title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega's authoritarian rule in Panama has been described as a dictatorship, and was marked by repression of the media, an expansion of the military, and the persecution of political opponents, effectively controlling the outcomes of any elections. He relied upon military nationalism to maintain his support, and did not a specific social or economic ideology. Noriega was known for his complicated relationship with the U.S., being described as being its ally and nemesis simultaneously. He has been called one of the best-known dictators of his time, and compared to authoritarian rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi and Augusto Pinochet.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno was born in Panama City, into a relatively poor pardo, or mixed-race, family with Native Panamanian, African, and Spanish heritage. His date of birth is generally given as February 11, 1934, but is a matter of uncertainty. It has been variously recorded as that date in 1934, 1936, and 1938. Noriega himself provided differing dates of birth. He was born in the neighborhood of El Terraplen de San Felipe. Noriega's mother, who was not married to his father, has been described as a cook and a laundress, while his father, Ricaurte Noriega, was an accountant. His mother, whose family name was Moreno, died of tuberculosis when he was still a child, and Noriega was brought up by a godmother in a one-room apartment in the slum area of Terraplén. Both his parents were dead by the time he was five years old.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega was educated first at the Escuela República de México, and later at the Instituto Nacional, a well-regarded high school in Panama City that had produced a number of nationalist political leaders. He was described as an "oddly serious child," a bookish student always neatly dressed by his godmother. During his time in the Instituto Nacional he met his older half-brother Luis Carlos Noriega Hurtado, a socialist activist and also a student at the school: Manuel had not previously met his siblings. Manuel began living with Luis, who introduced him to politics, including recruiting him into the Socialist Party's youth wing. Luis Noriega would later direct Panama's electoral tribunal. During his time in the socialist youth group, Noriega took part in protests and authored articles criticizing the U.S. presence in Panama. He is reported to have begun his association with the U.S. intelligence services at this time, providing information about the activities of his comrades. A $10.70 payment in 1955 was the first he received from the U.S.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega intended to become a doctor, but was unable to secure a place in the University of Panama's medical school. After graduating from the Instituto Nacional, Noriega won a scholarship to Chorrillos Military School in the Peruvian capital of Lima, with the help of Luis, who had by then received a position in the Panamanian embassy in Peru. Noriega began studying in Lima in 1958. While there, he made the acquaintance of Roberto Díaz Herrera, then studying at the Peruvian Police academy, who later became a close ally.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega married Felicidad Sieiro in the late 1960s, and the couple had three daughters: Lorena; Sandra; and Thays. Sieiro had been a school teacher, and Noriega a member of the National Guard. Her family, of Basque heritage, was reported to have been unhappy with the marriage. Noriega was repeatedly unfaithful to his wife, who at one point expressed a desire for a divorce, though she changed her mind later.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega graduated from Chorrillos in 1962 with a specialization in engineering. He returned to Panama and joined the Panama National Guard. Posted to Colón, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in September 1962. His commanding officer in Colón was Omar Torrijos, then a major in the National Guard. Torrijos became a patron and mentor to Noriega. In a 1962 incident Torrijos helped Noriega avoid legal trouble after a prostitute accused Noriega of beating and raping her. Soon after, Noriega's drinking and violence obliged Torrijos to confine him to his quarters for a month. Despite Noriega's problems, Torrijos maintained their relationship, ensuring they were always in the same command; he also brought Díaz Herrera into the same unit. Díaz Herrera and Noriega became both friends and rivals for Torrijos's favor.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: In 1964 Noriega had been posted to the province of Chiriquí, where Torrijos and Díaz Herrera were stationed. At the time, Arnulfo Arias, a native of that province, was preparing to contest the 1968 Panamanian Presidential election. Arias was a member of the National Revolutionary Party that represented the Panameñista movement. The sitting president, Roberto Chiari, belonged to the Liberal Party, which ordered Torrijos to harass Arias's party members and weaken his election bid. Torrijos passed this task on to Noriega, whose men arrested a number of people. Several prisoners said that they had been tortured; others stated they had been raped in prison. The mistreatment of Arias's supporters sparked public outrage, and led to Noriega being suspended for ten days, an item of information that was picked up by the U.S. intelligence services. In 1966, Noriega was again involved in a violent incident, allegedly raping a 13-year-old girl and beating her brother. After this, Torrijos transferred Noriega to a remote posting.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: As a second lieutenant in 1966, Noriega spent many months taking courses at the School of the Americas. The school was located at the United States Army's Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. Journalist John Dinges has suggested that Torrijos sent Noriega to the school to help him "shape up" and live up to Torrijos's expectations. Despite performing poorly in his classes, he received a promotion to first lieutenant in 1966, and Torrijos found him a job as an intelligence officer in the "North Zone" of the National Guard. Shortly afterward he returned to the School of the Americas for more training. At the school Noriega participated in courses on infantry operations, counterintelligence, intelligence, and jungle warfare. He also took a course in psychological operations at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega's job required him to penetrate and disrupt the trade unions that had formed in the United Fruit Company's workforce, and he proved adept at this work. His new superior officer Boris Martínez was a fervent anti-communist, and enforced strict discipline on Noriega. Reports have suggested that he continued to pass intelligence to the U.S. during this period, about the plantation workers' activities. In 1967 the administration of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson concluded that Noriega would be a valuable asset, as he was a "rising star" in the Panamanian military. Later, as the "de facto" leader of Panama, Noriega maintained a close relationship with the School of the Americas, partly due to the school's presence in Panama. Officials from the Panamanian military were frequently given courses at the school free of charge. Noriega was proud of his relationship with the school, and wore its crest on his military uniform for the rest of his career.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Arias was elected president in 1968 following a populist campaign. Soon after taking office he launched a purge of the National Guard, sending much of its general staff into "diplomatic exile" or retirement. In response, Torrijos and a few other officers led a coup against him, ousting him after an eleven-day presidency. The coup was set in motion by Martínez, as the leader of the garrison at Chiriquí, and received the support of most military officers. A power struggle followed between the various forces involved in the coup, and chiefly between Torrijos and Martínez. Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict. In February 1969, Torrijos's men seized Martínez and exiled him to Miami giving Torrijos control of the country.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: At the end of 1969 Torrijos went to Mexico on holiday. A coup was launched in his absence, in which Noriega's loyalty allowed Torrijos to hang on to power, greatly enhancing Torrijos's image. Noriega was promoted to captain a month after the coup attempt: just 18 months later, in August 1970, Torrijos promoted him to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him chief of military intelligence. According to Dinges, by this point had left his undisciplined past behind him. When Arias's supporters launched a guerrilla uprising in his home province, Noriega as the head of intelligence played an important role in putting it down within a year.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Torrijos retained power as a military ruler until 1981: during this time he negotiated the Torrijos–Carter Treaties with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which ensured that control over the Panama Canal would pass to Panama in 1999. These treaties, as well as a new labor code that included maternity leave, collective bargaining rights, and bonus pay, made Torrijos popular in Panama despite the absence of democratic elections. Torrijos's relationship with Noriega was symbiotic; Torrijos provided the political acumen, while Noriega enforced his unpopular decisions with force, when necessary. Noriega would provide intelligence and carry out covert operations that were critical to Torrijos successfully negotiating the release of the Panama Canal from the U.S.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Upon seizing power in 1968, Torrijos's government had passed legislation favorable to foreign corporations, including banks in the U.S. The following years saw a large expansion in international business activity and the influx of foreign capital, thereby giving participating corporations a stake in the continued existence of the military government. The government used its access to foreign capital to borrow extensively, fueling a rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy that contributed to the military regime's stability. Panama's borrowing peaked in 1978 when the Panama Canal treaty was being negotiated, a time at which the Carter government was particularly supportive of the Torrijos regime. The Carter administration's interest in signing a new treaty led it to largely overlook the increasing militarization of the Panamanian government, and its involvement in drug-trafficking.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega proved to be a very capable head of intelligence. During his tenure, he exiled 1,300 Panamanians whom he viewed as threats to the government. He also kept files on several officials within the military, the government, and the judiciary, allowing him to blackmail them later. Noriega also held the positions of head of the political police and head of immigration. His tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders. He was described as doing much of Torrijos's "dirty work". For instance, Noriega ordered the death of Jesús Héctor Gallego Herrera, a priest whose work at an agricultural cooperative was seen as a threat by the government. Gallego's body is reported to have been thrown from a helicopter into the sea. He also made an effort during this period to portray Panama as a hub of enforcement against drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: By the early 1970s, American law enforcement officials had reports of Noriega's possible involvement with narcotics trafficking. No formal criminal investigations were begun, and no indictment was brought: according to Dinges, this was due to the potential diplomatic consequences. This evidence included the testimony of an arrested boat courier, and of a drug smuggler arrested in New York. Though Torrijos frequently promised the U.S. cooperation in dealing with drug smuggling, Noriega would have headed any effort at enforcement, and the U.S. began to see Noriega as an obstacle to combatting drug smuggling. Dinges writes that the U.S. government considered several options to move Noriega out of the drug trafficking business, including assassinating him, and linking him to a fictional plot against Torrijos. Though no assassination attempt was made, the other ploys may have been tried in the early 1970s, according to Dinges. Dinges wrote that beginning in 1972 the U.S. relaxed its efforts at trapping individuals involved with smuggling within the Panama government, possibly as a result of an agreement between Torrijos and U.S. President Richard Nixon.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: During the early 1970s, Noriega's relationship with the U.S. intelligence services was regularized. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) placed him on its payroll in 1971, while he held his position as head of Panamanian intelligence; he had previously been paid by U.S. intelligence services on a case-by-case basis. Regular payments to him were stopped under the Carter administration, before being resumed and later stopped again under the administration of Ronald Reagan. The CIA valued him as an asset because he was willing to provide information about the Cuban government and later about the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Noriega also served as the U.S. emissary to Cuba during negotiations following the "Johnny Express" incident in December 1971. Noriega was given access to CIA contingency funds, which he was supposed to use to improve his intelligence programs, but which he could spend with little accountability. The contingency funds were as high as US$100,000 in some years.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The CIA was aware that Noriega was selling intelligence on the U.S. to Cuba while he was working for it. Noriega also undertook a number of activities while nominally working for the CIA that served his own ends at the expense of the U.S. government. Journalist Frederick Kempe wrote in 1990 that Noriega had been linked to a series of bombings targeting the U.S. territory in the Panama Canal Zone during the prelude to the U.S. Presidential election in 1976 after the administration of U.S. President Gerald Ford stepped back from negotiations about the Panama Canal. The bombings highlighted to the U.S. government the difficulty of holding on to the Panama Canal Zone in the face of hostility within Panama. Kempe stated that the U.S. knew of Noriega's involvement in the bombings but decided to turn a blind eye toward them. In a December 1976 meeting with George H. W. Bush, then the Director of Central Intelligence, Noriega flatly denied involvement, instead suggesting that the CIA was responsible.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: During negotiations for the Panama Canal treaties, the U.S. government ordered its military intelligence to wiretap Panamanian officials. Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed the U.S. agents and bought the tapes himself; the incident came to be known as the "Singing Sergeants affair". Although some intelligence officials wanted Bush to prosecute the soldiers involved, he declined to do so, because that would have exposed Noriega's role in the matter. The CIA did not report this incident to either the National Security Agency or the U.S. Justice Department. Noriega and Torrijos later used their knowledge of the U.S. wiretapping operations to tilt the Panama Canal negotiations in their favor. Noriega's drug-related activities came to the U.S. government's attention once again during the ratification process for the Panama Canal treaties, but were once again downplayed by the U.S. intelligence services in order to get the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: After the Nicaraguan Revolution was launched by the Sandinistas against U.S.-backed authoritarian ruler Anastasio Somoza Debayle in August 1978, Torrijos and Noriega initially supported the rebels, providing them with surplus National Guard equipment and allowing Panama to be used as a cover for arms shipments from Cuba to Nicaragua. Torrijos sought for himself the same aura of "democratic respectability" that the Sandinista rebels had in Nicaragua, and so abandoned the title of "Maximum Leader" he had taken in 1972, promising that elections would be held in 1984. Noriega also arranged for weapons purchased in the U.S. to be shipped to the Sandinista forces, a deal on which he made a profit. The U.S. discovered Noriega's role in supplying weapons, and though the episode proved embarrassing to the Carter administration in the U.S., no charges were brought against Noriega because the U.S. did not wish to anger a friendly government, and the issue was rendered moot by the Sandinista victory in 1979. After Somoza's overthrow, Noriega continued to smuggle weapons, selling them to leftist guerrillas fighting the U.S.-backed authoritarian government in El Salvador. After one of these shipments was captured, Torrijos, who had friends in the Salvadoran military government, reprimanded Noriega, though the shipments did not stop altogether.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Torrijos died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. A later investigation by the aircraft manufacturer stated it was an accident; Noriega's authority over the government investigation led to speculation about his involvement. Florencio Flores Aguilar had inherited Torrijos position, but true power lay with the trio of Noriega, Díaz Herrera, and Rubén Darío Paredes, who ranked just below him. Flores was removed in a quiet coup on March 3, 1982. By general agreement, Paredes was made leader until 1983, after which the military would work together to ensure his election as the president in the election scheduled for 1984. During this period Noriega became a full colonel and the National Guard's chief of staff, effectively the second-highest rank in the country. He reformed the National Guard as the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and with the financial assistance of the U.S., expanded and modernized it. The quick promotions they received earned him the officer corps' loyalty. Among the steps he took to consolidate his control was to bring the various factions of the army together into the PDF. On August 12, 1983, in keeping with Noriega's earlier deal with Paredes, Paredes handed over his position to Noriega, newly appointed a general, with the understanding that Noriega would allow him to stand for president. However, Paredes never received the political support he expected, and after assuming his new position Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not contest the election. Noriega, now head of the PDF, thus became the "de facto" ruler of Panama.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega preferred to remain behind the scenes, rather than become president, and to avoid the public scrutiny that came with the post. He did not have a particular social or economic ideology, and used military nationalism to unify his supporters. The Partido Revolucionario Democrático (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), which had been established by Torrijos and had strong support among military families, was used by Noriega as a political front for the PDF. This party drew considerable support from low-income employees brought into the government bureaucracy by its expansion under Torrijos and Noriega. Noriega compelled the Panamanian National Assembly to pass Law 20 of 1983, which was supposedly aimed at protecting the Panama Canal from communists, and allowed a huge influx of U.S. weapons to the Panamanian military. The law also tripled the size of the military forces Noriega's period in power saw significant capital flight from Panama; according to Kempe, this was at least in part because wealthy individuals worried their wealth would be seized by Noriega's administration.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The military government of Torrijos had maintained its power in large part by extracting resources from Panama's expanding service sector, particularly its illicit portions. According to political scientist Steve Ropp, Torrijos was a "gifted politician with a genuine concern for improving the economic lot of the average Panamanian", but his individual talent had a relatively small role to play in preserving his government. When Noriega created the PDF in 1983, he brought into its control Panama's customs and immigration apparatus, as well as the country's whole transportation network. This expansion of the military's role occurred simultaneously with a large growth in the cocaine trade, as well as in markets for weapons in various military conflicts in Central America. The profits the military reaped from these activities gave Noriega's military regime considerable financial clout.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega took control of most major newspapers by either buying a controlling stake in them or forcing them to shut down. The government also harassed, intimidated, or exiled individual journalists and editors. The newspaper "La Prensa", which remained independent and was frequently critical of Noriega, had its staff intimidated and its offices damaged; eventually, it too was forced to close. In May 1984, Noriega allowed the first presidential elections in 16 years. Noriega and Díaz Herrera picked Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino to be the PRD's candidate, with the intention of keeping him under close control. When the initial results showed Arias, who had the support of much of the opposition, on his way to a landslide victory, Noriega halted the count. After brazenly manipulating the results, the government announced that Barletta had won by a slim margin of 1,713 votes. Independent estimates suggested that Arias would have won by as many as 50,000 votes had the election been conducted fairly. More than 60,000 votes were not included in the final count. Noriega's rule became increasingly repressive, even as the U.S. government of Ronald Reagan began relying on him in its covert efforts to undermine Nicaragua's Sandinista government. The U.S. accepted Barletta's election, and signalled a willingness to cooperate with him, despite being aware of the flaws in the election process.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Between 1981 and 1987 the relationship between Noriega and the U.S. grew considerably. It was driven both by the U.S.'s pursuit of its security interests, and Noriega using these as an effective means of gaining favor. The emergence of internal conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador between 1979 and 1981 led the Reagan administration to look for allies in the region, including in Panama. Noriega acted as a conduit for U.S. support, including funds and weapons, to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. He allowed the CIA to establish listening posts in Panama, and also helped the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government against the leftist Salvadoran insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. U.S. spy ships used bases in Panama in their operations against the Nicaraguan government, and much of the intelligence gathered by these ships was processed in the U.S. bases in Panama. Noriega permitted these activities despite the Panama Canal treaties restricting the use of the U.S. bases to protecting the canal.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Bush, now U.S. vice president, met again with Noriega in December 1983 to discuss support for the Contras. Noriega had a working relationship with U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North by 1985. Noriega offered to assassinate or sabotage Sandinista leaders in return for North helping Noriega improve his image with the U.S. government. In June 1985 North met with Noriega in Panama and Noriega agreed to train Contra soldiers in Panama for an invasion of Nicaragua in 1986. In return for Panama's support for U.S. and Israeli efforts to supply the Contras with arms, the U.S. ignored Noriega's use of weapons-shipment networks to smuggle drugs into the U.S. Noriega was reported to have played a role in the Iran–Contra affair in the mid-1980s.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: There are varying reports about how much Noriega was paid by United States sources. In early 1990, Noriega biographer Frederick Kempe reported that the United States gave Noriega or his intelligence services annual payments in the range of $110,000 in 1976 increasing to $185,000 to $200,000 when he came to power during the Reagan administration. Dinges said that he could find no one willing to confirm persistent reports that he received a $200,000 per year stipend from the CIA.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Prior to and during Noriega's trial, Noriega's lead attorney Frank A. Rubino claimed that Noriega had received $11 million in payments from the CIA. In January 1991, federal prosecutors filed a financial report indicating that Noriega had received a total of $322,000 from the United States Army and the CIA over a 31-year period from 1955 to 1986. They stated that the release of information was to rebut allegations from defense attorneys that Noriega had been paid "millions of dollars" from the CIA. These payments included a total of $76,039 as "gifts and incentives" from the CIA.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Despite Noriega's alliance with the U.S., he also maintained close relationships with bitter enemies of the U.S., including Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua. A 1990 book discussing Noriega's administration stated that he had sold thousands of Panamanian passports to the Cuban government for use by its intelligence services. Cuba also obtained hardware imports from Panama that were restricted by the U.S. embargo, while it provided Panama with weapons and military advisers. Libya, as well as some U.S. allies, provided Noriega with funds when the U.S. was seeking to remove him from power.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Panama's and Noriega's involvement in drug-trafficking grew considerably over the early 1980s, peaking in 1984. Intensifying conflicts in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua had led to the creation of covert transportation networks that Noriega used to transport drugs to the U.S., particularly cocaine. During this period Colombia's Medellín Cartel was also seeking allies. Noriega became intimately involved with their drug trafficking and money-laundering operations, and received considerable sums as protection money, bribes, or shared of profits. In June 1986, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh recorded a U.S. White House official as saying that reducing Noriega's activities could greatly reduce international drug trafficking.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Hersh reported unnamed U.S. officials as saying that Noriega had amassed a personal fortune in European banks as a result of his illegal activities, as well as owning two homes in Panama and one in France. The wealth generated for the Panamanian military from drug-smuggling also helped stabilize the authoritarian government that it dominated. However, the military's control over wealth from illicit trade alienated the Panamanian business elite that had previously also benefited from such trade. Under Noriega, these profits were shared within the military less evenly than under Torrijos, eventually creating friction in the military leadership.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Many of the operations Noriega benefited from were run by associates such as Floyd Carlton and Cesar Rodríguez. Large sums from drug revenues were brought in from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Noriega received protection payments in these instances as well. American Steven Kalish also began a large scale business selling drugs, laundering money and selling hardware to the Panamanian military for considerable profits with Noriega's assistance. Dinges writes that at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to ship a load of marijuana worth U.S. $1.4 million through Panama, for which Noriega had agreed to provide false Panamanian customs stamps; Noriega was to be paid $1 million for this exercise.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Beginning in 1984 Noriega appeared to reduce the scale of his operations, and even ordered a raid against a cocaine factory in the interior of Panama, a raid which he then emphasized as evidence of his cooperation with the U.S. in their fight against drugs. He also ordered a crackdown on money laundering by Colombian cartel figures Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela. Noriega's new image as an opponent of drug trafficking was symbolized by his being invited as a speaker in 1985 to Harvard University, for a conference on the role of the military in Central America's wars, a speech which received a lot of attention in Panama's pro-government press. In 1986, a convoluted operation involving the East German Stasi and the Danish ship "Pia Vesta" ultimately aimed to sell Soviet arms and military vehicles to South Africa's Armscor, with the Soviets using various intermediaries to distance themselves from the deal. Noriega was apparently one of these intermediaries but backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a Panamanian port.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Hugo Spadafora was a physician and political activist who had first clashed with Noriega when they were both members of Torrijos's government. Though an ally of Torrijos, he and Noriega had been personal enemies for a long time. Despite not being a member of the opposition, he became a vocal critic of Noriega after returning to Panama from Guatemala in 1981. Spadafora amassed evidence of corruption within the government by using his position as an ally of Torrijos to question Noriega's allies, including Rodriquez and Carlton. This included a lengthy conversation with Carlton in mid-1985 after his drug operations had collapsed due to conflicts over a missing shipment, and he had received negative publicity in the Panamanian press. In September 1985 he accused Noriega of having connections to drug trafficking and announced his intent to expose him. The drug trafficking charges threatened Noriega's support among his own constituency of middle class individuals who had benefited under his and Torrijos's government.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: According to writers R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez, on an occasion when Spadafora was traveling by bus from Costa Rica to Panama, witnesses saw him being detained by the PDF after crossing the border. His decapitated body was later found wrapped in a United States Postal Service mail bag showing signs of brutal torture. Noriega was widely believed to be responsible for the murder, and according to Koster and Sánchez, the U.S. had intelligence implicating Noriega. On the day of Spadafora's arrest, the U.S. National Security Agency monitored a telephone conversation between Noriega and Luis Córdoba, the military commander in Chiriquí province where Spadafora was arrested. During the conversation Córdoba told Noriega, "We have the rabid dog." Noriega responded "And what does one do with a dog that has rabies?"


