Home " Magazines " Proceedings Magazine - March 2012 Vol. 138/3/1,309
A Fleet out of BalanceTeaching Naval Strategy - to All Who MatterOceans - The World's Vital Maritime ShortcutsSupporting Brothers - and Sisters - in ArmsNow Hear This - 'Semper CVN!'Show of Force - or Just for Show?Special - Anticipation and Surprise: The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 1990-99What's the Matter with Mahan?Making Expeditionary Force 21 Work'Amphibiosity' in the Asia-Pacific Subscribe To Our Feeds
Inside the New Defense Strategy
Proceedings Magazine - March 2012 Vol. 138/3/1,309 By Norman Friedman
What's new and what's not in 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense?' When President Barack Obama announced the administration's new defense strategy at the Pentagon on 5 January, he stated that it would be consistent with his goal of drastically cutting defense spending in the wake of the U.S. pullout from Iraq and the projected drawdown in Afghanistan. The elements discussed most prominently were the abandonment of the requirement that the United States be able to fight two regional wars simultaneously, followed by a shift to emphasis on the Pacific (rather than Europe) and the statement that the United States would continue the current policy of attacking (if necessary, preemptively) those plotting to attack us. Other accounts emphasized the need to build up cyber-defenses and to counter the anti-access threats posed by Iran and China. Another widely discussed element was a plan to draw down ground forces. That has happened previously, but this time we are promised special measures to keep the surviving forces from being hollowed out, and to prepare for expansion if necessary. The new concept is described as a pivot strategy, the United States "pivoting" from a concentration on the Middle East to one on East Asia. In this election year, the new strategy has been described in partisan terms. To some it is a gross drawdown, endangering U.S. interests, pandering to President Obama's base in the antiwar element of the Democratic Party. To others, it is an integral part of the attempt to control the federal budget, a side argument being that on the whole defense spending creates far fewer jobs than spending on, say, U.S. infrastructure. If the nature of war is changing (toward, for example, cyber-war) how much of the existing military structure is worth preserving? What is the basis of U.S. national security? We've Been Here Before None of these questions is new. This strategy embodies several earlier ones, and it may be best to evaluate it on that basis. It is often said that amateurs study tactics, but professionals study logistics. In this case, logistics is funding. Apart from a few rather basic concepts, there is no meaningful U.S. national strategy. Funding really does shape what can be done, and what is done. That is true whether or not the administration has a bias toward or away from defense; it is impossible to say how much is really needed, or how much is enough. The basics are rather persistent. The United States generally concentrates on keeping threats at arm's length, which means we have, wherever possible, a forward strategy. When that is impossible, as with the threat posed by strategic missiles, we tend toward deterrence. U.S. strategists have long thought in terms of two simultaneous wars, because the United States faces both Europe (and the Middle East) and Asia, and because a large regional war in one area would be more or less independent of one in the other. For example, for years the requirement for amphibious lift was two independent divisional lifts, one for each theater. After the end of the Cold War, the requirement was to be able to fight one regional war while maintaining enough force in place to preclude hostile victory in the other - the idea being that once the first had been won, forces could be swung to the other. After 9/11 the standard changed to an ability to fight two regional wars simultaneously. The U.S. Navy buildup projected after 9/11, and particularly the need for many more surface combatants (i.e., littoral combat ships), was justified on the grounds that there could be great deal more than two simultaneous crises. Naval strike forces could deal with many of them, even if there were not nearly enough ground forces to go around. The point was originally made by a slide showing multiple entirely conceivable crises on "a bad day in 2003," emphasizing that something like 9/11 was a new kind of crisis that could erupt along with crises formerly taken into account. In a larger sense, 9/11 was such a shock because it demonstrated that sub-national groups do not respond to deterrence: They have no home address where they can be threatened. The past decade reflected one forward strategy, which was to change conditions in the Muslim world in such a way that terrorism would become unpopular - hence the attempt at nation-building in Iraq. The Arab Spring It is entirely possible that the "Arab Spring" was ultimately the result of the effort in Iraq, and that it will eventually have the desired effect, though that will take some years to see. It is arguable that there is little point in a similar effort elsewhere in the Muslim world; either the Arab spring will work out happily, or it will turn out that nation-building bought nothing. The 9/11 attacks also convinced many in the George W. Bush administration that much more was needed in the way of homeland defense. There is no public indication of the sheer size of the