Read the following passage and questions, then choose the right answer from options, the answer should be one of A, B, C, D.

<passage>:
COMPLEXITY AND HUMANITY We have all seen the images. Volunteers pitching in. People working day and night coming up with the most ingenious, improvised solutions to everything from food and shelter to communications and security. Working disaster zones. It is, however, complex and rapidly changing and careless borrowers in the United States can upend economic others have planned, means that there are many more moving parts that affect each other. And from this scale of practical effects, complexity but the systematic application of knowledge to the creation of new knowledge, innovation to innovation, and information to making more information has become pervasive These two features−the global scale of interdependence of human action, and the systematic acceleration of innovation, make contemporary life a unpredictability makes it unwise to build systems that take too much discuss, learn, and repeat. That is why we have seen many more systems take on a loose, human centric model in the last decade and a half: from the radical divergence of Toyota’s production system from the highly structured model put in place by Henry Ford, to the Internet’s radical departure from the AT&amp T system that preceded it, and on to the way Wikipedia constructs human knowledge on the fly, incrementally, in ways that would have been seen, until recently, as too chaotic ever to work (and are still seen so be many). But it is time we acknowledge that systems work best by making work human. Modern Times Modern times were hard enough. Trains and planes, telegraph and telephone, all brought many people into the same causal space. The solution to this increased complexity in the late 19th, early 20th century was to increase the role of structure and improve its design. During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, this type of rationalization took the form of ever-more complex managed systems, with control. In business, this rationalization was typified by Fredrick Taylor’s Scientific Management, later embodied in Henry Ford’s assembly line. The ambition of these approaches was to specify everything that needed doing in minute detail, to enforce it through monitoring and rewards, and The idea was to eliminate human error and variability in the face of change by removing thinking to the system, and thus neutralizing the time, and what it did to humanity, more vividly than Charlie Chaplin’s assembly line worker in Modern Times. At the same time, government experienced the rise of bureaucratization and the administrative state. Nowhere was this done more brutally than in the totalitarian states of mid-century. But the impulse to build fully-specified systems, designed by experts, monitored and controlled so as to limit human greed and error and to manage uncertainty, was basic and widespread. It underlay the development of the enormously successful state bureaucracies that responded to the Great Depression with the New Deal. It took shape in the Marshall Plan to pull Europe out of the material abyss into which it had been plunged by World War II, systems too, we saw in mid-century marvels like the AT&amp system and the IBM mainframe. For a moment in history, these large scale managed systems were achieving efficiencies that seemed to overwhelm competing models: from the Tennessee Valley Authority to Sputnik, from perspective is already to presage the demise of the belief in their inevitable victory. The increasing recognition of the limits of command-and-control systems led to a new approach but it turned out to be a retrenchment, not an abandonment, of the goal of perfect rationalization of systems design, which assumed much of the human away. What replaced planning and control in these systems was the myth of perfect markets. This was achieved through a hyper-simplification of human nature, wedded to mathematical modeling of what hyper-simplified selfish rational actors, looking only to their own interests, would do under diverse conditions. This approach was widespread and influential it still is. And yet it led to such lust and desire, recklessness and helplessness, or how to slow down the transmission of AIDS. Only by concocting such a thin model of humanity−no more than the economists’ utility curve−and neglecting any complexities of social interactions that could not be conveyed through prices, could the appearance of rationalization be maintained. Like bureaucratic rationalization, perfect-market rationalization also had successes. But, like its predecessor, its limits as an approach to human systems design are becoming cleare seeing instead is the rise of human systems that increasingly shy away to coordinating human action will disappear. But these managed systems are becoming increasingly interlaced with looser structures, which invite and enable more engaged human action by drawing on intrinsic make the most innovative region in the United States a Ludic paradise, gratifying employees at the expense of productivity, but rather to engage the human and social in the pursuit of what is, in the long term, the only core business competency−innovation. Wikipedia has eclipsed all IPO and hiring the smartest guys in the room, but by building an open and inviting system that lets people learn together and pursue their The set of human systems necessary for action in this complex, unpredictable set of conditions, combining rationalization with human the regularities and dependencies among objects and processes are less occur through multiple systems simultaneously, have room to fail, or shift from one system to another to achieve a solution. of scientific management was to offer a single, integrated system where could be isolated and controlled. Fordism took that ambition and embedded the managerial knowledge in the technological platform of the reliance on small teams where each team member can perform all tasks, loosely coupled networks of innovation and supply represented by But let us also consider the system in question that has made this work possible, the Internet, and compare it to the design principles of the T network in its heyday. Unlike the Internet, AT&amp T’s network was phones at the endpoints, arguing that it needed to prohibit customers excluded competitors). This generated profit, but any substantial technical innovations required the approval of management and a re-engineering of the entire network. The Internet, on the other hand, was designed to be as general as possible. The network hardware merely hard processing work−manipulating a humanly-meaningful communication (a computers owned by users. This system allowed the breathtaking rate of innovation that we have seen, while also creating certain These vulnerabilities have led some to argue that a new system to manage the Internet is needed. We see first of all that doubts about trust and security on the Internet arise precisely because the network was originally designed for people who could more-or-less trust each other, and offloaded security from the network to the edges. As the network agents in the system were competent and benign, or at least sincere) declined. This decline was met with arguments in favor of building security into the technical system, both at its core, in the network company, or the employer. This is thought to be the most completely effective means of preventing copyright infringement or system failure, and preserving corporate security (these are the main reasons offered ultimate reversal of the human-centric, loosely-coupled design approach of the Internet. Instead of locating authority and capacity to act at malevolent, incompetent, or both. Taylorism, the Bell system and trusted computing are all efforts to remove human agency from action and replace it with well-designed, tightly-bound systems. That is, the specifications and regularities of time. Human agency, learning, communication and adaptation are minimized in managed systems, if not eliminated, and the knowledge in the system contrast, loosely-coupled systems affirmatively eschew this level of control, and build in room for human agency, experimentation, failure, communication, learning and adaptation. Loose-coupling is central to the new systems. It is a feature of system design that leaves room for human agency over time, only imperfectly constraining and enabling any given system designers are accepting the limitations of design and foresight, To deal with the new complexity of contemporary life we need to taught us anything, it is that what makes for human insight is extremely difficult to replicate or systematize. At the center of these new scope of action for human frailty. Although this idea is most alien to the mainstream of system design in the twentieth century, we must now communicate, that will encourage us to cooperate, and that will avoid

<question>:
What was the solution for increased complexity in the late 19th, early 20th century?

<options>:
A Assembly lines
B The increased role of structure and improved design
C Complex managed systems
D Child labor laws

<answer>:

B