed by another principle’s eternality. In his discussion of these matters, Judah adopts two models: one based on Islamicate Neoplatonism and the other on the Plotinian triad.
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According to the first model, Judah argues—citing Ghazali, Avicenna and Maimonides—that God in His complete simplicity and “by the love of His infinite beauty produces out of Himself alone the first intelligence and mover of the first heaven” (con l’amore de la sua immense bellezza immediate da sé sola la prima intelligenzia movtrice del primo cielo produce).[25] The first intelligence, in turn, contemplates (1) the beauty of its cause to produce the second intellect, and (2) its own beauty to produce the first heavenly sphere. This theory of emanation, based on the love of beauty,[26] pervades the entire universe (both supra- and sub-lunar). The Active Intellect, the lowest of the ten heavenly intellects and associated with the sphere of the moon, becomes the intellect of the corporeal world. By contemplating its own beauty it produces the forms found in this world, and in contemplating the beauty of its cause, it produces human intellects. Following this, Judah offers a Plotinian account based on a celestial triad.[27] He now distinguishes between three types of beauty that pervade the cosmos. The first is God qua the Source of beauty (l’attore di bellezza), the second is beauty itself (bellezza; i.e., intelligible beauty), and the third is the physical universe produced by this idea in the intellect of God (il participante di bellezza).[28]
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Judah subsequently uses the latter model, combined with kabbalistic embellishment, to interpret the first creation account in Genesis, where the physical world is now described as the offspring between God, the male principle, and intelligible beauty, now personified as a female.[29] Corporeal beauty, according to this model, becomes the primogeniture of God’s love for His female consort, wisdom. Since this physical world is intimately connected to God, it cannot be negated. Rather, this world becomes necessary, and this is a leitmotiv that runs throughout the work, for humans to make physical beauty “spiritual in our intellect.”[30] One must, in other words, orientate oneself towards sensible beauty in such a manner that one reverses the ontological chain.
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The above discussion is directly related to the way in which Judah’s envisages both psychology and prophecy. According to him, the five external senses divide into (1) those that are primarily material (materiali): touch (tatto), taste (gusto), and smell (odorato); and (2) those that are increasingly spiritual (spirituali): hearing (per l’audito) and sight (per l’occhi).[31] It seems that only the latter are able to penetrate behind the purely physical so as to abstract the spiritual from the corporeal. Hearing, intimately connected to the Renaissance ideal of rhetoric, consists of the ability to discern “fine speeches, excellent reasoning, beautiful verses, sweet music, and beautiful and harmonious melodies.”[32] Sight, ranked just above the faculty of hearing, owing to the primacy that Judah puts on vision, deals with “beautiful colors, regular patterns, and light in all its varied splendor.”[33] The senses, thus, function hierarchically as a prolegomenon to any form of higher knowledge, with the imagination forming the threshold (mezzo) between the senses and the intellect.
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Central to the unfolding argument in the Dialoghi is the concept of ocular power (forza oculare). In the first dialogue, Judah describes two modes of apprehending spiritual matters. The first is through the faculty of sight and the second through the intellect.[34] For the eye, like the intellect, is illumined by means of light, thereby establishing a relationship between the eye, the object seen, and the space that separates them.[35] Just as the sun supplies light to the eye, the divine intellect illumines the human intellect during the act of intellection. It is light, then, that enables us to “comprehend all the beautiful shining objects of the corporeal world.”[36] Sight becomes the model by which we engage the universe: it is what makes knowledge possible since it is only through vision of tangible particulars that we acquire knowledge of intelligibles.
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Judah subsequently distinguishes between three types of vision. The highest type is that of God’s visual apprehension of himself; following this is that associated with the angelic world, which sees God directly though not on equal terms; finally, there is human vision, which is the weakest of the three types and can only visualize the divine indirectly.[37] The best that most humans can do in this world is to obtain knowledge of incorporeal essences through corporeal particulars. Judah does admit, though, that some special individuals are able to unite with the angelic world, which he describes as the Agent Intellect (intelleto agente). When such unification (copulare) occurs, the individual “sees and desires divine beauty as in a crystal or a clear mirror, but not directly” (vede e desia la bellezza divine come in uno mezzo cristiallino, o sia chiaro specchio, ma non in se stessa immediate).[38] Judah refers to this act as prophecy. Like Maimonides, Judah claims that Moses did not prophesy through the imagination, but only through the intellect, which he nevertheless describes in highly visual terms as beholding “the most beautiful figure of God” (la bellissima figura di Dio).[39]
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In the third dialogue, Abrabanel further divides the human into a tripartite structure consisting of the body (il corpo), the soul (l’anima), and the intellect (l’intelletto).[40] The soul, which I have interpreted as the imaginative faculty because of the properties assigned to it,[41] is once again the intermediary (mezzo) between the body (and the senses) and the intellect.[42] Although he does not come right out and define the functioning of the soul in any detail, he does claim that it is indispensable to the proper working of the body and the intellect. Moreover, it is this faculty that is in constant danger of being corrupted by unhealthy corporeal desire and, most importantly for the present, it is ultimately responsible for translating the corporeal into the incorporeal and vice versa. This soul, in turn,
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has two faces (due faccie) , like those of the moon turned towards the sun and the earth respectively, the one being turned towards the intellect above it, and the other toward the body below. The first face looking towards the intellect is the understanding with which the soul reasons of universals and spiritual knowledge, extracting the forms and intellectual essences from particular and sensible bodies (estraendo le forme ed essenzie intellettuali da li particulari e sensibili corpi)…the second face turned towards the body is sense, which is particular knowledge of corporeal things known … These two faces have contrary or opposed notions; and as our soul with its upper face or understanding makes the corporeal incorporeal (l’incorporeo al corporeo), so the lower face, or sensible cognition, approaching the objects of sense and mingling with them, draws the incorporeal to the corporeal.[43]
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The traditional philosophical notion of love, going back at least to the time of Plato, is that love results from the imperfection and privation of that which loves. One loves, in other words, what one does not possess (see, e.g., Plato, Symposium 200a-201e).[44] Accordingly, that which is imperfect loves that which is perfect, and, that which is perfect (i.e., God) neither loves nor desires. Aristotle likewise claimed that that which is less perfect (e.g., slaves, children, wives and ruled) should have more love for that which is more perfect (e.g., freeborn, parents, husbands, and rulers) than vice versa. The First Cause, then, is loved but does not love. This discussion would predominate from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages.
