Early life and politics.

Born in Târgu Jiu, Tătărescu studied at Carol I High School in Craiova. He later went to France, where he was awarded a doctorate from the University of Paris in 1912, with a thesis on the Romanian parliamentary system ("Le régime électoral et parlementaire en Roumanie"). He subsequently worked as a lawyer in Bucharest. He fathered a son, Tudor, and a daughter, Sanda (married to the lawyer Ulise Negropontes in 1940).  After joining the National Liberal Party (PNL), he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in November 1919, representing Gorj County. Among his first notable actions as a politician was an initiative to interpellate Nicolae L. Lupu, the Minister of Interior Affairs Ministry in the Romanian National Party-Peasants' Party cabinet, in answer to concerns that the executive was tolerating socialist agitation in the countryside.  He stood among the PNL's "young liberals" faction (as they were colloquially known), supporting free trade and a more authoritarian rule over the country around King Carol II, and opposing both the older generation of leaders (who tended to advocate protectionism and a liberal democracy) and the dissident group of Gheorghe I. Brătianu ("see National Liberal Party-Brătianu").  Undersecretary in the Interior Affairs Ministry under several PNL cabinets (beginning with that of Ion I. C. Brătianu in 1922–1926), he first became noted as a collaborator of Ion G. Duca. In 1924–1936, in contrast to his post-World War II agenda, Tătărescu was a noted anti-communist, and reacted vehemently against the Romanian Communist Party (PCdR, later PCR)—recommending and obtaining its outlawing, based on Communist adversity to the concept of Greater Romania, and notably arguing that the Comintern-supported Tatarbunary Uprising was evidence of "imperialist communism".

First cabinet.

Context.

Tătărescu became leader of the cabinet in January 1934, as the fascist Iron Guard had assassinated Prime Minister Duca on 30 December 1933 (the five-day premiership of Constantin Anghelescu ensured transition between the two governments). His was the second PNL cabinet formed during Carol's reign, and the latter's failure to draw support from the mainstream group led to a tight connection being established between Carol and the young liberals, with Tătărescu backing the process leading to the creation of a royal dictatorship. One of Tătărescu's first measures was a decisive move to end the conflict between the National Liberal executive and the Mayor of Bucharest, Dem I. Dobrescu (who was backed by the National Peasants' Party)—making use of his prerogative, he removed Dobrescu from office on 18 January.  The brief period constituted a reference point in Romanian economy, as the emergence from the Great Depression, although marked by endemic problems, saw prosperity more widespread than ever before. This was, in part, the contribution of new economic relations which Tătărescu defended and encouraged: the state transformed itself into the main agent of economic activities, allowing for prosperous businesses to benefit from its demands, and, in time, leading to the creation of a "camarilla" dominated by the figures of industrialists such as Aristide Blank, Nicolae Malaxa, and Max Auschnitt. In this context, Tătărescu's allegedly subservient position in front of Carol was a frequent topic of ridicule at the time. According to a hostile account of the socialist Petre Pandrea: "Tătărescu was ceremonious in order to cover his menial nature. When he was leaving audiences [with the King], he pressed forward on the small of his back and returned "facing backwards" from the desk to the door, not daring to show his back. [...] Watching over the scene [...], Carol II exclaimed to his intimate assistants: — I don't have a big enough tooshie for all the politicians to kiss!"  Among other services rendered, he intervened in the conflict between Carol and his brother, Prince Nicholas, asking the latter to renounce either his marriage to Ioana Dumitrescu-Doletti—considered a misalliance by Carol, it had not been recognized by Romanian authorities—or his princely prerogatives. Nicholas chose the latter alternative in 1937.  Inside his party, Tătărescu lost ground to Dinu Brătianu, elected by the traditional Liberal elite as a compromise in order to ensure unity; upon his election in 1934, the latter stated: "This time as well, I would have gladly conceded, if I were to believe that anyone else in the party could gather voter unanimity."  The issue remained debated for the following two years. The party congress of July 1936 eventually elected Tătărescu to the second position in the party, that of general secretary.

European politics.

In his foreign policy, Prime Minister Tătărescu balanced two different priorities, attempting to strengthen the traditional military alliance with Poland which was aimed at the Soviet Union, and reacting against the growing regional influence of Nazi Germany by maintaining the relevancy of the Little Entente and establishing further contacts with the Soviets.  In August 1936, he removed Nicolae Titulescu from the office of Foreign Minister, replacing him with Victor Antonescu. This caused an uproar, with most of Romania's diplomatic corps voicing their dissatisfaction. Over the following months, virtually all of Titulescu's supporters were themselves recalled (including, among others, Constantin Vișoianu, the ambassador to Poland, Constantin Antoniade, Romania's representative to the League of Nations, Dimitrie Ghyka, the ambassador to Belgium, and Caius Brediceanu, the ambassador to Austria) while Titulescu's adversaries, such as Antoine Bibesco, were returned to office. Bibesco subsequently campaigned in France and the United Kingdom, in an attempt to reassure Romania's main allies that the move did not signify a change in Romania's priorities. Tătărescu was later blamed by his own party for having renounced the diplomatic course on which Romania had engaged.  In early 1937, Tătărescu rejected the proposal of Józef Beck, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, to withdraw Romania's support for Czechoslovakia and attempt a reconciliation with Hungary (the following year, Romania withdrew its support for the former, indicating, just before the Munich Agreement, that it was not in a position to guarantee Czechoslovakia's frontiers). This was accompanied by Czechoslovak initiatives to establish close contacts between the Little Entente and the Soviets: a scandal erupted in the same year, when the country's ambassador to Romania, Jan Šeba, published a volume calling for Soviet-Entente military cooperation (despite the Soviet-Romanian conflict over Bessarabia) and expressing the hope that the Soviet state would extend its borders into West Belarus and Ukraine. Kamil Krofta, Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister, received criticism for having prefaced the book, and, after Tătărescu paid a visit to Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža, Šeba was recalled to Prague.

Facing the Iron Guard.

In combating the Iron Guard, Tătărescu chose to relax virtually all pressures on the latter (while mimicking some of its messages), and instead concentrated again on curbing the activities of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) and outlawing its "Popular Front"-type organizations ("see Amicii URSS").  In April 1936, he and the Minister of the Interior Ion Inculeț allowed the a youth congress to gather in Târgu Mureș, aware of the fact that it was masking a fascist gathering; delegates to the congress, traveling in a special train commissioned by the government, vandalized Ion Duca's memorial plate in Sinaia train station, and, upon their arrival in Târgu Mureș, made public their violent anti-Semitic agenda. It was probably there that death squads were designated and assigned missions, leading to the murder of Mihai Stelescu, a former associate, in June of the next year.  In February 1937, an intense publicity campaign by the Guard, begun with the ostentatious funerals of Ion Moța and Vasile Marin (killed in the Spanish Civil War) and culminating in the physical assaulting of Traian Bratu, rector of the University of Iași, by Guardist students, provoked the premier's order to close down universities throughout the country.  Later in that year, the collaboration between monarch and premier, coupled with the fact that Tătărescu had successfully attracted nationalist votes from the Iron Guard, led to the signing of an electoral agreement between the latter, the National Peasants' Party (the main democratic opposition group), and the National Liberal Party-Brătianu—the pact was meant to prevent all attempt by Carol to manipulate the votes in elections. (A secondary and unexpected development was that the illegal PCR, which had decided to back the National Peasants' Party prior to the elections, eventually supported the electoral pact.) Tătărescu's own alliance policy rose the anger of his opponents inside the PNL, as he signed collaboration agreements with the fascist Romanian Front and German Party.  The 1937 elections led to an unprecedented situation: although the PNL and Tătărescu had gained the largest percentage of the vote (almost 36%), they fell short of being awarded majority bonus (granted at 40% of the vote). As the far right had gathered momentum (the Guard, running under the name of "Everything for the Fatherland Party", had obtained 15.6% of the vote), Carol was faced with the threat of an Iron Guard government, which would have been one deeply opposed to all of his political principles: he called on a third party, Octavian Goga's National Christian Party (coming from the anti-Semitic far right but deeply opposed to the Guard) to form a new cabinet in December of that year.  Consequently, Tătărescu renounced his offices inside the party, and, while keeping his office of general secretary, he was surpassed by the readmitted Gheorghe I. Brătianu — who was elected to the new office of PNL vice president on 10 January 1938. After the failure of Goga's policies to curb the rise of their competitors, the king, backed by Tătărescu, resorted to dissolving all political parties on 30 May 1938, creating instead the National Renaissance Front.

Rearmament.

As Prime Minister, Tătărescu showed particular concern for the modernization of the Romanian Armed Forces. Almost immediately after becoming Prime Minister, he established the Ministry of Armaments, chaired by himself. This ministry lasted for over three years before being dissolved on 23 February 1937, during his third cabinet.  Under Tătărăscu's premiership, Romania launched a ten-year rearmament program on 27 April 1935. Under this program, Romania acquired 248 Škoda 100 mm howitzers (delivered in the mid-1930s) and 180 Škoda 150 mm howitzers (delivered between 1936 and 1939). In 1936, Romania ordered 126 LT vz 35 tanks and 35 AH-IV tankettes. These acquisitions from Czechoslovakia were followed in 1937 by 12 Focke-Wulf Fw 58 aircraft, ordered from Germany and delivered between April and June that same year. Romania employed German technicians to build a shipyard at Galați using materials supplied by the Reșița works. There, two submarines would be built between 1938 and 1943, among others ("Marsuinul" and "Rechinul"). The resumed and much improved trade relations with Škoda, following the disastrous "Škoda Affair" of the early 1930s, were credited to the energy and ability of Tătărăscu, "the soldier-politician who reversed the usual order in Romanian politics by placing the welfare of the country superior to the lust for graft". It is worth noting, however, that of the 35 tankettes and 126 tanks ordered during Tătărescu's premiership, only 10 of the former and 15 of the latter actually arrived in Romania before the end of his mandate at the end of 1937. Both of these orders were delivered in full during late 1938 and early 1939, respectively. In 1936, Romania also started producing the Polish PZL P.11 fighter aircraft, of which 95 were ultimately built by IAR. In 1937, Romanian production of the improved PZL P.24 also commenced, with 25 fighters being built until 1939.