homeland-security budget, but it must be huge, and it is unlikely to decline anytime soon. It comes out of the same treasury that funds the military (as does the foreign aid that we hope builds countries less likely to attack us). That carries real costs to the military. This ought to sound familiar. In 1949 the administration of Harry S. Truman realized that the Soviets posed both military and political threats. There would be little point in being able to defend Western Europe (the Cold War prize) if the Western Europeans decided to vote communist because their economies were in shambles. The administration decided that it needed an integrated military-economic strategy. It funded the Marshall Plan (which rebuilt European economies) out of the same pot of money that was paying for a U.S. mobilization to face the Soviets, Not surprisingly, the military end had to be cut. What Stalin Knew The pot was limited, because Congress was unwilling to raise taxes or to increase the large deficit left over from World War II. That administration thought - incorrectly, it turned out - it could take the chance that the U.S. military was weak because the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. The monopoly did not last. Even worse, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin knew (through his spies) that the United States had very few bombs, certainly not enough to devastate the Soviet Union (nor did it have an effective strategic bomber force). He had what was later called a window of opportunity, and jumped through it to fight a war in Korea. The new strategic doctrine eschews a further exercise in nation-building or even, it seems, in intervention to protect friendly Muslim governments if their opponents turn to civil war. The Democrats' claim that Iraq had been a terrible mistake was a major theme in 2008 (the party avoided an antiwar label by claiming that Afghanistan was the right war to fight). Having a large capable ground force is a prerequisite for nation-building. A different way to say the same thing is that large armies get governments in trouble by offering possibilities that are easy to enter but very difficult to exit. President Dwight D. Eisenhower seems to have had exactly this potential in mind when he took a meat-ax to the U.S. Army during his tenure. The weakness of the Army became an important theme in the 1960 election, and President John F. Kennedy reversed his predecessor's policy. While Eisenhower had wanted it to be impossible for the United States to go in without partners making substantial contributions, the growing Army offered the nation a unilateral option in Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine In much the same way, in 1970 President Richard Nixon announced a new doctrine under which the United States would provide countries air and naval support, but would expect them to use their own ground forces. In theory, this Nixon Doctrine underpinned the Vietnamization of the Vietnam War, and it can be argued that it was successful (Nixon's political collapse after 1973 removed the threat of U.S. air and naval forces and thus made the ultimate North Vietnamese attack practical). At about the same time, President Nixon promised incoming Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr. that any money he saved by discarding older ships would be used to recapitalize the Fleet. That never happened, at least partly because the U.S. public demanded a "peace dividend" after the end of the unpopular Vietnam War. We should not mistake the considerable popularity of the U.S. military now for popular support of the wars we are now fighting - and those wars were forced on us far more than Vietnam was. Since deterrence and forward defense are so deeply embedded in our thinking, what does the new strategy do about persistent terrorist threats? It argues that the terrorists are not so much guerrilla fish swimming in a welcoming sea as individuals who have to be hunted down and killed. Thus the emphasis is to be on attacks against those individuals, such as the strike against Osama bin Laden and the continuing wave of attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). That may or may not work; critics have pointed out that if al Qaeda or its clones can seize control of one or more unstable countries, that victory will give them considerable power against us. However, given the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not clear that the U.S. public will be very supportive of a new nation-building (or -altering) war in the region. War by assassination may be all we can have. And it may well be that local governments will lose their taste for U.S. UAV bases. In that case this kind of war will have to be based at sea, which may already be obvious. What to Make of Iran All of this leaves out the one place in the Middle East that may pull us into a ground war: Iran. Iran is big and has a large population. It seems unlikely that any military planner can envisage a strategy that would quickly unseat the Iranian regime. However, it is entirely possible that we will find ourselves drawn into a ground war to defend allies, just as we found ourselves drawn into the war over Kuwait in 1990-91. In that case, an extreme drawdown of ground forces will be most unfortunate. However, the drawdown announced, 10 or 15 percent over about a decade, is limited and also probably quite reversible. If President Obama is re-elected, the drawdown may steepen considerably (as it also may if funding is automatically cut after the 2012 election). Now