title: South African Border War

text: During his final years in office, Vorster had recognised that growing international pressure would eventually force South Africa to grant some form of autonomy or independence to South West Africa. He made token acknowledgements of the UN's role in deciding the territory's future and his administration had publicly renounced the notion of annexation. As Vorster's successor, Botha felt bound by this commitment—at least in principle—to an autonomous South West Africa. His strategy was to cultivate a viable political alternative to SWAPO, preferably moderate and anti-communist in nature, which was committed to close military and security links with South Africa. In the meantime, Botha forestalled further discussions on an internal settlement by demanding the withdrawal of the Cuban armed forces from Angola as a precondition of Namibian independence. Botha argued that the Cuban presence in Angola constituted a legitimate security concern for South West Africa, so it was not unreasonable that independence be contingent on a prior Cuban withdrawal. This initiative was supported by the US, which wanted a Namibian settlement consistent with Western interests, namely a region free of what Chester Crocker termed "Soviet-Cuban military adventurism". Crocker endorsed the linkage since it was related to South West Africa's security situation, which needed to be stabilised prior to independence. Botha's precondition was denounced by SWAPO for arbitrarily tying South West Africa's fate to the resolution of another regional conflict. Some Western powers also disapproved of Cuban linkage; for example, the French government issued the statement that it was inappropriate "the Namibian people should serve as hostages" to broader US foreign policy goals. The Cuban government interpreted linkage as further proof that South Africa was a foreign policy pawn of the US, and believed it to be part of a wider diplomatic and military offensive by the Reagan administration against Cuban interests worldwide.


title: South African Border War

text: Botha called on other African states and Western nations to back his demands: "say to the Cubans 'go home' and say to the Russians 'go home', and the minute this happens I will be prepared to settle all our military forces inside South Africa". Botha also assured the UN that he would take steps to prepare South West Africa for independence "as long as there are realistic prospects of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola". The linkage of Namibian independence to the Cuban presence in Angola proved controversial, but it did involve the two Cold War superpowers—the US and the Soviet Union— in a joint mediation process for resolving the South African Border War at the highest level. In September 1982 Crocker met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev for talks on the issue of Cuban-Namibian linkage. His deputy, Frank G. Wisner, held a series of parallel discussions with the Angolan government. Wisner promised that the US would normalise diplomatic and economic relations with Angola in the event of a Cuban withdrawal.


title: South African Border War

text: To demonstrate South African commitment to Namibian independence, Botha permitted a moderate, multi-party coalition to create a South West African interim government in August 1983, known as the Multi-Party Conference and subsequently as the Transitional Government of National Unity. Provision was made for an executive and legislative assembly, and the new government was bestowed with all the powers formerly held by the territory's Administrator-General. The rise of an interim government was accompanied by a defence policy dubbed "Namibianisation", a reference to the Vietnamization programme the US had pursued during the Vietnam War. Increasingly the South African war effort rested on what limited white manpower could be raised in South West Africa itself, and local black units drawn from the San, Ovambo, Kavango, and East Caprivian (Lozi) ethnic groups. The main objectives of Namibianisation were to establish a self-sufficient military infrastructure in South West Africa, reduce casualty rates among South African personnel, and reinforce the perception of a domestic civil conflict rather than an independence struggle.


title: South African Border War

text: The SADF had started recruiting black South West Africans in 1974 and established segregated military and paramilitary units for semi-autonomous tribal entities such as Ovamboland two years later. PLAN had previously benefited from the deployment of white South African conscripts, reservists, and policemen unfamiliar with the terrain or environment; indigenous recruits were perceived as a means of mitigating this disadvantage. In April 1980, Administrator-General Gerrit Viljoen announced that transfer of some control over military and police forces to South West Africans would occur once the necessary structures were implemented. Through its defence headquarters in Windhoek, the SADF had exercised final authority on all military resources and counter-insurgency efforts. In theory, these arrangements were modified by the establishment of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) and the South West African Police (SWAPOL), since both of these forces were placed under the control of the interim government; the latter was also empowered to implement and oversee conscription as it saw fit. However, the SADF retained functional command of all military units; the senior general officer of the SADF in South West Africa also doubled as commander of the SWATF. By the mid 1980s the SWATF numbered about 21,000 personnel and accounted for 61% of all combat troops deployed along the Cutline. Both the SWATF and the Government of National Unity remained dependent on massive SADF military support.


title: South African Border War

text: Operation Protea had exposed a glaring lack of professionalism on the part of FAPLA units, which had relied too heavily on their Soviet advisers and were almost immediately routed once they had to leave their fortified bases. In terms of training, morale, organisation, and professional competence—including the ability to operate its own equipment with effectiveness—the Angolan army had proved decidedly vulnerable. Protea indicated that it was in no condition to repel or even inflict serious losses on the South African expeditionary troops, resulting in a ratio of casualties almost overwhelmingly in the SADF's favour. That debacle led to a greater FAPLA dependency on augmented Cuban forces and another large arms deal, valued in excess of one billion dollars, being signed with the Soviet Union. Defence expenditures increased to consume 50% of Angola's state budget by the end of 1982. FAPLA embarked on a massive recruiting drive, purchased new T-54/55 and T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, and took delivery of about thirty new combat aircraft, including twelve Sukhoi Su-20 strike fighters. It also ordered more air search radars and surface-to-air missiles to replace those destroyed in Protea.


title: South African Border War

text: While Namibianisation altered the tactical realities of the war on the Cutline, the SADF was planning a fourth operation modelled after Sceptic, Protea, and Daisy. In April 1982, PLAN insurgents killed 9 South African soldiers near Tsumeb, over 200 kilometres south of the border. South Africa claimed 152 security-related incidents involving PLAN occurred in South West Africa that year, and acknowledged the combat deaths of 77 SADF and SWATF personnel. In July 1983 PLAN carried out its first major act of urban sabotage, detonating a bomb in the centre of Windhoek, which caused extensive property damage but no civilian injuries. Infiltration of Ovamboland and Kavangoland increased dramatically at around the same time, with 700 insurgents entering both regions. The SADF claimed to have killed or captured just under half the insurgents by May, but was unable to prevent the others from making their way further south. These developments indicated that PLAN had not lost its will to persevere despite the enormous materiel losses sustained during Protea, and the infiltration of men and supplies into South West Africa continued apace.


title: South African Border War

text: Their confidence buoyed by the previous successful incursions into FAPLA-held territory, which had achieved marked success at only minimal cost in lives and materiel, Botha and his defence chiefs scheduled Operation Askari for December 1983. Like Protea, Askari was a major combined arms assault on PLAN base areas and supply lines in Angola; it also targeted nearby FAPLA air-defence installations and brigade headquarters. According to General Georg Meiring, commander of the SADF in South West Africa, Askari would serve the purpose of a preemptive strike aimed at eliminating the large numbers of PLAN insurgents and stockpiles of weapons being amassed for the annual rainy season infiltration.


title: South African Border War

text: The buildup of South African armour and artillery on the border did not go unnoticed; by late November the Soviet Union had enough satellite reconnaissance photographs and other intelligence to deduce that the SADF was preparing for another major incursion into Angola. During a private meeting arranged at the Algonquin Hotel by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar at Moscow's request, Soviet diplomats informed their South African counterparts that further aggression towards FAPLA would not be tolerated. The Soviets threatened unspecified retaliation if FAPLA's grip on Angola disintegrated further as a result of Askari. Simultaneously, in a direct show of force, a Soviet aircraft carrier and three surface ships called at Luanda before rounding the Cape of Good Hope. This constituted the most powerful Soviet naval detachment which had ever approached within striking distance of South African waters. Botha was unmoved, and Askari proceeded as scheduled on 9 December. Its targets were several large PLAN training camps, all of which were located no more than five kilometres from an adjacent FAPLA brigade headquarters. The four local FAPLA brigades represented one-seventh of the entire Angolan army, and three had substantial Soviet advisory contingents. Soviet General Valentin Varennikov, who was instrumental in directing the Angolan defence, was confident that "given their numerical strength and armament, the brigades...[would] be able to repel any South African attack". FAPLA's Cuban allies were less optimistic: they noted that the brigades were isolated, incapable of reinforcing each other quickly, and possessed insufficient mobile anti-aircraft weapons to protect them outside their bases. The Soviets recommended a static defence, appealing directly to Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, while the Cubans urged a withdrawal. Caught between two conflicting recommendations, dos Santos hesitated, and the brigades were ultimately annihilated piecemeal by the advancing South African armoured columns. Amid the confusion, a number of Angolan troops managed to break out of the South African encirclement and move north to link up with Cuban units, but a total of 471 FAPLA/PLAN personnel were killed or captured.


title: South African Border War

text: Despite achieving their objectives during Operation Askari, the South African forces had encountered unexpectedly determined resistance from PLAN and FAPLA. The SADF acknowledged 25 killed in action and 94 wounded, the highest number of casualties suffered in any single operation since Operation Savannah. FAPLA also claimed to have shot down 4 South African aircraft.


title: South African Border War

text: On 6 January 1984, United Nations Security Council Resolution 546 was adopted with thirteen votes in favour and two abstentions, by the US and UK. The resolution condemned Operation Askari and demanded South Africa's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Angola. An earlier draft of the same text imposing mandatory trade sanctions on South Africa until it ceased cross-border raids was abandoned under American pressure. The Soviet Union announced that it had reached yet another, more comprehensive agreement with Angola to bolster FAPLA's defence capabilities, and delivered the public warning to South Africa that "further aggression cannot be left unpunished".


