title: Will Geer

text: He maintained a garden at his vacation house, called Geer-Gore Gardens, in Nichols, Connecticut. He visited often and attended the local Fourth of July fireworks celebrations, sometimes wearing a black top hat or straw hat and always his trademark denim overalls with only one suspender hooked. He also had a small vacation house in Solana Beach, California, where his front and back yards were cultivated as vegetable gardens rather than lawns.


title: Will Geer

text: As he was dying on April 22, 1978, of respiratory failure at the age of 76, his family sang Woody Guthrie's "This Land Is Your Land" and recited poems by Robert Frost at his deathbed. His remains were cremated; his ashes are buried at the Theatricum Botanicum in the Shakespeare Garden in Topanga Canyon, California.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast is a line of digital media players developed by Google. The devices, designed as small dongles, can play Internet-streamed audio-visual content on a high-definition television or home audio system. The user can control playback with a mobile device or personal computer through mobile and web apps that support the Google Cast protocol, or by issuing commands via Google Assistant; later models introduced an interactive user interface and remote control. Content can be mirrored to video models from the Google Chrome web browser on a personal computer or from the screen of some Android devices.


title: Chromecast

text: The first-generation Chromecast, a video streaming device, was announced on July 24, 2013, and made available for purchase on the same day in the United States for . The second-generation Chromecast and an audio-only model called Chromecast Audio were released in September 2015. A model called Chromecast Ultra that supports 4K resolution and high dynamic range was released in November 2016. A third generation of the HD video Chromecast was released in October 2018. The latest models, called Chromecast with Google TV, were the first in the product line to feature an interactive user interface and remote control; a 4K model was released in September 2020, followed by a 1080p model in September 2022.


title: Chromecast

text: Critics praised the Chromecast's simplicity and potential for future app support. The Google Cast SDK was released on February 3, 2014, allowing third parties to modify their software to work with Chromecast and other Cast receivers. According to Google, over 20,000 Google Cast–ready apps are available, as of May 2015. Over 30 million units have sold globally since launch, making the Chromecast the best-selling streaming device in the United States in 2014, according to NPD Group. From Chromecast's launch to May 2015, it handled more than 1.5 billion stream requests.


title: Chromecast

text: According to Google, the Chromecast was originally conceived by engineer Majd Bakar. His inspiration for the product came around 2008 after noticing the film-viewing tendencies of his wife Carla Hindie. Using her laptop, she would search for a film to watch on a streaming service and add it to her queue, before closing her laptop and using a gaming device to play the film on a television. She took these steps because she found television interfaces difficult to use to search for content. Bakar found the whole process inefficient and wanted to build a phone-based interface that would allow video to play on a large display through a small hardware device. After joining Google in 2011 to work on products that "would change how people used their TVs", Bakar pitched the idea for the Chromecast. Development on the product began in 2012; late that year, Bakar brought home a beta version of the product for Hindie to test. The device was launched in July 2013.


title: Chromecast

text: All Chromecast devices offer at least two methods to stream content: the first employs mobile and web apps that support the Google Cast technology; the second, which applies to video models, allows mirroring of content from the web browser Google Chrome running on a personal computer, as well as content displayed on some Android devices. In both cases, playback is initiated through the "cast" button on the sender device.


title: Chromecast

text: When no content is streamed, video-capable Chromecasts display a user-personalizable content feed called "Backdrop" that can include featured and personal photos, artwork, weather, satellite images, weather forecasts, and news.


title: Chromecast

text: If a television's HDMI ports support the Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) feature, pressing the cast button will also result in the video-capable Chromecast automatically turning on the TV and switching the television's active audio/video input using the CEC command "One Touch Playback".


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast devices are dongles that are powered by connecting the device to an external power adapter or USB port using a USB cable. Video-capable Chromecasts plug into the HDMI port of a high-definition television or monitor, while the audio-only model outputs sound through its integrated 3.5 millimeter audio jack/mini-TOSLINK socket. By default, Chromecasts connect to the Internet through a Wi-Fi connection to the user's local network. A standalone USB power supply with an Ethernet port allows for a wired Internet connection; the power adapter for early Chromecast models was first introduced in July 2015 for US$15, while the adapter for Chromecast with Google TV was released in October 2020 for US$20.


title: Chromecast

text: The original Chromecast measures in length and has an HDMI plug built into the body. It contains the Marvell Armada 1500-mini 88DE3005 system on a chip (SoC) running an ARM Cortex-A9 processor. The SoC includes codecs for hardware decoding of the VP8 and H.264 video compression formats. Radio communication is handled by AzureWave NH–387 Wi-Fi which implements 802.11 b/g/n (2.4 GHz). The device has 512 MB of Micron DDR3L RAM and 2 GB of flash storage.


title: Chromecast

text: The model number H2G2-42 is likely a reference to "The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy" abbreviation "H2G2"—in the novel, the number 42 is the "Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything." The bundled power adapter bears the model number MST3K-US, a reference to the television series "Mystery Science Theater 3000".


title: Chromecast

text: The second-generation Chromecast has a disc-shaped body with a short length of HDMI cable attached (as opposed to the HDMI plug built into the original model). The cable is flexible and the plug can magnetically attach to the device body for more positioning options behind a television. The second-generation model uses a Marvell Armada 1500 Mini Plus 88DE3006 SoC, which has dual ARM Cortex-A7 processors running at 1.2 GHz. The unit contains an Avastar 88W8887, which has improved Wi-Fi performance and offers support for 802.11 ac and 5 GHz bands, while containing three adaptive antennas for better connections to home routers. The device contains 512 MB of Samsung DDR3L RAM and 256 MB of flash storage.


title: Chromecast

text: The model number NC2-6A5 may be a reference to the registry number "NCC-1701" of the fictional starship USS "Enterprise" from the "Star Trek" franchise, the "saucer section" of which the device resembles: NC can be read as NCC, and 6A5 converted from hexadecimal is 1701.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast Audio is a variation of the second-generation Chromecast designed for use with audio streaming apps. Chromecast Audio features a 3.5 millimeter audio jack/mini-TOSLINK socket, allowing the device to be attached to speakers and home audio systems. One side of the device is inscribed with circular grooves, resembling those of a vinyl record. A December 2015 update introduced support for high-resolution audio (24-bit/96 kHz) and multi-room playback; users can simultaneously play audio across multiple Chromecast Audio devices in different locations by grouping them together using the Google Home mobile app. The feature made Chromecast Audio a low-cost alternative to Sonos' multiple-room music systems.


title: Chromecast

text: With the advent of Google Home smart speakers, the device became tangential to Google's product strategy and was discontinued in January 2019. In addition, the third-generation Chromecast supports Chromecast Audio technology, allowing it to be paired with other devices for multi-room synchronized playback.


title: Chromecast

text: The model number RUX-J42 may have been a reference to the Jimi Hendrix albums "Are You Experienced" (stylized "R U eXperienced") and "Midnight Lightning", which had the internal code J-42. Chromecast Audio was also developed with the internal codename Hendrix.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast Ultra is similar in design to the second-generation model, but features upgraded hardware that supports the streaming of 4K resolution content, as well as high-dynamic range (HDR) through the HDR10 and Dolby Vision formats. Google stated that the Chromecast Ultra loads video 1.8 times faster than previous models. Unlike previous models that could be powered through a USB port, the Chromecast Ultra requires the use of the included power supply for connecting to a wall outlet. The power supply also offers an Ethernet port for a wired connection to accommodate the fast network speeds needed to stream 4K content. The Chromecast Ultra was one of the first devices to support Google's cloud gaming service Stadia; a Chromecast Ultra was included with a controller in the "Founder's Edition" and "Premiere Edition" bundles for Stadia.


title: Chromecast

text: The third-generation Chromecast added 60 frames-per-second playback support at a resolution of 1080p, compared to the second-generation Chromecast's maximum of 720p at the same frame rate. Google said the third-generation Chromecast offered a 15 percent increase in speed over the second-generation model. The magnetic attachment between the dongle body and HDMI plug that was present on prior models was dropped for the third-generation device.


title: Chromecast

text: The Chromecast with Google TV, retroactively renamed to "Chromecast with Google TV (4K)" with the release of the HD version, runs the Android TV operating system and features a brand new user interface branded "Google TV" that is navigated with an included Bluetooth remote control. The remote has dedicated buttons for opening YouTube and Netflix, as well as a Google Assistant button for initiating voice commands or search queries through the remote's microphone. The remote can be programmed to control the power, volume, and input functions of televisions and soundbars through HDMI-CEC or infrared signals. Like previous models, the Chromecast with Google TV allows content to be cast to it from other devices. It outputs video up to a 4K resolution and supports HDR through the Dolby Vision, HDR10, and HDR10+ formats, while also supporting the audio formats Dolby Digital, Dolby Digital Plus, and Dolby Atmos. Support for Google's Stadia cloud gaming service was added on the device on June 23, 2021. Unlike some previous models that could be powered by a television's USB port, the Chromecast with Google TV requires a power adapter, which connects via USB cable to the dongle's USB-C port. The Chromecast and its remote are available in three different colors: Snow, Sky, and Sunrise.


title: Chromecast

text: In September 2022, the Chromecast with Google TV (HD) was released. It is a 1080p version of the Chromecast with Google TV (4K), and is the successor to the third-generation Chromecast.


title: Chromecast

text: At the time of Chromecast's launch, four compatible apps were available: YouTube and Netflix were supported as Android, iOS, and Chrome web apps; Google Play Music and Google Play Movies & TV were also supported, but originally only as Android apps. Additional Chromecast-enabled apps would require access to the Google Cast software development kit (SDK). The SDK was first released as a preview version on July 24, 2013. Google advised interested developers to use the SDK to create and test Chromecast-enabled apps, but not distribute them. While that admonition remained in force, Chromecast-enabled applications for Hulu Plus and Pandora Radio were released in October 2013, and HBO Go in November. Google opened the SDK to all developers on February 3, 2014. In its introductory documentation and video presentation, Google said the SDK worked with both Chromecast devices and other unnamed "cast receiver devices". Chromecast product manager Rish Chandra said that Google used the intervening time to improve the SDK's reliability and accommodate those developers who sought a quick and easy way to cast a photo to a television without a lot of coding.


