title: Emperor Norton

text: In December 1852, Norton thought he saw a business opportunity when China, facing a severe famine, placed a ban on the export of rice, causing the price of rice in San Francisco to increase from four to thirty-six cents per pound (9 to 79 cents/kg). When he heard the "Glyde", which was returning from Peru, was carrying of rice, he bought the entire shipment for $25,000 (or twelve and a half cents per pound), hoping to corner the market. Shortly after he signed the contract, several other shiploads of rice arrived from Peru, causing the price of rice to plummet to three cents a pound. Norton tried to void the contract, stating the dealer had misled him as to the quality of rice to expect.


title: Emperor Norton

text: For nearly two years, from early 1853 to late 1854, Norton and the rice dealers were involved in a protracted litigation. Although Norton prevailed in the lower courts, the case reached the Supreme Court of California, which ruled against him in October 1854. Later, the Lucas Turner and Company bank foreclosed on his real estate holdings in North Beach to pay Norton's debt. He filed for insolvency in August 1856.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton continued to run newspaper ads selling various commodities. Although these ads appear to have run their course by mid 1857, there are other public traces of Norton during this period. In September 1857, he served on a jury for a case of a man accused of stealing a bar of gold from Wells, Fargo & Co. and, in August 1858, Norton ran an ad announcing his candidacy for U.S. Congress. By this time, he was living in reduced circumstances at a working class boarding house.


title: Emperor Norton

text: By 1859, Norton had become completely discontented with what he considered the inadequacies of the legal and political structures of the United States. In July 1859, he issued a brief "Manifesto" addressed to the “Citizens of the Union”. It outlined in the broadest terms the national crisis as Joshua saw it and suggested the imperative for action to address this crisis at the most basic level. The Manifesto ran as a paid ad in the "San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin".


title: Emperor Norton

text: Two months later, on September 17, 1859, Norton hand-delivered the following letter, declaring himself "Emperor of these United States", to the offices of the "Bulletin":


title: Emperor Norton

text: The paper printed the letter in that evening's edition, for humorous effect, and thus began Norton's whimsical 21-year "reign" over the United States.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton issued numerous decrees on matters of state, including a decree on October 12, 1859, to formally abolish the United States Congress. In it, he observed:


title: Emperor Norton

text: In this same decree, Norton repeated his order that all interested parties assemble at Musical Hall in San Francisco in February 1860 to "remedy the evil complained of."


title: Emperor Norton

text: In an imperial decree issued in January 1860, Norton summoned the Army to depose the elected officials of the U.S. Congress:


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton's orders were ignored by the Army, and Congress likewise continued without any formal acknowledgement of the decree. A decree in July 1860 ordered the dissolution of the republic in favor of a temporary monarchy. Norton issued a mandate in 1862 ordering both the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant churches to publicly ordain him as "Emperor", hoping to resolve the many disputes that had resulted in the Civil War.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton then turned his attention to other matters, both political and social. In a proclamation dated August 12, 1869, and published in the "San Francisco Daily Herald", he declared the abolition of the Democratic and Republican parties, explaining that he was "desirous of allaying the dissensions of party strife now existing within our realm."


title: Emperor Norton

text: The failure to treat Norton's adopted home city with appropriate respect was the subject of a particularly stern edict that often is cited as having been written by Norton in 1872, although evidence is elusive for the authorship, date, or source of this decree:


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton was occasionally a visionary, and some of his imperial decrees exhibited profound foresight. He is said to have issued instructions to form a League of Nations, he explicitly forbade any form of conflict between religions or their sects, and he issued several decrees calling for the construction of a suspension bridge or tunnel connecting Oakland and San Francisco—with the last of these decrees showing his irritation at the lack of prompt obedience by the authorities:


title: Emperor Norton

text: Long after his death, similar structures were built in the form of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge and the Transbay Tube, and there have been efforts since the 1930s to name the Bay Bridge after Emperor Norton or at least to add "Emperor Norton Bridge" as an honorary name for the bridge.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton spent most of his daylight hours inspecting the streets; spending time in parks and libraries; and paying visits to newspaper offices and old friends in San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley. In the evenings, he often was seen at political gatherings or at theatrical or musical performances.


title: Emperor Norton

text: He wore an elaborate blue uniform with gold-plated epaulettes, at some time given to him secondhand by officers of the United States Army post at the Presidio of San Francisco. He embellished this with a variety of accoutrements, including a beaver hat decorated with a peacock or ostrich feathers and a rosette, a walking stick and an umbrella. In the course of his rounds, he took note of the condition of the sidewalks and cable cars, the state of repair of public property, and the appearance of police officers. He also often had conversations on the issues of the day with those he encountered.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton caricaturist Edward Jump started a rumor that two noted stray dogs named Bummer and Lazarus (which were also San Francisco celebrities) were Norton's pets. Norton ate at free-lunch counters where he shared his meals with the dogs, although he did not in fact own them.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Special officer Armand Barbier was part of a local auxiliary force whose members were called "policemen" but in fact were private security guards paid by neighborhood residents and business owners, and he arrested Norton in 1867 to commit him to involuntary treatment for a mental disorder. The arrest outraged the citizens and sparked scathing editorials in the newspapers, including the "Daily Alta" which wrote "that he had shed no blood; robbed no one; and despoiled no country; which is more than can be said of his fellows in that line". Police Chief Patrick Crowley ordered Norton released and issued a formal apology on behalf of the police force, and Norton granted an Imperial Pardon to Barbier. Police officers of San Francisco thereafter saluted him as he passed in the street.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton did receive some tokens of recognition for his position. The 1870 U.S. census lists Joshua Norton as 50 years old and residing at 624 Commercial Street, and his occupation is listed as "Emperor". It also notes that he was insane.


title: Emperor Norton

text: During the 1860s and 1870s, there were occasional anti-Chinese demonstrations in the poorer districts of San Francisco, and riots took place, sometimes resulting in fatalities. Starting in the late 1870s, these riots were fomented at rallies that took place on Sunday afternoons at the sandlots across from City Hall. The rallies were led by Denis Kearney, a leader of the anti-Chinese Workingmen's Party of California. At a sandlot rally held on April 28, 1878, Emperor Norton appeared just before the start of proceedings, stood on a small box and challenged Kearney directly, telling him and the assembled crowd to disperse and go home. Norton was unsuccessful, but the incident was widely reported in local papers over the next couple of days.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton issued his own money in the form of scrip, or promissory notes, which were accepted from him by some restaurants in San Francisco. These notes came in denominations between fifty cents and ten dollars, and the few surviving notes are collector's items that routinely sell for more than $10,000 at auction.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Throughout his reign, Norton commented on the policies and actions of foreign governments, issuing proclamations and sending letters to foreign leaders in attempts to establish congenial and fruitful relations with them and their countries and, if he felt it necessary, to cajole better behavior.


title: Emperor Norton

text: In 1862, Mexico was invaded by French Emperor Napoleon III after not being able to pay war reparations after the disastrous Reform War. Napoleon installed the Habsburg Maximilian I as his puppet ruler. That news would quickly reach the United States, and in San Francisco one man suggested that Emperor Norton take the title "Protector of Mexico"—both because no one had been appointed protector yet and because of a popular legend stating Norton was the son of Napoleon III. Norton happily obliged adding the title to many of his proclamations. But, he later would revoke this title, stating "It is impossible to protect such an unsettled nation".


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton wrote Queen Victoria multiple letters suggesting they could marry to strengthen ties between their nations. This would ultimately prove futile as the Queen would never respond.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton also sent multiple letters to Kamehameha V, the King of Hawaii at the time, regarding an estate in Hawaii. Near the end of his reign Kamehameha would refuse to recognize the democratic U.S. government, instead opting to only recognize Norton as sole leader of the United States.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Norton was the subject of many tales. One popular story suggested that he was the son of Emperor Napoleon III and that his claim of coming from South Africa was a ruse to prevent persecution. Rumors also circulated that Norton was supremely wealthy and was feigning poverty because he was miserly.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Starting a few years after Norton declared himself Emperor, local newspapers—notably, the "Daily Alta California"—began to print fictitious decrees; it is believed that newspaper editors themselves drafted these fake proclamations to suit their own agendas. Weary of this, Norton in January 1871 named the Black-owned and -operated "Pacific Appeal" his "imperial organ." Between September 1870 and May 1875, the "Appeal" published some 250 proclamations over the signature of Norton I. Historians and researchers who have studied Norton closely generally regard these proclamations as being authentic.


