title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The first military engagements in Sri Lankan history were marked by the advent of Prince Vijaya, a prince from the Bengal region who landed along with his followers on the beaches of northwestern Sri Lanka around 543 BC. Prince Vijaya and his followers occupied the lands of the native Vedda people. Repeated incursions by South Indians, particularly the Cholas, into Sri Lankan territory occurred throughout the next few centuries and led to the engagement of the rival forces in battle. In one famous encounter, Sinhalese King Dutugamunu (161-37 BC) raised an army of eleven thousand in his battle against the Chola invader Elara, whom he eventually defeated. Dutugemunu's organisational skills, bravery and chivalry are famous and his battles have gone down in history as outstanding offensive operations.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Other Sri Lankan monarchs whose military achievements stand out include Gajabahu I (113-35), who sailed to India to bring back his captured soldiers, and Dhatusena (463-79) who is credited with repulsing numerous Indian invasions and for organising a naval build-up to deter seaborne attacks. He also had the foresight to cover his defences with artillery. Vijayabahu I (1055–1110) was another warrior king who dislodged Indian invaders and united the country. Parakramabahu the Great (1153–86) was an outstanding monarch of the Polonnaruwa period, and his accomplishments as a military leader and a great administrator are noteworthy. His reign included a military expedition to Burma in retaliation for indignities inflicted on his envoys and Burmese interference in the elephant trade. This marked the first overseas expedition in Sri Lankan military history. It is also reported that Parakramabahu's fame was such that his assistance was sought by South Indian rulers who were involved in internecine struggles. Another strong ruler in the Transitional period of Sri Lanka was Parakramabahu VI, who defeated Indian invaders, united the island and ruled it from capital Kotte. Although the known epigraphical records do not indicate that the Sri Lankan rulers had a full-time standing army at their disposal, there is evidence supported by legend, designation, name, place and tradition that prove there were 'stand-by' equestrian, elephant, and infantry divisions to ensure royal authority at all times. Militias were raised as the necessity arose, and the soldiers returned to their pursuits, mainly for farming, after their spell of military duty.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Parts of Sri Lanka came under the control of three colonial European powers, namely the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Dutch in the 17th century and the British in the 18th century. Yet, until the entire island was ceded to the British in 1815, regional kingdoms maintained most of their independent defense forces and were able to successfully repulse repeated thrusts by the European armies. However the British, unlike their counterparts, were not primarily restricted to maritime power, and thus had the capability to bring the entire island under their control and to integrate locals into the British defense forces.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: At the beginning of the 16th century, modern Europe first came in contact with Sri Lanka. In 1505 a Portuguese fleet, while operating in the Indian seas against Arab traders, was blown off course and landed at Galle, on the southern coast of the island. In 1517 the Portuguese re-appeared, and with the consent of the Sinhalese King established a trading post in Colombo. Having initiated contact with Sri Lanka as traders, the Portuguese soon made themselves political masters of the western seaboard. Numerous forts were soon established, and features of European civilisation was introduced.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Portuguese are credited with the introduction of European-style fortresses to Sri Lanka during this era. Although some locals already possessed military training and fighting experience, there is no evidence that the Portuguese employed local inhabitants into their own forces. Thus the Portuguese were forced to restrict their presence in the island due to their small numbers and their efforts were more focused toward projecting maritime power.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1602 Dutch explorers first landed in Sri Lanka. By 1658 they had completely ousted the Portuguese from the coastal regions of the island. Much like the Portuguese, they did not employ locals in their military and preferred to live in isolation, pursuing their interests in trade and commerce. Like the Portuguese, they defended their forts with their own forces, but unlike the Portuguese, Dutch forces employed Swiss and Malay mercenaries. The Dutch Forts in Jaffna, Galle, Matara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee were sturdily built and are considered a tribute to their military engineering skills. Also, like the Portuguese, the Dutch focussed on maritime power and although they had the capability to develop and use local forces, they chose to isolate themselves from the local population.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The British Empire then ousted the Dutch from the coastal areas of the country, and sought to conquer the independent Kandyan Kingdom. In the face of repeated British assaults, the Kandyans were forced into a degree of guerilla warfare and fared well against their superior British adversaries.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Initially the British stationed their forces, which included naval vessels, artillery troops and infantry, to defend the island nation from other foreign powers, using the natural harbor of Trincomalee as their headquarters in Sri Lanka. In 1796, the Swiss and Malay mercenaries who were previously in the service of the Dutch were transferred to the British East India Company. While the Swiss Regiment de Meuron left in 1806 and was eventually disbanded in Canada in 1822, the Malays, who initially formed a Malay Corps, were converted into the 1st Ceylon Regiment in 1802 and placed under a British commanding officer. In the same year, the British became the first foreign power to raise a Sinhalese unit, which was named the 2nd Ceylon Regiment, also known as the Sepoy Corps.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1803 the 3rd Ceylon Regiment was created with Moluccans and recruits from Penang. All these regiments fought alongside British troops in the Kandyan Wars which began in 1803. Throughout the following years, more Sinhalese and Malays were recruited to these regiments, and in 1814 the 4th Regiment was raised, which was composed entirely of African troops. It was later renamed as the Ceylon Rifle Regiment. Eventually, the Kandyan Kingdom was ceded to the British in 1815, and with that they gained control over the whole island. Resistance to British occupation cropped up almost instantly. During the first half-century of occupation, the British faced a number of uprisings, and were forced to maintain a sizable army in order to guarantee their control over the island. After the Matale Rebellion led by Puran Appu in 1848, in which a number of Sinhalese recruits defected to the side of the rebels, the recruitment of Sinhalese to the British forces was temporarily halted.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The second phase in the employment of non-British personnel commenced in 1881 after the enactment of an ordinance designed to authorise the creation of a Volunteer Corps in the island. It was designated the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers (CLIV). This move compensated for the disbandment of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment in 1874. The Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers was originally administered as a single unit. However, over the years various sections of the volunteers grew large enough to become independent from their parent unit. The different units that emerged from the Volunteer Force were the


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1910 the name of the military was formally changed to the Ceylon Defence Force (CDF). It continued to grow throughout the early period of the 20th century. The CDF saw active service when a contingent of the Ceylon Mounted Infantry (CMI) in 1900, and a contingent of the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps (CPRC) in 1902, took part in the Second Boer War in South Africa. Their services were recognised by the presentation in 1902 of a colour to the CMI, and a presentation in 1904 of a banner to the CPRC. In 1922, the CDF was honoured by the presentation of the King's and Regimental colours to the Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI).


