user13375: Does reality exist? Carlo Rovelli (a famous theoretical physicist) doesn't think so and he cites Nagarjuna as believing the same:

Rovelli has a different idea. He says reality doesn’t exist. The
reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100
years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not
being real.
It was at this point — a third of the way through the book — that I
mimicked Heisenberg and took my first long, befuddled walk. Reality
doesn’t exist? What on earth does that mean? Rovelli’s favourite
example is a red chair. ‘Red’ doesn’t exist, for sure — everyone knows
that philosophical chestnut: it’s just the way our brains make sense
of light of a certain wavelength. But Rovelli also insists that
nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape —
except in its relationship to the person looking at it. And you can
keep banging away at this type of argument until you get to the level
of the atoms forming the chair. Insisting that anything about this red
chair needs to exist outside of relationships is metaphysical
neediness.
Part of the fun of Rovelli’s book is that your immediate reaction to
his ideas — repugnance or delight — isn’t meaningless. Without
mathematics or experiment, by page 81 your thoughts are at the
frontier of quantum theory, and it’s time for your second
brain-cudgeling walk. If things exist only by virtue of their
interaction with other things, what happens to them between times? Do
they vanish? Do instants of time also not exist? Does it even make
sense to talk this way? Oh dear, oh dear.
Rovelli devotes a precious chapter to the work of the second-century
Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, who also insists there is no ultimate
layer of real things.

Emphasis mine. These ideas form the heart of his well regarded Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and are discussed extensively in his new book Helgoland.
Other questions on this forum have asked whether physical reality exists, but the highest rated answers have mostly danced around the question. They argue that it is our "attitude" about such questions that is relevant... In other places, the assertion is that this question is one of the "thickets" or is somehow unanswerable or is somehow not amenable to logic.
I find all of these quite flaccid in the face of this prominent theoretical physicist coming out quite explicitly saying that our current best known laws of the universe (properly interpreted) indicate that reality itself doesn't exist and that the unwillingness to acknowledge this by other physicists is "metaphysical neediness!" He is arguing that we can talk about this meaningfully and use our reason to arrive at this conclusion with mathematics, logic and empiricism.
I'd also say that it is quite obvious the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism and should not just be ignored or danced around. So, is he right?

user254: He says reality doesn’t exist
Does he, or is that a paraphrase by the reviewer? And if he does, is he simplifying for the reader? Or trolling a bit, maybe trying to challenge the reader by saying something edgy?
The reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100 years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not being real.
That sounds like not even hearsay -- merely imputing motive -- but who knows.
But Rovelli also insists that nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape — except in its relationship to the person looking at it.
I'd phrase that more impersonally -- not "in relationship to the person" but "in relationship to the observation" or "in relationship to the experiment".
I suppose it's axiomatic to physicists -- it was when I was at school, a while ago admittedly -- that you "observe" things "experimentally" and that the observation interacts (or interferes) with what's observed.
So for example when you look at a couch you're observing the effect of shining photos at it.
There are other ways to observe a couch, other experiments -- with your bum (by sitting on it), or perhaps with a pair of scissors -- or with a jar of acid, or a stick of dynamite -- or by asking someone else what they think of it.
Different experiments lead to different observations.
If things exist only by virtue of their interaction with other things ...
(As I was saying)
... what happens to them between times?
Yeah. I guess that's where sunyata becomes relevant, i.e. the question supposes that "they" (things) have or possibly even haven't some thingness (i.e. existence).
It might be a meaningless question -- like if I said, "white is the only colour", then it wouldn't make sense to ask, "What colour is it when it isn't white?"
reality itself doesn't exist
That may be an exaggeration or subject to misinterpretation. There's a Zen story (titled Nothing Exists) that may be relevant. And scientists make a fuss about consensus and reproduceable experiments -- they're presumably studying something, whether that (subject/object of study) is called "reality" or merely "interactions" might be just semantics, right?
Still it's something Physicists have talked about (including Shrodinger's Cat for example), as Philosophers may have too.
I haven't read the book -- the review or paraphrase of it you quoted makes it sound like popular science possibly written so as to "Épater la bourgeoisie" -- especially the supposed shock value of its coming from a physicist.
the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism
Perhaps so, but perhaps also it's something you learn when you're a child -- that your experience of the world and people depends on and may vary according to your interactions with them -- a truism then.
This also reminds me  of Le Guin's Bryn Mawr Commencement Address -- that it might sound remarkable to hear this message spoken in what she calls "the father tongue" -- where in another context it might be just a truism (or worse).
Now I don't mean to say that Buddhist doctrine is written in the father tongue or mother tongue. I think that what makes Buddhism different than Physics, I found to be a welcome difference:

Rational and humane
Offering salvation (e.g. from death)
Using metrics like "virtue" and "wisdom" and "truthful" and "harmless" and so on as a measure -- measures which aren't in the same realm or domain as physics.

So, is he right?
I might have been harsher about physics, and a book that I haven't even read, than they deserve -- sorry if that's raining on your enthusiasm.
To answer your question, though, the review doesn't entice me to buy the book -- so I don't know if he's right -- the author (if not the reviewer) is presumably more right about Physics than I'm likely to be.
But the way the review presented it, the doctrine does sound to me unremarkable, well-known, easily explained in terms of orthodox philosophy of science -- so to answer your question, "Yes he's right".
The only surprising thing to me is the claim that (other) "physicists have been led astray", because the little that's paraphrased here seemed to me mostly orthodox (so wouldn't they see it that way too). Though even the bit about physicists being astray might be 'right' (I've for sure met fewer of them in life than he has), for example I don't know that the Schrodinger's Cat discussions were ever much good.

user20844: Quoted below is Candrakīrti's Lucid Words - A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom.
Perhaps Mr. Rovelli is misrepresenting Nāgārjuna’s teaching.
True dharma is the middle way. Those who see existence or non-existence don't see peace.


5  Analysis of the Elements (dhātus)
5.1. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic; if it were prior to its defining characteristic, it
would have no defining characteristic.
5.2. There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. If there is  nothing without a defining
characteristic, then to what does a defining characteristic apply?
5.3. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic, nor does it apply to what already has a defining
characteristic.  Nor  does  it  apply  to  something other than what
has or does not have a defining characteristic.
5.4. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present, then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized. If the
characterized does not make sense, then the defining  characteristic
is not possible.
5.5. Therefore, the characterized does not exist, and the defining characteristic does not exist.  And an existent  (bhāva)  does not
exist without what is characterized and the defining characteristic.
5.6. If there is no existent (bhāva), then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)?  And [if] the analyzer that has neither the
quality of existing nor not existing, how does he know either the
existent or the nonexistent?
5.7 .  Therefore,  space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent;  it is neither the characterized nor the defining characteristic. And the
other five elements are the same in this regard as space.
5.8. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do  not see peace, which is the quieting
(upaśama) of what is to be seen.