Second cabinet.

In this context, Tătărescu chose to back the regime, as the PNL, like the National Peasants' Party, remained active in nominal clandestinity (as the law banning it had never been enforced any further). Having personally signed the document banning opposition parties, he was expelled from the PNL in April 1938, and contested the legitimacy of the action for the following years. Allegedly, his ousting was recommended by Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasants' Party's and, for the following years, the closest of Dinu Brătianu's political allies.  Soon after his second arrival to power, Tătărescu became noted for the enthusiastic support he gave to the modernist sculptor Constantin Brâncuși, and directed state funds to finance the building of Brâncuși's "The Endless Column" complex in Târgu Jiu (completed in October 1938).  Alongside Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and Constantin Argetoianu (whom he succeeded as Premier), Tătărescu became a dominant figure in the group of maverick pro-Carol politicians. After a bloody crackdown on the Iron Guard, the Front attempted to reunite political forces in a national government that was to back Carol's foreign policies in view of increasing threats on Romania's borders after the outbreak of World War II. In 1945, Tătărescu stressed his belief that authoritarianism benefited Romania, and supported the view that Carol had meant to keep Romania out of the war. Tătărescu's second cabinet was meant to reflect the latter policies, but it did not draw any support from traditional parties, and, in April 1940, Carol, assisted by Ernest Urdăreanu and Mihail Ghelmegeanu, began talks with the (by then much weaker) Iron Guard.  Tătărescu remained in office throughout the rest of the Phony War, until the fall of France, and his cabinet signed an economic agreement with Nazi Germany (through which virtually all Romanian exports were directed towards the latter country) and saw the crumbling of Romania's alliance with the United Kingdom and France. The cabinet was brought down by the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union (effects of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact), as well as by Carol's attempt to appease German hostility by dissolving it, replacing Tătărescu with Ion Gigurtu, and recreating the Front as the totalitarian "Party of the Nation".

World War.

After the Second Vienna Award (when Northern Transylvania was lost to Hungary), confirming Carol's failure to preserve both the country's neutrality and its territorial integrity, Romania was taken over by an Iron Guard dictatorial government (the National Legionary State). Speaking five years later, Dinu Brătianu placed the blame for the serious developments on Tătărescu's own actions, addressing him directly: "I remind you: [...] you have contributed directly, in 1940, in steering the country towards a foreign policy that, as one could tell even then, was to prove ill-fated and which led us to the loathsome Vienna settlement, one which you have supported inside the Crown Council [...]."  On 26 November 1940, the Iron Guard began a bloody retaliation against various political figures who had served under Carol (following a late investigation into the 1938 killing of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the movement's founder and early leader, by Carol's authorities). Tătărescu and Constantin Argetoianu were among the second wave of captured politicians (on 27 November), and were destined for arbitrary execution; they were, however, saved by the intervention of regular police forces, most of whom had grown hostile to the Guardist militias.  Retired from political life during the war, he was initially sympathetic to Ion Antonescu's pro-German dictatorship ("see Romania during World War II")—Dinu Brătianu, who remained in opposition to the Antonescu regime, made mention an official visit to Bessarabia, recovered after the start of Operation Barbarossa, when Tătărescu had accompanied Antonescu, "thus making common cause with his warmongering action". At the time, his daughter Sandra Tătărescu Negropontes worked as an ambulance driver for the Romanian Red Cross.  In the end, Tătărescu became involved in negotiations aimed at withdrawing Romania from the conflict, and, while beginning talks with the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), tried to build foreign connections to support Romania's cause following the inevitable defeat; he thus corresponded with Edvard Beneš, leader of the Czechoslovak government in exile in England. Beneš, who had already been discussing matters involving Romania with Richard Franasovici and Grigore Gafencu, and had agreed to support the Romanian cause, informed the Allied governments of Tătărescu's designs.  Tătărescu later contrasted his diplomatic approach with the strategy of Barbu Știrbey (who had only attempted an agreement with the Western Allies in Cairo, instead of opening relations with the Soviets). Initially meeting with the refusal of Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Brătianu (who decided to invest their trust in Știrbey), he was relatively successful after the Cairo initiative proved fruitless: the two traditional parties accepted collaboration with the bloc formed by the PCR, the Romanian Social Democratic Party, the Ploughmen's Front, and the Socialist Peasants' Party, leading to the formation of the short-lived and unstable "National Democratic Bloc" (BND) in June 1944. It overthrew Antonescu in August, by means of the successful King Michael Coup.

Alliance with the Communists.

Tătărescu returned to the PNL later in 1944—after the Soviet Red Army had entered Romania and the country had become an Allied state, political parties were again allowed to register. Nevertheless, Tătărescu was again opposed to the party leaders Dinu and Gheorghe I. Brătianu, and split to form his own group in June–July 1945. Dinu Brătianu convened the PNL leadership and formally excluded Tătărescu and his partisans, citing their support for dictatorial regimes.  As the PCR, which was growing more influential (with the backing of Soviet occupation) while generally lacking popular appeal, sought to form alliances with various forces in order to increase its backing, Tătărescu declared his group to be left-wing and Social liberal, while attempting to preserve a middle course in the new political setting, by pleading for close relations to be maintained with both the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. N. D. Cocea, a prominent socialist who had joined the PNL, represented the faction in talks for an alliance with the Communists. The agreement, favored by Ana Pauker, was vehemently opposed by another member of the Communist leadership, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, who argued in favor of "making a distinction inside the bourgeoisie", and collaborating with the main PNL, while calling Tătărescu's faction "a gang of con artists, blackmailers, and well-known bribers".  Tătărescu became Foreign Minister and vice president of the government in the cabinet of Petru Groza when the latter came into office after Soviet pressures in 1945; his faction had been awarded leadership of four other ministries—Finance, with three successive office-holders (of whom the last was Alexandru Alexandrini), Public Works, with Gheorghe Vântu, Industry (with Petre N. Bejan), and Religious Affairs, with Radu Roșculeț. He indirectly helped the PCR carry out an electoral fraud during the general election in 1946 by failing to reply to American proposals for organizing fair elections. At the Paris Conference, where he was accompanied by the PCR leaders Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Pătrășcanu, he acknowledged the dissolution of "Greater Romania" under the provisions of the new Treaty (1947).

1947 and after.

Tensions between his group with the PCR occurred when the former founded itself as a party under the name of "National-Liberal Party" (commonly known as the National Liberal Party-Tătărescu), and, in June–July 1945, proclaimed its goal to be the preservation of property and a middle class under a new regime. Of himself and his principles, Tătărescu stated: "I am not a communist. Taking in view my attitudes towards mankind, society, property, I am not a communist. Thus, the new orientation in external politics which I demand for my country cannot be accused of being determined by affinities or sympathies of doctrine."  Speaking in retrospect, Gheorghiu-Dej indicated the actual relation between his party and Tătărescu's: "we have had to tolerate by our side a capitalist-gentry political group, Tătărescu's group".  Tătărescu himself continued to show his support for several PCR policies: in the summer of 1947, he condemned the United States for having protested against the repression of forces in the opposition. Nevertheless, at around the same time, he issued his own critique of the Groza government, becoming the target of violent attacks initiated by Miron Constantinescu in the PCR press. Consequently, he was singled out for negligence in office when, during the kangaroo trial of Iuliu Maniu ("see Tămădău Affair"), it was alleged that several employees of his ministry had conspired against the government. "Scînteia", the official voice of the PCR, wrote of all National Liberal Party-Tătărescu offices in the government: "The rot is all-encompassing! It has to be removed!".  Tătărescu resigned his office on 6 November 1947, and was replaced by the Communist Ana Pauker. For the following two months, he was sidelined in his own party by PCR pressures, and removed from its leadership in January 1948 (being replaced with Petre N. Bejan—the party was subsequently known as "National Liberal Party-Petre N. Bejan"). One of his last actions as cabinet member had been to sign the document officially rejecting the Marshall Plan.  After the proclamation of the "People's Republic of Romania" on 30 December 1947, the existence of all parties other than the PCR had become purely formal, and, after the elections of 28 March the one-party state was confirmed by legislation. He was arrested on 5 May 1950, and held in the notorious Sighet prison (alongside three of his brothers—Ștefan Tătărescu included—and his former collaborator Bejan). His son Tudor, who was living in Paris, suffered from schizophrenia after 1950, and had to be committed to an institution (where he died in 1955). Sandra Tătărescu Negropontes was also imprisoned in 1950, and released three years later, upon the death of Joseph Stalin.  One of Gheorghe Tătărescu's last appearances in public was his stand as one of the prosecution's witnesses in the 1954 trial of Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, when he claimed that the defendant had been infiltrated into the PCR during the time when he had been premier (Pătrășcanu was posthumously cleared of all charges). Released in 1955, Tătărescu died in Bucharest, less than two years later. According to Sanda Tătărescu Negropontes, this came as a result of tuberculosis contracted while in detention.

Gheorghe I. Tătărescu (also known as "Guță Tătărescu", with a slightly antiquated pet form of his given name; 2 November 1886 – 28 March 1957) was a Romanian politician who served twice as Prime Minister of Romania (1934–1937; 1939–1940), three times as Minister of Foreign Affairs ("interim" in 1934 and 1938; appointed to the office in 1945-1947), and once as Minister of War (1934). Representing the "young liberals" faction inside the National Liberal Party (PNL), Tătărescu began his political career as a collaborator of Ion G. Duca, becoming noted for his anti-Communism and, in time, for his conflicts with the PNL's leader Dinu Brătianu and the Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu. During his first time in office, he moved closer to King Carol II, leading an ambivalent policy toward the fascist Iron Guard and ultimately becoming instrumental in establishing the authoritarian and corporatist regime around the National Renaissance Front. In 1940, he accepted the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, and consequently had to resign.

