# Managing Groups and Teams/Groupthink

**Question: What is groupthink and how can a team prevent it?**

Groupthink is a behavioral
pattern exhibited by team members in an attempt to reduce conflict and
reach consensus without critically analyzing an issue. In order for a
team to achieve a high performing status, it is imperative that team
members are fully aware of and make efforts to avoid falling victim to
groupthink.

## Definition

Groupthink occurs when group members give priority to sustaining
concordance and internal harmony above critical examination of the
issues under consideration.[^1] Groupthink refers to a deterioration of
mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from
in-group pressures.[^2] Irving Janis referred to groupthink as a mode of
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a
cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of
action.[^3]

## History

![](GroupThink_Model.jpg "GroupThink_Model.jpg"){width="500"} Groupthink
has been used over the years to help understand group dynamics and why
certain groups are successful and others lead to disaster. A
considerable amount of social science literature shows that in
circumstances of extreme crisis, group contagion occasionally gives rise
to collective panic, violent acts of scapegoating, and other forms of
what could be called group madness.[^4] Many researchers feel that
groupthink arises out of highly cohesive groups (groups where there is a
lot of mutual liking and respect) that are put in extreme circumstances,
though there has been some debate about this conclusion (see Criticisms
of groupthink).

In the 1950's and 1960's, other social psychologists such as Leon
Festinger, Harold Kelley, and Stanley Schachter found that group
cohesiveness increases when there is more member participation and group
membership remains stable. Kurt Lewin, a social psychologist, found that
when group cohesiveness is high, all members express solidarity, mutual
liking, and positive feelings about attending meeting and carrying out
the routine tasks of the group.[^5] Thus, highly cohesive groups are
often high performing under normal circumstances.

Wilfred Bion, an eminent group therapist, investigated to what extent
cohesion could also contribute to negative group outcomes. Bion
described how the efficiency of working groups can be negatively
affected by preconscious misconceptions of group members. His stated
that by sharing basic assumptions that preserve the group, group members
tend to lose regard for the work at hand and focus more on maintaining
positive group relations.[^6] The higher the group cohesiveness, the
more power the group has over norms, acceptance of goals, reduction in
member anxiety, and a heightened level of group member's
self-esteem.[^7]

In 1972, Irving L. Janis coined the term "groupthink" after the Newspeak
vocabulary used in George Orwell's book 1984. Janis was an American
research psychologist who studied at Yale University and was a professor
at the University of California, Berkeley. Janis' background in social
sciences paved the way for his Groupthink theory.

Groupthink has been linked to many famous disasters where group decision
making lead to the end result. Janis used historical events such as the
Bay of Pigs, Pearl Harbor, and the escalation of the Vietnam War to
explain the characteristics of Groupthink in policy making. An
interesting aspect of Groupthink is that the theory is used to help
explain group dynamics after the event has taken place. To this date,
Groupthink has not been proven in a research study.

## Antecedent Conditions

According to Janis, there are three main antecedent conditions that
encourage groupthink tendencies to occur. When these three conditions
are present, the group is more suspect to groupthink.

The first condition is that decision makers constitute a cohesive group.
For example, if the decision makers in the group have been working
together for a long period of time and have had past successes, they
will usually operate as a cohesive group.

The second condition is there are structural faults in the organization.
Structural faults include: Insulation of the group, lack of traditional
impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodical procedures, and
homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.[^8]

The third condition is that the group is in a provocative situational
context. When a group experiences high stress from external threats the
context is created. The threats are usually compounded with the fact
that there is little hope of a better solution than what the leader of
the group is offering.[^9] Another factor that induces the provocative
situational context is low self-esteem within the group. The low
self-esteem is usually induced by recent failures, excessive
difficulties on decision-making that lowers each member's sense of
self-efficacy, and moral dilemmas.[^10]

## Symptoms

Irving L. Janis has identified eight main
Symptoms_of_Groupthink:
invulnerability, rationale, morality, stereotypes, pressure,
self-censorship, unanimity, and mind guards. The eight symptoms can be
divided into three specific types.[^11]:

-   Overestimation of the Group
    -   Illusion of invulnerability: This symptom can alleviate fears of
        failure and prevent unnerving fears of failure during a crisis.
    -   Belief in inherent morality of the group: The shared belief that
        "we are a good and wise group" inclines them to use group
        concurrence as a major criterion to judge the morality as well
        as the efficacy of any policy under discussion. The members
        believe since the group's objectives are good any means we
        decide to use must be good as well.[^12]
-   Closed-Mindedness
    -   Collective Rationalization: The group will construct
        rationalizations in order to discount warnings and other forms
        of negative feedback that, taken seriously, might lead group
        members to reconsider their assumptions each time they recommit
        themselves to past decisions.[^13]
    -   Stereotypes of Out-Groups: This symptom is when the group uses
        undifferentiated negative stereotypes of opponents. This symptom
        enables the group to minimize decision conflicts between ethical
        values and expediency. Shared negative stereotypes of out-groups
        support the so-called "evil nature" of the enemy.[^14]
-   Pressures Toward Uniformity
    -   Self-Censorship: Victims of Groupthink avoid deviating from what
        appears to be group consensus. The group members will keep
        silent about their misgivings and even minimize to themselves
        the importance of their doubts.[^15]
    -   Illusion of Unanimity: An illusion of unanimity is shared within
        the group concerning all judgments expressed by members who
        speak in favor of the majority view. This symptom is supported
        by the false assumption that any individual who remains silent
        during any part of the discussion is in full accord with what
        the others are saying.[^16]
    -   Direct pressure on dissenters: Members of the group will apply
        direct pressure on any individual who momentarily expresses
        doubts about any of the group's shared illusions or who
        questions the validity of the arguments supporting a policy
        alternative favored by the majority.[^17]
    -   Self-appointed mind guards: This symptom protects the members
        from adverse information that might break the complacency they
        share about the effectiveness and morality of past
        decisions.[^18]

## Effects of Groupthink

Irving L. Janis calls the effects of groupthink "products". The products
are the consequences to poor decision making practices that lead to
inadequate solutions to the problems under discussion.[^19] There are
six products identified by Janis that are evident in groupthink
situations.

The first product is when the group limits its discussions to a few
alternative courses of action (often only two) without an initial survey
of all the alternatives that might be worthy of considerations.[^20] The
group ignores all possible solutions to an issue usually overlooking
better solutions.

A second product of groupthink is when the group fails to reexamine the
course of action initially preferred by the majority after they learn of
risks and drawbacks they had not considered originally.[^21] This
product is especially alarming because the group is not methodically
thinking through the consequences of their decisions. In government and
policy making situations, this product can have disastrous
repercussions.

The third product is when the members of a group spend little or no time
discussing whether there are not obvious gains they may have overlooked
or ways of reducing the seemingly prohibitive costs that made rejected
alternatives appear undesirable to them.[^22]

The fourth product is when the members of a group make little or no
attempt to obtain information from experts within their own
organizations who might be able to supply more precise estimates of
potential losses and gains.[^23] The members are afraid to find any
information that might sway the group from their decided course of
action.

The fifth product is when the members of a group show positive interest
in facts and opinions that support their preferred policy. In turn, they
tend to ignore facts and opinions that do not support their preferred
policy.[^24] Any information that supports the decision is embraced and
any information that disputes the decision is swept under the table. The
groupthink tendency prevails because the group does not want their
decision to be threatened in any way.

The sixth and final product identified by Janis is when the members of a
group spend little time deliberating about how the chosen policy might
be hindered by bureaucratic inertia, sabotaged by political opponents,
or temporarily derailed by common accidents. They fail to work out
contingency plans to cope with foreseeable setbacks that could endanger
the overall success of their chosen course.[^25]

## Ways to prevent groupthink

There are many different opinions on how to prevent groupthink. However
they all have the same underling theme: Create an open environment for
ideas and participation. There are five simple steps which can be taken
to create this environment:[^26][^27]

1.  Leaders should allow each member to challenge ideas and present
    objections.
2.  Members should talk about and solicit ideas with people outside the
    group.
3.  Outside experts should be invited to attend meetings.
4.  Avoid expressing opinions about the preferred outcome.
5.  Assign
    Devil\'s_Advocate
    at all meetings to challenge any and all ideas.