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Spadafora's murder badly damaged Noriega's image, both within and outside Panama, and created a crisis for the Panamanian regime. Barletta, who was in New York City when Spadafora was murdered in September 1985, announced his intention to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. Upon his return to Panama, however, he was forced to resign by the PDF and was replaced by Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle. Barletta was highly regarded in the Reagan administration, and his removal brought a downturn in the relations between the U.S. and Noriega. After Spadafora's murder the U.S. began to view Noriega as a liability rather than an asset, despite his ongoing support for U.S. interventions elsewhere. The U.S. response included reducing economic assistance and pressuring Panama to reform its banking secrecy laws, crack down on narcotics trafficking, investigate the murder of Spadafora, and reduce the PDF's role in the government. The response to Spadafora's murder created divisions within the PRD, and further damaged the credibility of the government-controlled news media.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Díaz Herrera considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power during a brief period that Noriega was traveling outside the country, but despite mobilizing some troops, eventually decided against following through with the coup, realizing he could not count on sufficient support. Furthermore, Noriega had made a deal with his deputy, to the effect that he would step down as military leader in 1987 and allow Díaz Herrera to succeed him. In 1987, however, Noriega went back on this agreement, announced he would be heading the military for the next five years, and assigned Díaz Herrera to a diplomatic post. Díaz Herrera retaliated by making public statements accusing Noriega of rigging the 1984 election, murdering Spadafora, and of trafficking in drugs, as well as of assassinating Torrijos with a bomb on his plane.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Díaz Herrera's statements provoked huge protests against Noriega, with 100,000 people, approximately 25% of the population of Panama City, marching in protest on June 26, 1987. As with Spadafora's murder, these incidents strengthened and brought together the internal opposition to Noriega. Noriega charged Díaz Herrera with treason, and cracked down hard on the protesters. The U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking Noriega to step down until Díaz Herrera could be tried; in response Noriega sent government workers to protest outside the U.S. embassy, a protest which quickly turned into a riot. As a result, the U.S. suspended all military assistance to Panama, and the CIA stopped paying Noriega a salary. The Senate resolution had the effect of identifying the U.S. with the effort to remove Noriega; Noriega exploited the rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position. Without the support of the U.S., Panama defaulted on its international debt, and that year the country's economy shrunk by 20%. Though the U.S. considered not recognizing Delvalle as president, the state department decided against it, as it would have amounted to breaking relations with Noriega.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega's relationship with the U.S. deteriorated further during the late 1980s, particularly after the U.S. began to suspect that Noriega was supporting other intelligence services. Hersh wrote in 1986 that U.S. intelligence officials suspected that Noriega was selling intelligence to the Cuban government of Fidel Castro; his report received widespread attention. Bob Woodward published a story about Noriega in "The Washington Post" soon afterward, going into even greater detail about Noriega's intelligence connections. Woodward and Hersh's reputations made certain that the stories were taken seriously. Spadafora had also informed the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of some of his findings about Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling. Multiple U.S. agencies continued to investigate Noriega despite opposition from the Reagan administration. In 1988 Noriega was indicted by U.S. federal grand juries in courts in Miami and Tampa on charges of drug-trafficking. The indictment accused him of "turning Panama into a shipping platform for South American cocaine that was destined for the U.S., and allowing drug proceeds to be hidden in Panamanian banks". Soon afterward an army colonel and a few soldiers made an attempt to overthrow Noriega; their poorly planned effort was crushed within a day.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The presidential election of May 1989 was marred by fraud and violence. "Coalición para la Liberación Nacional" (Coalition for National Liberation), a pro-military coalition led by the PRD, named Carlos Duque, a former business partner of Noriega, as its candidate. The "Alianza Democrática de Oposición Cívica" (Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition), an opposition coalition, nominated Guillermo Endara, a member of Arias' Panameñista Party, and two other prominent oppositionists, Ricardo Arias Calderón and Guillermo Ford, as vice-presidential candidates. Anticipating fraud, the opposition tracked ballot counts at local precincts on the day of the election (local ballot counts were done in public). As an exit poll made it clear that the opposition slate was winning by a wide margin, reports of missing tally sheets and seizures of ballot boxes by the PDF soon emerged. In the afternoon of the day after the election, the Catholic bishops conference announced that a quick count of public tallies at polling centers showed the opposition slate winning 3–1. Official tallies the day after that, however, had Duque winning by a 2–1 margin.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Rather than publish the results, Noriega voided the election, claiming that "foreign interference" had tainted the results. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, present in Panama as an observer, denounced Noriega, saying the election had been "stolen", as did Archbishop of Panama Marcos G. McGrath. Noriega had initially planned to declare Duque the winner regardless of the actual result. Duque knew he had been badly defeated and refused to go along. The next day, Endara, Arias Calderón, and Ford rolled through the old part of the capital in a triumphant motorcade, only to be intercepted by a detachment of Noriega's paramilitary Dignity Battalions. Arias Calderón was protected by a couple of troops, but Endara and Ford were badly beaten. Images of Ford running to safety with his guayabera shirt covered in blood were broadcast around the world. When the 1984–1989 presidential term expired, Noriega named a longtime associate, Francisco Rodríguez, acting president. The U.S. recognized Endara as the new president. Noriega's decision to void the election results led to another coup attempt against him in October 1989. A number of Noriega's junior officers rose up against him, led by Lieutenant Colonel Moisés Giroldi Vera, but the rebellion was easily crushed by the members of the PDF loyal to Noriega. After this attempt, he declared himself the "maximum leader" of the country. The rebels were captured and taken to a military base outside Panama City, where they were tortured and then executed.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: In March 1988, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with Noriega seeking his resignation. Panama was represented at these negotiations by Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt. Negotiations collapsed after several months of lengthy and inconclusive talks; according to Dinges, Noriega had no intentions of ever resigning. On December 15, 1989, the PRD-dominated legislature spoke of "a state of war" between the United States and Panama. It also declared Noriega "chief executive officer" of the government, formalizing a state of affairs that had existed for six years. The U.S. government stated that Noriega's forces were harassing U.S. troops and civilians. Three incidents in particular occurred very near the time of the invasion, and were mentioned by Bush as a reason for the invasion. In a December 16 incident, four U.S. personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside PDF headquarters in the El Chorrillo neighborhood of Panama City. The United States Department of Defense said that the servicemen were traveling unarmed in a private vehicle, and that they attempted to flee the scene only after their vehicle was surrounded by a crowd of civilians and PDF troops. First Lieutenant Robert Paz of the United States Marine Corps was shot and killed in the incident. An American couple who witnessed the incident was also arrested and harassed by the PDF.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The U.S. launched its invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. Although the killing of the Marine was the ostensible reason for the invasion, the operation had been planned for months before his death. The move was the largest military action by the U.S. since the Vietnam War, and included more than 27,000 soldiers, as well as 300 aircraft.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The invasion began with a bombing campaign that targeted Noriega's private vehicles, and the PDF headquarters located in Panama City. Several slums in the middle of the city were destroyed as a result. The day after the invasion, Noriega's deputy Colonel Luis del Cid retreated with some soldiers to the mountains outside David City, after laying mines in the airport. Though this was part of a contingency plan for the invasion, del Cid quickly decided that the Panamanian military was not in a position to fight a guerrilla war against the U.S., and negotiated a surrender. Twenty-three U.S. soldiers were killed in the operation, including two that were killed by friendly fire; 324 soldiers were injured. Casualties among the Panamanian forces were much higher; between 300 and 845. The U.S. government reported between 202 and 250 civilian deaths; Americas Watch estimated 300 civilian deaths; and the United Nations estimated 500 civilian deaths.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: On December 29, the United Nations General Assembly voted, 75–20 with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as a "flagrant violation of international law". According to a CBS poll, 92% of Panamanian adults supported the U.S. incursion, and 76% wished that U.S. forces had invaded in October during the coup. Activist Barbara Trent disputed this finding, saying in a 1992 Academy Award-winning documentary "The Panama Deception" that the Panamanian surveys were completed in wealthy, English-speaking neighborhoods in Panama City, among Panamanians most likely to support U.S. actions. Human Rights Watch described the reaction of the civilian population to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega received several warnings about the invasion from individuals within his government; though he initially disbelieved them, they grew more frequent as the invasion drew near, eventually convincing Noriega to go on the run. Noriega used a number of subterfuges, including lookalikes and playbacks of his recorded voice, to confuse U.S. surveillance as to his whereabouts. During his flight Noriega reportedly took shelter with several supportive politicians, including Balbina Herrera, the mayor of San Miguelito. The last two days of his flight were spent partly with his ally Jorge Krupnick, an arms dealer also wanted by the U.S. Kempe reported that Noriega considered seeking sanctuary in the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies, but both buildings were surrounded by U.S. troops. On the fifth day of the invasion, Noriega and four others took sanctuary in the Apostolic Nunciature, the Holy See's embassy in Panama. Having threatened to flee to the countryside and lead guerrilla warfare if not given refuge, he instead turned over the majority of his weapons, and requested sanctuary from Archbishop José Sebastián Laboa, the papal nuncio.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Prevented by treaty from invading the Holy See's embassy, U.S. soldiers from Delta Force erected a perimeter around the Nunciature. Attempts to dislodge Noriega from within included gunning vehicle engines, turning a nearby field into a landing pad for helicopters, and playing rock music at loud volumes (Van Halen cassette tape provided by Special Forces Sergeant John Bishop). After ten days, Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. He was detained as a prisoner of war, and later taken to the United States.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Following his capture Noriega was transferred to a cell in the Miami federal courthouse, where he was arraigned on the ten charges which the Miami grand jury had returned two years earlier. The trial was delayed until September 1991 over whether Noriega could be tried after his detention as a prisoner of war, the admissibility of evidence and witnesses, and how to pay for Noriega's legal defense. The trial ended in April 1992, when Noriega was convicted on eight of the ten charges of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering. On July 10, 1992, Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in prison.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: In pre-trial proceedings, the government stated that Noriega had received $322,000 from the U.S. Army and the CIA. Noriega insisted that he had in fact been paid close to $10,000,000, and that he should be allowed to testify about the work he had done for the U.S. government. The district court held that information about the operations in which Noriega had played a part supposedly in return for payment from the U.S. was not relevant to his defense. It ruled that "the tendency of such evidence to confuse the issues before the jury substantially outweighed any probative value it might have had." One of the witnesses in the trial was Carlton, who had previously flown shipments of drugs for Noriega. Information about Noriega's connections to the CIA, including his alleged contact with Bush, were kept out of the trial. After the trial, Noriega appealed this exclusionary ruling by the judge to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court ruled in the government's favor, saying that the "potential probative value of this material [...] was relatively marginal".


