user13375: It is widely understood across all Buddhist traditions that the Buddha often spoke of persons and used words like 'I' and 'person' and 'self' and this is not seen as problematic or contradictory to the doctrine of anatman.
Just as it is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’
SN 5.10

It is also self-evident that the Buddha would associate a proper name with individual beings and use this name conventionally over time to identify specific individuals. This is also not controversial for any Buddhist tradition that I'm aware.
However, there were times when "the self" was discussed in such a way that the Buddha would not answer such as the famous case of Vacchagotta. It is widely understood that the Buddha found Vacchagotta's questions or mindset about those questions as problematic. Specifically, he held that Vacchagotta was confused or had some invalid presuppositions about the self that directly violated or contradicted the doctrine of anatman.
Vacchagotta held to the notion that the self necessarily had hypostatic existence. Other words for this include "intrinsic", "inherent", "substantial", by different traditions of Buddhism.
There are some on this forum who hold that speaking of the self in this life - when it is merely for conventional communication - is fine and not in contradiction to anatman, but speaking of the self in other lives in the same continuity is strictly forbidden as always contradicting anatman and necessarily presupposing hypostatic existence.
Why insist that all discussions of future or past lives necessarily entails the presupposition of hypostatic existence? In short, why is it that hypostatic existence is only sometimes the basis for discussions in this life, but always the basis for discussions about past or future lives? Why do some hold so dearly that the Buddha could not be speaking of future lives in the very same conventional manner that the Buddha often used the word "I" to refer to himself in his present life... merely as a means of communicating the truth to worldly beings?
Why is it that some believe we can speak faultlessly of persons in this life and identifying them across various points in time in this life, but we are foreclosed of speaking faultlessly of persons in next lives or in past lives?

Update: trying to make this more clear given discussions in answers below...
Consider the Yamaka Sutta:

“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling,
perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as
the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do
you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling,
without perception, without volitional formations, without
consciousness?”—“No, friend.”
“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and
actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I
understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
the body and does not exist after death’?”
SN 22.85

From this we can draw four conclusions:

It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as possessing or consisting of the aggregates taken together

It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as not-possessing the aggregates or without them taken together

The Tathagata is not to be regarded as "real and actual" aka hypostatically existent

This is true both for future lives (the focus of Yamaka's question) as well as the present life


If this is so, then it was entirely appropriate to refer to the Tathagata as existing in his present life, but not to do so with the presupposition that the Tathagata was hypostatically existent aka 'real and actual', right? It was faultless to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally, right?
If this is so, then why is it a fault to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally in a future life? Indeed, Yamaka was rebuked for denying this very thing, right?!
With this question I'm interested in the perspective and answers from all the Buddhist traditions.

user8157: I must read the entire question later. However, to answer the title of the question: the Pali suttas have a number of examples of speaking about the 'conventional self' in past and future lives (eg. MN 81, MN 123 and MN 143).
Personally, I regard all of this as "fake dhamma" composed under the ambitions of King Ashoka, when probably the Jataka, Buddhavamsa and Apadana (which are all about literal past lives) were composed. For example:

MN 81 (which says "I was" in a past life) contradicts SN 22.79 (which says any recollect of the past is not-self and mere aggregates).
MN 81 includes the phrase 'ahaṃ tena samayena') found numerously in the later day Buddhavamsa.
MN 123 (where a new born infant says "I am") contradicts MN 64 (which says a new born infant cannot have "identity").
MN 143 contradicts other suttas that say Anathapindikovada was a stream-enterer. If Anathapindikovada was a stream-enterer, he obviously understood the dhamma of non-attachment spoken in MN 143, which MN 143 says Anathapindikovada never heard before.


It is both from chronological point of view and as a class of poetical
composition, [that] the Pali Apadāna ranks with the Buddhavaṁsa and
Cariyāpiṭaka. According to the traditional enumeration of the Buddhist
canonical texts, these are reckoned as the last three works of the
Khuddaka Nikāya. Even from the doctrinal point of view the three works
together show the Mahāyāna [OMG!] Buddhism in the making.
Buddhakhetta and Buddhāpadāna by Mr. Dwijendralal Barua, M.A


