user471: I read "Anatta and Rebirth" by Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (let's call this explanation B) and I also read similar explanations by Yuttadhammo Bhikkhu from this answer, this comment and this answer (let's call this explanation Y).
First I need to make some definitions and assumptions, before asking my questions:

The birth and death of a moment in Y is equivalent to the birth and death of selfhood in B i.e. a moment of selfhood.
The definition of birth (jati) and existence (bhava) comes from SN 12.2, while the definition of being (satta) comes from SN 5.10.
Sammuti-marana or conventional death or conceptual death is equivalent to the event of physical death (according to this answer).
"At the moment of conceptual death, this process of momentary birth and death continues unimpeded unless one has experienced 'death by cutting off'" in Y is what I will call "continuity of suffering beyond physical death" (that is, without rebirth).
The fact that the Buddha taught that there is no rebirth whatsoever is proven in the story of Bhikkhu Sati in MN 38, where Sati describes his understanding of rebirth, "it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another" and consciousness as "it is that which speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions". This is a kind of self view associating consciousness and self.
The fact that the Buddha taught that suffering can continue beyond physical death is proven in many suttas: MN 4 ("with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared"), SN 15.3 (ocean of tears), SN 44.9, Dhp 400 (last body), MN 57, SN 42.3, DN 2, Dhp 153-154 and many more.
Explanation Y supports both #5 and #6 above.
Explanation B supports #5 above, but does not explicitly reject #6 above.
There are some Buddhists (sometimes describing themselves as Secular Buddhists) who reject rebirth and also reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death. They claim to reconcile Buddhism with science using explanation B, and say that any kind of continuity beyond physical death is superstition.
Those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to DN 1 and SN 12.17. Both are false views.

Questions:

Am I right to say that Buddhadasa Bhikkhu in "Anatta and Rebirth" (explanation B), while correctly rejecting rebirth, did not explicitly reject the continuity of suffering beyond physical death? 
Are there any other sources, from speeches or writings of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, that prove that he had explicitly rejected the continuity of suffering beyond physical death?
Am I right to say that those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to DN 1 and SN 12.17?


user13375: I don't know Buddhadasa Bhikkhu nor Yuttadhammo Bhikkhu so I can't speak to their views.
As for this:

"The fact that the Buddha taught that there is no rebirth whatsoever
is proven in the story of Bhikkhu Sati in MN 38, where Sati describes
his understanding of rebirth, "it is this same consciousness that runs
and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another" and
consciousness as "it is that which speaks and feels and experiences
here and there the result of good and bad actions". This is a kind of
self view associating consciousness and self."

I do not think this is a correct assumption and the conclusion does not follow from the evidence. Just because Bhikkhu Sati was faulted for speaking of rebirth in a certain way it doesn't follow that everyone is so faulted for speaking of rebirth in any way.
The story of Bhikkhu Sati (MN 38) and the story of Bhikkhu Yamaka (SN 22.85) offer a very revealing contrast and when taken together refute this assumption.
Both Bhikkhu Sati and Bhikkhu Yamaka had the false view of the hypostatic existence of the self (aka that the self is "real and actual"). The former identified the self with "the same consciousness" existing in life after life. This is indeed an eternalistic view and incorrect. The latter identified the self with "the body" and asserted that with its' break up, the self ends. This is indeed an annihilationist view and incorrect.
The thing that links both of these is the appearance and belief in a real and actual self. That is why they were rebuked. It is not appropriate to regard the self as possessing or consisting of the aggregates nor as existing under its own power separate from the aggregates.