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Before receiving his permanent prison assignment, Noriega was placed in the Federal Detention Center, Miami. Noriega was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution, Miami. Under Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, Noriega was considered a prisoner of war, despite his conviction for acts committed prior to his capture by the "detaining power" (the US). This status meant that he had his own prison cell, furnished with electronics and exercise equipment. His cell was nicknamed "the presidential suite". While Noriega was in prison, he was visited regularly over two years by two evangelical Christian ministers, Clift Brannon and Rudy Hernandez. Noriega, nominally a Roman Catholic, was reported to have undergone a conversion to evangelical Christianity in May 1990, and was baptized in October 1992, while still in prison. Noriega's prison sentence was reduced from 30 years to 17 years for good behavior: his sentence thus ended on September 9, 2007.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega was tried "in absentia" in Panama for crimes committed during his rule. In October 1993 Noriega and two others were convicted of the murder of Spadafora by the court of the Third Judicial District, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Panama's Supreme Court confirmed the sentence on December 20, 1995. In 1994, Noriega and Heráclides Sucre, an agent of his secret police, were convicted by a jury of the murder of Giroldi, who had led the 1989 coup attempt against Noriega. Though Noriega was tried "in absentia", a judge traveled to the US to question him in December 1993. Noriega and Sucre both received a 20-year sentence, the maximum penalty sought by the prosecutor. Finally, Noriega received a third 20-year sentence in 1996 for his role in the death of nine military officers supporting Giroldi; the group had been executed in a hangar at the Albrook air base after the coup attempt, in an incident that came to be known as the massacre of Albrook. Noriega was also prosecuted over the 1968 disappearances of Luis Antonio Quirós and Everett Clayton Kimble Guerra in Chiriquí, and the 1971 death of Heliodoro Portugal. These cases had not reached a conclusion at the time of his death in 2017.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: The French government had requested Noriega's extradition after he was convicted of money laundering in 1999. It stated that Noriega had laundered in drug proceeds by purchasing luxury apartments in Paris. Noriega was convicted "in absentia", but French law required a new trial after the subject of an "in absentia" sentence was apprehended. France had previously made Noriega a "Commandeur" of the Légion d'honneur in 1987.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: In August 2007, a U.S. federal judge approved the French government's request to extradite Noriega to France after his release. Noriega appealed his extradition because he claimed France would not honor his legal status as a prisoner of war. Though Noriega had been scheduled to be released in 2007, he remained incarcerated while his appeal was pending in court. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear his appeal in January 2010, and in March declined a petition for a rehearing. Two days after the refusal, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami lifted the stay that was blocking Noriega's extradition. Later that month Noriega's attorney stated that he would travel to France and try to arrange a deal with the French government.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega was extradited to France on April 26, 2010. Noriega's lawyers claimed the La Santé Prison, at which he was held, was unfit for a man of his age and rank; the French government refused to grant him prisoner of war status, which he had had in the United States. On July 7, 2010, Noriega was convicted by the 11th chamber of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris and sentenced to seven years in jail. The prosecutor in the case had sought a ten-year prison term. In addition, the court ordered the seizure of €2.3 million (approximately U.S. $3.6 million) that had long been frozen in Noriega's French bank accounts.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: In 1999, the Panamanian government had sought the extradition of Noriega from the U.S., as he had been tried "in absentia" and found guilty of murder in Panama in 1995. After Noriega was imprisoned in France, Panama asked the French government to extradite Noriega so he could face trial for human rights violations in Panama. The French government had previously stated that extradition would not happen before the case in France had run its course. On September 23, 2011, a French court ordered a conditional release for Noriega to be extradited to Panama on October 1, 2011. Noriega was extradited to Panama on December 11, 2011, and incarcerated at El Renacer prison to serve the sentences, totalling 60 years, that he had accumulated "in absentia" for crimes committed during his rule.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: On February 5, 2012, Noriega was moved to the Hospital Santo Tomás in Panama City because of high blood pressure and a brain hemorrhage. He remained in the hospital for four days before being returned to prison. It was announced on March 21, 2012, that Noriega had been diagnosed with a brain tumor, which was later revealed to have been benign. On January 23, 2017, he was released from prison and placed under house arrest to prepare for surgery that would remove the tumor. On March 7, 2017, he suffered a brain hemorrhage during surgery which left him in critical condition in the intensive care unit of Hospital Santo Tomás. Noriega died on May 29, 2017, at the age of 83. Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela announced Noriega's death shortly before midnight, writing, "The death of Manuel A. Noriega closes a chapter in our history; his daughters and his relatives deserve to bury him in peace."