title: South African Border War

text: Askari had shaken the South African government's confidence in its ability to retain the military advantage indefinitely in Angola. Heavier and more sophisticated weapons were being used, the rate of casualties had increased, and the air superiority that had accounted for many of the SADF's previous successes was diminishing. Nor was Botha and his cabinet certain of continued political and diplomatic support from the US, which had chosen to abstain rather than exercise its veto with regard to UN Security Council Resolution 546. The Reagan administration perceived that both Angola and South Africa had grown weary of the war and were more susceptible to pressure for a ceasefire and mutual disengagement. American diplomats offered to mediate peace talks accordingly, and on 13 February South African and Angolan officials met for the first time in Lusaka. Three days later, South Africa announced that it would withdraw its expeditionary forces from Cunene Province by the end of March, provided the Angolans agreed to prevent PLAN from taking advantage of the situation to infiltrate South West Africa. The Angolan government pledged to restrain PLAN and MK, and to prohibit any movement of Cuban troops southward towards the border. These respective commitments were formalised as the Lusaka Accords. FAPLA and the SADF agreed to set up a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to police the disengagement. Under the JMC, joint South African and Angolan patrols were carried out along six hundred kilometres of the border.


title: South African Border War

text: Cuba and the Soviet Union were not consulted on the Lusaka Accords until after they had been signed. In a heated exchange with President dos Santos, Fidel Castro complained, "the final decision was yours, not ours, but at least we could have talked beforehand, and we, as well as the Soviets, could have expressed our disagreement beforehand...both the Soviets and us, your two main allies, the two who support Angola, who have been making immense efforts on your behalf, we were faced with a "fait accompli"".


title: South African Border War

text: UNITA denounced the Lusaka Accords, insisting that any peace effort which excluded it would fail. PLAN also routinely violated the disengagement area, prompting the SADF to delay and later cancel its withdrawal. In July 1984 South Africa formally announced that it would not withdraw from Angola, citing widespread PLAN activity in the border region.


title: South African Border War

text: The truce between South Africa and Angola survived only about fifteen months. Negotiations for completing the SADF withdrawal were stalled due to intransigence on both sides concerning the linkage policy, with the two governments clashing over timetables for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and Namibian independence, respectively. While the Soviet Union and Cuba did nothing to impede the dialogue, they feared that Luanda might sacrifice PLAN and MK by agreeing to expel them from the country. Castro confided to Soviet officials that he had no intention of authorising a withdrawal of Cuban forces if the Angolan government signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa similar to the Nkomati Accord. As a last resort, the Cuban presence in Angola would be maintained unilaterally for the purpose of aiding PLAN, with or without Luanda's approval.


title: South African Border War

text: In October 1984, dos Santos blamed South Africa for stalling the implementation of the Lusaka Accords and called for the US to resolve the impasse by exerting pressure on Botha. On 17 November, dos Santos proposed a five-point peace plan on the following terms: a complete SADF withdrawal from Angola, a renewed ceasefire agreement, a formal pledge by the South African government to begin implementing Namibian independence under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, a formal pledge by the Angolan government to begin implementing a three year phased withdrawal of all but 5,000 Cuban troops, and recognition of SWAPO and Cuba as an equal party in negotiations. Botha wanted all the Cuban military personnel to be withdrawn, and over a period of twelve months rather than three years. He also countered that the Namibian independence process could only take place once the Cuban withdrawal was initiated.


title: South African Border War

text: The Lusaka Accords were abandoned in the wake of Operation Argon, a failed sabotage mission carried out by South African special forces in Angola's oil-rich Cabinda exclave. Four years of military escalation and massive defence expenditures had a drastic impact on Angola's state finances, which were only being balanced by petroleum revenue. The largest oil refinery in the country was located on the Cabindan coast and operated by a US firm, Gulf Oil, under the auspices of the Cabina-Gulf Oil National Petroleum Company of Angola (SONAGOL). By 1984 Gulf had invested over 1.3 billion dollars in its Cabinda operation, which was exporting 165,495 barrels of oil per day. At the time, the revenue from the Gulf refinery generated 90% of Angola's foreign exchange. The Reagan administration separated its political positions on Angola from its position on SONAGOL, with Crocker hoping that American multinational companies in general, and Gulf in particular, would be a moderating force on the Marxist government. South Africa had noted the critical importance of the refinery's contribution to the FAPLA war effort and had begun investigating ways to disrupt it without incurring the ire of the US, which would have to react if American commercial interests were threatened. The SADF believed that a covert sabotage operation was possible, as long as the destruction was not attributable to South Africa and a credible cover story could be used to link the attack to a domestic Angolan movement such as UNITA or the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). An attack on the oil platforms was ruled out, as this was beyond the capabilities of either UNITA or FLEC, so the SADF opted to infiltrate the refinery's oil storage facilities and mine the fuel tanks. The damage incurred would cripple Angola's ability to finance its military operations and give it greater economic incentive to accede to South African demands in the ongoing negotiations rather than risk returning to war.


title: South African Border War

text: The sabotage mission received the code name Operation Argon, and 15 South African special forces operators deployed to Cabinda by sea in May 1985. They were discovered by a FAPLA patrol during the infiltration attempt, and two of the raiders were shot dead with a third, Captain Wynand Petrus du Toit, being captured. Under interrogation, du Toit confessed that the objective of Argon was to sabotage the storage tanks at Cabinda Gulf. The South African government disavowed du Toit and denied responsibility, but General Viljoen later confirmed the SADF's role in the operation. Consequently, the ceasefire imposed as a result of the Lusaka Accords collapsed, and further peace talks were abandoned.


title: South African Border War

text: The diplomatic repercussions of Operation Argon's failure were immense. Castro believed the failed raid indicated that the US and South Africa were not truly committed to peace, and had been dishonest during the ceasefire negotiations. Angola announced it was no longer willing to consider a line of dialogue with South Africa on the Cuban withdrawal. The US condemned Operation Argon as an "unfriendly act by a supposedly friendly government".


title: South African Border War

text: In early 1984, just after South Africa and Angola had agreed to the principles of a peace settlement, UNITA had seized the opportunity to issue its own demanding conditions under which it would also accept the terms of a ceasefire. Savimbi requested a government of national unity with the MPLA in which he was granted a part, and threatened to begin attacking major cities if he was ignored. In this manner Savimbi sought to interlace conditionality over an SADF and FAPLA disengagement with his own conflict of interests with the Angolan regime. Although Botha approved of UNITA as an ostensibly anti-communist movement, he did nothing to impress Savimbi's demands on dos Santos. UNITA responded by raiding Sumbe, a settlement two hundred and sixty kilometres to the south of Luanda. That June, UNITA sabotaged the oil pipeline in Cabinda, kidnapping 16 British expatriate workers and a Portuguese technician. Six months later the insurgents raided Cafunfo, killing 100 FAPLA personnel. Most of these attacks were planned and executed from Jamba, a town in Cuando Cubango Province, which Savimbi had proclaimed UNITA's new national headquarters. Jamba had no prior strategic significance, possessed no agricultural base, and had limited access to fresh water, but it was located as far away from FAPLA bases as possible and within easy reach of SADF bases in Ovamboland and the Caprivi Strip. FAPLA had deserted the region for precisely this reason, withdrawing north after Operation Protea, but in the process left behind a power vacuum which Savimbi was quick to exploit. Savimbi used Jamba to augment UNITA's public image, investing heavily in local infrastructure. He opened the settlement to American and South African journalists, honed his public relations skills in frequent press conferences denouncing the MPLA, and lobbied for Western aid. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the US government opened covert channels to provide military assistance to UNITA. It repealed the Clark Amendment, which explicitly barred further CIA support for the UNITA and the FNLA, allowing the agency to resume Angolan operations. The Angolan government asserted this was "proof of the complicity there has always been between the US executive and the retrograde racist Pretoria regime" and it had "no alternative but to suspend the contacts it has had with US government envoys".


title: South African Border War

text: In 1986, Savimbi visited Washington, where he met with American officials and was promised military hardware valued at about ten million dollars, including FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles and BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles. The US also pledged to continue its support for UNITA even if it lost the umbrella of protection conferred by the SADF presence in southern Angola.


title: South African Border War

text: At the US government's request, South Africa began lending UNITA a greater degree of material assistance, and aided the CIA in the acquisition of untraceable arms for the Angolan insurgents. The CIA was interested in acquiring Soviet and Eastern European arms for UNITA, as they could be easily passed off as weapons individual partisans had captured from FAPLA. South Africa possessed a vast stockpile of Soviet arms seized during Operations Sceptic, Protea, and Askari, and was persuaded to transfer some of it to UNITA.


title: South African Border War

text: After Operation Savannah had failed to prevent the ascension of the MPLA in Angola, the South African political leadership generally accepted that reversing that verdict by force was unrealistic. At the same time, Vorster and Botha had recognised that a total military defeat of PLAN was elusive without the impossible corollary of a victory over the combined FAPLA-PLAN alliance in Angola. Some hardliners in their respective administrations wanted South Africa's full military weight behind Savimbi to help him extinguish the MPLA government, while others favoured simply using it to wage a limited containment exercise against PLAN. An offensive strategy which offered the chance to aggressively attack Angola by land, sea, and air and focus directly on the MPLA's centres of power was never discussed and became more remote as time went on. In its place, therefore, the other popular option was promulgated, which was to focus chiefly on fighting PLAN, the primary threat within the geographical limits of South West Africa proper, and attempting to intimidate Angola in the form of punitive cross-border raids, thus assuming an essentially defensive posture.


title: South African Border War

text: While Botha never seriously considered the overthrow of the MPLA as a viable objective, he endorsed increasing aid to UNITA for several reasons: it would mend diplomatic relations with the US, especially after the debacle of Operation Argon, UNITA could be molded into a proxy to harass PLAN, and donating captured weapons to Savimbi was cost-effective and deniable.