格奥尔基·塔塔内斯库(1886年-11月2日-1957年-3月28日),罗马尼亚政治家,2次担任罗马尼亚总理,3次担任外交部长,一次担任国防部长。他是国家自由党中新自由主义派的代表人物。一开始是Ion G. Duca的合作者,持反共主义立场,与国家自由党领袖Dinu Brătianu、外相尼古莱·蒂杜莱斯库时有冲突。他首度执政时与卡罗尔二世接近,对法西斯主义持矛盾态度。1940年同意将比萨拉比亚和北布科维纳割让给苏联,并因此辞职。


History.

The airline was founded in 2017 and submitted its request to the Vietnamese prime minister for approval. Aimed at hiring up to 600 employees, personnel recruitment began in April 2018. The airline's AOC was granted on 9 July 2018. Bamboo Airways subsequently passed the five stages for certification required by Vietnam's Civil Aviation Authority. After reviewing the airline's financial structure and business plan the Ministry of Transport issued an aviation license in November 2018. “We have a clear strategy to build Bamboo Airways as a 5-star airline operating both domestic and international routes. Beside an outstanding business model, we also aspire to deliver new service standards to our passengers with comfort, relaxation and satisfaction on every trip”- Trinh Van Quyet, Chairman of FLC Group. Operations started on 16 January 2019, with a leased Airbus A320 linking Ho Chi Minh City with Hanoi.

Corporate affairs.

Key people.

, Duong Thi Mai Hoa held the vice-president and general manager positions. Dang Tat Thang held the CEO position,.

Ownership.

Bamboo Airways is owned by FLC Group, a company dedicated to property development, finance, and mining, among other activities.

Headquarters.

Bamboo Airways is headquartered in Hanoi.

Destinations.

As of June 2020, Bamboo Airways serves the following destinations:

Fleet.

, the Bamboo Airways fleet consists of the following aircraft: In March 2018, Bamboo Airways signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Airbus for up to 24 Airbus A321neos. A commitment for 20 Boeing 787-9s was signed in June 2018 with Boeing, with the airline completing the deposit requirement to reserve these aircraft. The Airbus aircraft will be fitted with business and economy class, whereas the Dreamliners will be fitted with first, business and economy class.  The carrier inducted its first aircraft, an Airbus A319-100, in December 2018. The same month, Bamboo Airways took delivery of its first A321neo, on lease from GECAS.  The airline started operations with aircraft on lease from third party lessors before taking delivery of the aircraft from Airbus.

Bamboo Airways JSC, operating as Bamboo Airways, is a Vietnamese leisure airline owned by the FLC Group, registered in Quy Nhon, Vietnam, with a head office in Cầu Giấy District, Hanoi. The airline was established with a charter capital of US$56.52 million. The carrier started operations in January 2019, with the strategy of become a 5-Star airline.

越竹航空(,英语:Bamboo Airways)是越南的一间航空公司,该公司是由魏志华创设的,是越南的第五家航空,第二家私营航空公司,2019年1月中开始运营,1个月内以开辟10条国内航线。经营由归仁及河内出发的国内线以及亚洲区域国际线。


Early life and career.

Crowder was born on July 7, 1987 in Detroit, Michigan. Early in his life, Crowder's family immigrated to Canada, moving to the city of Montreal, Quebec, where he would live for the rest of his childhood. Crowder attended Centennial Regional High School. Crowder describes himself as a pro-life Christian conservative. Early in his career, he worked as a voice actor for the character Alan "The Brain" Powers on the children's television series "Arthur". He began performing stand-up comedy at age 17. He then acted in a number of films, including the role of Doug Moore in the 2009 movie "To Save a Life". From 2009 to 2012, Crowder worked for Fox News. Crowder creates mainly comedic content and political commentary on his YouTube channel.

Political activity.

By 2009, Crowder regularly posted satirical videos on politically conservative media, including Pajamas Media and later at Andrew Breitbart's Big Hollywood. Crowder served as the master of ceremonies at the 2011 Conservative Political Action Conference, and generated some controversy with a rap video he premiered at CPAC 2012. In October 2012, Crowder's YouTube video parodying Lena Dunham's ad endorsing Barack Obama was mentioned in the conservative magazine "The American Spectator". In 2016, Crowder created a short video for the conservative website PragerU in which he criticizes democratic socialism as being little to no different from Marxism.

December 2012 union protest.

In December 2012, Crowder and members of Americans for Prosperity were involved in an altercation at a demonstration in Michigan concerning the state's recently passed right-to-work law. The incident began with an attempt by union activists to tear down the Americans for Prosperity tent, which was eventually successful. During the altercation, Crowder was punched several times by a union activist. Crowder posted an edited video of the incident to his YouTube channel that cut footage of the alleged assailant being pushed to the ground and getting back up, right before throwing the punches at Crowder. However, Fox News' broadcasts of the incident included footage of the man being pushed. "The New York Times" stated, "The same footage also shows that Mr. Crowder had his hand on that man's shoulder just before he tumbled to the ground, but, while the camera does not capture the whole sequence of events, it seems likely that the man was knocked to the ground as members of the two sides pushed against one other, not shoved down by Mr. Crowder." Crowder later released an unedited copy of the video.  An AFL–CIO spokesman, Eddie Vale, stated that the organization did not condone the tearing down of the Americans for Prosperity tent or the violence against Crowder and his group.  In March 2013, Ingham County Prosecutor Stuart Dunnings III declined to press charges against anyone involved in the December 2012 altercation. According to Dunnings, his office was originally sent an edited version of the video of Crowder's altercation. However, upon reviewing the unedited version, the prosecutor's office decided not to pursue the case. Dunnings stated that, "It's pretty clear the person that they wanted to charge was acting in self-defense."

After Fox News.

In October 2013, Fox News dropped Crowder. This was announced shortly after Crowder made negative statements about Fox News host Sean Hannity and about Fox News. In 2017, the "Louder with Crowder" program became a daily program featured on "Conservative Review's" new streaming service, CRTV.

Change My Mind meme.

'Change My Mind' is an Internet meme that originated from a photograph of Crowder seated behind a sign that reads "Male Privilege is a Myth / Change My Mind". Crowder set up the table outside the campus of Texas Christian University and invited students walking by to change his mind on the subject, as part of a regular segment Crowder performs on his YouTube channel and podcast, where he sits at a table with a sign including the phrase "Change My Mind". After Crowder uploaded it on his Twitter account on February 18, 2018, the photograph quickly became a means for others to change the signs about different situations, often mocking and parodying Crowder.  In June 2018, "Complex" rated the meme at 18 on their list of "The Best Memes of 2018 (so far)".

Investigation by YouTube.

In June 2019, YouTube investigated Crowder for using racist and homophobic slurs targeting Carlos Maza in multiple videos reacting to the Vox series "Strikethrough", which Maza hosts. Crowder referred to Maza as "Mr. Lispy queer", an "angry little queer", and a "gay Mexican", and mocked him with a stereotypical gay voice, sometimes while wearing a t-shirt with Che Guevara on it that said "Socialism is for f*gs ["sic"]". In addition, Maza said that Crowder's fans have doxxed and harassed him.  Crowder responded with a video where he said his use of slurs was "playful ribbing" and that "it's funny, it's a comedy show". He said that the investigation was a "war we will fight to the bitter end" and that "this is an example of a giant, multinational media conglomeration... attempting to squash a competitor". He also stated that he is opposed to doxxing and harassment. After YouTube's demonetization of his videos, Crowder stated on his Twitter account, "Vox is still going to be pissed; they're not going to be happy with this", and called the situation a brewing "Adpocalypse". He also added "their goal is to completely get rid of people" in reference to Vox.  According to an analysis by Vox Media's "The Verge", Crowder's videos "routinely contain egregious violations of YouTube's policies against cyberbullying". Maza said Crowder's videos about him are "dehumanizing, and it's something I thought YouTube would be more protective about because it brands itself as being a queer space". Vox editors Lauren Williams and Joe Posner also tweeted in defence of Maza, stating "our efforts to protect Carlos and others from historically marginalized groups from being silenced or driven from the platform by incessant harassment are in line with these values", in reference to political debate and free speech.<ref name="http://www.washingtontimes.com"></ref> In response to this tweet, political commentator Ben Shapiro spoke out in defense of Crowder, tweeting, "This, right here, from @voxdotcom EIC Lauren Williams and Head of Video Joe Posner, is a vile lie. Maza has not been silenced in any way. The only people seeking to silence are those who demand Crowder be deplatformed because Maza's precious feelings were supposedly hurt."  YouTube concluded that the language used by Crowder "was clearly hurtful", but "the videos as posted don't violate our policies". It determined that Crowder had not encouraged his viewers to harass or dox Maza either on YouTube or other platforms and that the main point of his video was to respond to opinion. The decision to not suspend the channel drew considerable criticism. The next day, YouTube suspended the channel's monetization until Crowder addresses "all of the issues" with his channel, citing community guidelines. The decision to demonetize Crowder's account was criticized by Republican Senator Ted Cruz, who had previously appeared on Crowder's show.

Personal life.

Crowder married his wife, Hilary, in August 2012, and wrote about the benefits of remaining abstinent prior to his marriage.

Steven Blake Crowder (; born July 7, 1987) is an American-Canadian conservative political commentator, comedian and YouTuber. He hosts the YouTube channel and podcast "Louder with Crowder", where he gives his opinion on sociopolitical issues in the U.S and their solutions. He is also a former contributor at Fox News.

史蒂芬·布雷克·克劳德(英语:Steven Blake Crowder,1987年-7月7日)是美国的一位演员、喜剧演员和保守派政治评论员。他是Louder with Crowder的主持人,并且曾长期在大众新闻频道出演。克劳德出生在格罗斯波因特。2009年之后,克劳德开始定期在保守媒体上出演。2011年他担任保守政治行动会议的主持。


Career.

Early career.

Born in Spijkenisse, Laurence grew up in Hellevoetsluis. He has been writing his own songs since he was 13 years old, as an escape from being bullied. He started his musical career at the Rock Academy in Tilburg, playing in a number of school bands, including his own, The Slick and Suited. Formed in 2013, the band went on to perform at Eurosonic Noorderslag. In an Instagram post in February 2020, he revealed he had oxygen deprivation at birth, and thus had a motor disorder affect his right hand.

2014–2018: "The Voice of Holland".

