user-1: I appreciate that various aspects of Nagarjuna's teachings are rejected by Theravadans but I'm wondering where the line is drawn. For some of his teachings I can see room for scepticism, but what about his central argument? Four questions...
In his Fundamental Verses Nagarjuna demonstrates the absurdity of positive or extreme metaphysical positions. 
Do Theravadans accept this proof as valid and sound? 
Do they accept its result, which is the logical absurdity of extreme views? 
If they do accept this logical result, do they also accept the falsity of such views?    
If they do not accept N's argument, on what grounds do they not do so?  
EDIT: Perhaps I should have asked just this. Is it possible to endorse the logical result of Nagarjuna's argument in Fundamental Wisdom and remain a Theravadan?   

user-1: You are referring to a full book comprising of 27 chapters, with at least ten different translations. That makes it hard to know what the "positive or extreme metaphysical positions" are for someone unfamiliar with his writings, so the question may be difficult to answer without specific references.
Anyway, with all due respect for Nagarjuna, from a fundamentalist approach here are some suggestions for demarcation criterias from the nikayas.
AN 4.77:

Mendicants, these four things are unthinkable. They should not be thought about, and anyone who tries to think about them will go mad or get frustrated. What four?
The scope of the Buddhas …
The scope of one in absorption …
The results of deeds …
Speculation about the world …
These are the four unthinkable things. They should not be thought about, and anyone who tries to think about them will go mad or get frustrated.

https://suttacentral.net/an4.77/en/sujato
MN 63:

These positions that are undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One — 'The cosmos is eternal,' 'The cosmos is not eternal,' 'The cosmos is finite,' 'The cosmos is infinite,' 'The soul & the body are the same,' 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' 'After death a Tathagata exists,' 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist' — I don't approve, I don't accept that the Blessed One has not declared them to me. I'll go ask the Blessed One about this matter. If he declares to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,' that 'The cosmos is not eternal,' that 'The cosmos is finite,' that 'The cosmos is infinite,' that 'The soul & the body are the same,' that 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' that 'After death a Tathagata exists,' that 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' that 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will live the holy life under him. If he does not declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,'... or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will renounce the training and return to the lower life.

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html
MN 2:

'Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? Who was I in the past? How was I in the past? In the past, who had been I and who was I [in the subsequent existence]? Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? Who will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? In the future, having been who, who will I be?'
Also as regards the present, uncertainty arises in him thus: 'Do I exist? Do I not exist? Who am I? How am I? From where has this soul come? Where will this soul go?'
In a person who thus considers improperly there arises one of the six [wrong] views. The view 'I have self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I have no self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive self through self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive non-self through self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive self through non-self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, he has the view thus: 'That self of mine speaks, knows and experiences the results of wholesome and unwholesome actions. That self of mine is permanent, stable, durable, incorruptible and will be eternal like all things permanent.'

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.bpit.html

user12857: Bhikkhu K. Ñāṇananda, a Theravādin monk, did mention him from time to time. From Questions & Answers On Dhamma :

“The five ascetics were given a teaching based on the ethical middle
  path, avoiding the two extremes of kāmasukhal- likānuyoga and
  attakilamathānuyoga. But the middle path of right view is found in the
  Kaccānagotta Sutta, beautifully used by Ven. Nāgārjuna. When the
  Theravadins got engrossed with the Abhidhamma they forgot about it.
  The Mādhyamikas were alert enough to give it the attention it
  deserved.
(...)
“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna sermons,” he
  says, “because there was no need. All that was needed was already
  found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgārjuna brought to light what was
  already there but was hidden from view. Unfortunately his later
  followers turned it in to a vāda.”
He goes on to quote two of his favourite verses from Ven. Nāgārjuna’s
  Mūlamādhyamakakārikā (as usual, from memory):
Śūnyatā sarva-dṛṣtīnaṃ proktā niḥsaranaṃ jinaiḥ, yeṣāṃ śūnyatā-dṛṣtis
  tān asādhyān babhāṣire [MK 13.8] The Victorious Ones have declared
  that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are
  possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.
Sarva-dṛṣti-prahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat, anukampam upādāya taṃ
  namasyāmi gautamaṃ I reverently bow to Gautama who, out of compassion,
  has taught the doctrine in order to relinquish all views. – [MK 26.30]
Bhante doesn’t bother translating the verses; the ones provided above
  are by David Kalupahana.;
“When I first read the Kārikā I too was doubting Ven. Nāgārjuna’s
  sanity” he laughs. “But the work needs to be understood in the
  context. He was taking a jab at the Sarvāstivādins. To be honest, even
  the others deserve the rebuke, although they now try to get away by
  using Sarvāstivāda as an excuse. How skilled Ven. Nāgārjuna must have
  been, to compose those verses so elegantly and filling them with so
  much meaning, like the Dhammapada verses. It’s quite amazing. This has
  been rightly understood by Prof. Kalupahana.”
Prof. David J. Kalupahana is an eminent Sri Lankan scholar who stirred
  up another controversy when he portrayed Ven. Nāgārjuna as a reformist
  trying to resurrect early Buddhist teachings. He had been a lecturer
  during Bhante Ñāṇananda’s university days as a layman at Peradeniya.
(...)
“Ven. Nāgārjuna was right: at the end, all is empty. We are not
  willing to accept that existence is a perversion. Existence is
  suffering precisely because it is a perversion.”