title: Chromecast

text: Over time, many more applications have been updated to support Chromecast. At Google I/O 2014, the company announced that 6,000 registered developers were working on 10,000 Google Cast–ready apps; by the following year's conference, the number of compatible apps had doubled. Google's official list of compatible apps and platforms is available on the Chromecast website. Google has published case studies documenting Chromecast integration by Comedy Central, "Just Dance Now", Haystack News and Fitnet.


title: Chromecast

text: In July 2019, the Amazon Prime Video apps for Android and iOS added Chromecast support, marking the first time Amazon's streaming service supported the device. The move followed a four-year dispute between Google and Amazon in which Amazon stopped selling Chromecast devices and Google pulled YouTube from Amazon Fire TV.


title: Chromecast

text: The development framework has two components: a sender app based on a vendor's existing Android or iOS mobile app, or desktop Web app, which provides users with content discovery and media controls; and a receiver app, executing in a Chrome browser-like environment resident on the cast receiver device. Both make use of APIs provided by the SDK.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast uses the multicast Domain Name System (mDNS) protocol to search for available devices on a Wi-Fi network. Chromecast previously used the Discovery and Launch (DIAL) protocol, which was co-developed by Netflix and YouTube.


title: Chromecast

text: At the introductory press conference, Mario Queiroz, Google's VP of Product Management, said that the first-generation Chromecast ran "a simplified version of Chrome OS". Subsequently, a team of hackers reported that the device is "more Android than ChromeOS" and appears to be adapted from software that was embedded in the since-discontinued Google TV platform. As with ChromeOS devices, Chromecast operating system updates are downloaded automatically without notification.


title: Chromecast

text: Differing from all previous models, the Chromecast with Google TV runs on the Android TV operating system. A modified user interface, branded "Google TV" (unrelated to Google's discontinued smart TV platform), replaces the stock interface of Android TV. The Google TV interface emphasizes content recommendations and discovery across different services and installed apps, compared to the stock Android TV interface that is more focused on navigating between individual installed apps. Google TV is compatible with over 6,500 apps built for Android TV. At launch, over 30 streaming services were integrated with Google TV for use in its content aggregation features.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast is managed through the Google Home app, which enables users to set up new devices and configure existing ones (such as specifying which "Ambient Mode" images are shown when no other content is cast). The app manages other Google Cast-supported devices, including the Google Home smart speaker.


title: Chromecast

text: Originally called simply "Chromecast", the app was released concurrently with the original Chromecast video model and made available for both Android and iOS mobile devices. The app was released outside the US in October 2013.


title: Chromecast

text: In May 2016, the Chromecast app was renamed Google Cast due to the proliferation of non-Chromecast products that support casting. In October 2016, the Google Cast app was renamed Google Home, the name also given to the company's smart speaker—leaving "Google Cast" as the name of the technology.


title: Chromecast

text: Google made the first-generation Chromecast available for purchase online in the US on July 24, 2013. To entice consumers, Google initially included a promotion for three months of access to Netflix at no cost with the purchase of a Chromecast. The device quickly sold out on Amazon.com, BestBuy.com, and Google Play, and within 24 hours, the Netflix promotion was ended because of high demand. On March 18, 2014, Google released the Chromecast to 11 new markets, including the UK, Germany and Canada with the BBC iPlayer enabled for UK users.


title: Chromecast

text: In July 2014, to commemorate the first anniversary of the device's launch, Google announced it would offer their music streaming service, Google Play Music All Access, at no cost for 90 days to Chromecast owners who had not previously used All Access; the service normally costs US$9.99 per month. On December 10, 2014, Chromecast was launched in India through e-commerce marketplace Snapdeal in partnership with Bharti Airtel. That same month, Google offered a promotion whereby anyone purchasing a Chromecast from a participating retailer before December 21 would receive a US$20 credit for the Google Play Store. Google offered a US$6 credit to the Store for all Chromecast owners beginning on February 6, 2015.


title: Chromecast

text: On September 29, 2015, Google announced the second-generation Chromecast and an audio-only model called Chromecast Audio. Each model was made available for purchase the same day for US$35. Days later, Amazon.com announced that it would ban the sale of Chromecast and Apple TV devices, presumably because they compete with Amazon's own Fire TV and Fire TV Stick. Google discontinued Chromecast Audio in January 2019.


title: Chromecast

text: On September 30, 2020, Google announced the Chromecast with Google TV during its "Launch Night In" event, though the product was already sold early at some retailers such as Walmart and the Home Depot during the week prior to its announcement. Google offered a promotion whereby anyone who signed up for YouTube TV and paid for one month of the service (a US$65 cost) would receive a Chromecast with Google TV at no cost; the offer was available only in the US to first-time YouTube TV subscribers. Additionally, in December 2020, Google made an offer available to YouTube TV users who had been continuous subscribers since June 2018 that allowed them to redeem a Chromecast with Google TV at no cost.


title: Chromecast

text: Nilay Patel of "The Verge" gave the Chromecast an 8.5/10 score in his review, saying, "The Chromecast is basically an impulse purchase that just happens to be the simplest, cheapest, and best solution for getting a browser window on your TV." Speaking of the adapter's potential, he said, "it seems like the Chromecast might actually deliver on all that potential, but Google still has a lot of work to do." In particular, Patel pointed to Apple's AirPlay protocol as an example of an established competitor with many more features. "TechCrunch"s review of the device said, "Even with a bug or two rearing its head, the Chromecast is easily worth its $35 pricetag." "Gizmodo" gave the device a positive review, highlighting the ease of setup and sharing video. In comparing the device to competitors, the review said, "Chromecast isn't Google's version of Apple TV, and it's not trying to be... But Chromecast also costs a third of what those devices do, and has plenty of potential given that its SDK is just a few days old."


title: Chromecast

text: Michael Gorman of "Engadget" gave the Chromecast an 84/100 score, writing, "it's a platform that's likely to improve dramatically as more apps start to support the technology." In his comparing the Chromecast to competing devices, Gorman illustrated that it initially had support from fewer multimedia services, but because of its low price and ease of use, he concluded "we can wholeheartedly recommend the Chromecast for anyone who's been looking for an easy, unobtrusive way to put some brains into their dumb TV." Will Greenwald of "PC Magazine" rated it 4/5, saying, "The Google Chromecast is the least expensive way to access online services on your HDTV", although he noted that "The lack of local playback and limited Chrome integration holds it back in some respects." David Pogue of "The New York Times" praised the device for its $35 retail price, saying, "It's already a fine price for what this gadget does, and it will seem better and better the more video apps are made to work with it." Pogue noted the limitations of the device's screen mirroring feature and said using only mobile devices as a remote control was not "especially graceful", but he called Chromecast the "smallest, cheapest, simplest way yet to add Internet to your TV".


title: Chromecast

text: Nicole Lee of "Engadget" rated the second generation Chromecast an 85/100, highlighting the added support for 802.11ac and dual-band Wi-Fi networks and the usefulness of the updated Chromecast mobile app for finding content to cast. She said of the device, "No, it's not that much better than the original, but it still delivers great bang for your buck." David Katzmaier of "CNET" gave it a 7.9/10 score, calling the new hardware design more practical and praising the Chromecast app's search capabilities. He ultimately preferred other streaming devices with dedicated remotes over the Chromecast for everyday use, but said "for parties, travel and temporary connections, it's worth having a Chromecast in your arsenal".


title: Chromecast

text: In the face of stronger competition from devices such as the Apple TV, Roku or Fire TV, reviewers started to consider the 2018 Chromecast a secondary streaming device. Trusted Reviews considered it a "very minor" upgrade. "Tom's Guide" said it has almost "nothing to show" to reflect three years of hardware advancement in the streaming space.


title: Chromecast

text: Chris Welch of "The Verge" gave the Chromecast with Google TV an 8.5/10 score, calling it a "big success" that "checks off almost everything important" for a streaming device. Welch praised the remote control and the Google TV interface's emphasis on content discovery, while noting some occasional sluggish performance. He concluded that Google "reinvented the Chromecast as an excellent 4K streamer that's dramatically easier to use — turns out actual menus and a remote really do matter — without losing sight of what made the original great". Sam Rutherford of "Gizmodo" said the device "instantly catapulted Google to the front of the streaming dongle wars with a $50 device that's smarter and easier to use than pretty much anything else out there". He lauded the remote control and user interface of Google TV, saying that it "feels just a bit more curated, polished, and tweaked to make the process of jumping back into your favorite shows and movies (or discovering new ones) that much faster". Eli Blumenthal of "CNET" gave the device a 9/10 score and described it as "the search giant's best TV effort yet and one of the best streamers you can buy, period". He praised Google TV's content aggregation and called it an upgrade over the stock Android TV interface. Blumenthal also called the integration with Google Assistant the best part of the Chromecast, despite some quirks with search results for video content.


title: Chromecast

text: Nicole Lee of "Engadget" called it "not only the best Chromecast yet, but also one of the most value-packed streaming devices on the market". She complimented the remote control design and the Google TV interface for being "far easier to navigate" than the standard Android TV interface. She also opined that Google TV was better than Amazon's Fire TV at aggregating content from multiple services, and that Google Assistant was "smarter" than Amazon's Alexa for voice commands. Nick Pino of "TechRadar" rated the device four-and-a-half stars and called it "a revelation – it fixes something that wasn't broken, and improves a nearly perfect technology in a tangible way". He praised the hardware, video and audio format support, and the user interface's ease of use, calling it a "retooled streaming device that... offers a whole new experience that's more user-friendly for folks who are used to using a remote control and an easily navigable interface." Brian X. Chen of "The New York Times" was surprised by the number of privacy policies the user had to agree to and the number of permissions the user had to grant during the setup process, and he was disappointed with the recommendations given by Google TV.