go back to logistics - to money. Well before the Bush administration, many were saying that defense would soon be heading for a "train wreck," because the cost of maintaining forces in the way that had become traditional was unsustainable. A worse problem would arise as the first baby boomers reach retirement age and Social Security and similar costs explode - which is actually a global problem. The United States has been more fortunate than many countries because its population is still growing, so a fair number of workers are still supporting each retiree. However, that ratio is worsening. It is already desperate in Europe, which is one reason NATO countries already spend so little, proportionately, on defense (the existence of a strong U.S. military is, of course, another). All About People How do you squeeze down defense spending? Personnel, including medical care, already account for much of the cost. The reason is that the United States never really adjusted to the idea of having a large standing military force. Until about 1950 the pattern was simple. We maintained a very small force, then mobilized for an emergency like a world war. Once the emergency was over, the force was cut. Those who had been mobilized imposed few or no costs until they were old and ill, and until the 1950s not many veterans lived long enough to collect pensions or to obtain expensive healthcare. Now, fortunately, people live much longer, and the average number in the military is much higher. Moreover, there is no longer a draft as a source of inexpensive manpower. The new strategy includes hopeful words about cutting the cost per person, but in reality the only way to save a lot of money over the medium run is to cut numbers. Ground forces require very large numbers of personnel. During the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan we tried to avoid the cost of growing the ground forces sufficiently by coercing the Reserves into acting as permanent ground forces. That worked, but it seems obvious that this resource has largely been expended. Some would argue that there is not much more to cut in the surface fleet. Nor can overall numbers of ships be cut indefinitely, because the ocean is so vast and because there has to be some mechanism to advance our sea power. Carriers are the remaining manpower-intensive ships, and that is largely because air operations require so many people. Yet the carriers are also the core of the Fleet, because they alone offer sustained striking power. Indeed, the new strategy explicitly rejects any draw-down in carrier numbers, recognizing that they are more likely to provide what is needed in the Far East than fixed bases. It seems time to look more closely at whatever can be done to reduce the operating cost of a fixed level of carrier air power. UAVs, if they are properly operated, may help enormously. Acquisition Reform It seems inevitable, too, that there will be another close look at acquisition. The widespread sense is that weapon systems cost far too much. Previous attempts to control costs have failed. The real lesson of procurement reform is that its focus is entirely wrong. Reform seems to begin well after the weapon system has been defined. In fact, cost control is a matter of self-discipline, largely at the stage at which requirements are set. The implicit idea in current attempts at reform is that those defining it have a clear understanding of what is needed. That may sometimes be the case, but the Navy's experience in buying ships suggests that understanding is often far less definite. The reform that counts is probably in the way requirements are framed. Our ships and aircraft usually meet their required goals, but changes in the goals - often subtle ones - might have made them enormously less expensive. The new strategy does not and cannot address this issue. One might add that, ironically, procurement reform was rammed down the Navy's throat, replacing a very successful procurement technique based on about a century's experience. The situation is more complicated now because so much of weapon capability resides in software, and no one seems to be able to associate capabilities with levels of software cost or complexity. In the end, the point is that the new strategy almost inevitably repeats what previous administrations have felt compelled to do at the end of expensive wars. It faces some new problems, such as the high cost of future Social Security, and it enjoys some advantages - there is, for example, no current Soviet-scale threat. Eyes on China China poses the largest potential threat. No one in the United States is likely to imagine that this country will create a mass army to operate at length there. However, we can readily envision a need to counter Chinese aggression, because East Asia is increasingly vital to us. The Chinese appear to be building a massive oceanic navy based on Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's insight that seaborne trade is a vital national interest. The Chinese seem to take that idea seriously. In that case, we have a counter based on our own highly capable Fleet. China may indeed have a strategic center of gravity in the form of chokepoints for the shipping that brings it vital resources. It may be time for us to revive interest in antishipping warfare. Of course it is also possible that the Chinese army is en route to convincing its government that the best future source of resources is Siberia. The Russians seized that territory centuries ago; it is possible that Chinese