See also this, this and this (from a more Early Buddhist Texts perspective than Theravādin, however).

user471: OP:

In his Fundamental Verses Nagarjuna demonstrates the absurdity of
  positive or extreme metaphysical positions.
Do Theravadans accept this proof as valid and sound?

Personally, I am not familiar with Nagarjuna's works regarding the absurdity of positive or extreme metaphysical positions.
Theravadans generally accept the absurdity of extreme metaphysical positions, because they accept the absurdity of all metaphysics, due to the following statements in the suttas.
So, I suppose we can say that Theravadans agree with Nagarjuna?
From Acintita Sutta:

"Conjecture about [the origin, etc., of] the world is an
  unconjecturable that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring
  madness & vexation to anyone who conjectured about it.

From Sabba Sutta:

"Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen & pay close attention. I will
  speak."
"As you say, lord," the monks responded.
The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear &
  sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations,
  intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would
  say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on
  what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable
  to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it
  lies beyond range."

To the Buddha, pragmatism was more important than metaphysics. Please see the Parable of the Poisoned Arrow.

user19253: Of course traditionally Theravada Buddhism has regarded Nagarjuna as not one of its own.  He has too long been claimed by Mahayana to expect otherwise.  But  some relatively recent scholarship regards him as a transitional figure, with close affinities -- as you suspect -- to Early Buddhism.  In fact, a very strong case can be made that he regarded himself as a defender of Gautama as recorded in the suttas. His opponents were not in the suttas, but in the Abhidharma philosophy that dates from several centuries after Gautama and several centuries before Mahayana.  
A.K. Warder's rather monumental Indian Buddhism argues that Nagarjuna was closer to Gautama than the Mahayana, and blurs the distinction.
David Kalupauhana's  Nagarjuna: Philosophy of the Middleway is an eminently scholarly translation and commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika which argues that Nagarjuna was not Mahayanist at all, and in fact makes the case that the Karika itself is a commentary on the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, upholding Gautama's view of the middle way between "eternalism" and "nihilism."
You can find Velez de Cea, “Emptiness in the Pali Suttas and the question of Nagarjuna's orthodoxy.” (Philosophy East and West 55(4) October 2005) on line. Here, parallels between Nagarjuna and the suttas are gathered, and Nagarjuna's roots in the suttas is demonstrated.  
In the Sunna Sutta, Gautama is asked: “In what respect is it said that the world is empty?" and answers; "Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self.” This is pretty much Nagarjuna's view. In the Sunyatatasaptati (Emptiness: The Seventy Stanzas),  he writes that “since the intrinsic being [self-nature] of all entities does not exist . . . therefore they are empty."   
The reason I have this at  my fingertips is because I've been spending my time in COVID lock-down writing a piece on Nagarjuna that argues that he believes he is upholding Gautama's Dharma.  Although it's dressed up, it was really written just to pass the time, but I'll put it on line for you, and in fact would be pleased if you read it, and comment if you wish. It will be at 
Reading  Nagarjuna -- A rendition of Chapters 1, 24, and 25 of The Mulamadhyamakakarika for Students of the Buddha's Dharma
You are right that Nagarjuna and Gautama both reject the unanswerable questions" about Ultimate Realities (and N. warns that only fools confuse emptiness with the Absolute), believing, in distinction to almost every religion,  that answers to metaphysical questions are not necessary for "salvation." As I suspect you know, the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta  asks "did I ever say to you . . . live the holy life under me, and I will declare to you that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal . . . [etc.].   The final chapter of the Karika, “Examination of Views,” is concerned entirely with  the unanswered questions contained in this and other suttas. The last verse of the Karika states:  “I reverently bow down to Gautama who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views.”  The "views" he refers to are the unanswered questions of the suttas. No more no less. 
I think it is clear from the suttas and Karika that there are 2 reasons for rejecting the unanswered questions -lst because they are improper questions in the sense that they have no answers, they are metaphysical speculations 2nd because they do help --- and N. echoes G. on both counts.
You can certainly, IMO, like me, be a follower of the Buddhism of the suttas and accept almost all of N.'s Karika. But whether a strict Theravedan would agree, I cannot say.