title: Chromecast

text: In July 2014, Google announced that in the device's first year on sale, "millions" of units had sold and over 400 million casts had been made. The number of casts surpassed one billion by January 2015, and 1.5 billion by May 2015. The company confirmed that Chromecast was the best-selling media streaming device in the United States in 2014, according to NPD Group. In February 2015, Google Korea announced that about 10 million Chromecasts had been sold globally in 2014. At Google I/O in May 2015, the company announced 17 million units had sold since launch, a figure that reached 20 million by September 2015, 25 million by May 2016, and 30 million by July 2016. According to Strategy Analytics, Chromecast captured more than 35% of the digital streamer market internationally in 2015. As of October 2017, over 55 million Chromecasts and Chromecast built-in devices have been sold.


title: Chromecast

text: Digital Trends named Chromecast the "Best Product of 2013". In March 2014, "Engadget" named Chromecast an Editor's Choice winner for "Home Theater Product of the Year" as part of the website's annual awards; for the following year's awards, the website named the device the winner of "Best in Home Entertainment".


title: Chromecast

text: In July 2015, Google signed a deal with the Television Academy to provide Chromecasts to Emmy Award voters to allow them to view screeners of nominated media. The multi-year agreement will reduce the volume of DVD screeners distributed each year.


title: Chromecast

text: Chromecast appeared on several lists of technology from the 2010s. "Time" named it one of the 10 best gadgets of the decade, saying, "It might not be an essential piece of technology in the decade to come, but the Chromecast's influence on streaming media can't be understated." "USA Today" ranked Chromecast the 7th-best gadget of the 2010s. "PC Magazine" listed it as one of the "most iconic tech innovations" of the decade, saying, "Google made wireless streaming from mobile devices to the TV as simple as a few taps, all for $35." "The Verge" ranked it 39th on their list of the gadgets of the 2010s, saying that Chromecast "helped make streaming video a normal part of many households".


title: Chromecast

text: On January 3, 2019, hackers took control of Chromecast devices, stating they were exposing security risks. The hackers claimed to access 70,000 devices through a router setting that makes connected devices viewable to the public. The bug was dubbed CastHack, and was first found in 2014 by the security consultancy firm Bishop Fox and observed again in 2016.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (12 December 1875 – 24 February 1953) was a German field marshal in the "Heer" (Army) of Nazi Germany during World War II.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Born into a Prussian family with a long military tradition, Rundstedt entered the Prussian Army in 1892. During World War I, he served mainly as a staff officer. In the inter-war years, he continued his military career, reaching the rank of Colonel General () before retiring in 1938.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: He was recalled at the beginning of World War II as commander of Army Group South in the invasion of Poland. He commanded Army Group A during the Battle of France, and requested the Halt Order during the Battle of Dunkirk. He was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal in 1940. In the invasion of the Soviet Union, he commanded Army Group South, responsible for the largest encirclement in history, the Battle of Kiev. He was relieved of command in December 1941 after authorizing the withdrawal from Rostov, but was recalled in 1942 and appointed Commander-in-Chief in the West.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: He was dismissed after the German defeat in Normandy in July 1944, but was again recalled as Commander-in-Chief in the West in September, holding this post until his final dismissal by Adolf Hitler in March 1945. Though aware of the various plots to depose Hitler, Rundstedt neither supported nor reported them. After the war, he was charged with war crimes, but did not face trial due to his age and poor health. He was released in 1949, and died in 1953.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Gerd von Rundstedt was born in Aschersleben, north of Halle in Prussian Saxony (now in Saxony-Anhalt). He was the eldest son of Gerd Arnold Konrad von Rundstedt, a cavalry officer who served in the Franco-Prussian War. The Rundstedts are an old Junker family that traced its origins to the 12th century and classed as members of the "Uradel", or old nobility, although they held no titles and were not wealthy. Virtually all the Rundstedt men since the time of Frederick the Great had served in the Prussian Army. Rundstedt's mother, Adelheid Fischer, was of Huguenot (French Protestant) descent. He was the eldest of four brothers, all of whom became Army officers. Rundstedt's education followed the path ordained for Prussian military families: the junior cadet college at Diez, near Koblenz, then the military academy at Lichterfelde in Berlin.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Unable to meet the cost of joining a cavalry regiment, Rundstedt joined the 83rd Infantry Regiment in March 1892 as a cadet officer (). The regiment was based at Kassel in Hesse-Kassel, which he came to regard as his home town and where he maintained a home until 1945. He undertook further training at the military college () at Hannover, before being commissioned as a lieutenant in June 1893. He made a good impression on his superiors. In 1896 he was made regimental adjutant, and in 1903 he was sent to the prestigious War Academy () in Berlin for a three-year staff officer training course. At the end of his course Rundstedt was described as "an outstandingly able officer ... well suited for the General Staff." He married Luise "Bila" von Goetz in January 1902 and their only child, Hans Gerd von Rundstedt, was born in January 1903.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt joined the General Staff of the German Army in April 1907 serving there until July 1914, when he was appointed chief of operations to the 22nd Reserve Infantry Division. This division was part of XI Corps, which in turn was part of General Alexander von Kluck's First Army. In 1914 this Army was deployed along the Belgian border, in preparation for the invasion of Belgium and France, in accordance with the German plan for victory in the west known as the Schlieffen Plan.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt served as 22nd Division's chief of staff during the invasion of Belgium, but he saw no action since his Division was held in reserve during the initial advance. In December 1914, suffering from a lung ailment, he was promoted to Major and transferred to the military government of Antwerp. In April 1915 his health recovered, and he was posted as chief of staff to the 86th Infantry Division which was serving as part of General Max von Gallwitz's forces on the Eastern Front. In September he was once again given an administrative post, as part of the military government of German-occupied Poland, based in Warsaw. He stayed in this post until November 1916, until he was promoted by being made chief of staff to an Army Corps, XXV Reserve Corps, which was fighting in the Carpathians. Here he saw much action against the Russians. In October 1917 he was appointed chief of staff to LIII Corps, in northern Poland. The following month, however, the October Revolution led to the collapse of the Russian armies and the end of the war on the eastern front. In August 1918 Rundstedt was transferred to the west, as chief of staff to XV Corps in Alsace, under General Felix Graf von Bothmer. Here he remained until the end of the war in November. Bothmer described him as "a wholly excellent staff officer and amiable comrade." He was awarded the Iron Cross, first class, and was recommended for the Pour le Mérite, but did not receive it. He thus ended World War I, although still a major, with a high reputation as a staff officer.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt's Corps disintegrated in the wake of defeat and the German Revolution, but while most officers were demobilised, he remained in the Army, apparently at the request of General Wilhelm Groener, who assumed leadership of the shattered Army. He briefly rejoined the General Staff, but this was abolished under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919. In October, Rundstedt was posted to the staff of Military District () V, based in Stuttgart, under General Walter von Bergmann. He was there when the attempted military coup known as the Kapp Putsch took place in March 1920. Bergmann and Rundstedt, like most of the Army leadership, refused to support the coup attempt: Rundstedt later described it as "a failure and a very stupid one at that." This was not an indication of any fondness for the Weimar Republic on Rundstedt's part – he remained a monarchist. It was a reflection of his view that Army officers should not interfere in politics, and should support the government of the day, whatever its nature: a view he was to hold firmly to throughout his career. He testified at the Nuremberg trials in 1946: "We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take part in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt rose steadily in the small 100,000-man army (the ) allowed to Germany by the Versailles Treaty. In May 1920 he was made chief of staff to the 3rd Cavalry Division, based in Weimar, thus achieving his early ambition of being a cavalry commander. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel () in 1920, and to full colonel in 1923, when he was transferred to II, based in Stettin. In 1926 he was made chief of staff to Group Command () 2, which covered the whole of western Germany and was based in Kassel, and promoted to major general (). In 1928 Rundstedt finally left staff positions behind him and was made commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division, based in Breslau. This was considered a front-line posting, given Germany's tense relations with Poland and the fact that Poland at this time had a much bigger army than Germany.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In January 1932, Rundstedt was appointed commander of III, based in Berlin, and also given command of the 3rd Infantry Division. This brought him, at 57, into the highest ranks of the German Army, reflected in his promotion to Lieutenant General (). It also inevitably brought him into close contact with the political world, which was in a disturbed state due to the Great Depression and subsequent rise of Hitler's Nazi Party. The Defence Minister, General Kurt von Schleicher, was scheming to bring the Nazis into the government, and the Chancellor, Franz von Papen, was planning to overthrow the Social Democrat government of Prussia, Germany's largest state. Despite his dislike of politics, Rundstedt could not remain uninvolved in these matters. In July 1932 Papen used his emergency powers to dismiss the Prussian Government. Martial law was briefly declared in Berlin and Rundstedt was made martial law plenipotentiary. He protested to Papen about this and martial law was lifted after a few days. In October Rundstedt was promoted to full General and given command of 1, covering the whole of eastern Germany.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In January 1933 Hitler became chancellor, and within a few months, dictator. The Defence Minister, General Werner von Blomberg, ensured that the Army remained loyal to the new regime. In February he arranged for Hitler to meet with senior generals, including Rundstedt. Hitler assured the generals that he favoured a strong Army and that there would be no interference with its internal affairs. Rundstedt was satisfied with this, but made it clear in private conversations that he did not like the Nazi regime. He also said, however, that he would do nothing to oppose it. In 1934, when General Kurt Freiherr von Hammerstein-Equord resigned as chief of staff, Hitler wished to appoint General Walther von Reichenau to succeed him. Rundstedt led a group of senior officers in opposing the appointment, on the grounds that Reichenau was too openly a supporter of the regime. Hitler and Blomberg backed down and General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch was appointed instead. When Fritsch was forced to resign in 1938, Rundstedt again blocked Reichenau's appointment, and the post went to General Walther von Brauchitsch.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Like most of the Army, Rundstedt feared the growing power of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and was relieved when it was purged, although he and many others were angered that two generals, Schleicher and Ferdinand von Bredow, were killed. He was among the senior officers who later persuaded Hitler to have these two officers posthumously (but secretly) rehabilitated. Some sources also claim he was among those senior officers who demanded courts-martial for those responsible for the murders, although Rundstedt didn't testify to that at Nuremberg. The Army was uncomfortable with the purge but Rundstedt, and the rest of the Army, still took the personal oath of loyalty to Hitler that Blomberg introduced. Rundstedt also supported the regime's plans for rearmament, culminating in the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935, which was followed by the reintroduction of conscription. By 1935, when he turned 60, Rundstedt was the senior officer of the German Army in terms of service, and second only to Blomberg in rank. Recognising his status, Hitler cultivated him, appointing him as Germany's representative at the funeral of King George V in January 1936.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Given his prestige, Rundstedt was a central figure in the Blomberg–Fritsch Affair which engulfed the German Army in early 1938. This was a political manoeuvre by senior Nazis Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler to strengthen their positions within the Nazi regime at the expense of the military leadership. Together they forced the resignation of both Blomberg and Fritsch, the former under threat of blackmail because of his second wife's dubious past, and the latter on fabricated charges of homosexuality. On 31 January, Rundstedt and the Army Chief of Staff, General Ludwig Beck, representing the officer corps, had an angry meeting with Hitler. Rundstedt agreed that Blomberg had disgraced himself and demanded that he be court-martialled, which Hitler refused. On the other hand, he defended Fritsch, correctly accusing Himmler of having fabricated the allegations against him. He insisted that Fritsch have the right to defend himself before a Court of Honour, which Hitler reluctantly agreed to. Beck promoted Rundstedt as Fritsch's successor, but Rundstedt declined, and the post went to Brauchitsch. At Beck's urging, Fritsch challenged Himmler to a duel, but Rundstedt (as senior officer of the Army) declined to pass on Fritsch's letter.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: During 1938 and 1939 Beck and other senior officers were hatching plots to remove Hitler from power if he provoked a new war with Britain and France over Czechoslovakia or Poland, a war they were convinced Germany would lose. Rundstedt was aware of these plots, and Beck tried to recruit him to the plotters' ranks, knowing of his disdain for the Nazi regime. But Rundstedt stuck firmly to his position that officers should not be involved in politics, no matter how grave the issues at stake. On the other hand, he did not report these approaches to Hitler or the Gestapo, then or later. From a purely military point of view, Rundstedt was apprehensive about Hitler's plans to attack Czechoslovakia, since he believed that Britain and France would intervene and Germany would be defeated. Brauchitsch lacked the courage to oppose Hitler directly, but agreed to Beck's request for a meeting of senior commanders. At the meeting widespread opposition to Hitler's plans to coerce Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland issue was expressed. Beck urged the officers to oppose Hitler's plans openly, but Rundstedt, while agreeing about the dangers of war before Germany was fully re-armed, would not support him, but declared himself unwilling to provoke a new crisis between Hitler and the Army. He advised Brauchitsch not to confront Hitler, apparently afraid that Brauchitsch would be dismissed and replaced by Reichenau. When Hitler heard about the meeting, Beck was forced to resign. Even after this, two of Rundstedt's friends, Generals Erwin von Witzleben and Erich Hoepner, remained involved in anti-Hitler plots and continued to try to recruit him.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In November 1938, shortly after his division had taken part in the bloodless occupation of the Sudetenland, Rundstedt retired from the Army with the rank of Colonel-General (), second only to the rank of Field Marshal. It was suggested that Hitler had forced him out, either because of his opposition to the plan to invade Czechoslovakia or because of his support for Fritsch, but this seems not be the case: he had in fact asked permission to retire some time earlier. Just short of his 63rd birthday, he was not in good health and missed his family – he was now a grandfather. Moreover, despite their recent confrontations, he remained on good terms with Hitler, who made him honorary colonel () of his old regiment on his retirement. Rundstedt also agreed that in the event of war he would return to active service.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt's retirement did not last long. By early 1939 Hitler had decided to force a confrontation with Poland over the Polish Corridor, and planning for a war with Poland began. In May, Hitler approved Rundstedt's appointment as commander of Army Group South, to invade Poland from Silesia and Slovakia. His chief of staff was General Erich von Manstein, his chief of operations Colonel Günther Blumentritt. His principal field commanders would be (from west to east as they entered Poland) General Johannes Blaskowitz (8th Army), General Walther von Reichenau (10th Army), and General Wilhelm List (14 Army).


