title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Despite a consensus at the highest levels of the U.S. and British governments that it would be necessary "to liquidate Sukarno", as related in a CIA memorandum from 1962, and the existence of extensive contacts between anti-communist army officers and the U.S. military establishment – training of over 1,200 officers, "including senior military figures", and providing weapons and economic assistance – the CIA denied active involvement in the killings. Declassified U.S. documents in 2017 revealed that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of the mass killings from the beginning and was supportive of the actions of the Indonesian Army. U.S. complicity in the killings, which included providing extensive lists of PKI officials to Indonesian death squads, has previously been established by historians and journalists.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: A top-secret CIA report from 1968 stated that the massacres "rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Support for Sukarno's presidency under his "Guided Democracy" depended on his forced and unstable "Nasakom" coalition between the military, religious groups, and communists. The rise in influence and increasing militancy of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), and Sukarno's support for it, was a serious concern for Muslims and the military, and tension grew steadily in the early and mid-1960s. The third-largest communist party in the world, the PKI had approximately 300,000 cadres and full membership of around two million. The party's assertive efforts to speed up land reform frightened those who controlled the land and threatened the social position of Muslim clerics. Sukarno required government employees to study his Nasakom principles as well as Marxist theory. He had met with Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People's Republic of China, and after this meeting had decided to create a militia, called a Fifth Force, which he intended to control personally. Sukarno ordered weapons from China to equip this Fifth Force. He declared in a speech that he favoured revolutionary groups whether they were nationalist, religious or communist, stating, "I am a friend of the Communists because the Communists are revolutionary people." He said at a Non-Aligned Movement summit meeting in Cairo in October 1964 that his current purpose was to drive all of Indonesian politics to the left and thereby to neutralise the "reactionary" elements in the Army that could be dangerous for the revolution. Sukarno's international policies increasingly reflected his rhetoric.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Sukarno hosted the Bandung Conference in 1955 (in Bandung, Indonesia). It was a conference of mostly former colonised countries throughout Asia and Africa (including China, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). The conference was the predecessor to the Non-Aligned Movement and was not a communist convention. However, this was enough for the U.S. to be very suspicious of Sukarno and suspect him of deep communist sympathies.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The PKI became very popular in Indonesia and performed better and better in elections throughout the 1950s. They were less corrupt than other political parties and followed through on their promises.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: As early as 1958, Western powers—in particular the U.S. and the U.K.—pushed for policies that would encourage the Indonesian Army to act forcefully against the PKI and the Left, which included a covert propaganda campaign designed to damage the reputation of Sukarno and the PKI, and secret assurances along with military and financial support to anti-communist leaders within the Army. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) considered assassinating Sukarno and selected an "asset" to do the job, but instead produced a porn video with an actor portraying Sukarno and a Soviet flight attendant to delegitimise him and paint him as a communist. However, the video was not released because the agency could not put together a convincing enough film.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: On the evening of 30 September 1965, a group of militants, known as the 30 September Movement, captured and executed six of Indonesia's top military generals. The movement proclaimed itself as Sukarno's protectors, issuing a pre-emptive strike to prevent a possible "coup" by the "anti-Sukarno", pro-Western Council of Generals.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Following the execution, the movement's forces occupied Merdeka Square in Jakarta and the presidential palace. Shortly afterwards, however, President Sukarno refused to commit to the movement, for it had captured and assassinated many of his top generals. As the night continued, its poor leadership began to show, starting with a series of incoherent radio messages. The movement mainly aimed to occupy the main telecommunications building; however, it ignored the east side of the square, which was the location of "Kostrad", the armed forces strategic reserve. At the time, Major General Suharto was in control of the reserve, and upon hearing the news of the takeover, he quickly capitalised on the movement's weaknesses, regaining control of the square without resistance. Following the surrender, the movement's troops did not take further action. At the same time, the Indonesian military slowly gained influence as Sukarno's waned, and within days, the government was under the control of Suharto. He immediately deployed troops and dispersed the movement while trumpeting the movement's actions as a "danger" to the nation.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: A military propaganda campaign to link the "coup" attempt with the PKI, masterminded by Suharto and the military, began to sweep the country on 5 October. (the Armed Forces Day and the day of the six generals' state funeral). Graphic images and descriptions of the murdered, tortured, and even castrated generals began to circulate the country. The campaign was successful despite falsified information, convincing both Indonesian and international audiences that the murders were a PKI attempt to undermine the government under President Sukarno. Though the PKI denied involvement, pent-up tension and hatred that had built up over the years were released.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Even though the 30 September Movement killed 12 people, Suharto ultimately presented it as a nationwide conspiracy to commit mass murder. Millions of people associated with the PKI, even illiterate peasants from remote villages, were presented as murderers and accomplices of the movement. Already in early 1966, two Indonesian specialists at Cornell University, Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, observed in their Cornell Paper that Suharto's Army began the anti-communist campaign well after the 30 September Movement had collapsed. Between the moment that the movement ended and the moment that the Army's mass arrests began, three weeks had elapsed in which no violence or trace of civil war occurred, even according to the Army itself. Sukarno constantly protested the purge, stating that the Army was "burning down a house to kill a rat", but he was powerless as Suharto commanded a firm hold on the military.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The Army removed top civilian and military leaders it thought sympathetic to the PKI. The parliament and cabinet were purged of Sukarno loyalists. Leading PKI members were immediately arrested, some summarily executed. Army leaders organised demonstrations in Jakarta during which on 8 October, the PKI Jakarta headquarters was burned down. Anti-Communist youth groups were formed, including the Army-backed Indonesian Students' Action Front (KAMI), the Indonesian Youth and Students' Action Front (KAPPI), and the Indonesian University Alumni Action Front (KASI). In Jakarta and West Java, over 10,000 PKI activists and leaders were arrested, including famed novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The initial deaths occurred during organised clashes between the Army and the PKI, including some Indonesian armed forces units who were sympathetic to communism and were resisting General Suharto's crackdown. For example, much of the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Police Mobile Brigade Corps were infiltrated up to commander level by the PKI. In early October, forces of the Strategic Command (Suharto's "Kostrad") and the RPKAD para-commandos led by Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo were sent to Central Java, a region with strong PKI support, while troops of uncertain loyalty were ordered out. At the same time, the Siliwangi Division was deployed to guard Jakarta and West Java, both of which, unlike Central and East Java, remained relatively immune to the mass killings. Early fighting in the Central Java highlands and around Madiun suggested the PKI might be able to establish a rival regime centred on these regions. However, widespread fears of a civil war between factions supported by the United States and China, respectively, quickly evaporated as the forces sent by Suharto took control. Many rebel commanders chose not to fight as Suharto-deployed forces arrived, although resistance came from some, like General Supardjo, for a few more weeks.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: As the Sukarno presidency began to unravel and Suharto began to assert control following the "coup" attempt, the PKI's top national leadership was hunted and arrested, with some summarily executed. In early October, PKI chairman Dipa Nusantara Aidit had flown to Central Java, where the "coup" attempt had been supported by leftist officers in Yogyakarta, Salatiga, and Semarang. Fellow senior PKI leader Njoto was shot around 6 November, Aidit on 22 November, and First Deputy PKI Chairman M.H. Lukman was killed shortly after that.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The killings started in October 1965 in Jakarta, spread to Central and Eastern Java and later to Bali, and smaller outbreaks occurred in parts of other islands, including Sumatra. The communal tensions and bitter hatreds that had built up were played upon by the Army leadership, which characterised Communists as villains, and many Indonesian civilians took part in the killings. The worst massacres were in Aceh, Bali, Central and East Java where PKI support was at its strongest. The situation varied across the country, and the role of the Army has never been fully explained. In some areas, the Army organised, encouraged, trained, and supplied civilian groups and local militias. In other areas, communal vigilante action preceded the Army, although in most cases, killings did not commence before military units had sanctioned violence by instruction or example. It was in the earlier stages of the killings that the Army's direct involvement in clashes with the PKI occurred. By the end of October, groups of devout Muslims joined the purge of Communists, claiming it was their duty to cleanse Indonesia of atheism.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In some areas, civilian militia knew where to find known Communists and their sympathisers, while in others, the Army demanded lists of Communists from village heads. There was no disguise associated with PKI membership, and most suspects were easy to identify within communities. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta supplied the Indonesian military with lists of up to 5,000 suspected Communists. Although some PKI branches organised resistance and reprisal killings, most went passively to their deaths. Not all victims were PKI members. Often the label "PKI" was used to include anyone to the left of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). In other cases, victims were suspected or simply alleged Communists or were victims of grievance settling with little or no political motive. Anti-Communist killings were then instigated with youths, assisted by the Army. Most of the victims were not major political figures and were mostly among the poor and the lower middle-class such as farmers, plantation labourers, factory workers, students, teachers, artists and civil servants. They were often targeted because they or someone they knew, such as a friend or family member, had joined the PKI or affiliated organisation.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: With very few exceptions, the killings were not spontaneous but carried out with a high degree of organisation. Most of the victims were also detainees of the Indonesian Army, making the killings summary executions. Initially, many leftists willingly turned themselves in to the military and the police, believing they would be safe and, therefore, the reasonable thing to do. The killings were carried out 'face to face' as in Rwanda or Cambodia, unlike the mechanical methods of killing used by Nazi Germany. The methods of non-mechanised violence and killing included shooting, dismembering alive, stabbing, disembowelment, castration, impaling, strangling and beheading with Japanese-style samurai swords. Firearms and automatic weapons were used on a limited scale, with most of the killings being carried out with knives, sickles, machetes, swords, ice picks, bamboo spears, iron rods and other makeshift weapons. Islamic extremists often paraded severed heads on spikes. Corpses were often thrown into rivers, and at one point, officials complained to the Army of congested rivers that run into the city of Surabaya due to the bodies. In areas such as Kediri in East Java, Nahdlatul Ulama youth wing (Ansor Youth Movement) members lined up Communists, cut their throats and disposed of the bodies in rivers. Rows of severed penises were often left behind as a reminder to the rest. The killings left whole sections of villages empty, and the houses of victims or the interned were looted and often handed over to the military.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Local Chinese Indonesians were killed in some areas, and their properties looted and burned as a result of anti-Chinese racism, on the excuse that D.N. Aidit had brought the PKI closer to China. In the predominantly Christian islands of Nusa Tenggara, Christian clergy and teachers suffered at the hands of Muslim youth.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Although there were occasional and isolated flare-ups until 1969, the killings mostly subsided by March 1966, when either there were no more suspects or authorities intervened. Solo residents said that exceptionally high flooding in March 1966 of the Solo River, considered mystical by the Javanese, signalled the end of the killings.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In Java, much of the killing was along "aliran" (cultural stream) loyalties; the Army encouraged "santri" (more devout and orthodox Muslims) among the Javanese to seek out PKI members among the "abangan" (less orthodox) Javanese. The conflict that had broken out in 1963 between the Muslim party Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the PKI turned into killings in the second week of October. The Muslim group Muhammadiyah proclaimed in early November 1965 that the extermination of "Gestapu/PKI" constituted Holy War ("Gestapu" being the military's name for the "30 September Movement"), a position that was supported by other Islamic groups in Java and Sumatra. For many youths, killing Communists became a religious duty. Where there had been Communist centres in Central and East Java, Muslim groups portraying themselves as victims of Communist aggression justified the killings by evoking the Madiun Affair of 1948. Roman Catholic students in the Yogyakarta region left their hostels at night to join in the execution of truckloads of arrested Communists.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Although the killings subsided in early 1966 for most of the country, they went on for years in parts of East Java. In Blitar, guerrilla action was maintained by surviving PKI members until they were defeated in 1967 and 1968. The mystic Mbah Suro, along with devotees of his Communist-infused traditional mysticism, built an army, but he and his 80 followers were killed in a war of resistance against the Indonesian Army.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Mirroring the widening of social divisions across Indonesia in the 1950s and early 1960s, the island of Bali saw conflict between supporters of the traditional Balinese caste system and those rejecting these traditional values, particularly the PKI. Communists were publicly accused of working towards destroying the island's culture, religion, and character, and the Balinese, like the Javanese, were urged to destroy the PKI. Government jobs, funds, business advantage and other spoils of office had gone to the Communists during the final years of Sukarno's presidency. Disputes over land and tenants' rights led to land seizures and killings when the PKI promoted "unilateral action". As Indonesia's only Hindu-majority island, Bali did not have the Islamic forces involved in Java, and it was upper-caste PNI landlords who instigated the elimination of PKI members. High Hindu priests called for sacrifices to satisfy spirits angered by past sacrilege and social disruption. Balinese Hindu leader Ida Bagus Oka told Hindus: "There can be no doubt [that] the enemies of our revolution are also the cruellest enemies of religion, and must be eliminated and destroyed down to the roots." Like parts of East Java, Bali experienced a state of near civil war as Communists regrouped.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The balance of power was shifted in favour of anti-Communists in December 1965, when personnel from both the Army Para-commando Regiment and 5th Brawijaya Military Region units arrived in Bali after having carried out killings in Java. Led by Suharto's principal troubleshooter, Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, Javanese military commanders permitted Balinese squads to kill until reined in. In contrast to Central Java, where the Army encouraged people to kill the "Gestapu", Bali's eagerness to kill was so tremendous and spontaneous that, having provided logistic support initially, the Army eventually had to step in to prevent chaos. Sukarno's choice of Bali's provincial governor, Suteja, was recalled from office and accused of preparing a communist uprising, and his relatives were tracked down and killed. A series of killings similar to those in Central and East Java were led by black-shirted PNI youth. For several months, militia death squads went through villages capturing suspects and taking them away. Hundreds of houses belonging to communists and their relatives were burnt down within one week of the reprisal crusade, with occupants being butchered as they ran from their homes. An early estimate suggested that 50,000 people, including women and children, were killed in this operation alone. The population of several Balinese villages were halved in the last months of 1965. All the Chinese shops in the towns of Singaraja and Denpasar were destroyed, and many of their owners who were alleged to have financially supported the "Gestapu" killed. Between December 1965 and early 1966, an estimated 80,000 Balinese were killed, roughly 5% of the island's population at the time, and proportionally more than anywhere else in Indonesia.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: PKI-organised movements and campaigns against foreign businesses in Sumatra's plantations provoked quick reprisals against communists following the coup attempt. In Aceh, as many as 40,000 were killed, part of the possibly 200,000 deaths across Sumatra. Ethnic Javanese migrants were slaughtered en masse in South Sumatra. The regional revolts of the late 1950s complicated events in Sumatra as many former rebels were forced to affiliate themselves with Communist organisations to prove their loyalty to the Indonesian Republic. The quelling of the 1950s revolts and 1965 killings were seen by most Sumatrans as a "Javanese occupation". In Lampung, another factor in the killings seems to have been Javanese immigration. In West Kalimantan, after the killings ended in 1967, indigenous pagan Dayaks expelled 45,000 ethnic Chinese from rural areas, killing as many as 2,000 to 5,000. The Chinese refused to fight back since they considered themselves "a guest on other people's land" with the intention of trading only.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Islam in Java was divided between Abangan, who mixed Islam with other religions like Hinduism and native religious practices, and the Santri, who followed standard orthodox Islam. Many Abangans were supporters of the Communist Party, and their interests were thus supported by the PKI. They subsequently made up most of the people who were slaughtered in the killings. Abangans were targeted for attacks by Ansor, the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama and the Santri with help from the Indonesian Army. To avoid being classified as atheist and communists, Abangan Muslims were forced by the Indonesian government to convert to Hinduism and Christianity in the aftermath of the slaughter.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In Sumatra, anti-Javanese Sumatran youths massacred the ethnic Javanese plantation labourers and PKI members throughout North Sumatra. In Lombok, natives slaughtered mostly ethnic Balinese all across the region.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The targeting of ethnic Chinese played an important role in the killings in Sumatra and Kalimantan, which have been called genocide. Charles A. Coppel is sharply critical of this characterisation, in which he sees a western media and academics unwilling to face the consequences of an anti-communist agenda that they endorsed, instead scapegoating Indonesian racism and indulging in extravagant and false claims of hundreds of thousands or millions of Chinese killed. Charles Coppel wrote of the distorted coverage in an article titled: "A genocide that never was: explaining the myth of anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia, 1965–1966". Coppel sees the same bias in coverage of the May 1998 riots, where the Volunteer Team for Humanity noted non-Chinese looters made up the majority of those who were killed. His thesis continues to inspire debate.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: An estimate is that around 2,000 Chinese Indonesians were killed (out of a total estimated death toll of between 500,000 and 3 million people), with documented massacres taking place in Makassar, Medan and Lombok island. Robert Cribb and Charles A. Coppel noted that "relatively few" Chinese were actually killed during the purge while most of the dead were native Indonesians. The death toll of the Chinese was in the thousands, while the death toll of native Indonesians was in the hundreds of thousands. Ethnic Balinese and Javanese made up the vast majority of people who were massacred.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Although the general outline of events is known, much is unknown about the killings, and an accurate and verified count of the dead is unlikely ever to be known. There were few Western journalists or academics in Indonesia at the time; the military was one of the few sources of information, travel was difficult and dangerous, and the regime that approved and oversaw the killings remained in power for three decades. The Indonesian media at the time had been undermined by restrictions under "Guided Democracy" and by the "New Order's" takeover in October 1966. With the killings occurring at the height of Western fears over communism during the Cold War, there was little investigation internationally, which would have risked complicating the West's preference for Suharto and the "New Order" over the PKI and the "Old Order".