13375: <p>Does reality exist? Carlo Rovelli (a famous theoretical physicist) <a href="https://www.spectator.com.au/2021/04/small-things-misbehaving/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">doesn't think so and he cites Nagarjuna</a> as believing the same:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Rovelli has a different idea. <strong>He says reality doesn’t exist.</strong> The
reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100
years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not
being real.</p>
<p>It was at this point — a third of the way through the book — that I
mimicked Heisenberg and took my first long, befuddled walk. Reality
doesn’t exist? What on earth does that mean? Rovelli’s favourite
example is a red chair. ‘Red’ doesn’t exist, for sure — everyone knows
that philosophical chestnut: it’s just the way our brains make sense
of light of a certain wavelength. But Rovelli also insists that
nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape —
except in its relationship to the person looking at it. And you can
keep banging away at this type of argument until you get to the level
of the atoms forming the chair. Insisting that anything about this red
chair needs to exist outside of relationships is metaphysical
neediness.</p>
<p>Part of the fun of Rovelli’s book is that your immediate reaction to
his ideas — repugnance or delight — isn’t meaningless. Without
mathematics or experiment, by page 81 your thoughts are at the
frontier of quantum theory, and it’s time for your second
brain-cudgeling walk. If things exist only by virtue of their
interaction with other things, what happens to them between times? Do
they vanish? Do instants of time also not exist? Does it even make
sense to talk this way? Oh dear, oh dear.</p>
<p>Rovelli devotes a precious chapter to the work of the second-century
<strong>Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, who also insists there is no ultimate
layer of real things.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Emphasis mine. These ideas form the heart of his well regarded <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics</a> and are discussed extensively in his new book <a href="https://rads.stackoverflow.com/amzn/click/com/0593328884" rel="nofollow noreferrer" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Helgoland.</a></p>
<p>Other <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/9063/is-lack-of-inherent-existence-the-same-as-not-real">questions</a> on this forum have asked whether <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/33313/what-buddhism-says-about-physical-reality">physical reality exists</a>, but the highest rated answers have mostly danced around the question. They argue that it is our &quot;attitude&quot; about such questions that is relevant... In other places, the assertion is that this question is one of the &quot;thickets&quot; or is somehow unanswerable or is somehow not amenable to logic.</p>
<p>I find all of these quite flaccid in the face of this prominent theoretical physicist coming out quite explicitly saying that our current best known laws of the universe (properly interpreted) indicate that reality itself doesn't exist and that the unwillingness to acknowledge this by other physicists is &quot;metaphysical neediness!&quot; He is arguing that we can talk about this meaningfully and use our reason to arrive at this conclusion with mathematics, logic and empiricism.</p>
<p>I'd also say that it is quite obvious <strong>the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism</strong> and should not just be ignored or danced around. So, is he right?</p>
 254: <p><strong>He says reality doesn’t exist</strong></p>
<p>Does he, or is that a paraphrase by the reviewer? And if he does, is he simplifying for the reader? Or trolling a bit, maybe trying to challenge the reader by saying something edgy?</p>
<p><strong>The reason physicists have been led astray by bonkers theories in the 100 years since Helgoland is because they can’t bear the thought of not being real.</strong></p>
<p>That sounds like not even hearsay -- merely imputing motive -- but who knows.</p>
<p><strong>But Rovelli also insists that nothing else about the chair exists either — its weight, its shape — except in its relationship to the person looking at it.</strong></p>
<p>I'd phrase that more impersonally -- not &quot;in relationship to the person&quot; but &quot;in relationship to the observation&quot; or &quot;in relationship to the experiment&quot;.</p>
<p>I suppose it's axiomatic to physicists -- it was when I was at school, a while ago admittedly -- that you &quot;observe&quot; things &quot;experimentally&quot; and that the observation interacts (or interferes) with what's observed.</p>
<p>So for example when you look at a couch you're observing the effect of shining photos at it.</p>
<p>There are other ways to observe a couch, other experiments -- with your bum (by sitting on it), or perhaps with a pair of scissors -- or with a jar of acid, or a stick of dynamite -- or by asking someone else what <em>they</em> think of it.</p>
<p>Different experiments lead to different observations.</p>
<p><strong>If things exist only by virtue of their interaction with other things ...</strong></p>
<p>(As I was saying)</p>
<p><strong>... what happens to them between times?</strong></p>