"“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling,
perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as
the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as one
who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without
volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, friend.”"
“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and
actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I
understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
the body and does not exist after death’?”
SN 22.85

Now some people have taken this teaching and come to the wrong conclusion that it is incorrect to assert that the self exists or to speak of the self at all. However, we know this is just wrong. The Buddha often spoke of people as existing and also used normal everyday language. He used the words "I" and "mine" and "person" and "self" and used proper names all the time. This is not controversial because it is widely understood that the Buddha did so when speaking conventionally and was faultless since he had completely gone beyond the appearance or belief in hypostatic existence (aka real and actual).
The reason your assumption is wrong is because you are ruling out that it is possible to speak of rebirth in exactly that way: by speaking conventionally and faultlessly without any appearance or belief in hypostatic existence. Indeed, the Buddha spoke often of rebirth just like this.
Just as it is possible to speak faultlessly about persons in this life, it is possible to speak faultlessly about rebirth of those persons in future lives and in past lives. The fault only entails when the speech is presumed upon the basis of the appearance and belief in hypostatic existence. That fault is equal in severity and scope whether an ignorant one is speaking of this life, past lives or future lives.
Just as we can speak faultlessly of persons existing in this very life even though they are not "real and actual" we can speak of persons existing in future or past lives even though they are not "real and actual."
Indeed we must. Why? Because it is so! Persons and selves exist in this very life and they also exist in past and future lives. The Buddha only spoke the truth.
For those who don't hold to this I've asked this question so I can understand how they've arrived at the idea that speaking of rebirth is never faultless, but speaking of persons in this life can be.

471: <p>I read "<a href="https://www.dhammatalks.net/Books7/Buddhadasa_Bhikkhu_Anatta_and_Rebirth.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Anatta and Rebirth</a>" by Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (let's call this explanation B) and I also read similar explanations by Yuttadhammo Bhikkhu from <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/10113/471">this answer</a>, <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/10067/#comment14637_10113">this comment</a> and <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/53/471">this answer</a> (let's call this explanation Y).</p>

<p>First I need to make some definitions and assumptions, before asking my questions:</p>

<ol>
<li>The birth and death of a moment in Y is equivalent to the birth and death of selfhood in B i.e. a moment of selfhood.</li>
<li>The definition of birth (jati) and existence (bhava) comes from <a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn12.2/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 12.2</a>, while the definition of being (satta) comes from <a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn5.10/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 5.10</a>.</li>
<li>Sammuti-marana or conventional death or conceptual death is equivalent to the event of physical death (according to <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/30429/471">this answer</a>).</li>
<li>"<em>At the moment of conceptual death, this process of momentary birth and death continues unimpeded unless one has experienced 'death by cutting off'</em>" in Y is what I will call "continuity of suffering beyond physical death" (that is, without rebirth).</li>
<li>The fact that the Buddha taught that there is no rebirth whatsoever is proven in the story of Bhikkhu Sati in <a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn38/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 38</a>, where Sati describes his understanding of rebirth, "<em>it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another</em>" and consciousness as "<em>it is that which speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions</em>". This is a kind of self view associating consciousness and self.</li>
<li>The fact that the Buddha taught that suffering can continue beyond physical death is proven in many suttas: <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.004.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 4</a> ("<em>with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared</em>"), <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn15/sn15.003.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 15.3</a> (ocean of tears), <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.009.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 44.9</a>, <a href="http://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/verseload.php?verse=400" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dhp 400</a> (last body), <a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn57/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 57</a>, <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn42/sn42.003.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 42.3</a>, <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html#recollection" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DN 2</a>, <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.11.than.html#dhp-154" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dhp 153-154</a> and many more.</li>
<li>Explanation Y supports both #5 and #6 above.</li>
<li>Explanation B supports #5 above, but does not explicitly reject #6 above.</li>
<li>There are some Buddhists (sometimes describing themselves as Secular Buddhists) who reject rebirth and also reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death. They claim to reconcile Buddhism with science using explanation B, and say that any kind of continuity beyond physical death is superstition.</li>
<li>Those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to <a href="https://suttacentral.net/dn1/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DN 1</a> and <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.017.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 12.17</a>. Both are false views.</li>
</ol>