## Historical Examples

### Bay of Pigs Invasion

The idea for the
Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion
was first suggested by John F. Kennedy's main political opponent,
Richard M. Nixon. As Vice President during the Eisenhower
administration, Nixon had proposed that the United States government
secretly send a trained group of Cuban exiles to Cuba to fight against
Castro. In March 1960, acting on Nixon's suggestion, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence Agency to organize Cuban
exiles in the United States into a unified political movement against
the Castro regime and to give military training to those who were
willing to return to their homeland to engage in guerrilla warfare. The
CIA put a large number of its agents to work on this clandestine
operation, and they soon evolved an elaborate plan for a military
invasion. Apparently without informing President Eisenhower, the CIA
began to assume in late 1960 that they could land a brigade of Cuban
exiles not as a band of guerrilla infiltrators but as an armed force to
carry out a full-scale invasion.

Two days after the inauguration in January 1961, President John F.
Kennedy and several leading members of his new administration were given
a detailed briefing about the proposed invasion by Allen Dulles, head of
the CIA, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. During the next eighty days, a core group of presidential
advisers repeatedly discussed this inherited plan informally and in the
meeting of an advisory committee that included three Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In early April 1961, at one of the meetings with the President,
all the key advisers gave their approval to the CIA's invasion plan.
Their deliberations led to a few modifications of details, such as the
choice of the invasion site.

On April 17, 1961, the brigade of about fourteen hundred Cuban exiles,
aided by the United States Navy, Air Force, and the CIA, invaded the
swampy coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Nothing went as planned. On the
first day, none of the four ships containing reserve ammunition and
supplies arrived; the first two were sunk by planes in Castro's air
force, and the other two promptly fled. By the second day, the brigade
was completely surrounded by twenty thousand troops of Castro's
well-equipped army. By the third day, about twelve hundred members of
the brigade, comprising almost all who had not been killed, were
captured and ignominiously led off to prison camps.[^28]

Symptoms:

-   Overestimation of the Group
    -   The CIA felt that the Cuban exiles would carry out the invasion
        without any ground support from the United States.
    -   They also felt that Casto's army was so weak that the Cuban
        exiles could hold his army at the beachhead.
    -   This plays into the first example that the Cuban exiles would
        carry out the invasion no matter what.
-   Closed-Midedness
    -   They assumed that if the brigade did not succeed they could just
        retreat to the Escambray Mountains and reinforce guerrilla units
        that were there.
    -   They also assumed that the invasion would spark uprisings behind
        the lines, and that those uprisings would support the exiles and
        prompt the top poling of the Castro regime.
-   Pressures Toward Uniformity
    -   The invasion was actually an idea from the Presidency of
        Dwight D. Eisenhower, which had not been implemented. Once
        John F. Kennedy became President he took over the invasion and
        was given a brief overview of what they had planned. Also, the
        briefing was given by two members of the original group that had
        devised the plan. The new Presidency most likely felt as though
        they needed to implement the plan from the prior Presidency, and
        as a result went forward with the invasion without thinking
        through the entire situation.

Some of the effects of groupthink that were apparent in the Bay of Pigs
example were:

-   The group did not reexamine the course of action initially preferred
    by the majority. As mentioned above, this was a result of President
    John F. Kennedy taking over once he had became President and not
    reevaluating the situation and decisions that had been made.
-   The group also limited discussion to a few alternative courses of
    action. To this degree Janis Jarvis mentions that several members of
    the existing group debriefed the President on the plan of action.

### Titanic

The RMS Titanic was an
Olympic-class passenger liner owned by the White Star Line and was built
at the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, in what is now Northern
Ireland. At the time of her construction, she was the largest passenger
steamship in the world.