title: Emperor Norton

text: On the evening of January 8, 1880, Norton collapsed on the corner of California Street and Dupont Street (now Grant Avenue) in front of Old Saint Mary's Cathedral while on his way to a lecture at the California Academy of Sciences. His collapse was immediately noticed, and "the police officer on the beat hastened for a carriage to convey him to the City Receiving Hospital", according to the next day's obituary in the San Francisco "Morning Call". Norton died before a carriage could arrive. The "Call" reported, "On the reeking pavement, in the darkness of a moonless night, under the dripping rain... Norton I, by the grace of God, Emperor of the United States and Protector of Mexico, departed this life". Two days later, the "San Francisco Chronicle" led its article on Norton's funeral with the headline "Le Roi Est Mort." (lit. "The King is dead")


title: Emperor Norton

text: It quickly became evident that Norton had died in complete poverty, contrary to rumors of wealth. Five or six dollars in small change was found on his person, and a search of his room at the boarding house on Commercial Street turned up a single gold sovereign, worth around $2.50. His possessions included his collection of walking sticks, his rather battered saber, a variety of headgear including a stovepipe, a derby, a red-laced Army cap, and another cap suited to a martial band-master, an 1828 French franc, and a handful of the Imperial bonds that he sold to tourists at a fictitious 7% interest. There were fake telegrams purporting to be from Emperor Alexander II of Russia congratulating Norton on his forthcoming marriage to Queen Victoria, and from the President of France predicting that such a union would be disastrous to world peace. Also found were his letters to Queen Victoria and 98 shares of stock in a defunct gold mine.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Initial funeral arrangements were for a pauper's coffin of simple redwood. However, members of a San Francisco businessmen's association called the Pacific Club established a funeral fund that provided for a handsome rosewood casket and arranged a dignified farewell. Norton's funeral on Sunday, January 10 was solemn, mournful, and large. Paying their respects were members of "all classes from capitalists to the pauper, the clergyman to the pickpocket, well-dressed ladies and those whose garb and bearing hinted of the social outcast". The next day, the "San Francisco Chronicle" reported, under the headline "Le Roi Est Mort," that some 10,000 people had come to view the Emperor's body in advance of the 2 p.m. funeral. Notwithstanding the later legend of a "two-mile-long cortege," the "Chronicle" reported in the same article that people lined the streets for only the first block or two; the Emperor's casket was attended by "only three carriages," with no mourners on foot; and that there were "about thirty people" at the burial service in the Masonic Cemetery.


title: Emperor Norton

text: In 1934, Emperor Norton's remains were transferred to a grave site at Woodlawn Memorial Park Cemetery in Colma, California.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Details of Norton's life story may have been forgotten, but he has been immortalized in literature. Mark Twain resided in San Francisco during part of Emperor Norton's public life, and he modeled the character of the King in "Adventures of Huckleberry Finn" on him. Robert Louis Stevenson made Norton a character in his 1892 novel "The Wrecker". Stevenson's stepdaughter Isobel Osbourne mentioned Norton in her autobiography "This Life I've Loved", stating that he "was a gentle and kindly man, and fortunately found himself in the friendliest and most sentimental city in the world, the idea being 'let him be emperor if he wants to.' San Francisco played the game with him."


title: Emperor Norton

text: In more modern times, the life of Emperor Norton is the inspiration for "L'Empereur Smith", a Lucky Luke comic book adventure published in 1976. Norton also appears as a character in the comic book "The Sandman", Vol. 2, No. 31, "Three Septembers and a January", by Neil Gaiman and Shawn McManus, and is voiced by John Lithgow in the audio book version of the comic.


title: Emperor Norton

text: There have been a number of television adaptations of the Norton story. In the June 15, 1956, episode of the western anthology series "Death Valley Days", titled "Emperor Norton", Parker Garvie played the title character. In the February 27, 1966, episode of the western television series Bonanza, titled "The Emperor Norton", Sam Jaffe played the lead role. The episode also featured William Challee as Sam Clemens, a.k.a. Mark Twain. In the December 18, 1956 episode of "Broken Arrow (TV series)" season 1, episode 11, titled "The Conspirators" Florenz Ames played the "Emperor Norton".


title: Emperor Norton

text: Since 1974, the Imperial Council of San Francisco has been conducting an annual pilgrimage to Norton's grave in Colma, California, just outside San Francisco. In January 1980, ceremonies were conducted in San Francisco to honor the 100th anniversary of the death of "the one and only Emperor of the United States".


title: Emperor Norton

text: The Emperor Norton Trust—founded and based in San Francisco from 2013 to 2019, and originally known as The Emperor's Bridge Campaign—is a nonprofit that engages in research, education, and advocacy to advance the legacy of Emperor Norton.


title: Emperor Norton

text: Emperor Norton is considered a patron saint of Discordianism, and a park in the Republic of Molossia is named "Norton Park".


title: Emperor Norton

text: In 1939, the group E Clampus Vitus commissioned a plaque commemorating Emperor Norton's call for the construction of a suspension bridge between San Francisco and Oakland, via Yerba Buena Island (formerly Goat Island). The group intended to place the plaque on the recently opened San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge or, failing that, the new Transbay Terminal. This was not approved by the bridge authorities, however, and the plaque was installed at the Cliff House in 1955. It was moved to the Transbay Terminal in 1986, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the bridge. The Terminal was closed and demolished in 2010 as part of the project to construct a new Transbay Transit Center, and the plaque was placed in storage. After being restored in late 2018, the plaque was rededicated and reinstalled at the new transit center in September 2019 but,after being vandalized in 2020, was moved in 2021 to Molloy's Tavern, in Colma, Calif.


title: Emperor Norton

text: There have been two 21st-century campaigns to name all or parts of the Bay Bridge for Emperor Norton.


title: Emperor Norton

text: San Francisco District 3 Supervisor Aaron Peskin introduced a resolution to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in November 2004, after a campaign by San Francisco Chronicle cartoonist Phil Frank calling for the entire bridge to be named for Norton.


title: Emperor Norton

text: On December 14, 2004, the Board approved a modified version of this resolution, calling for only "new additions," i.e., the planned replacement for the bridge's eastern section, to be named "The Emperor Norton Bridge". Neither the City of Oakland nor Alameda County passed any similar resolution, so the effort went no further.


title: Emperor Norton

text: In June 2013, eight members of the California Assembly and two members of the California Senate introduced a resolution to name the western section of the bridge for former California state Speaker and San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown. In response, there have been public efforts seeking to revive the earlier Emperor Norton effort. An online petition launched in August 2013 calls for the entire bridge system to be named for him. The petition was the impetus for the creation of The Emperor's Bridge Campaign—now known as The Emperor Norton Trust—which carried forward the bridge-naming effort through 2022, citing the precedent of 30 California bridges for which the state has authorized multiple names. The Trust called on the legislature simply to add "Emperor Norton Bridge" as an honorary name for the Bay Bridge, leaving in place all existing names. Most recently, the organization hoped to sponsor a legislative resolution that would take effect in 2022, the 150th anniversary of Emperor Norton's proclamations of 1872, setting out the original vision for the bridge. The legislature did not take up the issue in 2022, and the Trust currently has suspended its bridge-naming effort.


title: Emperor Norton

text: In October 2022, The Emperor Norton Trust announced a new effort to have the San Francisco Ferry Building clock tower named "The Emperor Norton Tower" in 2023 — the 125th anniversary of the opening of the building in 1898.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The Crimean status referendum of 2014 was a disputed referendum on March 16, 2014, concerning the status of Crimea, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the local government of Sevastopol (both subdivisions of Ukraine) after Russian forces were sent to seize control of Crimea.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The referendum was held amidst Russia's annexation of Crimea. The referendum asked local populations whether they wanted to rejoin Russia as a federal subject, or if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea's status as a part of Ukraine.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The official result from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was a 97 percent vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation with an 83 percent voter turnout, and within the local government of Sevastopol there was also a 97 percent vote for integration into Russia with an 89 percent voter turnout.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The March 16 referendum's available choices did not include keeping the status quo of Crimea and Sevastopol as they were at the moment the referendum was held. The 1992 constitution accords greater powers to the Crimean parliament, including full sovereign powers to establish relations with other states; therefore, many Western and Ukrainian commentators argued that both provided referendum choices would result in "de facto" separation from Ukraine. The final date and ballot choices were set only ten days before the plebiscite was held. Before, during and after the plebiscite was proclaimed, the Crimean peninsula was host to Russian soldiers to manage and oversee public buildings and Ukrainian military installations.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Following the referendum, the State Council of Crimea and Sevastopol City Council declared the independence of the Republic of Crimea from Ukraine and requested to join the Russian Federation. On the same day, Russia recognized the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign state.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The referendum was illegal under the Constitution of Ukraine. It is not recognized by most countries, mainly due to the presence of Russian forces. Thirteen members of the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of a resolution declaring the referendum invalid, but Russia vetoed it and China abstained. A United Nations General Assembly resolution was later adopted, by a vote of 100 in favor vs. 11 against with 58 abstentions, which declared the referendum invalid and affirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity. As the plebiscite was proclaimed, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People called for a boycott of the referendum.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to the 2001 Ukrainian population census, 58.3% of the population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are ethnic Russians, 24.3% are ethnic Ukrainians and 12% are Crimean Tatars. In Sevastopol, 71.6% are ethnic Russians and 22.4% are ethnic Ukrainians. 77% of Crimea's and 94% of Sevastopol's population are native speakers of Russian.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Crimea and Sevastopol are neighboring subdivisions of Ukraine located in the Crimean peninsula, a region with a long and complex history. Demographically, the region is currently populated by Russian-speaking majorities but with such demographics undergoing dramatic changes for the past 200 years, due in part to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars 70 years ago. Following the Tatar deportation, large numbers of ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians settled in the region.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: During the period of the Soviet Union, the Crimean Oblast was a subdivision of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic until the 1954 transfer of Crimea into the Ukrainian SSR. Crimea became part of independent Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, shortly after Crimea had re-gained its autonomy following a 1991 referendum. The Ukrainian parliament abolished the and the office of President of Crimea in 1995. In 1998, Crimea gained a new constitution, which granted it less autonomy; notably, any legislation passed by the Crimean parliament could be vetoed by the Ukrainian parliament.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Polling in 2008 by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, also called the Razumkov Centre, found that 63.8% of Crimeans (76% of ethnic Russians, 55% of ethnic Ukrainians, and 14% of ethnic Crimean Tatars, respectively) would like Crimea to secede from Ukraine and join Russia, and that 53.8% of Crimeans would like to preserve its current status but with expanded powers and rights (note that these are mutually exclusive propositions with overlapping support). Razumkov characterized Crimeans' views as controversial and unsteady, and therefore vulnerable to internal and external influences. The Razumkov Centre states in a 2009 analysis, that the second half of 2008 saw a rise in conflict (as a result of the Orange Revolution). Surveys from 2008-11, however, showed a rise of respondents who defined Ukraine as their "motherland" up from 32% to 71%.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The United Nations Development Programme conducted a series of polls in Crimea between 2009 and 2011 about the question of leaving Ukraine and joining Russia with a sample size of 1,200:


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: A poll by the International Republican Institute in May 2013 found that 53% wanted "Autonomy in Ukraine (as today)", 12% were for "Crimean Tatar autonomy within Ukraine", 2% for "Common oblast of Ukraine" and 23% voted for "Crimea should be separated and given to Russia".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: A poll conducted in Crimea in 2013 and then repeated February 8 – 18, 2014 (just days before the ousting of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych), by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) found 35.9% and then 41% support for unification of all Ukraine with Russia.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The Crimean Institute of Political and Social Research conducted a survey from March 8–10, 2014, and found that 77% of respondents planned to vote for "reunification with Russia", while 97% of polled Crimeans assessed the current situation in Ukraine as negative.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: From March 12 – 14, 2014, Germany's largest pollster, the GfK Group, conducted a survey with 600 respondents and found that 70.6% of Crimeans intended to vote for joining Russia, 10.8% for restoring the 1992 constitution, and 5.6% did not intend to take part in the referendum. The poll also showed that if Crimeans had more choices, 53.8% of them would choose joining Russia, 5.2% restoration of 1992 constitution, 18.6% a fully independent Crimean state and 12.6% would choose to keep the previous status of Crimea.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Gallup conducted an immediate post-referendum survey of Ukraine and Crimea and published their results in April 2014. Gallup reported that, among the population of Crimea, 93.6% of ethnic Russians and 68.4% of ethnic Ukrainians believed the referendum result accurately represents the will of the Crimean people. Only 1.7% of ethnic Russians and 14.5% of ethnic Ukrainians living in Crimea thought that the referendum results didn't accurately reflect the views of the Crimean people.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: In May 2014, Washington, D.C., pollster Pew Research published results of a survey that encompassed Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia, in which it was reported that 88% of Crimeans believed the government of Kyiv should officially recognize the result of Crimea's referendum.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Between December 12 and 25, 2014, Levada-Center carried out a survey of Crimea that was commissioned by John O'Loughlin, College Professor of Distinction and Professor of Geography at the University of Colorado in Boulder, and Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), Professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech's National Capital Region campus. The results of that survey were published by Open Democracy in March, 2015, and reported that, overall, 84% of Crimeans felt the choice to secede from Ukraine and accede to Russia was "Absolutely the right decision", with the next-largest segment of respondents saying the decision to return to Russia was the "Generally right decision". The survey commissioners, John O'Loughlin and Gerard Toal, wrote in their Open Democracy article that, while they felt that the referendum was "an illegal act under international law", their survey shows "It is also an act that enjoys the widespread support of the peninsula's inhabitants, with the important exception of its Crimean Tatar population" with "widespread support for Crimea's decision to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation one year ago". Their survey also reported that a majority of Crimean Tatars viewed Crimea's return to Russia as either the "Absolutely right decision" or the "Generally right decision".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: From January 16 – 22, 2015, Germany's GfK Group, with support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, followed-up their pre-referendum survey of Crimeans' voting intention with a post-referendum survey about how satisfied Crimeans are with the outcome of their referendum. GfK's post-referendum survey found that 82% of Crimeans "Fully endorse" Crimea's referendum and return to Russia, while another 11% "Mostly endorse" it.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: From February 9 – 18, 2015, Russian public opinion research centre, VTsIOM, carried out a door-to-door survey of 1,600 Crimean respondents. The VTsIOM survey asked how people would vote if the same referendum on Crimea's identity that was held in March 2014 were held again at the present time (February 2015). VTsIOM reported that 97% of ethnic Russians, 91% of ethnic Ukrainians, 49% of ethnic Tatars, and 92% of all other ethnic groups would vote for Crimea to join Russia, while 1% of ethnic Russians, 4% of ethnic Ukrainians, 26% of ethnic Tatars, and 2% of all other ethnic groups would vote to remain an autonomous region of Ukraine.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: In November 2017, German pollster ZOiS published the results of a survey which reported that 85.3% of Crimeans excluding Tatars, and 61.8% of Crimean Tatars excluding other Crimean demographics thought that Crimeans would either vote the same or that the majority would vote the same as they did in 2014 if the same referendum were held at the present time (November 2017). 3.8% of Crimeans excluding Tatars, and 16.2% of Crimean Tatars responded that most Crimeans would vote differently if the same referendum were held again at that time in 2017. The ZOiS survey also reported that, among the Crimean population apart from Tatars, when asked what was the reason Crimea became a part of Russia in 2014, 32.9% of respondents said that Crimea became a part of Russia as a result of Kyiv's neglect of the region over many years, 25% of respondents said it happened because of the mobilization of the Crimean population, 24% respondents said it happened as a result of the Euromaidan, and 17.4% said it happened as a result of Russia's action. When the same question was asked of Crimean Tatars, excluding all other demographics in Crimea, 36.3% of respondents said that Crimea became a part of Russia as a result of the Euromaidan, 32.9% said it happened as a result of Kyiv's neglect of the region over many years, 24% of respondents said it happened as a result of Russia's action, and 7.8% said it happened because of the mobilization of the Crimean population.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: In March 2019, Russian public opinion research centre, VTsIOM, published the results of a new survey of Crimea in which 89% of respondents said they would vote to "reunify" with Russia if a referendum on the matter were held next week. The same survey reported 93% of Crimeans viewed Crimea's "reunification" with Russia in a positive light, while 3% viewed it in a negative light. 86% of respondents said they believed that Crimea is developing more successfully as under Russian control, while 72% said that the "reunification" had a positive effect on their lives and that of their families. 59% of respondents said they had "noticed positive changes on the peninsula in the last year".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: In December 2019, Levada-Center was again commissioned by John O'Loughlin, College Professor of Distinction and Professor of Geography at the University of Colorado in Boulder, and Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail), Professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech's National Capital Region campus, to carry-out a survey of Crimea's attitudes towards their referendum and living as a part of Russia. The survey aimed to repeat the questions of their 2014 survey. The 2019 survey found that 82% of Crimea's population supported Crimea's accession to Russia, as opposed to 86% in 2014. The survey also found that 58% of Crimean Tatars now supported Crimea's accession to Russia, as opposed to 39% in 2014.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Amidst tensions in the region during the Ukrainian revolution, On February 27, Russian forces cut the Crimean Peninsula off from the mainland Ukraine and took over Supreme Council of Crimea. Under armed occupation, the Crimean regional government was dissolved and reconstituted under Russian supervision, and voted to hold a referendum on the status of Crimea on May 25. Olha Sulnikova, head of information and analysis department of the Crimean parliament, reported on the phone from inside the parliamentary building that 61 of the registered 64 deputies had voted for the referendum resolution and 55 for the resolution to dismiss the government. In statement delivered by a spokesperson for newly appointed chairman Aksionov said ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in the 2014 Ukrainian revolution was a "coup" and the new interim government in Kyiv was illegitimate and stated that the referendum was a response to these developments.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Interfax-Ukraine reported that, "it is impossible to find out whether all the 64 members of the 100-member legislature who were registered as present, when the two decisions were voted on or whether someone else used the plastic voting cards of some of them" because due to the armed occupation of parliament it was unclear how many members of parliament were present. Russian militia commander Igor Girkin recounted that his squad "collected" the deputies into the chambers, and had to "forcibly drive them to vote". Enver Abduraimov, member of the parliament presidium, said that he did not go inside when he saw that armed guards who secured the building were confiscating all communications devices from deputies. Andriy Krysko, head of the Crimean branch of the Voters Committee of Ukraine, announced that no one from the parliament secretariat was in the building when voting took place.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Originally the referendum was to be about the status of Crimea within Ukraine and was initially set for May 25, but later, on March 1, it was moved up to March 30. The referendum was approved by the Supreme Council of Crimea in February but the Central Election Commission of Ukraine denounced it by stating that the Crimean authorities do not possess the legal jurisdiction to conduct it. Regarding the referendum's initial purpose, "The Daily Telegraph" reported on February 27, that it, "appears to be for greater autonomy within Ukraine rather than for full independence."