-1: <p>I appreciate that various aspects of Nagarjuna's teachings are rejected by Theravadans but I'm wondering where the line is drawn. For some of his teachings I can see room for scepticism, but what about his central argument? Four questions...</p>

<p>In his <em>Fundamental Verses</em> Nagarjuna demonstrates the absurdity of positive or extreme metaphysical positions. </p>

<p>Do Theravadans accept this proof as valid and sound? </p>

<p>Do they accept its result, which is the logical absurdity of extreme views? </p>

<p>If they do accept this logical result, do they also accept the falsity of such views?    </p>

<p>If they do not accept N's argument, on what grounds do they not do so?  </p>

<p>EDIT: Perhaps I should have asked just this. Is it possible to endorse the logical result of Nagarjuna's argument in <em>Fundamental Wisdom</em> and remain a Theravadan?   </p>
 -1: <p>You are referring to a full book comprising of 27 chapters, with at least ten different translations. That makes it hard to know what the &quot;positive or extreme metaphysical positions&quot; are for someone unfamiliar with his writings, so the question may be difficult to answer without specific references.</p>
<p>Anyway, with all due respect for Nagarjuna, from a fundamentalist approach here are some suggestions for demarcation criterias from the nikayas.</p>
<p><strong>AN 4.77:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mendicants, these four things are unthinkable. They should not be thought about, and anyone who tries to think about them will go mad or get frustrated. What four?</p>
<p>The scope of the Buddhas …</p>
<p>The scope of one in absorption …</p>
<p>The results of deeds …</p>
<p>Speculation about the world …</p>
<p>These are the four unthinkable things. They should not be thought about, and anyone who tries to think about them will go mad or get frustrated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://suttacentral.net/an4.77/en/sujato" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://suttacentral.net/an4.77/en/sujato</a></p>
<p><strong>MN 63:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>These positions that are undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One — 'The cosmos is eternal,' 'The cosmos is not eternal,' 'The cosmos is finite,' 'The cosmos is infinite,' 'The soul &amp; the body are the same,' 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' 'After death a Tathagata exists,' 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata both exists &amp; does not exist,' 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist' — I don't approve, I don't accept that the Blessed One has not declared them to me. I'll go ask the Blessed One about this matter. If he declares to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,' that 'The cosmos is not eternal,' that 'The cosmos is finite,' that 'The cosmos is infinite,' that 'The soul &amp; the body are the same,' that 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' that 'After death a Tathagata exists,' that 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' that 'After death a Tathagata both exists &amp; does not exist,' or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will live the holy life under him. If he does not declare to me that 'The cosmos is eternal,'... or that 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,' then I will renounce the training and return to the lower life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html</a></p>
<p><strong>MN 2:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>'Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? Who was I in the past? How was I in the past? In the past, who had been I and who was I [in the subsequent existence]? Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? Who will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? In the future, having been who, who will I be?'</p>
<p>Also as regards the present, uncertainty arises in him thus: 'Do I exist? Do I not exist? Who am I? How am I? From where has this soul come? Where will this soul go?'</p>
<p>In a person who thus considers improperly there arises one of the six [wrong] views. The view 'I have self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I have no self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive self through self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive non-self through self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, the view 'I perceive self through non-self' arises in him really and firmly. Or, he has the view thus: 'That self of mine speaks, knows and experiences the results of wholesome and unwholesome actions. That self of mine is permanent, stable, durable, incorruptible and will be eternal like all things permanent.'</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.bpit.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.bpit.html</a></p>
 12857: <p>Bhikkhu K. Ñāṇananda, a Theravādin monk, did mention him from time to time. From <a href="http://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Questions-and-Answers_Web_Edition_Rev_0-9.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Questions &amp; Answers On Dhamma</a> :</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>“The five ascetics were given a teaching based on the ethical middle
  path, avoiding the two extremes of kāmasukhal- likānuyoga and
  attakilamathānuyoga. But the middle path of right view is found in the
  Kaccānagotta Sutta, beautifully used by Ven. Nāgārjuna. When the
  Theravadins got engrossed with the Abhidhamma they forgot about it.
  The Mādhyamikas were alert enough to give it the attention it
  deserved.</p>
  