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Judah’s theory of love, by contrast, was intimately connected to the literary interests of humanism and the aesthetic sensibilities of Renaissance artists.[45] As a consequence, Judah faults previous thinkers for (1) not ascribing love to God and (2) confining their discussion of love primarily to that between humans, thereby ignoring the dynamic role of God in relationships based on this principle. Using the name of Plato as a metonym for other philosophers, he is critical of this approach:
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Plato in his Symposium discusses only the kind of love that is found in men, which has its final cause in the lover but not in the beloved (terminato ne l’amante ma non ne l’amato), for this kind mainly is called love, since that which ends in the loved one is called friendship and benevolence (ché quel che si termina ne l’amato si chiama amicizia e benivolenzia). He rightly defines this love as a desire of beauty (desiderio di bellezza). He says that such love is not found in God, because that which desires beauty and doesn’t have it is not beautiful, and God, who is the highest beauty, does not lack beauty nor can he desire it, whence he cannot have love, that is, of such a kind (Tale amore dice che non si truova in Dio, però che quel che desia bellezza non l’ha né è bello, e a Dio, che è sommo bello, non gli manca bellezza né la può desiare, onde non può avere amore, cioè di tal sorte).[46]
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Judah seeks to provide a corrective to this and, in the process, offer what he considers to be a more comprehensive theory of love. In particular, he intertwines love and beauty such that the lover of beauty seeks to unite with the source of beauty, something that the lover subsequently seeks to reproduce himself (the lover is always male, according to Judah because it is responsible for impregnating the passive and receptive female principle). This can take the form of God’s creation of the universe, the artist’s creation of a work of art, and the philosopher’s composition of a pleasing work of philosophy. In his discussion of love, Judah also departs from other Renaissance thinkers. Whereas Ficino had equated human love with sensual love between humans, Judah, drawing upon Maimonidean precedents, resignifies human love as, on one level, that which the intellect has for God.[47]
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Perhaps, Judah’s biggest departure from earlier thinkers is his ascription of love to God. Here, however, his discussion is not entirely new; rather, he picks up on a number of issues discussed in the work of Hasdai Crescas (ca. 1340–ca. 1410), the important critic of Aristotelianism and Maimonideanism. For Crescas, breaking from both the Platonic and Aristotelian positions, love need not be associated with privation or imperfection:
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Inasmuch as it is known that God, may He be blessed, is the sources and fountain of all perfection, and in virtue of his perfection, which is His essence, He loves the good, as may be seen from His actions in bringing into existence the entire universe, sustaining it perpetually, and continuously creating it anew, and all be means of His simple will, it must necessarily be that the love of the good is an essential property of perfection. It follows from this that the greater perfection [of the lover] the greater will be the love and the pleasure in the desire.[48]
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Love, for Crescas, is tantamount to God’s creative activity. In the third book of the Dialoghi Judah picks up this theme:
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Divine Love (L’amor divino) is the inclination (tendenzia) of God’s most beautiful wisdom toward the likeness of His own beauty, to wit, the universe created by Him, together with its return to union with His supreme wisdom; and His pleasure is the perfect union of His image with Himself (la perfetta unione di sua immagine in se stesso), and of His created universe with Himself as Creator.[49]
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Judah’s subsequent discussion of love, however, departs significantly from either Crescas or other Renaissance thinkers. This is especially the case when it comes to Judah’s refusal to abnegate sensual love. Rather, he celebrates such love as the gateway to cosmic or spiritual love. Sensual love, for him, becomes that which orientates the individual towards the Divine. Unlike Crescas, however, Judah does not reject the Maimonidean concept of God as divine intellect. Furthermore, Judah’s discussion finds no homolog in the thought of Crescas or even Maimonides when it comes to the concept of God’s beauty.
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Near the end of the third dialogue, Judah introduces the “circle of love,” il circulo degli amari, as follows:
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
The circle of all things (il circulo di tutte) begins from their first origin, and passing successively through each thing in turn, returns to its first origin as to its ultimate end (ultimo fine), thus containing every degree of being in its circular form (comprendendo tutti li gradi de le cose a modo circulare), so that the point which is the beginning also comes to be the end. This circle has two halves (due mezzi), the first from the beginning to the point most distant from it, the mid-point, and the second from this mid-point to the beginning again.[50]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
This circle, in other words, begins with the divine, whose love creates and sustains the universe: “each degree of being with paternal love procreates its immediate inferior, imparting its being or paternal beauty to it, although in a lesser degree as is only fitting.”[51] This emanative framework, the love of that which is more beautiful for that which is less beautiful, comprises the first half of the circle. Every thing in the universe exists on a hierarchical chain of being, from the pure actuality of the divine to the pure potentiality of prime matter. Just as the superior desires the perfection of the inferior, the inferior desires to unite with the superior. The first half of the circle spans from God to utter chaos, whereas, the second half of this circle works in reverse. It is the love of the inferior for the superior, predicated on the former’s privation and subsequent desire to unite with the superior.
