title: Sky Rojo

text: The second season of "Sky Rojo" was filmed before the first season even premiered. As with the former, the second season also consisted of eight episodes of around 25-five minutes each. On 29 March 2021, it was announced that the second season would premiere on 23 July 2021.


title: Sky Rojo

text: On 12 August 2021, it was announced that the series had been renewed for a third and final season. Asier Etxeandia, who plays Romeo, confirmed that the season was scheduled to begin filming in November 2021. In February 2022, Lali Espósito, who plays Wendy, announced in "El Hormiguero" that Rauw Alejandro will appear on the third and final season of "Sky Rojo".


title: Sky Rojo

text: During its premiere weekend, "Sky Rojo" was the fourth most watched show on Netflix globally, and the most watched non-English language show in the world. It also was the most watched show in Argentina, Spain, Brazil, Colombia, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Israel, Jamaica, Paraguay, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while reaching the top ten in sixty-one countries.


title: Sky Rojo

text: American business magazine "Forbes" reported that "Sky Rojo" was the most watched show in Spain the day after its release, outperforming Disney+'s "The Falcon and the Winter Soldier" (the platform's most-watched series premiere ever during its opening weekend) in that territory. According to TV Time, early performance data for "Sky Rojo" during its release weekend, from 9 March to 21 March, showed that the series entered the Top 5 for most-watched subscription video on demand originals across key European, Middle Eastern, African and Latin American markets. Sheena Scott of "Forbes" wrote that "with Argentine superstar Lali Espósito starring in the series, it is no surprise that Sky Rojo also topped Netflix's chart as the number one TV show in Argentina during its launching weekend". In the United States and the United Kingdom, however, "Sky Rojo" never entered the Top 10 TV shows chart on Netflix during its release weekend, despite receiving some favorable reviews from critics.


title: Sky Rojo

text: "Sky Rojo" was met with a very positive response from critics. Review aggregator website Rotten Tomatoes gave "Sky Rojo" an approval rating of 92% based on 13 reviews, with an average rating of 7.4/10. Multiple critics compared the series' cinematography with the films of Quentin Tarantino. Elizabeth Vincentelli of "The New York Times" described the series as "sheer excess" for its "simultaneously minimal and over the top" plot. Ellen E. Jones of "The Guardian" gave the series' first season four stars out of five and wrote: ""Sky Rojo's" punchy 25-minute runtime is never long enough to truly try the patience. Those wild cliffhanger endings should have you slamming "next episode" faster than Coral slams the accelerator at a busy intersection". "NME"'s James McMahon gave the show three stars out of five and dubbed the show as "cool" and "exciting" one, highlighting its "great music and solid performances". Juan Sanguno from "El País" wrote that ""Sky Rojo" turns every punch, every humiliation, and every threat into a triumph".


title: Sky Rojo

text: Sharing creators with "Money Heist", it was only natural that "Sky Rojo" got compared to it. In her review, Keyla Cobb of "Decider" wrote that those who loved "Money Heist" will love "Sky Rojo" since "both dramas look gorgeously slick, perfectly crumpling their on-the-run characters enough to look worn but still sexy" while also singling out both shows' convergence in their "dedication to humanity". Cobb concluded that ""Sky Rojo" feels like a successor to "Money Heist"". The reviewer also compared the series to other TV shows like "Good Girls", "Big Sky" and "Fargo" since they all revolve around "panicked people who did something wrong and are now being chased by a nefarious force far more powerful than them".


title: Sky Rojo

text: Valerie Ettenhofer of "Film School Rejects" highlighted "Sky Rojo" "unique blend of dark humor, serious violence, and heightened drama". However, she wrote that the show is "neither as deep nor as clever as it thinks it is, but the thriller seems more concerned with being addictive than being perfect, and on that front, it succeeds". She criticized Moisés and Christian's "obnoxious amount of screen time" since "their frequent scenes are repetitive, unfocused, and not nearly as engaging as anything involving the women they're after", and that their scenes seem like mere "attempts to humanize the villains". Ultimately, Ettenhofer said that ""Sky Rojo's" greatest strengths are its lead [actresses and actors]". David Craig of "Radio Times" highlighted Verónica Sánchez's "strong" performance and gave the show four out of five stars. Craig wrote: "on paper, "Sky Rojo" sounds as if it should be a rather bleak affair but, for the most part, the series avoids becoming too heavy by balancing its serious themes with a pulpy sense of humour". Lali Espósito's performance was also singled out by many critics, with Trae Delellis of "Miami New Times" dubbing it as "mesmerizing and affecting".


title: German grammar

text: Although some features of German grammar, such as the formation of some of the verb forms, resemble those of English, German grammar differs from that of English in that it has, among other things, cases and gender in nouns and a strict verb-second word order in main clauses.


title: German grammar

text: German has retained many of the grammatical distinctions that some Germanic languages have lost in whole or in part. There are three genders and four cases, and verbs are conjugated for person and number. Accordingly, German has more inflections than English, and uses more suffixes. For example, in comparison to the -s added to third-person singular present-tense verbs in English, most German verbs employ four different suffixes for the conjugation of present-tense verbs, namely - for the first-person singular, - for the informal second-person singular, - for the third-person singular and for the informal second-person plural, and - for the first- and third-person plural, as well as for the formal second-person singular/plural.


title: German grammar

text: Owing to the gender and case distinctions, the articles have more possible forms. In addition, some prepositions combine with some of the articles.


title: German grammar

text: Numerals are similar to other Germanic languages. Unlike modern English, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese, units are placed before tens as in Early Modern English, Danish, Dutch, Yiddish and Frisian.


title: German grammar

text: A German noun – excluding pluralia tantum – has one of three specific grammatical genders (masculine, feminine, neuter). Nouns are declined for case (nominative, accusative, dative, genitive) and grammatical number (singular, plural). In German, all nouns are capitalized, not just proper nouns.


title: German grammar

text: German has all three genders of late Proto-Indo-European—the masculine, the feminine, and the neuter. Most German nouns are of one of these genders. Nouns denoting a person, such as ("woman") or ("man"), often agree with the natural gender of what is described. However there exist several notable counterexamples such as ("girl") and ("miss"), since the diminutive forms ending in or are grammatically neuter. Thus these are not illogical. However, gender and sex don't have to agree as in: (old, regional or anthropological: "woman"; a cognate of the English "wife"), ("human", male or female), ("guest", male or female; the feminine is obsolete). Furthermore, in German, the gender of nouns without natural gender is not comprehensively predictable. For example, the three common pieces of cutlery all have different genders: ("knife") is neuter, ("fork") is feminine, and ("spoon") is masculine.


title: German grammar

text: Students of German are often advised to learn German nouns with their accompanying definite article, as the definite article of a German noun corresponds to the gender of the noun. However, the meaning or form, especially the ending, of a noun can be used to recognize 80% of noun genders. For instance, nouns ending in the suffixes , , , or are always feminine. Nouns ending in , or , or are nearly always masculine. As noted above, nouns ending in or are neuter. Many nouns bearing both the prefix and the suffix , as well as many nouns ending in , , or , also are neuter. A noun ending in is likely to be feminine; it is masculine when it denotes people or a few animals: ("cat"), ("flower") and ("love") are feminine, while ("messenger"), ("boy") and ("knave") are masculine. A few nouns ending in are neuter, like ("end"). Similarly, a noun ending in is likely to be masculine (, , ); however, ("knife") and ("water") are neuter, whereas ("mother") and ("butter") are feminine.


title: German grammar

text: The German language has several different ways of forming the plural. Most feminine nouns are regular, using the ending "n" or "en", but many masculine and neuter nouns are not. For example, some plurals are formed with an or , some with an umlaut and an , other plurals are the same as the singular, and some add or an umlaut and . Many loanwords as well as some dialectal or colloquial nouns, take a plural in (e.g. → ). Some foreign endings, such as Latin , are deleted before the plural ending (e.g. → ). Sometimes the stress in the plural form is changed, for example der → .


title: German grammar

text: Special colloquial or dialectal plural forms also exist. For example, is often used as the plural of "stick" in northern Germany, whereas the standard plural is .


title: German grammar

text: Unlike English, which has lost almost all forms of declension of nouns and adjectives, German inflects nouns, adjectives, articles and pronouns into four grammatical cases. The cases are the nominative (, , ), genitive (, , ), dative (, , ), and accusative (, , ). The case of a particular noun depends on the grammatical function of the noun in the sentence.


title: German grammar

text: Note: In earlier usage (17–19th century) German words derived from Latin also had a vocative, a dative and an ablative case. E.g.: the Latin-German dative: "er aber sagte zu Petro" [Petrus (m.)]; ablative: "von dem Corpore" [Corpus (n.)], "von der Radice" [Radix (f.)], and some words still have a vocative (e.g. , vocative or , and , vocative or ).


title: German grammar

text: In contrast to strongly inflected languages like Latin, German expresses cases chiefly by inflecting the determiner that accompanies the noun rather than the noun itself. However, grammatical number (singular vs. plural) is nearly always expressed by inflecting the noun (, ). Other exceptions of a suffix expressing the case of a noun along with the article are the forms of genitive and dative singular and dative plural.


title: German grammar

text: Today, the use of the genitive case is relatively rare in spoken language – speakers sometimes substitute the dative case for the genitive in conversation. But the genitive case remains almost obligatory in written communication, public speeches and anything that is not explicitly colloquial, and it is still an important part of the (language of education). Television programs and movies often contain a mix of both, dative substitution and regular genitive, depending on how formal or "artistic" the program is intended to be. The use of the dative substitution is more common in southern German dialects, whereas Germans from northern regions (where Luther's Bible-German had to be learned like a foreign language at that time) use the genitive more frequently. Though it has become quite common not to use the genitive case when it would formally be required, many Germans know how to use it and generally do so. Especially among the higher educated, it is considered a minor embarrassment to be caught using the dative case incorrectly. So it is not typically recommended to avoid the genitive when learning German: although the genitive has been gradually falling out of use for about 600 years, it is still far from extinct. The historical development of the has to some extent re-established the genitive into the language, and not necessarily just in written form. For example, the genitive is rarely used in colloquial German to express a possessive relation (e.g. "my father's car" may sound odd to some Germans in colloquial speech), but the partitive genitive is quite common today (e.g. "one of the best"). Furthermore, some verbs take the genitive case in their object, but this is often ignored by some native speakers; instead, they replace these genitive objects with (substitutional) prepositional constructions: e.g. ("I'm ashamed of you.") turns into (or )." ("I'm ashamed because of you.").


title: German grammar

text: A German book series called "Der Dativ ist dem Genitiv sein Tod" ("The dative is to the genitive its death") alludes to this phenomenon (being called "genitive's death struggle" by the author) in its title. In correct standard German, the title would be ("The dative is the genitive's death"), or alternatively ("The dative is the death of the genitive"). As is apparent, the book uses dialect, i.e. by employing the dative case together with a possessive pronoun instead of the genitive, to poke fun at what the author perceives as a decline in the German language, since in written German a dative construction replacing the genitive is still considered a major error. This is, by the way, not how most Standard German speakers would colloquially replace the genitive case; rather, this usage is prevalent in some German regional dialects, such as Bavarian. Standard German speakers would construct , which is (being literally the English ""of the" Genitive") — incorrect in the Standard as well, but far less incriminating.


title: German grammar

text: Linguistically, the thesis of the genitive case dying out can easily be refuted. Indeed, the genitive case has been widely out of use in most dialects of the German language for centuries. Only the replacement of dialects by a colloquial Standard German is new, and the use of the genitive case in the written language is unaffected. Also, many Germans wrongly use the genitive after prepositions such as , and , although the dative is required.


title: German grammar

text: There are, however, legitimate dative constructions to indicate possession, as in . The construction ', virtually appears only in Latin beginners' translations, as the sentence should indicate (). Some dialects have which is literally a dativus possessivus. If a genitive is unmarked and without article (practically, in the plural), usage of ', followed by the dative, is not only legitimate but required, as in: (minorities' affairs are to be protected). In that case, would contain a definite article, which does not reflect the intended indefiniteness of ; itself is an unmarked plural, i.e. it could be any grammatical case. Additionally, the dative case is commonly used to indicate possession of bodily parts that are the direct objects of an action. Constructions such as ("He broke his arm.", literally "He broke himself the arm.") and ("You'll put your eyes out, kid!", literally "You [will] put yourself the eyes out, kid!" ) are typical and correct in any context. In English, this construction only occurs in the construction "to look someone in the eye" and its variants.


title: German grammar

text: The dative case is used for the indirect object of a verb. The sentence ("I give my son a dog") contains a subject , a verb , an indirect object ; and a direct object . is the "to whom" or the destination of the object of the subject's action, and therefore takes the masculine dative .


title: German grammar

text: Dative also focuses on location. (See accusative or dative prepositions below.) German places strong emphasis on the difference between location and motion; the accusative case is used for motion and the dative for location. There are four important verbs that show this dichotomy: /, /, /, / (motion/location). The sentence [] , "I hang the picture on(to) the wall." demonstrates motion. On the other hand, the sentence [] shows location; now, the picture is located on the wall, so is dative.


title: German grammar

text: The case of a noun after a preposition is decided by that preposition. No prepositions require the nominative case, but any other case may follow one; for example, the preposition (for) is followed by the accusative case, the word (with) is followed by the dative, and the word (outside of) is followed by the genitive case. Certain prepositions, called "two way prepositions", have objects either in dative or accusative, depending on whether the use implies position (e.g. = "in the kitchen", dative case) or direction (e.g. = "in"to" the kitchen", accusative case).


title: German grammar

text: A German nominal phrase, in general, consists of the following components in the following order:<br>


title: German grammar

text: article, number (cardinal or ordinal), adjective(s), noun, genitive attribute, position(s), relative clause, reflexive pronoun


title: German grammar

text: Of course, most noun phrases are not this complicated; adjectives, numbers, genitive attributes, positions, relative clauses and emphasizers are always optional.


title: German grammar

text: A nominal phrase contains at least a cardinal number, an adjective, a pronoun or a noun. It always has an article, except if it is an indefinite plural noun or refers to an uncountable mass.


title: German grammar

text: A nominal phrase can be regarded a single unit. It has a case, a number, and a gender. Case and number depend on the context, whereas the main noun determines the gender.


title: German grammar

text: A nominal phrase may have a "genitive attribute", for example to express possession. This attribute may be seen as merely another nominal phrase in the genitive case which may hang off another nominal phrase.


title: German grammar

text: A direct translation of would be "the profession of the old man." "The old man's profession" could be translated directly and correctly as , though this form is almost never used in modern German, even if educated circles regarded it a very elegant use of language. It is found in poetry, especially if helpful for metrical and rhyming purposes.


title: German grammar

text: A nominal phrase may contain a "position phrase"; this may be seen as merely another nominal phrase with a preposition (or postposition) or a pronominal adverb (see Adverbial phrases).


title: German grammar

text: These are a feature of written (particularly educated) German. One also might hear them in the context of formal oral communications as well (such as news broadcasts, speeches, etc.).


title: German grammar

text: Aside from their highly inflected forms, German relative pronouns are less complicated than English. There are two varieties. The more common one is based on the definite article , , , but with distinctive forms in the genitive (, ) and in the dative plural (). Etymologically this is related to English "that". The second, which is more literary and used for emphasis, is the relative use of , , , comparable with English "which". As in most Germanic languages, including Old English, both of these inflect according to gender, case and number. They get their gender and number from the noun they modify, but the case from their function in their own clause.


title: German grammar

text: The relative pronoun is neuter singular to agree with , but dative because it follows a preposition in its own clause. On the same basis, it would be possible to substitute the pronoun .


title: German grammar

text: However, German uses the uninflecting ' ("what") as a relative pronoun when the antecedent is , or ("everything", "something", "nothing"), or when the antecedent is an entire clause.


title: German grammar

text: But when would follow a preposition (still modifying an entire clause), it needs to be replaced with + preposition or + preposition when the preposition begins with a vowel. The same applies to indirect questions.


title: German grammar

text: The inflected forms depend on the number, the case and the gender of the corresponding noun. Articles have the same plural forms for all three genders.


title: German grammar

text: In relation to nouns, cardinal numbers are placed before adjectives, if any. If the number is relatively low, it is usually not combined with an indefinite plural article (e.g. or ). Personal pronouns of the first and second person are placed before numbers. Personal pronouns of the third person cannot be used with numbers.


title: German grammar

text: The cardinal number (one) is partly identical in form and inflection to the indefinite article. The number is distinguished from the article in speech by intonation and in writing sometimes by emphasis (e.g. italics, increased letter-spacing or small caps: , or ). In colloquial German, the indefinite article is often shorted to or (like English and Dutch ), whereas becomes . In dialects, the shortening may arrive at (Schwa, like English ) or in Upper German regions. The cardinal number (= one), however, always retains its full pronunciation (again like Dutch ).


title: German grammar

text: The numbers (two) and (three) (and sometimes other numbers as well) have case endings in some instances. Where an adjective would have weak endings, numbers do not have endings. If an adjective had strong endings, these numbers may also have strong endings in the genitive case.


title: German grammar

text: If there is no other word carrying the strong ending of the genitive plural, the numbers must carry it.


title: German grammar

text: If these numbers are center of a nominal phrase in the dative plural and no other word carries case markers, they may carry dative endings.


title: German grammar

text: German adjectives normally precede the noun they are modifying. German adjectives have endings which depend on the case, number and (in the singular) gender of the nominal phrase. There are three sets of endings: strong endings, mixed endings and weak endings. Which set is used depends on what kind of word the adjective comes after, and sometimes also on the gender and case.


title: German grammar

text: In contrast to Romance languages, adjectives are only declined in the attributive position (that is, when used in nominal phrases to describe a noun directly). Predicative adjectives, separated from the noun by "to be", for example, are not declined and are indistinguishable from adverbs.


title: German grammar

text: The declension of an adjective depends not only on the gender, number and case of the noun it modifies, but also on whether the indefinite article, definite article or no article is used with it. The following table shows two examples which exemplify all three cases:


title: German grammar

text: Declension of adjectives is mandatory even in proper names. The name of Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, for instance, changes into when preceded by a definite article. Adjectival bynames given to historical or legendary persons must also be declined according to their grammatical role in a phrase or sentence. Hence, one says ("Charlemagne became emperor in the year 800"), but ("The sword of Charlemagne").


title: German grammar

text: The pronouns of the third person may be used to replace nominal phrases. These have the same gender, number and case as the original nominal phrase. This goes for other pronouns, too.


title: German grammar

text: The reflexive personal pronoun (in English, "myself" etc.) takes distinct forms only in the 3rd person (and 2nd person formal address) dative and accusative, to wit, . (Uncapitalized also in the 2nd person formal).


title: German grammar

text: German verbs may be classified as either "weak", if they form their past tense with a dental consonant inflection, or "strong", if they exhibit ablaut (vowel gradation). Most verbs of both types are regular, though various subgroups and anomalies do arise. However, textbooks often class all strong verbs as irregular. There are more than 200 strong and irregular verbs, and there is a gradual tendency for strong verbs to become weak.


title: German grammar

text: In German declarative main clauses the finite verb is always placed as the second element. When there are more verbs in a sentence, the non-finite ones are placed at the end of the clause. With a subordinating conjunction, all verbs appear at the end of the clause. A verb placed as the second element does not necessarily mean it is the second word, rather, it is the second constituent of the clause. For instance the first position may be occupied by an article and a noun, a possessive pronoun, or even an entire subordinate clause.


title: German grammar

text: The following examples illustrate the use of subordinate clauses as the first element in a verb second structure: (Bold words indicate a subordinate clause. Underlined words indicate verbs as both second and last elements in the sentence.)


title: German grammar

text: Inside a subordinate clause, introduced by a conjunction or a relative pronoun, the finite verb form comes last. Examples: (Bold words indicate the subordinate clause, bold italicized words indicate subordinating conjunction, bold underlined words indicate verbs at end of the sentence)


title: German grammar

text: German has many verbs that have a separable prefix that can be unattached to its root. Examples are , to appear or look, and , to imagine, or to introduce.


title: German grammar

text: Prepositions are designed to give some direction, location, intensity, etc. to a sentence. The way such is indicated in German may be different from the way it would be in English.


title: German grammar

text: Furthermore, there are instances where German uses a preposition in a way that is unlike English, e.g. as a separable prefix attributed to a verb. For example, in (Turn the lights off!), (out) is used instead of . There is also the verb , literally "to sleep out", which in English idiom would be expressed by "sleep in".


title: German grammar

text: The objects of some prepositions have a fixed case. For example, if , a dative preposition, is used in a sentence, its object will be dative, as in the sentence (I'm visiting with my family). Notice the dative feminine inflection on .


title: German grammar

text: <nowiki>***</nowiki> As a preposition takes the genitive or a colloquial dative: () "along the way", but as a postposition it takes the accusative with the same meaning: .


title: German grammar

text: "Unusual" prepositions, which exist in vast amounts in bureaucratic style, as a rule take the genitive. The nascent preposition ( "direction", as in , I'm driving in the direction of Munich) takes the accusative.


title: German grammar

text: Two-way prepositions with either the dative or accusative mean location with the dative, as in "where?" (), and direction with the accusative, as in "where to?" ().


title: German grammar

text: Modal particles () are a part of speech used frequently in spoken German. These words affect the tone of a sentence instead of conveying a specific literal meaning. Typical examples of this kind of word in German are , , , , , , , , or . Many of these words also have a more basic, specific meaning (e.g. "well", "yes", "already", "also"), but in their modal use, this meaning is not directly expressed — that is, there is no real English equivalent to those words, so in an English translation, the German modal particles are usually omitted.


title: H.R.

text: Paul D. Hudson (born February 11, 1956), known professionally as H.R. (Human Rights), is an American musician who leads the hardcore punk band Bad Brains, and is an instrumental figure in the development of the genre. His vocal delivery has been described as diverse, ranging from a rapid-fire nasal whine, to feral growling and screeches, to smooth near-crooning or staccato reggae rhymes. He has departed the band periodically to pursue solo efforts that are more reggae than Bad Brains' punk sound. He is the older brother of Earl Hudson, Bad Brains' drummer.


title: H.R.

text: Born in Liverpool, England to a Jamaican mother and American father stationed with the US Air Force in the UK, his family moved to the United States when he was a toddler, and proceeded to move around until finally settling in Washington, D.C. He was a gifted athlete from an early age, competing in swimming and pole-vaulting. He and his younger brother Earl both entered the local D.C. music scene as teenagers with their friends and future bandmates Dr. Know and Darryl Jenifer. H.R. was an early nickname that initially stood for "hunting rod", but which he changed to stand for "human rights".


title: H.R.

text: H.R. and his bandmates became Rastafari around 1979 after attending a Bob Marley concert at the Capitol Center. This spiritual direction influenced the music of Bad Brains via his vocals, and inspired the creation of his reggae band, Human Rights (or H.R.).


title: H.R.

text: Although reggae is the main focus of his solo material, he explores rock and other musical genres. He has had numerous albums released on SST Records. A "Village Voice" review of a Bad Brains concert described H.R.'s presence on stage: "like James Brown gone berserk, with a hyperkinetic repertoire of spins, dives, back-flips, splits, and skanks"


title: H.R.

text: H.R. has collaborated with the Long Beach Dub Allstars on their song "New Sun" on the "Right Back" album, and with P.O.D. on their song "Without Jah, Nothin'", on the album "Satellite".


title: H.R.

text: In recent years, H.R.'s Human Rights performances have become markedly more mellow and restrained, focusing primarily on reggae. This is a stark contrast to his wildly animated, aggressive stage performances of the late 1970s and 1980s.


title: H.R.

text: Interviews with H.R. feature prominently in the 2006 documentary "American Hardcore", in which he discusses the early days of the hardcore scene in New York City and Washington D.C., and his association with peers like Minor Threat and the Cro-Mags. In particular, he recalls encouraging Ian MacKaye to fully articulate Minor Threat's emerging straight edge philosophy, to give young people a positive direction. As depicted in the 2012 documentary "Bad Brains: A Band in D.C.", H.R.'s bizarre behavior, such as wearing a motorcycle helmet during a performance and refusing to sing, caused friction with other members of the band.


title: H.R.

text: In late 2016, the film "Finding Joseph I: The HR From Bad Brains Documentary" premiered in Europe and the United States. Directed by James Lathos, the documentary features interviews with H.R., as well as other musicians, peers, and family member, while chronicling his life, struggles, and philosophies, particularly "PMA" (positive mental attitude). The film's companion book was published by Lesser Gods in January 2017.


title: H.R.

text: H.R is also credited with coining the term "moshing", in reference to the style of dance which first emerged in hardcore punk venues in Washington D.C. in the early 1980s. Though originally referred to as mashing, such as in the title of Bad Brain contemporary Scream's 1982 song "Total Mash," the dance gradually became known under the moniker of moshing after audience members misunderstood H.R.'s pronunciation of the word due to his pseudo-Jamaican accent.


title: H.R.

text: In 2016, H.R.'s wife, Lori, revealed that H.R. suffers from SUNCT syndrome, a rare neurological disorder which causes sporadic, excruciating headaches. He underwent brain surgery in early 2017 to relieve the headaches. He also suffers from schizophrenia.


title: Meritorious Unit Commendation

text: The Meritorious Unit Commendation (MUC; pronounced "muck") is a mid-level unit award of the United States Armed Forces. The U.S. Army awards units the Army MUC for exceptionally meritorious conduct in performance of outstanding achievement or service in combat or non-combat, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps award units the Navy MUC for valorous or meritorious achievement or service in combat or non-combat, and the U.S. Coast Guard awards units the Coast Guard MUC for valorous or meritorious achievement or service not involving combat.


title: Meritorious Unit Commendation

text: The Army MUC emblem worn to represent award of the MUC is 1 inches wide and inches in height. The emblem consists of a inch wide gold frame with laurel leaves which encloses a scarlet 67111 ribbon. The previously authorized emblem was a gold color embroidered laurel wreath, 1 inches in diameter on a 2 inches square of olive drab cloth.


title: Meritorious Unit Commendation

text: The Navy MUC was authorized by SECNAV Notice 1650 on 17 July 1967 and is awarded by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, or Commandant of the Marine Corps to any unit of the Navy or Marine Corps that has distinguished itself, under combat or non-combat conditions, by either valorous or meritorious achievement, which renders the unit outstanding compared to other units performing similar service, but not sufficient to justify award of the Navy Unit Commendation. This award may also be conferred upon units of the other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, and the armed forces of friendly foreign nations serving with U.S. Armed Forces, provided such units meet the standards established for Navy and Marine Corps units. To justify this award, the unit must have performed service of a character comparable to that which would merit the award of a Bronze Star Medal, or achievement of like caliber in a non-combat situation, to an individual. Normal performance of duty or participation in many combat missions does not, in itself, justify the award. An award will not be made to a unit for actions of one or more of its component parts, unless the unit performed uniformly as a team in a manner fully justifying collective recognition.


title: Meritorious Unit Commendation

text: The Coast Guard MUC was established in November 1973, and is awarded in the name of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The MUC may be awarded to any unit of the Coast Guard that has distinguished itself by either valorous or meritorious achievement or service in support of Coast Guard operations not involving combat. The Commandant may also bestow the award upon a unit of another branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, provided the unit meets the standards established for Coast Guard units. To justify the award, the service performed as a unit must be comparable to that which would meet the award of a Coast Guard Achievement Medal (CGAM) to an individual. Normal performance of duty or participation in a large number of operational missions does not in itself justify the award. A Coast Guard MUC will not be awarded to a large unit for actions of one or more of its sub-units unless the entire unit performed as a team.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Some authors have carried out comparisons of Nazism and Stalinism. They have considered the similarities and differences between the two ideologies and political systems, the relationship between the two regimes, and why both came to prominence simultaneously. During the 20th century, the comparison of Nazism and Stalinism was made on totalitarianism, ideology, and personality cult. Both regimes were seen in contrast to the liberal democratic Western world, emphasizing the similarities between the two.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Political scientists Hannah Arendt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Carl Joachim Friedrich, and historian Robert Conquest were prominent advocates of applying the totalitarian concept to compare Nazism and Stalinism. Historians Sheila Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer highlight the differences between Nazism and Stalinism, with Geyer saying that the idea of comparing the two regimes has achieved limited success. Historian Henry Rousso defends the work of Friedrich "et al.", while saying that the concept is both useful and descriptive rather than analytical, and positing that the regimes described as totalitarian do not have a common origin and did not arise in similar ways. Historians Philippe Burrin and Nicolas Werth take a middle position between one making the leader seem all-powerful and the other making him seem like a weak dictator. Historians Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin take a longer historical perspective and regard Nazism and Stalinism not as examples of a new type of society but as historical anomalies and dispute whether grouping them as totalitarian is useful.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Other historians and political scientists have made comparisons between Nazism and Stalinism as part of their work. The comparison has long provoked political controversy, and in the 1980s led to the historians' dispute within Germany known as the "Historikerstreit".


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Hannah Arendt was one of the first scholars to publish a comparative study of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. In her 1951 work "The Origins of Totalitarianism", Arendt puts forward the idea of totalitarianism as a distinct type of political movement and form of government, which "differs essentially from other forms of political oppression known to us, such as despotism, tyranny, and dictatorship." Arendt distinguishes between a totalitarian movement, such as a political party with totalitarian aims, and a totalitarian government. Not all totalitarian movements succeed in creating totalitarian governments once they gain power. In Arendt's view, although many totalitarian movements existed in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, only the governments of Stalin and Hitler succeeded in fully implementing their totalitarian aims.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Arendt traced the origin of totalitarian movements to the 19th century, focusing especially on antisemitism and New Imperialism. She emphasized the connection between the rise of European nation-states and the growth of antisemitism, which was because the Jews represented an "inter-European, non-national element in a world of growing or existing nations." Conspiracy theories abounded, and the Jews were accused of being part of various international schemes to ruin European nations. Small antisemitic political parties formed in response to this perceived Jewish threat. According to Arendt, these were the first political organizations in Europe that claimed to represent the interests of the whole nation instead of the interests of a class or other social group.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: European imperialism of the 19th century, better known as New Imperialism, also paved the way for totalitarianism by legitimizing the concept of endless expansion. After Europeans had engaged in imperialist expansion on other continents, political movements developed which aimed to copy the methods of imperialism on the European continent itself. Arendt refers specifically to the pan-movements of pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism, which promised continental empires to nations with little hope of overseas expansion. According to Arendt, "Nazism and Bolshevism owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other ideology or political movement."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Arendt posits that both the Nazi and Bolshevik movements "recruited their members from mass of apparently indifferent people whom all other parties had given up", and who "had reason to be equally hostile to all parties." For this reason, totalitarian movements did not need to use debate or persuasion, and did not need to refute other parties' arguments. Their target audience did not have to be persuaded to despise the other parties or the democratic system, because it consisted of people who already despised mainstream politics. As a result, totalitarian movements were free to use violence and terror against their opponents without fear that this might alienate their own supporters. Instead of arguing against their opponents, they adopted deterministic views of human behaviour. They presented opposing ideas as "originating in deep natural, social, or psychological sources beyond the control of the individual and therefore beyond the power of reason." The Nazis in particular, during the years before their rise to power, engaged in "killing small socialist functionaries or influential members of opposing parties" both as a means to intimidate opponents and as a means of demonstrating to their supporters that they were a party of action, "different from the 'idle talkers' of other parties."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Totalitarian governments make extensive use of propaganda and are often characterized by having a substantial distinction between what they tell their own supporters and the propaganda they produce for others. Arendt distinguishes these two categories as "indoctrination" and "propaganda". Indoctrination consists of the message that a totalitarian government promotes internally to the members of the ruling party and that segment of the population that supports the government. Propaganda consists of the message that a totalitarian government seeks to promote in the outside world and among parts of its own society that may not support the government. According to Arendt, "the necessities for propaganda are always dictated by the outside world", while the opportunities for indoctrination depend on "the totalitarian governments' isolation and security from outside interference."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The indoctrination used by the Soviets and the Nazis was characterized by claims of "scientific" truth and appeals to "objective laws of nature." Both movements took a deterministic view of human society, and stressed that their ideologies were based on scientific discoveries regarding race (in the case of the Nazis) or the forces governing human history (in the case of the Soviets). Arendt identifies this as being in specific ways similar to modern advertising, in which companies claim that scientific research shows their products to be superior; however, she posits more generally that it is an extreme version of "that obsession with science which has characterized the Western world since the rise of mathematics and physics in the sixteenth century." By using pseudoscience as the primary justification for their actions, Nazism and Stalinism are distinguished from earlier historical despotic regimes, who appealed instead to religion or sometimes did not try to justify themselves at all. According to Arendt, totalitarian governments did not merely use these appeals to supposed scientific laws as propaganda to manipulate others. Totalitarian leaders like Hitler and Stalin genuinely believed that they were acting in accordance with immutable natural laws, to such an extent that they were willing to sacrifice the self-interest of their regimes for the sake of enacting those supposed laws. The Nazis treated the inhabitants of occupied territories with extreme brutality. They planned to depopulate Eastern Europe to make way for colonists from the German "Herrenvolk" ("master race"), even though this actively harmed their war effort. Stalin repeatedly engaged in purges of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of people who deviated even slightly from the party line, even when this weakened the party or the Soviet government, because he believed that they represented the interests of "dying classes" and their demise was historically inevitable.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Arendt also identifies the central importance of an all-powerful leader in totalitarian movements. She distinguishes between totalitarian leaders like Hitler and Stalin and non-totalitarian dictators or autocratic leaders. The totalitarian leader does not rise to power by personally using violence or through any special organizational skills but by controlling personnel appointments within the party so that all other prominent party members owe their positions to him. With loyalty to the leader becoming the primary criterion for promotion, ambitious party members compete with each other in trying to express their loyalty, and a cult of personality develops around the leader. Even when the leader is not particularly competent and the members of his inner circle are aware of his deficiencies, they remain committed to him out of fear that the entire power structure would collapse without him.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Once in power, according to Arendt, totalitarian movements face a major dilemma: they built their support based on anger against the status quo and on impossible or dishonest promises, but now they have become the new status quo and are expected to carry out their promises. They deal with this problem by engaging in a constant struggle against external and internal enemies, real or imagined, to enable them to say that, in a sense, they have not yet gained the power they need to fulfil their promises. According to Arendt, totalitarian governments must constantly be fighting enemies in order to survive. This explains their irrational behaviour, such as when Hitler continued to make territorial demands even after he was offered everything he asked for in the Munich Agreement, or when Stalin unleashed the Great Terror even though he faced no significant internal opposition.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Arendt highlights the widespread use of internment camps by totalitarian governments, positing that they are the most important manifestation of the need to find enemies to fight against, and are therefore "more essential to the preservation of the regime's power than any of its other institutions." Although forced labor was commonly imposed on inmates of concentration camps, Arendt posits that their primary purpose was not any material gain for the regime because "[t]he only permanent economic function of the camps has been the financing of their own supervisory apparatus; from the economic point of view, the concentration camps exist mostly for their own sake." The Nazis, in particular, carried this to the point of "open anti-utility" by expending large sums of money, resources, and manpower during a war for the purpose of building and staffing extermination camps and transporting people to them. This sets apart the concentration camps of totalitarian regimes from older human institutions that bear some similarity to them, such as slavery. Slaves were abused and killed for the sake of profit; concentration camp inmates were abused and killed because a totalitarian government needed to justify its existence. Finally, Arendt points out that concentration camps under both Hitler and Stalin included large numbers of inmates who were innocent of any crime not only in the ordinary sense of the word but even by the standards of the regimes themselves; that is to say, most of the inmates had not committed any action against the regime.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Throughout her analysis, Arendt emphasized the modernity and novelty of the governmental structures set up by Stalin and Hitler, arguing that they represented "an entirely new form of government" which is likely to manifest itself again in various other forms in the future. She also cautioned against the belief that future totalitarian movements would necessarily share the ideological foundations of Nazism or Stalinism, writing that "all ideologies contain totalitarian elements."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The totalitarian paradigm in the comparative study of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was further developed by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who wrote extensively on this topic both individually and in collaboration. Similar to Hannah Arendt, they state that "totalitarian dictatorship is a new phenomenon; there has never been anything quite like it before." Friedrich and Brzezinski classify totalitarian dictatorship as a type of autocracy but state that it is different in important ways from most other historical autocracies. In particular, it is distinguished by a reliance on modern technology and mass legitimation.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Unlike Arendt, Friedrich and Brzezinski apply the notion of totalitarian dictatorship not only to the regimes of Hitler and Stalin but also to the Soviet Union throughout its entire existence as well as the regime of Benito Mussolini in Italy and the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong. Friedrich stated that the "possibility of equating the dictatorship of Stalin in the Soviet Union and that of Hitler in Germany" has been a deeply controversial topic and a subject of debate almost from the beginning of those dictatorships. Various other aspects of the two regimes have also been the subject of intense scholarly debate, such as whether Nazi and Stalinist ideologies were genuinely believed and pursued by the respective governments, or whether the ideologies were merely convenient justifications for dictatorial rule.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Friedrich and Brzezinski posit that Nazism and Stalinism are not only similar to each other, but also represent a continuation or a return to the tradition of European absolute monarchy on certain levels. In the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the monarch ultimately held all decisional power and was considered accountable only to God. In Stalinism and Nazism, the leader likewise held all real power and was considered accountable only to various intangible entities, such as "the people", "the masses", or "the Volk"; the common feature of autocracies, whether monarchical or totalitarian, is the concentration of power in the hands of a leader who cannot be held accountable by any legal mechanisms, and who is supposed to be the embodiment of the will of an abstract entity. Friedrich and Brzezinski also identify other features common to all autocracies, such as "the oscillation between tight and loose control." The regime alternates between periods of intense repression and relative freedom, often represented by different leaders, and this depends in part on the personal character of different leaders. Friedrich and Brzezinski believe that there is also an underlying political cycle in which rising discontent leads to increased repression until the opposition is eliminated. Controls are relaxed until the next time that popular dissatisfaction begins to grow.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Placing Stalinism and Nazism within the broader historical tradition of autocratic government, Friedrich and Brzezinski hold that "totalitarian dictatorship, in a sense, is the adaptation of autocracy to twentieth-century industrial society." At the same time, they insist that totalitarian dictatorship is a ""novel" type of autocracy". They posit that 20th-century totalitarian regimes, such as those of Hitler and Stalin, had more in common with each other than with any other form of government, including historical autocracies of the past. Totalitarianism can only exist after the creation of modern technology, because such technology is essential for propaganda, surveillance of the population, and the operation of the secret police. When speaking of the differences and similarities between Fascist and Communist regimes, Friedrich and Brzezinski insist that the two kinds of totalitarian governments are "basically alike" but "not wholly alike" in that they are more similar to each other than to other forms of government, but they are not the same. Among the major differences between them, Friedrich and Brzezinski particularly identify that Communists seek "the world revolution of the proletariat". Meanwhile, Fascists wish to "establish the imperial predominance of a particular nation or race."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: In terms of the similarities between Nazism and Stalinism, Friedrich lists five main aspects that they hold in common: First, an official ideology that is supposed to be followed by all members of society, at least passively, and which promises to serve as a perfect guide towards some ultimate goal. Second, a single political party, composed of the most enthusiastic supporters of the official ideology, representing an elite group within society (no more than 10 per cent of the population), and organized along strictly regimented lines. Third, "a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control of all means of effective armed combat" in the hands of the party or its representatives. Fourth, a similar monopoly held by the party over the mass media and all technological forms of communication. Fifth, "a system of terroristic police control" that is not only used to defend the regime against actual enemies, but also to persecute various groups of people who are only suspected of being enemies or who may potentially become enemies in the future.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, the two first pillars of any totalitarian government are the dictator and the party. The dictator, whether Stalin, Hitler or Mussolini, holds supreme power. Friedrich and Brzezinski explicitly reject the claim that the party, or any other institution, could provide a significant counterweight to the dictator's power in Nazism or Stalinism. The dictator needs the party in order to be able to rule, so he may be careful not to make decisions that would go directly against the wishes of other leading party members, but ultimate authority rests with him and not with them. Like Arendt, Friedrich and Brzezinski also identify the cult of personality surrounding the leader as an essential element of a totalitarian dictatorship and reference Stalin's personality cult in particular. They also draw attention to how Hitler and Stalin were expected to provide ideological direction for their governments and not merely practical leadership. Friedrich and Brzezinski write that "unlike military dictators in the past, but like certain types of primitive chieftains, the totalitarian dictator is both ruler and high priest." That is to say, he not only governs, but also provides the principles on which his government is to be based. This is partly due to the way that totalitarian governments arise. They come about when a militant ideological movement seizes power, so the first leader of a totalitarian government is usually the ideologue who built the movement that seized power, and subsequent leaders try to emulate him.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The totalitarian dictator needs loyal lieutenants to carry out his orders faithfully and with a reasonable degree of efficiency. Friedrich and Brzezinski identify parallels between the men in Hitler and Stalin's entourage, arguing that both dictators used similar people to perform similar tasks. Martin Bormann and Georgy Malenkov were both capable administrators and bureaucrats. Heinrich Himmler and Lavrentiy Beria were ruthless secret police chiefs responsible for suppressing any potential challenge to the dictator's power. Both Hitler and Stalin promoted rivalry and distrust among their lieutenants to ensure that none of them would become powerful enough to challenge the dictator himself. This is the cause of an important weakness of the totalitarian regimes: the problem of succession. Friedrich points out that neither the Nazi nor the Stalinist government established any official line of succession or mechanism to decide who would replace the dictator after his death. The dictator, being the venerated "father of the people", was regarded as irreplaceable. There could never be any heir apparent because such an heir would have been a threat to the dictator's power while he was alive; the dictator's inevitable death would always leave behind a major power vacuum and cause a political crisis. In the case of the Nazi regime, since Hitler died mere days before the final defeat of Germany in the war, this never became a major issue; in the case of the Soviet Union, Stalin's death led to a prolonged power struggle.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Friedrich and Brzezinski also identify critical similarities between the Nazi and Stalinist political parties, which set them apart from other types of political parties. Both the Nazi Party and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) under Stalin had stringent membership requirements and did not accept members based on mere agreement with the party's ideology and goals; they strictly tested potential members in a manner similar to exclusive clubs, and often engaged in political purges of the membership, expelling large numbers of people from their ranks, and sometimes arresting and executing those expelled, such as in the Great Purge or the Night of the Long Knives. The totalitarian party cultivates the idea that to be a member is a privilege that needs to be earned, and total obedience to the leader is required to maintain this privilege. While both Nazism and Stalinism required party members to display such total loyalty in practice, they differed in how they dealt with it in theory. Nazism openly proclaimed the hierarchical ideal of absolute obedience to the "Führer" and the "Führerprinzip" as one of its key ideological principles. Stalinism denied that it did anything similar and proclaimed to uphold democratic principles, with the party congress made up of elected delegates supposedly being the highest authority. Stalinist elections typically featured only a single candidate, and the party congress met very rarely and always approved Stalin's decisions. Regardless of the differences in their underlying ideological claims, the Nazi and Stalinist parties were organized in practice along similar lines, with a rigid hierarchy and centralized leadership.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Each totalitarian party and dictator is supported by a specific totalitarian ideology. Friedrich and Brzezinski agree with Arendt that Nazi and Stalinist leaders really believed in their respective ideologies and did not merely use them as tools to gain power. Several major policies, such as the Stalinist collectivization in the Soviet Union of agriculture or the Nazi Final Solution, cannot be explained by anything other than a genuine commitment to achieving ideological goals, even at great cost. The ideologies and their goals were different, but they had in common a utopian commitment to reshaping the world and a determination to fight by any means necessary against a real or imagined enemy. This stereotyped enemy could be described as "the fat rich Jew or the Jewish Bolshevik" for the Nazis, or "the war-mongering, atom-bomb-wielding American Wallstreeter" for the Soviets.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, the most important difference between Nazi and Stalinist ideology lies in the degree of universality involved. Stalinism, and communist ideology in general, is universal in its appeal and addresses itself to all the "workers of the world." Nazism, on the other hand, and fascist ideology in general, can only address itself to one particular race or nation, i.e. the "master race" that is destined to dominate all others. Therefore, "in communism social justice appears to be the ultimate value, unless it be the classless society that is its essential condition; in fascism, the highest value is dominion, eventually world dominion, and the strong and pure nation-race is "its" essential condition, as seen by its ideology." This means that fascist or Nazi movements from different countries will be natural enemies rather than natural allies, as they each seek to extend the dominion of their own nation at the expense of others.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Friedrich and Brzezinski also draw attention to the symbols used by Nazis and Stalinists to represent themselves. The Soviet Union adopted the hammer and sickle, a newly-created symbol "invented by the leaders of the movement and pointing to the future." Meanwhile, Nazi Germany used the swastika, "a ritual symbol of uncertain origin, quite common in primitive societies." One is trying to project itself as being oriented towards a radically new future, while the other is appealing to a mythical heroic past.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Totalitarian dictatorships maintain power through propaganda and terror, which Friedrich and Brzezinski believe to be closely connected. Terror may be enforced with arrests and executions of dissenters but can also take more subtle forms, such as the threat of losing one's job, social stigma and defamation. "Terror" can refer to any widespread method used to intimidate people into submission as a matter of daily life. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, the most effective terror is invisible to the people it affects. They develop a habit of conforming and not questioning authority, without necessarily being aware that this is what they are doing. Terror creates a society dominated by apparent consensus, where the vast majority of the population appears to support the government. Propaganda is then used to maintain this appearance of popular consent.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Totalitarian propaganda is one of the features that distinguishes totalitarian regimes as modern forms of government. It separates them from older autocracies, since a totalitarian government holds complete control over all means of communication, not only public communication such as the mass media but also private communication such as letters and telephone calls, which are strictly monitored. The methods of propaganda were very similar in the Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Both Joseph Goebbels and Soviet propagandists sought to demonize their enemies and present a picture of a united people standing behind their leader to confront foreign threats. In both cases, there was no attempt to convey complex ideological nuances to the masses, with the message being instead about a simplistic struggle between good and evil. Both Nazi and Stalinist regimes produced two very different sets of propaganda, one for internal consumption and one for potential sympathizers in other countries. Moreover, both regimes would sometimes radically change their propaganda line as they made peace with a former enemy or got into a war with a former ally.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Paradoxically, a totalitarian government's complete control over communications renders that government highly misinformed. With no way for anyone to express criticism, the dictator has no way of knowing how much support he has among the general populace. With all government policies always declared successful in propaganda, officials cannot determine what worked and what did not. Both Stalinism and Nazism suffered from this problem, especially during the war between them. As the war turned against Germany, there was growing opposition to Hitler's rule, including within the ranks of the military, but Hitler was never aware of this until it was too late, such as with the 20 July plot. During the early days of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the Soviet leadership apparently believed that the population of West Berlin was sympathetic to Soviet Communism and that they would request to join the Soviet zone. Given enough time, the gap between genuine public opinion and what the totalitarian government believes about public opinion can grow so vast that the government is no longer able to even produce effective propaganda, because it does not know what the people think and so it does not know what to tell them. Friedrich and Brzezinski refer to this as the "ritualization of propaganda": the totalitarian regime continues to produce propaganda as a political ritual, with little real impact on public opinion.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The totalitarian use of mass arrests, executions, and concentration camps was analyzed at length by Friedrich and Brzezinski. They hold that "totalitarian terror maintains, in institutionalized form, the civil war that originally produced the totalitarian movement and by means of which the regime is able to proceed with its program, first of social disintegration and then of social reconstruction." Both Stalinism and Nazism saw themselves as engaging in a life-or-death struggle against implacable enemies; however, to declare that the struggle had been won would have meant to declare that most of the totalitarian features of the government were no longer needed. A secret police force has no reason to exist if there are no dangerous traitors who need to be found. The struggle, or civil war against internal enemies, must be institutionalized and must continue indefinitely. In the Stalinist Soviet Union, the repressive apparatus was eventually turned against members of the Communist Party itself in the Great Purge and the show trials that accompanied it. By contrast, Nazism had a much shorter lifespan in power, and Nazi terror generally maintained an outward focus, with the extermination of the Jews always given top priority. The Nazis did not turn inward towards purging their own party except in a limited way on two occasions (the Night of the Long Knives and the aftermath of the 20 July plot).


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The peak of totalitarian terror was reached with the Nazi concentration camps. These ranged from labor camps to extermination camps, and Friedrich and Brzezinski describe them as aiming to "eliminate all actual, potential, and imagined enemies of the regime." As the field of Holocaust studies was still in its early stages at the time of their writing, they do not describe the conditions in detail, but do refer to the camps as involving "extreme viciousness." They also compare these camps with the Soviet Gulag system and highlight concentration camps as a method of punishment and execution by Nazi and Stalinist regimes alike. Unlike Hannah Arendt, who held that the Gulag camps served no economic purpose, Friedrich and Brzezinski posit that they provided an important source of cheap labor for the Stalinist economy.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The comparative study of Nazism and Stalinism was carried further by other scholars, such as Moshe Lewin and Ian Kershaw, and their collaborators. Writing after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Lewin and Kershaw take a longer historical perspective and regard Nazism and Stalinism not so much as examples of a new type of society like Arendt, Friedrich, and Brzezinski did, but more as historical "anomalies" or unusual deviations from the typical path of development that most industrial societies are expected to follow.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The task of comparing Nazism and Stalinism is, according to them, a task of explaining why Germany and Russia (along with other countries) deviated from the historical norm. At the outset, Lewin and Kershaw identify similarities between the historical situations in Germany and Russia before the First World War and during that war. Both countries were ruled by authoritarian monarchies, who were under pressure to make concessions to popular demands. Both countries had "powerful bureaucracies and strong military traditions." Both had "powerful landowning classes" while also being in the process of rapid industrialization and modernization. Both countries had expansionist foreign policies with a particular interest in Central and Eastern Europe. Lewin and Kershaw say that these factors did not make Stalinism or Nazism inevitable but that they help explain why the Stalinist and Nazi regimes developed similar features.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Ian Kershaw stated that Stalinism and Nazism are comparable in "the nature and extent of their inhumanity" but that the two regimes were different in some aspects. Lewin and Kershaw question the usefulness of grouping the Nazi and Stalinist regimes together under a totalitarian category, saying that it remains an open question whether the similarities between them are greater or smaller than the differences. In particular, they criticize what they see as the ideologically motivated attempt to determine which regime killed more people, saying that apologists of each regime are trying to defend their side by positing that the other was responsible for more deaths.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Lewin and Kershaw place the cult of personality at the centre of their comparison of Nazism and Stalinism, writing that both regimes "represented a new genre of political system centred upon the artificial construct of a leadership cult – the 'heroic myth' of the 'great leader', no longer a king or emperor but a 'man of the people." Concerning Stalinism, they emphasize its bureaucratic character and its "merging of the most modern with the most archaic traits" by combining modern technology and the latest methods of administration and propaganda with the ancient practice of arbitrary rule by a single man. They compare this with the Prussian military tradition in Germany, which had been called "bureaucratic absolutism" in the 18th century, which played a significant role in the organization of the Nazi state in the 20th century.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Kershaw agrees with Mommsen that there was a fundamental difference between Nazism and Stalinism regarding the importance of the leader. Stalinism had an absolute leader, but he was not essential. Another could replace him. Nazism, on the other hand, was a "classic charismatic leadership movement", defined entirely by its leader. Stalinism had an ideology that existed independently of Stalin, but for Nazism, "Hitler "was" ideological orthodoxy", and Nazi ideals were by definition whatever Hitler said they were. In Stalinism, the bureaucratic apparatus was the foundation of the system, while in Nazism, the person of the leader was the foundation.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Lewin also focuses on the comparison between the personality cults of Hitler and Stalin, and their respective roles in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. He refers to them as the "Hitler myth" and the "Stalin myth", and posits that they served different functions within their two regimes. The function of the "Hitler myth" was to legitimize Nazi rule, while the function of the "Stalin myth" was to legitimize not Soviet rule itself but Stalin's leadership within the Communist Party. Stalin's personality cult existed precisely because Stalin knew that he was replaceable and feared that he might be replaced, and so needed to bolster his authority as much as possible. While the "Hitler myth" was essential to Nazi Germany, the "Stalin myth" was essential only to Stalin, not the Soviet Union itself.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Together with fellow historian Hans Mommsen, Lewin posits that the Stalinist and Nazi regimes featured an "intrinsic structural contradiction" which led to "inherent self-destructiveness": they depended on a highly organized state bureaucracy that was trying to set up complex rules and procedures for every aspect of life, yet this bureaucracy was under the complete personal control of a despot who made policy decisions as he saw fit, routinely changing his mind on major issues, without any regard for the rules and institutions which his own bureaucracy had set up. The bureaucracy and the leader needed each other, but also undermined each other with their different priorities. Mommsen sees this as a much greater problem in Nazi Germany than in Stalin's Soviet Union, as the Nazis inherited large parts of the traditional German bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the Soviets largely built their bureaucracy from the ground up. He says that many of the irrational features of the Nazi regime, such as wasting resources on exterminating undesirable populations instead of using those resources in the war effort, were caused by the dysfunction of the Nazi state rather than a fanatical commitment to Nazi ideology.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Per the "Führerprinzip", all decisional power in the Nazi state ultimately rested with Hitler, who often issued only vague and general directives, forcing other Nazi leaders lower down in the hierarchy to guess what precisely the Führer wanted. This confusion produced competition between Nazi officials, as each of them attempted to prove that he was a more dedicated Nazi than his rivals by engaging in ever more extreme policies. This competition to please Hitler was, according to Mommsen, the real cause of Nazi irrationality. Hitler was aware of it and deliberately encouraged it out of a "social-darwinist conviction that the best man would ultimately prevail." Mommsen states that this represents a structural difference between the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Despite its purges, Stalin's regime was more effective in building a stable bureaucracy, such that the system could sustain itself and continue even without Stalin. The Nazi regime, on the other hand, was much more personalized and depended entirely on Hitler, being unable to build any lasting institutions.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Kershaw also saw significant personal differences between Stalin and Hitler and their respective styles of rule. He describes Stalin as "a committee man, chief oligarch, man of the machine" and a "creature of his party," who came to power only thanks to his party and his ability to manipulate the levers of power within that party. Hitler, by contrast, came to power based on his charisma and mass appeal, and in the Nazi regime, it was the leader that created the party instead of the other way around. According to Kershaw, "Stalin was a highly interventionist dictator, sending a stream of letters and directives determining or interfering with policy". Meanwhile, Hitler "was a non-interventionist dictator as far as government administration was concerned," preferring to involve himself in military affairs and plans for conquest rather than the daily routine of government work, and giving only broad verbal instructions to his subordinates regarding civilian affairs, which they were expected to translate into policy.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Although both regimes featured all-pervasive cults of personality, there was a qualitative difference between those cults. Stalin's personality cult was "superimposed upon the Marxist-Leninist ideology and Communist Party". It could be abandoned or replaced with a personality cult around some other leader without major changes to the regime. On the other hand, "the 'Hitler myth' was structurally indispensable to, and the very basis of, and scarcely distinguishable from, the Nazi Movement and its "Weltanschauung"." The belief in the person of Hitler as the unique saviour of the German nation was the very foundation of Nazism, to such an extent that Nazism found it impossible to even imagine a successor to Hitler. In Kershaw's analysis, Stalinism was a fundamentally bureaucratic system, while Nazism embodied "charismatic authority" as described by Max Weber. Stalinism could exist without its leader, while Nazism could not.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The topic of comparisons between Nazism and Stalinism was also studied in the 1990s and 2000s by historians Philippe Burrin, Henry Rousso, and Nicolas Werth.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Rousso defends the work of Carl Friedrich by pointing out that Friedrich himself had only said that Stalinism and Nazism were comparable, not that they were identical. Rousso also says that the popularity of the concept of totalitarianism, the way that large numbers of people have come to routinely refer to certain governments as totalitarian, should be seen as evidence that the concept is useful, that it describes a specific type of government which is different from other dictatorships. At the same time, Rousso states that the concept of totalitarianism is descriptive rather than analytical: the regimes described as totalitarian do not have a common origin and did not arise in similar ways. Nazism is unique among totalitarian regimes in having taken power in "a country endowed with an advanced industrial economy and with a system of political democracy (and an even older political pluralism)."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: According to Rousso, all other examples of totalitarianism, including the Stalinist regime, took power "in an agrarian economy, in a poor society without a tradition of political pluralism, not to mention democracy, and where diverse forms of tyranny had traditionally prevailed." He sees this as a weakness of the concept of totalitarianism, because it merely describes the similarities between Stalinism and Nazism without dealing with the very different ways they came to power. On the other hand, Rousso agrees with Arendt that "totalitarian regimes constitute something new in regard to classical tyranny, authoritarian regimes, or other forms of ancient and medieval dictatorships", and he says that the main strength of the concept of totalitarianism is the way it highlights this inherent novelty of the regimes involved.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Nicolas Werth and Philippe Burrin have worked on comparative assessments of Stalinism and Nazism, with Werth covering the Stalinist regime and Burrin covering Nazi Germany. One of the topics they have studied is how much power the dictator held in the two regimes. Werth identifies two main historiographical approaches in the study of the Stalinist regime: Those who emphasize the power and control exercised by Joseph Stalin himself, attributing most of the actions of the Soviet government to deliberate plans and decisions made by him, and those who posit that Stalin had no pre-determined course of action in mind, that he was reacting to events as they unfolded, and that the Soviet bureaucracy had its own agenda which often differed from Stalin's wishes. Werth regards these as two mistaken extremes, one making Stalin seem all-powerful, the other making him seem like a weak dictator. He believes that the competing perspectives help draw attention to the tension between two different forms of organization in the Stalinist Soviet Union, namely an "administrative system of command", bureaucratic and resistant to change but effective in running the Soviet state, and the strategy of "running the country in a crudely despotic way by Stalin and his small cadre of directors." Werth agrees with Lewin that there was an inherent conflict between the priorities of the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalin's accumulation of absolute power in his own hands. According to Werth, this unresolved and unstated conflict led to the Great Purge and the use of terror by Stalin's regime against its party and state cadres.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: In studying similar issues concerning the Nazi regime, Philippe Burrin draws attention to the debate between the "Intentionalist" and "Functionalist" schools of thought, which dealt with the question of whether the Nazi regime represented an extension of Hitler's autocratic will, faithfully obeying his wishes, or whether it was an essentially chaotic and uncontrollable system that functioned on its own with little direct input from the Führer. Like Kershaw and Lewin, Burrin says that the relationship between the leader and his party's ideology was different in Nazism compared to Stalinism in that "[o]ne can rightly state that Nazism cannot be dissociated from Hitlerism, something that is difficult to affirm for Bolshevism and Stalinism." Unlike Stalin, who inherited an existing system with an existing ideology and presented himself as the heir to the Leninist political tradition, Hitler created both his movement and its ideology by himself, and claimed to be "someone sent by Providence, a Messiah whom the German people had been expecting for centuries, even for two thousand years, as Heinrich Himmler enjoyed saying." There could be no conflict between the party and the leader in Nazi Germany because the Nazi Party's entire reason for existence was to support and follow Hitler; there was a potential for division between the leader and the state bureaucracy due to the way that Nazism came to power as part of an alliance with traditional conservative elites, industrialists, and the army.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Unlike the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany did not build its own state but inherited the state machinery of the previous government. This provided the Nazis with an immediate supply of capable and experienced managers and military commanders; however, it also meant that the Nazi regime had to rely on the cooperation of people who had not been Nazis before Hitler's rise to power and whose loyalty was questionable. It was only during the war, when Nazi Germany conquered large territories and had to create Nazi administrations for them, that brand new Nazi bureaucracies were created without any input or participation from traditional German elites. This produced a surprising difference between Nazism and Stalinism; when the Stalinist Soviet Union conquered territory, it created smaller copies of itself and installed them as the governments of the occupied countries, while Nazi Germany did not attempt to create copies of the German government back home, and experimented with different power structures and policies, often reflecting a "far more ample Nazification of society than what the balance of power authorized in the Reich."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Another major topic investigated by Werth and Burrin was the violence and terror employed by the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Werth reports that the Stalinist Soviet Union underwent an "extraordinary brutalization of the relations between state and society" for rapid modernization and industrialization, to "gain one hundred years in one decade, and to metamorphose the country into a great industrial power." This transformation was accomplished at the cost of massive violence and a sociopolitical regression into what Werth calls "military-feudal exploitation." The types of violence employed by the Stalinist regime included loss of civil rights, mass arrests, deportations of entire ethnic groups from one part of the Soviet Union to another, forced labor in the Gulag, mass executions (especially during the Great Terror of 1937–1938), and most of all the great famine of 1932–1933, known as the Holodomor. All levels of Soviet society were affected by Stalinist repression, from top to bottom. At the top, high-ranking members of the Soviet Communist party were arrested and executed under the claim that they had plotted against Stalin. In some cases, they were forced to confess to imaginary crimes in the Moscow Trials. At the bottom, the peasantry suffered the Soviet famine of 1932–1933 and faced very high grain quotas even outside the famine years.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Werth identifies four categories of people that became the targets of Stalinist violence in the Soviet Union. He lists them from smallest to largest. The first and smallest group consisted of many of Stalin's former comrades-in-arms, who had participated in the revolution and were known as Old Bolsheviks. They were dangerous to Stalin because they had known him before his rise to power and could expose the many false claims made by his personality cult. The second group consisted of mid-level Communist Party officials, subject to mass arrests and executions in the late 1930s, particularly during the Great Purge. Eliminating them served a dual purpose; it helped Stalin centralize power in the Kremlin instead of regional centres and provided him with "corrupt officials" that he could blame for earlier repressions and unpopular policies. Werth draws parallels between this and the old Tsarist tradition of blaming "bad bureaucrats" for unpopular government actions rather than the Tsar. The third group was made up of ordinary citizens from all walks of life who resorted to petty crime to provide for themselves in the face of worsening living standards, for example, by taking home some wheat from the fields or tools from the factory. This type of petty crime became very widespread and was often punished as intentional sabotage motivated by political opposition to the Soviet Union. The fourth and largest category consisted of ethnic groups subject to deportation, famine, or arbitrary arrests under the suspicion of being collectively disloyal to Stalin or the Soviet state. This included the Holodomor, the deportation of ethnic groups suspected of pro-German sympathies, such as the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens and others, and eventually also persecution of ethnic Jews, especially as Stalin grew increasingly antisemitic near the end of his life.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Burrin's study of violence carried out by the Nazi regime begins with the observation that "violence is at the heart of Nazism" and that Nazi violence is "established as a doctrine and exalted in speech." According to Burrin, this marks a point of difference between Nazism and Stalinism. In Stalinism, there was a gulf between ideology and reality when it came to violence. The Soviet regime continuously denied being repressive, proclaimed itself a defender of peace, and sought to conceal all the evidence to the contrary. In Nazism, on the other hand, "doctrine and reality were fused from the start." Nazism not only practised violent repression and war but advocated it in principle as well, considering war to be a positive force in human civilization, and openly seeking "Lebensraum" ("living space") and the domination of the European continent by ethnic Germans.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Burrin identifies three motivations for Nazi violence: political repression, exclusion and social repression, and racial politics. The first of these, political repression, is common in many dictatorships. The Nazis aimed to eliminate their real or imagined political opponents, first in the Reich and later in the occupied territories during the war. Some of these opponents were executed, while others were imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps. The first targets of political repression, immediately after Hitler's rise to power in 1933, were the parties of the left in general, and the Communist Party of Germany in particular. After the mid-1930s, repression was extended to clergy members and later to the conservative opposition, especially after the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1944. The death penalty was used on a wide scale, even before the war. During the war, political repression was greatly expanded inside Germany and especially in the newly occupied territories. Political prisoners in the concentration camps numbered only about 25,000 at the beginning of the war. By January 1945, they had swelled to 714,211, most of them non-Germans accused of plotting against the Reich. The second type of Nazi violence, motivated by exclusion and social repression, was the violence aimed at purging German society of people whose lifestyle was considered incompatible with the social norms of the Nazi regime, even if the people involved were racially pure and able-bodied. Such people were divided into two categories: homosexuals and "asocials", who were only vaguely defined, and included "Gypsies, tramps, beggars, prostitutes, alcoholics, the jobless who refused any employment, and those who left their work frequently or for no reason."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The third and final type of Nazi violence, by far the most extensive, was violence motivated by Nazi racial policies. This was aimed both inward, to cleanse the "Aryan race" of "degenerate" elements and life unworthy of life, and outward to seek the extermination of "Untermensch" ("inferior people"); Germans considered physically or mentally unfit were among the first victims. One of the first laws of the Nazi regime mandated the forced sterilization of people suffering from physical handicaps or who had psychiatric conditions deemed to be hereditary. Later, sterilization was replaced by the murder of the mentally ill and people with severe disabilities as part of a "euthanasia" program called Aktion T4. Burrin states that this served no practical political purpose, as the people being murdered could not have possibly been political opponents of the regime. Hence, the motivation was purely a matter of racial ideology. The most systematic and by far the most large-scale acts of Nazi violence were directed at "racially inferior" non-German populations. As laid out in "Generalplan Ost", the Nazis wished to eliminate most of the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe, partly through deportation and partly through murder, to secure land for ethnic German settlement and colonization. Even more urgently, the Nazis wished to exterminate the Jews of Europe, whom they regarded as the implacable racial enemy of the Germans. This culminated in the Holocaust, the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Unlike all other target populations, the Jews were to be exterminated completely, with no individual exceptions for any reason.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: In "Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared", editors Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick dispute the concept of totalitarianism, noting that the term entered political discourse first as a term of self-description by the Italian Fascists and was only later used as a framework to compare Nazi Germany with the Soviet Union. They posit that the totalitarian states were not as monolithic or as ideology-driven as they seemed. Geyer and Fitzpatrick describe Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as "immensely powerful, threatening, and contagious dictatorships" who "shook the world in their antagonism." Without calling them "totalitarian", they identify their common features, including genocide, an all-powerful party, a charismatic leader, and pervasive invasion of privacy. They posit that Stalinism and Nazism did not represent a new and unique type of government, and can be placed in the broader context of the turn to dictatorship in Europe in the interwar period. They appear extraordinary because they were the "most prominent, most hard-headed, and most violent" of the European dictatorships of the 20th century. They are comparable because of their "shock and awe" and sheer ruthlessness but underneath superficial similarities were fundamentally different, and that "when it comes to one-on-one comparison, the two societies and regimes may as well have hailed from different worlds."


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: According to Geyer and Fitzpatrick, the similarities between Nazism and Stalinism stem from being "ideology driven" and sought to subordinate all aspects of life to their respective ideologies. The differences stem from the fact that their ideologies were opposed to each other and regarded each other as enemies. Another major difference is that Stalin created a stable and long-lasting regime, while Nazi Germany had a "short-lived, explosive nature." The stable state created by Stalinism was based on an entirely new elite, while Nazism, despite having the support of the traditional elite, failed to achieve stability. According to Geyer and Fitzpatrick, the two regimes borrowed ideas from one another, especially regarding propaganda techniques, most of all in architecture and cinema, but also in terms of state surveillance and antisemitism. At the same time, they both vigorously denied borrowing anything from each other. While their propaganda methods were similar, the content was different; Soviet wartime propaganda revolved around the idea of resisting imperial aggression, while Nazi propaganda was about wars of racial conquest. Geyer and Fitzpatrick state that while both Stalinism and Nazism sought to create a New Man, an "entirely modern, illiberal, and self-fashioned personage", they had different visions about what being a New Man would mean.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Among the other authors contributing to the volume edited by Geyer and Fitzpatrick, David L. Hoffmann and Annette Timm discuss biopolitics and the pro-natalist policies of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. Both governments were highly concerned over low fertility rates in their respective populations and applied extensive and intrusive social engineering techniques to increase births. Reproductive policies in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were administered through their health care systems. Both regimes saw health care as a key pillar to their designs to develop a new society. While the Soviet Union had to design a public health care system from scratch, Nazi Germany built upon Germany's pre-existing public health care system that existed since 1883, when Otto von Bismarck's legislation had created the world's first national public health care program. The Nazis centralized the German health care system in order to enforce Nazi ideological components upon it. They replaced existing voluntary and government welfare agencies with new ones devoted to racial hygiene and other components of Nazi ideology.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The Nazi and Stalinist attempt to control family size was not unique. Many other European states practised eugenics at this time (including most of the Allies), and the Stalinist and Nazi ideals were vastly different. They had more in common with third parties than with each other, as Nazi Germany's policies were somewhat similar to those in Scandinavia at the time. In contrast, the Soviet Union's policies resembled those in Catholic countries. The common point between Nazi and Stalinist practices was the connection of reproduction policies with the ideological goals of the state, described as "part of the project of a rational, hypermodern vision for the re-organization of society". There were nevertheless substantial differences between the two regimes' approaches. Stalin's Soviet Union never officially supported eugenics as the Nazis did, and the Soviet government called eugenics a "fascist science", although there were Soviet eugenicists. The two regimes also had different approaches to the relationship between family and paid labor, as Nazism promoted the male single-breadwinner family while Stalinism promoted the dual-wage-earner household.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: In another contribution to the same volume, Christian Gerlach and Nicolas Werth discuss the topic of mass violence and the way that both Stalinism and Nazism used it. Both Stalin's Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were violent societies where the state accepted mass violence, such as the Great Terror of 1937 to 1938 in the Soviet Union and the Holocaust in Nazi Germany and its occupied territories in World War II.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany utilized internment camps led by state agencies: the NKVD in the Soviet Union and the SS in Nazi Germany. They also engaged in violence against minorities based on xenophobia, with the xenophobic violence of the Nazis being outspoken but rationalized as being against "asocial" elements. In contrast, the xenophobic violence of the Stalinists was disguised as being against "anti-Soviet", "counter-revolutionary", and "socially harmful" elements, a term which often targeted diaspora nationalities. The Stalinist Soviet Union established "special settlements" where the "socially harmful" or "socially dangerous" who included ex-convicts, criminals, vagrants, the disenfranchised and "declassed elements" were expelled to. These "special settlements" were mainly in Siberia, the far north, the Urals, or other inhospitable territories. In July 1933, the Soviet Union made a mass arrest of 5,000 Romani people effectively based on their ethnicity, who were deported that month to the "special settlements" in Western Siberia. In 1935, the Soviet Union arrested 160,000 homeless people and juvenile delinquents and sent many of them to NKVD labor colonies where they did forced labor.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: The Nazi regime was founded upon a racialist view of politics and envisioned the deportation or extermination of the majority of the population of Eastern Europe in order to open up "living space" for ethnic German settlers. This was mainly intended to be carried out after an eventual German victory, but steps had already started being taken while the war was still ongoing. For instance, by the end of 1942, the Nazis had deported 365,000 Poles and Jews from their original homes in western Poland (now German-annexed) and into the General Government. A further 194,000 Poles were internally displaced (not deported to another territory but expelled from their homes). The Nazis had also deported 100,000 persons from Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg, as well as 54,000 Slovenians.