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt's armies advanced rapidly into southern Poland, capturing Kraków on 6 September, but Reichenau's over-ambitious attempt to take Warsaw by storm on 9 September was repelled. Soon after, Blaskowitz's exposed northern flank was attacked by the Polish Poznań Army, leading to the major engagement of the Polish campaign, the Battle of the Bzura. Rundstedt and Manstein travelled to Blaskowitz's headquarters to take charge, and by 11 September the Poles had been contained in a pocket around Kutno. By 18 September the Poznan Army had been destroyed, and Warsaw was besieged. Reichenau's forces took Lublin on 11 September, while List's army was advancing to the east towards Lvov, where they eventually linked up with Soviet forces advancing from the east under the terms of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Warsaw surrendered on 28 September, and by 6 October fighting in southern Poland had ceased.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: From the first days of the invasion, there had been incidents of German troops shooting Polish soldiers after they had surrendered, and killing civilians, especially Polish Jews. Some of these incidents were the work of units of the SS-VT, forerunner of the Waffen-SS, but some involved regular Army units. Rundstedt's biographer says: "There is certainly no evidence that Rundstedt ever condoned, let alone encouraged, these acts." Rundstedt told Reichenau that such actions did not have his authorisation. In fact, both Rundstedt and Blaskowitz complained to the chief of staff, General Franz Halder, about the Army Command's apparent tolerance of such incidents. Nevertheless, as commander of Army Group South, Rundstedt was legally responsible for the behaviour of his troops, and these incidents later formed part of the charges of war crimes against him.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Behind the Army came SS (task forces) commanded by Theodor Eicke, who began systematically executing Jews and members of the Polish educated classes. One commanded by Udo von Woyrsch operated in 14th Army's area. At Dynów Woyrsch's men herded the town's Jews into the synagogue then burned it down. By 20 September, over 500 Jews had been killed. In 1939, this was still too much for most German Army officers to stand. After complaints from numerous officers, Rundstedt banned Woyrsch's units from the area, but after his departure his order was rescinded. On 20 October Rundstedt resigned his command and was transferred to the western front.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: On 25 October, Rundstedt took up his new post as commander of Army Group A, facing the French border in the Ardennes mountains sector, and based in Koblenz. To his north Army Group B under General Fedor von Bock faced the Dutch and Belgian borders, while to his south Army Group C under General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb faced the French along the Maginot Line. Manstein was again his chief of staff and Blumentritt his chief of operations, although Manstein soon departed to command an infantry corps and was replaced by General Georg von Sodenstern. Rundstedt's main field commanders (from north to south) were Blaskowitz (9th Army), List (12th Army) and General Ernst Busch (16th Army).