title: South African Border War

text: US and South African justification for arming UNITA lay partly in the increased supply by the Soviet Union of more sophisticated weapons to FAPLA, as well as the increased number of Cuban troops in Angola, which had rapidly swelled from 25,000 to 31,000 by the end of 1985. While the Lusaka Accords were still in force, the Cuban and Soviet military delegations had urged dos Santos to take advantage of the ceasefire with the SADF to eliminate UNITA. There was a considerable increase in Soviet military assistance to Angola during this period, with the transfer of another billion dollars' worth of arms to FAPLA, including about 200 new T-55 and T-62 tanks. Moscow trained more Angolan pilots and delivered more advanced fighter aircraft to Luanda, particularly Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23s. Over a three year period Angola had become the second largest importer of arms on the African continent. FAPLA's arsenal expanded so exponentially that the SADF became convinced that the Soviet-sponsored arms buildup was intended for deployment elsewhere. General Malan gave a speech in which he expressed alarm at the "flood" of Soviet military equipment and its sophisticated nature, claiming that it was much more than needed to cope with the SADF's limited expeditionary forces and UNITA. Malan theorised that "the Russians want to develop a strong, stabilised base in Angola and then use the equipment and personnel positioned there wherever necessary in the subcontinent". South Africa gradually became locked in a conventional arms race with Angola; each side argued that it had to match the increased force available to the other. To counter the appearance of advanced MiG-23 and SU-22 fighters in Angola, for instance, South Africa began development on two sophisticated fighter aircraft of its own, the Atlas Cheetah and the Atlas Carver. Both programmes would consume billions of rand.


title: South African Border War

text: Intending to wrest back the initiative, sever UNITA's logistics lifelines to South West Africa and Zaire, and forestall any future insurgent offensives, FAPLA launched Operation Saluting October in mid-1987. The impetus for Saluting October likely originated with the Soviet military mission, which pressed the idea of a major conventional thrust to destroy UNITA's southeastern front as early as 1983. It had received a new commander that year, Lieutenant General Petr Gusev, former deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District. In light of the war's length, its cost, the rising death toll, and looming cuts in the Soviet military expenditure which would limit future efforts to support FAPLA's war effort, Gusev wanted a decisive multi-divisional offensive to crush UNITA once and for all. Operation Saluting October was a two-pronged offensive aimed at retaking three major settlements from UNITA, Cangamba, Cassamba, and Mavinga. The FAPLA command staff intended the attack on Cangamba and Cassamba as a feint, hoping to draw UNITA forces there and away from Mavinga. Once Mavinga was in government hands, FAPLA could expel the remaining insurgents from Moxico Province and pave the way for a final assault on Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba. Between 4 and 9 Soviet advisers were to be attached on the battalion level, albeit with strict orders not to participate in the fighting and withdraw from the front as necessary to avoid contact with UNITA. They were accompanied by a small number of Cuban advisers and East German technical personnel serving in a variety of support roles.


title: South African Border War

text: Gusev and his staff appealed to Moscow for more aid to FAPLA, particularly strike aircraft, for another offensive; this request was granted. In what had become an annual practice, an estimated billion dollars' worth of arms was flown into Luanda by Soviet Antonov An-24 flights, as many as 12 per day for a six-month period. The equipment was offloaded in the capital and transferred to Angolan Ilyushin Il-76s, which in turn flew them directly to the front.


title: South African Border War

text: To FAPLA, the experience of planning and executing an operation of such massive proportions was relatively new, but the Soviet military mission was convinced that a decade of exhaustive training on its part had created an army capable of undertaking a complex multi-divisional offensive. The Angolan brigade commanders had repeatedly expressed reservations about splitting the force and fighting on two fronts, arguing that a single assault on Mavinga would be more linear and sufficient. FAPLA's Cuban advisers objected on the grounds that South Africa might intervene on behalf of its erstwhile ally. "Don't get into such wasting, costly, and finally pointless offensives," Castro had vented to Gusev's staff. "And count us out if you do." General Arnaldo Ochoa, the senior Cuban military officer in Angola, also protested that the tactics FAPLA were being forced to adopt were more applicable to combat operations in central Europe than an offensive against an irregular fighting force on the broken African terrain. Ronnie Kasrils, MK's intelligence chief, warned the Soviet mission that if Saluting October proceeded an SADF counteroffensive was imminent. Gusev overruled the Cuban and MK concerns, and the operation commenced without contingency plans for a South African intervention.


title: South African Border War

text: The preliminary phase of the new offensive began in August 1987. Eight FAPLA brigades deployed to Tumpo, a region to the east of Cuito Cuanavale in early August, where on Soviet advice they temporarily paused for more supplies and reinforcements. This would prove to be a fatal error. On 14 August, having lost days of precious time, FAPLA resumed its efforts to advance; by then South Africa had launched Operation Moduler to halt the offensive. The bloody campaign that followed entailed a series of engagements known collectively as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.


title: South African Border War

text: Prior to 1987, the South African government was reluctant to become directly involved with its UNITA's internal struggle with Luanda, other than providing that movement with arms and some limited air and artillery support. Nevertheless, Botha recognised that if Jamba fell, the buffer provided by UNITA's presence in southern Angola would collapse with it, and FAPLA would allow PLAN to gain direct access to its territory contiguous to the border. This would make PLAN infiltration of northern South West Africa almost impossible to check, especially in the Caprivi Strip and Kavangoland. As Cuban and MK sources had predicted, the commitment of regular ground troops alongside UNITA was authorised, albeit on the condition that strict control would be exercised over combat operations at the highest level of government to ensure that political and diplomatic requirements meshed with the military ones. The SADF took advantage of FAPLA's numerous delays to assemble a blocking force strong enough to stop the FAPLA drive on Mavinga. By the end of August, South Africa's expeditionary forces near Mavinga had built up to include 32 Battalion, 101 Battalion of the SWATF, and its elite 61 Mechanised Battalion Group.


title: South African Border War

text: There were three major rivers and nine tributaries between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga. Although none of the rivers were especially large, all the prospective crossing points were adjacent to vast expanses of swamps and waterlogged flood plains. These stalled the FAPLA advance and permitted the SADF to create effective choke points which further hampered FAPLA's progress. The South African general staff judged correctly that if these narrow entry points were seriously contested they had the potential to bottleneck the FAPLA brigades. They opted to launch a counteroffensive at the Lomba River, which was the last of the three rivers FAPLA had to cross before reaching Mavinga. The success of the South African counteroffensive was ensured by the rapid collapse of FAPLA's 47 Infantry Brigade, which was tasked with establishing a bridgehead on the Lomba's southern bank.


title: South African Border War

text: In conventional terms, the FAPLA brigades theoretically possessed more than enough strength and firepower to dislodge UNITA and the SADF from the Lomba River. But they were inadequately trained or experienced to counter the South African blocking force, which was composed of units selected for their experience in mobile bush warfare, and were outmanoeuvred in the thick foliage cover. The Lomba's swampy environment also hampered coordinated actions and allowed the SADF to isolate and rout each brigade in piecemeal engagements. Between September and October 1987 FAPLA suffered almost 2,000 casualties during several failed river crossings. With much of its bridging equipment destroyed, FAPLA abandoned the offensive and ordered its remaining brigades back to Cuito Cuanavale. The Soviet military mission had suffered 3 dead and at least 1 seriously wounded. The SADF had suffered 17 dead and 41 wounded, as well as the loss of 5 armoured vehicles.


title: South African Border War

text: During Operation Moduler, Cuban combat troops had remained well north of the Lomba River and declined to participate in the fighting, per Castro's instructions. In Luanda, President dos Santos summoned General Gusev and the senior Cuban general officer, Gustavo Fleitas Ramirez, for an urgent conference to discuss the worsening military situation and the failure of Operation Saluting October. Ramirez reminded dos Santos that Cuba had been opposed to the offensive from the beginning. Gusev lamented in his memoirs that "I informed [chief of the Soviet general staff] Akhromeyev about the result of the operation, but the most difficult task, in moral terms, was to inform the president of Angola, whom I had assured that the operation would succeed and that Savimbi would be crushed".


title: South African Border War

text: On 25 November 1987, United Nations Security Council Resolution 602 was passed, condemning Operation Moduler as an illegal violation of Angolan sovereignty. The resolution expressed dismay at the continued presence of SADF troops in Angola and called for their unconditional withdrawal. South African foreign minister Pik Botha flatly dismissed the resolution out of hand, citing the unaddressed issue of Cuban linkage. He promised that the SADF would depart Angola once FAPLA's Cuban and Soviet advisers had likewise been withdrawn, or when their presence no longer threatened South African interests.


title: South African Border War

text: On 29 September P.W. Botha added a third objective to Operation Moduler: the destruction of all FAPLA units east of Cuito Cuanavale. The reasons for this shift in objectives once FAPLA had abandoned its offensive were not apparent to everybody in the South African government. Pik Botha and his senior colleagues in the foreign ministry cautioned against a major offensive north of the Lomba, citing potential diplomatic repercussions. But confidence in the SADF had been buoyed by its effective defence of the Lomba, and members of the South African general staff successfully agitated for a renewed offensive towards Cuito Cuanavale. It is unclear whether they interpreted their new objective as veiled permission to seize Cuito Cuanavale itself, although the option was discussed.