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: During the First World War, many volunteers from the Defence Force travelled to Great Britain and joined the British Army, and many of them were killed in action. One of them mentioned by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was Private Jacotine of the CLI, who was the last man left alive in his unit at the Battle of Lys, and who continued to fight for 20 minutes before he was killed.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1939, the CDF was mobilised and an enormous expansion took place which required the raising of new units such as the Ceylon Signals Corps, the Auxiliary Territorial Service (Ceylon) and also the Colombo Town Guard, which had been previously disbanded, but was later re-formed to meet military requirements. During the Second World War, Britain assumed direct control over the Armed Forces of Ceylon.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: At the end of World War II, CDF which had increased in size during the war began demobilisation. In 1948 Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain, becoming a Dominion within the Commonwealth and a year earlier Ceylon entered into the bi-lateral Anglo-Ceylonese Defence Agreement of 1947. This was followed by the Army Act No. 17 of 1949 which was passed by Parliament on April 11, 1949, and formalised in Gazette Extraordinary No. 10028 of October 10, 1949 marked the creation of the Ceylon Army, consisting of a regular and a volunteer force, the later being the successor of the disbanded CDF. Therefore, October 10, 1949, is considered the day the Ceylon Army was raised, and as such October 10 is celebrated annually as Army Day. Brigadier James Sinclair, Earl of Caithness was appointed as Commandant of the Ceylon Army. The Defence Agreement of 1947 provided the assurance that British would come to the aid of Ceylon in the event it was attacked by a foreign power and provided British military advisers to build up the country's military. In November, a Ceylon Army Guard takes over duties at Echelon Barracks from the Guard of the British Army.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Army Headquarters, Ceylon was established in Colombo, with a General Staff Branch, an Adjutant General Branch, a Quartermaster General Branch and a Pay and Records Branch. Soon after the Headquarters, Ceylon Volunteer Force was established. The initial requirement was to raise an artillery regiment, an engineer squadron, an infantry battalion, a medical unit, and a service corps company. For much of the 1950s the army was preoccupied with the task of building itself and training existing and new personal. To this aim the British Army Training Team (BATT) advisory group carried out training for ex-members of the CDF within the Ceylon Army, field rank officers were sent to the British Army Staff College, Camberley and some attached to units of the British Army of the Rhine to gain field experience. Newly recruited officer cadets were sent for training at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, stating with 10 officer cadets in 1950, which continued until the 1968 and both officers and other ranks were sent to specialist training courses in Britain, India, Pakistan and Malaya. There were no formations and all units were structured to directly function under the Army Headquarters. However temporary field headquarters were to be formed at the time requirement arose.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Due to a lack of any major external threats, the growth of the army was slow, and the primary duties of the army quickly moved towards internal security by the mid-1950s, the same time as the first Ceylonese Army Commander Major General Anton Muttukumaru took command of the army. The first internal security operation of the Ceylon Army began in 1952, code named "Operation Monty" to counter the influx of illegal South Indian immigrants brought in by smugglers on the north-western coast, in support of Royal Ceylon Navy coastal patrols and police operations. This was expanded and renamed as Task Force Anti Illicit Immigration (TaFII) in 1963 and continued up to 1981 when it was disbanded. The Army was mobilised to help the police to restore peace under provincial emergency regulations during the 1953 hartal, the 1956 Gal Oya Valley riots and in 1958 it was deployed for the first time under emergency regulations throughout the island during the 1958 Riots.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: During the 1950s and 1960s the army was called upon to carry to essential services when the workers went on strike which were organised by the left-wing parties and trade unions for various reasons, the most notable was the 1961 Colombo Port strike, during which ships threatened to bypass Colombo port and the country almost starved. To counter these common strikes several units were formed, who were employed in development work when there were no strikes. New regiments were formed, which included the Ceylon Armoured Corps, Ceylon Sinha Regiment and the Ceylon Pioneer Corps.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1962 several senior officers attempted a military coup, which was stopped hours before it was launched. Thereafter the government mistrusted the military and reduced the size and growth of the army, especially the volunteer force, disbanding several units and forming the Gemunu Watch.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In 1971, the Army found itself facing a full blown insurgency, when the JVP Insurrection broke out in April 1971. Having been caught by surprise, as a result of failure to comprehend the magnitude of the insurgency from intelligence reports. Although completely ill-prepared to deal with an insurgency, lacking weapons, ammunition, equipment and training; the army responded quickly and successfully defeated the insurgency by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna by mid 1971.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In May 1972, when Ceylon was proclaimed a republic and changed its name from the Dominion of Ceylon to the Republic of Sri Lanka, all Army units were renamed accordingly.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: By the late 1970s the army was confronted with a new conflict, this time with Tamil militant groups in the north of the island. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the prominent of these Tamil militant groups. The war escalated to the point where India intervened as a peacekeeping force. This was later seen as a tactical error, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force united nationalist elements such as the JVP to politically support the LTTE in their call to evict the IPKF. This led to a second insurgency by the JVP, forcing the army to deploy its forces in the south of the island and to fight on two fronts between 1987 and 1989. The 1980s saw a massive expiation of the army from 15,000 personal to over 30,000 and more. New regiments were raised, while others were expanded with new battalions. New weapons and equipment were introduced as the war shifted from counter-insurgency to conventional warfare tactics, with multi battalion, brigade and division scale operations. New regiments were formed which included the Commando Regiment, Special Forces Regiment, Mechanized Infantry Regiment, Gajaba Regiment, Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment, Military Intelligence Corps, Sri Lanka Army Women's Corps, Sri Lanka Rifle Corps and the Sri Lanka National Guard.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The war with the LTTE was halted several times for peace negotiations, the last of which following the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2002 with the help of international mediation. However, renewed violence broke out in December 2005 and following the collapse of peace talks, the Army has been involved in the heavy fighting that has resumed in the north and east of the country.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Since 1980 the army has undertaken many operations against the LTTE rebels. The major operations conducted by the army eventually led to the recapture of Jaffna and other rebel strongholds. On 19 May 2009 Sri Lankan army declare the victory of war as they found the dead body of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. This marked the end of the war, with the LTTE ceasing to exist in Sri Lanka as a result of prolonged military offensives conducted by Sri Lanka army. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces, including the army, have been accused of committing war crimes during the war, particularly during the final stages. A panel of experts appointed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to advise him on the issue of accountability with regard to any alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the civil war found "credible allegations" which, if proven, indicated that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the Tamil Tigers.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: As of present, the bulk of the Sri Lankan Army is deployed for domestic defensive and combat operations, while a sizable foreign deployment is maintained.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Due to the Sri Lankan Civil War the army has been on a constant mobilized (including reservist) state since the 1980s. The majority of the army has been deployed in the North and Eastern provinces of the country, which includes 14 Divisions coming under six operational headquarters and 2 independent Divisions and several independent Brigades. The army is also based in other parts of the island for internal security including a Division for the defence of the capital.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Sri Lanka Army has taken part in two peacekeeping missions with United Nations over the course of its history. First assignment was in the Congo (ONUC) (1960–1963). Most recently, following the signing of a ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the LTTE in 2002, Sri Lankan forces were invited by the United Nations to be part of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti. In the process of the peacekeeping operations, two soldiers were killed in a raid in Petit-Goave.<ref name="sdut-3/21/05"></ref> After over 6 months of service, the first contingent of the peacekeeping force returned to Sri Lanka on May 17, 2005. In December 2007, 7th rotation of the Sri Lankan contingent had been deployed with a force of 991 officers and other ranks, many of those deployed have been awarded the United Nations Medal for their services. In November 2007, 114 members of the 950 member Sri Lankan Army peacekeeping mission in Haiti was accused of sexual misconduct and abuse which resulted in 108 members, including three officers, being sent back after being implicated in alleged misconduct and sexual abuse where sex was exchanged for money and valuable items, with some acts considered rape as they involved those under 18. In January 2019, a Sri Lankan army officer and trooper on peace keeping duty in Mali were killed and three more wounded when their convoy came under an IED attack. The incident prompted the army to accelerate its Avalon program.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Sri Lanka Army's newest contingent of 243 professionally-trained Army personnel in the Combat Convoy Company (CCC), well-prepared to serve in the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) left the island on the 21st of April 2021.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The professional head of the army is the Commander of the Army. He is assisted by the Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Army and a Deputy Chief of Staff. The Commandant of the Volunteer Force is head of the Army Volunteer Force and is responsible for the administration and recruitment of all reserve units and personal. The Army Headquarters, housed in the Defence Headquarters Complex in Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte is the main administrative and the operational headquarters of the Sri Lanka Army.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Army Headquarters is divided into a number of branches, namely the General Staff (GS) branch responsible for coordination of operations and training and the Adjutant General's (AGs) branch responsible for personal administration, welfare, medical services, and rehabilitation. The Quarter Master General's (QMGs) branch is responsible for feeding, transport, movement, and construction and maintenance. The Master General of Ordnance's (MGOs) branch is responsible for procurement and maintenance of vehicles and special equipment. The Military Secretary's Branch is responsible for handling all matters pertaining to officers such as promotions, postings and discipline. Each branch is headed by an officer in the rank of Major General who is directly responsible to the Commander of the Army for the smooth functioning of the Branch. Under each Branch, there are several Directorates, each headed by a Brigadier.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The headquarters of field formations each have its own staff. For instance a divisional headquarters is divided into a GS branch as an AQ branch, each headed by a Colonel and is responsible for operations & training and administration & logistics respectively. Similarly, a Brigade Major and Major AQ is responsible for operations and administration in a brigade.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Like the Indian Army, the Sri Lanka Army has largely retained the British-style regimental system that it inherited upon independence. The individual regiments (such as the Sri Lanka Light Infantry and the Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment) operate independently and recruit their own members. Officers tend to remain in a single battalion throughout their careers. The infantry battalion, the basic unit of organization in field operations, includes five companies of four platoons each. Typical platoon has three squads (sections) of ten personnel each. In addition to the basic infantry forces, a commando regiment was also established in 1986. Support for the infantry is provided by an armoured regiment, five reconnaissance regiments, three mechanized infantry regiments, five field artillery regiments, a rocket artillery regiment, three commando regiments, three special forces regiments, six field engineering regiments, five signals battalions, a medical corps, and a variety of logistics units.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Organized and controlled by the Army General Staff at Army HQ, various formations are raised from time to time to suit various security requirements and operations in the country and overseas. The Army at present has deployed 12 Divisions, 7 task forces and several independent brigades. Except for the 11 Division based at the Panagoda Cantonment which is responsible for the maintenance of capability for the defense of the capital, all other divisions, task forces and brigades are deployed for operations in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, coming under five regional commands known as "Security Forces Headquarters", which are the Security Forces Headquarters Jaffna (SFHQ-J), Wanni (SFHQ-W), East (SFHQ-E), Mullaittivu (SFHQ-MLT), West (SFHQ-W) and Central (SFHQ-C). One Security Forces Headquarters, the SFHQ-KLN was disbanded in 2021.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Each SFHQ and most divisions are commanded by a General Officer Commanding in the rank of Major General. A SFHQ has several divisions under its command and each division is further divided into brigades. Each brigade is commanded by an officer in the rank of Brigadier and has a number of Infantry battalions, support arms (Artillery, Engineers and Signals) and support services (Service Corps, Engineering Services, Ordnance Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) under assigned to it. There are also several administrative brigades (Artillery Brigade, Armored Brigade, etc.) and the Air Mobile Brigade.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In other parts of the country, there are Area and Sub-Area Headquarters. Armour, Artillery, Engineers and Signals Units are grouped under Brigade Headquarters of their own arm; Armored Brigade, Artillery Brigade and so on.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: At the formation of the Ceylon Army in 1949, the need to train a standing army was felt strongly since the Ceylon Defence Force had operated on a regimental training model to maintain the efficiency of its volunteers culminating with the annual two week training camp at the garrison town of Diyatalawa, in the Badulla District which became the traditional training grounds for the newly formed army. The Army Recruit Training Depot was established in Diyatalawa in 1950 and later renamed as the Army Training Centre. Officer cadets were sent to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, along with specialized training at trade schools of the British Army, while officers of field rank were sent to the Staff College, Camberley and to the Royal College of Defence Studies. With the economic limitations in the 1960s, focus was given for local training in order to save foreign exchange. The army initiated basic officer training at the Army Training Centre in 1968. With the rapid expansion of the army in the 1980s and 1990s saw the establishment of local specialist and trade schools, along with staff colleges and a defence university. At present the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) with its headquarters at Diyatalawa formulates all training doctrine of the army and all its training centres. ARTRAC directs all army training establishments, regimental training establishments and battalion training schools.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: All pre-commissioning training for officers are carried out at the Sri Lanka Military Academy (SLMA) (formally the Army Training Centre) and at the Volunteer Force Training School situated in Diyatalawa. The officer cadets graduating from SLMA are commissioned as officers in the regular and volunteer forces. The course for officer cadets runs for ninety weeks and includes training in tactics and administration which helps prepare the cadets to take up the positions of platoon and company commanders. The course consisted of military and academic subjects and also trained the cadets physically. The course helps to promote leadership qualities and the understanding of each one's role as an officer and a servant of the state. Due to the lack of officers within the lower levels, the training process was sped up in the 1980s by developing a short commission course. The cadets were given a training of fifty-six weeks and devoted themselves to continue their careers in the military with the mandatory ten years of service for regular army officers and five years of service for volunteer officers. Once completing their basic training at SLMA, junior officers would receive specialized training at training centres which would include young officers courses in their area of specialization followed by advanced training on weapon systems.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Junior field officers attended the Junior Staff Course at the Officer Career Development Centre followed by the Command and Staff Course at the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) at Batalanda, Makola which was established in 1997 as the Army Command and Staff College. Officers may attend specialist long courses such as the Logistics Staff Course is conducted at the Army School of Logistics which was established in 2011. Senior field officers attend the prestigious National Defence College (NDC) in Colombo which is the highest level of training.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) formed in 1981 and situated in Ratmalana, fourteen kilometers south of Colombo, as only university specializing in defence studies in the island. Each year, approximately fifty cadets from all three services are admitted to the university (aged 18–22) to participate in a three-year programme of academic work and as sent to their service academies for their final year of training. In addition KDU conducts postgraduate and masters programs in defence related subjects for officers who attend staff and defence courses at DSCSC and NDC.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Training for the new recruits are carried out by the Army Training School in Maduru Oya and at several locations by training battalions, followed by additional specialized training in arms or trade at training centres such as the Infantry Training Centre in Minneriya and the Combat Training School in Ampara.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: At its formation the armed forces of Sri Lanka had limited indigenous training facilities, especially in technical and advanced roles, they have depended greatly on military training provided by foreign countries. The United Kingdom played a major role in the early years following independence and have continued to be an important source of military expertise to the Sri Lankan military. Other sources include India, Pakistan, the United States, Australia and Malaysia. Additionally, in an agreement reached in 1984, Israeli security personnel (reportedly from Shin Bet, the Israeli counterespionage and internal security organisation) trained army officers in counterinsurgency techniques. With the rapid expansion of the army, in recent years it has expanded its training facilities locally.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Sri Lankan Army has also provided special training to the United States Army on their request as well as many other countries in military education regarding civilian rescue, jungle combat, and guerilla warfare etc.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Sri Lanka Army presently stands at 200,000 strong including 2,960 women plus and 58,000 reservists.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In late 1987, the army had a total estimated strength of up to 40,000 troops, about evenly divided between regular army personnel and reservists on active duty. The approximately 20,000 regular army troops represented a significant increase over the 1983 strength of only 12,000. Aggressive recruitment campaigns following the 1983 riots raised this number to 16,000 by early 1985. By 1990 the army had expanded to over 90,000 personnel and by 2007, it had expanded to over 120,000.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Since the Sri Lankan armed forces are all volunteer services, all personal in the Sri Lanka Army have volunteered as regular personnel or reservists. This should not be confused with the traditional term "volunteers" used for reservists or reservist units. Recruitment of the personal are carried island wide with a restrictions in the northern and eastern provinces during the civil war in those areas. The Rifle Corps is the only territorial unit that carries out recruitment from a specific area. In June 2009, Sri Lanka announced plans to create a "Tamil regiment" to promote integration in the army.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Parama Weera Vibhushanaya is the highest award for valour awarded in the Sri Lankan armed forces. Army recipients include;