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega's authoritarian rule of Panama has been described as a dictatorship, while Noriega himself has been referred to as a "strongman". A 2017 obituary from the BBC stated that Noriega "was an opportunist who used his close relationship with the United States to boost his own power in Panama and to cover up the illegal activities for which he was eventually convicted". A 2010 article in "The Guardian" referred to him as the best known dictator of his time, and as "Panama's answer" to Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi". Dinges writes that though Noriega's regime saw a number of murders and crimes, they were similar in scale to those that occurred at the same time under the authoritarian governments of Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador; these governments never saw the level of condemnation from the U.S. that Noriega's did.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: After Noriega's death, an article in "The Atlantic" compared him to Castro and Augusto Pinochet, stating that while Castro had been the nemesis of the U.S., and Pinochet had been its ally, Noriega had managed to be both. It called Noriega the archetype of U.S. intervention in Latin America: "The lawless, vicious leader whom the U.S. cultivated and propped up despite clear and serious flaws." The author stated that although Panama was a freer democracy after Noriega's removal, it was still plagued by corruption and drug trafficking, while Daniel Ortega, whom the U.S. tried to fight with Noriega's help, remained firmly in power in Nicaragua, and argued that this demonstrated the failure of the U.S.'s approach to Latin American interventions.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega took great care to shape perceptions of him. He permitted and encouraged rumors that as Panama's chief of intelligence, he was in possession of negative information about everybody in the country. Dinges suggests that the impression among some officials that Noriega made money off of every transaction in the country may have been cultivated by Noriega himself. Among opposition leaders in Panama he was seen variously as a sexual pervert, a sadist, and a rapist. Within U.S. government circles contradictory images abounded; Noriega was seen as a CIA spy, a drug trafficker, a nationalist supporting Torrijos, an ally of Cuba, and an ally of Oliver North and the Contras. He was perceived as a trusted collaborator in the war against drugs, even as the DEA was investigating him for involvement in smuggling. By the time of his removal he had come to be hated in the U.S., and the invasion was portrayed as an attempt to remove an evil man. Dinges writes that these contradictory images played a large role in shaping the U.S. government's self-contradictory policy towards Noriega.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: Noriega used the moniker "El Man" to refer to himself, but he was also derogatorily known as "cara de piña", or "pineapple face" in Spanish, as a result of pockmarked features left by an illness in his youth. He detested the name, and it would later be the subject of a lawsuit. He lived a lavish lifestyle during his time as the "de facto" ruler of Panama, and it was described in an obituary as a "libertine life off drug-trade riches, complete with luxurious mansions, cocaine-fueled parties and voluminous collections of antique guns". His bravado during public speeches was remarked upon by commentators; for instance, after his indictment in the U.S., he made a public speech while brandishing a machete, and declaimed "Not one step back!" The attitude of machismo that Noriega adopted has been described as a reaction to the persecution which his half-brother Luis faced as an openly homosexual man in Panama and Peru. This image contrasted sharply with the impact of a mug shot which was taken of him after his capture, and became a symbol of his fall from power. He was described as a deeply superstitious man, who placed trust in a number of talismans which he carried with him.