title: South African Border War

text: Per Botha's new directive, the SADF commenced Operation Hooper with the goal of encircling the retreating Angolan brigades and preparing for operations further east of the Cuito River. The decision to commence Hooper towards the end of the 1987 calendar year created problems for the SADF, since a number of white conscripts involved in the Lomba River engagements were nearing the end of their national service. This led to a delay of several weeks while the existing troops were gradually withdrawn from Angola and replaced with a new intake. The SADF had dispatched a second mechanised battalion, 4 South African Infantry, to Angola, as well as a squadron of Olifant Mk1A tanks and a battery of G5 and G6 howitzers. Between January and March 1988, the SADF and UNITA launched several bloody offensives just east of Cuito Cuanavale to destroy the shattered Angolan units that had succeeded in establishing a new defensive line there, an initiative which became known as Operation Packer. They managed to drive FAPLA deeper into a shrinking perimeter between the Cuito, Tumpo, and Dala rivers known as the "Tumpo Triangle".


title: South African Border War

text: The Cubans and Soviets concurred with FAPLA's decision to withdraw to Cuito Cuanavale, with Castro pointing out that a strong defensive stand could plausibly be made there if the brigades managed to reach it. He also suggested that the only way to defeat the South African expeditionary forces in the long term was to outflank them and apply pressure to the South West African border. This would entail opening up yet another military front, in southwestern Angola, well south of Cuito Cuanavale. On 15 November, dos Santos had written a letter to Castro requesting direct Cuban military assistance against the SADF. Castro agreed on the condition that he and General Arnaldo Ochoa receive command of all FAPLA forces on the front. The Soviet military mission was notably excluded from all future operational planning. Shortly afterwards, the Cuban government authorised the deployment of an armoured brigade and several air defence units—about 3,000 personnel—to Cuito Cuanavale. Castro suspected that the South Africans would not be content with eliminating FAPLA east of the town and that they intended to take control of Cuito Cuanavale's strategic airfield as well. His strategy was to strengthen the defence of that settlement while making preparations to vastly increase the Cuban troop presence at Lobito, near the South West African border.


title: South African Border War

text: The FAPLA and Cuban defenders now ringed their defensive positions with minefields and interlocking fields of fire from dug-in tanks and field guns, into which they channelled SADF assaults. On multiple occasions the combined UNITA and SADF forces launched unsuccessful offensives which became bogged down in minefields along narrow avenues of approach and were abandoned when the attackers came under heavy fire from the Cuban and FAPLA artillerymen west of the Cuito River. The defenders' artillery was sited just beyond the maximum range of the South African artillery and on high ground which gave them a commanding view of the battlefield. This advantage, coupled with the proliferation of minefields, and heavily reinforced FAPLA-Cuban defensive positions rendered further attacks by the South African troops futile.


title: South African Border War

text: Operations Hooper and Packer were terminated after the SADF had killed almost 700 FAPLA troops and destroyed about half of the Angolan brigades' remaining tanks and armoured vehicles. Cuba had suffered 42 dead and the loss of 6 tanks. South African casualties were relatively light: 13 dead and several dozen severely wounded. Three SADF tanks were also abandoned in a minefield, while most of the others were damaged beyond immediate repair or rendered unserviceable due to mechanical problems. UNITA suffered thousands of casualties, prompting accusations that its troops had been used as "cannon fodder" by the SADF. Cuban post-action reports claimed that UNITA insurgents had been sent through the minefields at gunpoint to clear the way for the South African armour.


title: South African Border War

text: The Tumpo Triangle campaign exposed several flaws in the planning of the South African defence chiefs and general staff. They had estimated quite accurately that their forces would be able to inflict a crushing defeat on FAPLA in the flood plains and open terrain south of Cuito Cuanavale. But they had not anticipated so many Angolan units would survive and establish strong defensive lines in the Tumpo Triangle, or that the addition of Cuban troops there would stiffen the resistance considerably. Further South African miscalculations appeared in the latter phases of the campaign. One was the assumption that the small and highly mobile but lightly armed SADF expeditionary force was suited to mounting frontal attacks on well-prepared defenders supported by dug in artillery west of Cuito. The use of battalions trained and organised for mobile warfare in this manner was in violation of the SADF's own mechanised doctrine. The defending Angolans had ample dug-in artillery and the benefit of air cover: the Soviet Union's increased willingness to supply FAPLA with advanced fighter aircraft and even Soviet pilots on loan posed a serious threat to South African air operations over Cuito Cuanavale. As Soviet involvement grew, and the number of air battles increased, South Africa's air force began encountering MiG-23s flown by well-trained Soviet pilots. Furthermore, Angolan pilots newly trained under Soviet supervision at Lubango were proving more capable of challenging South African fighters. For the first time the SADF began losing aircraft in numbers, indicating the contested extent of the Angolan skies.


title: South African Border War

text: The SADF's declining air supremacy forced a number of operational changes. South African pilots exercised a standoff bombing capacity of twenty kilometres and timed their raids so they were out of range before FAPLA MiGs could be scrambled to intercept them. The necessity of avoiding prolonged aerial contact was partly dictated by fuel considerations: the SADF Mirage F1AZ and F1CZ fighters launched from distant bases in South West Africa, which meant they had barely enough fuel for three minutes of combat once they reached Cuito Cuanavale. The impact on ground operations was more consequential. FAPLA MiGs flew reconnaissance missions in search of the G5 and G6 howitzers, forcing the South African artillery crews to resort to increasingly elaborate camouflage and take the precaution of carrying out their bombardments after dark. Owing to the increase in losses and damage due to UNITA's US-supplied Stinger missiles, however, MiG pilots had to adopt contingencies of their own to reduce the vulnerability of their aircraft. Cuban and Angolan warplanes were forced to drop bombs from higher altitudes, greatly reducing their accuracy. FAPLA airfields were also monitored by South African forward artillery observers, who called in bombardments to destroy aircraft while they were exposed on the runway and preparing to take off.


title: South African Border War

text: Although the SADF and UNITA counteroffensive had been checked, FAPLA remained heavily strained and more dependent than before on its Cuban allies and Soviet materiel. This gave dos Santos an incentive to ease the military dilemma with negotiations and he reopened the possibility of reaching a new ceasefire and disengagement agreement with South Africa. As early as January 1987, Chester Crocker had responded to positive signals from Luanda, especially when President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the People's Republic of the Congo offered to mediate peace talks between the rival states. Yet preliminary discussions in Brazzaville throughout late 1987 and early 1988 remained stymied by the Angolan government's refusal to compromise on the timetable for a proposed Cuban withdrawal. The Cuban government had not been consulted on the Brazzaville talks in advance and resented what it perceived as a discourtesy on the part of dos Santos. This factor had the effect of persuading Castro to make an authoritative bid to join the Angolan-US peace talks. He was determined that Cuba no longer be excluded from negotiations concerning its own military, and the results of any future settlement on the withdrawal process leave Cuba's image untarnished.


title: South African Border War

text: While Operation Hooper was underway in late January 1988, Crocker relented to pressure and accepted Cuba as an equal partner in further peace talks. Castro agreed that he would not introduce extraneous issues to the agenda, such as Cuba–US relations, and that discussion of a phased troop withdrawal would extend to all Cuban military personnel stationed in Angola, including combat troops, logistical staff, and advisers. With Cuba's entry into the Brazzaville talks, its desire to shift its military involvement in Angola from a passive, defensive role to an offensive one intensified. Castro opted to escalate ground operations against the SADF, since he considered diplomatic progress impossible as long as South Africa still clung to the likelihood of a tactical victory. He retained a solely defensive posture at Cuito Cuanavale, keeping the SADF fixed in place, while carrying out his longstanding proposal to launch a flanking manoeuvre towards the South West African border. The new offensive would consist of a movement of Cuban forces in divisional strength west of the Cunene River.


title: South African Border War

text: On 9 March, Castro ordered all Cuban troops massed at Lobito, which had grown to about 40,000 men, southward. He likened their movement to "a boxer who with his left hand blocks the blow [at Cuito Cuanavale] and with his right – strikes [in the west]". "That way," Castro recounted on another occasion, "while the South African troops were being bled slowly dry in Cuito Cuanavale, down in the southwest...40,000 Cuban soldiers...backed by about 600 tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces, 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons, and the daring MiG-23 units that took over the skies, advanced towards the Namibian border, ready to sweep away the South African forces".


title: South African Border War

text: As the Cuban brigades advanced, they accumulated thousands of PLAN insurgents, who departed their bases to join the offensive. The presence of so many Cuban troops effectively resuscitated PLAN's sagging fortunes, as it curtailed new South African military initiatives against the insurgents not only in Angola but South West Africa as well. Firstly, the region being occupied by the Cubans just north of the border was the same territory the SADF had monitored and patrolled for almost a decade in order to prevent PLAN infiltration into Ovamboland. Secondly, all South African units near the border had ceased routine counter-insurgency operations while they were being mobilised to resist a potential Cuban invasion. Matters were complicated further when the Cubans formed three joint battalions with PLAN fighters, each with its own artillery and armoured contingents. Due to the integration of the insurgents with Cuban personnel at the battalion level, South African patrols found it impossible to engage PLAN in Angola without risking a much larger confrontation involving aggressive and well-armed Cuban troops.


title: South African Border War

text: The limited number of SADF troops available near the border could not halt the continued progress of the Cuban army or reduce the threat to South West Africa. There were simply too few personnel and resources to secure the broad defensive positions along the Cutline against a conventional force in divisional strength. Nevertheless, the SADF was able to slow the Cuban offensive with a series of effective delaying actions throughout mid-1988, an initiative known as Operation Excite. When South African officials warned against an invasion of South West Africa, Castro retorted that they were "in no position to demand anything". Havana also issued an ambiguous statement which read, "we are not saying we will not go into Namibia". The South African government responded by mobilising 140,000 reservists—a figure almost unprecedented in SADF history—and threatening severe repercussions on any Cuban unit which crossed the border.