Shortly before midnight on 14 April 1912, four days into the ship\'s
maiden voyage, Titanic struck an iceberg and sank two hours and forty
minutes later, early on 15 April 1912. The sinking resulted in the
deaths of 1,517 of the 2,223 people on board, making it one of the
deadliest peacetime maritime disasters in history. The high casualty
rate was due in part to the fact that, although complying with the
regulations of the time, the ship did not carry enough lifeboats for
everyone aboard. The ship had a total lifeboat capacity of 1,178 people,
although her maximum capacity was 3,547.

The Titanic was designed by some of the most experienced engineers, and
used some of the most advanced technologies available at the time. It
was popularly believed to have been unsinkable.[^29] It was a great
shock to many that, despite the extensive safety features, the Titanic
sank. The frenzy on the part of the media about Titanic\'s famous
victims, the legends about the sinking, the resulting changes to
maritime law, and the discovery of the wreck have contributed to the
continuing interest in, and notoriety of, the
Titanic.[^30]![](RMS_Titanic_3.jpg "RMS_Titanic_3.jpg"){width="250"}

Symptoms

-   Overestimation of the Group
    -   The Titanic was viewed as being the safest ship ever built and
        therefore was viewed as being "unsinkable". As a result the ship
        was only equipped with 20 lifeboats, which was only enough to
        carry half of the ships total passengers.
    -   The rudder construction was also determined to be much smaller
        than needed in comparison to the size of the ship.
-   Closed-Mindedness
    -   The SS California, another ship in the area, had warned the
        Titanic by radio of the ice packs, for which it had stopped for
        the night. The Titanic ignored the warnings.
-   Pressures Toward Uniformity
    -   Everyone bought into the idea that the Titanic was "unsinkable".

Some of the effects that were apparent in the sinking of the Titanic
include:

-   Members showed positive interest in facts and opinions that
    supported their preferred policy, such as the fact that the Titanic
    was the largest passenger ship of its time and the opinion that the
    Titanic was unsinkable. While at the same time ignoring facts such
    as the fact that the rudder construction was too small and the
    opinion from the SS California which had stopped for the night
    because of the ice packs.

## Recent Examples

### 9-11-2001

![](National_Park_Service_9-11_Statue_of_Liberty_and_WTC_fire.jpg "National_Park_Service_9-11_Statue_of_Liberty_and_WTC_fire.jpg")

The unfortunate truth is that, especially in the case of analyzing and
recognizing Groupthink, hindsight is 20/20.

Several events (real and imagined, catastrophic and global) in the last
ten years possess Groupthink symptoms. Though it is impossible to
pinpoint Groupthink as the catalyst for these events, it is interesting
to consider how it may have contributed to their development.

Take, for example: attacks in 2001. "Warnings about Al Qaeda may have
gone unheeded as the incoming administration may have unwisely ranked
the Al Qaeda threat somewhere lower than other objectives like national
missile defense, China and the ousting of Saddam Hussein," suggests a
writer who wrote about the attacks. Paul Wolfowitz is also quoted as
saying, \"You give bin Laden too much credit. He could not do all these
things,\"[^31] before the attacks occurred. These quotes suggest the
presence of an illusion to invulnerability; rationalizing warnings to
change the group's assumptions; and stereotyping those who are opposed
to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, disfigured, impotent, or
stupid. Whether the other characteristics of Groupthink were present is
a question left to those who were present in the national security
meetings.

### Y2K

Another example can be found in the
Y2K scare prevalent in 1999. In this
instance the group is different than others discussed: instead of from a
centralized unit of individuals, Y2K was perpetuated by programmers
across the globe. Sam Meddis had this to say about Y2K February of 1999.
\"My point is that Y2K has already consumed more effort, money and angst
than is merited. At this point the problem has less to do with computer
code than with psychology. If we march on like lemmings convinced that
major disaster is inevitable, then our hysterical actions might make it
so. We\'ll have our doomsayers, not our machines, to thank for
that.\"[^32]

Five years after the year 2000 arrived, Larry Seltzer, of eWeek, had
this to say, \"What we all should have argued for at the time was
perspective: A focus on worst-case planning is usually
unwarranted.\"[^33]

A USA Today columnist who resisted Y2K paranoia received this letter
from a programmer:![](Y2K_Logo.gif‎ "Y2K_Logo.gif‎")

-   \"First, the bad news: this problem is real, very big, and isn\'t
    going to be fixed in time...There is no likelihood whatsoever that
    the banking system is going to make it, nor the power grid as a
    whole. Therefore, we are in for a major disaster. The good news? You
    (and all the other pollyannas who have your head stuck in the sand)
    will stop consuming valuable resources, like air. Too bad that you
    may convince others not to protect themselves as well, but I guess
    that\'s another example of Darwinism in action. By the way, I am a
    computer programmer with almost 30 years experience in the field,
    and I have nothing to sell regarding Y2K. I wonder if you can twist
    that into some reason that my opinions should be disregarded?\"[^34]

This letter gives interesting insight into this particular programmer's
thought process and potentially other programmers as well. The quote
reveals unquestioning belief in the morality of the group, stereotyping
those who are opposed to the group, illusions of unanimity among group
members, and pressure on the columnist to conform to the group's
thinking. This programmer is, in affect, playing the role of a mind
guard---shielding the group from dissenting information.

## Criticisms of groupthink

Despite the widespread acceptance of the groupthink theory, it is not
without criticism. In his essay "So Right It\'s Wrong: Groupthink and
the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making"[^35] Robert
Baron explores skepticism around the groupthink model by scholars
involved in further analysis and testing of the theory. Baron suggests
that the strength and acceptance of the model is based on popular
culture's predisposition toward a familiar social scenario and symptoms
rather than on scientific findings.

Scientific study of the groupthink theory is rare as he states, "The
majority of reports take the form of group decision case studies or
historical sampling studies." His research sites papers from academics
familiar with the groupthink theory, such as a 1980 Longley and Pruit
paper proposing that "the dangers posed by selective historical
analysis, the possibility that the groupthink symptoms in Janis's
historical examples (particularly self censorship of dissent) might be
more a result of group stage (early formation) than a function of
Janis's antecedent conditions (crisis, cohesion, directive leadership,
etc.) and the argument that suppression of dissent might be functional
in certain group settings."[^36]

He also sites studies which provide significant supporting evidence
contrary to the model. Data taken from studies such as R.J. Brown's
study on "Minimal group situations and intergroup discrimination"
(1980)[^37] include scientific testing of the model with conclusions
that dispute some of Janis's claims. "It clearly is not the case, as
Janis had surmised, that cohesion leads to poor decision making. Indeed,
all the evidence suggests that it is unrelated to decision quality or
may even be associated with better decision processes." In addition
Teltlock ( 1991) found that "neither degree of crisis nor cohesion was
reliably related to decision quality of major national policy
decisions."[^38]

Baron goes on to further investigate the groupthink theory and
historical scientific testing. He dissects Janis's conditions for
groupthink and proposes a revised model. His "ubiquity model" identified
three antecedent conditions for groupthink phenomena to occur, and
separates these from less well researched "amplifying conditions."

`   Antecedent Conditions:`

1.  Social Identification: Allegiance and social identity with the group
    forms because of common goals, history, or shared fate. Information
    has more influence when it originates from this in-group source as
    it receives more attention and elaboration.
2.  Salient Norms: Norms emerge within the group serving to bias
    discussion towards commonly held information, a symptom similar to
    Stasser's "hidden profile paradigm."[^39]
3.  Situational Low Self Efficacy. When presented with especially
    challenging problems, group members will refrain from proposing
    non-conforming ideas unless they are very confident in its success,
    and this confidence is reduced when the problem is more challenging
    resulting in suppression of counter arguments, and elevation of
    in-group ideas.