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Over 23,790 Sri Lankan armed forces personnel were killed since begin of the civil war in 1981 to its end in 2009, this includes 12 generals killed in active duty or assassinated. 659 service personnel were killed due to the second JVP Insurrection from 1987 to 1990. 53 service personnel were killed and 323 were wounded in the first JVP Insurrection from 1971 to 1972. Notable fallen members include;


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The Directorate of Rehabilitation was established with the intention and focus towards the rehabilitation of Officers and Other Ranks Wounded in Action. However, with the increase of a number of casualties due to the operations, the Sri Lanka Army proceeded to utilize the services of battle casualties with the view of obtaining a productive service from these individuals. As a result, under mentioned institutes had been established.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Making a corps for women was dreamed by former Commander of the Army General Denis Perera who became commander in October 1977. Gen. Perera sought help from the British Army's Women's Royal Army Corps and in 1978 three females were sent to Britain for officer training. They returned to Sri Lanka in August 1979 after completion of eight months of training. The corps was officially formed on September 14, 1979, with one battalion (the 1st regular battalion).


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The first three female cadets to enroll the army were K.C. Jayaweera, M.P Wijegunawardena and V.P. Senevitathna (trained in Britain) and the first batch of female cadets to be trained in Sri Lanka was commissioned from the Sri Lanka Military Academy on 18 August 1984. On 16 October 1980, ten women were recruited for N.C.O. training and were given the basic Army training at the Army Training Centre, Diyatalawa. These N.C.O.s passed out in November 1980. The three officers and ten N.C.O.s participated at the Independence Day celebrations held at the Galle Face Green for the first time in 1981 and Women's Corps has been a part of the country's Independence celebrations ever since. Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) A.W. Thambiraja (male) was the first Commanding Officer of the 1st regular battalion (1 SLAWC) and Major K.C. Weerasekara was promoted to Lt. Col. in 1993; she was the first woman to be promoted to this rank from this corps and was also the first woman to be appointed as the commanding officer of the 1 SLAWC in 1989 in the rank of Major.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The regimental centre of the corps was established on 17 November 1997 at Borella. Male Major General W.A.A. de Silva RSP USP was the first Colonel Commandant of the Regiment and female Lieutenant Colonel M.H.P.S. Perera, USP was the first Centre Commandant. Major General H.I.G. Wijerathna, USP was the first female colonel commandant of this regiment who served from 2008 to 2010 and Brigadier D.T.N. Munasinghe was the second female to be appointed as the colonel commandant in 2016.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: The primary aim of raising Women's Corps was to provide telephone operators, computer operators, nurses and clerks, to release the male counterparts to the battle field. However, women soldiers were also employed on field duties later. Six more battalions were created in the 1990s and 2000s.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Over 25 female soldiers have been killed in action with the first in 1997. In 2021, a special 'Women Corps Quick Reaction Rider Team' was formed to operate in an emergency situation in Jaffna; female soldiers were in motorcycles.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In the 1980s, the army expanded its range of weapons from the original stock of World War II-era British Lee–Enfield rifles, Sten Submachine guns, Vickers machine guns, Bren machine guns, 6-inch coastal guns, Daimler Armoured Cars, Bren Gun Carriers, 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft guns and 4.2-inch heavy mortars as well as post war Alvis Saladins, Alvis Saracen, Ferrets and Shorland S55s. New sources of weaponry in the mid-to-late 1970s included the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China – countries with which the leftist Bandaranaike government had close ties.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: To meet the threat posed by predominantly the LTTE, Army purchased modern military hardware including 50-caliber heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, Night Vision Devices, 106 mm recoilless rifles, 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, 40 mm grenade launchers and some sniper rifles. Refurbished armored personnel carriers were added to the 'A' vehicle fleet of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment, Sri Lanka Armoured Corps. These APCs enabled the Armoured Corps to have their own assault troops to provide close contact protection to their Alvis Saladin and Ferret Scout Cars which were vulnerable to anti-tank weapons. The capability of the Sri Lanka Artillery was enhanced with the introduction of Ordnance QF 25 pounders. Chinese-made 122 mm, 130 mm and 152 mm howitzers were introduced to the Sri Lankan Army in 1995 and 1998 whilst 122 mm Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL), were first used in 2000 by the Sri Lanka Army.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Though the weapons were obsolete at the time of purchase, security forces found them to be successful in combat. Land mines proved to be the most lethal threat to personnel, as a number of mines were deployed against unprotected trucks and buses by the LTTE in the northern and eastern Provinces. These land mines weighed approximately 50 – 100 kg, against which no armoured vehicle that the SLA possessed was able to withstand the blast effect. Consequently, Armscor Buffels – South African armoured personnel carriers constructed on a Unimog chassis – were imported in quantity. By 1987 Sri Lanka's indigenous Unicorn APC had been engineered from the Buffel, followed by the improved Unibuffel class. Both the Unicorn and the Unibuffel are assembled by the Sri Lanka Electrical & Mechanical Engineers (SLEME).


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: In recent years, Sri Lanka has become increasingly reliant on China for weapons. This is due to most European nations and the United States Governments passing regulations about the selling of weaponry to nations which are suffering from internal conflict. However the United States has expressed its intent to maintain military training assistance. Recently the Sri Lankan Army started to produce locally weapons such as a new multiple rocket launcher, with 10 barrels and a firing range of 20 km. The SLEME is also producing vehicles for transport, the UniCOLT series trucks, and landmine-resistant vehicles, the UniAIMOVs and the UniAVALONs. In 2020, the Army shipped several modernized Unibuffels to the Sri Lankan forces who are serving in a peacekeeping mission in Mali.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Sri Lanka also continues to receive a variety of weapons from Britain, India, Japan, Pakistan, Israel and other former suppliers.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Inaugurated on 12 July 1984, Sri Lanka Army Seva Vanitha Unit functions with the main objective of providing welfare facilities to the next of kin of war heroes who have sacrificed their lives, gone missing in action or injured whilst defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their motherland while also empowering the families of the serving Army personnel. Traditionally the organization functions under the leadership of the wife of the serving Commander of the Army, and the members are the spouses of Army Officers as well as Lady Officers. The organization extends to 22 Regimental branches functioning under the patronage of the wives of the respective Regimental Commanders.


title: Sri Lanka Army

text: Sri Lanka Army Seva Vanitha Unit conducts various welfare projects such as Viru Kekulu pre-schools, day care centres, welfare shops, bakeries and salons, with the committed contribution of the dedicated membership. Construction of houses, giving away of educational scholarships and assisting in times of natural disasters, are done at both organizational and Regimental levels. The volunteer service extended by the spouses of the Army Officers whilst multitasking at their roles as wives, mothers and professionals, is an immense strength to Sri Lanka Army.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: Imam-ul-Haq (; born 22 December 1995) is a Pakistani international cricketer. On his One Day International (ODI) debut against Sri Lanka, he became the second batsman for Pakistan, and thirteenth overall, to score a century on debut. In August 2018, he was one of thirty-three players to be awarded a central contract for the 2018–19 season by the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB).


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In the final of the 2016–17 Quaid-e-Azam Trophy, he scored 200 not out batting for Habib Bank Limited. In the final of 2017–18 National T20 Cup, he scored 59 not out batting for Lahore Blues, and was named man of the match.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In July 2022, he was signed by Somerset to play in their final four matches of the County Championship in England.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In October 2017, he was named in Pakistan's One Day International (ODI) squad for their series against Sri Lanka. He made his ODI debut for Pakistan against Sri Lanka on 18 October 2017, scored a maiden ODI century and was named man of the match. He became the second Pakistan batsman after Saleem Elahi to score an ODI hundred on debut.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In April 2018, he was named in Pakistan's Test squad for their tours to Ireland and England in May 2018. He made his Test debut for Pakistan, against Ireland, on 11 May 2018. He scored a half century in the final innings of the match which was instrumental in the team's win.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: On 20 July 2018, in the fourth ODI against Zimbabwe, he and Fakhar Zaman made the highest opening partnership in ODIs, with 304 runs. Pakistan finished their innings at 399 for the loss of one wicket, their highest score in ODIs. Zaman and Imam had scored 705 runs together across the series, the most by a pair in a bilateral ODI series.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In January 2019, during the third ODI against South Africa, Imam became the second fastest batsman to score 1,000 runs in ODIs, doing so in his 19th innings.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In April 2019, he was named in Pakistan's squad for the 2019 Cricket World Cup. He made his Twenty20 International (T20I) debut for Pakistan against England on 5 May 2019. Ahead of the Cricket World Cup, in the ODI series against England, Imam scored 151 runs in the third ODI match. This was the highest individual total for a Pakistan batsman against England in a One Day International.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In June 2020, he was named in a 29-man squad for Pakistan's tour to England during the COVID-19 pandemic. In July, he was shortlisted in Pakistan's 20-man squad for the Test matches against England. In July 2021, in the third match against England, he scored his 2,000th run in ODI cricket.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: In March 2022, in the opening match of the series against Australia, Imam scored his first century in Test cricket. In the second innings, he scored another century, becoming the tenth batter for Pakistan to score a century in both innings of a Test.


title: Imam-ul-Haq

text: He was born in Multan on 22 December 1995. He is the nephew of Inzamam-ul-Haq, a former Pakistani cricket star who also served as the national team's captain. Their ancestors migrated to Pakistan from the city of Hansi in the present-day Indian state of Haryana, in 1947.


title: Babooshka (song)

text: "Babooshka" is a song by English singer Kate Bush, taken from her third studio album "Never for Ever" (1980). Released as a single in June 1980, it spent 10 weeks in the UK chart, peaking at number five. It was an even bigger hit in Australia, where it peaked at number two (for three weeks) and was the 20th best-selling single of the year. A rock song, "Babooshka" is about a woman who sends love letters to her husband under the titular pen name. The song makes notable use of Fairlight CMI digital synthesizer.


title: Babooshka (song)

text: Kate Bush recorded "Babooshka" between January and June 1980, during the recording sessions of "Never for Ever". It was described as a rock song. The track features John Giblin on bass and marks the significance of fretless bass sounds as instrumental "male" partners through Bush's music in the early eighties. The song ends with a sample of glass breaking, one of the earliest examples of a sample created with the newly available Fairlight CMI digital synthesizer.


title: Babooshka (song)

text: According to an interview Bush gave to the Australian TV series "Countdown" in 1980, the song chronicles a wife's desire to test her husband's loyalty. To do so, she takes on the pen name of Babooshka and sends notes to her husband in the guise of a younger woman—something which she fears is the opposite of how her husband currently sees her (hence the barbed lines "Just like his wife before she 'freezed' on him/Just like his wife when she was beautiful".) Bush said that's "something I didn't realise at the time", when she learnt that "бaбушка" (babushka) is the Russian word for "grandmother" (although the stress in Russian falls on the first syllable, not the second).


title: Babooshka (song)

text: The trap is set when, in her bitterness and paranoia, Babooshka arranges to meet her husband, who is attracted to the character who reminds him of his wife in earlier times. She thereby ruins the relationship due to her paranoia. Bush cited the English folk song "Sovay", in which a woman dresses as a highwayman and accosts her lover in order to test his devotion, as an inspiration for the story of Babooshka. "I'm sure I heard about it on some TV series years ago, when I was a kid," Bush remarked of the song's story. "You know, these period things that the BBC do. I think it's an extraordinary thing for someone to do... That's why I found it fascinating."


title: Babooshka (song)

text: The music video depicts Bush beside a double bass (contrabass) that symbolises the husband, wearing a black bodysuit and a veil in her role as the embittered wife. This changes into an extravagant, mythlike, and rather revealing "Russian" costume as her alter-ego, Babooshka. An illustration by Chris Achilleos for the cover of the 1978 book "Raven – Swordsmistress of Chaos" was the basis for the costume.


title: Babooshka (song)

text: The B-side contains her song "Ran Tan Waltz", her second non-album B-side. This song is performed as a tragicomedy, where Bush portrays a man bemoaning his bad luck in life being married to a wayward mother. This song uses the word "dick" in the first verse as dysphemism for a penis. Bush has stated that she does not typically use such harsh language or write such sexually explicit material, but that she considered the song "good naughty fun".


title: Babooshka (song)

text: "Babooshka" became Bush's second top five hit in the UK and was certified silver for sales of over 250,000 by the BPI.


title: Babooshka (song)

text: In 2021, the song experienced a resurgence in popularity due to the app TikTok, giving American audiences exposure to Bush.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Prince Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi (born 27 August 1928) is a South African politician and Zulu traditional leader who is currently a Member of Parliament and the traditional prime minister to the Zulu royal family. He was Chief Minister of the KwaZulu bantustan during apartheid and founded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1975. He also served as Minister of Home Affairs from 1994 to 2004.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi was one of the most prominent black politicians of the apartheid era and his legacy in that period remains controversial. He was the sole political leader of the KwaZulu government, entering when it was still the native reserve of Zululand in 1970 and remaining in office until it was abolished in 1994. Critics described his administration as a de facto one-party state, intolerant of political opposition and dominated by Inkatha (now the IFP), Buthelezi's political movement. In parallel to his mainstream political career, Buthelezi held the chieftaincy of the Buthelezi clan and was traditional prime minister to three successive Zulu kings, beginning with King Cyprian Bhekuzulu in 1954. He was himself born into the Zulu royal family; his maternal great-grandfather was King Cetshwayo kaMpande, whom he played in the 1964 film "Zulu." While leader of KwaZulu, Buthelezi both strengthened and appropriated the public profile of the monarchy, reviving it as a symbol of Zulu nationalism. Bolstered by royal support, state resources, and Buthelezi's personal popularity, Inkatha became one of the largest political organisations in the country.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: During the same period, Buthelezi publicly opposed apartheid and often took a patently obstructive stance toward the apartheid government. He lobbied consistently for the release of Nelson Mandela and staunchly refused to accept the nominal independence which the government offered to KwaZulu, correctly judging that it was a superficial independence. However, Buthelezi was derided in some quarters for participating in the bantustan system, a central pillar of apartheid, and for his moderate stance on such issues as free markets, armed struggle, and international sanctions. He became a bête noire of young activists in the Black Consciousness movement and was repudiated by many in the African National Congress (ANC). A former ANC Youth League member, Buthelezi had aligned himself and Inkatha with the ANC in the 1970s, but in the 1980s their relationship became increasingly acrimonious. It emerged in the 1990s that Buthelezi had accepted money and military assistance from the apartheid regime for Inkatha, arguably stoking the political violence in KwaZulu and Natal in the 1980s and 1990s.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: He also played a complicated role during the negotiations to end apartheid, for which he helped set the framework as early as 1974 with the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith. During the Congress for a Democratic South Africa, the IFP under Buthelezi lobbied for a federal system in South Africa with strong guarantees for regional autonomy and the status of Zulu traditional leaders. This proposal did not take hold and Buthelezi became aggrieved by what he perceived as the growing marginalisation both of the IFP and of himself personally, as negotiations were increasingly dominated by the ANC and the white National Party government. He established the Concerned South Africans Group with other conservatives, withdrew from the negotiations, and launched a boycott of the 1994 general election, South Africa's first under universal suffrage. However, despite fears that Buthelezi would upend the peaceful transition entirely, Buthelezi and the IFP not only participated in the election but also joined the Government of National Unity formed afterwards by newly elected President Mandela. Buthelezi served as Minister of Home Affairs under Mandela and under his successor, Thabo Mbeki, despite near-continuous tensions between the IFP and the governing ANC.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In subsequent years, the IFP struggled to expand its popular base beyond the new province of KwaZulu-Natal, which had absorbed KwaZulu in 1994. As the party's electoral fortunes declined, Buthelezi survived attempts by rivals within the party to unseat him. He remained the IFP's president until the party's 35th National General Conference in August 2019, when he declined to seek re-election and was succeeded by Velenkosini Hlabisa. In the 2019 general election, he was elected to a sixth consecutive term as a Member of Parliament for the IFP.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Prince Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi was born on 27 August 1928, at Ceza Swedish Missionary Hospital in Mahlabathini in southeastern Natal. His mother was Princess Magogo kaDinuzulu (born 1900, died 1984), the daughter of former Zulu King Dinuzulu and sister of the incumbent King Solomon kaDinuzulu. In 1923, she became the tenth but principal wife (and ultimately one of 40 wives) of Buthelezi's father, Mathole Buthelezi. Mathole Buthelezi was a traditional leader as chief of the Buthelezi clan and his marriage to the princess was arranged by King Solomon to heal a rift between the clan and the royal family. Buthelezi is sometimes referred to by his clan name, Shenge, used as an honorific.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi was educated at Impumalanga Primary School at Mahashini in Nongoma from 1935 to 1943, then at Adams College, a famous mission school in Amanzimtoti, from 1944 to 1946. From 1948 to 1950, he studied at the University of Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape. In 1948, the National Party was elected to government in South Africa and begun implementing a formal system of apartheid, and Buthelezi joined the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) Youth League in 1949. In January 2012, he said of this period:I was taught by Professor ZK Matthews, I knew Dr John Langalibalele Dube, I was mentored by Inkosi Albert Luthuli, and I worked closely with Mr Oliver Tambo and Mr Nelson Mandela. My personal history cannot be extricated from the history of the liberation struggle, or from that of the African National Congress.Buthelezi made much of his association with Pixley ka Isaka Seme, a founder of the ANC, who was married to his mother's half-sister. He counted Seme, Albert Luthuli, and Mahatma Gandhi as among his political influences; he was also inspired by Martin Luther King's leadership of the American civil rights movement. He was expelled from Fort Hare in 1950 for participating in a student boycott during a visit to the campus of Gideon Brand Van Zyl, the national Governor-General. He later completed his Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Natal and worked as a clerk in the government's Department of Native Affairs in Durban.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In 1953, Buthelezi returned to Mahlabathini to become chief (inkosi) of the Buthelezi clan, a hereditary position and lifetime appointment. In his account, he had planned to become a lawyer but had been advised to accept the chieftaincy by ANC leaders Albert Luthuli and Walter Sisulu. Buthelezi later recounted how Luthuli had persuaded him not to "betray my people and seek my own selfish ends away from them". He also said that his mother had encouraged him to take up the role. During apartheid, the government was responsible for recognising the status of chiefs, and Buthelezi's chieftaincy was not recognised until 1957, according to him because the government was wary of his activism. In other accounts, the delay was caused by a succession battle in the Buthelezi family, in which the government ultimately favoured Buthelezi over his elder half-brother Mceleli. Mceleli was later banished from the region.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: As chief, Buthelezi was involved in organising a ceremony to unveil the Shaka Memorial in Stanger in September 1954, sometimes called the first Shaka Day celebration; he later said that the ceremony was the first time he or King Cyprian Bhekuzulu had ever worn "traditional" Zulu dress, which they did frequently thereafter. He also acted in the 1964 film "Zulu", about the Battle of Rorke's Drift, playing the role of his real-life great-grandfather, King Cetshwayo kaMpande. He said that the role had already been cast but "when they came to my place, mainly to get extras for the battle scenes, then they noticed a family resemblance to my great-grandfather. They said how would it be if you played the part? I agreed."


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In 1954, King Cyprian appointed Buthelezi his traditional prime minister – Buthelezi lists the full title as Traditional Prime Minister to the Zulu Nation ("uNdunankulu kaZulu") and Monarch. He was reappointed by Cyprian's successor, King Goodwill Zwelithini, in 1968. According to Buthelezi, his paternal family was traditionally responsible for providing the royal family with its prime ministers, although the term itself was apparently a new innovation and referred to what previously might have been called the king's premier chief, his most senior advisor among the traditional leaders beneath him. He pointed in particular to his paternal great-grandfather, Mnyamana, who was a senior advisor to his maternal great-grandfather, King Cetshwayo, during the Anglo-Zulu War, and also claimed that his father was appointed traditional prime minister to his uncle, King Solomon, in 1925.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi's hereditary claims in this respect are not uncontroversial. In particular, some Zulus dispute Buthelezi's claim that his paternal great-great-grandfather, Nqengelele Buthelezi, was "the most senior advisor" to King Shaka, founder of the Zulu kingdom; they argue that the role was filled by Ngomane of the Mthethwas, and also point out that several kings in the intervening period did not have Buthelezis as advisers. Buthelezi's supporters sometimes claim instead that Nqengelele was a senior advisor "alongside Ngomane". Others point out that, especially since the colonial period, when traditional leadership structures were politicised to help administer indirect rule, traditional leadership positions "have rarely been a simple product of genealogy".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: A more specific challenge to Buthelezi's authority came after King Cyprian's death in 1968. Prince Mcwayizeni Israel Zulu insisted that he was the monarch's rightful senior advisor, as the most senior Zulu prince, and ahead of Zwelithini's coronation he entered into a decades-long feud with Buthelezi. Buthelezi was rumoured to have been estranged from the royal family from 1968 to 1970, as his status as traditional prime minister came into question.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi's native region, the native reserve of Zululand, was affected by the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and the first Bantu authorities were established in 1959, though with significant resistance from parts of the population and tribal leadership. In 1970, the Zululand Territorial Authority was established, and its 200 members, most of them traditional leaders, unanimously elected Buthelezi its Chief Executive Officer. Buthelezi again claimed that ANC leaders – Albert Luthuli and Oliver Tambo – had encouraged him to accept the position.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Over the next decade, Zululand was transformed into KwaZulu, the most populous of the ten bantustans (or "homelands") established by the South African government as part of the NP's scheme of grand apartheid. Under the Bantu Self-Government Act, each of the so-called Bantu or black African ethnic groups would govern itself, under Bantu authorities pursuing so-called separate development, in a territory that would ultimately become fully independent of white-ruled South Africa. KwaZulu (meaning "place of the Zulus") was the bantustan allocated to Zulu South Africans, who, under the Black Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, had their South African citizenship revoked in favour of nominal KwaZulu citizenship. In line with Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, a separate constitution was promulgated for KwaZulu in 1972 to provide for "stage one" of the territory's self-government; it created the indirectly elected KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, dominated by traditional leaders, which replaced the Zululand Territorial Authority.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Under this new system, Buthelezi became head of the executive branch as the Chief Executive Councillor of KwaZulu; his title was changed to Chief Minister in February 1977 when the territory was declared fully "self-governing" and its government was granted additional powers.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The 1972 KwaZulu constitution vested all executive powers in Buthelezi and granted the Zulu king a largely ceremonial role, requiring him to "hold himself aloof from party politics and sectionalism". This was a political triumph for Buthelezi. Viewed as a modernist, he had prevailed against monarchists in the Zulu traditional leadership who had argued that executive powers should be vested in Zulu monarchy. This proposition had tempted the NP government, partly because of Buthelezi's "patently obstructive and critical stance". On some accounts, it was during this struggle that Buthelezi began to appeal to his family's tradition of providing traditional prime ministers, seeking to establish a claim to the premiership.During his tenure in the KwaZulu government, there were "a series of crises" as Buthelezi attempted to entrench King Zwelithini's position as a constitutional monarch and to disable him politically. In 1979, for example, he accused the king and Price Mcwayizeni of attempting to form an opposition party together; in 1980, newspapers reported that Zwelithini had attempted to join the apartheid army but had been blocked by Buthelezi. Despite this, in other respects the Zulu monarchy underwent a renaissance during Buthelezi's premiership. After the defeat of the Zulu kingdom in 1879, Zulu monarchs had become subjects of the South African government, and the monarchy's power and stature had suffered; in 1951 King Cyprian's recognition by the NP government was something of a landmark. Buthelezi's intimacy with the royal family thus allowed a symbiotic mutual benefit, as Buthelezi appropriated the symbols of the Zulu monarchy for political gain, particularly reviving them in service of Zulu nationalism, while also reviving the cultural relevance of the monarchy. Buthelezi told a gathering in 1985:His Majesty and I share a platform and symbolize the unity of our people. His Majesty symbolizes the deep spirit of unity for the Zulu people and I symbolize the political determination to pursue time-honoured values which have always been important in the struggle for liberty. Together His Majesty and I share the load which is placed on the Zulu nation. We will never be torn apart.According to Jo Beall, Buthelezi was able to mobilise Zulu symbols in this way because he maintained a support base among the region's other traditional leaders, who "bought into and gave credence to his use of Zulu ethnic identity for political purposes".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi founded the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement at KwaNzimela outside Melmoth on 21 March 1975 and became its first president. In Zulu, it was first known as Inkatha ya kaZulu (Inkatha of the Zulu), and then renamed Inkatha ye Sizwe (Inkatha of the Nation) or Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Sizwe (Inkatha of National Liberation). The name "inkatha" derived from the sacred Zulu coil, a symbol of the unity of the Zulu nation and of fealty to the Zulu king. The name Inkatha ya kaZulu came from its predecessor movement, founded by Buthelezi's maternal uncle King Solomon in 1928, which Buthelezi sought to revive. The earlier movement was, in Buthelezi's words, "a national movement to restore national consciousness and pride"; it was primarily a traditionalist cultural movement. According to Buthelezi, adopting the name Inkatha had been the suggestion of Bishop Alphaeus Zulu, who hoped that an emphasis on cultural matters might protect the organisation from being banned by the apartheid government.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Yet the new Inkatha had political aims: on the movement's 40th anniversary in 2015 Buthelezi said he had formed the party to "reignite mobilisation among the oppressed majority in the hiatus left by the banning of political parties [by the apartheid government]. From the very beginning, we spoke of equality, freedom, negotiations and peaceful resistance". In the 1970s, Inkatha's declared objectives included the liberation of Africans from cultural domination by whites; the eradication of neocolonialism and imperialism; the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination, racialism, and racial segregation; and the development of a framework for power-sharing and political reform in South Africa.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Another of Inkatha's declared objectives was to uphold the "inalienable rights" of Zulus to self-determination and national independence. Formally, and as Buthelezi often insisted, Inkatha was not a sectional party but a national movement open to all black South Africans; in practice its members were almost all Zulus from the KwaZulu region. It came to be closely associated with Zulu nationalism, often boosted by myths of dubious historical veracity. Buthelezi's biographer, Gerhard Maré, wrote in 1991: Inkatha has relied on politicized cultural diversity, on a militant Zulu ethnicity, to mobilize people into its fold... Buthelezi argues that "Zulus," a social construct that has been anything but constant over time, should have a separate political dispensation, that its members have certain unique personality traits, that an insult directed at that identity deserves retribution, and that its survival justifies conflict with other organizations and individuals.A notable feature of Inkatha was its "over-personalised" character: it was, in R. W. Johnson's phrase, perceived "as a one-man band". Buthelezi remained Inkatha's sole president throughout apartheid and for more than two decades afterwards. According to Marina Ottaway, Buthelezi envisioned the formation and growth of Inkatha as a means of extending his ideological and organisational control of KwaZulu. It has also been suggested that he hoped the movement would help entrench his power over King Zwelithini. Buthelezi said that the idea had been born on a visit to Lusaka, Zambia in 1974, when Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, "speaking on behalf of the Frontline States", had "urged me to found a membership-based organisation to reignite political mobilisation" in South Africa and to create "a cohesive force".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi also attempted to build broader political coalitions. In 1976 he formed the Black Unity Front to coordinate among bantustan leaders, and in January 1978 he spearheaded the formation of a spin-off organisation, the South African Black Alliance. The Alliance initially comprised Inkatha, the Labour Party, and the Indian Reform Party; Buthelezi was elected its chairman. Its objectives were to forge black unity and prepare for a broad-based national convention, with a longer-term goal of becoming the major opposition force to the apartheid government. However, its impact was "minimal", partly because its multi-racial participants were wary of Buthelezi's "dubious record on cross-ethnic relations".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Although Buthelezi dubbed KwaZulu a "liberated zone", elements of his administration were authoritarian, and he was described as personally exerting "iron-fisted control" over KwaZulu. He was not only chief minister but also finance minister, and became police minister in 1980 when the KwaZulu Police was established. In addition to alleged abuses by the police force, a common complaint was that Buthelezi restricted political organisation, making KwaZulu a de facto one-party "state". This was the result of legal and coercive constraints, but also of the Zulu royal family's close alignment to Inkatha, which allowed Inkatha leaders "to imply that opposition to the movement is synonymous with disloyalty to the Zulu nation as a whole". Opposition was also restricted inside Inkatha – for example, the organisation's constitution prescribed that only the KwaZulu chief minister could serve as party president.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The Inkatha constitution additionally set out that all Zulus automatically became members of Inkatha, although it also set out membership fees; as Buthelezi explained in 1975, "all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be members who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation". An Inkatha membership card was known to be a virtual prerequisite for expedient access to public services and, in many sectors, for employment in the public service. In 1978, for example, the legislative assembly adopted a ruling that public servants' standing in Inkatha would be taken into account when the Public Service Commission assessed them for promotion; and in 1989 schoolteachers complained about being "invited" to join Inkatha or risk being fired. Thus R. W. Johnson referred to Inkatha's reputation for recruitment by means of "administrative coercion"; the "New York Times" compared it to Tammany Hall at its peak.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: King Zwelithini was Inkatha's official patron, and the entire membership of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly served on Inkatha's National Council, formally designated in terms of the Inkatha constitution as the supreme body of the "Zulu nation". Human Rights Watch said in 1993 that KwaZulu government institutions were "virtually identical" with Inkatha institutions, and that Inkatha often benefitted from the protection and resources of the KwaZulu state. From 1976, Inkatha rolled out "education for nationhood" in public schools, introducing Inkatha's "philosophy" into the curriculum, and public teachers were required to make time available for students to participate in the activities of Inkatha's youth wing, the Inkatha Youth Brigade. A 1993 report by Human Rights Watch concluded: Freedom of expression, assembly, and association all endorsed by the draft constitution for KwaZulu/Natal proposed by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly are not respected. The KwaZulu Police are allowed to operate with an almost complete lack of accountability for their actions, and are routinely guilty of incompetence, bias and even criminal activities... In these circumstances, the continuing existence of the KwaZulu homeland is itself one of the principal obstacles to free political activity in the Natal region.However, Buthelezi was instrumental in setting up teacher training and nursing colleges throughout the late-1970s and the early-1980s. According to him, he spearheaded the establishment of the Mangosuthu University of Technology in Umlazi through fundraising, primarily from mining magnate Harry Oppenheimer, with whom he was friendly.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Throughout apartheid, Buthelezi stridently refused to accept the full – but largely nominal – political and legal independence proffered by the central government and accepted by the TBVC states. In 1976, at a rally commemorating the Sharpeville massacre, he declared, "South Africa is one country. It has one destiny. Those who are attempting to divide the land of our birth are attempting to stem the tide of history." In April 1981, he rejected "Pretoria's plans for this fraudulent independence", saying that Zulus would "prefer to die in the hundreds of thousands than be forced to be foreigners in their homeland, which is South Africa".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In 1982, Buthelezi led a political and legal battle to block the government from carrying out a proposed land deal, which would have seen the region of Ingwavuma in northern KwaZulu – from the Mozambican border in the west to the Indian Ocean coast in the east – ceded to neighbouring Swaziland. In this he partnered with Enos Mabuza, leader of the kaNgwane bantustan, which would have been ceded to Swaziland in its entirety under the proposed deal. Buthelezi argued that the apartheid government intended to use the land deal to extend South African influence in Swaziland; it would have allowed Swaziland to act as a conservative buffer state between South Africa and the left-wing, pro-ANC Frontline State of Mozambique. Observers also pointed out that it would advance the apartheid policy of stripping black South Africans of South African citizenship and that it could be a form of retaliation against Buthelezi for refusing to accept KwaZulu independence.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi held popular demonstrations against the deal, lobbied the Organisation of African Unity for support, and challenged the plan four successive times in court. While a fifth judgement was pending, the apartheid government shelved the plan. In a prime example of his strategy of using the apartheid government's own policies against it , he won the case with the argument that the government's own law required it to consult bantustan leaders on the deal. Allister Sparks said it was "the first time in memory" that "black South Africans have forced the white segregationist government to back down on a major issue involving the ideology of apartheid or racial separation". In 2022 a statue of Buthelezi was erected in Jozini, Ingwavuma to commemorate his role.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The value and sincerity of Buthelezi's contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle was a highly polarising issue inside South Africa during apartheid and remains controversial. Archbishop Desmond Tutu famously asked Buthelezi to leave the funeral of Robert Sobukwe in 1978 because supporters of the Pan Africanist Movement objected fiercely to his presence, throwing stones at him and calling him a "sell-out" and "government stooge". Though Buthelezi left the event at Tutu's request, he had reportedly told the youths, "If you chaps want to kill me, do so. I am prepared to die"; he reflected afterwards, "I remember our Lord's crucifixion. He was spat on too".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The Black Consciousness movement was particularly critical; for example, the South African Students' Organisation organised demonstrations at the University of Zululand in 1976 to protest the award of an honorary doctorate to Buthelezi. In the late 1970s, Tambo of the ANC told Herbert Vilakazi that "these '76 boys" – young ANC members radicalised during the 1976 Soweto Uprising and influenced by Black Consciousness – were insisting that he should "stop having relations with Buthelezi" and "consider him an enemy". Their stance was influenced by that of Steve Biko, the leading Black Consciousness intellectual, who had argued that the apartheid government was exploiting Buthelezi – rather than vice versa, as Buthelezi believed – and that Buthelezi "solves so many conscience problems" both for white South Africans and for foreign observers. Indeed, in his famous exposition of blackness as a political identification, Biko used Buthelezi as his example of someone who appeared black but operated as an extension of a white system.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Because he was the political leader of a bantustan, Buthelezi's alleged "collaboration" with the separate development scheme, and therefore with apartheid, was highly controversial. Nevertheless, he always insisted that his role in the bantustan system was compatible with his avowed opposition to apartheid. Academic Laurence Piper, conceding that Buthelezi's brand of resistance politics was "peculiar", described him as "a conservative nationalist intent on 'using the system against itself' by advancing anti-apartheid politics within the boundaries of government tolerance". In this vein, responding to the accusation that he had switched allegiances, Buthelezi said, "What I'm doing is working within the system". Indeed, historian Stephen Ellis wrote that, perhaps excepting Bantu Holomisa, Buthelezi was "more successful than any other homeland leader in asserting his own autonomy" against the apartheid state.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In 1971, Buthelezi said that, "Homeland leaders who have accepted separate development have done so because it is the only way in which Blacks in South Africa can express themselves politically." He consistently lobbied for the government to make the separate development policy "meaningful" by granting genuine autonomy to the bantustans: his policy was "one of accepting separate development as the only practical alternative and trying to force the government to match theory with practice". Also in 1971, in a column for the "Rand Daily Mail" entitled "End This Master-Servant Relationship", Buthelezi called on the central government to provide KwaZulu with more land and resources, arguing:The plain truth of the matter is that if the South African Government does not deliver the goods on the basis of its own scheme, the Blacks of this country will become even more disillusioned than at present... I am not prepared to say that separate development is the only hope, but it may be a contribution to the development of the situation. It may be a contribution to the unravelling of the problem, insofar as, if we attain full independence, our hand will be strengthened. Gone will be the days then, one hopes, when people will think of us simply as 'kaffirs.'Buthelezi's admirers point out that he initially, and skillfully, resisted the central government's plan to implement separate development in KwaZulu, taking an "intransigent" stance that set him apart from the leaders of other black areas. They argue that he submitted to the process of drafting the KwaZulu constitution only under intense pressure both from the NP government and from his colleagues in the Zululand tribal authorities, and that he later delayed KwaZulu's progression to full self-government by delaying the required elections, including by insisting that voter registration should be conducted using new identity cards rather than the detested "dompas" (pass books). His critics submit that the delays were designed to give him time to sideline monarchist leaders who might otherwise have sought to unseat him. Yet his supporters respond that he sought to sideline the monarchists in the knowledge that they were likely to "organiz[e] the authority on conservative lines in cooperation with the white bureaucracy".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Admirers also point to his refusal to accept independence for KwaZulu, which – especially since KwaZulu was the country's most populous bantustan – stymied the full implementation of separate development. Speaking in December 1994, Gavin Relly, the former chairman of Anglo American, said that Buthelezi's refusal to accept nominal independence made him "the anvil on which apartheid was broken". Buthelezi agreed with this assessment. In a characteristic rebuke of his critics in 1991, he said that they were "snapping at my heels from behind as I march forward" towards a prosperous, stable and non-racial South Africa: "they do not have the greatness in them to formulate the tasks, let alone to pursue the tasks".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: While he was leader of KwaZulu, Buthelezi's relationship with the ANC was complex. Inkatha had been founded in 1975 with the blessing of the ANC leadership, including ANC president Oliver Tambo; the ANC had been banned by the South African government since 1960 and operated in exile from Lusaka, Zambia. According to Buthelezi, he remained in contact with Tambo and with Nelson Mandela, then imprisoned, whom he respected greatly. In the 1970s, Buthelezi publicly embraced the ANC and adopted its symbols – including its colours, green, black and gold – for Inkatha. He reminded people that Seme and John Dube had been involved in Inkatha's predecessor movement, founded by his uncle. The overwhelming implication of many of Buthelezi's public statements during the time was that Inkatha was continuous with the historical tradition of the ANC and even constituted, in a symbolic sense, the ANC's internal wing. In 1985, after the relationship had deteriorated, Tambo said that the ANC leadership had agreed to the formation of Inkatha in 1975 in the hope that Buthelezi could lead mass anti-apartheid mobilisation through the legal avenues available to politicians in the bantustan system. His view was that the ANC had not sufficiently supported and guided Inkatha after 1975 and that Buthelezi was the ANC's "fault".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The turning point was a meeting between Buthelezi and Tambo in London on 30 October 1979. In Buthelezi's account of the meeting, the ANC proposed that Inkatha operate as its surrogate in KwaZulu, particularly providing safe houses and recruits for the armed wing Umkhonto weSizwe; Buthelezi refused because he objected to the ANC's armed struggle. According to an analyst at the South African Institute of Race Relations, it was clear that Buthelezi and the ANC had fallen out over some form of disagreement about "who was going to be the tail and who was going to be the dog". While the ANC had only a meagre presence inside South Africa at the time, opinion polling indicated that Buthelezi was certainly one of black South Africa's most popular politicians, and Inkatha had an estimated membership of about 250,000 people; it is possible that Buthelezi and his advisors believed that his popularity should earn him recognition by the ANC as leader of the anti-apartheid movement.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In June 1980, the ANC's Alfred Nzo delivered a public repudiation of Buthelezi and Inkatha, widely reported on in South Africa, in which he said that Buthelezi's actions could no longer be seen as the flawed implementation of good intentions but had to be recognised as the actions of a "police agent" and "jail warder". Completing the break, Tambo said that Inkatha had "emerged on the side of the enemy against the people". Throughout the 1980s, there was strong anti-Buthelezi sentiment among segments of the ANC. An internal ANC document published in June 1985 said that Buthelezi "projects the illusion of autonomy from the enemy and pretends to pursue national aims. His counterrevolutionary role must be exposed and we must work to win over his supporters and deprive him of his social base." At a meeting with the ANC in January 1991 – Buthelezi's first since 1979 – Buthelezi reportedly complained to attendees that "very few" members of the ANC National Executive Committee had not "at one time or another engaged in my vilification", and then provided a list of examples of attacks. These included that Chris Hani had called him "a government lackey and running dog" who was "living in a fool's paradise" and that Joe Slovo had said his political program was tribalism in disguise.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi had responded by criticising the exiled ANC in turn. By the mid-1980s, he claimed publicly that the ANC in exile was not the genuine standard-bearer of the pre-1960 ANC of Seme and Luthuli; Inkatha, instead, was the heir of its political principles and historical role in the liberation of black people in South Africa. He also founded in 1986 a conservative trade union, the United Workers Union of South Africa, allied with Inkatha, to counter the growing influence of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions. According to observers, the ANC's repudiation of Buthelezi, coupled with its diplomatic offensive in the 1980s, narrowed Buthelezi's political options and opened a competition over popular support, partly explaining Buthelezi's growing turn in the 1980s towards appeals to conservative constituencies in South Africa and abroad, including through increased emphasis on Zulu nationalism.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Buthelezi deviated from the orthodoxy of the anti-apartheid movement in ways other than his involvement in the homeland system. Some contemporary reappraisals conclude that Buthelezi, though fundamentally opposed to apartheid, endorsed less radical methods than the ANC and other groups. During the 1976 Soweto Uprising, he condemned the harsh police response but also condemned the riots and appealed to "responsible elements" to form vigilante units to protect township property; his influence is credited with having prevented the protests from spreading to KwaZulu. In the 1980s, he was a strident anti-communist and claimed that the ANC, then operating from exile, was undemocratic and dominated by hardline communists. He opposed the armed struggle and the student protests, consumer boycotts, and union strikes that dominated grassroots anti-apartheid organising in that period under the United Democratic Front (UDF). He was also an outspoken opponent of international sanctions against the apartheid state, arguing that black people bore their economic costs; <nowiki>"</nowiki>I have responsibility to see that black children are educated and fed, that their parents have jobs and housing," he said. He lobbied for the repeal of the American Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, including on visits to the United States during which he met with President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and President George H. W. Bush in 1991. Indeed, he was highly popular with American conservatives and organisations such as the Heritage Foundation. He also developed a lifelong friendship with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, notwithstanding her conciliatory attitude toward the apartheid regime.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: However, Buthelezi rejected the 1983 Constitution introduced by the NP to establish the Tricameral Parliament, believing, as other activists did, that the political reforms it introduced were insufficient. He campaigned for a "no" vote in the 1983 constitutional referendum alongside Frederik van Zyl Slabbert of the Progressive Federal Party and other liberals. The "New York Times" observed that he treated P. W. Botha, who led the South African government throughout the 1980s, "with patent contempt". In 1986, for example, Buthelezi said that Botha "has got his head so deeply buried in the sand that you will have to recognize him by the shape of his shoes", and he refused to meet with Botha for five years after Botha was impolite to him in a meeting. Moreover, in addition to his refusal to accept nominal independence for KwaZulu, he refused to negotiate constitutional questions with the NP government while Nelson Mandela and other black political leaders remained imprisoned. Mandela thanked Buthelezi for his constant agitation in this regard, both in a private letter from Robben Island and then publicly after his release in February 1990. Buthelezi claimed that he was solely responsible for persuading the government to enter into negotiations with black leaders and to release Mandela: "The government has come to this position because of me. The government has released Mandela because of me. It's I who released Mandela!" Indeed, "Securing the release of Mandela and political prisoners to begin democratic negotiations" remained listed on his parliamentary biography in 2022.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: For some ANC leaders, their most significant gripe with Buthelezi was the perception that he had ordered, sanctioned, or allowed the ongoing political violence in KwaZulu, Natal, and the Transvaal between Inkatha supporters and groups aligned to the ANC and broader Congress movement, including the UDF. The violence had begun in the 1980s, continued well into the 1990s, and was often described as constituting a low-intensity civil war. In August 1990, Mandela reportedly dismissed the prospect of meeting with Buthelezi because "we cannot meet a man who wants to see the blood of black people"; Jay Naidoo publicly called him a "murderer". Buthelezi's alleged involvement in political violence is also the primary concern of some of his harshest contemporary critics, such as "City Press" editor Mondli Makhanya. At the time, Buthelezi blamed the ANC for the violence; he still did in 2019. He said that he had never endorsed violence and that he could not control any "high-ranking members of Inkatha who have been involved in acts of violence in their local situations"; but the "New York Times" noted that his public statements about the violence were "calculatedly ambiguous". For example, he frequently defended Zulus' right to self-defence and to carry the cultural or traditional weapons, such as assegais, that were often used in violent clashes with ANC supporters.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: In the early 1990s, the ANC theorised the political violence as caused by a state-sponsored "third force" bent on dividing and destabilising the anti-apartheid movement. Buthelezi dismissed this claim, saying in 1991, "We should not pretend that the real violence in South Africa is not by and large produced by blacks in attacks on blacks." However, evidence later uncovered suggested that the ANC was correct that the state had some degree of involvement in the violence, insofar as there was a degree of covert collaboration between Inkatha and the apartheid government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In mid-1991, the "Weekly Mail" broke the so-called Inkathagate scandal, revealing that the state had provided R250 000 in covert support to Inkatha and R1.5 million to the affiliated United Workers' Union. The funding was paid directly to a secret account in Buthelezi's name. According to one leaked internal document, the support was designed to be used to "show everyone that [Buthelezi] has a strong base."