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: On March 4, the district administration court of Kyiv nullified the no confidence vote in the Council of Ministers of Crimea and the appointment of Sergey Aksyonov as Prime Minister of Crimea and declared the organization and conduct of the referendum as illegal. On March 6, the Supreme Council changed the date of the referendum from March 30 to 16 and changed the choice for the referendum from greater autonomy to accession to the Russian Federation. This decision was made with 78 votes in favor and 8 abstentions. Concerns were raised about the presence of armed forces outside the parliament and reports of lawmakers being denied access to the vote. Later that day, acting President Turchynov announced "In accordance with power I am conferred on, I have stopped the decision of the Crimean parliament. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine will initiate dissolution of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We will defend the inviolability of the Ukrainian territory." On 14 March, the referendum was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and a day later, the Verkhovna Rada formally dissolved the Crimean parliament.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People had called for a boycott of the referendum. Several hundred residents of Crimea, mainly Crimean Tatars, left Crimea for security reasons according to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. The BBC reported that most of the Crimean Tatars that they interviewed were boycotting the vote.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The referendum was announced to be held on March 16 2014 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. The procedure for holding the referendum was established by the temporary referendum regulations adopted by the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: There were two choices to choose from on the ballot. Voters were able to choose only one of these. The choices reflected the following stances:


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The referendum's available choices did not include keeping the status quo of retaining arrangements enacted by the 1998 Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Additionally, the second choice, is unclear because there were two revisions of the Crimean constitution in 1992. The original 1992 constitution was adopted together with a declaration of independence, but parliament then amended the constitution one day later to affirm that Crimea "was a part of Ukraine".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Many commentators, including "The New York Times", Kyiv Post, and Fox News argued that both choices would result in "de facto" independence.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The ballot was printed in three languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar (in the Cyrillic script).


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: There were two simultaneous referendums, one organised by the city council of Sevastopol and another organised by a special committee set up by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The voting boxes were transparent and the ballots were not placed in envelopes in such a way as to make the marked ballots visible through the box walls.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The referendum was to be decided by a simple majority with the choice with the most votes declared winner. The referendum rules did not state if there was a threshold number of votes needed for the result to be enacted.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Organizing and holding the referendum on Crimea's accession to Russia was illegal under the Constitution of Ukraine. According to article 73 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine and article 3 of the 2012 Ukrainian law "On all-Ukrainian referendum", territorial changes can only be approved via a referendum where all the citizens of Ukraine are allowed to vote, including those that do not reside in Crimea. The Central Election Commission of Ukraine also stated that there are no judicial possibilities, according to the legislation of Ukraine, to initiate such changes.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The reactions of many nations to the referendum—particularly of Western nations—were addressing the matter of Crimean secession from Ukraine, whereas the Crimean referendum itself was not about secession from Ukraine, but took Crimea's secession from Ukraine to already be "de facto" following its government's declaration. Crimea's March 16 referendum occurred following the March 11 declaration of Crimea's independence from Ukraine made by Crimea's parliament, which was made following a controversial parliamentary vote of 78 in favour of, and 22 against Crimea's secession from Ukraine. Both of the ballot options for the March 16, 2014 Crimean referendum acknowledged that Crimea was already an independent state at that time, despite the declaration of independence occurring without a national vote in Ukraine, as the constitutions required.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The interim Ukrainian government, the European Union, and several other bodies stated that any referendum held by the local government of Crimea without the express authority of Ukraine is unconstitutional and illegitimate. The interim government in Kyiv and the pro-Russian Crimean faction did not recognize each other as legitimate. Additionally, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People—the unofficial political association of the Crimean Tatars—called for a boycott of the referendum.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Russia and the Crimean parliament argue that the referendum is legal, citing the UN recognized right of self-determination and the advisory opinion on Kosovo in which the International Court of Justice declared that international law contains no prohibition against declarations of independence. Legal scholars have disputed the validity of the Kosovo analogy.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The Venice Commission declared that the referendum was illegal under both Ukrainian and Crimean Constitutions, and violated international standards and norms. The Venice Commission stressed that self-determination was to be understood primarily as internal self-determination within the framework of the existing borders and not as external self-determination through secession. Moreover, the Venice Commission opined, any referendum on the status of a territory should have been preceded by serious negotiations among all stakeholders, and that such negotiations did not take place.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Many scholars and politicians (Neil Melvin, Robert McCorquodale, John Kerry, John B. Bellinger III, Marc Weller among others) have stated that the referendum was conducted under the cover of assault rifles and, thus, the result was obtained through violence. However, according to Russia Today and ITAR-TASS those claims are not substantiated by the Polish Eurasian thinker Mateusz Piskorski (co-founder of the pro-Kremlin European Center of Geopolitical Analysis), the FPÖ's Ewald Stadler and Johannes Hübner, Pavel Chernev, Aymeric Chauprade, Tatjana Ždanoka, Srđa Trifković, who said they saw no signs of pressure or military presence during the referendum, and that the Crimean people were genuinely eager to have their say in the vote.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Party of Regions MP Yuriy Miroshnychenko claimed on March 11 that "the Crimean referendum is illegitimate, and its holding must be immediately stopped". Another Party of Regions MP, Hanna Herman, commented the same day about Yanukovych's press conference, "He needs to ... prevent the illegal referendum".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: President of Russia Vladimir Putin during his conversation with Mustafa Dzhemilev, a former Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, stated that Ukrainian Independence from the Soviet Union was not obtained legitimately, while maintaining that the Crimean referendum followed all international-law, the UN charter, and the convention established by Kosovo's NATO-prodded annexation from Serbia.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to BBC News the campaign leading up to the referendum was "almost entirely pro-Russian". Pro-Russia election posters often featured crossed-out swastikas in an alleged attempt to be saying "No" to the Ukrainian government, who they alleged to be neo-Nazis. Shortly after the referendum was called, Ukrainian TV channels were made unavailable for Crimean viewers, some of them were replaced with Russian stations. BBC News also stated it had received reports of violence against pro-Ukrainian activists.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Unsigned billboards and leaflets campaigning for the referendum, describing new Ukraine government as fascists and showing economic reasons to join Russia, appeared throughout Crimea.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: On March 10, 2014 the "de facto" Prime Minister of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, made an unofficial verbal invitation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor the plebiscite. However, later in the day, an OSCE spokeswoman said that Crimea did not have the authority to invite the organization into the region as it is not a fully-fledged state and, therefore, incapable of requesting services provided exclusively to OSCE members. OSCE observers currently in the Crimea were asked to leave by the Russian authorities in the area. On March 11, the OSCE chair, Switzerland's Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter, declared the referendum as unconstitutional and therefore the OSCE would not send observers. OSCE military observers attempted to enter the region four times but were turned away, sometimes after warning shots were fired, which was another reason given for not dispatching referendum observers.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: OSCE also published a report about their observations which "produced significant evidence of equipment consistent with the presence of Russian Federation military personnel in the vicinity of the various roadblocks encountered".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The UN Human Rights Envoy Ivan Šimonović had to cancel his trip to Crimea as the current situation did not permit his travel. He intended to observe the human rights situation which was Russia's explanation for its engagement in Crimea. Reports from the UN criticised the circumstances surrounding the referendum, especially the presence of paramilitaries, self-defence groups and unidentifiable soldiers.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Russian-controlled media and referendum organizers said that from nearly 70 to 135 international observers monitored the referendum without reporting any violations, but the objectivity of these has been questioned, because many of them had ties to far-right extremist groups.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to Yale historian Timothy Snyder, the Russian government invited individuals belonging to European far-right, anti-semitic and neo-Nazi parties to serve as observers. At least some of the international observers were managed and financed by the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy & Elections (EODE), a far-right, NGO international election-monitoring organization.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Shaun Walker from "The Guardian" reported that during a press conference on the eve of the referendum, some of the aforementioned observers "went on political rants against U.S. hegemony in the world", describing the press conference as "rather bizarre".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Exit-polls were allowed only for the Republican Institute of Sociological Research since, according to Russia-24, no other organizations have applied for accreditation for exit polls.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: A Russian journalist claimed that she was allowed to vote even after admitting she was a Russian citizen with only a temporary one-year permit to live in Crimea. "According to all the laws, this is illegal," she said in one interview. "I am a foreign citizen. How can I decide the destiny of the Crimean Autonomous Republic of Ukraine?"


