 如果做过标记的熊回来捣乱被抓住两次以上，护林员就有权力射杀它。
It is easy to feel sorry for an animal that discovers tasty food and can’t resist getting more the easy way.	一只发现了美味的动物抵制不了再次轻易获得美味的诱惑，我们都会为它感到遗憾。
The bear has no idea that its days are numbered unless it remains in the forest and hunts in the traditional way for its meals.	除非待在树林里以传统的方式捕猎食物，否则它的生命就已经进入了倒计时，这一点黑熊并不清楚。
But that bear was following the wisdom natural selection had programmed in its genes: food that is high in proteins and sugars is good for you, and the less energy you expend getting it, the better.	可那头黑熊是按照自然选择在它基因中种下的智慧来采取行动：富含蛋白质和糖的食物非常有益，而且获取食物消耗的能量越少越好。
That much the bear knows well.	这一点黑熊很清楚。
It had no chance to learn – and probably never will – that picnic tables and garbage cans are defended by forest rangers with orders to kill.	它没有学习的机会¾也许永远也没有¾它无从知道野餐桌和垃圾桶受到护林员的保护，必要的时候甚至可以射杀。
How much luckier we humans are, knowing what is good and bad for us.	相比之下我们人类是多么幸运，知道什么对我们有益，而什么又有害。
We cannot be trapped so easily by things that taste good but will cause our downfall.	如果一件东西看上去很好却会让我们跨掉，我们就不会那么轻易地受到诱惑。
But, in reality, most of us are no different from that bear.	但实际上，我们大多数人和那只熊并没有什么不同。
Most people are aware that high-fat diets, too much alcohol, smoking, promiscuous sex, and recreational drugs, while pleasant, can ruin one's health.	高脂肪食品、烟酒过量、滥性和迷药尽管能带来一时之乐，却可以毁掉一个人的健康。
Yet we can’t resist the lure of the garbage can and its delights.	尽管如此，我们也抵御不了垃圾桶和快乐的诱惑。
But at least we have had clear warnings about the dangers of such habits, so people who want to use such knowledge can avoid being trapped.	可我们至少清楚这种陋习的后果，这样愿意听从劝告的人就不会落入圈套。
There are other potentially harmful pleasures in the environment that are less known, but not less destructive than those that are.	我们周围还有很多乐趣不那么为人了解，却和那些为人们熟知的陋习一样能造成伤害。
One of the most seductive of these pleasures – and thus one of the most dangerous – is television.	这些活动中最富诱惑力、也最危险的就是电视。
Television is attractive to the architecture of the human nervous system: our brains are built to absorb information and follow rapid changes in the sensory field.	电视对人类的神经系统颇具吸引力：我们的大脑天生就适合接受信息和快速变幻的感官刺激。
TV provides these in easily digestible, sumptuously prepared morsels.	电视以非常易于接受的方式为人类提供了大量的感官刺激。
Constant change and the appearance of excitement absorb viewers’ attention.	片刻不停的变幻和刺激吸引了观众的注意力。
The Sistine Chapel cannot compare with it – most children will become bored after ten minutes by the frescoes of Michelangelo, but will watch a detergent commercial with riveted interest.	西斯廷教堂根本无法与之相比¾大多数孩子10分钟以后就会对米开朗基罗的壁画感到厌倦，但却能对洗涤用品广告保持长久的注意力。
All of this applies just to the way the medium works, without taking content into consideration.	这些都是由于介质的缘故，与内容毫不相干。
The content in turn reinforces the seductive qualities of the medium by offering generous helpings of sex, violence, easy comfort, and other material that we are genetically prepared to respond to, but that in large doses detract from the ability to lead productive and serene lives.	而内容又再次强化了介质的诱惑力，为人们慷慨地提供性、暴力、低级娱乐和其它方面的趣味，而我们天性上就容易受到这些东西的诱惑。 长此以往，大量的低级趣味让人们丧失了丰富而又平静地生活的能力。
Indeed, by now the evidence that television watching is a dangerous habit has grown to such proportions that it is a wonder that stronger warnings and effective prevention have not been adopted.	实际上，看电视是种危险陋习的证据已经十分明显，以至于没有人提出强烈的警告和有效的防御措施，的确让人感到非常奇怪。
Among the many findings is that watching too much television induces passivity, both at the level of neural functioning and of behavior and that it interferes with learning and reduces political and civic participation.	发现之一是过多地看电视会让人变得被动，无论从神经还是行为反应上都是如此。 它会影响人们学习新知识，影响他们参与政治活动。
It also encourages aggressive behavior in children and produces negative moods such as sadness and loneliness.	它还会鼓励儿童采取过激行为，让人们产生悲伤孤独等负面情绪。
Nor is there any evidence of benefits to counterbalance these negative effects.	此外也没有发现任何好处，能够平衡这些负面的影响。
When television was in its infancy, many thinkers ­ and not surprisingly, television producers – painted the future of the medium in glowing terms: TV would keep us informed, cultured, and entertained; it would strengthen family life and civic virtues.	电视还处于襁褓中的时候，很多思想家，不难想象还有电视的制造者¾用闪闪发光的语汇描述着这种媒介的未来：电视会为我们输送信息、让我们了解文化、获得娱乐，此外还有利于家庭生活和传播人类美德。
None of this happened.	但这些都没有成为现实。
Even the informational value of television turned out to be a dream: individuals and communities that watch TV often know much less about what is happening in the world than comparable audiences that do not.	即便是信息传递方面的价值也根本无从谈起：一般来讲，看电视的群体和个人对周边世界的了解要远逊于对照组。
The only clearly positive effect of TV watching is that people feel relaxed while doing it, and many people are willing to exchange that relaxation for the more enjoyable and useful things they might be doing instead.	看电视唯一一个显而易见的好处是能让人们放松，而很多人为了这种放松宁愿牺牲更加有趣和有用的选择。
Like the bear that learned to fill his stomach comfortably, they feel satisfied to be entertained without having to exert themselves.	就像学会轻松填饱肚子的狗熊一样，不用付出努力就能得到娱乐让人们感到非常满意。
Of course, television can be nice when consumed in small doses and with discernment.	当然，如果有选择地少量观看，电视也会带来不少益处。
Like drinking a glass or two of wine, it helps digestion and lightens the mind.	就像饮下一两杯红酒，看电���会有利消化，放松心情。
But those who spend hours watching it each evening, with less and less control over their attention, and deriving progressively less enjoyment from what they watch, risk becoming as besotted as an alcoholic who only feels alive when he blots out reality.	但如果每晚都花费几个小时，对注意力的分配越来越失去控制，从所看节目中获得的乐趣也日益减少，就会冒着沦为酒鬼的危险，只在脱离现实的时候才有生命力。
No bear, if it knew what we do, would fall into that trap.	如果能够知道我们会做什么，那么没有一只黑熊会愿意落入圈套。
	
Black Swan World	黑天鹅世界
BERLIN – In today’s global financial crisis, the image of a black swan has become a symbol for the seemingly impossible that somehow occurs, turning the world upside down.	柏林 — — 在当今全球金融危机的背景下，黑天鹅的形象已经成为表面看似不可能的事情但不知何故而发生，最终导致世界起伏跌宕的象征。
This year will afford us ample opportunity to examine the black swans that are already among us, and to prepare for the arrival of even more.	今年给我们提供了足够多的机会来审视周围已经存在的黑天鹅，并为即将到来的更多黑天鹅做好准备。
November, for example, marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.	例如，今年十一月将要迎来柏林墙倒下20周年纪念日。
The night of November 9, 1989, marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union and its empire, and thus also of the bipolar world that had, for five decades, divided Germany and Europe.	1989年11月9日的夜晚，标志着苏联以及整个苏维埃帝国崩溃的开始，同时也是分裂德国和整个欧洲的两极世界终结的开始。
A year before, few people considered this world-shaking event even a remote possibility.	而在此前的一年，即使发生的概率是微乎其微，仍然很少有人认为如此震惊世界的事件会发生。
Yet it happened, and the world changed almost overnight.	然而事件却发生了，世界几乎在一夜之间被改变。
After the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order, victorious Western capitalism, under the leadership of the only world power, the United States, reigned supreme in global politics, and even more so in the global economy.	在苏联和两极世界消失后，胜利的西方资本主义在唯一的世界霸主美国的领导下，称霸全球政治，甚至统治全球经济。
Nothing and no one, it seemed, could stem the global triumph of the market, with its transcendence of all previous limits on wealth – that is, until September 15, 2008, the fateful date when Lehman Brothers went bust and the meltdown of the global financial system began.	好像没有任何事情和任何人能够阻止拥有超过之前所有财富的市场经济在全球范围内的胜利 — — 直到2008年9月15日，这个日子是雷曼兄弟倒闭和全球金融体系走向崩溃的开始。
While a distraught world is still trying to fathom the consequences of this global crash and to mitigate its impact, the call of the next black swan can already be heard: the global climate disaster.	当惊慌失措的世界正在努力估测这次全球金融危机的后果并减轻其影响的时候，下一个黑天鹅的叫声已经清晰可见：全球气候灾难。
It seems to be part of human nature willfully to deny the possibility of great crises, or at least to downplay them.	人们往往对于巨大危机发生的可能固执地否认或者不予重视，这也许是人的本性之一。
“Impossible” or “It won’t be all that bad” are the two magic formulae on which we tend to rely.	“不可能”或者“不会那么糟的”是两个我们常常依赖的惯用套词。
And we refuse to learn the lesson of the black swan even when the next one is already visible for all to see!	甚至下一个黑天鹅已然清晰可见的时候，我们仍拒绝吸取已经发生的黑天鹅事件的教训。
Although the generations alive today have witnessed two completely unexpected crises of epic proportions within the last 20 years, we indulge in a shocking collective repression of a climate disaster with far more serious – and foreseeable – consequences.	虽然当今的一代在过去不到20年的时间内目睹了两个未曾想象的百年难遇的危机，但是我们对于即将到来的气候灾难以及之后更严重的可预见的后果，却是集体性的置若罔闻。
But, in fact, by linking the answers to the global climate and economic crises, we can find a way out of both.	但是，其实将全球气候和经济危机的结果联系起来的话，我们可以找到一种解决这两个问题的方法。
The solutions to the climate crisis are already well known, the money is available, and so are the technologies, or where they aren’t, they could be developed.	解决气候危机的方法我们已经找到，资金不是问题，技术也还可以（即使有些地方还不足，也可进一步发展 ） 。
What is lacking is the strategic vision and determined action of the major political players.	我们所欠缺的就是全球主要政治人物战略的眼光和坚决的行动。
As for the economic crisis, bailouts and stimulus packages on the order of billions of dollars, euros, yen, or yuan have been planned or implemented to stem the further slide of the global economy.	对于经济危机来说，数十亿美元、欧元、日元或者人民币的的政府救援和财政刺激计划已经被计划或执行以阻止全球经济的进一步下滑。
But, while references to the Great Depression are justified, the lesson of that crisis, and of the New Deal, is that effective programs can at best cushion the fall and bring about stabilization.	但是，如果以大萧条的经验正确的话，危机的教训是：罗斯福新政执行的计划最多只是使得经济不再继续下滑，逐渐企稳而已。