nationalism will embrace this fact. In that case the Russians will share our interest in curbing Chinese ambitions. Their land power (if it revives) may be a complement to our sea power (and vice-versa). This is not an explicit theme in the new national strategy, but it would certainly support both the determination to keep the Navy strong and the Obama administration's interest in maintaining and strengthening ties to Russia, even at the expense of some Central Europeans. Cyber Then there is an entirely new kind of geography: cyber-geography. The Internet seems to have (in effect) abolished distance. Thus there are no geographical barriers to attack, and it is not clear what other sorts of barriers we can erect. Clearly, a hostile entity can attack us through the Internet. Cyber-attacks are like terrorism, in that right now we find it difficult or impossible to associate a home address with an attack. As with terrorism, our strategy is a combination of deterrence (or attack) and defense; the less effective the forward part of the strategy, the more we are forced into defensive measures. Because the forward part of the strategy (both attack and deterrence) is black, it is difficult to say publicly how the balance should be reached. But we know it cannot be inexpensive. Like homeland security, cyber security is a considerable expense that must come largely from the conventional part of the defense budget. Presumably a major goal is to make attack expensive enough that it can only be mounted by governments or their like. The new strategy relies heavily on naval forces and on lightweight ground forces that can strike and then leave. It was not the only possibility. We might, for example, have adopted a strategy focused on the Middle East and on the possibility of enforcing and preserving changes we find acceptable. Another alternative would have been withdrawal from the Far East - though that would have had high costs in terms of our trade connections there. Yet another would have been to rely heavily on deterrence, in the form of enhanced nuclear forces and also on an ability to strike globally at very short notice (a capability now being developed). We can be sure that all of these possibilities (and others) will be debated extensively in the months ahead. Dr. Friedman is Proceedings ' "World Naval Developments" columnist. He is the author of The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems , Fifth Edition, and Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter Through Three World Wars , available from the Naval Institute Press at . Read more
Norman Friedman
Norman Friedman is a consultant on global naval strategy, naval trends, and naval warfare. An internationally known military technology analyst and naval historian, he worked for a decade as an advisor to Secretaries of the Navy, and for another 10 years with a leading U.S. think tank. Dr. Friedman travels the world speaking to military and defense industry leaders, and appears frequently appears on television as a guest commentator. He has authored more than 30 books, and has since the 1980s contributed regular columns analyzing world naval developments for Proceedings magazine. His PhD in Physics was earned at Columbia University.
U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
This series offers detailed descriptions of the evolution of all classes of the principal U.S.... Read More
NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO WORLD NAVAL WEAPON SYSTEMS
Long recognized as the most comprehensive reference work available on the subject, this guide... Read More
U.S. SUBMARINES THROUGH 1945
SEAPOWER AS STRATEGY
A noted defense analyst and naval weapons expert lays out the roles of navies and naval strategy in... Read More
Transformation a Century Ago
Navalists at the turn of the 20th century were beginning to see the oceans as highways for both... Read More
Both Gulf Wars Offer Lessons
As this is written, the war for Iraq is entering its third week. At least some Iraqis are resisting... Read More
Are We Already Transformed?
Despite the hand-wringing over transformation, the Navy's history of dispersed operations... Read More
U.S. Survives Blackest Tuesday
The USS Cole (DDG-67) was rolled onto Northrop Grumman's floating drydock in Pascagoula,... Read More
World Naval Developments: U.S. Survives Blackest Tuesday; Fleet Reorganization Promises Integration; Stealth Faces New Challenge
The USS Cole (DDG-67) was rolled onto Northrop Grumman's floating drydock in Pascagoula,... Read More
World Naval Developments
This satellite image taken on 4 April shows the Navy EP-3E parked on a taxiway of the Lingshui... Read More
What Happened to the Kursk?
In August, the Russian Oscar 2-class (Project 949A) missile submarine Kursk sank in the Barents... Read More
World Naval Developments: A Problem with Precision?
In February, U.S. and British aircraft struck Iraqi air defenses covering the "no-fly"... Read More
Naval Race in the Far East? Early in September, Israeli F-15s bombed a remote part of the... Read More
Naval Race in the Far East?
Early in September, Israeli F-15s bombed a remote part of the Syrian... Read More
Steaming Into a New World
The Cold War was a war for national survival. It demanded sacrifices that lesser conflicts... Read More
Serbian Air Defenses Take on Stealth
Early in the attacks on targets in Kosovo and Serbia, the... Read More
The Real Purpose of Strategy
In October the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jointly issued a... Read More
Oil, Oil, Everywhere?