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The chairman of the electoral campaign of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People claimed officials did not check carefully whether voters' names were on the electoral register and that some voters were bussed in to Bakhchysarai to increase participation rates in the city. Mejlis also stated that only 34.2% of Crimea residents participated in the referendum.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: There were a few reports of people confiscating identification documents before the voting day. Simferopol city administration confirmed these claims and declared these actions unlawful.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to three Czech observers funded by the pro-Russian far-right non-governmental organization Eurasian Observatory for Democracy & Elections, deputy Stanislav Berkovec reported that the voting was free and the foreign deputies could move freely. According to his discussions with people, even the Tatars inclined towards Russia. Another deputy Milan Šarapatka reported that the referendum was formally regular and that there was no evidence of pressure on voters.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to Miloslav Soušek (the Vysoké Mýto mayor), the course of the referendum was comparable to the elections in the Czech Republic, he saw no soldiers in the town.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to the Central Election Commission of Ukraine on February 28, 2014 there were 1,534,815 registered voters in the autonomous republic of Crimea and 309,774 in the city of Sevastopol, which totals to 1,844,589 voters in the two Ukrainian regions.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to organizers of the referendum, 1,274,096 people voted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, giving the plebiscite an 83.1% turnout in that region.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: In the evening of 16 March 2014, Mikhail Malyshev, the Crimean election Spokesman, reported that as of 20:00, 1,250,427 people or 81.36% voted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 274,136 or 89.50% voted in Sevastopol for a total of 1,524,563 or 82.71% of the electorate. ITAR-TASS initially reported this as 1,724,563 voters in total, but corrected it later. The discrepancy led to some reports of a 123% turnout in Sevastopol.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: On 5 May, the Russian President's Human Rights Council posted a report to their site about human rights in Crimea based on interviews with roughly 20 local human rights activists conducted over the course of two and a half days. One member of the council, Yevgeny Bobrov, reported the opinion that the "vast majority of the citizens of Sevastopol voted in favor of unification with Russia in the referendum (50–80%)" and that "in Crimea, various data show that 50–60% voted for unification with Russia, with a turnout of 30–50%". On 7 May the Council stated that the report was not an official position of the Council.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Mustafa Dzhemilev, a recent Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, reports that according to his sources the actual turn-up was only 32.4%, however he did not provide any evidence to support this claim. Mejlis Deputy Chairman Akhtem Chiygoz argued that voter turnout in the referendum among Crimeans did not exceeded 30–40 percent, but he did not provide any evidence either.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Andrey Illarionov, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Russian government adviser, cited results of previous polls over past three years showing the Crimean support for joining Russia between 23 and 41 percent to conclude that the actual support for the reunification of Crimea with Russia was about 34 percent and that at least two thirds of Crimea did not vote for it. He called the referendum a "grossly rigged falsification" and the outcome "cynically distorted".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The results of a survey by the U.S. government Broadcasting Board of Governors agency, conducted April 21–29, 2014, showed that 83% of Crimeans felt that the results of the March 16 referendum on Crimea's status likely reflected the views of most people there, whereas this view is shared only by 30% in the rest of Ukraine.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to the Gallup's survey performed on April 21–27, 82.8% of Crimean people consider the referendum results reflecting most Crimeans' views, and 73.9% of Crimeans say Crimea's becoming part of Russia will make life better for themselves and their families, while 5.5% disagree.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to survey carried out by Pew Research Center in April 2014, the majority of Crimean residents say they believed the referendum was free and fair (91%) and that the government in Kyiv ought to recognize the results of the vote (88%).


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: According to a poll of the Crimeans by the Ukrainian branch of Germany's biggest market research organization, GfK, on January 16–22, 2015: "Eighty-two percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it. ... Fifty-one percent reported their well-being had improved in the past year."


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Bloomberg's Leonid Bershidsky noted that "The calls were made on Jan. 16–22 to people living in towns with a population of 20,000 or more, which probably led to the peninsula's native population, the Tatars, being underrepresented because many of them live in small villages. On the other hand, no calls were placed in Sevastopol, the most pro-Russian city in Crimea. Even with these limitations, it was the most representative independent poll taken on the peninsula since its annexation."


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Most countries, particularly Western ones, declared the referendum invalid and a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Gábor Vona, leader of Hungary's Jobbik hailed the recent referendum in Crimea as "exemplary". Members of Austria's populist right-wing Freedom Party of Austria, the Flemish nationalist group Vlaams Belang and France's National Front pronounced the referendum free and fair.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: The next day after the referendum, the parliament of Crimea asked the Russian Federation "to admit the Republic of Crimea as a new subject with the status of a republic".


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: Later on the same day, March 17, Putin issued a decree formally recognizing Crimea as an independent state. On March 18, the Russian, Crimean, and Sevastopolian leadership signed the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia, which was ratified by the Russian Federal Assembly on March 21. A transition period was in force for integrating Crimean governmental institutions, ending on January 1, 2015.


title: 2014 Crimean status referendum

text: After the seizure of Ukrainian naval base at Feodosia on March 24, Russian troops have seized most of Ukraine's military bases in Crimea. On the same day, the acting President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, ordered the withdrawal of Ukrainian armed forces from Crimean peninsula.


title: Mise en place

text: Mise en place () is a French culinary phrase which means "putting in place" or "gather". It refers to the setup required before cooking, and is often used in professional kitchens to refer to organizing and arranging the ingredients (e.g., cuts of meat, relishes, sauces, par-cooked items, spices, freshly chopped vegetables, and other components) that a cook will require for the menu items that are expected to be prepared during a shift.


title: Mise en place

text: In the kitchen, the phrase is used as a noun (i.e., the setup of the array of ingredients), a verb (i.e., the process of preparing) and a state of mind. The term's broader meanings can be applied to classrooms, hospitals, IT departments, and elsewhere.