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In the first 20 years following the killings, 39 serious estimates of the death toll were attempted. Before the killings had finished, the Indonesian Army estimated 78,500 had been killed, while the PKI put the figure at two million. The Indonesian Army later estimated the number killed to be one million. In 1966, Benedict Anderson had set the death toll at 200,000. By 1985 he concluded that a total of 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed. Most scholars now agree that at least half a million were killed, thus more than in any other event in Indonesian history. An armed forces security command estimate from December 1976 put the number at between 450,000 and 500,000. Robert Cribb suggests the most accurate figure is 500,000, though he notes it is incredibly difficult to determine the precise number of people killed. However, Jan Walendouw, one of Suharto's confidants, admitted that about 1.2 million Indonesians were killed. Vincent Bevins estimates the numbers killed at up to a million or perhaps more.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Arrests and imprisonment continued for ten years after the purge. A 1977 Amnesty International report suggested "about one million" PKI cadres and others identified or suspected of party involvement were detained. Between 1981 and 1990, the Indonesian government estimated that there were between 1.6 and 1.8 million former prisoners "at large" in society. It is possible that in the mid-1970s, 100,000 were still imprisoned without trial. It is thought that as many as 1.5 million were imprisoned at one stage or another. Those PKI members not killed or imprisoned went into hiding while others tried to hide their past. Those arrested included leading politicians, artists and writers such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and peasants and soldiers.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Those incarcerated in the vast network of prisons and concentration camps, which rivalled the worst camps of the USSR, faced "extraordinarily inhumane conditions." Many did not survive this first period of detention, dying from malnutrition and beatings.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: As people revealed the names of underground Communists, often under torture, the numbers imprisoned rose from 1966–68. Methods of torture included severe beatings with makeshift materials like electric cable and large pieces of wood, breaking fingers and crushing toes and feet under the legs of tables and chairs, pulling out fingernails, electric shocks, and burning with molten rubber or cigarettes. Detainees were sometimes forced to watch or listen to the torture of others, including relatives such as spouses or children. Both men and women were subjected to sexual violence while in detention, including rape and electric shocks to the genitals. Women, in particular, were subjected to brutal gendered violence, including being forced to ingest the urine of their captors and having their genitals and breasts mutilated. Myriad instances of torture and rape, with victims including girls younger than 13, were reported to Amnesty International. Those released were often placed under house arrest, had to report to the military regularly, or were banned from Government employment, as were their children.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Sukarno's balancing act of "Nasakom" (nationalism, religion, communism) had been unravelled. His most significant pillar of support, the PKI, had been effectively eliminated by the other two pillars—the Army and political Islam; and the Army was on the way to unchallenged power. Many Muslims were no longer trusting of Sukarno, and by early 1966, Suharto began to defy Sukarno openly, a policy that Army leaders had previously avoided. Sukarno attempted to cling to power and mitigate the Army's new-found influence, although he could not bring himself to blame the PKI for the coup as demanded by Suharto. On 1 February 1966, Sukarno promoted Suharto to the rank of lieutenant general. The Supersemar decree of 11 March 1966 transferred much of Sukarno's power over the parliament and Army to Suharto, ostensibly allowing Suharto to do whatever was needed to restore order. On 12 March 1967, Sukarno was stripped of his remaining power by Indonesia's provisional parliament, and Suharto named Acting President. On 21 March 1968, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly formally elected Suharto as president.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Several hundred or thousand Indonesian leftists travelling abroad were unable to return to their homeland. For example, Djawoto, the ambassador to China, refused to be recalled and spent the rest of his life outside of Indonesia. Some of these exiles, writers by trade, continued writing. This Indonesian exile literature was full of hatred for the new government and written simply, for general consumption, but necessarily published internationally.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In late 1968, the National Intelligence Estimate for Indonesia reported: "An essential part of the Suharto government's economic program ... has been to welcome foreign capital back to Indonesia. Already about 25 American and European firms have recovered control of mines, estates, and other enterprises nationalized under Sukarno. Liberal legislation has been enacted to attract new private foreign investment. ... There is substantial foreign investment in relatively untapped resources of nickel, copper, bauxite, and timber. The most promising industry ... is oil."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The killings served as a direct precedent for the genocidal invasion and occupation of East Timor. The same generals oversaw the killing in both situations and encouraged equally brutal methods—with impunity.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The killings in Indonesia were so effective and enjoyed such prestige among Western powers that they inspired similar anti-communist purges in countries such as Chile and Brazil. Vincent Bevins found evidence that indirectly linked the metaphor "Jakarta" to eleven countries.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: To Western governments, the killings and purges were seen as victory over communism at the height of the Cold War. Western governments and much of the West's media preferred Suharto and the "New Order" to the PKI and the increasingly leftist "Old Order". The British ambassador, Andrew Gilchrist, wrote to London: "I never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change." News of the massacre was carefully controlled by Western intelligence agencies. Journalists, prevented from entering Indonesia, relied on the official statements from Western embassies. The British embassy in Jakarta advised intelligence headquarters in Singapore on how the news should be presented: "Suitable propaganda themes might be: PKI brutality in murdering Generals, ... PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign Communists. ... British participation should be carefully concealed."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: A headline in "U.S. News & World Report" read: "Indonesia: Hope... where there was once none". Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt commented in "The New York Times", "With 500,000 to 1 million Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place." The nationalist oilman H. L. Hunt proclaimed Indonesia the sole bright spot for the United States in the Cold War and called the ouster of Sukarno the "greatest victory for freedom since the last decisive battle of World War II." "Time" described the suppression of the PKI as "The West's best news for years in Asia," and praised Suharto's regime as "scrupulously constitutional." "It was a triumph for Western propaganda," Robert Challis, a BBC reporter in the area, later reflected. Many Western media reports repeated the Indonesian Army's line by downplaying its responsibility for and the rational, organised nature of the mass killing. They emphasised the role of civilians instead, invoking the orientalist stereotype of Indonesians as primitive and violent. A "New York Times" journalist wrote an article titled "When a Nation Runs Amok" explaining that the killings were hardly surprising since they occurred in "violent Asia, where life is cheap."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: U.S government officials were "almost uniformly celebratory" of the mass killings. In recalling their attitudes regarding the killings, State Department intelligence officer Howard Federspiel said that "no one cared, as long as they were Communists, that they were being butchered." Within the United States, Robert F. Kennedy was one of the only prominent individuals to condemn the massacres. He said in January 1966: "We have spoken out against the inhuman slaughters perpetrated by the Nazis and the Communists. But will we speak out also against the inhuman slaughter in Indonesia, where over 100,000 alleged Communists have not been perpetrators, but victims?" U.S. economic elites were also pleased with the outcome in Indonesia. Following Suharto's consolidation of power in 1967, many companies, including Freeport Sulphur (see Grasberg mine), Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, General Electric, American Express, Caterpillar Inc., StarKist, Raytheon Technologies and Lockheed Martin, went to explore business opportunities in the country.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: USSR's Andrei Sakharov called the killings a 'tragic event' and described it as "an extreme case of reaction, racism and militarism", but otherwise, the Soviet response was relatively muted. It was likely in response to the PKI siding with China in the Sino-Soviet split. Other Communist states issued sharp criticism of the killings. The Chinese government stated they were "heinous and diabolical crimes ... unprecedented in history." China also offered refuge to Indonesian leftists fleeing the violence. One Yugoslav diplomat commented that "even assuming the guilt of the politburo [PKI leadership], which I do not, does this justify genocide? Kill the Central Committee, but do not kill 100,000 people who do not know and had no part in it [the 30 September Plot]." The killings perhaps provided a justification for the Cultural Revolution in China, as Chinese communist leaders were fearful that "hidden bourgeois elements" could infiltrate or destroy leftist movements and organisations, and it was built around this narrative. The Suharto government was condemned as a "military fascist regime" by the government of North Korea.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The United Nations avoided commenting on the killings. When Suharto returned Indonesia to the UN, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania was the only member state to protest.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: At the time of the killings, the Cold War between Western powers, in particular the United States, and the communist powers, was at its height. The U.S. government and the rest of the Western Bloc had the goal of halting the spread of communism and bringing countries into its sphere of influence; the eradication of the PKI and Suharto's taking power would be a major turning point in the Cold War. The United Kingdom had an additional, direct, motive to want Sukarno out of power: he opposed the Malayan federation, formed from former states of British Malaya neighbouring Indonesia; since 1963 there had been conflict and armed incursions by the Indonesian army across the border, following communist insurgency from 1948 to 1960 in British Malaya and then independent Commonwealth member Malaya.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Geoffrey B. Robinson, professor of history at UCLA, posits that, based on documentary evidence, powerful foreign states, in particular the United States, Great Britain and their allies, were instrumental in facilitating and encouraging the Indonesian Army's campaign of mass killing, and without such support, the killings would not have happened. He elaborates in his 2018 book "The Killing Season":