How important is the rising price of oil? A few months ago it was said that... Read More
Iran's Uncertain Nuclear Status
In December, the U.S. intelligence community released parts of a... Read More
Unsatisfied Customers
This has not been a happy time for relations between Russia and the Indian... Read More
Network-Centric Warfare: Space Style
In mid-February an SM-3 missile from the cruiser USS Lake Erie... Read More
Heed Moore's Law
As in previous years, the Navy League's 2008 Sea, Air, Space Symposium was a paean... Read More
Going Underground
In April photographs of a Chinese naval base on Hainan, a large island in the... Read More
How Not to Design a Warship
David K. Brown, a senior British warship designer and for many... Read More
(click here to view the print version)
Who Needs Pilots?
In June Secretary of Defense Robert M.... Read More
A Shift to Soft Power
In July, Defense Secretary Robert F.... Read More
Putin's New Cold War
In August the Russians invaded the independent republic of Georgia, formerly... Read More
An event that shook the U.S. stock market in early September may be very relevant... Read More
Crash and Burn?
The most significant defense development of the past six months has been the... Read More
Maritime Vulnerability
The terrorist raid on Mumbai in late November 2008 dramatized the maritime... Read More
A Transformation in Carrier Aviation?
On 16 December 2008, Northrop Grumman rolled out the... Read More
The High Cost of Computers?
The world economic downturn seems to be stopping plans by chip... Read More
Deterrence vs. Defense
In February Iran orbited a small satellite. This event matters because it... Read More
Economic Entanglements
In March Chinese ships intercepted and tried to drive off two U.S. Navy... Read More
Better Security through Business
Backing up our sales of ships and equipment with ongoing consultation creates relationships.... Read More
Chasing the Pirates
The April seizure of the U.S. merchant ship Maersk Alabama and the protracted... Read More
Banning the Bomb?
Late in May, North Korea exploded its second nuclear device. It had recently... Read More
Tomorrow's Wars
The United Kingdom celebrated its first Armed Forces Day late in June. The... Read More
Russian Arms Industry Foundering
Last month the Russian Navy hosted its biennial naval show in St.... Read More
A Great Equalizer?
In July India launched its long-awaited nuclear-powered submarine, Arihant (... Read More
Another Great Leap Forward?
The first of October is the national holiday of the People's Republic... Read More
Russia Shops Around
What might once have seemed a fantasy now seems more realistic. A year ago... Read More
The South Carolina Sisters: America's First Dreadnoughts
The products of a flawed process, the revolutionary USS South Carolina and Michigan nevertheless... Read More
All Jammed Up
At Paris in June 2009 and again at Zhuhai in November, the Chinese displayed drawings... Read More
Stealing Signals
In December 2009 intelligence revealed that insurgents in Afghanistan were... Read More
Danger on the Waterfront
The aftermath of January's Haitian earthquake dramatized an obvious but... Read More
New Modes of Failure
Toyota's automobile problems carry some interesting lessons for naval and... Read More
Hard Lessons in the Littorals
In March, the Korean corvette Cheonan sank near the border between... Read More
Making Deterrence Work
In May the Obama administration announced a new national nuclear policy. Its... Read More
North Korea's Gambit
In mid-May the South Korean government presented clear evidence, in the form... Read More
Too Much Access?
A leaking (or spy) scandal that erupted in mid-June may illuminate the issue of... Read More
Aided by Perception and Luck
In the 1920s, the U.S. Navy leaped forward in naval aviation by learning how to vastly increase... Read More
You Can Run, But You Can't Hide
Late in July the National Research Council released a... Read More
A High-Stakes Game
For the past year, the advent of a Chinese "carrier killer"... Read More
Virus Season
A spectacular cyber-attack has dramatized the potential of this type of warfare.... Read More
Whither Britannia?