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Hitler's original plan was to attack in late November, before the French and British had time fully to deploy along their front. The plan, devised by Hitler, was essentially for a re-run of the invasion of 1914, with the main assault to come in the north, through Belgium and the Netherlands, then wheeling south to capture Paris, leaving the French Army anchored on the Maginot Line. Most senior officers were opposed to both the timing and the plan. Rundstedt, Manstein, Reichenau (commanding 6th Army in Army Group B), List and Brauchitsch remonstrated with Hitler in a series of meetings in October and November. They were opposed to an offensive so close to the onset of winter, and they were opposed to launching the main attack through Belgium, where the many rivers and canals would hamper armoured operations. Manstein in particular, supported by Rundstedt, argued for an armoured assault by Army Group A, across the Ardennes to the sea, cutting the British and French off in Belgium. This "Manstein Plan" was the genesis of the blitzkrieg of May 1940.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: A combination of bad weather, the arguments of his generals, and a breach of security when the details of the original plan fell into Allied hands, eventually led Hitler to agree to postpone the attack until early 1940, when it was again delayed by the invasion of Denmark and Norway. In February, Hitler finally accepted the Manstein Plan. General Günther von Kluge's 4th Army and General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs's 2nd Army were transferred from Army Group B to Rundstedt's command. General Ewald von Kleist was now to command Panzer (Armoured) Group Kleist, consisting of three armoured corps, led by Heinz Guderian, Georg-Hans Reinhardt and Hermann Hoth. These armoured corps were to be the spearhead of the German thrust into France. Although Manstein is often credited for the change of plans, he himself acknowledged Rundstedt's decisive role. "I would stress that my commander, Colonel-General von Rundstedt, agreed with my view throughout, and backed our recommendations to the full. Without his sanction we could never have kept up our attempts to change OKW's mind."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: During this hiatus, the group of senior officers who were plotting against Hitler's war plans, led by Halder, renewed their efforts, convinced that an attack in the west would lead to a war which Germany would lose. Brauchitsch agreed with Halder's fears, but continued to vacillate about opposing Hitler – he asked Reichenau and Rundstedt to remonstrate with Hitler, but they refused. Witzleben suggested that Rundstedt, Leeb and Bock should jointly refuse to carry out Hitler's orders to carry out the attack. Two of the conspirators, Abwehr officers Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, discussed this with Leeb, who turned them down but did not report them. On 13 March, Himmler came to Koblenz to give the generals, including Rundstedt, an ideological lecture, in the course of which he made it clear that the atrocities against civilians which some of them had witnessed in Poland had been carried out on his orders, and with the approval of Hitler. "I do nothing that the Führer does not know", he said.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The attack was finally launched on 10 May. By 14 May, Guderian and Hoth had crossed the Meuse and had broken open the Allied front. As planned, the British and French had advanced into Belgium to meet Bock's offensive, and were in danger of being cut off there by a German thrust to the sea. Both Hitler and Rundstedt had doubts about the safety of allowing the armoured corps to get too far ahead of their infantry support, however. Hitler sent the chief of staff of the Armed Forces Supreme Command (, OKW), General Wilhelm Keitel, to Rundstedt's headquarters, to urge caution. In Halder's words, Hitler was "frightened by his own success ... afraid to take any chance." Guderian objected vehemently to being ordered to halt, and Rundstedt was forced to mediate between Hitler and his impetuous armoured commanders, who were backed by Halder. By 20 May, Guderian's tanks had reached the sea at Abbeville and closed the trap on the British and French, who were already in retreat to the English Channel ports.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: By this time, however, Kleist's armoured forces were thinly stretched and had suffered losses of up to 50% of their tanks. Kleist asked Rundstedt for a pause while the armoured units recovered and the infantry caught up, and Rundstedt agreed to this. At the same time, Göring attempted to persuade Hitler that the Luftwaffe could destroy the trapped Allied armies, freeing the German forces to turn south towards Paris. Hitler accepted this view, and on 24 May issued what became known as the Halt Order, preventing the German armour from rapidly capturing Calais and Dunkirk. The Luftwaffe were unable to destroy the Allied armies, however, and the halt allowed the British Expeditionary Force and many French troops to be evacuated from Dunkirk. This decision, for which Hitler, Rundstedt and Kleist shared responsibility, proved very costly to Germany's war effort in the long term. After the war, Rundstedt described the Halt Order as "an incredible blunder" and assigned full blame to Hitler. His biographer concedes that this "does not represent the whole truth", because the original impetus for a pause came from Kleist and Rundstedt himself.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Attention then turned to the attack on the French armies to the south. On 29 May, Hitler came to Rundstedt's headquarters at Charleville-Mézières to discuss the new offensive. Bock's Army Group B on the right was to advance on Paris, while Rundstedt's Army Group A, now consisting only of List's 12th Army, Weichs's 2nd Army and Busch's 16th Army, was to attack towards Soissons and Rheims. Rundstedt's attack began on 9 June, and within a few days had broken the French resistance. By 12 June, his forces were across the Marne and advancing south-east towards Alsace. Dijon fell on 16 June and Lyon on 20 June. By this time French resistance was crumbling and on 22 June the French requested an armistice. In July, Hitler announced that Rundstedt and a number of other field commanders were to be promoted to the rank of Field Marshal () during the 1940 Field Marshal Ceremony. Although Rundstedt wished to resume his retirement, he was persuaded by Hitler to stay in France and set up headquarters at Saint-Germain-en-Laye about outside Paris. There he oversaw the planning for the proposed invasion of Britain, Operation Sealion, but never took the prospects for this operation seriously, and was not surprised when Hitler called it off in September after the Luftwaffe's setback in the Battle of Britain. Even then, Rundstedt was not to be allowed to retire, when in October Hitler appointed him Commander-in-Chief West (, or OB West).