13375: <p>It is <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28659/is-this-talk-just-a-convention">widely understood across all Buddhist traditions</a> that the Buddha often <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28646/is-it-correct-to-say-that-one-who-craves-for-and-imply-existence-of-self/28651#28651">spoke of persons</a> and used words like 'I' and 'person' and 'self' and this is not seen as problematic or contradictory to the doctrine of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatt%C4%81" rel="nofollow noreferrer">anatman.</a></p>
<p>Just as it is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,<br />
The word ‘chariot’ is used,<br />
So, when the aggregates exist,<br />
There is the convention ‘a being.’</p>
<p><a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn5.10/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 5.10</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is also self-evident that the Buddha would associate a proper name with individual beings and use this name conventionally over time to identify specific individuals. This is also not controversial for any Buddhist tradition that I'm aware.</p>
<p>However, there were times when &quot;the self&quot; was discussed in such a way that the Buddha would not answer such as the famous case of <a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn44.10/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Vacchagotta.</a> It is widely understood that the Buddha found Vacchagotta's questions or mindset about those questions as problematic. Specifically, he held that Vacchagotta was confused or had some invalid presuppositions about the self that directly violated or contradicted the doctrine of anatman.</p>
<p>Vacchagotta held to the notion that the self necessarily had <a href="https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hypostatic" rel="nofollow noreferrer">hypostatic existence.</a> Other words for this include &quot;intrinsic&quot;, &quot;inherent&quot;, &quot;substantial&quot;, by different traditions of Buddhism.</p>
<p>There are some on this forum who hold that speaking of <em>the self in this life</em> - when it is merely for conventional communication - is fine and not in contradiction to anatman, but speaking of <em>the self in other lives</em> in the same continuity is strictly forbidden as always contradicting anatman and necessarily presupposing hypostatic existence.</p>
<p>Why insist that all discussions of future or past lives necessarily entails the presupposition of hypostatic existence? In short, why is it that hypostatic existence is only sometimes the basis for discussions in this life, but always the basis for discussions about past or future lives? Why do some hold so dearly that the Buddha could not be speaking of future lives in the very same conventional manner that the Buddha often used the word &quot;I&quot; to refer to himself in his present life... merely as a means of communicating the truth to worldly beings?</p>
<p>Why is it that some believe we can speak faultlessly of persons in this life and identifying them across various points in time in this life, but we are foreclosed of speaking faultlessly of persons in next lives or in past lives?</p>
<hr />
<p>Update: trying to make this more clear given discussions in answers below...</p>
<p>Consider the Yamaka Sutta:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling,
perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as
the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.” “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do
you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling,
without perception, without volitional formations, without
consciousness?”—“No, friend.”</p>
<p>“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and
actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I
understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
the body and does not exist after death’?”</p>
<p><a href="https://suttacentral.net/dn1/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 22.85</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>From this we can draw four conclusions:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as possessing or consisting of the aggregates taken together</p>
</li>
<li><p>It is not appropriate to regard the Tathagata as not-possessing the aggregates or without them taken together</p>
</li>
<li><p>The Tathagata is not to be regarded as &quot;real and actual&quot; aka hypostatically existent</p>
</li>
<li><p>This is true both for future lives (the focus of Yamaka's question) as well as the present life</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>If this is so, then it was entirely appropriate to refer to the Tathagata as existing in his present life, but not to do so with the presupposition that the Tathagata was hypostatically existent aka 'real and actual', right? It was faultless to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally, right?</p>
<p>If this is so, then why is it a fault to refer to the Tathagata as merely existing conventionally in a future life? Indeed, Yamaka was rebuked for denying this very thing, right?!</p>
<p>With this question I'm interested in the perspective and answers from all the Buddhist traditions.</p>
 8157: <p>I must read the entire question later. However, to answer the title of the question: the Pali suttas have a number of examples of speaking about the 'conventional self' in past and future lives (eg. MN 81, MN 123 and MN 143).</p>
<p>Personally, I regard all of this as &quot;fake dhamma&quot; composed under the ambitions of King Ashoka, when probably the Jataka, Buddhavamsa and Apadana (which are all about literal past lives) were composed. For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>MN 81 (which says &quot;I was&quot; in a past life) contradicts SN 22.79 (which says any recollect of the past is not-self and mere aggregates).</li>
<li>MN 81 includes the phrase 'ahaṃ tena samayena') found numerously in the later day Buddhavamsa.</li>
<li>MN 123 (where a new born infant says &quot;I am&quot;) contradicts MN 64 (which says a new born infant cannot have &quot;identity&quot;).</li>
<li>MN 143 contradicts other suttas that say Anathapindikovada was a stream-enterer. If Anathapindikovada was a stream-enterer, he obviously understood the dhamma of non-attachment spoken in MN 143, which MN 143 says Anathapindikovada never heard before.</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>It is both from chronological point of view and as a class of poetical
composition, [that] the Pali Apadāna ranks with the Buddhavaṁsa and
Cariyāpiṭaka. According to the traditional enumeration of the Buddhist
canonical texts, these are reckoned as the last three works of the
Khuddaka Nikāya. Even from the doctrinal point of view the three works
together show the <strong>Mahāyāna</strong> [OMG!] Buddhism in the making.</p>
<p>Buddhakhetta and Buddhāpadāna by Mr. Dwijendralal Barua, M.A</p>
</blockquote>