title: South African Border War

text: Despite taking the necessary countermeasures on the battlefield, the South African government discerned it had reached the political limits of further escalation in Angola. The casualties sustained during the Cuito Cuanavale campaign had been sufficient to cause public alarm and provoke difficult questions about the tactical situation on the border and why South African soldiers were dying there. There was little reason to believe yet another bloody campaign would be successful in expelling the Soviets and Cuba from the region; on the contrary, as in the past, it could lead to an increase in the amount of Soviet weapons and Cuban troops. The conflict had also evolved from a low-intensity struggle against lightly armed insurgents into protracted battles between armies backed by all the paraphernalia of modern conventional warfare, with the accompanying rise in human and material costs. This contributed to a sense of war weariness and increased the growing skepticism and sensitivity in civilian circles towards the SADF's Angolan operations.


title: South African Border War

text: The failure of the Soviet-supervised Operation Saluting October, along with the consequent destruction of hundreds of millions of dollars' of FAPLA's Soviet-supplied arms, had the effect of moderating Moscow's stance on Angola. In a notable departure from its previous foreign policy stance, the Soviet Union disclosed it too was weary of the Angolan and South West African conflicts and was prepared to assist in a peace process—even one conducted on the basis of Cuban linkage. Reformist Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, also wished to reduce defence expenditures, including the enormous open-ended commitment of military aid to FAPLA, and was more open to a political settlement accordingly.


title: South African Border War

text: For South Africa and the Soviet Union—the two parties which had previously refrained from joining the US-mediated talks—the point had now been reached where the costs of continuing the war exceeded its anticipated benefits. This necessitated a change in perceptions in both nations, which began warming to the possibility of a negotiated peace. The Soviet government agreed to jointly sponsor with the US a series of renewed peace talks on 3 and 4 May 1988. For its part, South Africa made its first bid to join the tripartite negotiations and agreed to send a delegation of diplomats, intelligence chiefs, and senior SADF officers. The Soviet and US diplomats in attendance, including Crocker, made it clear to the South Africans that they wanted peace in Angola and a political settlement in South West Africa. They were also agreed on the need to bring pressure on their respective allies to bring about a solution. South Africa would be expected to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, in exchange for the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Cuban and Angolan delegations had already assented to a complete Cuban withdrawal, and under US pressure produced an extremely precise timetable which extended this process over three to four years. South Africa found this unacceptable but conceded that the withdrawal could be timed to certain benchmarks in the Namibian independence process.


title: South African Border War

text: According to Crocker, the US decision to use Security Council Resolution 435 as the basis and pivot for a regional settlement provided leverage over the discussions. The proposed formation of a UN "verification mission" to monitor Cuba's adherence to a withdrawal settlement proved instrumental in persuading the South African government that it would receive a balanced agreement. The talks began progressing more smoothly after July 1988, when Carlos Aldana Escalante was appointed head of the Cuban delegation. Aldana was chief of ideological affairs and international relations for the Communist Party of Cuba; he was far better informed of foreign developments, particularly in the Soviet bloc, than many of his contemporaries. In light of Gorbachev's reforms, political developments in Eastern Europe, and the reduction of tensions between the superpowers, Aldana believed that Cuba needed to work swiftly towards normalising relations with the US. Cooperation vis-à-vis Southern Africa was seen as a natural prerequisite to better relations with Washington and possibly, a permanent bilateral dialogue.


title: South African Border War

text: Between May and September 1988 the parties met for several rounds of talks in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and Brazzaville, but remained deadlocked on the nuances of the withdrawal timetable. The fact that there were two objectives—Namibian independence and a Cuban withdrawal—doubly aggravated the issue of timing and deadlines. In August, the Angolan, Cuban, and South African delegations signed the Geneva Protocol, which established the principles for a peace settlement in South West Africa and committed the SADF to a withdrawal from that territory. As a direct result of the Geneva Protocol, PLAN declared a ceasefire effective from 10 August. The 1988 US presidential elections lent new urgency to the negotiations, which had recently stalled after six consecutive rounds of talks in Brazzaville. Angola and Cuba had gambled heavily on a victory for Michael Dukakis and the Democratic Party during the US elections, hoping that this would spell the end of US aid to UNITA and a harder line on South Africa. At the time of the Geneva Protocol, dos Santos had commented that "if the Democrats had won the elections, there would be a readjustment in US policy, particularly on Southern Africa". The election of Republican candidate George H. W. Bush had the effect of persuading the Angolan and Cuban delegations to be more flexible. Crocker reiterated on several occasions that a new US administration meant changes in personnel and basic policy review, and pressed them not to waste months of effort.


title: South African Border War

text: Three days after the US election results were released, the parties reconvened in Geneva and within the week had agreed to a phased Cuban withdrawal over the course of twenty seven months. In exchange, South Africa pledged to begin bestowing independence on South West Africa by 1 November 1989. On 13 December, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed the Brazzaville Protocol, which affirmed their commitment to these conditions and set up a Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) to supervise the disengagement in Angola. The JMMC was to include Soviet and US observers. All hostilities between the belligerents, including PLAN, were to formally cease by 1 April 1989. On 22 December, the Brazzaville Protocol was enshrined in the Tripartite Accord, which required the SADF to withdraw from Angola and reduce its troop levels in South West Africa to a token force of 1,500 within twelve weeks. Simultaneously, all Cuban brigades would be withdrawn from the border to an area north of the 15th parallel. At least 3,000 Cuban military personnel would depart Angola by April 1989, with another 25,000 leaving within the next six months. The remaining troops would depart at a date not later than 1 July 1991. An additional condition was that South Africa would cease all support for UNITA, and Angola likewise for PLAN and MK.


title: South African Border War

text: On 20 December, United Nations Security Council Resolution 626 was passed, creating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the redeployment northwards and subsequent withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola. UNAVEM included observers from Western as well as non-aligned and communist nations. In February 1989 the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was formed to monitor the South West African peace process.


title: South African Border War

text: The initial terms of the Geneva Protocol and Security Council Resolution 435 provided the foundation from which a political settlement in South West Africa could proceed: holding of elections for a constitutional assembly, confinement of both PLAN and the SADF to their respective bases, the subsequent phased withdrawal of all but 1,500 SADF troops, demobilisation of all paramilitary forces that belonged to neither the SADF nor to the police, and the return of refugees via designated entry points to participate in elections. Responsibility for implementing these terms rested with UNTAG, which would assist in the SADF withdrawal, monitor the borders, and supervise the demobilisation of paramilitary units.


title: South African Border War

text: Controversy soon arose over the size of UNTAG's military component, as the member states of the Security Council expected to cover the majority of the costs were irritated by its relatively large size. However, Angola, Zambia, and other states sympathetic to PLAN insisted that a larger force was necessary to ensure that South Africa did not interfere with independence proceedings. Against their objections UNTAG's force levels were reduced from the proposed 7,500 to three battalions of 4,650 troops. This slashed projected expenses by nearly three hundred million dollars, but the Security Council did not approve the revised budget until 1 March 1989. The inevitable delay in UNTAG's full deployment ensured there were insufficient personnel prepared to monitor the movement of PLAN and the SADF or their confinement to bases on 1 April, when the permanent cessation in hostilities was to take effect. Secretary-General de Cuéllar urged restraint in the interim on both sides to avoid jeopardising the "de facto" ceasefire maintained since August 1988 or the 1 April implementation schedule. Nevertheless, PLAN took advantage of the political uncertainty in the weeks following the UNTAG budget debate to begin moving its forces in Angola closer to the border.


title: South African Border War

text: Since the early 1980s PLAN had consistently stated its intention to establish camps inside South West Africa during any future political transition, a notion rejected with equal consistency by the South African government. Compounding this fact was that PLAN insurgents also identified themselves as refugees without making any distinction between their civilian or military background, and the UN had explicitly invited refugees to return home. Indeed, PLAN did not possess many regular standing units and by the late 1980s many of its personnel followed cyclical patterns of fighting as insurgents before returning to refugee camps as civilians. On 31 March, Pik Botha complained to the JMMC that PLAN troops had advanced south of the 16th parallel and were massing less than eight kilometres from the border. He promptly intercepted UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari and UNTAG commander Dewan Prem Chand that evening and gave them the same information. On the morning of 1 April, the first PLAN cadres crossed into Ovamboland, unhindered by UNTAG, which had failed to monitor their activity in Angola due to the delays in its deployment. Ahtisaari immediately contacted SWAPO, ordering it to rein in PLAN, to little avail. The South African foreign ministry also contacted the Secretary-General, who in turn relayed the same message to SWAPO officials in New York.


title: South African Border War

text: At the end of the day, with no signs of the PLAN advance abating, Ahtisaari lifted all restrictions confining the SADF to its bases. Local police mobilised and fought off the invaders in a delaying action until regular SADF forces were able to deploy with six battalions. After the first two days the insurgents lost their offensive initiative, and the combined South African forces drove PLAN back across the border in a counteroffensive codenamed Operation Merlyn. Between 1 and 9 April 273 PLAN insurgents were killed in the fighting. The SADF and police suffered 23 dead. On 8 April, the JMMC had issued the Mount Etjo Declaration, which reiterated that the Tripartite Accord was still in effect and that South Africa, Angola, and Cuba remained committed to peace. It also ordered all PLAN insurgents remaining in Ovamboland to surrender at UNTAG-supervised assembly points.


title: South African Border War

text: Sam Nujoma denied any incursion had taken place on 1 April, claiming that he had only ordered PLAN insurgents already inside South West Africa to begin establishing base camps. He also pointed out that SWAPO had never been a signatory to the Tripartite Accord, and therefore the cessation of hostilities as dictated by its terms was non-binding. This drew some ire from Angola, which had given guarantees to the UN that PLAN would remain north of the 16th parallel. The SADF was re-confined to its bases on 26 April, then released into Ovamboland again to verify that the insurgents had departed. By May, all but a small handful of PLAN insurgents had been relocated north of the 16th parallel under JMMC supervision, effectively ending the South African Border War.