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: While the exact role of the U.S. government during the massacres remains obscured by still-sealed government archives on Indonesia for this period, it is known that "at a minimum," the U.S. government supplied money and communications equipment to the Indonesian Army that facilitated the mass killings, gave fifty million rupiah to the KAP-Gestapu death squad, and provided targeted names of thousands of alleged PKI leaders to the Indonesian Army. Robert J. Martens, political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta from 1963 to 1966, told journalist Kathy Kadane in 1990 that he led a group of State Department and CIA officials who drew up the lists of roughly 5,000 Communist Party operatives, which he provided to an Army intermediary. Kadane asserts that approval for the release of names came from top U.S. Embassy officials, including U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters, who all later denied involvement. Martens claimed he acted without approval to avoid red tape at a critical time. The State Department volume "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968," which the CIA attempted to suppress in 2001, acknowledges that the U.S. Embassy provided lists of communist leaders to Indonesians involved in the purges, and notes that Marshall Green stated in a 1966 airgram to Washington, which was drafted by Martens and approved by Masters, that the lists of communists were "apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership." Scholars have also corroborated the claim that U.S. Embassy officials provided lists of communists to Suharto's forces, who, according to Mark Aarons, "ensured that those so named were eliminated in the mass killing operations." Geoffrey B. Robinson asserts that U.S. government officials, among them Marshall Green, "published memoirs and articles that sought to divert attention from any possible U.S. role, while questioning the integrity and political loyalties of scholars who disagreed with them."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Vincent Bevins writes that this was not the first instance of U.S. officials providing lists of suspected communists to members of a foreign government to be rounded up and killed, as they had done so in Guatemala in 1954 and Iraq in 1963. Besides U.S. officials, managers of U.S.-owned corporate plantations also provided the Indonesian Army with lists of "troublesome" communists and union leaders who were subsequently hunted down and killed.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Robert Cribb, writing in 2002, claims "there is considerable evidence that the U.S. encouraged the killings, by both providing funds to anti-communist forces and supplying the Indonesian Army with the names of people whom it believed were PKI members. There is no evidence, however, that U.S. intervention significantly increased the scale of the killings." Vincent Bevins says that the Indonesian military bears "prime responsibility for the massacres and concentration camps," but adds that "Washington was the prime mover" of the operation and "shares guilt for every death." Mark Aarons contends that Marshall Green is "long seen as one of the principal officials involved in encouraging the slaughter." Kai Thaler asserts that declassified documents show that "U.S. officials were accessories to this mass murder" and "helped create the conditions for the killings." Bradley Simpson, Director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, contends that "Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the Army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia." He claims that documents show "the United States was directly involved to the extent that they provided the Indonesian Armed Forces with assistance that they introduced to help facilitate the mass killings," which included the CIA providing small arms from Thailand, and the U.S. government providing monetary assistance and limited amounts of communications equipment, medicine and a range of other items, including shoes and uniforms, to the Indonesian military.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Western support for the Indonesian Army solidified as it demonstrated its "resolve" through the mass killing campaigns. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy reported to the president that the events since 1 October had been "a striking vindication of U.S. policy towards Indonesia in recent years: a policy of keeping our hand in the game for the long-term stakes despite recurrent pressure to pull out" and that it was made clear to the Indonesian Army via U.S. Embassy's deputy chief of mission, Francis Joseph Galbraith, that "Embassy and the USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what Army doing." The primary concerns of U.S. officials by December 1965 were that Sukarno had yet to be removed and that plans to nationalise U.S. oil companies had yet to be reversed and warned the emerging Indonesian leadership that Washington would withhold support if threats to U.S. investments were not halted. Professor Ruth Blakeley writes "the case of Indonesia reveals the extent to which the U.S. state prioritised its elite interests over the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The United States, along with Great Britain and Australia, also played an active role in "black propaganda operations" during the killings, which included clandestine radio broadcasts being transmitted into the country that repeated Indonesian Army propaganda as part of a psychological warfare campaign designed to encourage support for the killings and to discredit the PKI. British Foreign Office documents declassified in 2021 revealed that British propagandists secretly incited anti-communists including army generals to eliminate the PKI, and used black propaganda, due to Sukarno's hostility to the formation of former British colonies into the Malayan federation from 1963. Harold Wilson's government had instructed propaganda specialists from the Foreign Office to send hundreds of inflammatory pamphlets to leading anti-communists in Indonesia, inciting them to kill the foreign minister, Subandrio, and claiming that ethnic Chinese Indonesians deserved the violence meted out to them.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Of all countries, Swedish arms supplies seem to have been the most substantial. According to a report by an Indonesian refugee in Japan, from early December 1965, Indonesia signed "a contract with Sweden for an emergency purchase of $10,000,000 worth of small arms and ammunition to be used for annihilating elements of the PKI." The Swedish Embassy's concerns about the slaughter did grow some months later, with Sweden's ambassador openly critical of the campaign of violence, but apparently after the fact.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Documentary filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer, director of "The Act of Killing" (2012) and "The Look of Silence" (2014), called on the U.S. to account for its role in the killings during a screening of the former for U.S. Congress members. On 10 December 2014, the same day "The Look of Silence" was released in Indonesia, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced a "Sense of the Senate Resolution" which condemned the killings and called for the declassification of all documents on U.S. involvement in the events, noting that "the U.S. provided financial and military assistance during this time and later, according to documents released by the State Department."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Declassified documents released by the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in October 2017 show that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of the massacres from the start and specifically refer to mass killings ordered by Suharto. The documents also reveal that the U.S. government actively encouraged and facilitated the Indonesian Army's massacres to further its geopolitical interests in the region and that U.S. officials and diplomats at the embassy kept detailed records of which PKI leaders were being killed. U.S. officials, dismayed at Indonesia's shift towards the left, were "ecstatic" over the seizure of power by right-wing generals who proceeded to exterminate the PKI, and were determined to avoid doing anything that might thwart the efforts of the Indonesian Army. The U.S. also withheld credible information which contradicted the Indonesian Army's version of events regarding the abortive coup by junior officers on 30 September 1965, which triggered the killings. On 21 December 1965, the Embassy's first secretary, Mary Vance Trent, sent a cable to the State Department which provided an estimate of 100,000 people killed, and referred to the events as a "fantastic switch which has occurred over 10 short weeks." Bradley Simpson said these previously secret cables, telegrams, letters, and reports "contain damning details that the U.S. was willfully and gleefully pushing for the mass murder of innocent people."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Discussion of the killings was heavily tabooed in Indonesia and, if mentioned at all, usually called "peristiwa enam lima", the incident of '65. Inside and outside Indonesia, public discussion of the killings increased during the 1990s and especially after 1998 when the New Order government collapsed. Jailed and exiled members of the Sukarno regime, as well as ordinary people, told their stories in increasing numbers. Foreign researchers began to publish increasingly more on the topic, with the end of the military regime and its doctrine of coercing such research attempts into futility.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The killings are skipped over in most Indonesian histories and have been scarcely examined by Indonesians, and has received comparatively little international attention. Indonesian textbooks typically depict the killings as a "patriotic campaign" that resulted in less than 80,000 deaths. In 2004, the textbooks were briefly changed to include the events, but this new curriculum discontinued in 2006 following protests from the military and Islamic groups. The textbooks which mentioned the mass killings were subsequently burnt by order of Indonesia's Attorney General. John Roosa's "Pretext for Mass Murder" (2006) was initially banned by the Attorney General's Office. The Indonesian parliament set up a truth and reconciliation commission to analyse the killings, but it was suspended by the Indonesian High Court. An academic conference regarding the killings was held in Singapore in 2009. A hesitant search for mass graves by survivors and family members began after 1998, although little has been found. Over three decades later, great enmity remains in Indonesian society over the events.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The Supardjo Document is a copy of the personal notes of General Supardjo regarding the 30 September Movement. It is one of the few primary sources of this event and gives insight into the movement from a military perspective, including Supardjo's opinion on what may have caused the movement to fail.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Satisfactory explanations for the scale and frenzy of the violence have challenged scholars from all ideological perspectives. One view attributes the communal hatreds behind the killings to the forcing of parliamentary democracy onto Indonesian society, claiming that such changes were culturally unsuitable and unnecessarily disruptive in the post-independence 1950s. A contrasting view is that when Sukarno and the military replaced the democratic process with authoritarianism, competing interests—i.e., the Army, political Islam, and Communism—could not be openly debated. They were suppressed instead and could only be expressed through violence. A breakdown in conflict resolution methods led to Muslim groups and the military adopting an "us or them attitude" and when the killings were over, many Indonesians dismissed the event as something the Communists had deserved. The possibility of returning to similar upheavals was cited as a factor in the New Order administration's political conservatism and tight control of the political system. Vigilance against an alleged Communist threat remained a hallmark of Suharto's three-decade presidency.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Although mostly unknown in the West compared to the Vietnam War and various right-wing coups in Latin America, the massacres and Suharto's rise to power are considered by historians to be a significant turning point in the Cold War. The massacres were also crucial to the expansion of capitalism in Indonesia, with Suharto rapidly implementing economic policies that his administration modeled off those of the "Berkeley Mafia", to liberalise the economy. Given U.S. foreign policy goals of stopping the spread of communism and bringing nations into its sphere of influence, the bloody purge which decimated the PKI, the third-largest Communist Party in the world at the time, was considered a huge victory. After viewing declassified documents released in 2017, historian John Roosa notes that much "of the U.S. foreign policy establishment viewed it as a great victory that they were able to sort of 'flip' Indonesia very quickly." He also states that the U.S. did not simply "stand by" and allow the killings to happen, claiming that "it's easy for American commentators to fall into that approach, but the U.S. was part and parcel of the operation, strategising with the Indonesian Army and encouraging them to go after the PKI."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In surveying the most recent histories of the events, along with declassified documents and witness statements, Vincent Bevins posits that the mass killings in mid-1960s Indonesia were not necessarily an isolated incident and serves as the apex of "a loose network of U.S.-backed anti-communist extermination programs" which emerged around the world from 1945 to 1990 (such as Operation Condor), and "carried out mass murder in at least 22 countries." He argues that, unlike the violence unleashed by communist leaders such as Joseph Stalin and Pol Pot, the violence of the anti-communist crusade of the United States has deeply shaped the world we live in today, a "worldwide capitalist order with the United States as its leading military power and center of cultural production." He argues that contrary to the popular notion that much of the developing world peacefully and willingly adopted the capitalist system advocated by the United States and its allies, it's possible that without this violence, "many of these countries would not be capitalist at all."


