user-1: 
According to the Brahmajala Sutta, Ajita propounded Ucchedavada (the
Doctrine of Annihilation after death) and Tam-Jivam-tam-sariram-vada
(the doctrine of identity of the soul and body), which denied the
separate existence of an eternal soul.

Annihilationism is usually thought of as one extreme, which assumes an atman. But if atman is permanent, I don't easily see the error here.

Why is it a self view?
Can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman?
If not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching, and is it still Ucchedavada?


user471: There's a very detailed description in DN 1.
Eternalism is the view that the self, atta or atman, is different from the body, and is eternal. When the body is destroyed, the self moves on to another body. But the self is never destroyed, is permanent and eternal.
Annihilation is the view where the self is identical with the body, and so it exists while the body exists and it is destroyed when the body is destroyed.
Or if someone holds the view that the self is a subtler body that exists when the physical body exists and will be destroyed with the destruction of the physical body, then that's also annihilationism.
Partial-eternalism is the view that either some beings are eternal (like God) while others are not, or some beings are eternal but could lose their immortality by corruption, or that consciousness or mind is eternal while body is not.
The above are all variants of self-view.
The Buddha taught that the self is a dependently originated emergent phenomena, a mental idea, that changes from time to time, depending on conditions. It's neither permanent nor standalone. Other things like body, mind, consciousness are all dependently originated conditioned phenomena.

-1: <blockquote>
<p>According to the Brahmajala Sutta, Ajita propounded Ucchedavada (the
Doctrine of Annihilation after death) and Tam-Jivam-tam-sariram-vada
(the doctrine of identity of the soul and body), which denied the
separate existence of an eternal soul.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Annihilationism is usually thought of as one extreme, which assumes an atman. But if atman is permanent, I don't easily see the error here.</p>
<ol>
<li>Why is it a self view?</li>
<li>Can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman?</li>
<li>If not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching, and is it still Ucchedavada?</li>
</ol>
 471: <p>There's a very detailed description in <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.01.0.bodh.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DN 1</a>.</p>
<p>Eternalism is the view that the self, atta or atman, is different from the body, and is eternal. When the body is destroyed, the self moves on to another body. But the self is never destroyed, is permanent and eternal.</p>
<p>Annihilation is the view where the self is identical with the body, and so it exists while the body exists and it is destroyed when the body is destroyed.</p>
<p>Or if someone holds the view that the self is a subtler body that exists when the physical body exists and will be destroyed with the destruction of the physical body, then that's also annihilationism.</p>
<p>Partial-eternalism is the view that either some beings are eternal (like God) while others are not, or some beings are eternal but could lose their immortality by corruption, or that consciousness or mind is eternal while body is not.</p>
<p>The above are all variants of self-view.</p>
<p>The Buddha taught that the self is a dependently originated emergent phenomena, a mental idea, that changes from time to time, depending on conditions. It's neither permanent nor standalone. Other things like body, mind, consciousness are all dependently originated conditioned phenomena.</p>