The real economic recovery – and this is the bad news – came only with WWII and the long Cold War that followed.	真正的经济复苏 — — 这可能是个坏消息 — — 只能来自于之后的第二次世界大战和冷战。
Rather than relying on war as an economic mega-project to end today’s recession, the international community should bet on the fight against the climate crisis, because globalization will continue, rapidly increasing the threats to the world’s climate.	如果不用战争来解决眼下的经济衰退的话，国际组织应该考虑使用抗击全球气候危机的办法，因为全球化仍在继续，这大大增加了对于世界气候的威胁。
In 1929, there were slightly more than two billion people living on the planet; today, there are 6.7 billion, and in 2050 there will be nine billion.	1929年，大约只有20亿多一点的人口生活在这个星球上；而今天，大约有67亿人，到2050年将会有90亿人。
All of them, thanks to globalization and new communication technologies, will strive for the same standard of living, give or take, which will necessarily lead to an overstretched global ecosystem.	由于全球化和新通信技术，所有这些人都会为标准化的生活（可能略有差异）而奋斗，这会导致全球生态系统的过渡扩张。
The question of whether to use coal or nuclear power is simply no longer apposite: without a breakthrough in renewable energies, global energy demand cannot be met, not to mention the dangers of a new Chernobyl.	是否能使用煤或者核能的问题已经不再恰当了：如果没有在可再生能源上的突破，全球能源的需求将不能得到满足，更别提一个新的切尔诺贝利事件的危险了。
Where this will lead the world can be seen even today: China already has the world’s most ambitious scheme for expanding nuclear energy, and every year it builds coal-fired power plants whose electricity output is roughly equivalent to the capacity of the entire British power grid!	这些今天已经有所显现：中国已经做好世界最大的核能计划，而且其每年所建造的火电厂的发电量大体相当于整个英国电网的容量。
So the black swan of the climate crisis is already preparing to land.	因此气候危机的黑天鹅已经将要到来。
To fight the climate crisis effectively demands nothing less than a green revolution of the global economy, the mega-project of the twenty-first century.	抗击气候危机对于全球经济来说不亚于一场绿色革命，这是21世纪的战争般的巨大计划。
Only the rich industrial nations of Europe, America, and Japan can afford to pay for the necessary investments in emerging countries.	只有富裕的工业国例如欧洲，美国和日本才能够负担得起在新兴国家的必要投资。
But this green revolution must be about more than spending money; it must also be about laws and standards, i.e. about political regulation and new technologies, as well as new products and markets, which mean new economic opportunities.	但是这个绿色革���不仅仅只是花钱，还要有相关法律与标准与之配套。 例如，政治监管和新的技术，还有意味着新经济机会的新产品和新市场。
This year, a new global climate agreement will be negotiated in Copenhagen to replace the Kyoto Protocol.	今年，一项新的全球气候协议将在哥本哈根进行商讨，目的是取代京都议定书。
This is effectively the last chance to prevent the next black swan from landing.	这是有效阻止下一个黑天鹅到来的机会。
But we must understand that Copenhagen is also a big chance to revive the global economy.	但是我们必须知道，哥本哈根必须是复苏全球经济的一次绝佳的机会。
All of the relevant powers of the twenty-first century are represented in the G-20, and they should see the success of Copenhagen as part of their direct responsibility.	作为所有21世纪相关国家代表的20国集团应该将哥本哈根的成功视作其直接责任的一部分。
This time, unlike at the London G-20 meeting, they should do the job properly – both to protect our climate and to reboot the global economy.	这次不同于伦敦的20国集团会议，他们应该充分做好他们的工作 — — 不仅仅是为了保护我们的气候，也是为了重振全球经济。
	
Blair’s EU disaster	布莱尔的欧盟灾难
When voters in France and the Netherlands turned down the proposal for a Constitution for the European Union, the world knew that the European project was in deep trouble.	法国和荷兰选民否决欧盟宪法提案后，全世界都知道欧洲项目陷入了深深的困境。
Last week’s bruising battle over the medium-term future of the Union’s budget has confirmed that verdict with a vengeance.	上周有关欧盟中期预算的激烈争执再次明白无误地证明了这个判断。
It also brought to a sorry close the UK’s six-month presidency of the European Council, confirming Britain’s long-standing reputation as the odd-man-out in the European Union.	这次争执也使英国6个月的欧洲理事会主席任期黯然结束，让人们再次看清了长久以来英国在欧盟内部形单影只的尴尬处境。
The two events are intimately connected.	这两个问题的关系盘根错节，密不可分。
French and Dutch voters did not say why they voted against the planned Constitution. But many commentators believe that they were protesting against what they perceived as the precipitate admission of ten new member states, mainly much poorer countries from Central and Eastern Europe.	法荷选民并没有明确说出反对宪法提案的原因，但很多评论家都认为他们是在对欧盟突然吸纳10个新成员国的做法进行抗议，这些新成员国主要包括来自中东欧的贫困国家。
In particular, voters were afraid that their jobs would be lost to hordes of Eastern immigrants, exemplified in the image widely quoted at the time, of the low-cost Polish plumber.	选民们尤其担心工作会被成群结队的东欧移民抢走，价格低廉的波兰管道工是当时东欧移民在欧洲人心目中的普遍形象。
The irony, of course, was that most of the 15 old member states had refused to give the new members full and immediate access to the Western job markets.	当然，具有讽刺意味的是：欧盟15个老成员国中的绝大多数都拒绝让新成员国立即全面地进入西欧劳务市场。
But in any event, it was too late to protest: the ten Eastern states had already been granted membership of the Union.	但无论如何，抗议已经为时太晚：10个东欧国家已经取得了欧盟成员的地位。
But now the 25 member states must deal with the financial consequences of that enlargement, not just in the overall size of the European Union budget for the next seven years, but in who pays and who benefits.	但现在这25个成员国必须面对扩盟带来的财政后果，这种后果不仅体现在未来7年内欧盟预算的总体数量，还体现在谁将付出而谁将获益。
In particular, the central issue is how far the old member states are willing to pay to boost the less developed economies of the new members.	具体地讲，核心问题是原有成员国愿意为促进发达程度较低的新成员国经济发展付出多大的代价。
In the event, it turned into a three-way battle between Britain, France and the new member states.	这种情况最终变成了英国、法国和新成员国三方之间的角力。
Traditionally, a large majority of the budget has gone either on agriculture or on the development of backward regions.	过去，预算的绝大部分都用于农业或者落后地区的发展。
In practice, this has meant large flows of money either to big agricultural producers, like France, or to poorer member states, like Greece and Portugal.	而实际上，这意味着会有大批的资金流入法国这样的农业生产大国，或者像希腊和葡萄牙这样的相对贫困的国家。
On both counts, the new member states expected to benefit substantially from the EU system.	在这两个方面，新成员国都将从欧盟系统获得巨大的补助。
In the past, the big loser from the EU system, in budgetary terms, was the UK; for while agriculture accounted for two thirds of all EU spending, the UK had a small farm sector, and therefore received small farm payments.	过去，英国是欧盟系统财政领域最大的输家。 因为尽管农业占到了欧盟开支的三分之二，英国的农业规模却很有限，因此得到的农业补助也微乎其微。
The British long complained of the unfairness of these rules, especially in view of the fact that the UK was one of the relatively poorer member states; and in 1984, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government demanded, and got, a massive rebate on its net contribution to the EU budget.	英国人很早就抱怨游戏规则的不公，尤其考虑到英国还属于欧盟内部相对贫困的国家。 1984年，玛格丽特·萨切尔执政的保守党政府提出并获得了欧盟的批准，英国对欧盟的净税额自此大幅度降低。
Today, the situation has changed in three important respects.	今天，整个局面有了3个方面的改变。 欧盟的农业政策开始实行改革，农业拨款占欧盟预算的份额也从60%下降到了40 % 。
EU farm policy has started to be reformed, and its share of the EU budget has fallen from over 60% to 40%; Britain has for several years enjoyed significantly faster economic growth than most other member states, so that it is now one of the richer EU countries, even compared with France and Germany; and the new member states are so much poorer than even the poorest of the old members, that they have an unanswerable moral case for a generous share of whatever budget could be negotiated.	近几年来英国的经济增长比其它多数欧盟成员国要快得多，早已进入了欧盟富裕国家的行列，即便与法、德两国相比也毫不逊色。 而新成员国的经济状况即便与旧成员国中最穷的相比依然相去甚远，因此英国在谈判确定的预算额度中负有不可推卸的道义责任。
When negotiations started six months ago, it was Britain’s turn to take over the Presidency of the European Council.	6个月前谈判开始时，恰逢英国接任欧洲理事会主席职务。
Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, electrified the world of European politics by telling the European Parliament that he was a “passionate pro-European”.	英国首相托尼·布莱尔向欧洲议会宣布自己是“充满热情的欧洲支持者 ” ， 他的这一表态轰动了整个欧洲政界。
This was a message for which Britain’s European friends had long been hoping, and for which they had waited in vain since Blair’s election in 1997.	英国的欧洲朋友们早就期待这样的表态，自从布莱尔1997年当选后他们就毫无结果地苦苦等候。
Certainly, he had never expressed any such sentiment inside the British Isles during the previous eight years.	当然，过去8年布莱尔从未在英伦诸岛表达过这样的观点。
Since Britain had been one of the most insistent advocates of enlargement of the EU to the candidates from Central and Eastern Europe, one might have expected that the Blair government would have wished to be correspondingly generous to the new-comers in the conduct of the budgetary negotiations.	由于英国自始至终坚持吸纳中东欧国家加入欧盟，人们可能会认为布莱尔政府在预算谈判中也会对新成员国表现出相应的慷慨。
At first, this seemed to be the British government’s chosen tactic.	开始时，这似乎是英国政府的既定战术。
Against all expectations, it struck a morally advantageous posture by offering to surrender some part of its budget rebate, but only if the rest of the European Union (i.e. France, in particular) would agree to fundamental reforms of EU farm policy.	出乎所有人的预料，英国提出可以放弃部分财政优惠，从而在道义上赢得了主动。 但兑现承诺的条件是欧盟其它国家（比如法国）同意对欧盟农业政策进行根本的改革。
It took some time before the British came to understand that since President Jacques Chirac is a beleaguered lame-duck President, who will remain in office but not in power until 2007, he is in no position to agree to any such bargain.	英国花了很长时间才明白：希拉克是个倍受秸难的软弱总统，任期持续到2007年但却掌握不了实权，他没有能力接受这样的讨价还价。