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Geoffrey B. Robinson asserts that while there is no consensus on the matter, some scholars have described the mass killings as "genocide". Jess Melvin claims the 1965–1966 massacre constitutes genocide under the legal definition as particular religious and ethnic groups were targeted collectively for their relations to the PKI. She cites Matthew Lippman and David Nersessian stating atheists are covered under the genocide convention and argues the Indonesian military prescribed the elimination of "atheists" and "unbelievers" collectively for their association with communism and the PKI, and thus these killings would constitute genocide. Melvin also asserts thsy the extermination of the PKI was an act of genocide by pointing out that the PKI themselves identified with a particular religious denomination known as "Red Islam" that mixed Islam with communism. She further argues the killings constitute genocide, rather than politicide, "because the PKI constitute an ideologically-based national group." This interpretation has been rejected by other scholars on the grounds that the United Nations definition of genocide does not mention the targeting of political groups. Historian Charles Coppel argues that the killings were politicide rather than genocide, because the victims "were overwhelmingly Javanese and Balinese, not Chinese".


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: In November 2015, the International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes Against Humanity in Indonesia, presided over by seven international judges, was held in The Hague, Netherlands. It was formally established in 2014 by human rights activists, academics, and Indonesian exiles in response to an "absence of an official domestic process of transitional justice based on truth finding." In July 2016, chief judge Zak Yacoob publicly read the tribunal's findings, which called the state of Indonesia directly responsible for the events and guilty of crimes against humanity, blamed Suharto for spreading false propaganda and laying the grounds for the massacres, and concluded that the massacres "intended to annihilate a section of the population and could be categorised as genocide"; the report also highlighted other allegations which the panel found to be well-founded, including enslavement in labour camps, ruthless torture, systematic sexual violence, and forced disappearance. Indonesia rejected the tribunal's ruling; Security Minister Luhut Pandjaitan said the killings were "none of their business, they are not our superiors and Indonesia has its own system." The court has no legal authority to issue binding decisions or rulings.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Judge Yacoob stated that "the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia were all complicit to differing degrees in the commission of these crimes against humanity." The judges concluded that the U.S. supported the Indonesian military "knowing well that they were embarked upon a programme of mass killings", which included providing lists of alleged communist party officials to the Indonesian security forces with a "strong presumption that these would facilitate the arrest and/or the execution of those that were named", whereas the UK and Australia repeated false propaganda from the Indonesian Army, even after it became "abundantly clear that killings and other crimes against humanity were taking place." Australia's foreign affairs ministry rejected the tribunal's conclusion, which it described as a "human rights NGO", and denies the country was in any way complicit in the killings. The U.S. and the U.K. have not responded to the tribunal's findings. Indonesian human-rights lawyer Nursyahbani Katjasungkana called on all three countries to admit their complicity, stating that it had been proved from their various diplomatic communications and could no longer be denied.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: During Suharto's regime, the media was heavily influenced and censored to show a 'certain' history of the 1965 incident: a history which purely and undoubtedly blamed the PKI for this political tragedy. However, in recent articles such as by "The Jakarta Post", a more in-depth and complex story is recognised by the media offering conflicting views on whom the blame should really fall. A film supporting the New Order's version of events, "Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI" ("Betrayal of Indonesia Communist Party") was broadcast annually on the government television station TVRI every 30 September. This version was the only one allowed in open discourse in the country. After Suharto's removal from power, many people, including those involved, told other versions of the events in various books and films. One, the documentary film "The Act of Killing", included interviews with individuals who had participated in the mass killings, and its companion piece "The Look of Silence" follows one grieving family trying to understand why it happened and exposes how those behind the massacres still revel in their crimes 50 years on, including boasting on camera how they dismembered, eviscerated, castrated and beheaded alleged communists. The film "The Year of Living Dangerously", based around events leading up to the killings, internationally released in 1982, was banned in Indonesia until 2000.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: A museum called the "Museum Pengkhianatan PKI (Komunis)", the "Museum of Communist Betrayal", was established in Jakarta to buttress the narrative that the PKI were traitors and deserved to be eradicated.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: The killings inspired many novelists to write their own rendition of the event, either on a more local, socio-cultural level, or on a national, political level. Books that were written in Indonesia during the New Order often faced censorship of certain concepts, while books written and published abroad were banned from the country.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: John Roosa's "Pretext for Mass Murder" traces a historical path through the 1965 event, painting a scenario of explanations for what preceded, caused and followed the coup. It focuses on several aspects of the coup such as the incoherence of facts and the incompetence of coup organisers to provide four main interpretations of the coup:(1) the movement as an attempted coup d'état by the PKI, (2) the movement as a mutiny of junior officers, (3) the movement as an alliance of Army officers and the PKI, and (4) the movement as a frame-up of the PKI. It also looks at material previously left unexplored in traditional discussions of the incident to give a reconstruction of the chaos that surrounds this period in Indonesian history.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Ahmad Tohari's trilogy novel "The Dancer" (Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk) depicts a village community caught in a revolution, giving readers a perspective less acknowledged in the more popular account of the massacres. By having its two main characters, Srintil and Rasus, on opposite ends of the revolution, the novel sketches not only the circumstances that could have drawn the greater rural public into communist practices but also the mindset of the people who were tasked with carrying out the killings. As the novel was published in 1981, certain aspects were censored by the New Order, but all the same, the trilogy provides valuable insight into the grass-root level of the anti-communist coup and the tragedies that followed.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Eka Kurniawan's "Beauty is a Wound" (2002) weaves history into satire, tragedy and the supernatural to depict the state of the nation before, during and after 1965. There is less focus on the military aspect of the coup, but a good deal of focus on the communists themselves through the form of interpersonal relationships and communist ghosts who could not find peace. Without meaning to, perhaps, the novel also gives readers a glimpse of the economy of Indonesia at the time using the example of a flourishing prostitute business and a temporary swimsuit business, among others. Kurniawan projects his feelings about the revolution and coup by constructing a story of theatrical characters around it and delivers a history of the nation all the way from Dutch occupation to Suharto.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: Louise Doughty's "Black Water" (2016) deals with the 1965 event by exploring them from a European viewpoint. Shifting between California and Indonesia as settings for the novel, the book is written from the perspective of a single man working as an operative for an international company. The novel focuses more on foreign reactions to the coup rather than the coup itself, especially from the foreign journalist community.


title: Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

text: "The Jakarta Method" (2020) by Vincent Bevins builds upon his writing for "The Washington Post" employing recently declassified records, archival probes, and primary eye-witness interviews gathered from one dozen countries to further examine and bring to greater public acknowledgement of the legacy of the killings.


title: Switchblade

text: A switchblade (aka switch knife, automatic knife, pushbutton knife, ejector knife, flick knife, Stiletto, flick blade, or spring knife (Sprenger, Springer)) is a type of knife with a sliding or pivoting blade contained in the handle which is extended automatically by a spring when a button, lever, or switch on the handle or bolster is activated. Virtually all switchblades incorporate a locking blade, where the blade is locked against accidental closure when the blade is in the open position. It is unlocked by a mechanism that allows the blade to be folded and locked in the closed position.


title: Switchblade

text: During the 1950s, US newspapers as well as the tabloid press promoted the image of a new violent crime wave caused by young male delinquents with a stiletto, switchblade, or flick knife, based mostly on anecdotal evidence. In 1954, Democratic Rep. James J. Delaney of New York authored the first bill submitted to the U.S. Congress banning the manufacture and sale of switchblades, beginning a wave of legal restrictions worldwide and a consequent decline in their popularity.


title: Switchblade

text: The most common type of switchblade is the side-opening or out-the-side (OTS) knife. These resemble traditional manually-operated folding knives, but feature a coil or leaf spring which powers a blade that is released when the activation button is pressed. Side-opening knives may feature a safety mechanism that prevent the accidental actuation of the blade release mechanism. Manipulation of a lever, slide button, bolster, or picklock releases the blade for closure.


title: Switchblade

text: A double action out the front knife is so-called because the blade emerges from the front of the handle and the thumb stud can be moved forwards or backwards to extend or retract the knife respectively.


title: Switchblade

text: The knife blade (dark grey) is locked in position by a spring-loaded restraining pin (yellow and red) fitting into a notch in the blade at position 1. The two spring carriers (green) fit into the spaces on the slide (blue) and this assembly rests to the side of the blade. The right spring carrier is restrained by a tab at position 2 that fits over the end of the blade. Tension on the main spring (red zig-zag) holds the other spring carrier, slide and thumb stud (light grey) to the right.


title: Switchblade

text: When the thumb stud is pushed forward the slide and left spring carrier are free to travel. This increases tension on the main spring as the blade and right spring carrier are locked. A ramp on the slide impinges on the lower pin. When the pin evacuates the notch, the blade and right spring carrier are free to move. The right spring carrier moves only a short distance before it comes to rest in the slide. Momentum carries the blade further before flanges (not shown) retard its motion.