title: South African Border War

text: General elections under a universal franchise were held in South West Africa between 7 and 11 November 1989, returning 57% of the popular vote for SWAPO. This gave SWAPO 41 seats in the territory's Constituent Assembly, but not a two-thirds majority which would have enabled it to unilaterally draft a constitution without the other parties represented. South West Africa formally obtained independence as the Republic of Namibia on 21 March 1990.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The Czech Republic national football team () represents the Czech Republic in international football. The team is controlled by the Football Association of the Czech Republic (FAČR). Historically, the team participated in FIFA and UEFA competitions as Bohemia and Czechoslovakia.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the first international competition of the Czech Republic was UEFA Euro 1996, where they finished runners-up and they have taken part at every European Championship since. Following the separation, they have featured at one FIFA World Cup, the 2006 tournament.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: When Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Czech Republic team was formed. They played their first friendly match away to Turkey on 23 February 1994. The newly formed team played their first home game in Ostrava, against Lithuania, in which they registered their first home win.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Their first competitive match was part of the UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying campaign, in which they defeated Malta 6–1 in Ostrava. During the campaign, the Czech Republic registered six wins, three draws, and a defeat against Luxembourg, finishing their qualifying Group 5 in first place, ahead of group favourites the Netherlands. In the final tournament, hosted by England, the Czechs progressed from the group stage, despite a 2–0 opening game defeat to Germany. They progressed to the UEFA Euro 1996 Final, losing 2–1 to Germany at Wembley Stadium.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The Czechs finished third in the 1998 FIFA World Cup qualifying group, behind Spain and Yugoslavia, and subsequently missed the tournament.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The Czech Republic qualified for Euro 2000, winning all of their group games and conceding five goals. In the finals the team were drawn in Group D, alongside France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The team lost to the Netherlands after last-minute penalty and lost the second match against France, which eliminated them from advancing to the knockout round. The Czech Republic managed a 2–0 win against Denmark in their final game courtesy of two goals from Vladimír Šmicer.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Once again, the Czech Republic failed to qualify for the World Cup, this time finishing second in their 2002 qualification group, behind Denmark, and then being beaten 1–0 in both legs by Belgium in the UEFA play-offs for a place in the finals.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: A team settled with Pavel Nedvěd, Jan Koller, Tomáš Rosický, Milan Baroš, Marek Jankulovski, Tomáš Galásek together with the emergence of goalkeeper Petr Čech were unbeaten in 2002 and 2003, scoring 53 goals in 19 games and qualifying for Euro 2004 in the process. The Czech Republic went on a 20-game unbeaten streak, which finally ended in Dublin on 31 March 2004 in a friendly match against the Republic of Ireland. The Czechs entered the Euro finals in Group D, alongside the Netherlands, Germany and Latvia. The team trailed 2–0 to the Netherlands before winning the game 3–2 and beat Germany in the final group match. The Czech Republic beat Denmark in the quarter-final, went into the semi-final against Greece and Tomáš Rosický hit the bar after just two minutes, Jan Koller had shots saved by the Greek goalkeeper and Pavel Nedvěd left the pitch injured in the end of the first half. It was not to be as the 90 minutes finished goalless and Greece won the game in the last minute of the first half of extra-time with a silver goal.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The Czech Republic achieved their record win during the 2006 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), thrashing Andorra 8–1 in a qualification match in Liberec. In the same match, Jan Koller became the all-time top scorer for the national team with his 35th international goal. At the end of the campaign, after finishing in second place in Group 1 then defeating Norway in a playoff, the Czechs qualified for their first FIFA World Cup. The team was boosted prior to the play-off matches by the return of Pavel Nedvěd, who had initially retired from international football after Euro 2004. The squad for the 2006 World Cup in Germany included 18 of the Euro 2004 team which reached the semi-finals. With the team ranked second in the world, they started the tournament with a 3–0 win over the United States. During the game, however, Jan Koller was forced to leave with a hamstring injury, putting him out of the tournament. In the next game, with Koller absent and Milan Baroš still recovering from injury, the team suffered a 2–0 loss to Ghana. Baroš returned for the final game against Italy which the Czechs had to win to progress. The team were reduced to ten men as Jan Polák was dismissed before half-time for two bookable offences. Italy went on to win 2–0. Pavel Nedvěd, Karel Poborský and Vratislav Lokvenc retired from the national team after this tournament.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: In the qualifying campaign for Euro 2008, they finished top of their group, above Germany on head-to-head records. The Czech Republic beat co-hosts Switzerland 1–0 in their opening game of the final tournament, before being beaten 3–1 by Portugal, meaning that they and Turkey carried identical records going into the final group game. Although the Czechs took a 2–0 lead just past the hour mark and looked set to qualify, Turkey scored three goals in the final 15 minutes of the game to win the game 3–2.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The Czechs faced World Cup qualification, being drawn in Group 3, under the guidance of coach Petr Rada. They started with a 0–0 away draw against Northern Ireland, before losing to Poland. A late goal from Libor Sionko won the next game 1–0 against Slovenia. This was followed by a win against San Marino, and a goalless draw in Slovenia. In their following match, against neighbours Slovakia, a 2–1 defeat at home left Czech Republic in a precarious qualifying position. Manager Petr Rada was dismissed and six players were suspended. Ivan Hašek took temporary charge as manager, gaining four points from his first two matches, as the team drew away to group leaders Slovakia and thrashed San Marino 7–0 in Uherské Hradiště. They subsequently beat Poland in Prague but followed this result with a goalless draw against Northern Ireland, finishing third in the group and failing to qualify for the World Cup. Hašek announced his immediate resignation.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: A changed team under Michal Bílek entered the Euro 2012 qualifiers and began with a home loss to Lithuania. But a win at home to Scotland was followed by wins against Liechtenstein. Spain defeated Czech Republic in between the Liechtenstein games, but the play-off spot was still in their hands. In the next game, a last minute penalty from Michal Kadlec away to Scotland secured a 2–2 draw. Despite Scotland winning their next two games and the Czechs again being defeated by Spain, the team could finish second if they could beat Lithuania away from home in the final game, assuming Spain would beat Scotland at home. Spain won 3–1 and Czech Republic defeated Lithuania 4–1 to seal second spot and a place in the play-offs. Czech Republic were drawn to face Montenegro in the two-legged play-off. A goal from Václav Pilař and a last minute second from Tomáš Sivok helped the Czechs to a 2–0 first leg lead. In the second leg in Podgorica, a late goal from Petr Jiráček sealed a 1–0 win and the Czechs ran out 3–0 aggregate winners and qualified for Euro 2012.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: At the tournament, the Czechs lost their opening game 4–1 to Russia, with their only goal coming from Václav Pilař. In their second match, against Greece, the Czech Republic went 2–0 up within the first six minutes thanks to goals from Petr Jiráček and a second from Pilař. Following the half-time substitution of captain Tomáš Rosický, Greece scored a second-half goal following a mistake from Czech goalkeeper Petr Čech, although there were no more goals and the Czech Republic recorded their first win of the tournament. Going into their third and final group match, the Czech Republic needed at least a draw against co-hosts Poland to advance to the knock-out stage of the tournament. A second-half strike by Jiráček proved the difference between the teams as the Czechs ran out 1–0 winners. Due to Greece beating Russia in the other group game, the Czech Republic subsequently finished top of Group A, becoming the first team to ever win a group at the European Championships with a negative goal difference. The Czech team faced Portugal in the quarter-finals. Portugal eventually made the breakthrough with 11 minutes remaining through a header from Cristiano Ronaldo to win the match 1–0 and eliminate Czech Republic.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Bílek stayed on as coach, despite unrest amongst fans, and was tasked with qualifying for the 2014 World Cup. The Czechs were drawn into UEFA Qualifying Group B along with Italy, Denmark, Bulgaria, Armenia and Malta. The beginning of the campaign was two goalless draws with Denmark and Bulgaria, paired with a narrow win against Malta, capping off their first three games. The team then lost 0–3 to Denmark at home. The team was able to win against Armenia and draw with group leaders Italy, but lost to both Armenia and Italy in the rematches. Bílek resigned after the loss and was replaced with assistant coach Josef Pešice. In their last two games with their new coach, the Czechs recorded wins over Malta and Bulgaria but lost to Italy, leaving them in third place and ending their qualification hopes. Pešice resigned as coach following the conclusion of qualifying.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Pavel Vrba was appointed as the team's new coach on the first day of 2014, ahead of Euro 2016 qualifying. The Czech team was drawn into Group A, along with Netherlands, Turkey, Iceland, Latvia and Kazakhstan. The Czech team began with a win, defeating Netherlands, and followed up with victories over Turkey, Kazakhstan and Iceland, leaving them as group leaders with maximum points after four matches. A draw at home against Latvia followed; nonetheless, Czech Republic remained group leader, and on 6 September 2015, qualified for their sixth European Championship. They only got one point from a draw with Croatia, losing to Spain and Turkey. During a friendly match against Australia on 1 June 2018, the Czechs recorded their biggest defeat losing 0–4 in Sankt Pölten, Austria. It was surpassed during their first qualifier for Euro 2020, as they were beaten 0–5 at Wembley Stadium by England.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Present in Group C during the 2018 World Cup qualifiers, the Czech Republic failed to qualify for the Russian World Cup as it finished in 3rd place with 4 wins, 3 draws and 3 defeats, behind directly qualified Germany and Northern Ireland, then unfortunate play-off.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: On the other hand, they qualified directly for UEFA Euro 2021, finishing 2nd in Group A during the qualifiers, with a record of 5 wins and 3 defeats in 8 games. The team won a prestigious home match against England, the group leader (2–1) and lost all three away matches, in England (0–5), Kosovo (1–2) and Bulgaria (0–1). It is placed in Group D for the first round of the finals, placed under the sign of reunion: with England played in the qualifiers, Croatia present in the same group 4 years earlier in France, as well as Scotland played in the framework of the 2020–21 UEFA Nations League.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: On November 18, 2020, the Czech Republic, then placed in Group 2 of League B in the 2020–2021 edition of the Nations League, obtained promotion to League A for the next edition thanks to a win at home against Slovakia on the last day of the group stages (2–0), allowing the Národní tým to overtake Scotland, which was defeated in Israel (0–1) at the same time. The team has a record of 4 wins and 2 losses (both in the first and second leg against Scotland, although the first leg in Prague was played by substitutes and U17-U19 players due to cases of COVID-19 affecting the regular starters).