So when the British came to terms with this harsh reality, they played out the lamentable end-game of their management of the negotiations with small-minded cheese-paring and logic-chopping offers, all designed primarily to safeguard narrow British interests, mainly at the expense of the new member states.	因此当英国人认清这种严酷的现实后，他们在谈判中抛出了鼠目寸光、强词夺理的可悲提议，目的主要是以牺牲新成员国的利益为代价，维护英国自身的狭隘利益。
It is a sad conclusion to a presidency, launched six-months ago, with Blair’s claim that he was a “passionate pro-European”. Yet the full text of his speech tells it all.	对于6个月前开始的主席任期，听惯了布莱尔“充满热情的亲欧洲人士”的漂亮口号，这恐怕是一个令人哀伤的结局。
Blair is in favour of Europe; but not this Europe.	布莱尔支持欧洲，但不支持现在的欧洲。
He wants to be a part of a political Europe; but only if the other member states follow Britain’s model of economic and social reform.	他希望成为欧洲政治的组成部分，但前提是其它欧盟国家遵循英国提出的经济和社会改革模式。
The problem is that economic and social reform are purely national responsibilities, and do not lie within the competence of the Union; if there is to be economic and social reform in France and Germany, that is a matter exclusively for French and German voters and politicians.	问题是经济和社会改革纯属于国家责任，超出了欧盟所能管辖的范畴。 如果法德两国要进行社会改革，那也只能是法德选民和政治家的事情。
It could only be a European matter, if the EU were a real federation.	只有当欧盟成为真正的联盟，上述���题才有可能成为欧洲事务。
Is Blair a federalist, then?	那么布莱尔是不是联邦主义者？
Heavens, no!	不！
He is merely an unthinking nationalist, living in terror of the nationalist yellow tabloid press.	他只是个轻率的民族主义份子，沉浸在民族主义份子低俗小报制造出来的恐怖氛围中。
So why does he say he is a passionate pro-European?	那么他为什么说自己是个热情的欧洲支持者？
Because he has not thought about the question for one moment.	原因是这个问题他连想都没想过。
	
Blair’s European Dilemma	布莱尔在欧洲进退两难
Tony Blair has achieved a remarkable third successive electoral victory.	托尼·布莱尔在第三次竞选中大获全胜。
But his sharply reduced majority in the House of Commons, and his damaged personal reputation, mean that his political position is seriously weakened.	但是工党在下议院中剧减的席位，布莱尔本人受损的个人声誉，意味着他的政治地位受到严重创伤。
As a result, he will be poorly placed to handle the challenges ahead, the most intractable of which will be the European Union’s new Constitution.	结果，可怜的他不得不着手于眼前的挑战，最难应付的就是欧盟的新宪法。
The Constitution, adopted by the 25 member states last year, is not, in itself, a big deal.	欧盟25国去年签署的宪法本身并不是一个大问题。
It introduces some significant improvements for majority voting in the Council of Ministers. It gives some more powers to the European Parliament.	它就部长联席会中的多数决投票引进了一些重大改进，赋予欧洲议会更多权力。
It includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights. It might help harmonize the foreign policies of the member states.	它还包含了一本基本权利宪法，这也许有助于平衡各成员国的外交政策。
But it is no revolutionary document.	但是它不是一份革命性的文件。
According to normal British constitutional practice, the government would be expected to ratify this Constitution by a vote in the House of Commons; and, until the recent general election, the government’s huge majority should have been more than sufficient.	按照正常的英国宪法惯例，政府应当根据下议院的投票批准宪法；在最近的这次大选之前，政府拥有的多数支持对通过这项宪法应该绰绰有余。
But Blair, beset by controversy over the unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq, thought he could avoid trouble at Westminster by postponing ratification until 2006 (that is, a comfortably long time in the future), and proposing that it be carried out by popular referendum.	但是，被围困在有关这场不得人心并且可能是非法的伊拉克战争的是非争论中的布莱尔，认为他可以拖到2006年（那可是很长一段时间）再批准，这样就可避免在Westminster的麻烦，并建议举行全民公投来批准它。
Unfortunately, as things stand, this is a referendum that Blair will not win, because all polls show a large and solid majority against the European Constitution.	不幸的是，就当前情况来看，这是一场布莱尔不会赢得的全民投票，因为所有的选票都显示绝大多数人坚决反对欧洲宪法。
Blair’s government may hope to be rescued by outside events.	布莱尔政府也许指望发生在国外的事件能救他们一把。
France will hold a referendum on the Constitution for the end of this month, and a French “No,” the British seem to think, might make their problem go away.	法国将在本月底就宪法举行全民公决，在英国看来，法国的一声“不”也许就能解决他们的问题。
For the general expectation is that if France rejects the Constitution, the Constitution would be dead, and no British referendum would be needed.	因为人们普遍认为，如果法国反对宪法，那么宪法就不会生效，那么英国也就不需要举行什么公投了。
If this is Blair’s calculation, he is mistaken.	如果布莱尔打着这样的如意算盘的话，他就错了。
Moreover, it is the kind of mistake that the British have been making in relations with Europe for the past half-century.	事实上，这正是过去半个世纪中英国在他们与欧洲关系问题上一直在犯的错误。
Some recent French polls now show a majority in favor of the Constitution.	最近法国的一些民意测验表明大部分人支持宪法。
But even if the French do vote “No,” that will not solve the British problem: on the contrary, it will precipitate a major political crisis, in France and across Europe, concerning the future of the EU – the type of crisis that the British have spent fifty years trying to evade. For if the Constitution is indeed dead, what happens next?	但是即使法国投了否决票，那也不会解决英国的问题：相反，它还会加速一场在法国及全欧洲范围内的有关欧盟未来的严重政治危机 — — 这正是英国五十年来试图避免的那一种危机。
None of the leading members of the Union will be interested in Britain’s views on this question.	没有任何一个欧盟领导国家会对英国对这一问题的看法感兴趣。
When Tony Blair swept to power in 1997, he was widely welcomed throughout Europe as the most pro-European British Prime Minister since Edward Heath a quarter of a century earlier.	自托尼·布莱尔1997年掌权以来，他在欧洲大受欢迎，成为自约二十五年前英国首相Edward Heath之后最为亲欧的英国首相。
He spoke French and seemed at ease with Britain’s neighbors across the Channel; more importantly, he seemed to sympathize with European integration.	他说法语，看起来和英国海峡两岸的邻里都相处融洽；更为重要的是，他看起来认同支持欧洲整合。
Eight years on, Europe knows better.	但是八年之后，欧洲看得更明白了。
It is now clear to all that Blair is fundamentally opposed to the idea of a more politically integrated Europe.	现在所有人都很清楚，布莱尔从内心深处反对一个政治更加整合的欧洲概念。
Not only has he kept Britain out of the single European currency over the past four years, he made it clear during the election campaign that he does not expect the UK to join the Euro during the next five years either.	过去四年中，他不仅在让英国置身于单一欧洲货币之外，并在他的竞选活动中明确表明，他不希望英国在今后五年中加入欧盟。
Occasionally Blair flirts with the idea of more European cooperation on foreign policy and defense.	偶尔，布莱尔会对在外交和国防政策上进行更多的欧洲性合作表现出浓厚兴趣。
But the past three years proved in practice that he prefers subservience to the war policy of President Bush to any sense of community with Europe.	但是过去的三年却证明，比起任何一种与欧洲团体的合作，他事实上更喜欢对布什的战争政策俯首帖耳。
In short, Blair is as opposed to the European project as all his predecessors.	简而言之，布莱对和他所有的前任一样反对欧洲计划。
One fundamental difference between France and Britain is that most of the mainstream political elite in France has long been broadly pro-European.	法国与英国最本质的差异之一就是大部分的法国主流政治精英长期以来都是明确亲欧的。
If the French electorate votes “No,” it will be much less a vote against the Constitution than a protest vote against President Jacques Chirac, or an expression of anxiety about the implications of the EU’s enlargement to Central Europe.	如果法国选民投了否定票，那与其说是反对宪法，还不如说是反对法国总统希拉克的投票，或者是他们对欧盟扩大至中欧的信号表示出的焦虑。
By contrast, Blair cannot win a referendum on the Constitution, not only because it is opposed by virtually all the popular press, but also because neither he nor any major political leader in Britain has ever had a good word to say about European integration.	相比之下，布莱尔无法赢得这场关于欧洲宪法的公投，不仅仅因为宪法确确实实受到所有广大媒体的反对，也因为不管是布莱尔还是任何其他英国重要政治领导人都从来没有说过欧洲整合的好话。
The crisis over the Union’s future direction triggered by a French “No” vote could last for some time.	法国的一票否决票所引发的欧盟未来方向的危机可能会持续一段时间。
But if the British imagine that the Constitution will just die, and that that will be the end of the story, they are deceiving themselves.	但是如果英国人认为宪法就这样消逝了，认为这样故事就结束了，那么他们就是在自欺欺人。
On the contrary, they will find themselves embroiled, like the rest of Europe, in a fundamental debate about the objectives of the Union.	相反，他们会发现他们已经像欧洲其他国家一样被卷入了一场有关欧盟目标的重要讨论之中。
They will then be forced to make public and explicit choices about the sort of Europe that they want, and this will put them at odds with their neighbors.	那时他们就会被迫在公众面前明确选择他们所要的欧洲类型，这将会引发他们与邻国之间的争执。
In the end, the French and other leading member states are likely to explore alternative ways of working towards a more politically integrated Europe.	最终，法国和其他欧盟领导成员国有可能去探寻不同的工作方法来实现一个政治更加整合的欧洲。
The most plausible institutional mechanism for this alternative way forward will be the existing grouping of those member states that have wanted to belong to a more united Europe by joining, or seeking to join, the euro zone.	这个方法最可能运用到的体系机制就是将那些正要加入或谋求加入欧元区、想要属于一个更为团结的欧洲的国家分组。
If the Constitution is rejected, the British, having chosen to stay out of that grouping, may find that they have maneuvered themselves into an even more remote outer circle of Europe.	如果宪法被否决��，选择远离分组的英国也许会发现他们把自己放在了一个更远的欧洲外圈之中。
	
Blame the Economists, Not Economics	要责备的是经济学家，而不是经济本身
CAMBRIDGE – As the world economy tumbles off the edge of a precipice, critics of the economics profession are raising questions about its complicity in the current crisis.	剑桥 — — 当今世界经济面临着崩溃的边缘，对经济学家的批评之声也日渐兴起，甚至有人认为他们是导致此次经济危机的同谋。
Rightly so: economists have plenty to answer for.	还是让我们来听听经济学家自己的说法吧。
It was economists who legitimized and popularized the view that unfettered finance was a boon to society. They spoke with near unanimity when it came to the “dangers of government over-regulation.”	经济学家一直都提倡金融秩序的自由性，几乎异口同声地反对“政府的过度监管 ” ， 认为自由的金融可以促进社会的繁荣。
Their technical expertise – or what seemed like it at the time –gave them a privileged position as opinion makers, as well as access to the corridors of power.	由于是以所谓专业的身份 — — 当时好象大家也是这么认为的 — — 他们掌握了一定的话语权，甚至可以进入权力的核心。
