Read the following passage and questions, then choose the right answer from options, the answer should be one of A, B, C, D.

<passage>:
COMPLEXITY AND HUMANITY everything from food and shelter to communications and security. Working otherwise, is a breakdown of systems. For a time, chaos reigns. For a affect each other. And from this scale of practical effects, complexity application of knowledge to the creation of new knowledge, innovation to innovation, and information to making more information has become These two features−the global scale of interdependence of human action, and the systematic acceleration of innovation, make contemporary life a unpredictability makes it unwise to build systems that take too much discuss, learn, and repeat. That is why we have seen many more systems take on a loose, human centric model in the last decade and a half: from the radical divergence of Toyota’s production system from the highly structured model put in place by Henry Ford, to the Internet’s radical T system that preceded it, and on to the way Wikipedia constructs human knowledge on the fly, incrementally, in ways that would have been seen, until recently, as too chaotic ever to work systems work best by making work human. Modern Times Modern times were hard enough. Trains and planes, telegraph and telephone, all brought many people into the same causal space. The solution to this increased complexity in the late 19th, early 20th century was to increase the role of structure and improve its design. During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, this type of rationalization took the form of ever-more complex managed systems, with control. In business, this rationalization was typified by Fredrick Taylor’s Scientific Management, later embodied in Henry Ford’s assembly line. The ambition of these approaches was to specify everything that needed doing in minute detail, to enforce it through monitoring and rewards, and later to build it into the very technology of work−the assembly line. The idea was to eliminate human error and variability in the face of change by removing thinking to the system, and thus neutralizing the time, and what it did to humanity, more vividly than Charlie Chaplin’s At the same time, government experienced the rise of bureaucratization and the administrative state. Nowhere was this done more brutally than in the totalitarian states of mid-century. But the impulse to build fully-specified systems, designed by experts, monitored and controlled so as to limit human greed and error and to manage uncertainty, was basic and widespread. It underlay the development of the enormously successful state bureaucracies that responded to the Great Depression with the New Deal. It took shape in the Marshall Plan to pull Europe out of the material abyss into which it had been plunged by World War II, and shepherded Japan’s industrial regeneration from it. In technical systems too, we saw in mid-century marvels like the AT&amp system and the IBM mainframe. For a moment in history, these large scale managed systems were achieving efficiencies that seemed to overwhelm competing models: from the Tennessee Valley Authority to Sputnik, from Watson’s IBM to General Motors. Yet, to list these paragons from today’s inevitable victory. The increasing recognition of the limits of command-and-control systems led to a new approach abandonment, of the goal of perfect rationalization of systems design, which assumed much of the human away. What replaced planning and control in these systems was the myth of perfect markets. This was achieved through a hyper-simplification of human nature, wedded to mathematical was widespread and influential it still is. And yet it led to such expected costs, and is given by EUm = B - C(1-Pm)(Pf) and EUf = B - humanity−no more than the economists’ utility curve−and neglecting any bureaucratic rationalization, perfect-market rationalization also had successes. But, like its predecessor, its limits as an approach to human systems design are becoming cleare seeing instead is the rise of human systems that increasingly shy away to coordinating human action will disappear. But these managed systems motivations and social relations. Dress codes and a culture of play in the workplace in Silicon Valley, like the one day per week that Google make the most innovative region in the United States a Ludic paradise, gratifying employees at the expense of productivity, but rather to the only core business competency−innovation. Wikipedia has eclipsed all IPO and hiring the smartest guys in the room, but by building an open The set of human systems necessary for action in this complex, agency, learning and adaptation, is as different from managed systems and perfect markets as the new Toyota is from the old General Motors, or as the Internet now is from AT&amp T then. The hallmarks of these newer systems are: (a) location of authority and practical capacity to act at cooperation, judgment and insight the regularities and dependencies among objects and processes are less all human and material elements of the production system. The ambition of scientific management was to offer a single, integrated system where could be isolated and controlled. Fordism took that ambition and embedded the managerial knowledge in the technological platform of the routines. Toyota Production System, by comparison, has a substantially reliance on small teams where each team member can perform all tasks, all communicate. The system is built on trust and a cooperative dynamic. The enterprise functions through a managerial control system, but also through social cooperation mechanisms built around teamwork and trust. However, even Toyota might be bested in this respect by the even more loosely coupled networks of innovation and supply represented by But let us also consider the system in question that has made this work possible, the Internet, and compare it to the design principles of the T network in its heyday. Unlike the Internet, AT&amp T’s network was fully managed. Mid-century, the company even retained ownership of the behavior, although it didn’t hurt either that this policy effectively excluded competitors). This generated profit, but any substantial technical innovations required the approval of management and a re-engineering of the entire network. The Internet, on the other hand, was designed to be as general as possible. The network hardware merely hard processing work−manipulating a humanly-meaningful communication (a a stream of packets−was to be done by its edge devices, in this case computers owned by users. This system allowed the breathtaking rate of innovation that we have seen, while also creating certain These vulnerabilities have led some to argue that a new system to manage the Internet is needed. We see first of all that doubts about trust and security on the Internet arise precisely because the network was originally designed for people who could more-or-less trust each other, and offloaded security from the network to the edges. As the network agents in the system were competent and benign, or at least sincere) declined. This decline was met with arguments in favor of building security into the technical system, both at its core, in the network effective means of preventing copyright infringement or system failure, and preserving corporate security (these are the main reasons offered for implementing such systems). Trusted computing in this form is the ultimate reversal of the human-centric, loosely-coupled design approach of the Internet. Instead of locating authority and capacity to act at Reintroducing the Human Taylorism, the Bell system and trusted computing are all efforts to remove human agency from action and replace it with well-designed, tightly-bound systems. That is, the specifications and regularities of time. Human agency, learning, communication and adaptation are minimized in managed systems, if not eliminated, and the knowledge in the system comes from the outside, from the designer, in the initial design over contrast, loosely-coupled systems affirmatively eschew this level of control, and build in room for human agency, experimentation, failure, communication, learning and adaptation. Loose-coupling is central to the agency over time, only imperfectly constraining and enabling any given system designers are accepting the limitations of design and foresight, To deal with the new complexity of contemporary life we need to taught us anything, it is that what makes for human insight is extremely difficult to replicate or systematize. At the center of these new experiment, learn and adapt. But enabling human agency also provides the mainstream of system design in the twentieth century, we must now Free software, Wikipedia, Creative Commons and the thousands of emerging information economy give us real existence proofs that human-centric systems can not merely exist, but thrive, as can the human beings and

<question>:
What state bureaucracy development saved Europe after WWII?

<options>:
A Frederick Taylor's Scientific Management
B The New Deal
C The Marshall Plan
D The Tennessee Valley Authority

<answer>:

C