<p>Questions:</p>

<ol>
<li>Am I right to say that Buddhadasa Bhikkhu in "<a href="https://www.dhammatalks.net/Books7/Buddhadasa_Bhikkhu_Anatta_and_Rebirth.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Anatta and Rebirth</a>" (explanation B), while correctly rejecting rebirth, did not explicitly reject the continuity of suffering beyond physical death? </li>
<li>Are there any other sources, from speeches or writings of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, that prove that he had explicitly rejected the continuity of suffering beyond physical death?</li>
<li>Am I right to say that those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to <a href="https://suttacentral.net/dn1/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DN 1</a> and <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.017.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 12.17</a>?</li>
</ol>
 13375: <p>I don't know Buddhadasa Bhikkhu nor Yuttadhammo Bhikkhu so I can't speak to their views.</p>
<p>As for this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;The fact that the Buddha taught that there is no rebirth whatsoever
is proven in the story of Bhikkhu Sati in MN 38, where Sati describes
his understanding of rebirth, &quot;it is this same consciousness that runs
and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another&quot; and
consciousness as &quot;it is that which speaks and feels and experiences
here and there the result of good and bad actions&quot;. This is a kind of
self view associating consciousness and self.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I do not think this is a correct assumption and the conclusion does not follow from the evidence. Just because Bhikkhu Sati was faulted for speaking of rebirth in <em>a certain way</em> it doesn't follow that everyone is so faulted for speaking of rebirth <em>in any way.</em></p>
<p>The story of Bhikkhu Sati (<a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn38/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 38</a>) and the story of Bhikkhu Yamaka (<a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn22.85/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 22.85</a>) offer a very revealing contrast and when taken together refute this assumption.</p>
<p>Both Bhikkhu Sati and Bhikkhu Yamaka had the false view of the hypostatic existence of the self (aka that the self is &quot;real and actual&quot;). The former identified the self with &quot;the same consciousness&quot; existing in life after life. This is indeed an eternalistic view and incorrect. The latter identified the self with &quot;the body&quot; and asserted that with its' break up, the self ends. This is indeed an annihilationist view and incorrect.</p>
<p>The thing that links both of these is the appearance and belief in a <em>real and actual</em> self. That is why they were rebuked. It is not appropriate to regard the self as possessing or consisting of the aggregates nor as existing under its own power separate from the aggregates.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling,
perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as
the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”</p>
<p>“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as one
who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without
volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, friend.”&quot;</p>
<p>“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not <strong>apprehended by you as real and
actual</strong> here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I
understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
the body and does not exist after death’?”</p>
<p><a href="https://suttacentral.net/sn22.85/en/bodhi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 22.85</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Now some people have taken this teaching and come to the wrong conclusion that it is incorrect to assert that the self exists or to speak of the self at all. However, we know this is just wrong. The Buddha often spoke of people as existing and also used normal everyday language. He used the words &quot;I&quot; and &quot;mine&quot; and &quot;person&quot; and &quot;self&quot; and used proper names all the time. This is <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/28659/13375">not controversial</a> because it is widely understood that the Buddha did so when speaking conventionally and was faultless since he had completely gone beyond the appearance or belief in hypostatic existence (aka real and actual).</p>
<p>The reason your assumption is wrong is because you are ruling out that it is possible to speak of rebirth in exactly that way: by speaking conventionally and faultlessly without any appearance or belief in hypostatic existence. Indeed, the Buddha spoke often of rebirth just like this.</p>
<p>Just as it is possible to speak faultlessly about persons in this life, it is possible to speak faultlessly about rebirth of those persons in future lives and in past lives. The fault only entails when the speech is presumed upon the basis of the appearance and belief in hypostatic existence. That fault is equal in severity and scope whether an ignorant one is speaking of this life, past lives or future lives.</p>
<p>Just as we can speak faultlessly of persons existing in this very life even though they are not &quot;real and actual&quot; we can speak of persons existing in future or past lives even though they are not &quot;real and actual.&quot;</p>
<p>Indeed we must. Why? Because it is so! Persons and selves exist in this very life and they also exist in past and future lives. The Buddha only spoke the truth.</p>
<p>For those who don't hold to this <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/45065/13375">I've asked this question</a> so I can understand how they've arrived at the idea that speaking of rebirth is never faultless, but speaking of persons in this life can be.</p>