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
The telos of Judah’s system occurs when the intellect is “absorbed in the science of the Divine and of things abstracted from matter, rejoicing in and becoming enamored of the highest grace and beauty which is in the creator and artificer of all things, so that it attains its ultimate happiness.”[52] Within this context, Judah employs a well-known and well-used metaphor in his discussion of the imaginative faculty, that of the mirror (specchio).[53] In the medieval Islamicate philosophical tradition, following Plotinus, the mirror (Ar. mir’â), is frequently used as an image for the perfected soul, at whose vanguard resides the intellect.[54] Just as the mirror reflects what is placed in front of it, the soul, in a state of perfection, reflects the higher principles of the universe. Early on in the Dialoghi, Philo asks Sophia, “Do you not see how the form of man is impressed on and received by a mirror, not as a complete human being, but within the limits of the mirror’s powers and capabilities, which reflect the figure only and not the essence.”[55] Later, in dialogue three, he argues that it is through our own “intellectual mirror” that we apprehend the divine:
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
It is enough for our intellectual mirror (specchio intellettuale) to receive and image (figurare) the infinite divine essence (l’immensa essenzia divina) according to the capacity of its intellectual nature; though there is a measureless gulf fixed between them, so far does its nature fall short of that of the object of its understanding.[56]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
By corporealizing the spiritual and spiritualizing the corporeal, the intellect, in tandem with the imagination, enables individuals to gain knowledge of the divine world. Unlike Maimonides and other medieval Aristotelians who equated the natural world with impermanence and evil, Judah argues that this world is the natural receptacle of heavenly powers: “Hence earth is the proper and regular consort of heaven, whereof the other elements are but paramours. For it is upon the earth that heaven begets all on the greater part of its progeny.”[57] In an interesting passage, Judah, like Maimonides before him, compares matter to a harlot.[58] Yet, unlike Maimonides, he reaches a radically different conclusion. For Judah, “it is this adulterous love that beautifies the lower world with such wondrous variety of the fair-formed things.”[59] In keeping with Judah’s claim that “the lower can be found in the higher,”[60] this world becomes one gigantic mirror that reflects spiritual beauty, and in which one can grasp divine intelligibles.[61] Just as Philo is enthralled by Sophia’s beauty, the individual, upon contemplating physical objects that are beautiful, apprehends the divine:
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
God has implanted His image and likeness in His creatures through the finite beauty imparted to them from His surpassing beauty. And the image of the infinite must be finite, otherwise it would not be a copy, but that of which it is the image. The infinite beauty of the Creator is depicted and reflected in finite created beauty like a beautiful face in a mirror and although the image is not commensurate with its divine pattern, nonetheless it will be its copy, portrait, and true likeness (Si depinge e immagina la bellezza infinita del creatore ne la bellezza finita creata come una bella figura in uno specchio: non però commisura l’immagine il divino immaginato, ma bene gli sará simulacro similitudine e immagine).[62]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
It is ultimately the love of beauty in the soul of the individual, combined with the cognizance that one lacks it in its entirety, that moves not only the soul of the individual, but also the entire cosmos. Virtuous love, which Philo answers in response to Sophia’s fourth question concerning the parents of love, is the highest form of love and, significantly, one can have this for either corporeal or spiritual things. Indeed, Philo intimates that such virtuous love can only emerge from sensible phenomena:[63]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
When [the soul] perceives a beautiful person whose beauty is in harmony with itself, it recognizes in and through this beauty, divine beauty, in the image of which this person is also made.[64]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
The goal of Judah’s system is to ascend through this hierarchy, that gateway to which is the sensual enjoyment that one derives from physical objects. Only after this can one appreciate spiritual beauty, an appreciation of which culminates in basking in the divine presence. Judah discusses this process in the following manner:
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
We ought principally to love the higher forms of beauty separated from formless matter and gross corporeality (amiamo le grandi bellezze separate da la deforme material e brutto corpe) , such as the virtues and the sciences, which are ever beautiful and devoid of all ugliness and defect. Here again we may ascend through a hierarchy of beauty from the lesser to the greater (ascendiamo per le minori a le maggiori bellezze) and from the pure to the purest leading to the knowledge and love, not only of the most beautiful intelligences, souls and motors of the heavenly bodies, but also of the highest beauty and of the supremely beautiful, the giver of all beauty, life, intelligence and being. We may scale this ladder only when we put away earthly garments and material affection (potremo fare quando noi abbandonaremo le vesti corporee e le passioni materiali)…[65]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
Even though the corporeal was, at the outset of this journey, indispensable; the higher one moves up the hierarchy the less important the material becomes. As far as the individual is concerned, the highest felicity resides in the union with God, which the Italian describes erotically as felice coppulativa:
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
Because the love of the human soul is twofold, it is directed not only towards the beauty of the intellect, but also towards the image of that beauty in the body. It happens that at times the love of intellectual beauty is so strong that it draws the soul to cast off all affection for the body; thus the body and soul in man fall apart, and there follows the joyful death in union with the divine (la morte felice coppulativa).[66]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
One of the most surprising features concerning the reception history of the Dialoghi is that a work of Jewish philosophy would subsequently become a European bestseller among non-Jews. In the years immediately following its Italian publication, the Dialoghi was translated into virtually every European vernacular. This popularity might be the result of the prominent role that grace (grazia) plays in the Dialoghi or the fact that Judah frequently stresses the interlocking relationship between the corporeal and the spiritual, something that seems to have resonated with contemporaneous Christian treatments of the incarnation in literary fiction.[67]
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
This popularity of the work has led some to posit that Judah Abrabanel’s thought is epigonic, responsible for disseminating the thought of “great thinkers” such as Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) to a wider audience. This essay’s point of departure, however, has been that the thought of Judah Abrabanel, while dependent upon certain features of these earlier thinkers, nevertheless makes significant departures from them in terms of his construction of an overarching system that revolves around the twin principles of love and beauty
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
Paradoxically, the initial response of Jews to the Dialoghi was for the most part negative. Some of the earliest criticisms, especially those of Saul ha-Kohen Ashkenazi, fault Judah with rationalizing kabbalistic principles. Ashkenazi, in a letter to Don Isaac Abrabanel, criticizes Judah for his lack of philosophical esotericism, and for spending too much time on linguistic matters, such as riddles and eloquence. Such antagonism reflects the broader context of the Maimonidean controversies, in which philosophers sought to make philosophy known to a broader Jewish public often by means of dramatic dialogues or philosophical novels. Those opposed to the Aristotelian-Maimonidean paradigm of philosophy often blamed such treatises for weakening the faith of Jews by diminishing their commitment to the halakhah (law) and, thus, making them more susceptible to conversion. Despite such initial criticisms, however, subsequent generations stressed the interrelationship between Platonism and kabbalah on the one hand, and philosophy and aesthetics on the other. Notable individuals include Azariah de Rossi (d. ca. 1578) and Judah Moscato (d. ca. 1594).