Very few among them (notable exceptions including Nouriel Roubini and Robert Shiller) raised alarm bells about the crisis to come.	除了鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼和罗伯特·希勒之外，很少有经济学家对即将到来的金融危机发出预警。
Perhaps worse still, the profession has failed to provide helpful guidance in steering the world economy out of its current mess.	恐怕更为糟糕的是，他们对如何摆脱经济危机也没有提出建设性的办法。
On Keynesian fiscal stimulus, economists’ views range from “absolutely essential” to “ineffective and harmful.”	对于凯恩斯主义者的经济刺激计划来说，经济学家的观点从“绝对必须”到“没有效率而且有害 ” ， 真是无所不包。
On re-regulating finance, there are plenty of good ideas, but little convergence. From the near-consensus on the virtues of a finance-centric model of the world, the economics profession has moved to a near-total absence of consensus on what ought to be done.	在对金融的监管方面，经济学家们不乏有一些好的建议，但也没有达成什么共识，过去他们一致地大力鼓吹“金融中心论”的好处，而现在，大家几乎各自一词，努力都出了自己的良方。
So is economics in need of a major shake-up?	难道经济学要有一个大的变革么？
Should we burn our existing textbooks and rewrite them from scratch?	难道我们要烧毁现在的教科书而从头再来么？
Actually, no. Without recourse to the economist’s toolkit, we cannot even begin to make sense of the current crisis.	当然不是，如果没有经济学家们的分析，我们现在都还不能意识到目前所面临危机的本质。
Why, for example, did China’s decision to accumulate foreign reserves result in a mortgage lender in Ohio taking excessive risks?	例如，为什么中国的外汇储备积累会引起俄亥俄州的房贷过剩？
If your answer does not use elements from behavioral economics, agency theory, information economics, and international economics, among others, it is likely to remain seriously incomplete.	如果你不懂得运用行为经济学原理，代理理论，信息经济学和国际经济学等，你可能就不知道其中的关联。
The fault lies not with economics, but with economists. The problem is that economists (and those who listen to them) became over-confident in their preferred models of the moment: markets are efficient, financial innovation transfers risk to those best able to bear it, self-regulation works best, and government intervention is ineffective and harmful.	问题不是出在经济学本身，而是在经济学家身上，经济学家们（以及听从他们的人）过分相信自己所偏好的经济学模型，这包括：市场是有效的；谁能掌握金融的创新，谁就可以很好地化解风险；金融行业自律是最好的监管；政府的干预是无效率且有害的。
They forgot that there were many other models that led in radically different directions.	他们可能忘记了其他的一些可能导致完全不同的结果的经济学模型。
Hubris creates blind spots.	过于的自信必然是潜在的危险。
If anything needs fixing, it is the sociology of the profession.	如果要有什么需要改变的的话，应该是他们的认知能力。
The textbooks – at least those used in advanced courses – are fine.	教科书，至少目前运用在顶尖学府的教科书，应该是没有问题的。
Non-economists tend to think of economics as a discipline that idolizes markets and a narrow concept of (allocative) efficiency.	几乎没有经济学家认为经济学是把市场看作一成不变，一种单一的经济理论不可能解释整个市场。
If the only economics course you take is the typical introductory survey, or if you are a journalist asking an economist for a quick opinion on a policy issue, that is indeed what you will encounter.	如果你只是参加一个入门的经济学课程，或是你是一个记者，问经济学家对当前政策的简要评论时，你可以会得到这个粗浅的答案。
But take a few more economics courses, or spend some time in advanced seminar rooms, and you will get a different picture.	而当你再进一步学习经济学课程，或是在高级研讨班里再多花一些时间，你就会得出完全不同的答案。
Labor economists focus not only on how trade unions can distort markets, but also how, under certain conditions, they can enhance productivity.	劳动经济学家不仅知道工会对市场的危害，同样也知道，在某种程度下，工会对提高生产力也有一定的好处。
Trade economists study the implications of globalization on inequality within and across countries.	贸易经济学家研究的是全球化对不同国家之间贸易不平衡，以及导致的后果。
Finance theorists have written reams on the consequences of the failure of the “efficient markets” hypothesis.	金融经济学家研究的是“有效市场”理论失效的后果。
Open-economy macroeconomists examine the instabilities of international finance.	开放经济学的宏观经济学家研究的是国际金融的不稳定性。
Advanced training in economics requires learning about market failures in detail, and about the myriad ways in which governments can help markets work better.	通过进一步对经济学的研究，你就会知道市场失灵的种种表现，以及政府对市场干预的各种有效手段。
Macroeconomics may be the only applied field within economics in which more training puts greater distance between the specialist and the real world, owing to its reliance on highly unrealistic models that sacrifice relevance to technical rigor.	宏观经济学家需要更为严格的训练，由于他们所依赖的是严格理想的数学模型，和现实有明显的区别，所以能够分清楚专家的理论和现实世界的差距尤其重要。
Sadly, in view of today’s needs, macroeconomists have made little progress on policy since John Maynard Keynes explained how economies could get stuck in unemployment due to deficient aggregate demand.	可悲的是，在目前看来，自从约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯解释了由于市场需求的不足，经济是如何受制于失业率的理论之后，宏观经济学家们并没有什么新的贡献。
Some, like Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, would say that the field has actually regressed.	正如同布拉德•德隆和保罗•克鲁格曼所说的，宏观经济学实际上已经在退步。
Economics is really a toolkit with multiple models – each a different, stylized representation of some aspect of reality. One’s skill as an economist depends on the ability to pick and choose the right model for the situation.	经济学是一个有着多种模型的工具 — — 每一种都代表着现实生活的某个方面，经济学家的能力就体现在如何运用正确的模式来解决当前问题。
Economics’ richness has not been reflected in public debate because economists have taken far too much license. Instead of presenting menus of options and listing the relevant trade-offs – which is what economics is about – economists have too often conveyed their own social and political preferences.	经济学的博大精深并不为公众所知道，原因是经济学家们有了太多的特权，经济学的本质是列出可能解决问题的方法，以及有关联的一些折中解决方案，而现在的经济学家只是将自己个人的偏好加在上面，不是运用理性的分析，而是将自己的意识形态，把自己所偏好的选项提交出来。
Instead of being analysts, they have been ideologues, favoring one set of social arrangements over others.	
Furthermore, economists have been reluctant to share their intellectual doubts with the public, lest they “empower the barbarians.” No economist can be entirely sure that his preferred model is correct.	更有甚之，经济学家不愿意将自己的质疑和大众分享，更不用说对社会大众的“教诲 ” ， 没有一个经济学家会认为自己的模式是完全正确的。
But when he and others advocate it to the exclusion of alternatives, they end up communicating a vastly exaggerated degree of confidence about what course of action is required.	但当他们在推销自己的方案时候，他们会以过分自信地口吻来表达，以此说服大家。
Paradoxically, then, the current disarray within the profession is perhaps a better reflection of the profession’s true value added than its previous misleading consensus.  Economics can at best clarify the choices for policy makers; it cannot make those choices for them.	具有讽刺意味的是，当前的经济学家们纷纷提出了自己不同观点，可谓是五花八门，这正说明了经济学家这个职业本身的价值所在。 经济学的本身是提出所有解决问题的可能性，而不是给出解决问题的答案。
When economists disagree, the world gets exposed to legitimate differences of views on how the economy operates.  It is when they agree too much that the public should beware.	当经济学家有不同意见的时候，大家对经济如何运行会有着更为深刻的认识，而当所有的经济学家都发出一个声音的时候，那就是我们该保持警惕的时候了。
	
Bleed the Foreigner	谁把外债当回事
PRINCETON – Today, the world is threatened with a repeat of the 2008 financial meltdown – but on an even more cataclysmic scale.	普林斯顿 — — 当前，世界正面临重演2008金融崩溃的危险 — — 甚至更厉害。
This time, the epicenter is in Europe, rather than the United States.	这回的震中是在欧洲，而不是美国。
And this time, the financial mechanisms involved are not highly complex structured financial products, but one of the oldest financial instruments in the world: government bonds.	而这次出事儿的金融工具，不是高度复杂的结构性产品，而是一种最古老的金融工具 — — 政府债券。
While governments and central banks race frantically to find a solution, there is a profound psychological dynamic at work that stands in the way of an orderly debt workout: our aversion to recognizing obligations to strangers.	尽管有关政府和央行急着想对策，但有一种深刻的心理机制阻碍着债务问题的有序解决：我们不太把欠陌生人的债当回事儿。
The impulse simply to cut the Gordian knot of debt by defaulting on it is much stronger when creditors are remote and unknown.	如果债权人远在他乡又素不相识，就会有比较强的冲动，索性违约，一了百了。
In 2007-2008, it was homeowners who could not keep up with payments; now it is governments.	2007~2008年，是购房者还不起钱，如今换成了政府。
But, in both cases, the lender was distant and anonymous.	但不论是当时还是今日，债主都是遥远的陌生人。
American mortgages were no longer held at the local bank, but had been repackaged in esoteric financial instruments and sold around the world; likewise, Greek government debt is in large part owed to foreigners.	美国人的按揭并未留在本地银行的账上，而是被打包成玄奥的金融工具卖到全世界。 同样地，希腊国债也有很大一部分攥在外国债主手里。
Because Spain and France defaulted so much in the early modern period, and because Greece, from the moment of its political birth in 1830, was a chronic or serial defaulter, some assume that national temperament somehow imbues countries with a proclivity to default.	鉴于西班牙和法国在近代早期曾多次违约，而希腊自从1830年独立以来更是习惯性违约者，有人便揣测，是不是民族性格令有些国家染上了违约的瘾。
But that search for long historical continuity is facile, for it misses one of the key determinants of debt sustainability: the identity of the state’s creditor.	但追溯这么漫长的历史连贯性有些想当然，因为忽略了决定某国是否能保持债务稳健的一个关键因素：谁是债主。
This variable makes an enormous difference in terms of whether debt will be regularly and promptly serviced.	在是否按时、迅速还债的问题上，这个变量影响巨大。
The frequent and spectacular early modern bankruptcies of the French and Spanish monarchies concerned for the most part debt owed to foreigners.	近代早期法国和西班牙经常上演的壮观的破产闹剧，大多数跟欠外债有关。
The sixteenth-century Habsburgs borrowed – at very high interest rates – from Florentine, Genovese, and Augsburg merchants.	16世纪的哈布斯堡王朝以极高利息向佛罗伦萨、日内瓦和奥格斯堡的商人借债。
Ancien régime France developed a similar pattern, borrowing in Amsterdam or Geneva in order to fight wars against Spain in the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, and against Britain in the eighteenth.	“旧制度”统治下的法国也发展出相似的行为模式，总是向阿姆斯特丹和日内瓦借钱，用来打仗，16、17世纪跟西班牙人打，到了18世纪跟英国人打。
