Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton is an American economist and academic. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Emeritus since 2018, and holds the Market Design Chair in Economics at the University of Cologne.

Cramton's research has focused on three related areas. The first is bargaining theory where he studies the role time and information play in determining bargaining outcomes. The second is auction theory and practice, where he examines the auctioning of interrelated items, such as radio spectrum, electricity, financial securities, rough diamonds, airport slots, and top-level domains. His work in bargaining and auctions is closely tied to his third theme: market design. His market design work concerns communications, energy, finance, transportation, and health industries.

Cramton has written over one hundred articles. As of 2020, his work has been cited over 14,400 times according to Google Scholar. His best known publications are: "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment", "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions", and "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response".
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University of Maryland
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Q54096
University of Cologne
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Q902174
radio spectrum
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Q1249105
airport slots
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Q14296
top-level domain
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Q48712450
market design
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Q494817
Google Scholar
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Q30069339
Peter Cramton
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2018-01-01T00:00:00Z^^http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime
2018
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2020-01-01T00:00:00Z^^http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime
2020
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