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
The actual influence that the Dialoghi would have on subsequent thinkers is more difficult to judge. Essentially, Judah adopted certain trajectories of medieval cosmology and psychology, combined them with Renaissance notions of beauty, and thereby created a full-blown aesthetics of Judaism. This led him to conceive of the universe as a living, dynamic structure, in which all levels share in a symbiotic and organic relationship. Unlike many of his medieval predecessors, he did not define this world, the world of form and matter, in terms of privation or its distance from the divine. On the contrary, he envisages this world as the arena wherein individuals encounter, through sensual particulars, the beauty and love of the divine. Abrabanel’s emphasis, like that of many of his Renaissance contemporaries, on aesthetics and the phenomenal world would eventually become an important dimension of 16th- and 17th -century natural philosophy. We do know, for example, that Baruch Spinoza had a copy of the Dialoghi in his library.
abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abrabanel/
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
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Ficino, Marsilio | -->humanism: in the Renaissance--> | Maimonides
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abrabanel
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
One doesn’t go far in the study of what there is without encountering the view that every entity falls into one of two categories: concrete or abstract. The distinction is supposed to be of fundamental significance for metaphysics (especially for ontology), epistemology, and the philosophy of the formal sciences (especially for the philosophy of mathematics); it is also relevant for analysis in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of the empirical sciences. This entry surveys (a) attempts to say how the distinction should be drawn and (b) some of main theories of, and about, abstract objects.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The abstract/concrete distinction has a curious status in contemporary philosophy. It is widely agreed that the ontological distinction is of fundamental importance, but as yet, there is no standard account of how it should be drawn. There is a consensus about how to classify certain paradigm cases. For example, it is usually acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics, like pure sets, are abstract (if they exist), whereas rocks, trees, and human beings are concrete. In everyday language, it is common to use expressions that refer to concrete entities as well as those that apparently refer to abstractions such as democracy, happiness, motherhood, etc. Moreover, formulations of mathematical theories seem to appeal directly to abstract entities, and the use of mathematical expressions in the empirical sciences seems indispensable to the formulation of our best empirical theories (see Quine 1948; Putnam 1971; and the entry on indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics). Finally, apparent reference to abstract entities such as sets, properties, concepts, propositions, types, and possible worlds, among others, is ubiquitous in different areas of philosophy.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Though there is a pervasive appeal to abstract objects, philosophers have nevertheless wondered whether they exist. The alternatives are: platonism, which endorses their existence, and nominalism, which denies the existence of abstract objects across the board. (See the entries on nominalism in metaphysics and platonism in metaphysics.) But the question of how to draw the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is an open one: it is not clear how one should characterize these two categories nor is there a definite list of items that fall under one or the other category (assuming neither is empty).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The first challenge, then, is to articulate the distinction, either by defining the terms explicitly or by embedding them in a theory that makes their connections to other important categories more explicit. In the absence of such an account, the philosophical significance of the contrast remains uncertain, for the attempt to classify things as abstract or concrete by appeal to intuition is often problematic. Is it clear that scientific theories (e.g., the general theory of relativity), works of fiction (e.g., Dante’s Inferno), fictional characters (e.g., Bilbo Baggins) or conventional entities (e.g., the International Monetary Fund or the Spanish Constitution of 1978) are abstract?