title: Mise en place

text: The term has also been used outside of cooking: psychologists Weisberg, "et al.", used the phrase to refer to "how one's stance towards a given environment places constraints on what one feels able to do within that environment, and how these assessments and predispositions impact the process of preparing to act." They used the term in a study of how a school became safer after security measureslike metal detectors and bars on the windowswere removed, leading to the unexpected outcome.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (; ) is a collection of infrastructure projects that are under construction throughout Pakistan beginning in 2013. Originally valued at $47 billion, the value of CPEC projects is worth $62 billion as of 2020. CPEC is intended to rapidly upgrade Pakistan's required infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic zones. On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia, while some major power projects were commissioned by late 2017.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: A vast network of highways and railways are to be built under the aegis of CPEC that will span the length and breadth of Pakistan. Inefficiencies stemming from Pakistan's mostly dilapidated transportation network are estimated by the government to cause a loss of 3.55% of the country's annual GDP. Modern transportation networks built under CPEC will link seaports in Gwadar and Karachi with northern Pakistan, as well as points further north in western China and Central Asia. A 1,100-kilometre-long motorway will be built between the cities of Karachi and Lahore as part of CPEC, while the Karakoram Highway from Hasan Abdal to the Chinese border will be completely reconstructed and overhauled. The currently stalled Karachi–Peshawar main railway line will also be upgraded to allow for train travel at up to 160 km per hour by December 2019. Pakistan's railway network will also be extended to eventually connect to China's Southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar. The estimated $11 billion required to modernise transportation networks will be financed by subsidized concessionary loans.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: CPEC's potential impact on Pakistan has been compared to that of the Marshall Plan undertaken by the United States in post-war Europe. Pakistani officials predict that CPEC will result in the creation of upwards of 2.3 million jobs between 2015 and 2030, and add 2 to 2.5 percentage points to the country's annual economic growth.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Over $33 billion worth of energy infrastructure are to be constructed by private consortia to help alleviate Pakistan's chronic energy shortages, which regularly amount to over 4,500MW, and have shed an estimated 2–2.5% off Pakistan's annual gross domestic product. Over 10,400 MW of energy generating capacity is to be brought online by the end of 2018, with the majority developed as part of CPEC's fast-tracked "Early Harvest" projects. A network of pipelines to transport liquefied natural gas and oil will also be laid as part of the project, including a $2.5 billion pipeline between Gwadar and Nawabshah to eventually transport gas from Iran. Electricity from these projects will primarily be generated from fossil fuels, though hydroelectric and wind-power projects are also included, as is the construction of one of the world's largest solar farms.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Should the initial $46 billion worth of projects be implemented, the value of those projects would be roughly equivalent to all foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970, and would be equal to 17% of Pakistan's 2015 gross domestic product. From the initial project, the scope has expanded from a net worth of $46 billion to $60 billion according to some sources. CPEC is seen as the main plank of China's Belt and Road Initiative.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: According to official statistics, 20% of CPEC is debt-based finance, while 80% of CPEC are investments in Joint Ventures (JV) enterprise between Pakistan and China, with the project contributing to 40,000 jobs for local Pakistanis and 80,000 jobs for Chinese. Official statistics suggested a return of US$6 billion to 8 billion from taxes per annum such as road and bridge tolls. The total CPEC loan is 6% of Pakistan's GDP, however the Indian Government has claimed the project a debt-trap. Nevertheless, officials countered that 3.5% of Pakistani GDP per annum is lost due to poor transportation networks, which the CPEC investment aims to remedy leading to added benefits for any lag in Pakistan's growth statistic. Economic analysts have stated tangible benefits of this initiative including an end to the major energy shortages in Pakistan which had previously crippled economic growth. On 14 January 2020, Pakistan operationalized Gwadar Port for Afghan transit trade. On 31 May 2021, Gwadar Port become fully operational, along with the availability of online booking for the delivery of goods.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: According to critics including the United States and India, the project is a debt-trap. However, the Pakistani government stated that most of the project consists of equity finance such as joint ventures instead of debt finance, giving Pakistan alternative means of raising capital for the project.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Plans for a corridor stretching from the Chinese border to Pakistan's deepwater ports on the Arabian Sea date back to the 1950s, and motivated construction of the Karakoram Highway beginning in 1959. Chinese interest in Pakistan's deep-water harbor at Gwadar had been rekindled by in 2002 China began construction at Gwadar port which was completed in 2006. Expansion of Gwadar Port then ceased thereafter owing to political instability in Pakistan following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf and subsequent conflict between the Pakistani state and Taliban militants.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In 2013, the then Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang decided to further enhance mutual connectivity. A memorandum of understanding on cooperation for long-term plan on China–Pakistan Economic Corridor between the two governments was inked by Xu Shao Shi and Shahid Amjad Chaudhry.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In February 2014, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain visited China to discuss the plans for an economic corridor in Pakistan. Two months later, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Premier Li Kequiang in China to discuss further plans, resulting in the full scope of the project to be devised under Sharif's tenure. In November 2014, Chinese government announced its intention to finance Chinese companies as part of its $45.6 billion energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: During the state visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Pakistan in April 2015, he wrote in an open editorial stating: "This will be my first trip to Pakistan, but I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own brother." On 20 April 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to commence work on the $46 billion agreement, which is roughly 20% of Pakistan's annual GDP, with approximately $28 billion worth of fast-tracked "Early Harvest" projects to be developed by the end of 2018.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: On 12 August 2015 in the city of Karamay, China and Pakistan signed 20 more agreements worth $1.6 billion to further augment the scale and scope of CPEC. Details of the plan are opaque, but are said to mainly focus on increasing energy generation capacity. As part of the agreement, Pakistan and China have agreed to co-operate in the field of space research.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In September and October 2015, the government of the United Kingdom announced two separate grants to the Government of Pakistan for construction of roadways that are complementary to CPEC. In November 2015, China included the CPEC into its 13th five-year development plan, while in December 2015, China and Pakistan agreed on a further $1.5 billion investment to set up an information and technology park as part of the CPEC project. On 8 April 2016, during the visit of Xinjiang's Communist Party chief Zhang Chunxian companies from Xinjiang with their Pakistan counterparts signed $2 billion of additional agreements covering infrastructure, solar power and logistics.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The first convoy from China arrived in Gwadar on 13 November 2016, thereby formalizing operation of CPEC. On 2 December 2016, the first cargo train, launching the direct rail route and sea freight service between China and Pakistan, departed from Yunnan. A cargo train loaded with 500 tonnes of commodities left Kunming for the port city of Guangzhou from where the cargo will be loaded on ships and transported to Karachi, marking the opening of the new route. The new rail, sea freight will cut logistics cost, including that of transport, by 50 per cent.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In November 2016, China announced an additional $8.5 billion investment in Pakistan with $4.5 billion allocated to upgrade Pakistan's main railway line from Karachi to Peshawar including tracks, speed, and signaling, and $4 billion toward an LNG terminal and transmission lines to help alleviate energy shortages. In February 2017, the Egyptian Ambassador to Pakistan expressed interest in CPEC cooperation. In January 2017, Chief Minister Pervez Khattak of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stated that he had received assurances from Chinese investment companies that they would invest up to $20 billion for projects. In March 2017, an agreement was signed for the projects, which include: a $1.5 billion oil refinery, irrigation projects worth $2 billion, a $2 billion motorway between Chitral and DI Khan, and $7 billion worth of hydro-electric projects.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: As of September 2017, more than $14 billion worth of projects were under construction. In March 2018, Pakistan announced that following the completion of under-construction energy projects, future CPEC energy projects would be geared towards hydropower projects.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Gwadar forms the crux of the CPEC project, as it is envisaged to be the link between China's ambitious One Belt, One Road project, and its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project. In total, more than $1 billion worth of projects are to be developed around the port of Gwadar by December 2017.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Initial infrastructure works at Gwadar Port commenced in 2002 and were completed in 2007, however plans to upgrade and expand Gwadar's port stalled. Under CPEC agreement, Gwadar Port will initially be expanded and upgraded to allow for docking of larger ships with deadweight tonnage of up to 70,000. Improvement plans also include construction of a $130 million breakwater around the port, as well as the construction of a floating liquefied natural gas facility that will have a capacity of 500 million cubic feet of liquefied natural gas per day and will be connected to the Gwadar-Nawabshah segment of the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The expanded port is located near a 2,282-acre free trade area in Gwadar which is being modeled on the lines of the Special Economic Zones of China. The swathe of land was handed to the China Overseas Port Holding Company in November 2015 as part of a 43-year lease. The site will include manufacturing zones, logistics hubs, warehouses, and display centres. Businesses located in the zone would be exempt from customs authorities as well as many provincial and federal taxes. Business established in the special economic zone will be exempt from Pakistani income, sales, and federal excise taxes for 23 years. Contractors and subcontractors associated with China Overseas Port Holding Company will be exempted from such taxes for 20 years, while a 40-year tax holiday will be granted for imports of equipment, materials, plant/machinery, appliances, and accessories that are to be for construction of Gwadar Port and special economic zone.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The special economic zone will be completed in three phases. By 2025, it is envisaged that manufacturing and processing industries will be developed, while further expansion of the zone is intended to be complete by 2030. On 10 April 2016, Zhang Baozhong, chairman of China Overseas Port Holding Company said in a conversation with "The Washington Post" that his company planned to spend $4.5  billion on roads, power, hotels and other infrastructure for the industrial zone as well as other projects in Gwadar city.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: China will grant Pakistan $230 million to construct a new international airport in Gwadar. The provincial government of Balochistan has set aside 4000 acres for the construction of the new $230 million Gwadar International Airport which will require an estimated 30 months for construction, the costs of which are to be fully funded by grants from the Chinese government which Pakistan will not be obliged to repay.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The city of Gwadar is further being developed by the construction of a 300 MW coal power plant, a desalinization plant, and a new 300-bed hospital. Plans for Gwadar city also include construction of the Gwadar East Bay Expressway – a 19 kilometre controlled-access road that will connect Gwadar Port to the Makran Coastal Highway. These additional projects are estimated to cost $800 million, and are to be financed by 0% interest loans extended by the Exim Bank of China to Pakistan.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In addition to the aforementioned infrastructure works, the Pakistani government announced in September 2015 its intention to establish a training institute named Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar, which is to be developed by the Gwadar Port Authority at the cost of 943 million rupees, and is designed to impart to residents the skills required to operate and work at the expanded Gwadar Port.