title: Manuel Noriega

text: British actor Bob Hoskins portrayed Manuel Noriega in the biographical 2000 American television movie "". Noriega was depicted in the video game "". In July 2014, he filed a lawsuit against the game company Activision for depicting him and using his name without his permission. Noriega, who filed the suit while in prison for murder, claimed he was portrayed as "a kidnapper, murderer and enemy of the state". On October 28, 2014, the case against Activision was dismissed by a judge in California.


title: CAN bus

text: A Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is a robust vehicle bus standard designed to allow microcontrollers and devices to communicate with each other's applications without a host computer. It is a message-based protocol, designed originally for multiplex electrical wiring within automobiles to save on copper, but it can also be used in many other contexts. For each device, the data in a frame is transmitted serially but in such a way that if more than one device transmits at the same time, the highest priority device can continue while the others back off. Frames are received by all devices, including by the transmitting device.


title: CAN bus

text: Development of the CAN bus started in 1983 at Robert Bosch GmbH. The protocol was officially released in 1986 at the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) conference in Detroit, Michigan. The first CAN controller chips were introduced by Intel in 1987, and shortly thereafter by Philips. Released in 1991, the Mercedes-Benz W140 was the first production vehicle to feature a CAN-based multiplex wiring system.


title: CAN bus

text: Bosch published several versions of the CAN specification and the latest is CAN 2.0 published in 1991. This specification has two parts; part A is for the standard format with an 11-bit identifier, and part B is for the extended format with a 29-bit identifier. A CAN device that uses 11-bit identifiers is commonly called CAN 2.0A and a CAN device that uses 29-bit identifiers is commonly called CAN 2.0B. These standards are freely available from Bosch along with other specifications and white papers.


title: CAN bus

text: In 1993, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) released the CAN standard ISO 11898 which was later restructured into two parts; ISO 11898-1 which covers the data link layer, and ISO 11898-2 which covers the CAN physical layer for high-speed CAN. ISO 11898-3 was released later and covers the CAN physical layer for low-speed, fault-tolerant CAN. The physical layer standards ISO 11898-2 and ISO 11898-3 are not part of the Bosch CAN 2.0 specification. These standards may be purchased from the ISO.


title: CAN bus

text: Bosch is still active in extending the CAN standards. In 2012, Bosch released CAN FD 1.0 or CAN with Flexible Data-Rate. This specification uses a different frame format that allows a different data length as well as optionally switching to a faster bit rate after the arbitration is decided. CAN FD is compatible with existing CAN 2.0 networks so new CAN FD devices can coexist on the same network with existing CAN devices.


title: CAN bus

text: CAN bus is one of five protocols used in the on-board diagnostics (OBD)-II vehicle diagnostics standard. The OBD-II standard has been mandatory for all cars and light trucks sold in the United States since 1996. The EOBD standard has been mandatory for all petrol vehicles sold in the European Union since 2001 and all diesel vehicles since 2004.


title: CAN bus

text: The modern automobile may have as many as 70 electronic control units (ECU) for various subsystems. Traditionally, the biggest processor is the engine control unit. Others are used for Autonomous Driving, Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS), transmission, airbags, antilock braking/ABS, cruise control, electric power steering, audio systems, power windows, doors, mirror adjustment, battery and recharging systems for hybrid/electric cars, etc. Some of these form independent subsystems, but communications among others are essential. A subsystem may need to control actuators or receive feedback from sensors. The CAN standard was devised to fill this need. One key advantage is that interconnection between different vehicle systems can allow a wide range of safety, economy and convenience features to be implemented using software alone - functionality which would add cost and complexity if such features were "hard wired" using traditional automotive electrics. Examples include:


title: CAN bus

text: In recent years, the LIN bus (Local Interconnect Network) standard has been introduced to complement CAN for non-critical subsystems such as air-conditioning and infotainment, where data transmission speed and reliability are less critical.


title: CAN bus

text: CAN is a multi-master serial bus standard for connecting electronic control units (ECUs) also known as nodes (automotive electronics is a major application domain). Two or more nodes are required on the CAN network to communicate. A node may interface to devices from simple digital logic e.g. PLD, via FPGA up to an embedded computer running extensive software. Such a computer may also be a gateway allowing a general purpose computer (like a laptop) to communicate over a USB or Ethernet port to the devices on a CAN network.


title: CAN bus

text: All nodes are connected to each other through a physically conventional two wire bus. The wires are a twisted pair with a 120 Ω (nominal) characteristic impedance.


title: CAN bus

text: This bus uses differential wired-AND signals. Two signals, CAN high (CANH) and CAN low (CANL) are either driven to a "dominant" state with CANH > CANL, or not driven and pulled by passive resistors to a "recessive" state with CANH ≤ CANL. A 0 data bit encodes a dominant state, while a 1 data bit encodes a recessive state, supporting a wired-AND convention, which gives nodes with lower ID numbers priority on the bus.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-2, also called high-speed CAN (bit speeds up to 1 Mbit/s on CAN, 5 Mbit/s on CAN-FD), uses a linear bus terminated at each end with 120 Ω resistors.


title: CAN bus

text: High-speed CAN signaling drives the CANH wire towards 3.5 V and the CANL wire towards 1.5 V when any device is transmitting a dominant (0), while if no device is transmitting a dominant, the terminating resistors passively return the two wires to the recessive (1) state with a nominal differential voltage of 0 V. (Receivers consider any differential voltage of less than 0.5 V to be recessive.) The dominant differential voltage is a nominal 2 V. The dominant common mode voltage (CANH+CANL)/2 must be within 1.5 to 3.5 V of common, while the recessive common mode voltage must be within ±12  of common.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-3, also called low-speed or fault-tolerant CAN (up to 125 kbit/s), uses a linear bus, star bus or multiple star buses connected by a linear bus and is terminated at each node by a fraction of the overall termination resistance. The overall termination resistance should be close to, but not less than, 100 Ω.


title: CAN bus

text: Low-speed fault-tolerant CAN signaling operates similarly to high-speed CAN, but with larger voltage swings. The dominant state is transmitted by driving CANH towards the device power supply voltage (5 V or 3.3 V), and CANL towards 0 V when transmitting a dominant (0), while the termination resistors pull the bus to a recessive state with CANH at 0 V and CANL at 5 V. This allows a simpler receiver which just considers the sign of CANH−CANL. Both wires must be able to handle −27 to +40 V without damage.


title: CAN bus

text: With both high-speed and low-speed CAN, the speed of the transition is faster when a recessive to dominant transition occurs since the CAN wires are being actively driven. The speed of the dominant to recessive transition depends primarily on the length of the CAN network and the capacitance of the wire used.


title: CAN bus

text: High-speed CAN is usually used in automotive and industrial applications where the bus runs from one end of the environment to the other. Fault-tolerant CAN is often used where groups of nodes need to be connected together.


title: CAN bus

text: The specifications require the bus be kept within a minimum and maximum common mode bus voltage, but do not define how to keep the bus within this range.


title: CAN bus

text: The CAN bus must be terminated. The termination resistors are needed to suppress reflections as well as return the bus to its recessive or idle state.


title: CAN bus

text: High-speed CAN uses a 120 Ω resistor at each end of a linear bus. Low-speed CAN uses resistors at each node. Other types of terminations may be used such as the Terminating Bias Circuit defined in ISO11783.


title: CAN bus

text: A provides power and ground in addition to the CAN signaling on a four-wire cable. This provides automatic electrical bias and termination at each end of each bus segment. An ISO11783 network is designed for hot plug-in and removal of bus segments and ECUs.


title: CAN bus

text: Each node is able to send and receive messages, but not simultaneously. A message or Frame consists primarily of the ID (identifier), which represents the priority of the message, and up to eight data bytes. A CRC, acknowledge slot [ACK] and other overhead are also part of the message. The improved CAN FD extends the length of the data section to up to 64 bytes per frame. The message is transmitted serially onto the bus using a non-return-to-zero (NRZ) format and may be received by all nodes.