<p>Yeah. I guess that's where sunyata becomes relevant, i.e. the question supposes that &quot;they&quot; (things) have or possibly even haven't some thingness (i.e. existence).</p>
<p>It might be a meaningless question -- like if I said, &quot;white is the only colour&quot;, then it wouldn't make sense to ask, &quot;What colour is it when it isn't white?&quot;</p>
<p><strong>reality itself doesn't exist</strong></p>
<p>That may be an exaggeration or subject to misinterpretation. There's a Zen story (titled <em>Nothing Exists</em>) that may be relevant. And scientists make a fuss about consensus and reproduceable experiments -- they're presumably studying something, whether that (subject/object of study) is called &quot;reality&quot; or merely &quot;interactions&quot; might be just semantics, right?</p>
<p>Still it's something Physicists have talked about (including Shrodinger's Cat for example), as Philosophers may have too.</p>
<p>I haven't read the book -- the review or paraphrase of it you quoted makes it sound like popular science possibly written so as to &quot;<em>Épater la bourgeoisie</em>&quot; -- especially the supposed shock value of its coming from a physicist.</p>
<p><strong>the answer to this question has vast soteriological consequences that are very deeply relevant to Buddhism</strong></p>
<p>Perhaps so, but perhaps also it's something you learn when you're a child -- that your experience of the world and people depends on and may vary according to your interactions with them -- a truism then.</p>
<p>This also reminds me  of Le Guin's <em>Bryn Mawr Commencement Address</em> -- that it might sound remarkable to hear this message spoken in what she calls &quot;the father tongue&quot; -- where in another context it might be just a truism (or worse).</p>
<p>Now I don't mean to say that Buddhist doctrine is written in the father tongue or mother tongue. I think that what makes Buddhism different than Physics, I found to be a welcome difference:</p>
<ol>
<li>Rational and humane</li>
<li>Offering salvation (e.g. from death)</li>
<li>Using metrics like &quot;virtue&quot; and &quot;wisdom&quot; and &quot;truthful&quot; and &quot;harmless&quot; and so on as a measure -- measures which aren't in the same realm or domain as physics.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>So, is he right?</strong></p>
<p>I might have been harsher about physics, and a book that I haven't even read, than they deserve -- sorry if that's raining on your enthusiasm.</p>
<p>To answer your question, though, the review doesn't entice me to buy the book -- so I don't know if he's right -- the author (if not the reviewer) is presumably more right about Physics than I'm likely to be.</p>
<p>But the way the review presented it, the doctrine does sound to me unremarkable, well-known, easily explained in terms of orthodox philosophy of science -- so to answer your question, &quot;Yes he's right&quot;.</p>
<p>The only surprising thing to me is the claim that (other) &quot;physicists have been led astray&quot;, because the little that's paraphrased here seemed to me mostly orthodox (so wouldn't they see it that way too). Though even the bit about physicists being astray might be 'right' (I've for sure met fewer of them in life than he has), for example I don't know that the Schrodinger's Cat discussions were ever much good.</p>
 20844: <p>Quoted below is Candrakīrti's Lucid Words - A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom.</p>
<p>Perhaps Mr. Rovelli is misrepresenting Nāgārjuna’s teaching.</p>
<p>True dharma is the middle way. Those who see existence or non-existence don't see peace.</p>
<blockquote>
<hr />
<h3>5  Analysis of the Elements (dhātus)</h3>
<p>5.1. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic; if it were prior to its defining characteristic, it
would have no defining characteristic.</p>
<p>5.2. There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. If there is  nothing without a defining
characteristic, then to what does a defining characteristic apply?</p>
<p>5.3. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic, nor does it apply to what already has a defining
characteristic.  Nor  does  it  apply  to  something other than what
has or does not have a defining characteristic.</p>
<p>5.4. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present, then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized. If the
characterized does not make sense, then the defining  characteristic
is not possible.</p>
<p>5.5. Therefore, the characterized does not exist, and the defining characteristic does not exist.  And an existent  (bhāva)  does not
exist without what is characterized and the defining characteristic.</p>
<p>5.6. If there is no existent (bhāva), then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)?  And [if] the analyzer that has neither the
quality of existing nor not existing, how does he know either the
existent or the nonexistent?</p>
<p>5.7 .  Therefore,  space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent;  it is neither the characterized nor the defining characteristic. And the
other five elements are the same in this regard as space.</p>
<p>5.8. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do  not see peace, which is the quieting
(upaśama) of what is to be seen.</p>
</blockquote>