title: Switchblade

text: Another restraining pin at position 3 fits into a notch and locks the blade in the extended position. A tab on the left spring carrier fits into a hole in the blade at position 4 which restrains the left spring carrier. This allows reverse force on the thumb stud to increase tension in the main spring before the upper restraining pin releases and the blade and carrier can return to the closed position.


title: Switchblade

text: The small restraining pin at 3 is the only thing holding the blade open and is prone to failure if abused. The whole slide assembly moves only a short distance, exactly as far as the thumb stud moves. The force that causes the blade to extend or retract is equal to the force applied by the user on the thumb stud to stretch the main spring before it releases. For this reason the tip of the blade is unlikely to even break skin and is entirely incapable of causing significant injury when released though the edge of the blade may still cut as it moves as with any knife. Any object in the path of the extending blade may cause the blade to stop before it can lock in position. This is easily remedied by either pulling the blade out so that it locks or pushing it in till it locks and then redeploying.


title: Switchblade

text: Double-action knives have the advantages of being able to automatically retract the blade, as well as allowing the main spring to be in the “at rest” position whenever the knife is fully open or closed. However, because they have more complicated mechanisms, double-action OTFs will tend to be more expensive, have a weaker firing action, and a less-solid lockup than comparable single-action OTFs.


title: Switchblade

text: A single action out the front knife operates under similar principles but will only automatically extend the blade which must then be manually retracted.


title: Switchblade

text: One spring post (green, left) is rigidly fixed to the handle (orange), the other spring post (green, right) is fastened to the base of the blade. The main spring (red) is under tension, but the blade cannot eject because the spring mounted button (light grey, its spring not shown) is resting in a notch in the blade. The cocking arm (blue) emerges through the base of the handle; friction with the handle holds it in place.


title: Switchblade

text: When the button is depressed (sideways into the handle or, as illustrated, into the page) a slot in it aligns with the blade and allows the blade to move forward. When the blade is fully extended flanges on the blade engage pins on the cocking arm retarding the blade's motion. The blade is locked in position when the rear notch of the blade allows the button to return to its rest position. Even if the button is pressed spring tension holds the knife open.


title: Switchblade

text: To retract the blade the button is again pressed so that its slot aligns with the blade. The cocking arm is pulled backwards which itself pulls the blade backward. When the blade is fully retracted the spring mounted button rests in the forward notch and again pops up and locks the blade in the cocked position. The cocking arm is then manually pushed forward to again sit flush with the handle.


title: Switchblade

text: Because the main spring is constantly acting on the blade and is extended by a far greater amount and is cocked by the whole hand and arm rather than by thumb the force it can exert on the blade is greater than with a double action knife. This will easily allow the tip of the blade to break skin when deployed and possibly penetrate a few millimetres or to pass through light clothing. While still not a hugely strong design, because it is more firmly attached a good quality single action out the front blade displays less wobble and play than its comparable quality double action counterpart.


title: Switchblade

text: While operationally identical (in terms of one-handed opening), the "spring-assist" or "assisted opening" knife is not a switchblade or automatic knife. A switchblade opens its blade from the handle automatically to the fully locked and open position with the single press of a button, lever, or switch that is remotely mounted in the knife handle or bolster. In contrast, a spring-assist design uses either 1) manual pressure upon a protrusion on the blade itself or 2) movement of a lever or switch directly linked to the blade to initiate "partial" opening of the blade, at which point an internal spring propels the blade into the fully open, locked position.


title: Switchblade

text: Despite this difference in function, the criminal codes of many nations treat the assisted opening knife as a prohibited weapon like the switchblade.


title: Switchblade

text: In the US, persons have been occasionally been arrested or prosecuted by state law enforcement authorities for carrying assisted-opening knives defined as an illegal switchblade. An attempt to criminalize the sale of spring-assisted knives by federal law enforcement was forestalled by a US 2009 amendment (Amendment 1447) to 15 U.S.C. §1244. This amendment provides that the Switchblade Knife Act shall not apply to "spring-assist" or "assisted-opening" knives (i.e. knives with closure-biased springs that require physical force applied to the blade to assist in opening the knife).


title: Switchblade

text: Beginning with the Austrian Arms Act of 1996 switchblades, like all other knives, are generally legal to buy, import, possess or carry, regardless of blade length or opening or locking mechanism. The only exception are minors (defined as persons under the age of 18) and people who have been expressly banned from owning and carrying any weapon ("Waffenverbot"): both groups may only possess knives which are not considered "weapons" under the Arms Act, defined as "objects that by their very nature are intended to reduce or eliminate the defensive ability of a person through direct impact". Switchblades usually fall under that definition.


title: Switchblade

text: In Austria the regulatory laws of individual states and the Assembly Act prohibit switchblades and other knives from being carried into a public building, school, public assembly, or public event.


title: Switchblade

text: In Australia, switchblades are banned by the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations as a Prohibited Import. Australian customs refer to the automatic knife or switchblade as a flick knife. Australian law defines a flick knife as a knife that has a blade which opens automatically by gravity, by centrifugal force, or by any pressure applied to a button, spring or device in or attached to the handle of the knife, a definition that would cover not only switchblades and automatic-opening knives, but also gravity knives and balisongs.


title: Switchblade

text: At a state and local level, most jurisdictions declare flick knives to be prohibited weapons in their respective acts, codes and regulations. Persons residing in states that do not have specific weapons legislation covering switchblades (such as Tasmania) are still covered by Federal Customs legislation, but in conditions where the state has no legislation against such items, an exemption may be applied for and received if approved by the chief supervisory officer of the police service in that state.


title: Switchblade

text: Some states which have specific legislation against switchblades allow individuals to apply for an exemption from this legislation if they have a legitimate reason. For example, in the state of Victoria, a member of a "bona fide" knife-collectors' association, who is not a prohibited person (per the Firearms Act 1996), and meets other guidelines and conditions may apply to the Chief Commissioner of Police for a Prohibited Weapons Exemption to possess, carry, or otherwise own such a knife. This exemption may then, in turn, be used to apply to the Australian Customs Service for an import permit.


title: Switchblade

text: Article 3, §1 of the 2006 Weapons Act lists the switchblade or automatic knife ("couteaux à cran d’arrêt et à lame jaillissante") as a prohibited weapon. In Belgium, the police and local jurisdictions are also allowed to prohibit the carrying or possession of a wide variety of knives, which are not explicitly banned by law, if the owner cannot establish a legitimate reason ("motif légitime") for having that knife, particularly in urban areas or at public events.


title: Switchblade

text: Under Part III of the Criminal Code a knife that has a blade that opens automatically by gravity or centrifugal force or by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, is illegal to possess, import, sell, buy, trade, or carry on one's person. These are prohibited weapons ("armes défendues"). While certain businesses can be granted a licence to acquire and possess prohibited weapons such as switchblades for use as props in movie productions, these exemptions do not apply to individuals.


title: Switchblade

text: Any type of automatic-opening knife or bladed tool that can be opened using just one hand (this includes any one-handed knife that has been deactivated by removing its opening mechanism) is illegal to own or possess. Multi-tools featuring one-hand opening blades are also illegal to own or possess. Manually opened one-handed knives are legal.


title: Switchblade

text: In Finland switchblade or automatic knives are legal to purchase or possess. All knives are considered as dangerous weapons and it is forbidden to carry any knife without a proper cause. The law forbids carrying or importing any automatic knife that has the blade completely hidden like OTF switchblades. The restriction does not apply to importing historically significant knives or those with significant artistic value. The law requires that switchblades be cased and secured while being transported.


title: Switchblade

text: French law defines switchblades as dangerous weapons, which may not be carried on one's person. If carried in a vehicle, such knives must be placed in a secure, locked compartment not accessible to the vehicle occupants. In addition, French law provides that authorities may classify any knife as a prohibited item depending upon circumstances and the discretion of the police or judicial authorities.


title: Switchblade

text: All large side-opening switchblade knives (blade longer than 8.5 cm), OTF switchblades, balisongs or butterfly knives (blade longer than 4 cm), and gravity knives are illegal to own, import or export under German law. Side-opening switchblade knives with single-edged blades not longer than 8.5 cm and incorporating a continuous spine are legal to own. Legal switchblades may be carried both open and concealed on one's person if there is a justified need for it ("berechtigtes Bedürfnis") or if the weapon cannot be accessed with less than 3 moves ("Transport in verschlossenem Behältnis"). Other laws or regulations may still prohibit the carrying of otherwise legal automatic or switchblade knives, particularly in certain situations or places (gatherings on public ground, check-in areas of airports).


title: Switchblade

text: According to decree 175/2003. (X. 28.) of the Hungarian government "a közbiztonságra különösen veszélyes eszközökről" (about the instruments particularly hazardous to public safety), it is prohibited to possess a switchblade in public places or private places open to the public – that includes the inside of vehicles present there – and on public transport vehicles, except for filmmaking and theatrical performances. Members of the Hungarian Army, law enforcement, national security agencies and armed forces stationed in Hungary are exempt from this limitation together with those who are authorised to carry such instruments by legislation. Sale of a switchblade is authorised only to the persons and organizations above. Customs clearance of switchblades may not be performed for private individuals such as tourists.


title: Switchblade

text: According to the Weapons Ordinance (Cap. 217), any person who has possession of any prohibited items (including Gravity Knife and Flick Knife) commits an offence.