Laurence participated in the fifth season of "The Voice of Holland", choosing Ilse DeLange as his coach. He advanced to the Cross Battles/Semi Finals before being eliminated. In March 2016, he decided to stop as lead singer of "The Slick". Laurence graduated from the Rock Academy in 2017. He, with Jihad Rahmouni, wrote the song "Closer" on K-pop duo TVXQ's 2018 album "".

2019–2020: Eurovision Song Contest & "Worlds on Fire".

In January 2019, Laurence was internally selected to represent the Netherlands in the Eurovision Song Contest 2019. He was nominated by Ilse DeLange, with whom Laurence still had contact after "The Voice". His song "Arcade" was first revealed in March 2019. On 18 May 2019, Duncan Laurence won the event in Tel Aviv, Israel with 498 points from 41 international juries and the public vote. The juries gave him 237 points, while the public vote gave him 261 points. He finished 26 points ahead of Italy and 128 points ahead of Russia, the two runners-up. He is the fifth Dutch entrant to ever win the competition, and the first since Teach-In won the Eurovision Song Contest 1975 with the song "Ding-a-dong". Laurence will tour the Netherlands and Europe in late 2019 with one concert also scheduled for Amsterdam in March 2020. On 10 June 2019, he performed at the 50th anniversary Pinkpop Festival in Landgraaf, the first Dutch Eurovision winner to perform at the event. He replaced Swedish duo First Aid Kit on the bill, who dropped out due to health reasons. On 23 October 2019, Laurence released his second single "Love Don't Hate It". It was also announced that he signed a deal with Capitol Records. In 2020, the artists' entrance at Rotterdam Ahoy was re-named "Door Duncan" in his honor. On 29 April 2020, Laurence announced the release of his first EP, "Worlds on Fire", it was released on 13 May 2020 and includes the singles "Arcade", "Love Don't Hate It" and "Someone Else".

Personal life.

As stated on his personal Instagram in October 2018, Laurence came out as bisexual "a couple of years ago". In a press conference shortly before the Eurovision final, Laurence affirmed his sexuality: "I am more than just an artist, I am a person, I am a living being, I'm bisexual, I'm a musician, I stand for things. And I'm proud that I get the chance to show what I am, who I am." In June 2019, he confirmed in an interview with Sergiusz Królak for Plejada.pl that he was in a relationship with a man. In September 2019 he announced that he and his boyfriend were no longer dating.

Duncan de Moor (born 11 April 1994), professionally known as Duncan Laurence, is a Dutch singer-songwriter. He began his music career in 2014 and became a semi-finalist in the fifth season of "The Voice of Holland". Laurence represented the Netherlands in the Eurovision Song Contest 2019 with the song "Arcade" and went on to win the competition, giving the Netherlands its first Eurovision win since 1975.

邓肯·劳伦斯(,1994年-4月11日)是荷兰的一位歌手。他在2014年开始音乐生涯,并在荷兰之声第五季中进入准决赛。劳伦斯代表荷兰参加2019年欧洲歌唱大赛,并赢得冠军。他在决赛中获得评审得分237分,观众得分261分,合计得分498分,成为第五位获得欧洲歌唱大赛冠军的荷兰人。他也是一位公开出柜的双性恋。


History.

Firebase evolved from Envolve, a prior startup founded by James Tamplin and Andrew Lee in 2011. Envolve provided developers an API that enables the integration of online chat functionality into their websites. After releasing the chat service, Tamplin and Lee found that it was being used to pass application data that were not chat messages. Developers were using Envolve to sync application data such as game state in real time across their users. Tamplin and Lee decided to separate the chat system and the real-time architecture that powered it. They founded Firebase as a separate company in September 2011 and it launched to the public in April 2012.  Firebase's first product was the Firebase Real-time Database, an API that synchronizes application data across iOS, Android, and Web devices, and stores it on Firebase's cloud. The product assists software developers in building real-time, collaborative applications.  In May 2012, a month after the beta launch, Firebase raised $1.1 million in seed funding from venture capitalists Flybridge Capital Partners, Greylock Partners, Founder Collective, and New Enterprise Associates. In June 2013, the company further raised $5.6 million in Series A funding from Union Square Ventures and Flybridge Capital Partners.  In 2014, Firebase launched two products. Firebase Hosting and Firebase Authentication. This positioned the company as a mobile backend as a service.  In October 2014, Firebase was acquired by Google. A year later, in October 2015, Google acquired Divshot, an HTML5 web-hosting platform, to merge it with the Firebase team.  In May 2016, at Google I/O, the company's annual developer conference, Firebase introduced Firebase Analytics and announced that it was expanding its services to become a unified backend-as-a-service (BaaS) platform for mobile developers. Firebase now integrates with various other Google services, including Google Cloud Platform, AdMob, and Google Ads to offer broader products and scale for developers. Google Cloud Messaging, the Google service to send push notifications to Android devices, was superseded by a Firebase product, Firebase Cloud Messaging, which added the functionality to deliver push notifications to both iOS and web devices. In January 2017, Google acquired Fabric and Crashlytics from Twitter to add those services to Firebase.  In October 2017, Firebase has launched Cloud Firestore, a real-time document database as the successor product to the original Firebase Realtime Database.

Services.

Analytics.

Google Analytics.

Google Analytics is a cost-free app measurement solution that provides insights on app usage and user engagement.

Develop.

Firebase Cloud Messaging.

Formerly known as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM), Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) is a cross-platform solution for messages and notifications for Android, iOS, and web applications, which as of 2016 can be used at no cost.

Firebase Authentication.

Firebase Authentication is a service that can authenticate users using only client-side code. It supports social login providers Facebook, GitHub, Twitter and Google as well as other service providers like Google Play Games, Apple, Yahoo, and Microsoft. Additionally, it includes a user management system whereby developers can enable user authentication with email and password login stored with Firebase.

Firebase Realtime Database.

Firebase provides a real-time database and back-end as a service. The service provides application developers an API that allows application data to be synchronized across clients and stored on Firebase's cloud. The company provides client libraries that enable integration with Android, iOS, JavaScript, Java, Objective-C, Swift and Node.js applications. The database is also accessible through a REST API and bindings for several JavaScript frameworks such as AngularJS, React, Ember.js and Backbone.js. The REST API uses the Server-Sent Events protocol, which is an API for creating HTTP connections for receiving push notifications from a server. Developers using the realtime database can secure their data by using the company's server-side-enforced security rules.

Cloud Firestore.

On January 31, 2019, Cloud Firestore was officially brought out of beta, making it an official product of the Firebase lineup. It is the successor to Firebase's original databasing system, Real-time Database, and allows for nested documents and fields rather than the tree-view provided in the Real-time Database.

Firebase Storage.

Firebase Storage provides secure file uploads and downloads for Firebase apps, regardless of network quality, to be used for storing images, audio, video, or other user-generated content. It is backed by Google Cloud Storage.

Firebase Hosting.

Firebase Hosting is a static and dynamic web hosting service that launched on May 13, 2014. It supports hosting static files such as CSS, HTML, JavaScript and other files, as well as support through Cloud Functions. The service delivers files over a content delivery network (CDN) through HTTP Secure (HTTPS) and Secure Sockets Layer encryption (SSL). Firebase partners with Fastly, a CDN, to provide the CDN backing Firebase Hosting. The company states that Firebase Hosting grew out of customer requests; developers were using Firebase for its real-time database but needed a place to host their content.

ML Kit.

ML Kit is a mobile machine learning system for developers launched on May 8, 2018, in beta during the Google I/O 2018. ML Kit APIs feature a variety of features including optical character recognition, detecting faces, scanning barcodes, labelling images and recognising landmarks. It is currently available for iOS or Android developers. You may also import your own TensorFlow Lite models, if the given APIs are not enough. The APIs can be used on-device or on-cloud.

Stability.

Crashlytics.

Crash Reporting creates detailed reports of the errors in the app. Errors are grouped into clusters of similar stack traces and triaged by the severity of impact on app users. In addition to automatic reports, the developer can log custom events to help capture the steps leading up to a crash. Before acquiring Crashlytics, Firebase was using its own Firebase Crash Reporting.

Performance.

Firebase Performance provides insights into an app's performance and the latencies the app's users experience.

Firebase Test Lab.

Firebase Test Lab provides cloud-based infrastructure for testing Android and iOS apps in one operation. Developers can test their apps across a wide variety of devices and device configurations. Test results—including logs, videos, and screenshots—are made available in the Firebase console. Even if a developer hasn't written any test code for their app, Test Lab can exercise the app automatically, looking for crashes. Test Lab for iOS is currently in beta.

Admob.

Admob is a Google product that integrates with Firebase audience.

Grow.

Firebase Dynamic Links.

Dynamic Firebase links are smart URLs that dynamically change their behavior to provide "the best available experience" across multiple platforms, including desktop web browsers, iOS, and Android, and in-depth links to mobile apps. Dynamic Links work in all app installs: if the user opens Dynamic Link on iOS or Android and the application is not installed, the user will be prompted to install the app first. Once installed, the application will start running and can access the link.

Firebase is a mobile and web application development platform developed by Firebase, Inc. in 2011, then acquired by Google in 2014. As of March 2020, the Firebase platform has 19 products, which are used by more than 1.5 million apps.

Firebase是Firebase,Inc.在2011年发布的行动和网络应用程序开发者平台,在2014年被Google收购。
 截至2020年3月,Firebase平台拥有19项产品,它们被超过150万个应用程序采用。


Plot.

The story follows a South Korean spy who infiltrates the North to obtain intelligence on the country's nuclear weapons plans in the mid-1990s.

Production.

Filming began on January 24, 2017 and concluded on July 25, 2017. Some parts of the film that are set in Beijing and North Korea were filmed in Taiwan.

Release.

The film made its world premiere in 2018 Cannes Film Festival. It released theatrically in South Korea on August 8, 2018, with age 12-rating. The film was sold to more than 100 countries, and was released theatrically in North America on August 17, 2018.  "The Spy Gone North" was released on VOD by CJ E&M on September 13, 2018.

Reception.

Critical response.