title: CAN bus

text: The devices that are connected by a CAN network are typically sensors, actuators, and other control devices. These devices are connected to the bus through a host processor, a CAN controller, and a CAN transceiver.


title: CAN bus

text: CAN data transmission uses a lossless bitwise arbitration method of contention resolution. This arbitration method requires all nodes on the CAN network to be synchronized to sample every bit on the CAN network at the same time. This is why some call CAN synchronous. Unfortunately the term synchronous is imprecise since the data is transmitted in an asynchronous format, namely without a clock signal.


title: CAN bus

text: The CAN specifications use the terms "dominant" bits and "recessive" bits, where dominant is a logical 0 (actively driven to a voltage by the transmitter) and recessive is a logical 1 (passively returned to a voltage by a resistor). The idle state is represented by the recessive level (Logical 1). If one node transmits a dominant bit and another node transmits a recessive bit then there is a collision and the dominant bit "wins". This means there is no delay to the higher-priority message, and the node transmitting the lower priority message automatically attempts to re-transmit six bit clocks after the end of the dominant message. This makes CAN very suitable as a real-time prioritized communications system.


title: CAN bus

text: The exact voltages for a logical 0 or 1 depend on the physical layer used, but the basic principle of CAN requires that each node listen to the data on the CAN network including the transmitting node(s) itself (themselves). If a logical 1 is transmitted by all transmitting nodes at the same time, then a logical 1 is seen by all of the nodes, including both the transmitting node(s) and receiving node(s). If a logical 0 is transmitted by all transmitting node(s) at the same time, then a logical 0 is seen by all nodes. If a logical 0 is being transmitted by one or more nodes, and a logical 1 is being transmitted by one or more nodes, then a logical 0 is seen by all nodes including the node(s) transmitting the logical 1. When a node transmits a logical 1 but sees a logical 0, it realizes that there is a contention and it quits transmitting. By using this process, any node that transmits a logical 1 when another node transmits a logical 0 "drops out" or loses the arbitration. A node that loses arbitration re-queues its message for later transmission and the CAN frame bit-stream continues without error until only one node is left transmitting. This means that the node that transmits the first 1 loses arbitration. Since the 11 (or 29 for CAN 2.0B) bit identifier is transmitted by all nodes at the start of the CAN frame, the node with the lowest identifier transmits more zeros at the start of the frame, and that is the node that wins the arbitration or has the highest priority.


title: CAN bus

text: For example, consider an 11-bit ID CAN network, with two nodes with IDs of 15 (binary representation, 00000001111) and 16 (binary representation, 00000010000). If these two nodes transmit at the same time, each will first transmit the start bit then transmit the first six zeros of their ID with no arbitration decision being made.


title: CAN bus

text: When the 7th ID bit is transmitted, the node with the ID of 16 transmits a 1 (recessive) for its ID, and the node with the ID of 15 transmits a 0 (dominant) for its ID. When this happens, the node with the ID of 16 knows it transmitted a 1, but sees a 0 and realizes that there is a collision and it lost arbitration. Node 16 stops transmitting which allows the node with ID of 15 to continue its transmission without any loss of data. The node with the lowest ID will always win the arbitration, and therefore has the highest priority.


title: CAN bus

text: Bit rates up to 1 Mbit/s are possible at network lengths below 40 m. Decreasing the bit rate allows longer network distances (e.g.,500 m at 125 kbit/s). The improved CAN FD standard allows increasing the bit rate after arbitration and can increase the speed of the data section by a factor of up to ten or more of the arbitration bit rate.


title: CAN bus

text: Message IDs must be unique on a single CAN bus, otherwise two nodes would continue transmission beyond the end of the arbitration field (ID) causing an error.


title: CAN bus

text: In the early 1990s, the choice of IDs for messages was done simply on the basis of identifying the type of data and the sending node; however, as the ID is also used as the message priority, this led to poor real-time performance. In those scenarios, a low CAN bus use of around 30% was commonly required to ensure that all messages would meet their deadlines. However, if IDs are instead determined based on the deadline of the message, the lower the numerical ID and hence the higher the message priority, then bus use of 70 to 80% can typically be achieved before any message deadlines are missed


title: CAN bus

text: All nodes on the CAN network must operate at the same nominal bit rate, but noise, phase shifts, oscillator tolerance and oscillator drift mean that the actual bit rate might not be the nominal bit rate. Since a separate clock signal is not used, a means of synchronizing the nodes is necessary. Synchronization is important during arbitration since the nodes in arbitration must be able to see both their transmitted data and the other nodes' transmitted data at the same time. Synchronization is also important to ensure that variations in oscillator timing between nodes do not cause errors.


title: CAN bus

text: Synchronization starts with a hard synchronization on the first recessive to dominant transition after a period of bus idle (the start bit). Resynchronization occurs on every recessive to dominant transition during the frame. The CAN controller expects the transition to occur at a multiple of the nominal bit time. If the transition does not occur at the exact time the controller expects it, the controller adjusts the nominal bit time accordingly.


title: CAN bus

text: The adjustment is accomplished by dividing each bit into a number of time slices called quanta, and assigning some number of quanta to each of the four segments within the bit: synchronization, propagation, phase segment 1 and phase segment 2.


title: CAN bus

text: The number of quanta the bit is divided into can vary by controller, and the number of quanta assigned to each segment can be varied depending on bit rate and network conditions.


title: CAN bus

text: A transition that occurs before or after it is expected causes the controller to calculate the time difference and lengthen phase segment 1 or shorten phase segment 2 by this time. This effectively adjusts the timing of the receiver to the transmitter to synchronize them. This resynchronization process is done continuously at every recessive to dominant transition to ensure the transmitter and receiver stay in sync. Continuously resynchronizing reduces errors induced by noise, and allows a receiving node that was synchronized to a node which lost arbitration to resynchronize to the node which won arbitration.


title: CAN bus

text: The CAN protocol, like many networking protocols, can be decomposed into the following abstraction layers:


title: CAN bus

text: Most of the CAN standard applies to the transfer layer. The transfer layer receives messages from the physical layer and transmits those messages to the object layer. The transfer layer is responsible for bit timing and synchronization, message framing, arbitration, acknowledgement, error detection and signaling, and fault confinement. It performs:


title: CAN bus

text: CAN bus (ISO 11898-1:2003) originally specified the link layer protocol with only abstract requirements for the physical layer, e.g., asserting the use of a medium with multiple-access at the bit level through the use of dominant and recessive states. The electrical aspects of the physical layer (voltage, current, number of conductors) were specified in ISO 11898-2:2003, which is now widely accepted. However, the mechanical aspects of the physical layer (connector type and number, colors, labels, pin-outs) have yet to be formally specified. As a result, an automotive ECU will typically have a particular—often custom—connector with various sorts of cables, of which two are the CAN bus lines. Nonetheless, several de facto standards for mechanical implementation have emerged, the most common being the 9-pin D-sub type male connector with the following pin-out:


title: CAN bus

text: This "de facto" mechanical standard for CAN could be implemented with the node having both male and female 9-pin D-sub connectors electrically wired to each other in parallel within the node. Bus power is fed to a node's male connector and the bus draws power from the node's female connector. This follows the electrical engineering convention that power sources are terminated at female connectors. Adoption of this standard avoids the need to fabricate custom splitters to connect two sets of bus wires to a single D connector at each node. Such nonstandard (custom) wire harnesses (splitters) that join conductors outside the node reduce bus reliability, eliminate cable interchangeability, reduce compatibility of wiring harnesses, and increase cost.


title: CAN bus

text: The absence of a complete physical layer specification (mechanical in addition to electrical) freed the CAN bus specification from the constraints and complexity of physical implementation. However it left CAN bus implementations open to interoperability issues due to mechanical incompatibility. In order to improve interoperability, many vehicle makers have generated specifications describing a set of allowed CAN transceivers in combination with requirements on the parasitic capacitance on the line. The allowed parasitic capacitance includes both capacitors as well as ESD protection (ESD against ISO 7637-3). In addition to parasitic capacitance, 12V and 24V systems do not have the same requirements in terms of line maximum voltage. Indeed, during jump start events light vehicles lines can go up to 24V while truck systems can go as high as 36V. New solutions are coming on the market allowing to use same component for CAN as well as CAN FD (see ).


title: CAN bus

text: Noise immunity on ISO 11898-2:2003 is achieved by maintaining the differential impedance of the bus at a low level with low-value resistors (120 ohms) at each end of the bus. However, when dormant, a low-impedance bus such as CAN draws more current (and power) than other voltage-based signaling busses. On CAN bus systems, balanced line operation, where current in one signal line is exactly balanced by current in the opposite direction in the other signal provides an independent, stable 0 V reference for the receivers. Best practice determines that CAN bus balanced pair signals be carried in twisted pair wires in a shielded cable to minimize RF emission and reduce interference susceptibility in the already noisy RF environment of an automobile.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-2 provides some immunity to common mode voltage between transmitter and receiver by having a 0 V rail running along the bus to maintain a high degree of voltage association between the nodes. Also, in the de facto mechanical configuration mentioned above, a supply rail is included to distribute power to each of the transceiver nodes. The design provides a common supply for all the transceivers. The actual voltage to be applied by the bus and which nodes apply to it are application-specific and not formally specified. Common practice node design provides each node with transceivers which are optically isolated from their node host and derive a 5 V linearly regulated supply voltage for the transceivers from the universal supply rail provided by the bus. This usually allows operating margin on the supply rail sufficient to allow interoperability across many node types. Typical values of supply voltage on such networks are 7 to 30 V. However, the lack of a formal standard means that system designers are responsible for supply rail compatibility.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-2 describes the electrical implementation formed from a multi-dropped single-ended balanced line configuration with resistor termination at each end of the bus.