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
It should be stressed that there may not be one single “correct” way of explaining the abstract/concrete distinction. Any plausible account will classify the paradigm cases in the standard way or give reasons for proceeding otherwise, and any interesting account will draw a clear and philosophically significant line in the domain of objects. Yet there may be many equally interesting ways of accomplishing these two goals, and if we find ourselves with two or more accounts that do the job rather well, there may be no point in asking which corresponds to the real abstract/concrete distinction. This illustrates a general point: when technical terminology is introduced in philosophy by means of examples, but without explicit definition or theoretical elaboration, the resulting vocabulary is often vague or indeterminate in reference. In such cases, it usually is pointless to seek a single correct account. A philosopher may find herself asking questions like, ‘What is idealism?’ or ‘What is a substance?’ and treating these questions as difficult questions about the underlying nature of a certain determinate philosophical category. A better approach may be to recognize that in many cases of this sort, we simply have not made up our minds about how the term is to be understood, and that what we seek is not a precise account of what this term already means, but rather a proposal for how it might fruitfully be used for philosophical analysis. Anyone who believes that something in the vicinity of the abstract/concrete distinction matters for philosophy would be well advised to approach the project of explaining the distinction with this in mind.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
So before we turn to the discussion of abstract objects in earnest, it will help if we clarify how some of the key terms will be used in what follows.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Frege famously distinguished two mutually exclusive ontological domains, functions and objects. According to his view, a function is an ‘incomplete’ entity that maps arguments to values, and is denoted by an incomplete expression, whereas an object is a ‘complete’ entity and can be denoted by a singular term. Frege reduced properties and relations to functions and so these entities are not included among the objects. Some authors make use of Frege’s notion of ‘object’ when discussing abstract objects (e.g., Hale 1987). But though Frege’s sense of ‘object’ is important, it is not the only way to use the term. Other philosophers include properties and relations among the abstract objects. And when the background context for discussing objects is type theory, properties and relations of higher type (e.g., properties of properties, and properties of relations) may be all be considered ‘objects’. This latter use of ‘object’ is interchangeable with ‘entity.’[1] Throughout this entry, we will follow this last usage and treat the expressions ‘object’ and ‘entity’ as having the same meaning. (For further discussion, see the entry on objects.)
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Though we’ve spoken as if the abstract/concrete distinction must be an exhaustive dichotomy, we should be open to the possibility that the best sharpening of it will entail that some objects are neither abstract nor concrete. Holes and shadows, if they exist, do not clearly belong in either category; nor do ghosts, Cartesian minds, fictional characters,[2] immanent universals, or tropes. The main constraint on an account of the distinction is that it draws a philosophically significant line that classifies at least many of the standard examples in the standard ways. It is not a constraint that everything be shoehorned into one category or the other.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Finally, some philosophers see the main distinction not as between abstract and concrete objects but as between abstract objects and ordinary objects, where the distinction is a modal one – ordinary objects are possibly concrete while abstract objects (like the number 1) couldn’t be concrete (Zalta 1983, 1988). In any case, in the following discussion, we shall assume that the abstract/concrete distinction is a division among existing objects, and that any plausible explanation of the distinction should aim to characterize a distinction among such objects.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete is not an ancient one. Indeed, there is a strong case for the view that, despite occasional exceptions, it played no significant role in philosophy before the 20th century. The modern distinction bears some resemblance to Plato’s distinction between Forms and Sensibles. But Plato’s Forms were supposed to be causes par excellence, whereas abstract objects are generally supposed to be causally inert. The original ‘abstract’/‘concrete’ distinction was a distinction among words or terms. Traditional grammar distinguishes the abstract noun ‘whiteness’ from the concrete noun ‘white’ without implying that this linguistic contrast corresponds to a metaphysical distinction in what these words stand for. In the 17th century, this grammatical distinction was transposed to the domain of ideas. Locke speaks of the general idea of a triangle which is “neither Oblique nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon [Scalene]; but all and none of these at once,” remarking that even this idea is not among the most “abstract, comprehensive and difficult” (Essay, IV.vii.9). Locke’s conception of an abstract idea as one that is formed from concrete ideas by the omission of distinguishing detail was immediately rejected by Berkeley and then by Hume. But even for Locke there was no suggestion that the distinction between abstract ideas and concrete or particular ideas corresponds to a distinction among objects. “It is plain, …” Locke writes, “that General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of things; but are Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether Words or Ideas” (III.iii.11).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The abstract/concrete distinction in its modern form is meant to mark a line in the domain of objects or entities. So conceived, the distinction becomes a central focus for philosophical discussion primarily in the 20th century. The origins of this development are obscure, but one crucial factor appears to have been the breakdown of the allegedly exhaustive distinction between mental and material objects, which had formed the main division for ontologically-minded philosophers since Descartes. One signal event in this development is Frege’s insistence that the objectivity and aprioricity of the truths of mathematics entail that numbers are neither material beings nor ideas in the mind. If numbers were material things (or properties of material things), the laws of arithmetic would have the status of empirical generalizations. If numbers were ideas in the mind, then the same difficulty would arise, as would countless others. (Whose mind contains the number 17? Is there one 17 in your mind and another in mine? In that case, the appearance of a common mathematical subject matter would be an illusion.) In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), Frege concludes that numbers are neither external concrete things nor mental entities of any sort.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Later, in his essay “The Thought” (1918), Frege claims the same status for the items he calls thoughts—the senses of declarative sentences—and also, by implication, for their constituents, the senses of subsentential expressions. Frege does not say that senses are abstract. He says that they belong to a third realm distinct both from the sensible external world and from the internal world of consciousness. Similar claims had been made by Bolzano (1837), and later by Brentano (1874) and his pupils, including Meinong and Husserl. The common theme in these developments is the felt need in semantics and psychology, as well as in mathematics, for a class of objective (i.e., non-mental) non-physical entities. As this new realism was absorbed into English-speaking philosophy, the traditional term ‘abstract’ was enlisted to apply to the denizens of this third realm. In this vein, Popper (1968) spoke of the ‘third world’ of abstract, objective entities, in the broader sense that includes cultural products such as arguments, theories, and works of art.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