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The year 2021 starts on a positive note for the Czech Republic, which manages to catch Belgium at home (1–1) in the qualifiers for the 2022 World Cup. Above all, UEFA Euro 2021 saw the Národní tým realize a much better European campaign than the one in 2016 when they were quickly eliminated, finishing last in their group with only one point; as Jaroslav Šilhavý's men managed to get out of the group. Indeed, the Czech Republic won the first game against Scotland, who were playing at home, with a double from Patrik Schick (2–0), including a goal from more than 45 meters, lobbing the goalkeeper David Marshall who was too far forward on the second goal of the game, a technical gesture that made the world go round. It then gets a draw (1–1) against Croatia, finalist of the 2018 FIFA World Cup before losing on the last day against England at Wembley (0–1) with the assurance before the start of the game to be at worst among the 4 best 3rd of group and thus reach the last 16. The Czechs finished among the 4 best 3rd of the group with 4 points, ahead of Croatia, which has the same number of points and the same overall goal difference, but which inherited the 2nd place in the ranking at the expense of the Czechs since the "Vatreni" scored more goals (4 against 3). In the 1/8th finals, the Czech Republic faced the Netherlands, first of their group with 3 victories and mentioned among the favourites for the final victory. The Czech Republic made a great collective performance and created the surprise by winning 2–0 with goals from Tomáš Holeš (68th minute) and Patrik Schick (80th minute) while the Dutch team finished the game with 10 players, Matthijs de Ligt being sent off for a deliberate hand in the last defender's position, preventing a Czech goal opportunity just before the hour mark The Národní tým, returning to the quarterfinal stage for the first time since 2012, challenged Denmark for a place in the last four of the competition. Unfortunately, they were beaten 1–2, having conceded the first Danish goal after 5 minutes of play due to a refereeing error caused by a non-existent corner, and stopped at the gates of the semi-finals after a successful run. Patrik Schick was the Czech Republic's top scorer with 5 goals, as many as Cristiano Ronaldo at the finals, and both strikers finished as joint top scorers in the competition.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: However, the Czech Republic failed to qualify for the World Cup in Qatar. The Czechs finished third in their group, behind Belgium and Wales, whom they failed to beat (home draw and away defeat in both cases), but they made it to the play-offs thanks to their position in the 2020–21 UEFA Nations League. They were eliminated in the semi-finals of the B lane, following an away defeat against Sweden in extra time (0–1, goal of Robin Quaison in the 110th minute).


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Since 1994, the Czech Republic home kit has primarily been red shirts, with either blue or red shorts. While their away kit has been white shirts with white shorts. Although the team wore blue shorts for a short period between 2010 and 2011. In 2020 the team introduced a new alternate colour as the away kit for the first time.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: Ten different cities hosted national team matches of the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2011. The most commonly-used stadium is Generali Arena, the home stadium of AC Sparta Prague. As of 3 June 2014, the team has played 36 of 92 home matches there. Since 2012, competitive games have also been held Doosan Arena, Plzeň.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The following squad was called up for the friendly matches against Faroe Islands and Turkey on 16 and 19 November 2022, respectively.


title: Czech Republic national football team

text: The following players have also been called up to the Czech Republic squad within the last twelve months:


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The Last House on the Left is a 1972 American exploitation horror film written, directed and edited by Wes Craven in his directorial debut. The film follows Mari Collingwood (Sandra Peabody), a hippie teenager who is abducted, raped, and tortured by a fugitive family on her seventeenth birthday. When they unwittingly seek refuge in her home, the killers face the vengeance of her parents.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Craven based the film on the 1960 Swedish film "The Virgin Spring", directed by Ingmar Bergman, which in turn is an adaptation of the Swedish ballad "Töres döttrar i Wänge". Craven developed the film with producer Sean S. Cunningham after working with him on "Together" (1971) and once the filmmakers obtained small funding from Hallmark Releasing to make another feature film. Craven wrote a script (originally overtly pornographic) on the concept of shock factor, wanting to depict violence in a realistic matter. Once casting began, Craven promised the actors auditioning that the film would instead be a traditional horror film.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The film was initially damaging to Craven's career and was controversial for its marketing, with the tagline "Can a movie go too far?", advertising its violence. While not being a massive box office draw at drive-ins, it grossed $3 million against a budget of under $90,000. Critics derided the film for its confrontational violence and Craven's use of black comedy—scenes of slapstick comedy intercut with scenes of rape and humiliation. However, it has since achieved a cult following and was nominated for AFI's 100 Years...100 Thrills. The film was particularly troubling for lead actress Peabody, who recalled struggling filming due to a constantly changing script and suffering abuse from her male co-stars. Many of the other actors involved in the film have expressed regret for starring in it decades after its release.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Mari Collingwood plans to attend a concert with her friend Phyllis Stone, for her seventeenth birthday. Her parents, Estelle and John, express their concern about her friendship with Phyllis, but let her go and give her a peace symbol necklace. Phyllis and Mari head into the city and on the way, they hear a news report of a recent prison escape involving criminals Krug Stillo, a sadistic rapist and serial killer; his heroin-addicted son, Junior; Sadie, a promiscuous psychopath and sadist; and Fred "Weasel" Podowski, a child molester, peeping Tom and murderer. Before the concert, Mari and Phyllis encounter Junior while he is trying to buy marijuana. He leads them to an apartment where they are trapped by the criminals. Phyllis tries to escape and reason with them, but she fails and is gang-raped. Meanwhile, Mari's unsuspecting parents prepare a surprise party for her.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The next morning, Mari and Phyllis are bound, gagged and put in the trunk of Krug's car and transported to the woods. Mari recognizes that the road is near her home. Phyllis is forced to urinate in her jeans and Mari and Phyllis are forced to perform sexual acts on each other. Phyllis distracts the kidnappers to give Mari an opportunity to escape but is chased by Sadie and Weasel, while Junior stays behind to guard Mari. Mari tries gaining Junior's trust by giving him her necklace and calling him "Willow". Phyllis stumbles across a cemetery where she is cornered and stabbed by Weasel. She crawls to a nearby tree and is stabbed to death. Mari convinces Junior to let her go, but her escape is halted by Krug. Krug carves his name into her chest, then rapes her. Mari vomits, quietly says a prayer and walks into a nearby lake, where Krug fatally shoots her.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: After they change out of their bloody clothes, the gang goes to the Collingwoods' home, masquerading as travelling salesmen. Mari's parents let them stay overnight. The gang finds photos of Mari and realize it is her home. Later, when Junior is in the midst of a heroin withdrawal, Estelle enters the bathroom to check on him and sees Mari's peace symbol necklace around his neck. She finds blood-soaked clothing in their luggage and overhears them talking about Mari's death, and of her disposal in a nearby lake.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Estelle and her husband rush into the woods, where they find Mari's body and decide to take revenge. Estelle seduces Weasel, bites off his penis and swallows it, and then leaves him to bleed to death. John takes his shotgun and shoots at Krug and Sadie. Krug escapes into the living room and overpowers John, before manipulating Junior into killing himself. John fetches a chainsaw, and Krug attempts to flee but is incapacitated by an electrocution booby-trap. Sadie rushes outside and falls into the backyard swimming pool where Estelle slits her throat. The sheriff arrives just as John kills Krug with the chainsaw.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Sean S. Cunningham made his directorial debut with the 1970 white coater film "The Art of Marriage", which grossed $100,000. The film attracted the attention of Steve Minasian's company Hallmark Releasing, which had a distribution partnership with American International Pictures. Cunningham made the 1971 film "Together" as a "better version" of "The Art of Marriage". Wes Craven, who had no money at the time, was put on the job of synchronizing dailies for "Together" and soon began editing the film with Cunningham, with whom he became good friends. Hallmark bought the film for $10,000, and it was considered a "hit", prompting the company to persuade Cunningham and Craven to make another film with a bigger budget; the company then gave them $90,000 to shoot a horror film.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Cunningham served as producer and Craven served as writer and director on the project. Written by Craven in 1971, the original script was intended to be a graphic "hardcore" film, with all actors and crew being committed to filming it as such. However, after shooting began, the decision was made to edit the script to be less harsh. This script, written under the title "Night of Vengeance", has never been released; only a brief glimpse is visible in the featurette "Celluloid Crime of the Century", a 2003 documentary on the making of the film. The crux of the plot is based on the Swedish ballad "Töres döttrar i Wänge", which itself was the basis of Ingmar Bergman's 1960 film "The Virgin Spring", of which Craven was an admirer. Craven envisioned a film in which the violence would be shown in detail onscreen, as he felt that many popular films of the era, such as Westerns, glamorized violence and the "vigilante hero", and gave the public a misleading representation of death in the wake of the Vietnam War.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The majority of the cast of "The Last House on the Left" were inexperienced or first-time actors, with the exception of Richard Towers, Eleanor Shaw and Sandra Peabody, who were all soap opera regulars and had prior film roles. Cunningham and Craven held casting calls for the film at Cunningham's office in Midtown Manhattan in late 1971. Peabody, who was returning to New York after a cross-country road trip, signed on to the film after responding to a casting notice in the trade publication "Backstage". Cunningham and Craven originally wanted her to read for the role of Phyllis; however, after meeting her, they decided to cast her in the lead role of Mari. Shaw was a prominent soap opera actress, and Towers worked as a talent agent in addition to acting. Although she did not recall the specific circumstances of how she became involved with the project, Lucy Grantham was ultimately cast in the role of Mari's best friend Phyllis. The role of the lead villain, Krug Stillo, was given to David Hess, also a musician and songwriter. Jeramie Rain, then twenty-one years old, was playing Susan Atkins in an Off-Broadway production based on the Manson family murders. Despite the fact that the original script called for an actress in her forties, Rain was awarded the part of Sadie. Fred Lincoln, who had appeared in pornographic films, was cast as Krug's criminal partner, while Mark Sheffler was given the role of Krug's heroin-addicted son. Sheffler was a struggling twenty-one year old actor and a client of Towers prior to filming, and was informed of auditions by him. According to Lincoln, he and Peabody were acquaintances and had the same agent at the time.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The film was shot on location for seven days in New York City, as well as Long Island, followed by shoots in rural locations outside of Westport, Connecticut. While filming in Connecticut, the cast and crew spent much time at producer Cunningham's family's home. According to Craven, the lake sequence was shot in the town reservoir of Weston, Connecticut. Craven sought a "documentary"-style appearance for the film, marked by close-up shots and single-cut takes.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Cunningham later described the film shoot as being "guerrilla-style", with the crew spontaneously filming at locations and being forced to leave due to lack of permits; in retrospect, Lincoln said that "nobody knew what [they] were doing". Much of the special effects in the film were achieved practically, some at Lincoln's suggestion. For example, for the sequence in which Phyllis is disemboweled, Lincoln helped craft fake intestines with condoms filled with fake blood and sand. For the murder sequence of Sadie in the swimming pool, Rain had a pouch full of fake blood attached underneath her shirt, as well as blood capsules in her mouth, which she manually punctured. Grantham recalled that during the scene in which Hess's character tells her to "piss her pants", she in fact urinated in her jeans. Steve Miner, who would later become a director himself, served as a production assistant on the film.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Hess recalled that much of the cast bonded heavily during the filming process since they were mostly inexperienced actors. In the 2003 documentary "Celluloid Crime of the Century", Lincoln, Rain and Sheffler recalled similar memories which recounted the making of the film. However, both Hess and director Craven recalled the on-set relationship between Hess and Peabody to be turbulent. Peabody was often treated differently than the rest of the cast to the point that Craven recalled there "not being much acting" during the shooting of the film's more violent scenes. Sheffler admitted during a one-on-one sequence with Peabody that he threatened to push her over a cliff if she failed to hit her marks.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Peabody stated that she was genuinely upset during the filming of the more violent scenes as she felt unprepared: "I was upset because I'm an emotional person, and I reacted to what was going on as if it were real. I had a really hard time with some of scenes, because I had come out of "American Playhouse", where it was all about preparation, and everything had to be real. I ended up doing a horrible job in the film. I was very upset, and I felt like I should have channeled that, but I couldn't... I was a young actress and I was still learning to balance any emotions I had from outside of the film into my scene work." Hess revealed that he actually got very physical with her during the filming of the rape scene, and that she could not do anything about it once the camera was running. During this particular shot, assistant director Yvonne Hannemann described it as an upsetting shoot, with her having to be consoled by Craven throughout filming. Peabody recalled, "One of the characters was a method actor, so he was trying to live his part... he'd come after us with a knife at night, trying to freak us out. This was the guy with the dark curly hair [David Hess] - he tried to play his role on and off the set. It was like, 'Lock your doors and windows at night, you don't want him to come get you!' I was scared; I thought this guy had been a killer at some point in his past!" Sandra states that although she was uncertain how a lot of the scenes would turn out, she trusted Craven and Cunningham and their vision for the film.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The film's soundtrack was written by Stephen Chapin and David Hess (who also played the main antagonist, Krug); Chapin wrote all the incidental music, arrangements and orchestration, as well as all the contracting and producing musicians. The music was deliberately written to break with established, conventional horror film scores at that point, employing a mix of 1960s folk rock and bluegrass. It also ran counter to the horror film convention of punctuating moments of fright with shock effects; during some of the film's most violent scenes, music that is completely at odds with the visual content plays.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: In 2013, the soundtrack had a re-release on vinyl, compact disc, cassette, and digital download through One Way Static Records. It was also reissued on a limited hand numbered picture disc for Record Store Day 2014.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: The film underwent multiple title changes, with its investors initially titling it "Sex Crime of the Century". However, after test screenings were completed, it was decided to change the title to "Krug and Company", but even this title was found to have little draw during test screenings. A marketing specialist who was an acquaintance of Cunningham's proposed the title "The Last House on the Left", which Craven initially thought was "terrible". The film was released under this title on August 30, 1972. Like many films during the era, it had a regional expansion to cinemas and drive-in theaters over the course of the next several months, opening in various U.S. cities between September and November 1972. It was frequently shown as part of a double or triple feature with other Hallmark/AIP releases, most notably Mario Bava's "Twitch of the Death Nerve", a film that would also have a considerable impact on the horror genre due to serving as a primary influence on Cunningham's later "Friday the 13th" franchise.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Due to its graphic content, the film sparked protests calling for its removal from local theaters throughout the fall of 1972. The Paris Cinema, a movie theater in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, issued an open letter to these criticisms in September 1972, in which it was noted:


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Promotional material capitalized on the film's graphic content and divisive reception, featuring taglines such as "To avoid fainting, keep repeating 'It's only a movie' ..." Under the "Last House" title, the film proved to be a hit, although anecdotes as to where the advertising campaign originated vary somewhat. Cunningham claims that marketing specialist who devised the "Last House" title was watching a cut of the film with his wife, who continually covered her eyes, prompting him to tell her that it was "only a movie". Other origins have been suggested, however, as it had been used twice before: first for H.G. Lewis's 1964 splatter film "Color Me Blood Red", and then for William Castle's "Strait-Jacket" the following year. The tagline was so successful that it was re-purposed by many of Hallmark's other releases, such as "Don't Look in the Basement" and "Don't Open the Window", and other exploitation films, sometimes with a unique spin. The film's title was also imitated, as in the cases of "Last House on Dead End Street" and "The House on the Edge of the Park", another film starring David Hess; other films, such as the aforementioned "Twitch of the Death Nerve", were later marketed as unofficial sequels with such titles as "Last House Part II".


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Newspaper advertisements featured lengthy statements from the film's producers defending it against claims that it sensationalized violence, one of which noted: "You will hate the people who perpetrate these outragesand you should! But if a movieand it is only a moviecan arouse you to such extreme emotion then the film director has succeeded ... The movie makes a plea for an end to all the senseless violence and inhuman cruelty that has become so much a part of the times in which we live." Promotional artwork accompanying such statements included a warning that the film was "not recommended for persons under 30". The film continued to be screened throughout the United States into 1973.


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Critical response to "The Last House on the Left" upon its original release was largely centered on its depictions of violence. Gene Siskel of the "Chicago Tribune" derided the film, writing: "My objection to "The Last House on the Left" is not an objection to the graphic representations of violence per se, but to the fact that the movie celebrates violent acts, particularly adult male abuse of young women ... I felt a professional obligation to stick around to see if there was any socially redeeming value in the remainder of the movie and found none." Howard Thompson of "The New York Times" wrote that he walked out of the theater during a screening: "When I walked out, after 50 minutes (with 35 to go), one girl had just been dismembered with a machete. They had started in on the other with a slow switch blade. The party who wrote this sickening tripe and also directed the inept actors is Wes Craven. It's at the Penthouse Theater, for anyone interested in paying to see repulsive people and human agony."


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Edward Blank of the "Pittsburgh Press" called the film a "cheap-jack movie of no discernible merit [...] riddled with awkward, self-conscious performances." Roger Ebert, however, gave the film three and a half out of four stars, and described it as "about four times as good as you'd expect". "The Christian Science Monitor" News Service referred to the film as a "desperately sordid melodrama" and a "vulgarized" version of "The Virgin Spring", and drew comparisons to Sam Peckinpah's 1971 film "Straw Dogs". Brian Nelson of "The Daily Dispatch" deemed it the worst film of the year, writing: "Producer Sean S. Cunningham has somehow managed to make what is possibly 1972's most worthless general release film and, with a sensational and overblown advertising campaign, parlay it into a major moneymaker. In doing so, he may be in line for the Cy Dung Award for the movie most offensive to the intelligence of an audience." The "Lubbock Avalanche-Journal"s Bill Towery suggested the film should have received an X rating, adding in his review: "Films such as these give the movie ratings system a bad name. But if your cup of tea is assault, murder, maiming, revenge, and violence, the movie is going to be perfect."


title: The Last House on the Left

text: On review aggregator Rotten Tomatoes, "The Last House on the Left" holds an approval rating of 63%, based on 40 reviews, and an average rating of 6.2/10. Its consensus reads, "Its visceral brutality is more repulsive than engrossing, but "The Last House on the Left" nevertheless introduces director Wes Craven as a distinctive voice in horror." On Metacritic, the film has a weighted average score of 68 out of 100, based on 8 critics, indicating "generally favorable reviews".


title: The Last House on the Left

text: Author and film critic Leonard Maltin awarded the film one-and-a-half out of a possible four stars. Maltin called the film "cheap", and "[a] repellent but admittedly powerful and (for better or worse) influential horror shocker." The film was nominated for AFI's 100 Years...100 Thrills.