  <p>(...)</p>
  
  <p>“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna sermons,” he
  says, “because there was no need. All that was needed was already
  found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgārjuna brought to light what was
  already there but was hidden from view. Unfortunately his later
  followers turned it in to a vāda.”</p>
  
  <p>He goes on to quote two of his favourite verses from Ven. Nāgārjuna’s
  Mūlamādhyamakakārikā (as usual, from memory):</p>
  
  <p>Śūnyatā sarva-dṛṣtīnaṃ proktā niḥsaranaṃ jinaiḥ, yeṣāṃ śūnyatā-dṛṣtis
  tān asādhyān babhāṣire [MK 13.8] The Victorious Ones have declared
  that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are
  possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible.</p>
  
  <p>Sarva-dṛṣti-prahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat, anukampam upādāya taṃ
  namasyāmi gautamaṃ I reverently bow to Gautama who, out of compassion,
  has taught the doctrine in order to relinquish all views. – [MK 26.30]</p>
  
  <p>Bhante doesn’t bother translating the verses; the ones provided above
  are by David Kalupahana.;</p>
  
  <p>“When I first read the Kārikā I too was doubting Ven. Nāgārjuna’s
  sanity” he laughs. “But the work needs to be understood in the
  context. He was taking a jab at the Sarvāstivādins. To be honest, even
  the others deserve the rebuke, although they now try to get away by
  using Sarvāstivāda as an excuse. How skilled Ven. Nāgārjuna must have
  been, to compose those verses so elegantly and filling them with so
  much meaning, like the Dhammapada verses. It’s quite amazing. This has
  been rightly understood by Prof. Kalupahana.”</p>
  
  <p>Prof. David J. Kalupahana is an eminent Sri Lankan scholar who stirred
  up another controversy when he portrayed Ven. Nāgārjuna as a reformist
  trying to resurrect early Buddhist teachings. He had been a lecturer
  during Bhante Ñāṇananda’s university days as a layman at Peradeniya.</p>
  
  <p>(...)</p>
  
  <p>“Ven. Nāgārjuna was right: at the end, all is empty. We are not
  willing to accept that existence is a perversion. Existence is
  suffering precisely because it is a perversion.”</p>
</blockquote>

<p>See also <a href="https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/nagarjuna-early-buddhist-texts/9903" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a>, <a href="https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/nibbana-sa-sara/15674" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a> and <a href="https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/nagarjunas-eight-negations/14700" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a> (from a more Early Buddhist Texts perspective than Theravādin, however).</p>
 471: <p>OP:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In his Fundamental Verses Nagarjuna demonstrates the absurdity of
  positive or extreme metaphysical positions.</p>
  
  <p>Do Theravadans accept this proof as valid and sound?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Personally, I am not familiar with Nagarjuna's works regarding the absurdity of positive or extreme metaphysical positions.</p>

<p>Theravadans generally accept the absurdity of extreme metaphysical positions, because they accept the absurdity of all metaphysics, due to the following statements in the suttas.</p>