As we turn to an overview of the current debate, it is therefore important to remember that the use of the terms platonist (for those who affirm the existence of abstract objects) and nominalist (for those who deny existence) is somewhat lamentable, since these words have established senses in the history of philosophy. These terms stood for positions that have little to do with the modern notion of an abstract object. Modern platonists (with a small ‘p’) need not accept any of the distinctive metaphysical and epistemological doctrines of Plato, just as modern nominalists need not accept the distinctive doctrines of the medieval nominalists. Moreover, the literature also contains mention of anti-platonists, many of whom see themselves as fictionalists about abstracta, though this doesn’t help if it turns out that the best analysis of fictions is to regard them as abstract objects. So the reader should therefore be aware that terminology is not always well-chosen and that the terms so used sometimes stand for doctrines that are more restricted than the traditional doctrines that go by the same name. Henceforth, we simply use platonism for the thesis that there exists at least one abstract object, and nominalism for the thesis that the number of abstract objects is exactly zero (Field 1980).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Before we survey the various proposals for drawing the abstract/concrete distinction, we should briefly say why the distinction has been thought to matter. Among philosophers who take the distinction seriously, it is generally supposed that while concrete objects clearly exist, abstract entities are problematic in distinctive ways and deny the existence of abstract entities altogether. In this section we briefly survey the arguments for nominalism and the responses that platonists have offered. If the abstract objects are unified as a class, it is because they have some feature that generates what seems to be a distinctive problem—a problem that nominalists deem unsolvable and which platonists aim to solve. Before we ask what the unifying feature might be, it may therefore help to characterize the various problems it has been thought to generate.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The contemporary debate about platonism developed in earnest when Quine argued (1948) that mathematical objects exist, having changed his mind about the nominalist approach he had defended earlier (Goodman & Quine 1947). Quine’s 1948 argument involves three key premises, all of which exerted significant influence on the subsequent debate: (i) mathematics is indispensable for empirical science; (ii) we should be ontologically committed to the entities required for the truth of our best empirical theories (all of which should be expressible in a first-order language); and (iii) the entities required for the truth on an empirical theory are those in the range of the variables bounded by its first-order quantifiers (i.e., the entities in the domain of the existential quantifier ‘\(\exists x\)’ and the universal quantifier ‘\(\forall x\)’). He concluded that in addition to the concrete entities contemplated by our best empirical science, we must accept the existence of mathematical entities, even if they are abstract (see also Quine 1960, 1969, 1976).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Quine’s argument initiated a debate that is still alive. Various nominalist responses questioned one or another of the premises in his argument. For instance, Field (1980) challenged the idea that mathematics is indispensable for our best scientific theories—i.e., rejecting (i) above—and thus faced the task of rewriting classical and modern physics in nominalistic terms in order to sustain the challenge. Others have taken on the somewhat less daunting task of accepting (i) but rejecting (ii) and (iii); they’ve argued that even if our best scientific theories, in regimented form, quantify over mathematical entities, this doesn’t entail a commitment to mathematical entities (see Azzouni 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Balaguer 1996, 1998; Maddy 1995, 1997; Melia 2000, 2002; Yablo 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009; Leng 2010.) Colyvan (2010) coined the expression ‘easy-roaders’ for this second group, since they avoided the ‘hard road’ of paraphrasing our best scientific theories in non-mathematical terms.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
By contrast, some mathematical platonists (Colyvan 2001; Baker 2005, 2009) have refined Quine’s view by advancing the so-called ‘Enhanced Indispensability Argument’ (though see Saatsi 2011 for a response). Some participants describe the debate in terms of a stalemate they hope to resolve (see Baker 2017, Baron 2016, 2020, Knowles & Saatsi 2019, and Martínez-Vidal & Rivas-de-Castro 2020, for discussion).[3]
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Aside from the debate over Quine’s argument, both platonism and nominalism give rise to hard questions. Platonists not only need to provide a theory of what abstract objects exist, but also an account of how we cognitively access and come to know non-causal, abstract entities. This latter question has been the subject of a debate that began in earnest in Benacerraf (1973), which posed just such a dilemma for mathematical objects. Benacerraf noted that the causal theory of reference doesn’t seem to make it possible to know the truth conditions of mathematical statements, and his argument applies to abstract entities more generally. On the other hand, nominalists need to explain the linguistic uses in which we seem to appeal to such entities, especially those uses in what appear to be good explanations, such as those in scientific, mathematical, linguistic, and philosophical pursuits (see Wetzel 2009, 1–22, for a discussion of the many places where abstract types are used in scientific explanations). Even though nominalists argue that there are no abstracta, the very fact that there is disagreement about their existence suggests that both platonists and nominalists acknowledge the distinction between the abstract and concrete to be a meaningful one.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
On the platonist side, various proposals have been raised to address the challenge of explaining epistemic access to abstract entities, mostly in connection with mathematical objects. Some, including Gödel (1964), allege that we access abstract objects in virtue of a unique kind of perception (intuition). Maddy (1990, 1997) developed two rather different ways of understanding our knowledge of mathematics in naturalistic ways. Other platonists have argued that abstract objects are connected to empirical entities, either via abstraction (Steiner 1975; Resnik 1982; Shapiro 1997) or via abstraction principles (Wright 1983; Hale 1987); we’ll discuss some of these views below. There are also those who speak of existent and intersubjective abstract entities as a kind of mental representation (Katz 1980).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