title: Switchblade

text: Section 9 of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 makes it an offence to carry a "flick knife" in any public space without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. A summary conviction is punishable with either a €1000 fine, up to 12 months imprisonment or both but if indictable the penalty can be up to five years in prison. The Act, which classifies a flick knife as an offensive weapon, also prohibits the manufacture, importation, sale, hire or loan of these knives. Conviction for any of these offences carries a sentence of up to seven years imprisonment.


title: Switchblade

text: In Italy, the switchblade or automatic opening knife ("coltello a scatto") is generally defined as an "arma bianca" (offensive weapon) rather than a tool. While legal for adults to purchase, such knives may not be transported outside of one's property nor carried on the person, either concealed or unconcealed, nor may it be carried in a motor vehicle where the knife may be accessed by driver or passengers. The Italian Ministry of Interior has warned that switchblade knives will be considered offensive weapons in their own right.


title: Switchblade

text: In Japan any switchblade over in blade length requires permission from the prefectural public safety commission in order to possess.


title: Switchblade

text: According to Lithuanian law it is illegal to carry or possess a switchblade if it meets one of the following criteria: the blade is longer than 8.5 cm; the width in the middle of the blade is less than 14% of its total length; the blade is double sided.


title: Switchblade

text: As of 2012, it is prohibited to own or possess, whether kept at home or not, any stilettos, switchblades, folding knives with more than one cutting edge, and throwing knives.


title: Switchblade

text: The Customs Import Prohibition Order 2008 prohibits the importation of "any knife having a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife (sometimes known as a 'flick-knife' or 'flick gun')". The Summary Offences Act 1981 and the Crimes Act 1961 section 202A(4)(a) make it an offence to possess any weapon in a public place without reasonable excuse.


title: Switchblade

text: Switchblades or automatic knives ("springkniver") may not be acquired, possessed, or carried in Norway "without justifiable purpose" and also assuming they "appear as products of violence".


title: Switchblade

text: Knives, including switchblades, although regarded as dangerous tools, are not considered weapons under Polish law, except for blades hidden in umbrellas, canes, etc. It is legal to sell, buy, trade and possess a switchblade, and Polish law does not prohibit carrying a knife in a public place. However, certain prohibitions may apply during mass events.


title: Switchblade

text: In Russia, switchblades (rus. "автоматический нож", "выкидной нож", "пружинный нож") are illegal only if their blade's length is more than 9 centimetres (about 3.5 inches) - this is an illegal weapon, and there is a fine 500-2000 Russian rubles (about $8–30) and withdrawing of the knife only for carrying it (article 20.8 of Offences Code of Russia), but not for illegal purchasing and possession (keeping at home or somewhere else). Only self-making and selling white arms (rus. "холодное оружие") is a crime in Russia (these two crimes are punished by: part 4 article 222 and part 4 article 223 of Russian Criminal Code). If the blade is shorter than 9 centimetres, anyone (even if people younger than 18 years old, having a criminal history or mental illness) can buy, own and concealed carry (open carry of any weapon or things that look like weapon at human settlements is forbidden in Russia; with the exception for policemen) such a switchblade without any license. But even in this case, it is recommended that people carry on their person an official certificate (type approval) (which is usually in a box with a purchased knife), which proves that it is not a melee weapon and not restricted to carry, in which case even knives longer than 9 cm are sometimes approved.


title: Switchblade

text: The importation and possession of switchblades are illegal in Singapore. It may not be also listed or sold in auctions in Singapore.


title: Switchblade

text: It is legal to carry and possess switchblade or automatic knives with no restriction to the length of the blade.


title: Switchblade

text: In South Africa, little to no laws exist on the possession, sale, manufacture, and carrying of weapons, other than firearms. Switchblades are legal for possession, sale, manufacture, and carrying.


title: Switchblade

text: In South Korea, any knife that automatically opens wider than 45 degrees with the push of a button and has a blade that is longer than 5.5 centimeters is subject to registration. In order to register the knife and legally possess it, one must be older than 20, have no previous criminal offences and be healthy both physically and psychologically. The registration process is carried out at nearby police stations. However, unless the owner of the knife has a hunting license, carrying the knife in public is generally prohibited.


title: Switchblade

text: In Sweden, the possession of any knife in a public place, at school, or public roads is prohibited. Exceptions are made for those who carry knives for professional or otherwise justified reasons. Switchblades may not be possessed by individuals under 21 years of age.


title: Switchblade

text: Knives whose blade can be opened with an automatic mechanism that can be operated with one hand are illegal to acquire (except with a special permit) in Switzerland under the Federal Weapons Act. Butterfly knives, throwing knives and daggers with a symmetrical blade are banned likewise. Violations are punishable with imprisonment of up to three years or a fiscal penalty, as provided for by article 33 of the same act.


title: Switchblade

text: Switchblades are illegal to buy, sell and carry in Turkey per the corresponding law 6136 (4) which includes an incarceration sentence of up to 1 year. However, due to the widespread use of switchblades and butterfly knives in the country, imprisoning is very rare and sentences are often converted to a fine when it is the only violation.


title: Switchblade

text: Under Article 263 of the Criminal Code, switchblades are not specifically prohibited; however, any knife definable as a 'dagger' may not be manufactured, sold, repaired for sale, nor carried on one's person without a valid permit.


title: Switchblade

text: On 12 May 1958, Parliament passed the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, which banned the manufacture, sale or offer to sell or hire any type of automatic-opening or switchblade knife. The law came in response to their perceived use by juvenile delinquents and gangs and associated media coverage, as well as by the 1958 passage of the Switchblade Knife Act in the United States. Indeed, much of the language in the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 appears to be taken directly from the American law.


title: Switchblade

text: In 2019, parliamentary amendments to Section 43, 44, and 46 of The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 make it illegal to own, possess, sell or transfer a switchblade or flick knife within the United Kingdom, including possession at home. According to UK government websites, assisted-opening knives are included in the amended and expanded definition of a prohibited 'flick knife'.


title: Switchblade

text: The "Switchblade Knife Act", (, , aka "SWA", enacted on August 12, 1958, and codified in ), prohibits the manufacture, importation, distribution, transportation, and sale of switchblade knives in commercial transactions substantially affecting interstate commerce between any state, territory, possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside that state, territory, U.S. possession, or the District of Columbia. The Act also prohibits possession of such knives on federal or Indian lands or on lands subject to federal jurisdiction. The federal SWA does "not" prohibit the ownership or carrying of automatic knives or switchblades inside state lines while not on federal property, nor does it prohibit the acquisition or disposition of such knives in an intrastate (in-state) transaction. Finally, the law does not prohibit interstate knife sales or transactions that are either noncommercial in nature, or which do not substantially affect interstate commerce (as defined by recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court).


title: Switchblade

text: U.S. Code Title 15, Sect. 1241 defines switchblade knives as any knives which open "1) by hand pressure applied to a button or other device in the handle of the knife, or any knife having a blade which opens automatically; (2) by operation of inertia, gravity, or both". The Act also prohibits the manufacture, sale, or possession of switchblade knives on any Federal lands, Native American reservations, military bases, and Federal maritime or territorial jurisdictions including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other territories. The act was amended in 1986 to also prohibit the importation, sale, manufacture, or possession of ballistic knives in interstate commerce.


title: Switchblade

text: U.S.C. 1716 prohibits the mailing or transport of switchblades or automatic knives through the U.S. mails (U.S. Postal Service), with a few designated exceptions. The act provides for a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than one year. provides:


title: Switchblade

text: In addition to federal law, some U.S. states have laws restricting or prohibiting automatic knives or switchblades, sometimes as part of a catchall category of "deadly weapons" or "prohibited weapons". A few states, among them Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York, prohibit sale, transfer, ownership or possession of automatic knives or switchblades as deadly or prohibited weapons, while others such as New Hampshire and Arizona have no restrictions on sale, ownership, possession, or carry (with some location-specific exceptions). Other states allow purchase, possession, and carrying on one's person to a limited degree, sometimes with restrictions on blade length or location.


title: Switchblade

text: The negative public reputation of the switchblade as the tool of the juvenile delinquent, derived from sensational media coverage of the 1950s, was enshrined in many state's criminal codes, and some of these laws persist to this day. Thus in some states, the possession or carrying of an automatic-opening knife or switchblade may become illegal based solely on its design or aesthetic appearance, or simply its use as a weapon in a given circumstance. For example, switchblade knives with blade shapes originally designed for the purpose of stabbing or thrusting, such as the dirk, dagger, poignard, or stiletto are automatically considered to be 'deadly weapons' (i.e. knives designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon to inflict death or serious bodily injury).


title: Switchblade

text: Over the years, state judicial decisions have expanded the original reach of switchblade laws, either by reclassifying single-edged automatic pocket knives with short, general-purpose blades as illegal 'dirks or daggers', or by re-defining otherwise legal manually-operated lock-blade pocket knives as a prohibited gravity knife, flick knife, or switchblade. Persons who used knives deemed prohibited as in their work or for self-defense, or who could not afford adequate legal representation, particularly racial minorities, have been disproportionately affected by the capricious enforcement of such laws.