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: By July 1940 Hitler was turning his mind to the invasion of the Soviet Union, commissioning General Erich Marcks to prepare preliminary plans. Although the Hitler-Stalin pact had served Germany's interests well, both strategically and economically, his whole career had been based on anti-communism and the belief that "Jewish Bolshevism" was the main threat to Germany and the Aryan race. In December Hitler made a firm decision for an attack on the Soviets the following spring, codenamed Operation Barbarossa. At this point Rundstedt learned that he was to give up his quiet life in occupied France and assume command of Army Group South, tasked with the conquest of Ukraine. Leeb would command in the north, heading for Leningrad, and Bock in the centre, charged with capturing Moscow. On the way, the three army groups were to encircle and destroy the Red Army before it could retreat into the Russian interior.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt, like most German officers, had favoured the policy of good relations with the Soviets followed by the commander General Hans von Seekt during the Weimar Republic years, when the Soviet connection was seen as a counter to the threat from Poland. He was also apprehensive about launching a new war in the east while Britain was undefeated. If so, he did nothing to oppose them, and in this he was in company even with officers who disliked and opposed Hitler's regime, such as Halder, who threw themselves into planning the invasion, and believed it would succeed. Even the most experienced officers shared Hitler's contempt for the Soviet state and army. "You have only to kick in the door," Hitler told Rundstedt, "and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In March Rundstedt left Paris to set up Army Group South's headquarters in Breslau. On the way he attended a conference in Berlin at which Hitler addressed senior officers. He made it clear that the ordinary rules of warfare would not apply to the Russian campaign. "This is a war of extermination", he told them. "We do not wage war to preserve the enemy." This gave the generals a clear warning that they would be expected not to obstruct Hitler's wider war aims in the east – the extermination of the Jews and the reduction of the Slavic peoples to serfdom under a new (Master race) of German settlers. As part of this strategy, the Commissar Order was issued, which stated that all Red Army commissars were to be executed when captured. Rundstedt testified at Nuremberg about the attitude of the Army to this Order: "Our attitude was unanimously and absolutely against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and told him that this was impossible ... The order was simply not carried out." This latter statement was clearly untrue, as the Commissar Order was widely carried out. But whether Rundstedt knew this was another matter, and this question was later to figure prominently in the issue of whether to charge him with war crimes.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Barbarossa was initially scheduled for May, at the beginning of the Russian spring, but was postponed until June because unseasonably wet weather made the roads impassable for armour (not because of the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April, as is commonly supposed). Rundstedt moved his headquarters to Tarnów in south-eastern Poland. Since the dividing line between Army Group Centre and Army Group South was just south of Brest-Litovsk, he was in command of more than half of the total German-Soviet front. Sodenstern was again his chief of staff. Under his command were (from north to south) Reichenau (6th Army), Kleist (1st Panzer Army) and General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel (17th Army). These three armies, bunched between Lublin and the Carpathians, were to thrust south-eastwards into Ukraine, aiming to capture Kiev and encircle and destroy the Soviet forces west of the Dnieper. In the south, General Eugen Ritter von Schobert (11th Army), supported by the Hungarian and Romanian armies, and also an Italian Army Corps, was to advance into Bessarabia (now Moldova) and the southern Ukraine. It's unlikely that Rundstedt thought a decisive victory was possible at this point; while saying farewell to the commander of Army Group North in early May, he remarked: "See you again in Siberia."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The attack began on 22 June. Despite ample warning from intelligence sources and defectors, Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Command were caught by surprise, and the Germans rapidly broke through the frontier defences, helped by their total command of the air. But the Soviet commander in northern Ukraine, Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos, was one of the better Soviet generals, and he commanded the Red Army's largest and best-equipped force: nearly a million men and 4,800 tanks. The Germans soon encountered stubborn resistance. Rundstedt testified at Nuremberg: "The resistance at the frontier was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared." The Soviet tank armies were in fact stronger than the German panzer divisions, and in the T-34 they possessed a superior tank: Kleist called it "the finest tank in the world." Rundstedt said after the war: "I realised soon after the attack that everything that had been written about Russia was wrong." But at this stage of the war the Red Army tank commanders lacked the tactical skill and experience of the German panzer commanders, and after ten days of bitter fighting Kleist's armour broke through, reaching Zhitomir, only 130 km from Kiev, on 12 July. By 30 July the Red Army in Ukraine was in full retreat. Rundstedt and his commanders were confident that they could seize Kiev "off the march," that is, without a prolonged siege.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Despite these successes, the campaign did not go according to plan. The front door was "kicked in", but the Red Army was not destroyed, and the Soviet state did not collapse. Once this became apparent, at the end of July, Hitler and his commanders had to decide how to proceed. Hitler ordered Army Group Centre to pause at Smolensk, while the panzer divisions were shipped to the north and the south.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Although Rundstedt opposed this diversion of forces, he was its beneficiary as attention was shifted to the southern front. He also benefited from disastrous decisions made by the Soviets. On 10 July Stalin appointed his old crony Marshal Semyon Budyonny commander in the Ukraine, with orders to stop the German advance at all costs. Budyonny ordered Kirponos to push his forces forwards to Kiev and Uman, despite the danger of encirclement, rather than withdraw and make a stand on the Dnieper. Rundstedt therefore decided to break off the advance towards Kiev, and to direct Kleist's armour south-eastwards, towards Krivoy Rog. By 30 July the Germans were at Kirovograd, 130 km east of Uman, cutting off the Soviet line of retreat (which had in any case been forbidden by Stalin). Meanwhile, Schobert's 11th Army was advancing north-eastwards from Bessarabia. On 2 August the two armies met, trapping over 100,000 Soviet troops, virtually all of whom were killed or captured. Southern Ukraine was thus left virtually defenceless, and by 25 August, when they entered Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans had occupied everything west of the Dnieper (except Odessa, which held out until October). Nevertheless, this had all taken longer than expected, and the Red Army was showing no signs of collapse. Rundstedt wrote to his wife on 12 August: "How much longer? I have no great hope that it will be soon. The distances in Russia devour us."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Neither the success at Uman nor what followed at Kiev would have happened had Rundstedt not backed his subordinates and resisted Hitler's interference in the conduct of the campaign. As during the French campaign, Hitler was panicked by his own success. By early July he was full of anxiety that the German armour was advancing too quickly, without infantry support, and that it was exposed to Soviet counter-attacks. On 10 July Brauchitsch arrived at Rundstedt's headquarters at Brody, with instructions from Hitler that Kleist was turn south towards Vinnitsa and link up with Schobert's army there, rather than continue south-east to Kirovograd. This would still have trapped many Soviet divisions, but it would have allowed the mass of Soviet forces at Uman and Kiev to escape. Rundstedt defended Kleist's ability to execute the larger encirclement, and persuaded Brauchitsch that he was right. Brauchitsch then contacted Halder, who succeeded in persuading Hitler to support Rundstedt. This was a sign that Rundstedt still had Hitler's respect, as were Hitler's two visits to Rundstedt's armies during this period.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: After Uman Budyonny's forces massed around Kiev – over 700,000 men – were left dangerously exposed, with Kleist's 1st Panzer Army regrouping to the south-east and General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army (part of Army Group Centre) smashing General Yeromenko's Briansk Front and advancing south from Gomel in White Russia, on a line well east of Kiev. The danger of encirclement was obvious, but Stalin stubbornly refused to consider withdrawal, despite warnings from both Budyonny and Kirponos that catastrophe was imminent. Budyonny has been freely blamed by postwar writers for the disaster at Kiev, but it is clear that while he was out of his depth as a front commander, he warned Stalin of the danger, and was dismissed for his pains. On 12 September Kleist crossed the Dnieper at Cherkasy heading north-east, and on 16 September his tanks linked up with Guderian's at Lokhvitsa, nearly 200 km east of Kiev. Although many Soviet troops were able to escape eastwards in small groups, around 600,000 men – four whole armies comprising 43 divisions, nearly one-third of the Soviet Army's strength at the start of the war – were killed or captured, and the great majority of those captured died in captivity. Kiev fell on 19 September. Kirponos was killed in action on 20 September, shortly before resistance ceased.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt had thus presided over one of the greatest victories in the history of warfare. But this catastrophe for the Red Army resulted far more from the inflexibility of Stalin than it did from the talents of Rundstedt as a commander or the skill of the German Army. David Stahel, a recent historian of the Kiev campaign, wrote: "Germany had been handed a triumph far in excess of what its exhausted armoured forces could have achieved without Stalin's obduracy and incompetence." In fact both the German Army and the Red Army were driven more by the dictates of their respective political masters rather than by the decisions of the military professionals. Stahel sums the situation up with his chapter heading: "Subordinating the generals: the dictators dictate." Kirponos could have withdrawn most of his army across the Dnieper in time had Stalin allowed him to do so, and Rundstedt himself acknowledged this. Had this happened, Rundstedt's forces would have been in no state to give chase: they were exhausted after two months of ceaseless combat. Despite their successes, they had sustained high levels of casualties and even higher levels of loss of equipment, both of which were impossible to replace. By September the German Army in the Soviet Union had suffered nearly 500,000 casualties. In a statement to the Army on 15 August, Rundstedt acknowledged: "It is only natural that such great effort would result in fatigue, the combat strength of the troops has weakened and in many places there is a desire for rest." But, said Rundstedt: "We must keep pressure on the enemy for he has many more reserves than we." This was a remarkable admission so early in the Russian campaign, and it showed that Rundstedt was already well aware of how unrealistic the German belief in a quick victory had been.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Despite the triumph at Kiev, by the end of September Rundstedt was becoming concerned about the state of his command. After three months of continuous fighting, the German armies were exhausted, and the Panzer divisions were in urgent need of new equipment as a result of losses in battle and damage from the poorly-paved Ukrainian roads. As autumn set in, the weather deteriorated, making the situation worse. Rundstedt wanted to halt on the Dnieper for the winter, which would allow the German Army time to rest and be re-equipped. But the German armies could not rest, for fear the Soviet southern armies (now commanded by the stubborn Marshal Semyon Timoshenko) would regroup and consolidate a front on the Donets or the Don. So, soon after the fall of Kiev, the offensive was resumed. Reichenau advanced east towards Kharkov and Kleist and Stülpnagel headed south-east towards the lower Donets. In the south 11th Army and the Romanians (commanded by Manstein following the death of Schobert) advanced along the Sea of Azov coast towards Rostov.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The Soviet armies were in a poor state after the catastrophes of Uman and Kiev, and could offer only sporadic resistance, but the German advance was slowed by the autumn rains and the Soviet scorched earth policy, which denied the Germans food and fuel and forced them to rely on overstretched lines of supply. Rundstedt's armies were also weakened by the transfer of units back to Army Group Centre to take part in the attack on Moscow (Operation Typhoon). Reichenau did not take Kharkov until 24 October. Nevertheless, during October Rundstedt's forces won another great victory when Manstein and Kleist's tanks reached the Sea of Azov, trapping two Soviet Armies around Mariupol and taking over 100,000 prisoners. This victory enabled Manstein to undertake the conquest of the Crimea (apart from the fortress city of Sevastopol) against only weak opposition, while Kleist advanced towards Rostov. Despite these defeats, the Red Army was able to fall back on the Don in reasonably good order, and also to evacuate many of the industrial plants of the Donbass.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: On 3 November Brauchitsch visited Rundstedt's headquarters at Poltava, where Rundstedt told him that the armies must halt and dig in for the winter. But Hitler drove his commanders on, insisting on an advance to the Volga and into the North Caucasus, to seize the oilfields at Maikop. These demands put Rundstedt under severe strain. The Germans were more than 300 km from Maikop and 500 km from the Volga at Stalingrad. On the other hand, they were over 1,000 km from their starting point in eastern Poland, and even further from their supply bases in Germany. The Russian winter set in with full force in mid-November. The Germans were short of food, fuel, ammunition, vehicles, spare parts and winter clothing. Partisan activity was growing in their rear areas, threatening their supplies. Rundstedt was now 65 and not in good health – he was a heavy smoker, and in October in Poltava he suffered a mild heart attack. He increasingly resorted to drink to cope with the strain. He was now in the position of having to launch a new offensive against his better judgement, with exhausted troops in very adverse conditions. This was a recipe for defeat, but Rundstedt obeyed Hitler's orders.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Kleist, his units reinforced by Waffen-SS General Sepp Dietrich's 1st SS Division (the ), attacked on 17 November, and captured Rostov on the 21st. But the Soviets had had time to prepare, and launched a counter-offensive on the 25th. On the 28th Rundstedt authorised Kleist to withdraw from Rostov and establish a front on the Mius, 70 km to the west. When Hitler heard of this the next day, he ordered that Rostov should be held, although it had in fact already been evacuated. Rundstedt replied by insisting on his decision, and adding: "Should confidence in my leadership no longer exist, I beg to request someone be substituted who enjoys the necessary confidence of the Supreme Command." Hitler took Rundstedt at his word, and on 1 December he dismissed him, replacing him with Reichenau. The new commander saw at once that Rundstedt was right, and succeeded in persuading Hitler, via Halder, to authorise the withdrawal. This was the first significant defeat the German Army suffered in World War II, and Rundstedt was the first senior commander to be dismissed.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Hitler, however, immediately realised that he had gone too far in arbitrarily sacking the most senior commander of the German Army. He arrived in Poltava on 3 December, where he found both Reichenau and Dietrich firm in defending the correctness of Rundstedt's actions. Sodenstern explained the full circumstances of the retreat from Rostov to Hitler, an explanation which Hitler grudgingly accepted. Hitler then met with Rundstedt and excused himself on the grounds that it had all been a misunderstanding. He suggested that Rundstedt take a period of leave, "and then once more place your incomparable services at my disposal." On 5 December, his honour restored, Rundstedt left Poltava, never to return to the Russian front.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Shortly after his return to Kassel, on his 66th birthday, Rundstedt received a cheque from Hitler for 250,000 Reichsmarks. This was part of Hitler's policy of buying the continuing loyalty of his senior commanders. Many found this offensive, but none turned down these gifts. Rundstedt tried to do the next best thing by failing to cash the cheque. By February this was attracting adverse comment in Berlin, and Rundstedt then cashed it. Some writers have sought to connect Rundstedt's acceptance of this money with his continuing refusal to support the resistance movement against Hitler's regime within the German Army. In fact Rundstedt refused to have anything to do with the money, handing it over to his daughter-in-law, and it was still untouched at his death in 1953.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In April 1941, during the planning phase of Barbarossa, Himmler and Brauchitsch had agreed that as the Army conquered Soviet territory, it would be handed over at once to the SS and the German Police, now fused under Himmler's leadership in the HSSPF (Higher SS and Police Leadership). Himmler set up four under the overall command of Reinhard Heydrich. In Rundstedt's area of command, C, commanded by Otto Rasch, operated in northern Ukraine, and D, commanded by Otto Ohlendorf, operated in southern Ukraine.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The were initially ordered to establish "security" in the rear areas by killing communists and partisans, but by 1941 the identity between Jews and communism was strongly established in the minds of most SS men and Police officers. In July Himmler told an SS gathering: "This nation [Russia] has been united by the Jews in a religion, a world-view, called Bolshevism." From the beginning, therefore, the mostly killed Jews: initially only adult males, but after a few months indiscriminately. By December 1941, when Rundstedt was dismissed as commander of Army Group South, C and D had killed between 100,000 and 150,000 people. In addition, various units participated in killing 33,000 Kiev Jews at Babi Yar in September 1941, only days after the city was occupied by the Army.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The Army did participate directly in these mass killings: officers of Reichenau's 6th Army took part in organising the massacre at Babi Yar. On 10 October he issued an order (known as the "Reichenau Order") headed "Conduct of the Troops in the East", in which he said: "The primary goal of the campaign against the Jewish-Bolshevist system is the absolute destruction of the means of power and the eradication of the Asian influence in the European cultural sphere ... Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding of the necessity of hard but just atonement of Jewish subhumanity []." Two days later Rundstedt circulated it to all his senior commanders, with the comment: "I thoroughly concur with its contents." He urged them to release their own versions and to impress upon their troops the need to exterminate the Jews.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Since Reichenau's order was widely understood as endorsing the mass killings of Ukrainian Jews which were going on behind the German lines, with which 6th Army at any rate was actively co-operating, Rundstedt's open endorsement of its strongly anti-Semitic language clearly contradicts his later assertions that he did not know what the were doing. He told interrogators in 1946 that he was aware of just one atrocity, at Berdichev on 30 July. At Nuremberg he sought to portray the issue in terms of anti-partisan warfare: "Disorderly, irregular warfare behind the front of the Army must bring very great misery to the population of the country affected. No army in the world can tolerate such conditions for any length of time, but in the interests of the security and protection of its own troops it must take sharp, energetic measures. But this should, of course, be done in a correct and soldierly manner." Rundstedt shared the general German Army prejudice against the (Eastern Jews) found in the Soviet Union. He described Zamość as "a dirty Jewish hole."