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Later in the 1990s, it was revealed that Inkatha had received significant military assistance from the apartheid military under a project codenamed Operation Marion. Under the project, the South African Defence Force (SADF) provided military training and other aid to Inkatha recruits, who would constitute an elite paramilitary force. About 200 Inkatha members, the so-called Caprivi 200, were flown to a SADF base in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (then South West Africa) for military training in early 1986. The project apparently originated in a covert request from Buthelezi. He reportedly approached the state for help training Inkatha protection units for Inkatha leaders, himself among them, who were explicitly or implicitly threatened by political rivals, including the ANC and UDF. However, the SADF-trained Inkatha unit was clearly intended to carry out offensive, as well as defensive, functions, and indeed they became a sort of hit squad. Among other things, Inkatha recruits were trained by special forces in the use of Soviet weapons, heavy duty weapons including mortars and RPG-7s; explosives, land mines, and hand grenades; and techniques for "attacks on houses with aim of killing all the occupants", as occurred in the 1988 Trust Feed massacre; once operational, the recruits also received assistance from South African Police officers who attempted to ensure that arrested Caprivi trainees obtained bail and were released. The Caprivi 200 were responsible for several assassinations of prominent UDF and ANC activists in Natal.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission conducted a comprehensive investigation and summarised its findings as follows:In 1986, the SADF force conspired with Inkatha to provide Inkatha with a covert, offensive paramilitary unit (hit squad) to be deployed illegally against persons and organisations perceived to be opposed to or enemies of both the South African government and Inkatha. The SADF provided training, financial and logistical management and behind-the-scenes supervision... Persons involved in giving the training and persons receiving training testified that they were giving and receiving training in order to engage in the unlawful killing of people... The Commission finds that the gross violations of human rights committed in consequence of Operation Marion were part of a systematic pattern of abuse that entailed deliberate planning on the part of the former state, the KwaZulu government, and the Inkatha political organisation.The Commission found that Buthelezi had been personally involved in planning the operation (which Buthelezi denied), as had General Magnus Malan; it also concluded that President Botha and the State Security Council had been aware of the scheme. In a related criminal trial, internal State Security Council documents from 1985 were released and showed that apartheid policymakers had viewed Buthelezi as a central component of the state's strategy to recruit surrogate black allies who could act as an internal bulwark against the ANC. The codename of the operation, Marion, was derived from the word marionette and related terms, suggesting that Buthelezi was seen as the state's marionette.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: During the same period, the Goldstone Commission and Steyn Commission found evidence that officers of the apartheid police's Security Branch had sold weapons to Inkatha between 1991 and 1994, during the peak of the ANC–Inkatha political violence, including AK-47s smuggled to Inkatha from outside the country; the Steyn Commission also found that the state had continued to provide military training to Inkatha members into the early 1990s. In addition, Water Felgate, a former Inkatha leader, told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that Buthelezi had met monthly with Bureau for State Security operatives; Buthelezi vehemently denied that he had had any dealings with apartheid intelligence agencies except in his capacity as KwaZulu chief minister.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Mandela's release from prison in February 1990 coincided with the unbanning of the ANC and other black political organisations, and marked the beginning of the final, most substantive stage of the negotiations which ended apartheid in 1994. To mark this new milieu, in July 1990, Buthelezi relaunched Inkatha as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a multi-ethnic political party which would seek a nationwide following. The organisation also changed its colours (until then the ANC's black, green, and gold), adding red and white to its flag. In 1990, Buthelezi claimed that the IFP had 1.9 million paid members, which would make it the largest party in South Africa, and he expected it to play a major role in the negotiations and ultimate settlement.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: On 4 January 1974 in Mahlabatini, Buthelezi signed the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith with Harry Schwarz, the Transvaal leader of the United Party, then South Africa's official parliamentary opposition. The declaration was proposed as a five-point blueprint for racial peace in South Africa and called for political reform by non-violent means – specifically, through inclusive negotiations on constitutional proposals, including a bill of rights. It also endorsed the federal concept for South Africa. It was viewed as a breakthrough in white liberal circles and was endorsed by three homeland leaders – Cedric Phatudi (Lebowa), Lucas Mangope (Bophuthatswana) and Hudson Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu). Buthelezi later said that, once founded, Inkatha subscribed to the principles set out in the Mahlabtini Declaration.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: By the 1980s, Buthelezi was a consistent advocate for political reforms instituting a federal system in South Africa, generally incorporating recognition for racial and ethnic identities – though from 1980 also including a common national citizenship and freedom of movement between regions – and therefore sometimes described as a form of consociationalism. Importantly, such proposals were compatible with Buthelezi's ambivalent stance on the principle of one man, one vote. By 1981, he was arguing that, as a matter of "practical politics", the principle would not be unobtainable in South Africa in the foreseeable future, given "the reality of racial hatred, racial fear and entrenched power groups". In 1986 he told journalists that he favoured one man, one vote as an ideal, but that compromise would be necessary to avoid violence. This put him directly at odds with the ANC, whose central vision was for a unitary post-apartheid state under full majority rule.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: During the negotiations on constitutional principles in 1991–1993, Buthelezi and the IFP continued to advocate for a federal system with a high degree of devolved regional autonomy and strong guarantees for the representation of minority interests, including the status of Zulu traditional leaders. Perhaps in support of the federal principle, during this period Buthelezi altered his rhetoric about KwaZulu's status as a homeland. He began referring to KwaZulu as the "Kingdom of KwaZulu", creating the false impression that the territory was continuous with Shaka's independent Zulu kingdom – and therefore that the disbanding of the homeland would amount to an attempt to disband the Zulu nation. For example, he told the "New York Times", "They [activists] talk about the homelands as if all the positions of homeland leaders are created by Pretoria. We were a sovereign nation until 1879, when we were defeated by the British. KwaZulu was always called KwaZulu." At one rally held by Buthelezi in 1992, King Zwelithini told the crowd that the ANC sought to "wipe the Zulus off the face of the earth".