The Netherlands and Britain, however followed a different path.	但荷兰和英国走的就是另外一条路。
They depended much less on foreign creditors than on domestic lenders.	它们的外债远远不如内债多。
The Dutch model was exported to Britain in 1688, along with the political revolution that deposed the Catholic James II and put the Dutch Protestant William of Orange on the English throne.	1688年英国光荣革命废黜了信仰天主教的国王詹姆斯二世，不仅把来自荷兰的新教徒威廉·奥伦治扶上英国王座，也把偏好内债的荷兰模式带到了英国。
Indeed, the Glorious Revolution enabled a revolution in finance.	事实上，光荣革命也促成了一场财政革命。
In particular, recognition of the rights of parliament – of a representative assembly – ensured that the agents of the creditor classes would have permanent control of the budgetary process.	尤其是议会权利的确立，使得预算从制定到执行的全过程都逃不开债权人阶级的代理人的监督。
They could thus guarantee – also on behalf of other creditors – that the state’s finances were solid, and that debts would be repaid.	他们督促国家保持财政稳健并偿还债务，也连带着保护了外国债权人的利益。
Constitutional monarchy limited the scope for wasteful spending on luxurious court life (as well as on military adventure) – the hallmark of early modern autocratic monarchy.	立宪君主制限制了宫廷的奢侈浪费和军事冒险，这两样可以说是近代早期专制君主制（如法国和西班牙）的招牌。
In short, the financial revolution of the modern world was built on a political order – which anteceded a full transition to universal democracy – in which the creditors formed the political class.	简言之，近代世界的财政革命依托于一种政治秩序 — — 债权人构成政治阶级，这种秩序是后来普遍民主制的先声。
That model was transferred to many other countries, and became the bedrock on which modern financial stability was built.	那种模式传播到许多国家，成为近代财政稳健的基石。
In the post-1945 period, government finance in rich industrial countries was also overwhelmingly national at first, and the assumptions of 1688 still held.	二战以后，发达国家的财政原本也是内债优先的，仍然保守着1688年的传统。
Then something happened.	后来，事情起了一些变化。
With the liberalization of global financial markets that began in the 1970’s, foreign sources of credit became available.	随着20世纪70年代开始的全球金融市场自由化，外国信贷资源变成可及之物。
In the mid-1980’s, the US became a net debtor, relying increasingly on foreigners to finance its debt.	到了20世纪80年代中期，美国成为净债务国，对外债的依赖程度与日俱增。
Europeans, too, followed this path.	欧洲也步其后尘。
Part of the promise of the new push to European integration in the 1980’s was that it would make borrowing easier.	20世纪80年代兜售欧洲一体化的广告词，有一条就是，一体化以后借债变得更容易。
In the 1990’s, the main attraction of monetary union for Italian and Spanish politicians was that the new currency would bring down interest rates and make foreign money available for cheap financing of government debt.	20世纪90年代，统一货币构想对意大利和西班牙政客的主要吸引力就在于，引入新货币既能压低利率，又能打开外国人的钱袋子，使政府可以实现廉价融资。
Until the late 1990’s and the advent of monetary union, most government debt in the European Union was domestically held: in 1998, foreigners held only one-fifth of sovereign debt.	一直到20世纪90年代末，欧元启动前夕，欧盟国家的国债还大都是内债：1998年，主权债务中外债比重只有五分之一。
That share climbed rapidly in the aftermath of the euro’s introduction.	欧元引入后，外债比重迅速上升。
In 2008, on the eve of the financial crisis, three-quarters of Portuguese debt, half of Spanish and Greek debt, and more than 40% of Italian debt was held by foreigners.	到2008年金融危机爆发前夜，葡萄牙国债的四分之三、西班牙和希腊国债的一般、意大利国债的四成多都成了外债。
When the foreign share of debt grows, so do the political incentives to impose the costs of that debt on foreigners.	随着外债比重上升，向外国人转嫁债务成本的政治诱惑也越来越大。
In the 1930’s, during and after the Great Depression, a strong feeling that the creditors were illegitimate and unethical bloodsuckers accompanied widespread default.	20世纪30年代大萧条期间及其后一段时间，世人曾有一种强烈的情绪，认为债权人就是一帮非法、败德的吸血鬼，于是当时违约成风。
Even US President Franklin Roosevelt jovially slapped his thigh when Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht told him that Nazi Germany would default on its external loans, including those owed to American banks, exclaiming, “Serves the Wall Street bankers right!”	当德意志帝国银行行长沙赫特（Hjalmar Schacht）对富兰克林·罗斯福说，纳粹德国将要对外债违约，包括欠美国一些银行的债务时，这位美国总统竟然一拍大腿，笑着说 ： “ 华尔街银行家罪有应得！
In Europe today, impatient Greeks have doubtless derived some encouragement from excoriations of bankers’ foolishness by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	”请看今日欧洲，德国总理默克尔、法国总统萨科齐屡屡苛责银行家们“愚蠢 ” ， 岂不也在纵容希腊人赖账的决心？
The economists’ commonplace that a monetary union demands a fiscal union is only part of a much deeper truth about debt and obligation: debt is rarely sustainable if there is not some sense of communal or collective responsibility.	“统一货币需要统一财政 ” ， 这句经济学家的老生常谈，其实揭示了一条更深刻的关于债务的真理：若没有责任共担之心，便难有可靠之债。
That is the mechanism that reduces the incentives to expropriate the creditor, and makes debt secure and cheap.	只有遵循这个道理，才能打消赖账之心，让债务变得安全而便宜。
At the end of the day, a collective, burden-sharing Europe is the only way out of the current crisis.	最终，欧洲只有团结起来，分担重担，才能平安走出当前危机。
But that requires substantially greater centralization of political accountability and control than Europeans seem able to achieve today.	但那需将政治责任和权力大��集中起来，远远超越欧洲人今日所能做到之程度。
And that is why many of them could be paying much more for credit tomorrow.	这也就是为什么，许多欧洲国家还只顾今天能挥霍，不管明天要还钱。
	
Blind in Gaza and Jerusalem	失明于加沙和耶路撒冷
LONDON – I spent the New Year in Sydney, watching the fireworks above the iconic bridge welcome in 2009.	伦敦 - - 我的元旦是在悉尼度过的。 我当时观看着烟火绽放在悉尼大桥上空欢迎2009年。
The explosions over Gaza that night were not intended to entertain, but rather to break Hamas and discredit it in the eyes of Palestinians.	而当天夜晚在加沙的爆炸则并不是打算让哈马斯高兴，而是想要破除其在巴勒斯坦人心目中的威信。
It was the latest resort to terrible violence in order to resolve how to share in peace what Christians still like to call the Holy Land.	这是最新的一次施暴行动，意在解决和平分享基督教徒称为的圣地。
Mahatma Gandhi criticized the biblical justification of retribution, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”	甘地批评圣经把“以牙还牙，以眼还眼”的报复合法化。
Followed through to its end, he argued, it would mean that all were blind.	他认为，如果听从这一教唆就会意味着所有人都失明。
And so it has proved in Palestine and Israel.	在巴勒斯坦和以色列就证明了这一点。
Blind in Gaza, blind in Jerusalem.	加沙和耶路撒冷都失明了。
Much of what has happened was predictable, as well over 1,400 men, women, and children have died and more than 4,000 have been injured.	超过1400名男子、妇女和儿童丧失，另有四千多人受伤，而大部分事情都是在预料之中的。
First, the United States justified the Israeli assault and blamed everything on Hamas, just as it used to pin all responsibility for whatever went wrong on Yasir Arafat and Fatah.	首先，美国给以色列的进攻予以合法化并且把责任全部推到哈马斯身上，正如以前它把所有的责任都算在阿拉法特和法塔赫头上一样。
Second, despite French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s welcome high-profile diplomacy, Europe has been irrelevant, if not quite invisible.	第二，尽管法国总统萨尔科奇高调外交斡旋受人欢迎，但是欧洲在这一事件中即使不是没有踪影，也是无关紧要。
As Israeli officials point out, Europeans are always there for the photo opportunity.	正如以色列官员指出的那样，欧洲人总是在那里摆姿势照照像而已。
The Quartet’s peacemaker, Tony Blair, is as unctuously nugatory as ever.	中东四方调停人布莱尔和以往一样没有效用。
He appears on CNN , but has he actually visited Gaza since his appointment in the summer of 2007?	他出现在有线新闻网之中，但是，从2007年他得到任命后有没有实际访问加沙呢？
No.	没有。
Third, as usual, Israel has accused of anti-Semitism those who have dared to criticize its disproportionate response to Hamas’s indefensible rocket attacks and its collective punishment of Palestinians.	第三，正如以往一样，只要有人敢于批评以色列对哈马斯火箭袭击反应过度及其对巴勒斯坦人的集体惩罚，以色列都指责为反犹主义。
An Italian cardinal, who admittedly spoke intemperately, was accused of using the language of Holocaust denial.	一位意大利的红衣主教一时失言，就被指责为使用否认犹太人大屠杀的语言。
By that standard, does my unqualified criticism of Hamas’s rocket attacks make me an Islamophobe?	那么根据这一标准，如果我不当地批评哈马斯的火箭袭击，是否我也是反伊斯兰教主义者呢？
Coincidentally, the deadly attack on Gaza came at the same time that a clutch of America’s most distinguished would-be Middle East peacemakers published books about how the task should properly be tackled.	凑巧的是，这次对加沙的致命攻击发生的时候，将会成为美国最为着名的中东和平使者出版了书籍，谈论如何正确解决问题。
It all sounded a bit like a series of job applications – the war for President Barack Obama’s ear.	这听起来就是求职申请，在争取奥巴马总统的注意力。
One thing all these experts could agree on is that President George W. Bush was a disaster.	这些专家的共识之一就是布什总统把事情搞糟了。
American policy might as well have been made in Likud’s headquarters.	美国的政策好像是在利库德总部里制定的一样。
Even at the end, when the United Nations Security Council voted on Gaza, Bush was happy to humiliate Condoleezza Rice at Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s bidding.	即使在最后，当联合国安理会对加沙问题投票的时候，布什还是乐意给莱斯难堪来讨好以色列总理奥尔穆特。
These “wise men,” advisers one and all to President Bill Clinton and other presidents, all seem to concede that the failure of the proposed Camp David accord in 2000 could not, after all, be laid solely at Arafat’s door.	这些“贤人”都是克林顿和其他总统的幕僚。 他们好像都承认2000年戴维营和平提议失败毕竟不能全部归咎于阿拉法特。
Former Israeli premier Ehud Barak should carry his share of the blame.	以色列前总理巴拉克也应该承担责任。
Moreover, they all criticize the Clinton-era practice of routinely clearing America’s policy positions first with Israel, which is hardly likely to win Arab confidence or support.	而且，他们都批评克林顿时代的政策首先获得以色列的认同，这样就难以赢得阿拉伯人的信任和支持。
The American diplomats’ arguments about process did not on the whole carry over into disagreement about the content of a peace deal. All more or less agree on this.	美国外交官有关和平进程的观点总体上并不涉及有关和平协议内容的分歧。
Two states.	
Security guarantees for Israel.	
A Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, adjusted by agreement through mutual land swaps. An end to most West Bank settlements.	所有人都大体同意以下几点。
No “right of return” for Palestinian refugees, but financial compensation for them. Some system of joint or international sovereignty over Jerusalem’s holy places and the division of the city so that it can become the capital of two states.	那就是，巴以建立两个国家；对以色列做出安全保证；通过协商互换领土调整在1967年边境内建立巴勒斯坦国；结束大多数西岸定居点；巴勒斯坦难民不得实施“返回家园”的权利，但是给予经济补偿；对耶路撒冷的圣地建立联合或者国际主权体系；分割耶路撒冷以便成为两国的首都。
Of course, this is what should happen.	当然，这是理应发生的事情。
And I suppose that it is conceivable that it could still happen with the help of welcome new mediators like Qatar and Turkey, whose prime minister called Israel’s attack “a serious crime against humanity.”	而且我认为，在新的受人欢迎的调停国家卡塔尔和土耳其的帮助下这依旧可能。 土耳其总理把以色列的袭击称为“严重的反人类罪行 ” 。
But I have begun to wonder whether it will really be possible to achieve peace on this basis.	但是我开始怀疑是否真的可能在这一基础上实现和平。
Fatah, and Palestinian moderates like President Mahmoud Abbas, have been totally discredited.	法塔赫和阿巴斯总统等巴勒斯坦温和派人物完全失去了信用。
Palestinians on the whole have been further radicalized.	巴勒斯坦人在整体上变得更为激进了。
Hamas, whose engagement and support is essential for any settlement, has sworn revenge.	任何和解都离不开哈马斯的参与和支持，而它却扬言复仇。
Every day, new Palestinian sorrows strike heaven in the face.	每天都会却发生新的巴勒斯坦人悲剧。
The widows and the mothers of the dead weep and cry out for bloody justice.	寡妇们和死者的母亲们痛哭流涕要求偿命。
Should we be surprised?	我们是否应该感到惊讶呢？
Had the British government pursued peace and the destruction of the IRA in Northern Ireland by bombing Catholic Derry, would that have alienated or won over Catholic opinion?	如果英国政府追求和平以及通过轰炸天主教城市摧毁北爱尔兰的共和军，那么这种做法是会离间还是赢得天主教舆论？
On the Israeli side, which political leaders really want a Palestinian state and are prepared to take the political risks associated with trying to establish one?	在以色列方面，那个政治领导人真正想要巴勒斯坦国家而且愿意冒着伴随试图建立巴勒斯坦国的政治风险呢？
Which of them are strong enough to deal with the West Bank settlers?	他们那个人足够强大来应付西岸的定居者呢？
There will be no peace settlement otherwise.	否则就不会有和平协议。
Which leaders will teach the facts of life to the more extreme members of the Jewish diaspora in America?	那个领导人会向美国犹太人中的极端分子讲述事实呢？
Who among Israel’s leaders understands that reconciliation is more important that retribution and revenge?	以色列领导人中谁理解和解要比报复和复仇更为重要呢？
However tough things looked in the past, I have never felt such a sense of despair about Palestine and Israel.	无论过去看来多么困难，我都没有对巴以问题感到绝望。
Reason has been drowned in blood.	理性被吞没在了鲜血里。
It seems as though the politics of hope have given way to the politics of the cemetery.	看起来希望的政治已经让位给了墓地的政治。
Poor Palestine. Poor Israel.	可怜的巴勒斯坦，可怜的以色列。
Who is there now who can still light a candle in the dark?	谁可以在黑暗中点燃蜡烛呢？
	
The Big Blockchain Lie	区块链大谎言
NEW YORK – With the value of Bitcoin having fallen by around 70% since its peak late last year, the mother of all bubbles has now gone bust.	纽约—比特币的价值从去年高点下跌了70%左右，这场所有泡沫之母已经破灭。
More generally, cryptocurrencies have entered a not-so-cryptic apocalypse.	更一般地说，加密货币已经进入了一场不那么秘密的浩劫。
The value of leading coins such as Ether, EOS, Litecoin, and XRP have all fallen by over 80%, thousands of other digital currencies have plummeted by 90-99%, and the rest have been exposed as outright frauds.	以太币、EOS、莱特币和XRP等主要加密货币都下跌了80%多，数千种其他数字货币下跌了90—99 % ， 其余更是露出了骗局的本质。
No one should be surprised by this: four out of five initial coin offerings (ICOs) were scams to begin with.	因此你不必感到奇怪，八成首次货币发行（ICO）从一开始就是骗局。
Faced with the public spectacle of a market bloodbath, boosters have fled to the last refuge of the crypto scoundrel: a defense of “blockchain,” the distributed-ledger software underpinning all cryptocurrencies.	面对市场的血雨腥风，加密恶棍的支持者们躲进了最后的避难所 ： “ 区块链”防线。 区块链是一种分布式记账软件，是所有加密货币的基础。
Blockchain has been heralded as a potential panacea for everything from poverty and famine to cancer.	区块链被说成是所有问题的潜在解决妙招，不管是贫困与饥荒还是癌症。
In fact, it is the most overhyped – and least useful – technology in human history.	事实上，它是人类历史上被吹得最厉害而实际最没用的技术。
In practice, blockchain is nothing more than a glorified spreadsheet.	在实践中，区块链无非是外表光鲜的电子表格。
But it has also become the byword for a libertarian ideology that treats all governments, central banks, traditional financial institutions, and real-world currencies as evil concentrations of power that must be destroyed.	但它却成了自由主义意识形态的代名词，将一切政府、央行、传统金融机构和真实货币视为邪恶的权力集中，必毁之而后快。
Blockchain fundamentalists’ ideal world is one in which all economic activity and human interactions are subject to anarchist or libertarian decentralization.	在区块链原教旨主义者的理想世界里，所有经济活动和人际互动都必须是无政府主义或自由主义去中心化的。
They would like the entirety of social and political life to end up on public ledgers that are supposedly “permissionless” (accessible to everyone) and “trustless” (not reliant on a credible intermediary such as a bank).	他们但愿社会和政治生活的全部最终都落在应该是“无许可 ” （ 向所有人开放）和“无信任 ” （ 不依赖银行等可信中介）的公共账簿上。
Yet far from ushering in a utopia, blockchain has given rise to a familiar form of economic hell.	但区块链并没有催生一个乌托邦，而是带来了我们耳熟能详的经济地域。
A few self-serving white men (there are hardly any women or minorities in the blockchain universe) pretending to be messiahs for the world’s impoverished, marginalized, and unbanked masses claim to have created billions of dollars of wealth out of nothing.	一些自利的白人（区块链圈子里很少有女性或少数群体）摆出一副全世界穷人、边缘群体和无银行服务大众的救世主形象，宣称无中生有地创造了数十亿美元财富。
But one need only consider the massive centralization of power among cryptocurrency “miners,” exchanges, developers, and wealth holders to see that blockchain is not about decentralization and democracy; it is about greed.	但只要想一想权力在加密货币“矿工 ” 、 交易所、开发者和财富所有者手中大量集中，就能看出区块链与去中心化和民主根本无关；它只和贪婪有关。
For example, a small group of companies – mostly located in such bastions of democracy as Russia, Georgia, and China – control between two-thirds and three-quarters of all crypto-mining activity, and all routinely jack up transaction costs to increase their fat profit margins.	比如，少数几家公司 — — 大多位于民主洼地俄罗斯、格鲁吉亚和中国 — — 控制着所有加密挖矿活动的三分之二到四分之三，并且都通过抬高交易成本来增加丰厚的利润。
Apparently, blockchain fanatics would have us put our faith in an anonymous cartel subject to no rule of law, rather than trust central banks and regulated financial intermediaries.	显然，区块链狂热分子将把我们引向完全不受法律约束的匿名卡特尔，而不是信任央行和受监管的金融中介。
A similar pattern has emerged in cryptocurrency trading.	加密货币交易也表现出类似的模式。
Fully 99% of all transactions occur on centralized exchanges that are hacked on a regular basis.	在中心化的交易所，99%的交易会不时被黑客入侵。
And, unlike with real money, once your crypto wealth is hacked, it is gone forever.	而和真实货币不同，一旦你的加密货币被入侵，就会永远消失。
Moreover, the centralization of crypto development – for example, fundamentalists have named Ethereum creator Vitalik Buterin a “benevolent dictator for life” – already has given lie to the claim that “code is law,” as if the software underpinning blockchain applications is immutable.	此外，加密开发的中心化 — — 比如，原教旨主义者们称以太坊创始人维塔利克·布特林（Vitalik Buterin）是“生活的仁慈独裁者 ” — —等于宣布了所谓的“代码即法律”是一个谎言。 在“代码即法律”的幌子下，好像作为区块链应用基础的软件坚如磐石。
The truth is that the developers have absolute power to act as judge and jury.	真相是开发者拥有绝对权力充当法官和陪审团。
When something goes wrong in one of their buggy “smart” pseudo-contracts and massive hacking occurs, they simply change the code and “fork” a failing coin into another one by arbitrary fiat, revealing the entire “trustless” enterprise to have been untrustworthy from the start.	如果他们的充满漏洞的“智能”伪合同出了问题，发生大规模入侵，他们只需要改改代码，用任性的指令将失败的货币“分叉”称另一种货币，这表明一整套“无信任”机制从一开始就完全不值得信任。
Lastly, wealth in the crypto universe is even more concentrated than it is in North Korea.	最后，加密世界的财富集中度比朝鲜还要高。
Whereas a Gini coefficient of 1.0 means that a single person controls 100% of a country’s income/wealth, North Korea scores 0.86, the rather unequal United States scores 0.41, and Bitcoin scores an astonishing 0.88.	基尼系数1.0表示一个人控制着一国100%的收入/财富，朝鲜的基尼系数为0.86，非常不平等的美国的基尼系数是0.41，而比特币的基尼系数高达0.88。
As should be clear, the claim of “decentralization” is a myth propagated by the pseudo-billionaires who control this pseudo-industry.	应该清楚，所谓的“去中心化”根本就是控制着这个伪行业的伪亿万富翁所宣传的神话。
Now that the retail investors who were suckered into the crypto market have all lost their shirts, the snake-oil salesmen who remain are sitting on piles of fake wealth that will immediately disappear if they try to liquidate their “assets.”	如今，被吸引到加密货币市场的散户都输了个底儿掉，而没有倒闭的神油贩子们作用万贯假财，只要他们试图套现“资产 ” ， 这笔财富就会立即蒸发。
As for blockchain itself, there is no institution under the sun – bank, corporation, non-governmental organization, or government agency – that would put its balance sheet or register of transactions, trades, and interactions with clients and suppliers on public decentralized peer-to-peer permissionless ledgers.	至于区块链本身，全世界没有一家机构 — — 银行、公司、非政府组织或政府机构 — — 会把资产负债表或与客户的交易、贸易和互动记录放在公开的去中心化点对点无许可账簿上。
There is no good reason why such proprietary and highly valuable information should be recorded publicly.	没有好理由认为如此重要的财产和无价的情报应该公开记录。
Moreover, in cases where distributed-ledger technologies – so-called enterprise DLT – are actually being used, they have nothing to do with blockchain.	此外，实际使用分布式记账技术 — — 所谓的企业DLT — — 的情况，也和区块链没有什么关系。
They are private, centralized, and recorded on just a few controlled ledgers.	它们是私有的、去中心化的，记录在区区几个受控制的账簿上。
They require permission for access, which is granted to qualified individuals.	它们的访问需要许可，许可只授予合格的人。
And, perhaps most important, they are based on trusted authorities that have established their credibility over time.	也许最重要的是，它们基于受信任的当局，它们的信誉需要时间的积淀。
All of which is to say, these are “blockchains” in name only.	所有这些说明 ， “ 区块链”徒有其名。
It is telling that all “decentralized” blockchains end up being centralized, permissioned databases when they are actually put into use.	总而言之，所有“去中心化”的区块链，到了实际使用时，最终都是中心化的、有许可的数据库。
As such, blockchain has not even improved upon the standard electronic spreadsheet, which was invented in 1979.	照此看，区块链甚至还不如1979年就发明的标准电子表格。
No serious institution would ever allow its transactions to be verified by an anonymous cartel operating from the shadows of the world’s authoritarian kleptocracies.	严肃的机构断不会允许让世界极权盗贼政权的阴影下运行的匿名卡特尔验证交易。
So it is no surprise that whenever “blockchain” has been piloted in a traditional setting, it has either been thrown in the trash bin or turned into a private permissioned database that is nothing more than an Excel spreadsheet or a database with a misleading name.	因此，毫不奇怪只要传统设定的“区块链”试水，要么被扔进垃圾箱，要么转变为私人有许可数据库，无非就是加上了误导性名字的Excel电子表格数据库。
	
The End of Big Banks	大银行的终结