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In September 1941 Rundstedt issued an order that soldiers were not to participate in or take photos of "Jewish operations", indicating awareness of their existence. The killings took place with the knowledge and support of the German Army in the east.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Under Rundstedt's command, Army Group South actively participated in the policies outlined in the Hunger Plan, the Nazi racial starvation policy, by "living off the land" and denying food supplies to Soviet prisoners of war and civilians. German troops "plundered huge quantities of livestock, grain and dairy produce", enough to feed themselves and to create substantial reserves for the Reich. However, due to transportation problems, the supplies could not be shipped to Germany and much of them spoiled during the winter of 1941/1942. As a consequence, mass starvation set in within urban areas, especially in Kiev and Kharkov.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: In March 1942 Hitler re-appointed Rundstedt OB West, in succession to Witzleben, who was ill. He returned to the comfortable headquarters in the Hotel Pavillon Henri IV in Saint-Germain, which he had occupied in 1940–41. Rundstedt's command of French and his good relationship with the head of the collaborationist Vichy regime, Marshal Philippe Pétain, were considerable assets. But his position was to grow increasingly difficult. Hitler did not intend giving him real authority, seeing him as a dignified figurehead. Although he was commander of the German Army in the west, charged with defending the coasts of France and Belgium against attack by the western Allies, the military governors in Paris and Brussels (Rundstedt's former subordinate Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel and Alexander von Falkenhausen respectively) were not under his direct command, and he had no control over the Navy or Air Force. He also had no control over the SS and Gestapo operations in France: the HSSPF in Paris, Carl Oberg, answered only to Himmler.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Secondly, the internal situation in France had changed greatly since Rundstedt's departure in March 1941. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union had led the French Communist Party to abandon its previous neutrality (its slogan was "Neither Pétain nor de Gaulle"), and launch active resistance against the Germans and the Vichy regime. The result was an escalating cycle of assassinations and reprisal killings that rapidly alienated the hitherto quiescent French population. On 20 October French Communists assassinated the German commander in Nantes, Karl Hotz, triggering the execution of over 100 French hostages. As military governor, Stülpnagel directed the policy of executing hostages. Rundstedt had no direct control over the Army's response to Resistance attacks. Nevertheless, many held him responsible, then and later.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt had more direct responsibility for the Commando Order of 1942, which later served as the basis of war crimes charges against him. There were in fact two German orders concerning captured Allied commandos. The first was issued by Rundstedt in July 1942, and stated that captured Allied parachutists were to be handed over to the Gestapo, , rather than made prisoners of war. This was a response to the increasing number of British agents being parachuted into France by the Special Operations Executive. The second was issued by Hitler personally in October, following the Dieppe Raid by the British and Canadians on the coast of France. It stipulated that all captured Allied commandos were to be executed, again regardless of whether they were in uniform. As a consequence, six British commandos captured in Operation Frankton, a raid on shipping at Bordeaux in December 1942, were executed by the German Navy. Although Rundstedt neither ordered nor was informed of this action, he was later held responsible as German commander in France.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Meanwhile, the military situation for the Germans was deteriorating. The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 raised the likelihood of an Allied invasion of France. Hitler's response was to order the construction of the Atlantic Wall, a system of coastal fortifications from Norway to the French-Spanish border, to be constructed by the Organisation Todt using slave labour. There was also a steady build-up of German forces in France, despite the demands of the eastern front. By June Rundstedt commanded 25 divisions. In November 1942 the Allies invaded French North Africa (Operation Torch). When the Vichy authorities in Africa surrendered after token resistance, the Germans responded by occupying all of France and dissolving what remained of the French Army. Rundstedt travelled to Vichy to placate Pétain, who threatened to resign but backed down after soothing words from Rundstedt. At the same time, in the Soviet Union, Rundstedt's old command, Army Group South, was facing disaster at Stalingrad, the turning point of World War II in Europe.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The catastrophe of Stalingrad prompted renewed efforts by dissident German officers to remove Hitler from power while there was still time, as they believed, to negotiate an honourable peace settlement. The conspirators were centered on Halder, Beck and Witzleben, but by 1943 all had been removed from positions of authority. The real movers were now more junior officers: Henning von Tresckow, chief of staff of Army Group Centre, Friedrich Olbricht, Chief of the Armed Forces Replacement Office, and Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, a member of the Replacement Army staff. Their strategy at this time was to persuade the senior field commanders to lead a coup against Hitler. Their initial target was Manstein, now commanding Army Group Don, but he turned Tresckow down at a meeting in March 1943. Several sources say that Rundstedt was also approached, although they do not say specifically who approached him. In any case, he refused to get involved, although both Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen were recruits to the conspiracy. By one account, he complained: "Why always me? Let Manstein and Kluge do it." He told Gerhard Engel, one of Hitler's adjutants, that he was "too old and had had enough."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: It was true, however, that Rundstedt was well past his best. The military historian Chester Wilmot wrote soon after the war: "The truth was that Rundstedt had lost his grip. He was old and tired and his once active brain was gradually becoming addled, for he had great difficulty in sleeping without the soporific aid of alcohol." Events in June 1944 showed that this was an exaggeration: Rundstedt was still capable of clear thought and decisive action. But his health was a matter of increasing concern to his staff and his family. His son Leutnant Hans-Gerd von Rundstedt was posted to his command as an aide-de-camp, partly to monitor his health and report back to Bila in Kassel. In one of his letters, Hans-Gerd referred to his father's "somewhat plentiful nicotine and alcohol consumption," but assured his mother that Rundstedt's health was basically sound. Nevertheless, in May 1943 Rundstedt was given leave and was sent to a sanatorium at Bad Tölz, south of Munich, which was also the site of an SS-Junker school. Later he stayed some time at Grundlsee in Austria, and was received by Hitler at his summer house at Berchtesgaden, a sign of Hitler's continuing respect for him. He was back at work by July.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943 removed Rundstedt's fears that France would be invaded that summer, but he could not have doubted that the massive build-up of American troops in Britain meant that a cross-channel invasion would come in 1944. In October Rundstedt sent Hitler a memorandum on the defensive preparations. He placed no faith in the Atlantic Wall, seeing it merely as useful propaganda. He said: "We Germans, do not indulge in the tired Maginot spirit." He argued that an invasion could only be defeated by a defence in depth, with armoured reserves positioned well inland so that they could be deployed to wherever the invasion came, and launch counter-offensives to drive the invaders back. There were several problems with this, particularly the lack of fuel for rapid movements of armour, the Allied air superiority which enabled them to disrupt the transport system, and the increasingly effective sabotage efforts of the French resistance. Hitler was not persuaded: his view was that the invasion must be defeated on the beaches. Characteristically, however, he told Rundstedt he agreed with him, then sent Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to France with orders to hasten the completion of the Atlantic Wall; while Rundstedt remained the commander in France, Rommel became the official commander of Army Group B. Rundstedt was extremely angered by this decision; although he admired Rommel's tactical skill, he knew from his colleagues that Rommel was notoriously difficult to work with and would mostly be able to ignore Rundstedt's authority thanks to his patronage by Hitler and Goebbels. Rommel in fact agreed with Rundstedt that the Atlantic Wall was a "gigantic bluff", but he also believed that Allied air power made Rundstedt's proposed defense plan impossible.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: By the spring of 1944 Rommel had turned the mostly nonexistent 'Wall' into a formidable defensive line, but since he believed the invasion would come somewhere between Dunkirk and the mouth of the Somme, much of his work was directed at strengthening the wrong area, although in late 1943 he had focused on Normandy. As fears of an imminent invasion mounted, conflict broke out among the commanders. Rommel wanted the armoured divisions positioned close to the coast, mostly in the area he considered at highest risk. The commander of armoured forces in France, General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, backed by Rundstedt, strongly disagreed, wanting his forces to be positioned inland to preserve their manoeuvrability. Eventually Hitler intervened, imposing a compromise: half the armour would be allocated to the Army Groups defending the beaches, and half would be kept in reserve under Geyr von Schweppenburg; the latter, however, were not to be deployed without Hitler's direct order. Hitler made matters worse by appointing Rommel commander of Army Group B, covering all of northern France. This unworkable command structure was to have dire consequences when the invasion came.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The invasion duly came before dawn on 6 June 1944, in Normandy, far to the west of the sector where Rundstedt and Rommel had expected it. Rommel was on leave in Germany, many of the local commanders in Normandy were at a conference in Rennes, and Hitler was asleep at Berchtesgaden. But Rundstedt, now 68, was up before 03:00, trying to take charge of a confusing situation. He immediately saw that the reported Allied airborne landings in Normandy presaged a seaborne invasion. He contacted OKW and demanded that he be given authority to deploy the armoured reserves, but OKW could not agree to this without Hitler's approval. Hitler's refusal came through at 10:00, followed by his change of mind at 14:30, by which time the Allies were well ashore and the cloud cover had lifted, preventing the armour from moving until dusk. In mid-afternoon Rundstedt ordered that "the Allies [be] wiped out before the day's end, otherwise the enemy would reinforce and the chance would be lost", but it was too late. Rundstedt's biographer concludes: "If Hitler had released the Panzer reserves as soon as Rundstedt had asked for them, the Allies would have experienced a much harder day on 6 June than they did." The historian Stephen E. Ambrose wrote: "The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window-dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW ... Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his actions decisive, his orders clear."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Being right was little consolation to Rundstedt. By 11 June it was evident that the Allies could not be dislodged from their beach-head in Normandy. Their total command of the air and the sabotage of roads and bridges by the Resistance made bringing armoured reinforcements to Normandy slow and difficult, but without them there was no hope of an effective counter-offensive. Supported by Rommel, he tried to persuade Keitel at OKW that the only escape was to withdraw from Normandy to a prepared defensive line on the Seine, but Hitler forbade any withdrawal. On 17 June Hitler flew to France and met Rundstedt and Rommel at his command bunker near Soissons. Both Field Marshals argued that the situation in Normandy required either massive reinforcements (which were not available) or a rapid withdrawal. Remarkably, they both also urged that Hitler find a political solution to end the war, which Rommel told him bluntly was unwinnable. Hitler ignored all their demands, requiring "fanatical" defence and a counter-attack with whatever was available. Rommel warned Hitler about the inevitable collapse in the German defences, but was rebuffed and told to focus on military operations.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: It was during the desperate German attempts to bring reserve units to the front that men of the SS Panzer Division destroyed the village of Oradour-sur-Glane in central France, in retaliation for partisan attacks in the area. Rundstedt was German commander-in-chief in France, had ordered to head north to Normandy, and had previously condoned tough action against partisans who had killed or tortured German officers or personnel, including the shooting of hostages. This was enough for the French government to demand after the war that he stand trial for the massacre at Oradour.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: On 29 June Rundstedt and Rommel were summoned to Berchtesgaden for a further meeting with Hitler, at which they repeated their demands, and were again rebuffed. On his return to Saint-Germain, on 30 June, Rundstedt found an urgent plea from Schweppenburg, who was commanding the armoured force at Caen, to be allowed to withdraw his units out of range of Allied naval gunfire, which was decimating his forces. Rundstedt at once agreed, and notified OKW of this decision. On 1 July he received a message from OKW countermanding his orders. In a fury, he phoned Keitel, urging him to go to Hitler and get the decision reversed. Keitel pleaded that this was impossible. "What shall we do?" he asked. Rundstedt is said to have replied "" (one version of the story as told by Blumentritt did not include the ""). This literally means "End the war, you idiots!", but has commonly been reported in English-language accounts as "Make peace, you idiots!" There has been some doubt raised as to whether Rundstedt actually said this, but Wilmot says the incident was recounted to him and Liddell Hart by Blumentritt, who was present.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Keitel conveyed to Hitler that Rundstedt felt unable to cope with the increased demands, and Hitler relieved him of his command, replacing him with Kluge. It is likely that Hitler had already decided that Rundstedt should be replaced after the meetings of 17 and 29 June. It was officially given out that Rundstedt was retiring on the grounds of age and ill-health. Hitler wrote him a "very cordial" letter, and awarded him the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross, one of the highest of the new decorations created in 1940. Rundstedt departed Saint-Germain for the last time on 4 July, accompanied by his son, and was driven back to the sanatorium at Bad Tölz, to be reunited with his wife. He told Rommel on departing that he would never hold another military command.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt had resisted all attempts to recruit him to the various conspiracies against Hitler that had been operating inside the German Army since 1938. Although he had not denounced or reported any of the officers who had approached him, he had shown no sympathy with their appeals. By June 1944 the conspirators had given up on him (and indeed on all the senior field commanders), so he was not approached by the group around Tresckow and Stauffenberg who hatched the unsuccessful plot to kill Hitler with a bomb at the Wolf's Lair (), his headquarters in East Prussia, and had no inkling of what was planned. When he heard of the attempt on 20 July, his reaction was very hostile. A year later, in June 1945, he told the investigating commission preparing for the Nuremberg Trials: "I would never have thought of such a thing, that would have been base, bare-faced treachery." Since he had every reason to try to put himself in a sympathetic light at Nuremberg, this certainly reflects his view in June 1944. He also argued, however, that the attempt to kill Hitler was pointless, because the German Army and people would not have followed the conspirators. "The Army and also the people still believed in Hitler at that time, and such an overthrow would have been quite unsuccessful." He reiterated his traditional sense of his duty as a soldier: had he supported the plot, he said, "I would have emerged and been considered for all time the greatest traitor to my Fatherland."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Officers like Rundstedt who argued that a coup against Hitler would not have won support in the Army or among the German people were, in the view of most historians, correct. Joachim Fest, writing of Tresckow, says: "Even officers who were absolutely determined to stage a coup were troubled by the fact that everything they were contemplating would inevitably be seen by their troops as dereliction of duty, as irresponsible arrogance, and, worst, as capable of triggering a civil war." On the attitude of the people, Fest writes: "Most industrial workers remained loyal to the regime, even as the war ground on."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Rundstedt was thus above suspicion of involvement in the 20 July plot, but he could not escape entanglement in its bloody aftermath. A large number of senior officers were directly or indirectly implicated, headed by Field Marshals Kluge, Rommel (very peripherally) and Witzleben, and Generals Falkenhausen, Erich Fellgiebel, Friedrich Fromm, Paul von Hase, Gustav Heistermann von Ziehlberg, Otto Herfurth, Erich Hoepner, Fritz Lindemann, Friedrich von Rabenau, Hans Speidel, Helmuth Stieff, Stülpnagel, Fritz Thiele, Georg Thomas and Eduard Wagner, as well as Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. Many of these would have been known personally to Rundstedt. Witzleben was an old colleague, and Stülpnagel had been his subordinate in Ukraine and his colleague in France. These considerations do not seem to have influenced his conduct at all.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: Hitler was determined not only to punish those involved in the plot, but to break the power, status, and cohesion of the Prussian officer corps once and for all. Since traditionally German officers could not be tried by civilian courts, he decided that the Army must expel all those accused of involvement. They could then be tried before the People's Court (), a special court established in 1934 to try political crimes and presided over by the fanatical Nazi Roland Freisler. Hitler therefore ordered the convening of a () to carry out the expulsions, and appointed Rundstedt to head it. The other senior members were Generals Keitel and Guderian, Walther Schroth, and Karl-Wilhelm Specht. This court considered only evidence placed before it by the Gestapo. No defence counsel was permitted, and none of the accused was allowed to appear. On this basis, several officers were expelled from the Army, while others were exonerated. Among those the court declined to expel were Halder (who had no involvement in the plot), and Speidel, Rommel's chief of Staff (who was deeply implicated). Those expelled appeared in batches before the People's Court, where after perfunctory trials most of them were executed by hanging. Rundstedt and Heinz Guderian have been singled out as the two who most contributed to Rommel's expulsion from the army, especially as both had good reason to dislike him; however, Rommel and Rundstedt had always had a grudging respect for one another, and Rundstedt later served as Hitler's representative at Rommel's state funeral.