A rather different line of approach to the epistemological problem was proposed in Linsky & Zalta 1995, where it is suggested that one shouldn’t attempt to explain knowledge of abstracta on the same model that is used to explain knowledge of concrete objects. They argue that not only a certain plenitude principle for abstract objects (namely, the comprehension principle for abstract objects put forward in Zalta 1983, 1988—see below) yields unproblematic ‘acquaintance by description’ to unique abstract objects but also that their approach actually comports with naturalist beliefs. Balaguer (1995, 1998) also suggests that a plenitude principle is the best way forward for the platonist, and that our knowledge of the consistency of mathematical theories suffices for knowledge of mathematical objects. And there are views that conceive of abstract objects as constituted by human—or, in general, intelligent—subjects, or as abstract artifacts (see Popper 1968; Thomasson 1999).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
A number of nominalists have been persuaded by Benacerraf’s (1973) epistemological challenge about reference to abstract objects and concluded that sentences with terms making apparent reference to them—such as mathematical statements—are either false or lack a truth value. They argue that those sentences must be paraphrasable without vocabulary that commits one to any sort of abstract entity. These proposals sometimes suggest that statements about abstract objects are merely instrumental; they serve only to help us establish conclusions about concrete objects. Field’s fictionalism (1980, 1989) has been influential in this regard. Field reconstructed Newtonian physics using second-order logic and quantification over (concrete) regions of space-time. A completely different tactic for avoiding the commitment to abstract, mathematical objects is put forward in Putnam (1967) and Hellman (1989), who separately reconstructed various mathematical theories in second-order modal logic. On their view, abstract objects aren’t in the range of the existential quantifier at the actual world (hence, we can’t say that they exist), but they do occur in the range of the quantifier at other possible worlds, where the axioms of the mathematical theory in question are true.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
These nominalistic approaches must contend with various issues, of course. At the very least, they have to successfully argue that the tools they use to avoid commitments to abstract objects don’t themselves involve such commitment. For example, Field must argue that space-time regions are concrete entities, while Putnam and Hellman must argue that by relying on logical possibility and modal logic, there is no commitment to possible worlds considered as abstract objects. In general, any nominalist account that makes essential use of set theory or model-theoretic structures must convincingly argue that the very use of such analytic tools doesn’t commit them to abstract objects. (See Burgess & Rosen 1997 for a systematic survey of different proposals about the existence of abstract objects.)
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Another nominalistic thread in the literature concerns the suggestion that sentences about (posited) abstract objects are quasi-assertions, i.e., not evaluable as to truth or falsehood (see Yablo 2001 and Kalderon 2005). Still others argue that we should not believe sentences about abstracta since their function, much like the instrumentalism discussed earlier, is to ensure empirical adequacy for observational sentences (Yablo 1998). This may involve differentiating between apparent content, which involves posited abstract objects, and real content, which only concerns concrete objects (Yablo 2001, 2002, 2010, 2014). (For more on these fictionalist accounts, see Kalderon 2005, Ch. 3, and the entry on fictionalism.)
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
A final group of views in the literature represents a kind of agnosticism about what exists or about what it is to be an object, be it abstract or concrete. These views don’t reject an external material world, but rather begin with some question as to whether we can have experience, observation, and knowledge of objects directly, i.e., independent of our theoretical frameworks. Carnap (1950 [1956]), for example, started with the idea that our scientific knowledge has to be expressed with respect to a linguistic framework and that when we wish to put forward a theory about a new kind of entity, we must have a linguistic framework for talking about those entities. He then distinguished two kinds of existence questions: internal questions within the framework about the existence of the new entities and external questions about the reality of the framework itself. If the framework deals with abstract entities such as numbers, sets, propositions, etc., then the internal question can be answered by logical analysis of the rules of the language, such as whether it includes terms for, or implies claims that quantify over, abstract objects. But, for Carnap, the external question, about whether the abstract entities really exist, is a pseudo-question and should be regarded as nothing more than the pragmatic question of whether the framework is a useful one to adopt, for scientific or other forms of enquiry. We’ll discuss Carnap’s view in more detail in subsection 3.7.1.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Some have thought that Carnap’s view offers a deflationist view of objects, since it appears that the existence of objects is not language independent. After Carnap’s seminal article, several other deflationist approaches were put forward (Putnam 1987, 1990; Hirsch 2002, 2011; Sider 2007, 2009; Thomasson 2015), many of them claiming to be a vindication of Carnap’s view. However, there are deflationist proposals that run counter to Carnap’s approach, among them, deflationary nominalism (Azzouni 2010) or agnosticism about abstract objects (Bueno 2008a, 2008b, 2020). Additionally, philosophers inspired by Frege’s work have argued for a minimal notion of an object (Rayo 2013, Rayo 2020 [Other Internet Resources]; and Linnebo 2018). We’ll discuss some of these in greater detail below, in subsection 3.7.2. A final agnostic position that has emerged is one that rejects a strict version of platonism, but suggests that neither a careful analysis of mathematical practice (Maddy 2011), nor the enhanced version of the indispensability argument (Leng 2020) suffice to decide between nominalism and moderate versions of platonism. Along these lines, Balaguer (1998) concluded that the question doesn’t have an answer, since the arguments for ‘full-blooded’ platonism can be matched one-for-one by equally good arguments by the anti-platonist.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
For additional discussion about the basic positions in the debate about abstract and concrete objects, see Szabó 2003 and the entries on nominalism in metaphysics and platonism in metaphysics, nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics and platonism in the philosophy of mathematics.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