On review aggregator Rotten Tomatoes, "The Spy Gone North" has an approval rating of 100% based on 14 reviews and an average rating of 6.8/10. On Metacritic, the film received average score 69 out of 100 based 6 reviews, indicating "generally favorable reviews".  Charles Bramesco of "The Guardian" rated the film 3 out of 5 and said, "Yoon [Jong-bin] executes all the classic double-agent set pieces with finesse, and those enamoured of the genre will appreciate a change of setting."  Maggie Lee of the "Variety" wrote, "Instead of the usual dose of action and suspense one expects of this genre, watching this dense 140-minute political drama unfold is like fumbling through a long tunnel that’s nonetheless worth it when the ray of light emerges at the end."  Deborah Young of "The Hollywood Reporter" said the film "is a stylish, blood-pounding thriller of the type Asian cinema is so good at making...For sheer topicality, the film is hard to beat, and to find a full-blown entertainment yarn in Cannes' midnight section that's partially set in newsworthy North Korea is rather astounding."

Box office.

The film finished second during its opening week behind "", with gross over five days screening (Wednesday to Sunday). On its second weekend, the film finished second behind "The Witness", with a 45% drop in gross to. After finishing second for two consecutive weekends, the film placed third during its third weekend, behind "On Your Wedding Day" and "The Witness". It had a 59% drop in gross, earning from 317,447 attendance.  On August 28, 2018, the film reached its break-even point with 4.7 million audience members having watched the film. During its fourth weekend, the film had a 74% drop in gross compared to its third weekend, finishing at seventh place with 86,336 attendance. The film stable on seventh place during its fifth weekend.  As of September 24, 2018, the film grossed from 4,970,004 total attendance.

The Spy Gone North is a 2018 South Korean spy drama film directed by Yoon Jong-bin. It stars Hwang Jung-min, Lee Sung-min, Cho Jin-woong and Ju Ji-hoon. The film is loosely based on the true story of Park Chae-seo, a former South Korean agent who infiltrated North Korea's nuclear facilities. The film was released in theaters on August 8, 2018.

是一部2018年剧情片,由 执导的一部韩国剧情片。入围第71届戛纳影展午夜单元。本片获得第23届釜山影展最佳影片、导演、最佳男主角、男配角、剧本及美术奖7项大奖提名,从演技到技术全方面获得评审的肯定。


Etymology.

The first two syllables of the name, "gippeum", is a native Korean word meaning "joy" or "happiness". The suffix "jo" (組) is a Sino-Korean word which describes a group of people, roughly analogous to the terms "squad" or "team". Kim Il-sung is believed to have established this corps of women in the belief that having sexual relations with young women would increase his jing and have the effect of enhancing his life force, or "gi" (chosŏn'gŭl: ; hancha: ; no relation to the "gi" in "gippeum").

History.

The "Gippeumjo" were reported to have been established in 1978, during the administration of Kim Il-sung. The first group was recruited by Lee Dong-ho, the First Vice Director of the Department of United Front of the WPK, for the purpose of entertaining Kim at the Munsu Chodaeso (문수 초대소; Munsu Guesthouse). In 2015 the recruiting and training of "Gippeumjo" were administered by the Fifth Department of Staff of the Organic Direction of the Party. The practice was said to have been maintained by Il-sung's son, Kim Jong-il, until his own death in 2011.  In April 2015, Kim Jong-un was reportedly seeking new members for his own "Gippeumjo", after his father's group of girls was disbanded in December 2011.

Structure.

Each "pleasure group" is composed of three "teams":  Girls from throughout the country are recruited to be "Gippeumjo" members according to government criteria (one of which is that they must be virgins). After being selected, they undergo a rigorous training period, with some "Haengbokjo" members being sent overseas for massage training. "Gippeumjo" members typically leave at age 22 or 25. At that time they are often married to members of North Korea's elite—and are also sometimes paired off with military officers seeking wives—and their former membership in the "Gippeumjo" is kept secret.

The Kippumjo or Gippeumjo (translated variously as "Pleasure Group", "Pleasure Groups", "Pleasure Squad", "Pleasure Brigade", or "Joy Division") is an alleged collection of groups of approximately 2,000 women and girls that is maintained by the leader of North Korea for the purpose of providing pleasure, mostly of a sexual nature, and entertainment for high-ranking Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) officials and their families, as well as occasionally distinguished guests.

欢乐组(),是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国设立的,包含近2000名13-40岁之间(其中大多在18-25岁之间)供朝鲜劳动党高级官员取乐的女性组织。该组织由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国防委员会维持,其中的女性有时也被提供给劳动党的“客人”进行“服务”。


Population.

Historical population.

During 1960–2015, the population grew to nearly 1.4 billion. Under Mao Zedong, China nearly doubled in population from 540 million in 1949 to 969 million in 1979. This growth slowed because of the one-child policy instituted in 1979.

Censuses in China.

The People's Republic of China conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. In 1987, the government announced that the fourth national census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every ten years thereafter. The 1982 census (which reported a total population of 1,008,180,738) is generally accepted as significantly more reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conducting the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, which donated US$15.6 million for the preparation and execution of the census.  China has been the world's most populous nation for many centuries. When China took its first post-1949 census in 1953, the population stood at 583 million; by the fifth census in 2000, the population had more than doubled, reaching 1.2 billion.  By the sixth census in 2010, the total population had reached to 1,370,536,875, with the mainland having 1,339,724,852, Hong Kong having 7,097,600, and Macau having 552,300.

Population of China by age and sex (demographic pyramid).

In 1982 China conducted its first population census since 1964. It was by far the most thorough and accurate census taken since 1949 and confirmed that China was a nation of more than 1 billion people, or about one-fifth of the world's population. The census provided demographers with a set of data on China's age-sex structure, fertility and mortality rates, and population density and distribution. Information was also gathered on minority ethnic groups, urban population, and marital status. For the first time since the People's Republic of China was founded, demographers had reliable information on the size and composition of the Chinese work force. The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976. Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Computers were installed in every provincial-level unit except Tibet and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pretests and small scale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between 1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census stations were opened in rural production brigades and urban neighborhoods. Beginning on 1 July 1982, each household sent a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census required about a month to complete and employed approximately 5 million census takers.  The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic categories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of household, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level, profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, number of children born and still living, and number of births in 1981. The six items pertaining to households were type (domestic or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births in 1981, number of deaths in 1981, and number of registered persons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in a number of important areas for which previous data were either extremely inaccurate or simply nonexistent, including fertility, marital status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex composition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment.  A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the household registration system were different, the two systems arrived at similar population totals. The discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the underreporting of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration system; families would not report some births because of the one-child policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to the rations of the deceased.  Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demographic patterns, measure current population conditions, and predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and foreign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the base population for forecasting and making assumptions about future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mortality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making population projections. The census data also were useful for estimating future manpower potential, consumer needs, and utility, energy, and health-service requirements. The sudden abundance of demographic data helped population specialists immeasurably in their efforts to estimate world population. Previously, there had been no accurate information on these 21% of the Earth's inhabitants. Demographers who had been conducting research on global population without accurate data on the Chinese fifth of the world's population were particularly thankful for the 1982 breakthrough census.

Population control.

Initially, China's post-1949 leaders were ideologically disposed to view a large population as an asset. But the liabilities of a large, rapidly growing population soon became apparent. For one year, starting in August 1956, vigorous support was given to the Ministry of Public Health's mass birth control efforts. These efforts, however, had little impact on fertility. After the interval of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders again saw rapid population growth as an obstacle to development, and their interest in birth control revived. In the early 1960s, schemes somewhat more muted than during the first campaign, emphasized the virtues of late marriage. Birth control offices were set up in the central government and some provincial-level governments in 1964. The second campaign was particularly successful in the cities, where the birth rate was cut in half during the 1963–66 period. The upheaval of the Cultural Revolution brought the program to a halt, however.  In 1972 and 1973 the party mobilized its resources for a nationwide birth control campaign administered by a group in the State Council. Committees to oversee birth control activities were established at all administrative levels and in various collective enterprises. This extensive and seemingly effective network covered both the rural and the urban population. In urban areas public security headquarters included population control sections. In rural areas the country's "barefoot doctors" distributed information and contraceptives to people's commune members. By 1973 Mao Zedong was personally identified with the family planning movement, signifying a greater leadership commitment to controlled population growth than ever before. Yet until several years after Mao's death in 1976, the leadership was reluctant to put forth directly the rationale that population control was necessary for economic growth and improved living standards.  Population growth targets were set for both administrative units and individual families. In the mid-1970s the maximum recommended family size was two children in cities and three or four in the country. Since 1979 the government has advocated a one-child limit for both rural and urban areas and has generally set a maximum of two children in special circumstances. As of 1986 the policy for minority nationalities was two children per couple, three in special circumstances, and no limit for ethnic groups with very small populations. The overall goal of the one-child policy was to keep the total population within 1.2 billion through the year 2000, on the premise that the Four Modernizations program would be of little value if population growth was not brought under control.  The one-child policy was a highly ambitious population control program. Like previous programs of the 1960s and 1970s, the one-child policy employed a combination of public education, social pressure, and in some cases coercion. The one-child policy was unique, however, in that it linked reproduction with economic cost or benefit.  Under the one-child program, a sophisticated system rewarded those who observed the policy and penalized those who did not. Through this policy, the increasing population got temperate after the penalties were made. Couples with only one child were given a "one-child certificate" entitling them to such benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity leave, better child care, and preferential housing assignments. In return, they were required to pledge that they would not have more children. In the countryside, there was great pressure to adhere to the one-child limit. Because the rural population accounted for approximately 60% of the total, the effectiveness of the one-child policy in rural areas was considered the key to the success or failure of the program as a whole.  In rural areas the day-to-day work of family planning was done by cadres at the team and brigade levels who were responsible for women's affairs and by health workers. The women's team leader made regular household visits to keep track of the status of each family under her jurisdiction and collected information on which women were using contraceptives, the methods used, and which had become pregnant. She then reported to the brigade women's leader, who documented the information and took it to a monthly meeting of the commune birth-planning committee. According to reports, ceilings or quotas had to be adhered to; to satisfy these cutoffs, unmarried young people were persuaded to postpone marriage, couples without children were advised to "wait their turn," women with unauthorized pregnancies were pressured to have abortions, and those who already had children were urged to use contraception or undergo sterilization. Couples with more than one child were exhorted to be sterilized.  The one-child policy enjoyed much greater success in urban than in rural areas. Even without state intervention, there were compelling reasons for urban couples to limit the family to a single child. Raising a child required a significant portion of family income, and in the cities a child did not become an economic asset until he or she entered the work force at age sixteen. Couples with only one child were given preferential treatment in housing allocation. In addition, because city dwellers who were employed in state enterprises received pensions after retirement, the sex of their first child was less important to them than it was to those in rural areas.  Numerous reports surfaced of coercive measures used to achieve the desired results of the one-child policy. The alleged methods ranged from intense psychological pressure to the use of physical force, including some grisly accounts of forced abortions and infanticide. Chinese officials admitted that isolated, uncondoned abuses of the program occurred and that they condemned such acts, but they insisted that the family planning program was administered on a voluntary basis using persuasion and economic measures only. International reaction to the allegations were mixed. The UN Fund for Population Activities and the International Planned Parenthood Federation were generally supportive of China's family planning program. The United States Agency for International Development, however, withdrew US$10 million from the Fund in March 1985 based on allegations that coercion had been used.  Observers suggested that an accurate assessment of the one-child program would not be possible until all women who came of childbearing age in the early 1980s passed their fertile years. As of 1987 the one-child program had achieved mixed results. In general, it was very successful in almost all urban areas but less successful in rural areas.  Rapid fertility reduction associated with the one-child policy has potentially negative results. For instance, in the future the elderly might not be able to rely on their children to care for them as they have in the past, leaving the state to assume the expense, which could be considerable. Based on United Nations and Chinese government statistics, it was estimated in 1987 that by the year 2000 the population 60 years and older (the retirement age is 60 in urban areas) would number 127 million, or 10.1% of the total population; the projection for 2025 was 234 million elderly, or 16.4%. According to projections based on the 1982 census, if the one-child policy were maintained to the year 2000, 25% of China's population would be age 65 or older by the year 2040. In 2050, the number of people over 60 is expected to increase to 430 million.