In mid-October the British government announced the result of its Strategic... Read More
Blocking the Path
Two Internet incidents earlier this year, revealed only in October, suggest... Read More
The Moscow-New Delhi Express
When he visited India last fall, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev... Read More
Naval Guard Debuts
At last fall's Euronaval, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) displayed... Read More
Air Power on a Budget
Early in February the U.S. Navy took what may well turn out to be a... Read More
The Libyan Excursion
As this column was being written, the air war against Libyan leader... Read More
The Pakistan Labyrinth
On 2 May U.S. Navy SEALs attacked the compound of Osama bin Laden,... Read More
It's What's Inside That Counts
The first major U.S. weapon system designed for the post-Cold War era, the NSSN features... Read More
Radar Shadowing Lights Up Stealth
Radar shadowing, a new antistealth technique, is out of the... Read More
The Economics of Corruption
In a continuing scandal, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev is... Read More
World Naval Developments in Review
Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles: How Large a Threat?
In February, a Navy SM-2 Block... Read More
They Built It - and People Came
By Norman Friedman
At the Paris Air Show in June, Bell and... Read More
Lockheed buys Northrop Grumman
Another famous name in U.S. aerospace is no more-Northrop... Read More
Look Who's Talking Two-Way
The Royal Navy has tested successfully a towed antenna to... Read More
The High Cost of No Carriers
The Libyan operation has provided a particularly clear... Read More
Danes Plan Fleet Modernization
The Royal Danish Navy is considering replacing its current Nils... Read More
World Naval Developments: Asian Financial Crisis Affects Defense Modernization
The ongoing economic problems in East Asia are likely to have important defense implications.... Read More
World Naval Developments: Getting Ready to Strike Iraq
The February 1998 preparations for U.S. strikes against Iraq highlighted some unfortunate naval... Read More
In March, it was reported that the British plan to build two carriers, with a third to follow... Read More
India Explodes Three Nukes
India startled the world by announcing on 11 May that it had... Read More
World Naval Developments: Thunder Rolls out of India and Pakistan
The series of nuclear tests conducted by India in May - followed closely by Pakistan in... Read More
World Naval Developments: What Is "Military" Technology?
The recent controversy over the sale of satellites to China highlights a central problem:... Read More
Let the Chips Fall Where They May
Some current researchers are arguing that Moore's Law... Read More
British Consider Larger Carrier
As predicted in these pages, the report of the British Defense... Read More
North Korean Satellite Launch Fails
At the end of August, the North Koreans launched their two... Read More
World Naval Developments: Launching Tomahawks at Terrorists: To What Effect?
On 19 August, U.S. warships off Pakistan and in the Red Sea fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at a... Read More
A Long Wait
In mid-August the Chinese carrier (which some speculate will be named the Shi Lang... Read More
Compromising Stealth?
In mid-October Lockheed-Martin announced a revolutionary new sensor... Read More
South African Navy Modernizes
In mid-November the South Africans announced a long awaited... Read More
World Naval Developments: The Typhoon Saga Ends
In December 1998, the U.S. government announced that it would assist the Russians in breaking up... Read More
World Naval Developments - Jointness on the Block?
This summer Canada restored the "Royal" prefix to the Canadian navy and air force.... Read More
We Bomb Iraq - Again
The December strikes on Iraq are a particularly good illustration of... Read More
Why Are We Going Into the Balkans?
ATO intervention in Kosovo, strongly supported by the United... Read More
World Naval Developments - Russia Fires Back on Missile Defense
As the United States erects a missile-defense system in Central Europe, Russian politicians have... Read More
World Naval Developments: British Deep-Six Project Horizon
Late in April, the British government withdrew from the troubled Project Horizon frigate program... Read More
World Naval Developments - A Different Kind of Blast
In November 2011 the U.S. Air Force announced the successful test (on 17 May) of a new cruise... Read More
Chinese Spied for Decades
Late in May the Clinton administration agreed to release a... Read More
World Naval Developments - The Human Factor in Cyber Security
A recent case of hacking - actually of industrial espionage - offers insights into the... Read More
What's new and what's not in 'Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for... Read More
World Naval Developments - Lessons from the Golden Age
Every other year the Royal Australian Navy hosts a sea-power conference and exposition in Sydney... Read More
World Naval Developments - The Perils of Succession
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il died in December. He apparently has been succeeded by his... Read More
Speaking Engagement & Signing
11:30am, Naval Order of the U.S., New York Commandery, NY Racquet & Tennis Club, 370 Park Ave... Read More
Expert Panelist
CNO Read More
"Meet the Authors & Book Signing ~ WEST"
4:00-5:30pm, Naval Institute Booth #1032, San Diego Convention Center, San Diego, CA Read More
THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY