# Consciousness Studies/Contemporary Explanations#Higher order thought

*This section is about the types of theory that have been advanced to
explain consciousness. Specific explanations should be entered as
separate pages.*

## Introduction

Explanations of consciousness fall into three broad categories, those
that attempt to explain the empirical experience called consciousness
with scientific theories, those that seek to find some way in which
consciousness could be explained by digital computers or nineteenth
century materialism by redefining or eliminating experience and those
that regard consciousness as inexplicable or supernatural.

## Identity theory of mind

The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is
identical to the brain. Type physicalists identify qualia and the form
of experience with brain activity. They argue that \"mind states\" have
physical causes and physical effects - thus the mind states themselves
must be physical; a non-physical \"middle step\" is superfluous.

Type physicalism has not yet gained widespread support because although
brain activity that correlates with experience has been found everywhere
in the brain, no set of brain activity that is phenomenal consciousness
itself has yet been found - although this is not surprising because
neuronal spike activity is unlikely to host phenomenal consciousness -
see scientific theories of
consciousness.

## Functionalism

Functionalism was developed as a theory of the mind-body problem because
of objections to identity theory and logical behaviourism. Its core idea
is that the mental states can be accounted for without taking into
account the underlying physical medium (the neurons), instead attending
to higher-level functions such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. It is
a theory of behaviour and access consciousness and so from the outset
avoids any explanation of phenomenal consciousness, substituting beliefs
and judgements (functions) for entities such as qualia.

According to functionalism, the mental states that make up consciousness
can essentially be defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a
particular physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in
multiple ways, including, theoretically, within non-biological
systems.This affords consciousness the opportunity to exist in non-human
minds that are based on algorithmic processors such as digital
computers. This is a highly contentious conjecture although
non-functionalist physicalists might agree that machines that are not
digital computers could possess consciousness through an identity theory
of mind - see The problem of machine and digital
consciousness.

Functionalism\'s explanation of consciousness, or the mental, is best
understood when considering the analogy made by functionalists between
the mind and the modern digital computer. More specifically, the analogy
is made to a \"machine\" capable of computing any given algorithm (i.e.
a Turing machine). This machine would involve:

Data input (the senses in humans), data output (both behaviour and
memory), functional states (mental states), the ability to move from one
functional state into another, and the definition of functional states
with reference to the part they play in the operation of the entire
entity - i.e. in reference to the other functional states. So long as
the same process was achieved, the \"physical stuff\" \-- that being
computer hardware or biological structure \-- could achieve
consciousness.

This variety of functionalism was developed by Hilary Putnam. One of the
major proponents of functionalism is Jerry Fodor.

Further reading:

Block, N. (1996). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan,
1996
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.pdf>

## Dualism

### Substance dualism

This theory proposes that phenomenal experience occurs in a non-physical
place. In Cartesian Dualism the non-physical place is an unextended soul
that looks out at the brain. In Reid\'s Natural Dualism the non-physical
place is a point-soul that looks out at the world.

### Property dualism

Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the
appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are
organized), mental properties emerge. Property dualism is a branch of
emergent materialism. The appeal to emergentism deserves closer
attention. Scientific theories often deal with emergent phenomena, for
instance an enzyme consists of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, manganese and
oxygen and from this catalytic action emerges. The theory of enzyme
structure and the action of this structure on the substrate explains how
this emergence occurs. Notice that the theory of enzymes explains the
emergence of catalytic activity; emergence does not explain the theory.
In science the statement that some property will \'emerge\' means that
there will be a theory that accounts for this property. Property
dualism, by appealing to emergence, is stating that some theory of
consciousness will be possible. In other words it is an explanation that
proposes that the explanation is yet to be known.

## Intentionalism

## Higher order thought

*This section is a stub and needs expansion*

## Eliminativism

Eliminative materialism is the school of thought that argues for an
absolute version of materialism with respect to mental entities and
mental vocabulary. It principally argues that our common-sense
understanding of the mind (often called \'folk psychology\') is not a
viable theory on which to base scientific investigation, and therefore
no coherent neural basis will be found for many such everyday
psychological concepts (such as belief or intention) and that behaviour
and experience can only be adequately explained on the biological level.

Eliminative materialists therefore believe that consciousness does not
exist and that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience
progresses. Similarly, they argue that folk psychological concepts such
as belief, desire and intention do not have any consistent neurological
substrate.

Proponents of this view often make parallels to previous scientific
theories which have been eliminated, such as the four humours theory of
medicine, the phlogiston theory of combustion and \'vital force\' theory
of life. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions
of these theories, but rejected them as obsolete. Eliminative
materialists argue that folk psychology is headed the same way.
According to W.V. Quine it will take tens of years before folk
psychology will be replaced with real science. (see Phenomenal
consciousness and access
consciousness).

Eliminative materialism was first defended by W.V. Quine, Paul
Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. This view is most associated with
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland although philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett would also consider themselves eliminativists for many
aspects of psychology. Philosopher Dale Jacquette has claimed that
Occam\'s Razor is the rationale behind eliminativism and reductionism.

The most common argument against eliminative materialism is the argument
from qualia, which is deployed in various forms by Thomas Nagel, Frank
Jackson, and many others. Perhaps the most powerful argument against
eliminativism is that experience itself is many things simultaneously;
it is, as Aristotle points out, immediate and hence is not composed of
judgements.

## Mysterianism

New Mysterianism is a philosophy proposing that certain problems (in
particular, consciousness) will never be explained.

Owen Flanagan noted in his 1991 book \"Science of the Mind\" that some
modern thinkers have suggested that consciousness might never be
completely explained. Flanagan called them \"the new mysterians\" after
the rock group ? and the Mysterians. The term originated with the
Japanese alien-invasion film The Mysterians. The \"old mysterians\" are
thinkers throughout history who have put forward a similar position.
They include Leibniz, Dr Johnson, and Thomas Huxley. The latter said,
\"How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his
lamp.\" \[6, p. 229, quote\]

Noam Chomsky distinguishes between problems, which seem solvable, at
least in principle, through scientific methods, and mysteries which do
not, even in principle. He notes that the cognitive capabilities of all
organisms are limited by biology, e.g. a mouse will never speak. In the
same way, certain problems may be beyond our understanding.

The term New Mysterianism has been extended by some writers to encompass
the wider philosophical position that humans don\'t have the
intellectual ability to understand many hard problems, not just the
problem of consciousness, at a scientific level. This position is also
known as Anti-Constructive Naturalism.

For example, in the mind-body problem, emergent materialism claims that
humans aren\'t smart enough to determine \"the relationship between mind
and matter.\" \[4\] Strong agnosticism is a religious application of
this position.

Colin McGinn is the leading proponent of the New Mysterian position.

Critics argue this philosophy isn\'t useful and encourages capitulation.
One critic noted:

the extreme \"Mysterian\" position, that there are vital issues forever
beyond our reach, is in many ways deeply unsatisfying. \[7\]

References

\[1\] McGinn, Colin - The Problem of Consciousness

\[2\] McGinn, Colin - Problems in Philosophy: the limits of enquiry

\[3\] McGinn, Colin - The Mysterious Flame

\[4\] Blackburn, Simon - Think: A compelling introduction to philosophy,
chapter two

\[5\] Flanagan, Owen - The Science of the Mind (1991) 2ed MIT Press,
Cambridge

\[6\] Horgan, John - The Undiscovered Mind (1999), Phoenix,


## Idealism and panpsychism

### Idealism