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Development of Gwadar includes the building of a hospital under a Chinese government grant. Under the proposed project medical blocks, nursing and paramedical institutes, medical college, central laboratory, and other allied facilities are to be constructed with the supply of medical equipment and machinery.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In 2020, Government released funds of Rs 320 million for a seawater desalination plant at Gwadar, with a capacity of five million gallons a day. The funds were also to be used in the expansion of the optical fiber network in Gwadar. and construction of a fish landing jetty.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The CPEC project envisages major upgrades and overhauls to Pakistan's transportation infrastructure. Under the CPEC project, China has announced financing for $10.63  billion worth of transportation infrastructure so far; $6.1  billion have been allocated for constructing "Early Harvest" roadway projects at an interest rate of 1.6 percent. The remainder of funds will be allocated when the Pakistani government awards contracts for the construction of road segments which are still in the planning phase.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Three corridors have been identified for cargo transport: the Eastern Alignment through the heavily populated provinces of Sindh and Punjab where most industries are located, the Western Alignment through the less developed and more sparsely populated provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and the future Central Alignment which will pass through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The CPEC projects call for reconstruction and upgrade works on National Highway 35 (N-35), which forms the Pakistani portion of the Karakoram Highway (KKH). The KKH spans the 887-kilometer long distance between the China-Pakistan border and the town of Burhan, near Hasan Abdal. At Burhan, the existing M1 motorway will intersect the N-35 at the Shah Maqsood Interchange. From there, access onwards to Islamabad and Lahore continues as part of the existing M1 and M2 motorways. Burhan will also be at the intersection of the Eastern Alignment, and Western Alignment.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Upgrades to the 487-kilometer long section between Burhan and Raikot of the Karakoram Highway are officially referred to in Pakistan as the Karakoram Highway Phase 2 project. At the southern end of the N-35, works are already underway to construct a 59-kilometer-long, 4-lane controlled-access highway between Burhan and Havelian which upon completion will be officially referred to as the E-35 expressway. North of Havelian, the next 66 kilometres of road will be upgraded to a 4-lane dual carriageway between Havelian and Shinkiari. Groundbreaking on this portion commenced in April 2016.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The entire 354 kilometres of roadway north of Shinkiari and ending in Raikot, near Chilas will be constructed as a 2-lane highway. Construction on the first section between Shinkiari and Thakot commenced in April 2016 jointly with construction of the Havelian to Shinkiari 4-lane dual carriageway further south. Construction on both these sections is expected to be completed with 42 months at a cost of approximately $1.26 billion with 90% of funding to come from China's EXIM bank in the form of low interest rate concessional loans.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Between Thakot and Raikot spans an area in which the government of Pakistan is currently either planning or actively constructing several hydropower projects, most notably the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and Dasu Dam. Sections of the N-35 around these projects will be completely rebuilt in tandem with dam construction. In the interim, this section of the N-35 is currently being upgraded from its current state until dam construction commences in full force at a later date. Improvement projects on this section are expected to be completed by January 2017 at a cost of approximately $72 million. The next 335 kilometres of roadway connect Raikot to the China-Pakistan border. Reconstruction works on this section of roadway preceded the CPEC, and were initiated after severe damage to roadways in the area following the 2010 Pakistan floods. Most of this section of roadway was completed in September 2012 at a cost of $510 million.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: A large earthquake rocked the region nearest to the China-Pakistan border in 2010, triggering massive landslides that dammed the Indus River, resulting in the formation of the Attabad Lake. Portions of the Karakoram Highway were submerged in the lake, forcing all vehicular traffic onto barges to traverse the new reservoir. Construction on a 24 kilometer series of bridges and tunnels to Attabad Lake began in 2012 and required 36 months for completion. The bypass consists of 2 large bridges and 5 kilometres worth of tunnels that were inaugurated for public use on 14 September 2015 at a cost of $275 million. The 175 kilometre road between Gilgit and Skardu will be upgraded to a 4-lane road at a cost of $475 million to provide direct access to Skardu from the N-35.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The term Eastern Alignment of CPEC refers to roadway projects located in Sindh and Punjab provinces – some of which were first envisioned in 1991. As part of the Eastern Alignment, a 1,152 km long motorway will connect Pakistan's two largest cities, Karachi and Lahore with 6-lane controlled access highway designed for travel speeds up to 120 kilometres per hour. The entire project will cost approximately $6.6 billion, with the bulk of financing to be distributed by various Chinese state-owned banks.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The entire Eastern Alignment motorway project is divided into four sections: a 136-kilometer long section between Karachi and Hyderabad also known as the M9 motorway, a 345-kilometer long section between Hyderabad and Sukkur, a 392-kilometer long section between , and a 333-kilometer section between Multan and Lahore via the town of Abdul Hakeem.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The first section of the project is providing high-speed road access from the Port of Karachi to the city of Hyderabad and interior Sindh. Upgrade and construction works on this section currently known as Super Highway between Karachi and Hyderabad began in March 2015, and will convert the road into the 4-lane controlled access M9 Motorway which was completed in an estimated 30 months. In February 2017, a completed 75 kilometer stretch of the motorway was opened for public use by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: At the terminus of the M9 motorway in Hyderabad, the Karachi-Lahore Motorway will continue onwards to Sukkur as a six-lane controlled-access motorway known also as M6 motorway that will be 345 kilometers long, The planned cost for this project is $1.7 billion, and will provide high-speed road access to interior Sindh – especially near the towns of Matiari, Nawabshah, and Khairpur. The project will require the construction of seven interchanges, and 25 bridges on the Indus river and irrigation canals. The planned route of the motorway runs roughly parallel to the existing National Highway and Indus Highway at various portions. In July 2016, the Pakistani government announced that the project would be open to international bidders on a build-operate-transfer basis, with Chinese and South Korean companies expressing interest in the project.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The 392 kilometers of the motorway is estimated to cost $2.89  billion, with construction works inaugurated on this section of roadway on 6 May 2016 and completed in September 2019.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: . The road will be a six lane wide controlled access highway, with 11 planned interchanges, 10 rest facilities, 492 underpasses, and 54 bridges along its route. The Pakistani government in January 2016 awarded the contract to build this section to China State Construction Engineering, but final approvals required for disbursement of funds were not granted by the Government of the People's Republic of China until May 2016. 90% of the project's cost is to be financed by concessionary loans from China, with the remaining 10% to be financed by the government of Pakistan. Construction on this segment is expected to last 36 months.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Construction of the costing approximately $1.5 billion was launched in November 2015 as a joint venture between the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited and Pakistan's Zahir Khan and Brothers Engineers The total length of this motorway section is 333 kilometres; however, the first 102 kilometres of the road between Khanewal and Abdul Hakeem is designed as part of the M4 Motorway, and is being funded by the Asian Development Bank. The portion of motorway between Abdul Hakeem and Lahore that is under construction as part of CPEC will consist of the remaining 231 kilometers.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The CPEC project envisages an expanded and upgraded road network in the Pakistani provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and western Punjab Province as part of the Western Alignment. The Western Alignment project will result in the upgrading of several hundred kilometers worth of road into 2 and 4-lane divided highways by mid-2018, with land acquisition sufficient for upgrading parts of the road to a 6-lane motorway in the future. In total, the CPEC project envisages reconstruction of 870 kilometers of road in Balochistan province alone as part of the Western Alignment. Of those 870 kilometers of road, 620 kilometers have already been rebuilt as of January 2016.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The Western Alignment roadway network will begin at the Barahma Bahtar Interchange on the M1 Motorway near the towns of Burhan and Hasan Abdal in northern Punjab province. The newly reconstructed Karakoram Highway will connect to the Western Alignment at Burhan, near where the new 285-kilometre-long controlled-access Brahma Bahtar-Yarik Motorway will commence. The motorway will terminate near the town of Yarik, just north of Dera Ismail Khan. Groundbreaking for the project took place on 17 May 2016. The motorway will traverse the Sindh Sagar Doab region, and cross the Indus River at Mianwali before entering into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It will consist of 11 interchanges, 74 culverts, and 3 major bridges spanning the Indus, Soan, and Kurram Rivers. Total costs for the project are expected to be $1.05 billion.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: At the southern terminus of the new Brahma Bahtar-Yarik motorway, the N50 National Highway will also be upgraded between Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Zhob in neighbouring Balochistan province, with eventual reconstruction between Zhob and Quetta. The upgraded roadway will consist of a 4 lane dual-carriageway spanning the 205 kilometre distance between the two cities. The first portion of the N50 to be upgraded will be the 81 kilometre portion of the N50 between Zhob and Mughal Kot, with construction works having begun in January 2016. Construction on this portion is expected to be completed by 2018 at a cost of $86 million. While the project is considered a vital link in the CPEC's Western Alignment, the project's cost will not be financed by Chinese state-owned banks, but instead by Asian Development Bank under a 2014 agreement which preceded CPEC, as well as by a grant provided by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Heading south from Quetta, the Western Alignment of the CPEC will continue to the town of Surab in central Balochistan as the N25 National Highway. From Surab, a 470 kilometre long route known as the N85 National Highway will connect central Balochistan with the town of Hoshab in southwestern Balochistan province near the city of Turbat. The stretch of road between these cities was completed in December 2016, as per schedule.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Along the Western Alignment route, the towns of Hoshab and Gwadar are connected by a newly built 193-kilometer-long portion of the M8 Motorway – the Hoshab to Gwadar portion of the motorway was completed and inaugurated in February 2016 by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The Western Alignment will be flanked by special economic zones along its route, with at least seven special economic zones planned to be established in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Long-term plans for a "Central Alignment" of the CPEC consist of a network of roads which is shortest route of CPEC and will commence in Gwadar and travel upcountry via the cities of Basima, Khuzdar, Sukkur, Rajanpur, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, and terminating in Dera Ismail Khan, with onward connections to Karakoram Highway via the Brahma Bahtar–Yarik Motorway.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The 184 kilometers long M-4 Motorway between Faisalabad and Multan does not fall under the scope of CPEC projects but is nevertheless considered vital to the CPEC transportation project. It will instead be financed by the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and will be the first project jointly financed by those banks. Further funding comes from an additional $90.7  million grant announced in October 2015 by the government of the United Kingdom towards the construction of a portion of the M4 Motorway project.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The CPEC project emphasises major upgrades to Pakistan's aging railway system, including rebuilding of the entire Main Line 1 railway between Karachi and Peshawar by 2020; this single railway currently handles 70% of Pakistan Railways traffic. As of 25.05.2022 this project is in doldrums due to reluctance of China to provide funds. In addition to the stalled Main Line 1 railway, upgrades and expansions are slated for the Main Line 2 railway, Main Line 3 railway. The CPEC plan also calls for completion of a rail link over the 4,693-meter high Khunjerab Pass. The railway will provide direct access for Chinese and East Asian goods to Pakistani seaports at Karachi and Gwadar by 2030.