title: CAN bus

text: In this configuration a dominant state is asserted by one or more transmitters switching the CAN− to supply 0 V and (simultaneously) switching CAN+ to the +5 V bus voltage thereby forming a current path through the resistors that terminate the bus. As such the terminating resistors form an essential component of the signalling system and are included not just to limit wave reflection at high frequency.


title: CAN bus

text: During a recessive state the signal lines and resistor(s) remain in a high impedances state with respect to both rails. Voltages on both CAN+ and CAN− tend (weakly) towards a voltage midway between the rails. A recessive state is present on the bus only when none of the transmitters on the bus is asserting a dominant state.


title: CAN bus

text: During a dominant state the signal lines and resistor(s) move to a low impedance state with respect to the rails so that current flows through the resistor. CAN+ voltage tends to +5 V and CAN− tends to 0 V.


title: CAN bus

text: Irrespective of signal state the signal lines are always in low impedance state with respect to one another by virtue of the terminating resistors at the end of the bus.


title: CAN bus

text: This signalling strategy differs significantly from other balanced line transmission technologies such as RS-422/3, RS-485, etc. which employ differential line drivers/ receivers and use a signalling system based on the differential mode voltage of the balanced line crossing a notional 0 V. Multiple access on such systems normally relies on the media supporting three states (active high, active low and inactive tri-state) and is dealt with in the time domain. Multiple access on CAN bus is achieved by the electrical logic of the system supporting just two states that are conceptually analogous to a ‘wired AND’ network.


title: CAN bus

text: A CAN network can be configured to work with two different message (or "frame") formats: the standard or base frame format (described in CAN 2.0 A and CAN 2.0 B), and the extended frame format (described only by CAN 2.0 B). The only difference between the two formats is that the "CAN base frame" supports a length of 11 bits for the identifier, and the "CAN extended frame" supports a length of 29 bits for the identifier, made up of the 11-bit identifier ("base identifier") and an 18-bit extension ("identifier extension"). The distinction between CAN base frame format and CAN extended frame format is made by using the IDE bit, which is transmitted as dominant in case of an 11-bit frame, and transmitted as recessive in case of a 29-bit frame. CAN controllers that support extended frame format messages are also able to send and receive messages in CAN base frame format. All frames begin with a start-of-frame (SOF) bit that denotes the start of the frame transmission.


title: CAN bus

text: The CAN standard requires that the implementation must accept the base frame format and may accept the extended frame format, but must tolerate the extended frame format.


title: CAN bus

text: In the event of a data frame and a remote frame with the same identifier being transmitted at the same time, the data frame wins arbitration due to the dominant RTR bit following the identifier.


title: CAN bus

text: The overload frame contains the two bit fields Overload Flag and Overload Delimiter. There are two kinds of overload conditions that can lead to the transmission of an overload flag:


title: CAN bus

text: The start of an overload frame due to case 1 is only allowed to be started at the first bit time of an expected intermission, whereas overload frames due to case 2 start one bit after detecting the dominant bit. Overload Flag consists of six dominant bits. The overall form corresponds to that of the active error flag. The overload flag's form destroys the fixed form of the intermission field. As a consequence, all other stations also detect an overload condition and on their part start transmission of an overload flag. Overload Delimiter consists of eight recessive bits. The overload delimiter is of the same form as the error delimiter.


title: CAN bus

text: The acknowledge slot is used to acknowledge the receipt of a valid CAN frame. Each node that receives the frame, without finding an error, transmits a dominant level in the ACK slot and thus overrides the recessive level of the transmitter. If a transmitter detects a recessive level in the ACK slot, it knows that no receiver found a valid frame. A receiving node may transmit a recessive to indicate that it did not receive a valid frame, but another node that did receive a valid frame may override this with a dominant. The transmitting node cannot know that the message has been received by all of the nodes on the CAN network.


title: CAN bus

text: Often, the mode of operation of the device is to re-transmit unacknowledged frames over and over. This may lead to eventually entering the "error passive" state.


title: CAN bus

text: Data frames and remote frames are separated from preceding frames by a bit field called interframe space. Interframe space consists of at least three consecutive recessive (1) bits. Following that, if a dominant bit is detected, it will be regarded as the "Start of frame" bit of the next frame. Overload frames and error frames are not preceded by an interframe space and multiple overload frames are not separated by an interframe space. Interframe space contains the bit fields intermission and bus idle, and suspend transmission for error passive stations, which have been transmitter of the previous message.


title: CAN bus

text: To ensure enough transitions to maintain synchronization, a bit of opposite polarity is inserted after five consecutive bits of the same polarity. This practice is called bit stuffing, and is necessary due to the non-return-to-zero (NRZ) coding used with CAN. The stuffed data frames are destuffed by the receiver.


title: CAN bus

text: All fields in the frame are stuffed with the exception of the CRC delimiter, ACK field and end of frame which are a fixed size and are not stuffed. In the fields where bit stuffing is used, six consecutive bits of the same polarity (111111 or 000000) are considered an error. An active error flag can be transmitted by a node when an error has been detected. The active error flag consists of six consecutive dominant bits and violates the rule of bit stuffing.


title: CAN bus

text: Bit stuffing means that data frames may be larger than one would expect by simply enumerating the bits shown in the tables above. The maximum increase in size of a CAN frame (base format) after bit stuffing is in the case


title: CAN bus

text: The stuffing bit itself may be the first of the five consecutive identical bits, so in the worst case there is one stuffing bit per four original bits.


title: CAN bus

text: since formula_2 is the size of the frame before stuffing, in the worst case one bit will be added every four original bits after the first one (hence the −1 at the numerator) and, because of the layout of the bits of the header, only 34 out of 44 of them can be subject to bit stuffing.


title: CAN bus

text: An undesirable side effect of the bit stuffing scheme is that a small number of bit errors in a received message may corrupt the destuffing process, causing a larger number of errors to propagate through the destuffed message. This reduces the level of protection that would otherwise be offered by the CRC against the original errors. This deficiency of the protocol has been addressed in CAN FD frames by the use of a combination of fixed stuff bits and a counter that records the number of stuff bits inserted.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898 series specifies physical and data link layer (levels 1 and 2 of the ISO/OSI model) of serial communication category called Controller Area Network that supports distributed real-time control and multiplexing for use within road vehicles.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-1:2015 specifies the data link layer (DLL) and physical signalling of the controller area network (CAN). This document describes the general architecture of CAN in terms of hierarchical layers according to the ISO reference model for open systems interconnection (OSI) established in ISO/IEC 7498-1 and provides the characteristics for setting up an interchange of digital information between modules implementing the CAN DLL with detailed specification of the logical link control (LLC) sublayer and medium access control (MAC) sublayer.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-2:2016 specifies the high-speed (transmission rates of up to 1 Mbit/s) medium access unit (MAU), and some medium dependent interface (MDI) features (according to ISO 8802-3), which comprise the physical layer of the controller area network. ISO 11898-2 uses a two-wire balanced signalling scheme. It is the most used physical layer in vehicle powertrain applications and industrial control networks.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-3:2006 specifies low-speed, fault-tolerant, medium-dependent interface for setting up an interchange of digital information between electronic control units of road vehicles equipped with the CAN at transmission rates above 40 kbit/s up to 125 kbit/s.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-4:2004 specifies time-triggered communication in the CAN (TTCAN). It is applicable to setting up a time-triggered interchange of digital information between electronic control units (ECU) of road vehicles equipped with CAN, and specifies the frame synchronisation entity that coordinates the operation of both logical link and media access controls in accordance with ISO 11898-1, to provide the time-triggered communication schedule.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-5:2007 specifies the CAN physical layer for transmission rates up to 1 Mbit/s for use within road vehicles. It describes the medium access unit functions as well as some medium dependent interface features according to ISO 8802-2. This represents an extension of ISO 11898-2, dealing with new functionality for systems requiring low-power consumption features while there is no active bus communication.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 11898-6:2013 specifies the CAN physical layer for transmission rates up to 1 Mbit/s for use within road vehicles. It describes the medium access unit functions as well as some medium dependent interface features according to ISO 8802-2. This represents an extension of ISO 11898-2 and ISO 11898-5, specifying a selective wake-up mechanism using configurable CAN frames.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 16845-1:2016 provides the methodology and abstract test suite necessary for checking the conformance of any CAN implementation of the CAN specified in ISO 11898-1.


title: CAN bus

text: ISO 16845-2:2018 establishes test cases and test requirements to realize a test plan verifying if the CAN transceiver with implemented selective wake-up functions conform to the specified functionalities. The kind of testing defined in ISO 16845-2:2018 is named as conformance testing.


title: CAN bus

text: As the CAN standard does not include common communication features, such as flow control, device addressing, and transportation of data blocks larger than one message, and above all, application data, many implementations of higher layer protocols were created. Several are standardized for a business area, although all can be extended by each manufacturer. For passenger cars, each manufacturer has its own standard.


title: CAN bus

text: CAN in Automation (CiA) is the international users' and manufacturers' organization that develops and supports CAN-based higher-layer protocols and their international standardization. Among these specifications are:


title: CAN bus

text: The CANopen Special Interest Group (SIG) "Lift Control", which was founded in 2001, develops the CANopen application profile CiA 417 for lift control systems. It works on extending the features, improves technical content and ensures that the current legal standards for lift control systems are met. The first version of CiA 417 was published (available for CiA members) in summer 2003, version 2.0 in February 2010, version 2.1.0 in July 2012, version 2.2.0 in December 2015, and version 2.3.1 in February 2020.


title: CAN bus

text: Jörg Hellmich (ELFIN GmbH) is the chairman of this SIG and manages a wiki of the CANopen lift community with content about CANopen lift.