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: From 1991 to 1993, Buthelezi led the IFP's delegation to the multi-party constitutional negotiations at the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), although he personally boycotted CODESA sessions in protest of the steering committee's decision not to allow a separate delegation representing King Zwelithini. CODESA II broke down due to the ANC's fury over what they perceived as the government's "third force" involvement in the ongoing political violence, and negotiations only resumed after the ANC and NP government signed a bilateral in September 1992. Buthelezi was furious that the IFP had been excluded from the agreement. In October 1992, he announced to a rally that the IFP would not participate in further negotiations and initiated the formation of the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). The group was an "unlikely alliance", uniting the IFP with black traditionalists in other bantustans – Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and Oupa Gqozo of Ciskei – and the white Conservative Party. Buthelezi himself later called it "a motley gathering". Although he walked back his threat and the IFP did participate in the next stage of talks at the MPNF, COSAG continued to act as a lobbying group, aiming to ensure that its members were not sidelined or played off against each other, as they believed they had been in the past, and to promote a united front in advocating for the broad principles of federalism and political self-determination.


title: Mangosuthu Buthelezi

text: Notwithstanding, Buthelezi felt that the negotiations had become two-sided and that the IFP – and he personally – were being marginalised by the ANC and the NP. In June 1993, he led the IFP to walk out of the MPNF and announce its withdrawal from negotiations. It did not formally participate in any of the further negotiations or ratify the proposals that emerged from them. The Ciskei and Bophuthatswana governments followed the IFP in withdrawing in October 1993; at that time, COSAG was reconstituted as the Freedom Alliance, also incorporating far-right white groups of the Afrikaner Volksfront.