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Procurement of an initial 250 new passenger coaches, and reconstruction of 21 train stations are also planned as part of the first phase of the project – bringing the total investment in Pakistan's railway system to approximately $5  billion by the end of 2019. 180 of the coaches are to be built at the Pakistan Railways Carriage Factory near Islamabad, while the Government of Pakistan intends to procure an additional 800 coaches at a later date, with the intention of building 595 of those coaches in Pakistan.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In September 2018, the new government led by Prime Minister Imran Khan reduced the Chinese investment in railways by $2 billion to $6.2 billion because of financing burdens.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The CPEC "Early Harvest" plan includes a complete overhaul of the 1,687 kilometre long Main Line 1 railway (ML-1) between Karachi and Peshawar at a cost of $3.65 billion for the first phase of the project, with the first phase expected to be completed by December 2017. As of 2022, this project has not been initiated. In June 2016, China and Pakistan unveiled plans for the second phase of the project, with a total cost of $8.2 billion for both phases of the project. The second phase of the ML-1 overhaul project is expected to be completed in 2021.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Upgrading of the railway line will permit train travel at speeds of 160 kilometres per hour, versus the average 60 to 105 km per hour speed currently possible on existing track, and is expected to increase Pakistan Railways' annual revenues by approximately $480 million. The upgrades are also expected to cut transit times from Karachi to Peshawar by half. Pakistani railways currently account for 4% of freight traffic in the country, and upon completion of CPEC, Pakistani railways are expected to transport 20% of the country's freight traffic by 2025.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The first part of the expedited first phase of the project will focus on upgrading the Multan to Peshawar section, which will then be followed by the Hyderabad to Multan section, and finally by the Hyderabad to Karachi section.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: At the time of CPEC's announcement, the ML-1 consisted of mostly dual track railway between Karachi, and the Lahore suburb of Shahdara, with long stretches of single track. From Shahdara, the track mainly consisted of a single track until the city Peshawar. Construction works to dualize the entire track between Karachi to Shahdara were completed and inaugurated in January 2016. As part of the first phase of the CPEC railway project, the remaining stretch of track between Shahdara and Peshawar is to be upgraded to a dual track railway.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The 676 kilometer portion between Lalamusa, north of Lahore, and Peshawar will require complete reconstruction with the addition of tunnels, culverts, and bridges, while over 900 kilometers south of Lalamusa towards Karachi will be upgraded to handle cars with a 25-ton axle load capacity. A spur from Taxila to Havelian will also be constructed, with a dry port to be established near the city of Havelian. Further, the entire length of track will have computerised signal systems, with stretches of track in urban areas to also be fenced off to prevent pedestrians and vehicles from crossing tracks in unauthorised areas.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In addition to upgrading the ML-1, the CPEC project also calls for similar major upgrade on the 1,254 kilometre long Main Line 2 (ML-2) railway between Kotri in Sindh province, and Attock in northern Punjab province via the cities of Larkana and Dera Ghazi Khan. The route towards northern Pakistan roughly parallels the Indus River, as opposed to the ML-1 which takes a more eastward course towards Lahore. The project also includes a plan to connect Gwadar, to the town of Jacobabad, Sindh which lies at the intersection of the ML-2 and ML-3 railways.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Medium term plans for the Main Line 3 (ML-3) railway line will also include construction of a 560 kilometer long railway line between Bostan near Quetta, to Kotla Jam in Bhakkar District near the city of Dera Ismail Khan, which will provide access to southern Afghanistan. The railway route will pass through the city of Quetta and Zhob before terminating in Kotla Jam, and is expected to be constructed by 2025.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Longer term projects under CPEC also call for construction of the 682 kilometre long Khunjerab Railway line between the city of Havelian, to the Khunjerab Pass on the Chinese border, with extension to China's Lanxin Railway in Kashgar, Xinjiang. The railway will roughly parallel the Karakoram Highway, and is expected to be complete in 2030.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The cost of the entire project is estimated to be approximately $12 billion, and will require 5 years for completion. A 300 million rupee study to establish final feasibility of constructing the rail line between Havelian and the Chinese border is already underway. A preliminary feasibility study was completed in 2008 by the Austrian engineering firm TBAC.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The $1.6 billion Orange Line of the Lahore Metro is regarded as a commercial project under CPEC. Construction on the line has already begun, with initial planned completion by Winter 2017 however this has been delayed several times, first to end of 2018, later to 2019 and 2020. It finally launched on 25 October 2020. The line will be long, of which will be elevated, with the remaining portion to be underground between Jain Mandir and Lakshmi Chowk. When complete, the project will have the capacity to transport 250,000 commuters per day, with plans to increase capacity to 500,000 commuters per day by 2025.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Pakistan's current energy generating capacity is 24,830 MW. Energy generation will be a major focus of the CPEC project, with approximately $33 billion expected to be invested in this sector. An estimated 10,400 MW of electricity are slated for generation by March 2018 as part of CPEC's "Early Harvest" projects.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The energy projects under CPEC will be constructed by private Independent Power Producers, rather than by the governments of either China or Pakistan. The Exim Bank of China will finance these private investments at 5–6% interest rates, while the government of Pakistan will be contractually obliged to purchase electricity from those firms at pre-negotiated rates. In April 2020, hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, Pakistan asked China to ease repayment terms on $30bn worth of power projects.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In March 2018, Pakistan announced that hydropower projects would be prioritized following the completion of under-construction power plants. Pakistan aims to produce 25% of its electricity requirements by renewable energy resources by 2030. China's Zonergy company will complete construction on the world's largest solar power plant – the 6,500 acre Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park near the city of Bahawalpur with an estimated capacity of 1000 MW is expected to be completed in December 2016. The first phase of the project has been completed by Xinjiang SunOasis, and has a generating capacity of 100 MW. The remaining 900 MW capacity will be installed by Zonergy under CPEC.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The Jhimpir Wind Power Plant, built by the Turkish company Zorlu Enerji has already begun to sell 56.4 MW of electricity to the government of Pakistan, though under CPEC, another 250 MW of electricity are to be produced by the Chinese-Pakistan consortium United Energy Pakistan and others at a cost of $659 million. Another wind farm, the Dawood wind power project is under development by HydroChina at a cost of $115 million, and will generate 50 MW of electricity by August 2016.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: SK Hydro Consortium is constructing the 870 MW Suki Kinari Hydropower Project in the Kaghan Valley of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province at a cost of $1.8 billion, SK Hydro will construct the project with financing by China's EXIM bank.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The $1.6 billion 720 MW Karot Dam which is under construction is part of the CPEC plan, but is to be financed separately by China's Silk Road Fund.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Pakistan and China have also discussed the inclusion of the 4,500 MW $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam as part of the CPEC project, though as of December 2015, no firm decision has been made – though Pakistani officials remain optimistic at its eventual inclusion. On 14 November 2017, Pakistan dropped its bid to have Diamer-Bhasha Dam financed under the CPEC framework.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The $2.4 billion, 1,100 MW Kohala Hydropower Project being constructed by China's Three Gorges Corporation predates the announcement of CPEC, though funding for the project will now come from CPEC fund. The project was approved by the government of Pakistani-administered Kashmir, the Chinese government and the Three Gorges corporation in 2020, the move was protested by India, which claims Kashmir as its territory. Renewable energy projects also include a 640 MW Mahl hydro power project.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Despite several renewable energy projects, the bulk of new energy generation capacity under CPEC will be coal-based plants, with $5.8 billion worth of coal power projects expected to be completed by early 2019 as part of the CPEC's "Early Harvest" projects.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: On 26 May, it was unveiled that transmission line of 660 KV would be laid between matiari and Lahore. The electricity would be produced from coal-based power plants at Thar, Port Qasim and Hub. It would have the capacity to supply 2000MW with 10 percent overloaded capability for 2 hours.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: In Balochistan province, a $970 million coal power plant at Hub, near Karachi, with a capacity of 660 MW to be built by a joint consortium of China's China Power Investment Corporation and the Pakistani firm Hub Power Company as part of a larger $2 billion project to produce 1,320 MW from coal.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: A 300 MW coal power plant is also being developed in the city of Gwadar, and is being financed by a 0% interest loan. Development of Gwadar also include a 132 KV(AIS) Grid Station along with associated D/C Transmission line at Down Town, Gwadar along with other 132 KV Sub Stations at Deep Sea Port Gwadar.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The $1.8 billion Sahiwal Coal Power Project, in full operation since 3 July 2017, is a project in central Punjab that has a capacity of 1,320 MW. It was built by a joint venture of two Chinese firms: the Huaneng Shandong company and Shandong Ruyi, who will jointly own and operate the plant. Pakistan will purchase electricity from the consortium at a tariff of 8.36 US cents/kWh.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The $589 million project to establish a coal mine and a relatively small 300 MW coal power plant to be built in the town of Pind Dadan Khan by China Machinery Engineering Corporation in Punjab's Salt Range. Pakistan's NEPRA has been criticized for considering a relatively high tariff of 11.57 US cents/kWH proposed by the Chinese firm, which had been initially agreed at 8.25 US cents/kWH in 2014. The Chinese firm argued that coal transportation costs had greatly increased due to the nonavailability of coal from nearby mines which had initially been regarded as the primary coal source for the project. The company argued that coal would instead have to be transported from distant Sindh province, which along with inefficiencies in mining procedures, increased the cost of fuel by 30.5%.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: The Shanghai Electric company of China will construct two 660 MW power plants as part of the "Thar-I" project in the Thar coalfield of Sindh province, while "Thar-ll" will be developed by a separate consortium. The facility will be powered by locally sourced coal, and is expected to be put into commercial use in 2018. Pakistan's National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) has agreed to purchase electricity from both Thar-l and Thar-ll at a tariff of 8.50 US cents/kWh for the first 330 MW of electricity, 8.33 US cents/kWh for the next 660 MW, and 7.99 US cents/kWh for the next 1,099 MW as further phases are developed.


title: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

text: Near the Thar-I Project, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation in conjunction with Pakistan's Engro Corporation will construct two 330 MW power plants as part of the "Thar-ll Project" (having initially proposed the simultaneous construction of two 660 MW power plants) as well as developing a coal mine capable of producing up to 3.8 million tons of coal per year as part of the first phase of the project." The first phase is expected to be complete by early 2019, at a cost of $1.95 billion. Subsequent phases will eventually generate an additional 3,960 MW of electricity over the course of ten years. As part of infrastructure required for electricity distribution from the Thar l and ll Projects, the $2.1 billion Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line, and $1.5 billion in Matiari to Faisalabad transmission line are also to be built as part of the CPEC project.