title: CAN bus

text: CAN is a low-level protocol and does not support any security features intrinsically. There is also no encryption in standard CAN implementations, which leaves these networks open to man-in-the-middle frame interception. In most implementations, applications are expected to deploy their own security mechanisms; e.g., to authenticate incoming commands or the presence of certain devices on the network. Failure to implement adequate security measures may result in various sorts of attacks if the opponent manages to insert messages on the bus. While passwords exist for some safety-critical functions, such as modifying firmware, programming keys, or controlling antilock brake actuators, these systems are not implemented universally and have a limited number of seed/key pairs.


title: CAN bus

text: When developing or troubleshooting the CAN bus, examination of hardware signals can be very important. Logic analyzers and bus analyzers are tools which collect, analyse, decode and store signals so people can view the high-speed waveforms at their leisure. There are also specialist tools as well as CAN bus monitors.


title: CAN bus

text: A is an analysis tool, often a combination of hardware and software, used during development of hardware which uses the CAN bus.


title: CAN bus

text: Typically the CAN bus monitor will listen to the traffic on the CAN bus in order to display it in a user interface. Often the CAN bus monitor offers the possibility to simulate CAN bus activity by sending CAN frames to the bus. The CAN bus monitor can therefore be used to validate expected CAN traffic from a given device or to simulate CAN traffic in order to validate the reaction from a given device connected to the CAN bus.


title: CAN bus

text: Bosch holds patents on the technology, though those related to the original protocol have now expired. Manufacturers of CAN-compatible microprocessors pay license fees to Bosch for use of the CAN trademark and any of the newer patents related to CAN FD, and these are normally passed on to the customer in the price of the chip. Manufacturers of products with custom ASICs or FPGAs containing CAN-compatible modules need to pay a fee for the CAN Protocol License if they wish to use the CAN trademark or CAN FD capabilities.


title: KK (singer)

text: Krishnakumar Kunnath (23 August 1968 – 31 May 2022), popularly known as KK, was an Indian playback singer. Regarded as one of the best and most versatile singers in India, he recorded songs in Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Odia, Bengali, Assamese and Gujarati.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK began his career by singing advertising jingles and made his film debut in 1996 on an A. R. Rahman soundtrack. He released his debut album, "Pal" in 1999. The songs "Pal" and "Yaaron" from the album became popular, and are used in school graduations. His popular songs included "Tadap Tadap Ke Is Dil Se" from "Hum Dil De Chuke Sanam" (1999), the Tamil song "Apadi Podu", "Dola Re Dola" from "Devdas" (2002), "Kya Mujhe Pyaar Hai" from "Woh Lamhe..." (2006), "Aankhon Mein Teri" from "Om Shanti Om" (2007), "Khuda Jane" from "Bachna Ae Haseeno" (2008), "Piya Aaye Na" from "Aashiqui 2" (2013), "Mat Aazma Re" from "Murder 3" (2013), "India Wale" from "Happy New Year" (2014), and "Tu Jo Mila" from "Bajrangi Bhaijaan" (2015).


title: KK (singer)

text: He received the 2009 Best Playback Singer – Male Screen Award for "Khuda Jaane", from the film "Bachna Ae Haseeno". KK received six Filmfare Awards nominations.


title: KK (singer)

text: Born in Delhi on 23 August 1968 to Malayali parents, Krishnakumar Kunnath grew up in New Delhi. He sang 3,500 jingles before breaking into Bollywood.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK attended Delhi's Mount St Mary's School, and Kirori Mal College, Delhi University. He appeared in the song "Josh of India", released to support the Indian national team during the 1999 Cricket World Cup.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK married Jyothy in 1991. His son, Nakul Krishna Kunnath, sang "Masti" (from his album, "Humsafar") with him. KK also had a daughter.


title: KK (singer)

text: After receiving a degree in commerce from Kirori Mal College, KK spent six months as a marketing executive before pursuing his love of music. He struggled to establish himself in the competitive recording industry, singing at hotels to make ends meet. KK moved to Mumbai in 1994.


title: KK (singer)

text: According to film director Mahesh Bhatt, "KK had an emotional bandwidth which echoed all the seasons of the heart. He could be frivolous, romantic and anguished. He could go into the depths, talk about the wonder and magic of life."


title: KK (singer)

text: KK believed that it was unimportant for a singer's face to be seen, but "a singer must be heard". In a 2019 interview, he said that he felt comfortable with a microphone but awkward in front of a camera. KK valued and "fiercely" protected his privacy. He did not want his singing to be associated with a particular actor and preferred singing for a number of actors.


title: KK (singer)

text: In 1994, KK gave a demo tape to Louis Banks, Ranjit Barot and Lesle Lewis. He was called by UTV, and sang a jingle for a Santogen Suiting ad. In a four-year period, KK sang over 3,500 jingles in 11 languages. He considered Lesle Lewis his mentor for giving him his first jingle to sing in Mumbai. KK then became a playback singer, beginning with A. R. Rahman's "Kalluri Saaley" and "Hello Dr." from Kadir's "Kadhal Desam" and "Strawberry Kannae" from AVM Productions's 1997 musical film, "Minsara Kanavu".


title: KK (singer)

text: KK made his Bollywood debut with the song "Tadap Tadap Ke Is Dil Se" in "Hum Dil De Chuke Sanam" (1999). Before this song, however, he had sung parts of "Chhod Aaye Hum" in Gulzar's "Maachis" (1996). KK considered "Tadap Tadap Ke Is Dil Se" the turning point of his career. Other popular songs included "Dola Re Dola" in "Devdas" (2002), "Kya Mujhe Pyaar Hai" in "Woh Lamhe..." (2006), "Aankhon Mein Teri" in "Om Shanti Om" (2007), "Khuda Jane" in "Bachna Ae Haseeno" (2008), "Piya Aaye Na" in "Aashiqui 2" (2013), "Mat Aazma Re" in "Murder 3" (2013), "India Wale" in "Happy New Year" (2014) and "Tu Jo Mila" from "Bajrangi Bhaijaan" (2015).


title: KK (singer)

text: KK received six Filmfare Awards nominations. He received the 2009 Screen Awards Best Playback Singer – Male award for "Khuda Jaane", from the film "Bachna Ae Haseeno". In 2022, KK worked with filmmaker Srijit Mukherji and lyricist Gulzar on a song for "". The song, "Dhoop Paani Bahne De", was the first song released since his death.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK sang popular songs in several languages, including Tamil. According to "Outlook", his songs defined Tamil film music during the 2000s and became part of Tamil culture. In 2004, KK's Tamil song "Appadi Podu" became popular across India and was played at clubs and weddings. He worked with A. R. Rahman on "Strawberry Kanne", a popular song, in 1997.


title: KK (singer)

text: He had a decade of hit songs during the 2000s. KK sang "Love Pannu" for Harris Jayaraj in 2001, followed by "Kadhal Oru Thani Katchi" and "Gundu Gundu Ponne". In 2003, he had two hits composed by Harris Jayaraj: "Uyirin Uyire" and "Kalyanam Dhaan Kattitkittu". "Uyirin Uyire" was popular in cities, and "Kalyanam Dhaan Kattitkittu" became popular across Tamil Nadu.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK sang "Kadhal Valarthen", composed by Yuvan Shankar Raja. He worked with Harris Jayaraj and Yuvan Shankar Raja to produce two hit songs: "Kadhalikkum Aasai" and "Ninaithu Ninaithu". "Andankaaka Kondaikaari", composed by Harris Jayaraj, was another successful song. KK sang "Annanoda Paatu" in the film "Chandramukhi". Other Tamil hit songs by were "Pani Thuli", "Olikuchi Udambukari", and "Lelakku Lelakku Lela". Despite his birth to a Malayali family in Thrissur, KK sang only one Malayalam song in his 25-year career: "Rahasyamay" in "Puthiya Mukham" (2009).


title: KK (singer)

text: In 1999, Sony Music had been launched in India and wanted to introduce a new artiste. KK was selected, and released his debut solo album: "Pal", with music by Lesle Lewis of the duo Colonial Cousins (who also arranged and produced the album). "Pal" was a pop rock album. and the songs "Aap Ki Dua", "Yaaron" and the title track, "Pal" were popular with audiences and on the music charts; "Pal" and "Yaaron" are frequently played at school farewells. KK received the 1999 Screen Award for Best SingerMale (non-film music) for the album.


title: KK (singer)

text: He released his next album, "Humsafar", on 22 January 2008. "Humsafar" featured "Aasman Ke", "Dekho Na", "Yeh Kahan Mil Gaye Hum", "Rain Bhai Kaari (Maajhi)", and the English-language ballad "Cineraria". The lyrics of its title track are a mixture of English and Hindi, and eight songs on the album were composed by KK.


title: KK (singer)

text: He sang many songs for television serials, including "Just Mohabbat", "Shaka Laka Boom Boom", "Kuch Jhuki Si Palkein", "Hip Hip Hurray", "Kkavyanjali" and "Just Dance". KK was a jury member on the talent-hunt show, "Fame Gurukul".


title: KK (singer)

text: He sang "Tanha Chala" on the Pakistani TV show "The Ghost", which aired on Hum TV in 2008. The song was composed by Farrukh Abid and Shoiab Farrukh, with lyrics by Momina Duraid.


title: KK (singer)

text: KK appeared on the MTV India musical programme "Coke Studio", singing the qawwali "Chadta Suraj" with the Sabri Brothers and a reprise of "Tu Aashiqui Hai" from "Jhankaar Beats". He appeared on "Surili Baat", on the Aaj Tak channel. KK performed on Sony Mix and "MTV Unplugged", which aired on MTV on 11 January 2014. He presented his Salaam Dubai 2014 concert in Dubai in April 2014, and performed in concert in Goa, Dubai, Chennai and Hong Kong.