WASHINGTON, DC – After nearly a decade of crisis, bailout, and reform in the United States and the European Union, the financial system – both in those countries and globally – is remarkably similar to the one we had in 2006.	发自华盛顿特区 — — 在美国及欧盟经历了近十年的危机，救市和改革后，金融体系 — — 无论是在这些国家和全球 — — 变得非常与2006年时的样子非常相似。
Many financial reforms have been attempted since 2010, but the overall effects have been limited.	自2010年以来人们尝试施行了多项金融改革，但总体效果却相当有限的。
Some big banks have struggled, but others have risen to take their place.	一些大银行陷入了困境，而其他一些则取而代之。
Both before the 2008 global financial crisis and today, just over a dozen big banks dominate the world’s financial landscape.	无论是2008年全球金融危机之前还是今时今日，金融版图上照样是十几个大银行一统天下的局面。
And yet the ground is shifting beneath the financial sector, and big banks could soon become a thing of the past.	但如今金融业正发生着某种变革，而大银行可能很快也将沦为明日黄花了。
Few officials privately express satisfaction with the progress of financial reform.	没有几个官员私下对金融改革的进展感到满意。
In public, most of them are more polite, but the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Neel Kashkari, struck a chord recently when he called for a reevaluation of how much progress has been made on addressing the problem of financial institutions that are “too big to fail” (TBTF).	不过在公开场合，他们大多都比较收敛，但明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行总裁尼尔·卡什卡利（Neel Kashkari）则最近激起了人们共鸣，因为他呼吁要对在应对那些“大而不能倒”的金融机构所导致的问题上所取得的进展进行重新评估。
Kashkari worked for Henry M. Paulson in the US Treasury Department, beginning in 2006.	卡什卡利自2006年开始在美国财政部长亨利·M·保尔森（Henry M. Paulson）手下任职。
He not only watched the financial crisis develop; in October 2008 he became the assistant secretary responsible for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), with the goal of stabilizing the financial system.	此人不仅旁观了金融危机的全过程，更亲身参与其中；2008年10月，他就任负责问题资产救助计划的副部长，受命稳定金融体系。
He is a Republican who has worked at both Goldman Sachs (a big bank) and PIMCO (a large asset-management company).	他也是一位同时在高盛（大型银行）和太平洋投资管理公司（大型资产管理公司）工作过的共和党人。
So people pay attention when he says, “I believe the biggest banks are still too big to fail and continue to pose a significant, ongoing risk to our economy.”	因此当他发表“我认为那些大银行仍然是大而不能倒，并继续对我们的经济构成显著且持续的风险。 ”这番谈话时自然就引起了人们的警觉。
And Kashkari is correct in his assessment of the Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010.	同时卡什卡利对2010年多德 - 弗兰克金融改革法案的评价也是正确的。
This legislation and the ensuing regulations have moved some issues in the right direction.	该立法以及随之出台的法规确实将某些事务推向了正确的方向。
“But given the enormous costs that would be associated with another financial crisis and the lack of certainty about whether these new tools would be effective in dealing with one,” he argues, “I believe we must seriously consider bolder, transformational options.”	“但考虑到另一场金融危机可能引发的庞大成本，同时这些新工具能否有效应对危机的不确定性 ， ” 他指出 ， “ 我认为我们必须认真考虑一些更大胆的，转型性的选项。 ”
Kashkari is now proposing exactly the right approach: to hold public conferences and extensive discussions to evaluate whether large banks should be broken up, whether they (and other financial institutions) should be forced to fund themselves with more equity and less debt, or whether there should be a debt tax to discourage excessive leverage.	卡什卡利目前提议采用一个完全正确的手段：举行公众会议和广泛的讨论以评估大型银行是否应该被分拆，是否这些银行（以及其他金融机构）应被强制留置更多资产并承担更少债务，或者是否应该征收债务税以遏制过度杠杆。
The first conference will be on April 4 (I will be one of the speakers).	第一次会议定于4月4日召开（而笔者也是演讲者之一 ） 。
Kashkari is just one of 12 presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks.	卡什卡利只是地区性联邦储备银行的12位总裁之一。
And he sits on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which sets monetary policy – but not on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which oversees bank regulation.	他同时担任联邦公开市场委员会委员，负责制定货币政策 — — 但不是在负责监督银行监管的联邦储备系统理事会。
Still, his call for an evaluation of the TBTF problem will have a major impact for three reasons.	但他要求评估大而不能倒问题的呼吁将产生重大的影响，原因有三：
First, the views he expresses are entirely sensible and mainstream, based on deep experience (his and others) with this and other financial crises.	首先，他表达的意见完全合理并符合主流，并构建于（他和其他人）对这场和其他金融危机的深厚经验之上。
Kashkari is presenting from a position of authority a message that many other reasonable people have been trying to convey for nearly a decade.	卡什卡利运用自身所处的权威角色，传达了许多其他理性的人们在近十年来一直在试图传达的信息。
Second, Kashkari has articulated – in appropriate central-bank language – precisely the same view that the remaining Democratic presidential candidates are putting before the voting public.	其次，卡什卡利所阐述的 — — 以适当的央行语言 — — 与余下的民主党总统候选人在选民面前提出的观点完全相同。
Hillary Clinton has a detailed and thoughtful plan for financial reform, with emphasis on taxing leverage and increasing capital requirements.	希拉里·克林顿为金融改革提出了一项细致周到的计划，将重点放在对杠杆征税并提高资本金要求上。
Bernie Sanders would prefer to break up the banks.	伯尼·桑德斯则倾向于分拆银行。
But the goal is the same; and, as Kashkari points out, any of these tools can potentially get us to a better place.	但目标是相同的;正如卡什卡利所指出的那样，任何这些工具都有可能让我们到达一个更好的境地。
When reasonable Republicans and Democrats begin to converge on policy, we are more likely to get sensible change.	当理性的共和党和民主党人开始在政策上趋同时，我们就更有可能实现合理的变革。
Third, Kashkari’s timing coincides with the arrival of new “blockchain” technology, which makes it possible to organize financial transactions in a more decentralized way.	第三，卡什卡利提出手段的时机与新“区块链（blockchain ） ” 技术的到来恰巧同步，使得人们可能以更分散的方式来组织金融交易。
Various versions of this technology are either already available or currently under development – and there is a very real prospect that this will reduce transaction costs across much of the financial sector.	这种技术的各种版本要么已经面市要么正在开发 — — 而且都有着一个非常真实的前景，将降低大多数金融行业的交易成本。
We do not yet know which version will prevail, and there is active discussion about how to ensure that the new standards and systems enhance stability, rather than (as with some previous financial innovations) producing unpleasant unintended consequences.	我们还不知道哪个版本会最终通行，同时也有关于如何确保新标准和系统得以增强稳定性，而不是（与以前的一些金融创新那样）产生不愉快的意外后果的热烈讨论。
Most important, blockchain technology has the potential to reduce substantially, or even eliminate, the value of being a trusted intermediary such as a large bank.	最重要的是，区块链技术有潜力去大幅减少 — — 或甚至消除 — — 那些可信中介机构（如大型银行）的存在价值。
And yet the big banks themselves are pouring money into this technology – presumably hoping to save at least some part of their business by limiting the degree of ultimate decentralization.	而大银行本身也在大量注资这类技术的研发 — — 大概是希望通过限制最终放权的程度以挽救它们自身的一部分业务。
Kashkari will lead the way to rethinking – and, one hopes, ending – the TBTF problem in traditional big banks.	卡什卡利将带领我们去反思 — — 并希望能结束 — — 传统大型银行的大而不能倒问题。
In a blockchain world, he and his colleagues are likely to work hard to prevent any variant of TBTF from reappearing.	在区块链的世界里，他和他的同事们会努力工作，以防止任何大而不能倒的变体死灰复燃。
	
The Blockchain Pipe Dream	区块链白日梦
NEW YORK – Predictions that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will fail typically elicit a broader defense of the underlying blockchain technology.	纽约—关于比特币和其他加密货币终归要失败的预言总是会引来许多人替区块链技术基础辩护。
Yes, the argument goes, over half of all “initial coin offerings” to date have already failed, and most of the 1,500-plus cryptocurrencies also will fail, but “blockchain” will nonetheless revolutionize finance and human interactions generally.	诚然，这一论点说，迄今为止的大部分“初次货币发行 ” （ ICO）都以失败告终，1,500多种加密货币也会有一大半失败，但“区块链”终将掀起金融和人类一般交易的革命。
In reality, blockchain is one of the most overhyped technologies ever.	事实上，区块链是有史以来最宣传过度的技术。
For starters, blockchains are less efficient than existing databases.	首先你，区块链不如已有数据库高效。
When someone says they are running something “on a blockchain,” what they usually mean is that they are running one instance of a software application that is replicated across many other devices.	如果有人说他们在“一个区块链上”运营，他的意思往往是他们在做一个到处复制而成的软件应用。
The required storage space and computational power is substantially greater, and the latency higher, than in the case of a centralized application.	与分散化应用相比，所需的储存空间和计算力要大得多，延迟（latency）也要长得多。
Blockchains that incorporate “proof-of-stake” or “zero-knowledge” technologies require that all transactions be verified cryptographically, which slows them down.	嵌入了“权益证明”或“零知识”技术的区块链要求所有交易都加密查证，因此会减慢速度。
Blockchains that use “proof-of-work,” as many popular cryptocurrencies do, raise yet another problem: they require a huge amount of raw energy to secure them.	使用“工作证明”技术的区块链 — — 许多流行的加密货币采取这种方式 — — 则会产生另外一个问题：它们需要巨量能源来保证。
This explains why Bitcoin “mining” operations in Iceland are on track to consume more energy this year than all Icelandic households combined.	这解释了为何今年冰岛比特币“挖矿”作业所消耗的能源比全部冰岛家庭加起来还要多。
Blockchains can make sense in cases where the speed/verifiability tradeoff is actually worth it, but this is rarely how the technology is marketed.	当速度/查证权衡真的划算时，区块链才有意义，但这项技术的兜售可不是这么说的。
Blockchain investment propositions routinely make wild promises to overthrow entire industries, such as cloud computing, without acknowledging the technology’s obvious limitations.	区块链投资方案通常会做出异常诱人的承诺，如颠覆云计算等整个行业，全然不顾这项技术的显而易见的局限性。
Consider the many schemes that rest on the claim that blockchains are a distributed, universal “world computer.”	比如，有很多项目宣称区块链是分布式的无处不在的“世界计算机 ” 。
That claim assumes that banks, which already use efficient systems to process millions of transactions per day, have reason to migrate to a markedly slower and less efficient single cryptocurrency.	这需要假设已经拥有高效的系统处理每天数百万笔交易的银行有理由切换到显著更慢、效率更低的单一加密货币。
This contradicts everything we know about the financial industry’s use of software.	这与我们所知的金融业软件使用之道完全背道而驰。
Financial institutions, particularly those engaged in algorithmic trading, need fast and efficient transaction processing.	金融机构，特别是有算法交易的金融机构，需要高速高效的交易处理。
For their purposes, a single globally distributed blockchain such as Ethereum would never be useful.	对于这些目标，单一的全球化分布式区块链（如以太坊）永远派不上大用场。
Another false assumption is that blockchain represents something akin to a new universal protocol, like TCP-IP or HTML were for the Internet.	另一个错误的假设是区块链代表了新的普适协议，就像互联网的TCP-IP协议和HTML协议。
Such claims imply that this or that blockchain will serve as the basis for most of the world’s transactions and communications in the future.	言下之意是这个或那个区块链将成为未来世界大部分交易和通讯的基础。
Again, this makes little sense when one considers how blockchains actually work.	同样地，考虑到区块链的实际工作情况，这纯属无稽之谈。
For one thing, blockchains themselves rely on protocols like TCP-IP, so it isn’t clear how they would ever serve as a replacement.	一方面，区块链本身需要依赖TCP-IP等协议，因此它们如何替代后者并不清楚。
Furthermore, unlike base-level protocols, blockchains are “stateful,” meaning they store every valid communication that has ever been sent to them.	此外，和基础层面的协议不同，区块链是“状态性”的，这意味着它们存储所有发送给它们的有效通讯。
As a result, well-designed blockchains need to consider the limitations of their users’ hardware and guard against spamming.	因此，设计良好的区块链需要考虑用户硬件的限制，防止垃圾邮件。