Population density and distribution.

China is the most populated country in the world and its national population density (137/km) is very similar to those of countries like Denmark (excluding Greenland) or the Czech Republic. However, the overall population density of China conceals major regional variations. In 2002, about 94% of the population lived east of the Heihe–Tengchong Line, which makes up only 43% of the total land area, which leads to much higher average density (about 280/km2, little less than Japan).  Broadly speaking, the population was concentrated east of the mountains and south of the northern steppe. The most densely populated areas included the Yangtze River Valley (of which the delta region was the most populous), Sichuan Basin, North China Plain, Pearl River Delta, and the industrial area around the city of Shenyang in the northeast.  Population is most sparse in the mountainous, desert, and grassland regions of the northwest and southwest. In Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, portions are completely uninhabited, and only a few sections have populations denser than ten people per km. The Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet autonomous regions and Qinghai and Gansu comprise 55% of the country's land area but in 1985 contained only 5.7% of its population.

Vital statistics.

Table of births and deaths 1950–2019.

China's fertility statistics differ depending on the source. According to the Ministry of Health and Family Planning November 2015 announcement, China's 2015 TFR was somewhere between 1.5 and 1.6. Ministry of Health and Family Planning:  The latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) seems to contradict this, stating China's TFR for 2015 was 1,05. Although there is a natural margin of error since the NBS surveys only a thin cross-section of Chinese society, approximately 1% of the total population. Fertility according to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS):

Total Fertility Rate from 1930 to 1949.

Children born per woman from 1930 to 1949. It is based on fairly good data for the entire period. Sources: Our World In Data and Gapminder Foundation.

Life expectancy.

Source: "UN World Population Prospects"

Fertility and mortality.

In 1949 crude death rates were probably higher than 30 per 1,000, and the average life expectancy was only 35 years. Beginning in the early 1950s, mortality steadily declined; it continued to decline through 1978 and remained relatively constant through 1987. One major fluctuation was reported in a computer reconstruction of China's population trends from 1953 to 1987 produced by the United States Bureau of the Census. The computer model showed that the crude death rate increased dramatically during the famine years associated with the Great Leap Forward (1958–60).  According to Chinese government statistics, the crude birth rate followed five distinct patterns from 1949 to 1982. It remained stable from 1949 to 1954, varied widely from 1955 to 1965, experienced fluctuations between 1966 and 1969, dropped sharply in the late 1970s, and increased from 1980 to 1981. Between 1970 and 1980, the crude birth rate dropped from 33.4 per 1,000 to 18.2 per 1,000. The government attributed this dramatic decline in fertility to the "wǎn xī shǎo" ("晚、稀、少", or "late, long, few": later marriages, longer intervals between births, and fewer children) birth control campaign. However, elements of socioeconomic change, such as increased employment of women in both urban and rural areas and reduced infant mortality (a greater percentage of surviving children would tend to reduce demand for additional children), may have played some role. The birth rate increased in the 1980s to a level over 20 per 1,000, primarily as a result of a marked rise in marriages and first births. The rise was an indication of problems with the one-child policy of 1979. Chinese sources, however, indicate that the birth rate started to decrease again in the 1990s and reached a level of around 12 per 1,000 in recent years.  In urban areas, the housing shortage may have been at least partly responsible for the decreased birth rate. Also, the policy in force during most of the 1960s and the early 1970s of sending large numbers of high school graduates to the countryside deprived cities of a significant proportion of persons of childbearing age and undoubtedly had some effect on birth rates (see Cultural Revolution (1966–76)). Primarily for economic reasons, rural birth rates tended to decline less than urban rates. The right to grow and sell agricultural products for personal profit and the lack of an old-age Welfare system were incentives for rural people to produce many children, especially sons, for help in the fields and for support in old age. Because of these conditions, it is unclear to what degree education had been able to erode traditional values favoring large families.  Today, the population continues to grow. There is also a serious gender imbalance. Census data obtained in 2000 revealed that 119 boys were born for every 100 girls, and among China's "floating population" the ratio was as high as 128:100. These situations led the government in July 2004 to ban selective abortions of female fetuses. It is estimated that this imbalance will rise until 2025–2030 to reach 20% then slowly decrease.  China now has an increasingly aging population; it is projected that 11.8% of the population in 2020 will be 65 years of age and older. Health care has improved dramatically in China since 1949. Major diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and scarlet fever have been brought under control. Life expectancy has more than doubled, and infant mortality has dropped significantly. On the negative side, the incidence of cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and heart disease has increased to the extent that these have become the leading causes of death. Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s fundamentally altered methods of providing health care; the collective medical care system has been gradually replaced by a more individual-oriented approach.  In 2018, China had the lowest birth rate since 1961, with an estimated of 15.23 million babies being born. The birth figure was 11.6 percent lower compared with 17,23 million in 2017. Officials had expected 21-23 million births in 2018, much more than the 15.23 that occurred. James Liang, an economics professor at Peking University, stated that the apparent birth peak was in 2016, and predicted that birth rates will continue to fall dramatically and that the birthrate will not be higher than 2018 for at least 100 years.  In Hong Kong, the birth rate of 0.9% is lower than its death rate. Hong Kong's population increases because of immigration from the mainland and a large expatriate population comprising about 4%. Like Hong Kong, Macau also has a low birth rate relying on immigration to maintain its population.

Total fertility rate.

According to the 2000 census, the TFR was 1.22 (0.86 for cities, 1.08 for towns and 1.43 for villages/outposts). Beijing had the lowest TFR at 0.67, while Guizhou had the highest at 2.19. The Xiangyang district of Jiamusi city (Heilongjiang) has a TFR of 0.41, which is the lowest TFR recorded anywhere in the world in recorded history. Other extremely low TFR counties are: 0.43 in the Heping district of Tianjin city (Tianjin), and 0.46 in the Mawei district of Fuzhou city (Fujian). At the other end TFR was 3.96 in Geji County (Tibet), 4.07 in Jiali County (Tibet), and 5.47 in Baqing County (Tibet).  The 2010 census reported a TFR of 1.18 (0.88 in cities, 1.15 in townships, and 1.44 in rural areas). The five regions with the lowest fertility rates were Beijing (0.71), Shanghai (0.74), Liaoning (0.74), Heilongjiang (0.75), and Jilin (0.76). The five regions with the highest fertility rates were Guangxi (1.79), Guizhou (1.75), Xinjiang (1.53), Hainan (1.51), and Anhui (1.48).  Total fertility rate by ethnic group (2010 census): Han (1.14), Zhuang (1.59), Hui (1.48), Manchu (1.18), Uyghur (2.04), Miao (1.82), Yi (1.82), Tujia (1.74), Tibetan (1.60), Mongols (1.26).

Labor force.

In 2012, for the first time, according to the National Bureau of Statistics in January 2013, the number of people theoretically able to enter the Chinese labor force (individuals aged 15 to 59), shrank slightly to 937.27 million, a decrease of 3.45 million from 2011. This trend, resulting from a demographic transition, is anticipated to continue until at least 2030. The World Factbook estimated the 2012 active labor force was 798.5 million.

Height and weight.

As of 2012, the average Chinese man was 167.1 centimeters tall (5 ft 5.8 in) in 2012, the figures showed, and women's average height was 155.8 centimeters (5 ft 1.3 in). The same study showed an average Chinese man weighed 66.2 kilograms (145.9 lbs, or 10 stone 5.9 lbs), up 3.5 kilograms (7.7 lbs) over 10 years, while women were 2.9 kilograms (6.4 pounds) heavier on average at 57.3 kilograms (126.3 pounds, or 9 stone 0.3 lbs). They were up just 0.4 centimeters (0.16 in) and 0.7 centimeters (0.28 in) respectively from 10 years earlier.

Gender balance.

Future challenges for China will be the gender disparity. According to the 2010 census, males account for 51.27% of China's 1.34 billion people, while females made up 48.73% of the total. The sex ratio (the number of males for each female in a population) at birth was 118.06 boys to every 100 girls (54.14%) in 2010, higher than the 116.86 (53.89%) of 2000, but 0.53 points lower than the ratio of 118.59 (54.25%) in 2005. In most western countries the sex ratio at birth is around 105 boys to 100 girls (51.22%).

