Who developed the first thermonuclear weapon?
2269463#4
The first full-scale thermonuclear test was carried out by the United States in 1952; the concept has since been employed by most of the world's nuclear powers in the design of their weapons. The design of all modern thermonuclear weapons in the United States is known as the "Teller–Ulam configuration" for its two chief contributors, Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, who developed it in 1951 for the United States, with certain concepts developed with the contribution of physicist John von Neumann. Similar devices were developed by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China.
Thermonuclear weapon
242883#32
The notion of using a fission weapon to ignite a process of nuclear fusion can be dated back to 1942. At the first major theoretical conference on the development of an atomic bomb hosted by J. Robert Oppenheimer at the University of California, Berkeley, participant Edward Teller directed the majority of the discussion towards Enrico Fermi's idea of a "Super" bomb that would use the same reactions that powered the Sun itself.
History of nuclear weapons
14458973#17
The United States Atomic Energy Commission, directed by David E. Lilienthal until 1950, was in charge of designing and building nuclear weapons. The policy was 100% civilian control. The U.S. had only 9 atomic bombs in 1946, but the stockpile grew to 650 by 1951. Lilienthal wanted to give high priority to peaceful uses, especially nuclear power plants, but coal was cheap and the power industry was not interested. Construction of the first nuclear plant would not begin until 1954. In early 1950, Truman authorized the development of thermonuclear weapons, a more powerful version of atomic bombs. Truman's decision to develop thermonuclear weapons faced opposition from many liberals and some government officials, but Truman believed that the Soviet Union would likely develop the weapons, and he was unwilling to allow the Soviets to have such an advantage. The first test of thermonuclear weaponry was conducted by the United States in 1952, and the Soviet Union performed its own thermonuclear test in August 1953.
Presidency of Harry S. Truman
2269463#43
The Soviet thermonuclear weapons program was aided heavily by Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs’ most valuable contribution to the Soviet weapons program concerned the hydrogen bomb. The idea of a hydrogen bomb arose from discussions between Enrico Fermi and Edward Teller in 1941. From 1943 Teller lectured at Los Alamos on what he called the "super". Following their meeting, Fermi was convinced by Teller to present a series of lectures detailing the current state of research into thermonuclear weapons. In September 1945 Fuchs passed a synopsis of these lectures to the Soviets. This information was important to the Soviets, but not solely for the information about the US bomb project. The importance of this material was in that it confirmed that the United States were working on their own thermonuclear weapon research. Although the information provided by Fuchs regarding the thermonuclear weapons research was not seen as entirely beneficial, it still provided the Soviet Union with knowledge such as the properties of tritium. Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen with two neutrons, which allows for more efficient fusion reactions to occur during the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Discovering the properties of this radioactive material would allow the Soviet Union to develop a more powerful weapon that requires less fuel. Following Fuchs's return, experts from the Soviet Union spent a great deal of time researching his findings for themselves. Even though the Soviets did obtain some original ideas, the findings of this research served to confirm Fuchs's notes from the American lectures on the matter. After his return to England in mid-1946, Fuchs was not again in touch with Soviet intelligence until September 1947, when his controller confirmed the Soviet interest in thermonuclear weapons. In response Fuchs provided details of the "ongoing theoretical superbomb studies in the U.S. under the direction of Teller and Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago." Fuchs obtained information regardless of the American McMahon Act, which prevented Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear weapons research. Under this act, Fuchs did not have routine access to American collaborators like Fermi and Teller. Fuchs was very close to Teller at Los Alamos, and while there Fuchs had worked on thermonuclear weapons. As Teller later recalled, "he [Fuchs] talked with me and others frequently in depth about our intensive efforts… it was easy and pleasant to discuss my work with him. He also made impressive contributions, and I learned many technical facts from him." Fuchs obtained the information, it energized the Soviets to direct new intelligence activities against research in Chicago. In February 1948 the Soviet Union formally began its hydrogen bomb program. A month later Fuchs again met with Feklisov, an event which "played an exceptional role in the subsequent course of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb program." A report of June 1953 warned that, although no indication of Soviet development of hydrogen bombs had been found, "Soviet research, development and even field testing of thermonuclear reactions based on the disclosures of Fuchs may take place by mid-1953." U.S. intelligence thus recognized for the first time that Fuchs' material held invaluable information for the Soviet thermonuclear weapons program.
Thermonuclear weapon
52018264#17
A New Weapons Committee was established at Aldermaston on 15 October 1951 to examine improvements to their atomic bombs. John Corner, the head of the theoretical group at Aldermaston, suggested producing a device in the "megaton range"—one with a yield of or more. In this he was thinking not of a thermonuclear weapon, but of a large fission one. The idea was not pursued at that time, because the RAF wanted more, not bigger, atomic bombs. Meeting in Bermuda in December 1953 with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had replaced Truman as president earlier that year, Churchill told him that the RAF had reckoned that fission bombs would be sufficient for most targets, and therefore that Britain had no intention of developing hydrogen bombs.