This explains why Bitcoin Core, the Bitcoin software client, processes only 5-7 transactions per second, compared to Visa, which reliably processes 25,000 transactions per second.	这解释了为何比特币软件客户端Bitcoin Core每秒钟只处理5—7笔交易，而维萨卡每秒钟可以可靠地处理25,000笔交易。
Just as we cannot record all of the world’s transactions in a single centralized database, nor shall we do so in a single distributed database.	正如我们无法用一个集中式数据库记录全世界的所有交易，我们也无法在一个分布式数据库中实现这一点。
Indeed, the problem of “blockchain scaling” is still more or less unsolved, and is likely to remain so for a long time.	事实上 ， “ 区块链缩放”的问题或多或少仍然没有得到解决，并在短期未来仍将保持这一状态。
Although we can be fairly sure that blockchain will not unseat TCP-IP, a particular blockchain component – such as Tezos or Ethereum’s smart-contract languages – could eventually set a standard for specific applications, just as Enterprise Linux and Windows did for PC operating systems.	尽管我们可以相当确定区块链不会取代TCP-IP，但区块链的一个要素 — — 如Tezos或以太坊的智能合约语言 — — 有望最终成为具体应用的标准，正如企业版Linux和Windows之于PC操作系统。
But betting on a particular “coin,” as many investors currently are, is not the same thing as betting on adoption of a larger “protocol.”	但像目前的许多投资者那样下注于某种“币”和下注于采用某种更大的“协议”不是一回事。
Given what we know about how open-source software is used, there is little reason to think that the value to enterprises of specific blockchain applications will capitalize directly into only one or a few coins.	基于我们对开源软件使用的认识，没有理由认为具体的区块链应用对企业的价值集中在一两种或几种币上。
A third false claim concerns the “trustless” utopia that blockchain will supposedly create by eliminating the need for financial or other reliable intermediaries.	第三种错误的观点是认为区块链将消灭对金融和其他可靠中介的需求，从而建立“无信任的”乌托邦。
This is absurd for a simple reason: every financial contract in existence today can either be modified or deliberately breached by the participating parties.	这是荒谬的，原因很简单：每一份今天存在的金融合同，都可以修改或被参与方违约。
Automating away these possibilities with rigid “trustless” terms is commercially non-viable, not least because it would require all financial agreements to be cash collateralized at 100%, which is insane from a cost-of-capital perspective.	通过自动化，用僵化的“无信任”条款将这些可能排除在商业上不可行，因为这要求所有金融协议都有100%的现金抵押，从资本成本角度，这实在过于疯狂。
Moreover, it turns out that many likely appropriate applications of blockchain in finance – such as in securitization or supply-chain monitoring – will require intermediaries after all, because there will inevitably be circumstances where unforeseen contingencies arise, demanding the exercise of discretion.	此外，似乎许多可能适用于金融的区块链应用 — — 如证券化和供给链监控等 — — 仍然需要中介，因为难免有一些环境会发生未预见到的情形，要求自由裁量。
The most important thing blockchain will do in such a situation is ensure that all parties to a transaction are in agreement with one another about its status and their obligations.	在这种情形中，区块链最重要的作用是确保交易的所有各方彼此同意其地位和各自的义务。
It is high time to end the hype.	应该立即停止区块链兴奋。
Bitcoin is a slow, energy-inefficient dinosaur that will never be able to process transactions as quickly or inexpensively as an Excel spreadsheet.	比特币是一只行动迟缓、能源效率低下的恐龙，永远无法像Excel电子表格那样迅速廉价地处理交易。
Ethereum’s plans for an insecure proof-of-stake authentication system will render it vulnerable to manipulation by influential insiders.	以太坊的计划 — — 不安全的权益证明鉴定系统 — — 将使其很容易受到有影响力的局内人的操纵。
And Ripple’s technology for cross-border interbank financial transfers will soon be left in the dust by SWIFT, a non-blockchain consortium that all of the world’s major financial institutions already use.	瑞波币的跨境银行间金融转账技术很快就会被SWIFT打得找不着北。 SWIFT是一个世界主要金融机构已在使用的非区块链服务。
Similarly, centralized e-payment systems with almost no transaction costs – Faster Payments, AliPay, WeChat Pay, Venmo, Paypal, Square – are already being used by billions of people around the world.	类似地，几乎没有交易成本的集中式电子支付系统 — — Faster Payments、支付宝、微信支付、Venmo、Paypal、Square等 — — 在全世界已有数十亿人正在使用。
Today’s “coin mania” is not unlike the railway mania at the dawn of the industrial revolution in the mid-nineteenth century.	今天的“币疯”和十九世纪工业革命前夕的铁路疯狂别无二致。
On its own, blockchain is hardly revolutionary.	就其本身而言，区块链算不上是一场革命。
In conjunction with the secure, remote automation of financial and machine processes, however, it can have potentially far-reaching implications.	但与金融和机械程序的远程自动化相结合后，它可以产生深远的潜在影响。
Ultimately, blockchain’s uses will be limited to specific, well-defined, and complex applications that require transparency and tamper-resistance more than they require speed – for example, communication with self-driving cars or drones.	说到底，区块链的使用将局限于具体的、定义清晰的复杂应用，这些应用要求透明度和抗干扰甚于要求速度 — — 比如与无人驾驶汽车或无人机的通讯。
As for most of the coins, they are little different from railway stocks in the 1840s, which went bust when that bubble – like most bubbles – burst.	至于各种币，它们和19世纪40年代的铁路股没有什么区别，将随着泡沫 — — 就像大部分泡沫一样 — — 的破裂而一蹶不振。
	
Block Thinking	思维一律
“Multiculturalism” has become a suspect term almost everywhere in the world nowadays, and particularly in Europe.	“多元文化”在当今世界的每一个地方，尤其是在欧洲，几乎成了可疑的代名词。
People say things like: “I used to be for openness and toleration of difference, but now I see where it’s leading.”	人们会说 ： “ 我曾经对不同的文化抱有开放以及宽容的态度，但是现在我看到它正引向何方了。
But where is it leading?	”但是它 正 引向何方呢？
Almost every reason for toleration’s apparent fall into disrepute concerns Islam.	几乎所有从宽容明显跌落到声名狼藉的原因都与伊斯兰教有关。
Even simple requests, like that of schoolgirls to wear headscarves in class, are suddenly freighted with immense political significance and treated as issues that must be resolved at the highest level of government.	甚至是简单的要求，就像女学生在班上戴头巾，都突然被装载了重大的政治性，并且被当成是必须由最高层的政府来解决的问题。
People – and their elected leaders as well -- often have the feeling that such seemingly innocent proposals are in fact part of an ominous “hidden agenda.”	人们以及他们选举出的领导人常常认为这些貌似清白的提议实际上是某个不祥的“暗藏的动机”的一部分。
That agenda is “Islam,” which many imagine to include all the terrible things that we can read about in the press every day: the stoning of adulterous women under Sharia law in northern Nigeria, the amputation of thieves’ hands in Saudi Arabia, honor killings of women who refuse arranged marriages in Pakistan (or even northern English cities like Bradford and Manchester), the willingness to justify suicide bombings.	那个动机就是“伊斯兰教 ” ， 许多人想象它包含了我们每天从媒体上读到的所有恐怖的事情：在尼日利亚北部根据伊斯兰教教法用石头砸死通奸的女人，在沙特阿拉伯砍下小偷的手，在巴基斯坦（或者甚至英国北方的城市，像布拉德福德和曼彻斯特）杀死拒绝接受包办婚姻的女人，为自杀性人体炸弹辩护的意愿。
If you reply that the girls who want to wear headscarves to school aren’t living in Nigeria or Saudi Arabia, and almost certainly don’t share the extreme Wahhabi views found in those countries, you will be met with a look of almost indulgent pity, a look of the type reserved for the terminally naïve.	如果你回答说想要戴头巾去上学的女孩并非生活在尼日利亚或沙特阿拉伯，并且几乎肯定不会持有在那些国家存在的瓦哈比教派的极端观点，你肯定会被回以一种几乎是宽容地怜悯的目光，一种为不可救药地天真的人保留的目光。
Or you will be told stories about how Saudi trained imams are twisting the girls’ arms, turning them into unwilling stalking-horses for “Islam.”	或者你会被告知沙特受过训练的伊玛目怎样扭住女孩子的手臂，把她们变成“伊斯兰教”不情愿的掩饰物的故事。
Indeed, it is virtually impossible nowadays to talk about headscarves as an issue in its own right.	事实上，今天要按其本来面目谈论头巾完全是不可能的事情。
All the sociological evidence about the girls’ motives, which are in fact very varied, is swept aside as irrelevant.	所有有关女孩子动机的社会学证据，事实上它们各不相同，因其不相干而被置之不理。
All that matters is the threat posed by Islam.	人们唯一关心的是伊斯兰教所带来的威胁。
This is a classic example of what I call “block thinking,” which seems to have made huge strides in Europe in recent years.	这正是我所称之为“思维一律”的典型例子，这种现象近些年在欧洲蔓延得非常快。
John Bowen’s recent book Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves documents this shift.	约翰·鲍文的近作《为什么法国不喜欢头巾》就记录了这种转变。
Block thinking fuses a varied reality into one indissoluble unity, and in two ways.	思维一律把各不相同的现实都融进一个牢不可破的联合体中，用的两种方式。
First, different manifestations of Islamic piety or culture are seen as alternative ways of expressing the same core meaning.	第一种是对伊斯兰教的虔诚或文化的不同表现被看成是以不同的方式表达了同一核心理念。
Second, all Muslims are then seen as endorsing these core meanings.	第二种方式是所有的穆斯林人都被看成是支持这些核心理念的。
The possibility that a girl wearing a headscarf might in fact be rebelling against her parents and their kind of Islam, and that others might be deeply pious while being utterly revolted by gender discrimination or violence, is lost from view.	一个女孩佩戴头巾事实上可能是对她父母以及 他们 所奉行的那种伊斯兰教的反抗，而另一些女孩可能对伊斯兰教非常虔诚同时对性别歧视或暴力极度反感。 但是人们从来不去关心这些可能性。
Block thinking is an age-old phenomenon, and we all do it to some degree.	思维一律的现象早已有之，并且我们每个人都有某种程度的思维一律。
But, while in another age we might have been indulgent about its consequences, today it has explosive potential, because people who think in this manner are prime recruits for seeing the world in terms of Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations.”	但是，在另一个时代我们也许会很宽容它所带来的后果，今天它却可能带有爆炸性的潜在力量，因为以这种方式思考的人最有可能按照萨默尔·亨廷顿的“文明冲突论”的观点来看这个世界。
What’s worse, the way such people then act tends to edge us closer to Huntington’s nightmare scenario.	更糟糕的是，以这种方式思考的人随后采取的行动会更把我们推向亨廷顿所描绘的恶梦般的局面。
By treating all the varied segments of Islam as nothing more than parts of a unified threat to the West, they make it harder for Muslims to stand out and criticize their own block thinkers – people like Osama bin Laden, who are building their own unified enemy, composed of “Christians and Jews.”	他们把持有不同观点的所有伊斯兰教徒都统统看成是对西方的威胁，使得穆斯林更难站出来批评他们自己的思维一律者 — — 就像本·拉登，后者正在树立他们自己的由“基督教徒和犹太教徒”组成的联合敌人。
Block thinkers on each side give aid and comfort to block thinkers on the other side, and with each exchange they pull us closer toward an abyss.	两方的思维一律者都给另一方的思维一律者以援助和安慰，而伴随这边每一次变动他们把我们推向了更深的深渊。
So how can we stop this madness?	那么我们怎样才能制止这种极度愚蠢的思维方式呢？
Block thought persists in part because its critics on each side are unknown to those on the other side.	思维一律者之所以如此顽固部分是因为一方对其的批评者并不为另一方对其的批评者所知晓。
Indeed, how many times does a critic of European block thought meet this kind of response: “But where are the Muslims who are criticizing extremist Islam?”	事实上，欧洲思维一律者的批评者经常会碰到这样的回答 ： “ 但是哪里有批评极端伊斯兰的穆斯林呢？ ”
Of course, one isn’t likely to meet them in the drawing rooms of Paris journalists or the wider European professional political class.	当然，你不太可能在巴黎记者或者更广泛的欧洲职业政治阶层的客厅里碰到他们。
But explaining that to block thinkers will never have the impact of a real connection to the multi-faceted discourse that is actually taking place on the other side.	但是对思维一律者解释这一点永远不会起到让他们真正接触在另一面真实发生着的多层面的讨论那样的作用。
The real question, then, is this: Where are the crossover figures who can provide that urgently needed connection?	那么，真正的问题就是：能够提供迫切需要的接触的横跨两面的人在哪里呢？
	
BMW's and Chinese Justice	BMW与中国的司法公正
In most places, the name BMW" implies luxury and exclusivity.
If a tagged bear is caught two or more times causing disruption, the rangers have orders to shoot it.