Ethnic groups.

The People'Republic of China (PRC) officially recognizes 56 distinct ethnic groups, the largest of which are Han, who constitute 91.51% of the total population in 2010. Ethnic minorities constitute 8.49% or 113.8 million of China's population in 2010. During the past decades ethnic minorities have experienced higher growth rates than the majority Han population, because they are not under the one-child policy. Their proportion of the population in China has grown from 6.1% in 1953, to 8.04% in 1990, 8.41% in 2000, and 8.49% in 2010. Large ethnic minorities (data according to the 2000 census) include the Zhuang (16 million, 1.28%), Manchu (10 million, 0.84%), Uyghur (9 million, 0.78%), Hui (9 million, 0.71%), Miao (8 million, 0.71%), Yi (7 million, 0.61%), Tujia (5.75 million, 0.63%), Mongols (5 million, 0.46%), Tibetan (5 million, 0.43%), Buyei (3 million, 0.23%), and Korean (2 million, 0.15%). Over 126,000 Westerners from Canada, the US and Europe are living in Mainland China. Almost 1% of people living in Hong Kong are Westerners.  Neither Hong Kong nor Macau recognizes the official ethnic classifications maintained by the central government. In Macau, the largest substantial ethnic groups of non-Chinese descent are the Macanese, of mixed Chinese and Portuguese descent (Eurasians), as well as migrants from the Philippines and Thailand. Overseas Filipinos (overwhelmingly female) working as domestic workers comprise the largest non-Han Chinese ethnic group in Hong Kong.

People from other immigration jurisdictions.

The 2010 Census counted 234,829 residents from Hong Kong, 21,201 residents from Macao, 170,283 residents from Taiwan, and 593,832 residents from other locations, totaling 1,020,145 residents.

Migration.

Internal migration in the People's Republic of China is one of the most extensive in the world according to the International Labour Organization. In fact, research done by Kam Wing Chan of the University of Washington suggests that "In the 30 years since 1979, China's urban population has grown by about 440 million to 622 million in 2009. Of the 440 million increase, about 340 million was attributable to net migration and urban reclassification. Even if only half of that increase was migration, the volume of rural-urban migration in such a short period is likely the largest in human history." Migrants in China are commonly members of a floating population, which refers primarily to migrants in China without local household registration status through the Chinese Hukou system. In general, rural-urban migrant workers are most excluded from local educational resources, citywide social welfare programs and many jobs because of their lack of hukou status.  In 2011 a total of 252.78 million migrant workers (an increase of 4.4% compared to 2010) existed in China. Out of these, migrant workers who left their hometown and worked in other provinces accounted for 158.63 million (an increase of 3.4% compared to 2010) and migrant workers who worked within their home provinces reached 94.15 million (an increase of 5.9% compared to 2010). Estimations are that Chinese cities will face an influx of another 243 million migrants by 2025, taking the urban population up to nearly 1 billion people. This population of migrants would represent "almost 40 percent of the total urban population," a number which is almost three times the current level. While it is often difficult to collect accurate statistical data on migrant floating populations, the number of migrants is undoubtedly quite large. "In China's largest cities, for instance, it is often quoted that at least one out of every five persons is a migrant." China's government influences the pattern of urbanization through the Hukou permanent residence registration system, land-sale policies, infrastructure investment and the incentives offered to local government officials. The other factors influencing migration of people from rural provincial areas to large cities are employment, education, business opportunities and higher standard of living.  The mass emigration known as the Chinese diaspora, which occurred from the 19th century to 1949, was mainly caused by wars and starvation in mainland China, invasion from various foreign countries, as well as the problems resulting from political corruption. Most immigrants were illiterate peasants and manual labourers, called "coolies" by analogy to the same pattern of immigration from India, who emigrated to work in countries such as the Americas, Australia, South Africa and Southeast Asia.

Urbanization.

Urbanization increased in speed following the initiation of the reform and opening policy. By the end of 2014, 54.7% of the total population lived in urban areas, a rate that rose from 26% in 1990.

Demographic statistics.

Demographic statistics according to the World Population Review.  The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. No statistics have been included for areas currently governed by the Republic of China (Taiwan). Unless stated otherwise, statistics refer only to mainland China. (See Demographics of Hong Kong and Demographics of Macau.)  See Infant mortality in China  note: data do not include Hong Kong and Macau  Sources:

The demographics of China demonstrate a large population with a relatively small youth component, partially a result of China's one-child policy. China's population reached 1 billion in 1982. As of November 2019, China's population stood at 1.43 billion, the largest of any country in the world. According to the 2010 census, 91.51% of the population was Han Chinese, and 8.49% were minorities. China's population growth rate is only 0.59%, ranking 159th in the world. China conducted its sixth national population census on 1 November 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, the statistics on this page pertain to mainland China only; see also Demographics of Hong Kong and Demographics of Macau.

据中华人民共和国国家统计局2020年1月17日发布数据,中国大陆总人口突破14亿人,为140005万人。居世界首位。


Motivation and physical interpretation.

The spin group is used in physics to describe the symmetries of (electrically neutral, uncharged) fermions. Its complexification, Spinc, is used to describe electrically charged fermions, most notably the electron. Strictly speaking, the spin group describes a fermion in a zero-dimensional space; but of course, space is not zero-dimensional, and so the spin group is used to define spin structures on (pseudo-)Riemannian manifolds: the spin group is the structure group of a spinor bundle. The affine connection on a spinor bundle is the spin connection; the spin connection is useful as it can simplify and bring elegance to many intricate calculations in general relativity. The spin connection in turn enables the Dirac equation to be written in curved spacetime (effectively in the tetrad coordinates), which in turn provides a footing for quantum gravity, as well as a formalization of Hawking radiation (where one of a pair of entangled, virtual fermions fall past the event horizon, and the other does not). In short, the spin group is a vital cornerstone, centrally important for understanding advanced concepts in modern theoretical physics. In mathematics, the spin group is interesting in its own right: not only for these reasons, but for many more.

Construction.

Construction of the Spin group often starts with the construction of a Clifford algebra over a real vector space "V" with a definite quadratic form "q". The Clifford algebra is the quotient of the tensor algebra T"V" of "V" by a two-sided ideal. The tensor algebra (over the reals) may be written as  The Clifford algebra Cl("V") is then the quotient algebra where formula_4 is the quadratic form applied to a vector formula_5. The resulting space is naturally graded, and can be written as where formula_7 and formula_8. The spin algebra formula_9 is defined as where the last is a short-hand for "V" being a real vector space of real dimension "n". It is a Lie algebra; it has a natural action on "V", and in this way can be shown to be isomorphic to the Lie algebra formula_11 of the special orthogonal group.  The pin group formula_12 is a subgroup of formula_13's Clifford group of all elements of the form where each formula_15 is of unit length: formula_16  The spin group is then defined as where formula_18 is the subspace generated by elements that are the product of an even number of vectors. That is, Spin("V") consists of all elements of Pin("V"), given above, with the restriction to "k" being an even number. The restriction to the even subspace is key to the formation of two-component (Weyl) spinors, constructed below.  If the set formula_19 are an orthonormal basis of the (real) vector space "V", then the quotient above endows the space with a natural anti-commuting structure: which follows by considering formula_22 for formula_23. This anti-commutation turns out to be of importance in physics, as it captures the spirit of the Pauli exclusion principle for fermions. A precise formulation is out of scope, here, but it involves the creation of a spinor bundle on Minkowski spacetime; the resulting spinor fields can be seen to be anti-commuting as a by-product of the Clifford algebra construction. This anti-commutation property is also key to the formulation of supersymmetry. The Clifford algebra and the spin group have many interesting and curious properties, some of which are listed below.

Double covering.

A double covering of SO("n") by Spin("n") can be given explicitly, as follows. Let formula_19 be an orthonormal basis for "V". Define an antiautomorphism formula_25 by This can be extended to all elements of formula_27 by homomorphism:  Observe that Spin("V") can then be defined as all elements formula_29 for which  With this notation, an explicit double covering is the homomorphism given by where formula_32. The above gives a double covering of both O("n") by Pin("n") and of SO("n") by Spin("n") because formula_33 gives the same transformation as formula_34. With a small amount of work, it can be seen that formula_35 corresponds to reflection across a hyperplane; this follows from the anti-commuting property of the Clifford algebra.

Spinor space.

It is worth reviewing how spinor space and Weyl spinors are constructed, given this formalism. Given a real vector space "V" of dimension an even number, its complexification is formula_36. It can be written as the direct sum of a subspace formula_37 of spinors and a subspace formula_38 of anti-spinors:  The space formula_37 is spanned by the spinors formula_41 for formula_42 and the complex conjugate spinors span formula_38. It is straightforward to see that the spinors anti-commute, and that the product of a spinor and anti-spinor is a scalar.  The spinor space is defined as the exterior algebra formula_44. The (complexified) Clifford algebra acts naturally on this space; the (complexified) spin group corresponds to the length-preserving endomorphisms. There is a natural grading on the exterior algebra: the product of an odd number of copies of formula_37 correspond to the physics notion of fermions; the even subspace corresponds to the bosons. The representations of the action of the spin group on the spinor space can be built in a relatively straightforward fashion.

Complex case.

The Spin group is defined by the exact sequence  It is a multiplicative subgroup of the complexification formula_47 of the Clifford algebra, and specifically, it is the subgroup generated by Spin("V") and the unit circle in C. Alternately, it is the quotient where the equivalence formula_49 identifies with.  This has important applications in 4-manifold theory and Seiberg–Witten theory. In physics, the Spin group is appropriate for describing uncharged fermions, while the Spin group is used to describe electrically charged fermions. In this case, the U(1) symmetry is specifically the gauge group of electromagnetism.

Accidental isomorphisms.