As part of his attempt to understand the nature of possible worlds, Lewis (1986a, 81–86) categorizes different ways by which one can draw the abstract/concrete distinction.[4] These include: the way of example (which is simply to list the paradigm cases of abstract and concrete objects in the hope that the sense of the distinction will somehow emerge); the way of conflation (i.e., identifying abstract and concrete objects with some already-known distinction); the way of negation (i.e., saying what abstract objects are by saying what they are not, e.g., non-spatiotemporal, non-causal, etc.); and the way of abstraction (i.e., saying that abstract objects are conceptualized by a process of considering some known objects and omitting certain distinguishing features). He gives a detailed examination of the different proposals that typify these ways and then attempts to show that none of them quite succeeds in classifying the paradigms in accord with prevailing usage. Given the problems he encountered when analyzing the various ways, Lewis became pessimistic about our ability to draw the distinction cleanly.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Despite Lewis’s pessimism about clarifying the abstract/concrete distinction, his approach for categorizing the various proposals, when extended, is a useful one. Indeed, in what follows, we’ll see that there are a number of additional ways that categorize attempts to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction and theorize about abstract objects. Even if there is no single, acceptable account, these various ways of drawing the distinction and theorizing about abstract objects do often cast light on the questions we’ve been discussing, especially when the specific proposals are integrated into a supplementary (meta-)ontological project. For each method of drawing the distinction and specific proposal adopting that method acquires a certain amount of explanatory power, and this will help us to compare and contrast the various ideas that are now found in the literature.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
According to the way of example, it suffices to list paradigm cases of abstract and concrete entities in the hope that the sense of the distinction will somehow emerge. Clearly, a list of examples for each category would be a heuristically promising start in the search for some criterion (or list of criteria) that would be fruitful for drawing the distinction. However, a simple list would be of limited significance since there are too many ways of extrapolating from the paradigm cases to a distinction that would cover the unclear cases, with the result that no clear notion has been explained.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
For example, pure sets are paradigm examples of abstract entities. But the case of impure sets is far from clear. Consider the unit set whose sole member is Joe Biden (i.e., {Joe Biden}), the Undergraduate Class of 2020 or The Ethics Committee, etc. They are sets, but it is not clear that they are abstract given that Joe Biden, the members of the class and committee are concrete. Similarly, if one offers the characters of Sherlock Holmes stories as examples to help motivate the primitive concept abstract object, then one has to wonder about the object London that appears in the novels.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
The refusal to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction while maintaining that both categories have instances might be called the way of primitivism, whenever the following condition obtains: a few predicates are distinguished as primitive and unanalyzable, and the explanatory power rests on the fact that other interesting predicates can be defined in terms of the primitives and that interesting claims can be judged true on the basis of our intuitive understanding of the primitive and defined notions. Thus, one might take abstract and concrete as primitive notions. It wouldn’t be an insignificant result if one could use this strategy to explain why abstract objects are necessarily existent, causally ineffiacious, non-spatiotemporal, intersubjective, etc. (see Cowling 2017: 92–97).
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
But closer inspection of this method reveals some significant concerns. To start with, when a distinction is taken as basic and unanalyzable, one typically has to offer some intuitive instances of the primitive predicates. But it is not always so easy to do this. For example, when mathematicians take set and membership as primitives and then assert some principles of set theory, they often illustrate their primitives by offering some examples of sets, such as The Undergraduate Class of 2020 or The Ethics Committee, etc. But these, of course, aren’t quite right, since the members of the class and committee may change while the class and committee remain the same, whereas if the members of a set change, one has a different set. A similar concern affects the present proposal. If one offers sets or the characters of the Sherlock Holmes novels as examples to help motivate the primitive concept abstract object, then one has to wonder about impure sets such as the unit set whose sole member is Aristotle (i.e., \(\{\textrm{Aristotle}\}\)) and the object London that appears in the novels.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
According to the way of conflation, the abstract/concrete distinction is to be identified with one or another metaphysical distinction already familiar under another name: as it might be, the distinction between sets and individuals, or the distinction between universals and particulars. There is no doubt that some authors have used the terms in this way. (Thus Quine 1948 uses ‘abstract entity’ and ‘universal’ interchangeably.) This sort of conflation is however rare in recent philosophy.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
Another methodology is what Lewis calls the way of abstraction. According to a longstanding tradition in philosophical psychology, abstraction is a distinctive mental process in which new ideas or conceptions are formed by considering the common features of several objects or ideas and ignoring the irrelevant features that distinguish those objects. For example, if one is given a range of white things of varying shapes and sizes; one ignores or abstracts from the respects in which they differ, and thereby attains the abstract idea of whiteness. Nothing in this tradition requires that ideas formed in this way represent or correspond to a distinctive kind of object. But it might be maintained that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be explained by reference to the psychological process of abstraction or something like it. The simplest version of this strategy would be to say that an object is abstract if it is (or might be) the referent of an abstract idea; i.e., an idea formed by abstraction. So conceived, the way of abstraction is wedded to an outmoded philosophy of mind.
abstract-objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
It should be mentioned, though, that the key idea behind the way of abstraction has resurfaced (though transformed) in the structuralist views about mathematics that trace back to Dedekind. Dedekind thought of numbers by the way of abstraction. Dedekind suggested that when defining a number-theoretic structure, “we entirely neglect the special character of the elements, merely retaining their distinguishability and taking into account only the relations to one another” (Dedekind 1888 [1963, 68]). This view has led some structuralists to deny that numbers are abstract objects. For example, Benacerraf concluded that “numbers are not objects at all, because in giving the properties (that is, necessary and sufficient) of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure—and the distinction lies in the fact that the ‘elements’ of the structure have no properties other than those relating them to other ‘elements’ of the same structure” (1965, 70). We shall therefore turn our attention to a variant of the way of abstraction, one that has led a number of philosophers to conclude that numbers are indeed abstract objects.
abstract-objects