title: Switchblade

text: In response to complaints raised about the constitutionality and inconsistent application of existing statutes to modern knife designs, several states such as Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have repealed older laws against possession or purchase of switchblade or automatic knives. Five states still prohibit anyone from selling, purchasing, owning or carrying a switchblade.


title: Switchblade

text: Unless preempted by state law, various county, city, or other local jurisdictions may also have their own codes or ordinances further restricting or prohibiting switchblade possession or use, for example Sioux Falls, South Dakota, or Oakland, California.


title: Switchblade

text: Switchblades date from the mid-18th century. The development of the first automatic knife was made possible by the invention of small tempered springs by the clockmaker Benjamin Huntsman in 1742.


title: Switchblade

text: The first spring-fired switchblade that can be authenticated appeared in the late 1700s, probably constructed by a craftsman in Italy. After 1816, no automatic knives were produced in Italy for 50 years due to laws passed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By 1900, Italy had resumed production of automatic knives of the [stiletto] pattern, all hand-crafted by individual cutlers or small knife forges. Most of these knifemakers were concentrated in the towns of Maniago, Frosolone, Campobasso, and Scarperia.


title: Switchblade

text: Unknown artisans developed an automatic folding spike bayonet for use on flintlock pistols and coach guns. Examples of steel automatic folding knives from Sheffield England have crown markings that date to 1840. Cutlery makers such as Tillotson, A. Davey, Beever, Hobson, Ibbotson and others produced automatic-opening knives. Some have simple iron bolsters and wooden handles, while others feature ornate, embossed silver alloy bolsters and stag handles. English-made knives often incorporate a "pen release" instead of a central handle button, whereby the main spring activated larger blade is released by pressing down on the closed smaller pen blade.


title: Switchblade

text: In France, 19th-century folding knives marked "Châtellerault" were available in both automatic and manually opened versions in several sizes and lengths. "Châtellerault" switchblades have recognizable features such as "S" shaped cross guards, picklock type mechanisms and engraved decorative pearl and ivory handles. In Spain, Admiral D'Estaing is attributed with a type of folding naval dirk that doubled as an eating utensil. In closed (folded) position, the blade tip would extend beyond the handle to be used at the dining table. It could be spring activated to full length if needed as a side arm, by pressing a lever instead of a handle button. By 1850, at least one American company offered a .22 rimfire single-shot pistol equipped with a spring-operated knife. After the American Civil War (1865), knife production became industrialized. The oldest American made mass-production automatic knife is the "Korn Patent Knife", which used a rocking bolster release.


title: Switchblade

text: The advent of mass production methods enabled folding knives with multiple components to be produced in large numbers at lower cost. By 1890, US knife sales of all types were on the increase, buoyed by catalog mail order sales as well as mass marketing campaigns utilizing advertisements in periodicals and newspapers. In consequence, knife manufacturers began marketing new and much more affordable automatic knives to the general public. In Europe as well as the United States, automatic knife sales were never more than a fraction of sales generated by conventional folding knives, yet the type enjoyed consistent if modest sales from year to year.


title: Switchblade

text: In 1892, George Schrade, a toolmaker and machinist from New York City developed and patented the first of several practical automatic knife designs. The following year, Schrade founded the New York Press Button Knife Company to manufacture his switchblade knife pattern, which had a unique release button mounted in the knife bolster. Schrade's company operated out of a small workshop in New York City and employed about a dozen workmen.


title: Switchblade

text: Swordmakers in Toledo, Spain, developed a market in the 1920s for gold plated automatic leverlock knives with pearl handles and enamel inlaid blades. Italian knifemakers had their own style of knives including both pushbutton and leverlock styles, some bearing design characteristics similar to the early French "Châtellerault" knife. Prior to World War II, hand crafted automatic knives marked "Campobasso" or "Frosolone" were often called "Flat Guards" because of the two-piece top bolster design. Some Italian switchblades incorporated a bayonet-type blade equipped with a blade lock release activated by prying up a locking flange at the hinge end, and were known as "picklock" models. These knives were later supplanted by newer designs which incorporated the blade lock release into a tilting bolster.


title: Switchblade

text: In Italy, increased production of automatic knives resulted from the actions of German businessman Albert Marx, who owned two cutlery manufacturing concerns in Solingen, Germany. After a trip to Maniago in 1907, Marx was convinced of the appeal of Italian style automatic knives, and duly took note of attempts by Maniago knifemakers to increase productivity using powered cutting tools. Marx promptly introduced the Solingen methods of semi-mass production to the Maniago knife industry, increasing output and lowering individual costs. While Italian automatic knives would remain hand-assembled and to some extent hand-crafted products, Marx's innovations did increase production, enabling exports to other parts of Italy and eventually throughout Europe and abroad. Over time, Maniago became the central hub of automatic knife production in Italy.


title: Switchblade

text: In the United States, commercial development of the switchblade knife was primarily dominated by the inventions of George Schrade and his "New York Press Button Knife Company", though "W.R. Case", "Union Cutlery", "Camillus Cutlery", and other U.S. knife manufacturers also marketed automatic knives of their own design. Most of Schrade's switchblade patterns were automatic versions of utilitarian jackknives and pocket knives, as well as smaller penknife models designed to appeal to women buyers. In 1903, Schrade sold his interest in the New York Press Button Knife Co. to the Walden Knife Co., and moved to Walden, New York, where he opened a new factory. There Schrade became the company's production superintendent, establishing a production line to manufacture several patterns of Schrade-designed switchblade knives, ranging from a large folding hunter to a small pocket knife. Walden Knife Co. would go on to sell thousands of copies of Schrade's original bolster button design.


title: Switchblade

text: The advertising campaigns of the day by Schrade and other automatic knife manufacturers focused on marketing to farmers, ranchers, hunters, or outdoors men who needed a compact pocket knife that could be quickly brought into action when needed. In rural areas of America, these campaigns were partially successful, particularly with younger buyers, who aspired to own the most modern tools at a time when new labor-saving inventions were constantly appearing on the market. Most American-made switchblades made after 1900 were patterned after standard utilitarian pocketknives, though a few larger "Bowie" or "Folding Hunter" patterns were produced with blade shapes and lengths that could be considered useful as fighting knives. Most had flat or sabre-ground clip or spear-point blade profiles and single-sharpened edges. Blade lengths rarely exceeded five inches (12 cm). A few manufacturers introduced the double switchblade, featuring two blades that could be automatically opened and locked with the push of a button.


title: Switchblade

text: At the low end of the market, "Shapleigh Hardware Company" of St. Louis, Missouri contracted thousands of switchblades under the trademark "Diamond Edge" for distribution to dealers across the United States and Canada. Most of these knives were novelty items, assembled at the lowest possible cost. Sold off display cards in countless hardware and general stores, many low-end "Diamond Edge" switchblades failed to last more than a few months in actual use. Other companies such as Imperial Knife and Remington Arms paid royalties to Schrade in order to produce automatic "contract knives" for rebranding and sale by large mail-order catalog retailers such as Sears, Roebuck & Co.


title: Switchblade

text: In 1904, in combination with his brothers Louis and William, George Schrade formed the Schrade Cutlery Co. in Walden, and began developing a new series of switchblades, which he patented in 1906–07. Schrade's new "Safety Pushbutton Knives" incorporated several design improvements over his earlier work, and featured a handle-mounted operating button with a sliding safety switch. A multi-blade operating button allowed the knife to operate with up to four automatic blades. In successive patents from 1906 through 1916 Schrade would steadily improve this design, which would later become known as the "Presto" series. With the "Presto" line, Schrade would largely dominate the automatic knife market in the United States for the next forty years. Schrade would go on to manufacture thousands of contract switchblade knives under several trademarks and brands, including "E. Weck", "Wade & Butcher", and "Case XX", while other companies used Schrade's patent as the basis for their own switchblade patterns. Among these were pocket and folding hunter pattern switchblades bearing the name "Keen Kutter", a trademark owned by E.C. Simmons Hardware Co. (later purchased by the Shapleigh Hardware Co.).


title: Switchblade

text: Having earned a handsome return from his work, Schrade traveled to Europe in 1911, first to Sheffield, England, where he assisted "Thomas Turner & Company" in expediting a wartime order from the British Navy. He next moved to the knifemaking center of Solingen, Germany. Schrade was aware of Solingen's reputation for having the best cutlery steel in Europe, and he opened a factory to produce his safety pushbutton switchblade knife there. In 1915 or 1916 Schrade sold his Solingen holdings (some sources state they were seized by the German government) and returned to the United States.


title: Switchblade

text: In 1918, Captain Rupert Hughes of the U.S. Army submitted a patent application for a specialized automatic-opening trench knife of his own design, the "Hughes Trench Knife". This was a curious device consisting of a folding spring-loaded knife blade attached to a handle which fastened to the back of the hand and was secured by a leather strap, leaving the palm and fingers free for grasping other objects. Pressing a button on the handle automatically extended a knife blade into an open position and locked position, allowing the knife to be used as a stabbing weapon. The "Hughes Trench Knife" was evaluated as a potential military arm by a panel of U.S. Army officers from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in June 1918. Unfortunately, after testing the board found the "Hughes" design to be of no value, and it was never adopted. Hughes went on to patent his automatic trench knife in 1919, though Hughes appears to have been unsuccessful in persuading a knife manufacturing company to produce his design.