In low dimensions, there are isomorphisms among the classical Lie groups called "accidental isomorphisms". For instance, there are isomorphisms between low-dimensional spin groups and certain classical Lie groups, owing to low-dimensional isomorphisms between the root systems (and corresponding isomorphisms of Dynkin diagrams) of the different families of simple Lie algebras. Writing R for the reals, C for the complex numbers, H for the quaternions and the general understanding that Cl("n") is a short-hand for Cl(R) and that Spin("n") is a short-hand for Spin(R) and so on, one then has that  There are certain vestiges of these isomorphisms left over for (see Spin(8) for more details). For higher "n", these isomorphisms disappear entirely.

Indefinite signature.

In indefinite signature, the spin group is constructed through Clifford algebras in a similar way to standard spin groups. It is a double cover of, the connected component of the identity of the indefinite orthogonal group. For, is connected; for there are two connected components. As in definite signature, there are some accidental isomorphisms in low dimensions:  Note that.

Topological considerations.

Connected and simply connected Lie groups are classified by their Lie algebra. So if "G" is a connected Lie group with a simple Lie algebra, with "G"′ the universal cover of "G", there is an inclusion  with Z("G"′) the center of "G"′. This inclusion and the Lie algebra formula_55 of "G" determine "G" entirely (note that it is not the case that formula_55 and π("G") determine "G" entirely; for instance SL(2, R) and PSL(2, R) have the same Lie algebra and same fundamental group Z, but are not isomorphic).  The definite signature Spin("n") are all simply connected for "n" > 2, so they are the universal coverings of SO("n").  In indefinite signature, Spin("p", "q") is not necessarily connected, and in general the identity component, Spin("p", "q"), is not simply connected, thus it is not a universal cover. The fundamental group is most easily understood by considering the maximal compact subgroup of SO("p", "q"), which is SO("p") × SO("q"), and noting that rather than being the product of the 2-fold covers (hence a 4-fold cover), Spin("p", "q") is the "diagonal" 2-fold cover – it is a 2-fold quotient of the 4-fold cover. Explicitly, the maximal compact connected subgroup of Spin("p", "q") is  This allows us to calculate the fundamental groups of Spin("p", "q"), taking "p" ≥ "q":  Thus once the fundamental group is Z, as it is a 2-fold quotient of a product of two universal covers.  The maps on fundamental groups are given as follows. For, this implies that the map is given by going to. For, this map is given by. And finally, for, is sent to and is sent to.

Center.

The center of the spin groups, for, (complex and real) are given as follows:

Quotient groups.

Quotient groups can be obtained from a spin group by quotienting out by a subgroup of the center, with the spin group then being a covering group of the resulting quotient, and both groups having the same Lie algebra.  Quotienting out by the entire center yields the minimal such group, the projective special orthogonal group, which is centerless, while quotienting out by {±1} yields the special orthogonal group – if the center equals {±1} (namely in odd dimension), these two quotient groups agree. If the spin group is simply connected (as Spin("n") is for ), then Spin is the "maximal" group in the sequence, and one has a sequence of three groups, splitting by parity yields: which are the three compact real forms (or two, if ) of the compact Lie algebra formula_59  The homotopy groups of the cover and the quotient are related by the long exact sequence of a fibration, with discrete fiber (the fiber being the kernel) – thus all homotopy groups for are equal, but π and π may differ.  For, Spin("n") is simply connected ( is trivial), so SO("n") is connected and has fundamental group Z while PSO("n") is connected and has fundamental group equal to the center of Spin("n").  In indefinite signature the covers and homotopy groups are more complicated – Spin("p", "q") is not simply connected, and quotienting also affects connected components. The analysis is simpler if one considers the maximal (connected) compact and the component group of.

Whitehead tower.

The spin group appears in a Whitehead tower anchored by the orthogonal group:  The tower is obtained by successively removing (killing) homotopy groups of increasing order. This is done by constructing short exact sequences starting with an Eilenberg–MacLane space for the homotopy group to be removed. Killing the homotopy group in Spin("n"), one obtains the infinite-dimensional string group String("n").

Discrete subgroups.

Discrete subgroups of the spin group can be understood by relating them to discrete subgroups of the special orthogonal group (rotational point groups).  Given the double cover, by the lattice theorem, there is a Galois connection between subgroups of Spin("n") and subgroups of SO("n") (rotational point groups): the image of a subgroup of Spin("n") is a rotational point group, and the preimage of a point group is a subgroup of Spin("n"), and the closure operator on subgroups of Spin("n") is multiplication by {±1}. These may be called "binary point groups"; most familiar is the 3-dimensional case, known as binary polyhedral groups.  Concretely, every binary point group is either the preimage of a point group (hence denoted 2"G", for the point group "G"), or is an index 2 subgroup of the preimage of a point group which maps (isomorphically) onto the point group; in the latter case the full binary group is abstractly formula_61 (since {±1} is central). As an example of these latter, given a cyclic group of odd order formula_62 in SO("n"), its preimage is a cyclic group of twice the order, formula_63 and the subgroup maps isomorphically to.  Of particular note are two series:  For point groups that reverse orientation, the situation is more complicated, as there are two pin groups, so there are two possible binary groups corresponding to a given point group.

In mathematics the spin group Spin("n") is the double cover of the special orthogonal group, such that there exists a short exact sequence of Lie groups (when )

数学中,旋量群 Spin("n") 是特殊正交群 SO("n") 的二重复叠,使得存在李群的短正合列:


Early life.

Zhou Qunfei was born in 1970 in Xiangxiang, Hunan province, China, the youngest of three children in a poor family. Before she was born, her father, a former soldier, became partially blinded and lost a finger in an industrial accident in the 1960s. A skilled craftsman, he supported the family by making bamboo baskets and chairs and repairing bicycles. Her mother died when she was five. As a child she helped her family raise animals for sustenance and small profit. Although she was the only one out of her siblings to attend secondary school and showed promise as a bright student, she dropped out at age 16 and moved in with her uncle's family to become a migrant worker in Shenzhen, the special economic zone in Guangdong province. While she briefly considered pursuing a government job for its stability, she discarded the idea as lacking a diploma would make it difficult to do so.  In Shenzhen she deliberately chose to work for companies near Shenzhen University, so she could take part-time courses at the university. She studied many subjects and passed the examinations to be certified for accounting, computer operations, customs processing, and even became licensed for driving commercial vehicles. Her biggest regret is not having studied English.

Career.

Although she dreamed of being a fashion designer, Zhou found a job working for a small family-run firm making watch parts for about 180 yuan a month. Displeased with the working conditions, she decided to quit after three months and submitted a letter of resignation explaining her reasons, yet expressing gratitude for the working opportunity. The letter moved the factory chief to offer her a promotion instead.  When the factory folded, she established her own company in 1993 at age 22, with her savings of HK$20,000 (~USD$3,000). It was her cousin who encouraged her to start on her own business, and the company began with her brother, sister, their spouses, and two cousins all working out of a three bedroom apartment. The company appealed to customers by promising higher-quality watch lenses. Here, Zhang took a hands on approach and involved herself in all parts of the company, including repairs and creating improved designs of factory machinery. In 2001, she caught her big break when her company won a profitable contract to make mobile phone screens for the Chinese electronics giant TCL Corporation.  Zhou Qunfei has stated that over the years she has started a total of 11 companies.

Lens Technology.

In 2003, while still producing watch faces, Zhou's company received a request from Motorola to develop glass screens for their Razr V3, during a period when the mobile phone industry was transitioning from plastic to glass display screens.  Following this, Zhou Qunfei started touch-screen maker Lens Technology (named so that it would turn up to potential customers searching "lens" online) in 2003 and the company soon received orders from other mobile-phone makers such as HTC, Nokia, and Samsung Electronics. After producing the touch screens for Apple's iPhone during its 2007 market entry, Lens developed into the dominant player of the industry. Lens Technology now primarily supplies touch-screens to leading electronics makers such as Apple, Samsung, and Huawei, receiving nearly 75% of its revenue from Apple and Samsung. The Apple Watch uses her company's glass and sapphire crystal screens. As of 2017, the company employs about 90,000 people, was expected to churn out more than a billion glass screens, and has 32 different factory locations.  On 18 March 2015, the 22nd anniversary of the founding of her first start-up, Lens Technology began trading on the ChiNext A-share market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The company's stock price rose by the market's daily limit of 44% on the first day and 10% every subsequent day for 13 days in a row between 19 March and 2 April. This made Lens Technology China's largest technology IPO in the first quarter of 2015.

Accomplishments.

During Lens' 2015 IPO offering, Zhou's (who holds 87.9% of the shares, a $7.2 billion stake as of July 2015) net worth rose 452%, dethroning Chen Lihua as China's richest woman. She also holds the position of the world's richest self made woman, and is one of the richest women in the technology sector.  Additionally, Zhou is on Forbes lists as #61 in 2016 Power Women, #205 in 2016 Billionaires (#9 out of Hong Kong billionaires), #18 in 2015 China Rich List, and #30 in 2015 Richest in Tech. Fortune ranked her #18 on their 2016 Most Powerful Women of Asia-Pacific list, and she is a newcomer to the list. Bloomberg has ranked her as #211 out of the world's billionaires.

Personal life.

Zhou Qunfei married her former factory boss, had a daughter, and divorced. Her daughter is currently studying overseas. In 2008, she married Zheng Junlong (), a longtime factory colleague who currently serves on the Lens board and has a 1.4% shareholding in the company. They have a seven-year-old son who lives at their Hong Kong family home. The family owns a $27 million estate in Hong Kong.  Zhou has stated that although she considers work to be her hobby, she also enjoys mountain climbing and ping pong.  Zhou Qunfei's rags-to-riches story has been hailed as an inspiration to the millions of migrant workers in China. In an interview with Gansu Television, she said the secret of her success was the desire to learn.

Zhou Qunfei (; born 1970) is a Chinese entrepreneur who founded the major touchscreen maker Lens Technology. After the public listing of her company on the Shenzhen ChiNext market in March 2015, her net worth reached US$10 billion, making her the richest woman in China. In 2018, she was named the world's richest self-made woman, with a net worth of $9.8 billion.

周群飞,湖南人,中国大陆企业家,手机玻璃制造厂“蓝思科技”的创始人兼董事长,湖南首富,中国大陆女首富。