Brown concludes that these three phenomenon are far more common than
Janis proposes and are "necessary and sufficient" for groupthink to
occur. He identifies other aspects of Janis's model merely as
"amplifying conditions" which may decrease decision quality but are not
necessary for groupthink symptoms to present themselves. Amplifying
Conditions

1.  Threat or Crisis -- The time consuming democratic process becomes
    dangerous when rapid and deceive action is critical.
2.  Intense Cohesion -- Crisis stimulates dependency needs
3.  Member Insecurity -- Heightens desire for social identification
    making members more susceptible to group norms.
4.  Directive Leadership -- Strong leadership more clearly identifies
    and establishes group norms, strengthening groupthink reactions.

This model accounts for persistence of groupthink phenomenon in even the
most minor of group settings, rather than the intense and historically
significant cases that Janis's model focuses on. Barons "ubiquity
model," proposes that the majority of Janis's conditions are "not
necessary to trigger such phenomena as polarized judgment, out-group
stereotyping, self censorship, and the illusion of consensus." He shows
that amplifying conditions need further laboratory study to show any
meaningful relationship to groupthink phenomena. The conclusion that
groupthink symptoms are far more widespread than Janis's claims and that
many of the symptoms are not an invariant feature of group decision
making but rather amplifying conditions that require more study provides
a less well known, but more well supported theory.

## Conclusion

An interesting point to consider is that when groups fail, we call the
culprit Groupthink; when groups succeed, we call the culprit
Synergy. Could an observer
diagnose a group's behavior as Groupthink versus synergy before the
outcome is realized? Or are groups consigned to wait for the end before
recognizing what behavior was involved? The danger of reflecting back is
that people may focus only on supporting evidence---blaming Groupthink
or synergy, as the case may be. The luging accident in the 2010 Winter
Olympics carries the thrill of Groupthink analysis, whereas the
commercial success of Disney's Animation Studios during the 1990's is
heralded as pure synergy.

The answer to this question may some day be decided, but the difficulty
in ensuring synergistic results is sure to continue. Synergy and
Groupthink appear to be two faces on one coin, where a combination of
external forces contributes in deciding which side lands face-up. As
Groupthink is a relatively new study (since the 1970's) perhaps
continued research will weigh the chances so that when the coin is
tossed, we can safely call out, "Synergy."

## References


[^1]: 1.Kroon, Marceline B.R. Effects of accountability on groupthink
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[^2]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^3]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^4]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^5]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^6]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^7]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^8]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^9]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^10]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^11]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^12]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^13]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^14]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^15]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^16]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^17]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^18]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^19]: Janis, Irving L. Groups: Pressures, decisions, and conflicts.
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[^20]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^21]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^22]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^23]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^24]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^25]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^26]: Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink. Boston. Houghton Mifflin
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[^27]: <http://www.hodu.com/groupthink.shtml>

[^28]: Janis, Irving L. Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company,
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[^29]: Richard Howells The Myth of the Titanic

[^30]: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titanic>

[^31]: Zeller, Tom. "The World; So Many Voices, So Many Versions" New
    York Times. Published: April 11,
    2004;http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/11/weekinreview/the-world-so-many-voices-so-many-versions.html?scp=2&sq=administration%20knew%20about%209/11&st=cse;
    Accessed March 1, 2010.

[^32]: Meddis, Sam Vincent. \"Don\'t Hold Breath for Y2K Disaster.\" USA
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    1999.http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ccc0215.htm. Accessed
    February 21, 2010.

[^33]: Seltzer, Larry. \"Some Perspective 5 Years After
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[^34]: Meddis.

[^35]: Baron, R. S. (2005). So Right It\'s Wrong: Groupthink and the
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[^36]: Longley, J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1980). Groupthink: A critique of
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[^37]: Brown, R. J., Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1980) Minimal group
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[^38]: Tetlock, P. E., (1979). Identifying victims of groupthink from
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[^39]: Stasser, G., & Stewart, D.D. (1992). Discovery of hidden profiles
    by decision-making groups: solving a problem vs. making a judgment.
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 63:426--34