On 12 and 19 March 1954, Penney briefed the Gen 475 Committee meetings, attended by the Chiefs of Staff, senior officials from the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office, and Sir Edwin Plowden, about recent developments in thermonuclear weapons. Sir Frederick Brundrett, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff's Working Party on the Operational Use of Atomic Weapons (OAW), then asked Penney on 25 May for a working paper for an OAW meeting on 31 May. In turn, OAW sent a report to the Chiefs of Staff, who recommended that the United Kingdom develop its own thermonuclear weapons. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, the First Sea Lord, recalled that:
British hydrogen bomb programme
2269463#58
The French nuclear testing site was moved to the unpopulated French atolls in the Pacific Ocean. The first test conducted at these new sites was the "Canopus" test in the Fangataufa atoll in French Polynesia on 24 August 1968, the country's first multistage thermonuclear weapon test. The bomb was detonated from a balloon at a height of 520 meters. The result of this test was significant atmospheric contamination. Very little is known about France's development of the Teller–Ulam design, beyond the fact that France detonated a 2.6 Mt device in the 'Canopus" test. France reportedly had great difficulty with its initial development of the Teller-Ulam design, but it later overcame these, and is believed to have nuclear weapons equal in sophistication to the other major nuclear powers.
Thermonuclear weapon
441642#2
In July 1954, the Cabinet decided to develop the hydrogen bomb. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston produced three designs: Orange Herald, a large boosted fission weapon; Green Bamboo, an interim thermonuclear design; and Green Granite, a true thermonuclear weapon. The first test series consisted of three tests in May and June 1957. In the first, Grapple 1, a version of Green Granite known as Short Granite was dropped from a Vickers Valiant bomber flown by Wing Commander Kenneth Hubbard. The bomb's yield was estimated at , far below its designed capability. Despite its failure, the test was hailed as a successful thermonuclear explosion, and the government did not confirm or deny reports that the UK had become a third thermonuclear power. The second test was Grapple 2, of Orange Herald. Its yield made it technically a megaton weapon. It was the largest ever achieved by a single stage device. Grapple 3 tested Purple Granite, a Short Granite with some fixes. Its yield was a very disappointing .
Operation Grapple
5368490#1
In 1953, shortly after the Americans tested a thermonuclear weapon in 1952, followed by the Soviets with Joe 4, and before the UK government took a decision in July 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston was asked about the possibilities for a very large pure fission bomb with a yield of one megaton. This study referred to the Zodiak Mk.3 bomb, but progressed no further than a rudimentary study. At this time studies were also started that ultimately led to a decision in 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, and the design studies were split into two tracks because the British at that time had not yet discovered the Teller-Ulam technique necessary to initiate fusion. One track led to an intermediate design, the so-called Type A thermonuclear design, similar to the Alarm Clock and layer cake hybrid designs of other nuclear powers; although these designs are now regarded as large boosted fission weapons, and no longer regarded as thermonuclear weapons that derive a very large part of their energy from a fusion reaction, designated by the British as Type B, but as hybrids. The British hybrid weapon was known as Green Bamboo, weighed approx 4,500 lb (2,045 kg) and its spherical shape measured approx 45 inches diameter with a 72-point implosion system. This Green Bamboo weapon was intended as the warhead for all projected British strategic delivery systems of the period; the Yellow Sun Stage 1 air-dropped bomb, and the Blue Steel air-launched stand-off missile. The large girth of these weapons was designed to accommodate the diameter of Green Bamboo's implosion sphere.
Violet Club
58901579#2
On 10 June 1948, Tamm headed a new group of theorists which included Andrei Sakharov, Vitaly Ginzburg, S.Z. Belenky and Romanov. They followed up Sakharov's ideas for a new thermonuclear weapon and went to KB-11 (now the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics) in the closed city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod. He started as a junior researcher, then senior, then head of department. In 1952, he received a degree in Physical and Mathematical Sciences with a thesis on kinetic processes of neutrons. This work on neutrons and efficiency continued, along with calculations on nuclear reaction kinetics and energy release of the Soviet Union's first thermonuclear weapon, the RDS-6, tested in 1953; for this he was awarded the Stalin Prize, the first of several awards. He was a leading developer of the RDS-37 - the first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear weapon - most specifically concerned with the power output. Romanov transferred to the new Scientific Research Institute-1011 as head of the theoretical department in 1955. Two years later, his team had developed a new megatonne-yield bomb design. He gained a Ph.D. in Physical and Mathematical Sciences in 1958 and was appointed to professorship of theoretical physics in 1962.
Yuri Romanov (physicist)
32781989#12
McCormack became involved in discussions with Edward Teller over the possibility of developing thermonuclear weapons, then known as the "Super". McCormack became an early advocate of the Super, which promised yields in the megaton range, and directed Norris Bradbury at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to proceed with its development even at the detriment of other weapons. The debate over the merits of the Super pitted the United States Air Force against the other services, which wanted more small, tactical weapons. Concurrently, there was a technical debate between Teller and other scientists like Robert Oppenheimer over the feasibility of the Super, because there was no guarantee that it would work, and even after Operation Greenhouse, the processes involved in thermonuclear reactions were not fully understood. It ultimately became apparent that the Super design would not work, but the development of the Teller-Ulam design provided a new path to high yield thermonuclear weapons. For his services as Director of Military Applications, McCormack was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal.
James McCormack
12295421#0
Test No. 6 is the codename for China's first test of a three-staged thermonuclear device and, also its sixth nuclear weapons test. The device was detonated at Lop Nur Test Base, or often dubbed as Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, in Malan, Xinjiang, on 17 June 1967. With successful testing of this three-stage thermonuclear device, China became the fourth country to have successfully developed a thermonuclear weapon after the United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. It was dropped from a Hong-6 (Chinese manufactured Tu-16) and was parachute-retarded for an airburst at 2960 meters. The bomb was a three-stage device with a boosted U-235 primary and U-238 pusher. The yield was 3.3 megatons.
Test No. 6