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: No incident in Rundstedt's career has damaged his posthumous reputation as much as his involvement in this process. John Wheeler-Bennett wrote in 1967: "To such a nadir of supine degradation had come the child of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and Moltke." He called the Court "the final farce of casuistry" and accused the officer corps of washing its hands, Pilate-like, of their comrades. Rundstedt's biographer writes: "This was something for which some Germans, while they were prepared to forgive him everything else, could and cannot excuse him." Speidel, despite the fact that he was spared, was bitterly critical of Rundstedt after the war, when he became a senior officer in the new West German Army. Blumentritt, always loyal to his old , complained in 1953: "He has had to endure vindictiveness and jealousy even up to and after the hour of his death."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The aftermath of the 20 July plot coincided with the rout of the German armies in both the east and the west. In the east Operation Bagration destroyed Army Group Centre and drove the Germans out of Byelorussia and eastern Poland: they were also forced out of the Balkans. In the west, the Americans, British and Canadians broke out of the Normandy pocket and swept across France, taking Paris on 25 August and Brussels on 3 September. The German command in the west was reorganised following the suicide of Kluge, the arrest of Stülpnagel and the incapacitation of Rommel. Field Marshal Walter Model, known as "the Führer's fireman" for his reputation for stabilising dangerous situations, was appointed both OB West and commander of Army Group B on 16 August, but even he could not do justice to both jobs. At Blumentritt's urgent request, supported by Model, Hitler agreed to ask Rundstedt to resume his post as OB West, which at a meeting on 1 September he agreed to do, saying "My Führer, whatever you order, I shall do to my last breath."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: The appointment of Rundstedt was at least in part a propaganda exercise. He was the most senior and one of the best known German Army commanders, both in Germany and abroad. His formidable reputation inspired confidence at home and trepidation among the enemy. His appointment was designed to impress the Allies, reassure the German people, and bolster the morale of the officer corps after the shock of 20 July and the subsequent purge. The Allies believed Rundstedt to be a far more powerful and influential figure than he in fact was, regarding him with "respect, almost awe" as the master strategist of the German Army – something he would not find helpful after the war. He had already appeared on the cover of "Time" magazine in August 1942, and did so again in August 1944, when it was suggested, quite wrongly, that he was behind the 20 July plot. There were even suggestions that he would take over leadership of the German state. But Hitler saw Rundstedt as a figurehead: he intended that operational control on the western front remain with the energetic and ruthless Model, a committed Nazi. Rundstedt, on the other hand, saw himself as the voice of experience, restraining the younger Model, whom he described as "courageous but impulsive."


title: Gerd von Rundstedt

text: With the comforts of Saint-Germain no longer available, Rundstedt established his headquarters near Koblenz. His chief of staff was now the capable General Siegfried Westphal. Under Rundstedt was Model, commanding Army Group B and facing the British and Canadians as they advanced through Belgium and into the Netherlands, and the Americans as they advanced into the Ardennes in southern Belgium and Luxembourg. Further south, Army Group G, commanded by General Hermann Balck, faced the Americans in Lorraine and Alsace, down to the Swiss border. In October, Army Group H in the north was split off from Model's very extended front, and was placed under the command of the paratroop general Kurt Student.