title: Comparison of Nazism and Stalinism

text: Stalinism in practice in the Soviet Union pursued ethnic deportations from the 1930s to the early 1950s, with a total of 3 million Soviet citizens being subjected to ethnic-based resettlement. The first major ethnic deportation took place from December 1932 to January 1933. Some 60,000 Kuban Cossacks were collectively criminally charged as a whole with association with resistance to socialism and affiliation with Ukrainian nationalism. From 1935 to 1936, the Soviet Union deported Soviet citizens of Polish and German origins living in the western districts of Ukraine, and Soviet citizens of Finnish origins living on the Finland-Soviet Union border. These deportations from 1935 to 1936 affected tens of thousands of families. From September to October 1937, Soviet authorities deported the Korean minority from its Far Eastern region that bordered on Japanese-controlled Korea. Soviet authorities claimed that the territory was "rich soil for the Japanese to till", implying a Soviet suspicion that the Koreans could join forces with the Japanese to unite the land with Japanese-held Korea. Over 170,000 Koreans were deported to remote parts of Soviet Central Asia from September to October 1937. These ethnically-based deportations reflected a new trend in Stalinist policy, a "Soviet xenophobia" based on ideological grounds that suspected that these people were susceptible to foreign influence, and which was also based on a resurgent Russian nationalism.