<p>So, I suppose we can say that Theravadans agree with Nagarjuna?</p>

<p>From <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.077.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Acintita Sutta</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>"Conjecture about [the origin, etc., of] the world is an
  unconjecturable that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring
  madness &amp; vexation to anyone who conjectured about it.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>From <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.023.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Sabba Sutta</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>"Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen &amp; pay close attention. I will
  speak."</p>
  
  <p>"As you say, lord," the monks responded.</p>
  
  <p>The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye &amp; forms, ear &amp;
  sounds, nose &amp; aromas, tongue &amp; flavors, body &amp; tactile sensations,
  intellect &amp; ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would
  say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on
  what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable
  to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it
  lies beyond range."</p>
</blockquote>

<p>To the Buddha, pragmatism was more important than metaphysics. Please see the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable_of_the_Poisoned_Arrow" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Parable of the Poisoned Arrow</a>.</p>
 19253: <p>Of course traditionally Theravada Buddhism has regarded Nagarjuna as not one of its own.  He has too long been claimed by Mahayana to expect otherwise.  But  some relatively recent scholarship regards him as a transitional figure, with close affinities -- as you suspect -- to Early Buddhism.  In fact, a very strong case can be made that he regarded himself as a defender of Gautama as recorded in the suttas. His opponents were not in the suttas, but in the Abhidharma philosophy that dates from several centuries after Gautama and several centuries before Mahayana.  </p>

<p>A.K. Warder's rather monumental Indian Buddhism argues that Nagarjuna was closer to Gautama than the Mahayana, and blurs the distinction.</p>

<p>David Kalupauhana's  Nagarjuna: Philosophy of the Middleway is an eminently scholarly translation and commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika which argues that Nagarjuna was not Mahayanist at all, and in fact makes the case that the Karika itself is a commentary on the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, upholding Gautama's view of the middle way between "eternalism" and "nihilism."</p>

<p>You can find Velez de Cea, “Emptiness in the Pali Suttas and the question of Nagarjuna's orthodoxy.” (Philosophy East and West 55(4) October 2005) on line. Here, parallels between Nagarjuna and the suttas are gathered, and Nagarjuna's roots in the suttas is demonstrated.  </p>

<p>In the Sunna Sutta, Gautama is asked: “In what respect is it said that the world is empty?" and answers; "Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self.” This is pretty much Nagarjuna's view. In the Sunyatatasaptati (Emptiness: The Seventy Stanzas),  he writes that “since the intrinsic being [self-nature] of all entities does not exist . . . therefore they are empty."   </p>

<p>The reason I have this at  my fingertips is because I've been spending my time in COVID lock-down writing a piece on Nagarjuna that argues that he believes he is upholding Gautama's Dharma.  Although it's dressed up, it was really written just to pass the time, but I'll put it on line for you, and in fact would be pleased if you read it, and comment if you wish. It will be at </p>

<p><a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vR577I7kwntIVXKkC3REZ_TCCTQUQUlMOEjbAGAqSEFOU96aEPm3X-iCY4QlE0hQA15drkACSBVOdRp/pub" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Reading  Nagarjuna -- A rendition of Chapters 1, 24, and 25 of The Mulamadhyamakakarika for Students of the Buddha's Dharma</a></p>

<p>You are right that Nagarjuna and Gautama both reject the unanswerable questions" about Ultimate Realities (and N. warns that only fools confuse emptiness with the Absolute), believing, in distinction to almost every religion,  that answers to metaphysical questions are not necessary for "salvation." As I suspect you know, the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta  asks "did I ever say to you . . . live the holy life under me, and I will declare to you that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal . . . [etc.].   The final chapter of the Karika, “Examination of Views,” is concerned entirely with  the unanswered questions contained in this and other suttas. The last verse of the Karika states:  “I reverently bow down to Gautama who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views.”  The "views" he refers to are the unanswered questions of the suttas. No more no less. </p>

<p>I think it is clear from the suttas and Karika that there are 2 reasons for rejecting the unanswered questions -lst because they are improper questions in the sense that they have no answers, they are metaphysical speculations 2nd because they do help --- and N. echoes G. on both counts.</p>

<p>You can certainly, IMO, like me, be a follower of the Buddhism of the suttas and accept almost all of N.'s Karika. But whether a strict Theravedan would agree, I cannot say.</p>
