user20830: I've been a practitioner of Vipassana and Mahamudra for 2 years now. One thing quite bothering me is various explanations from different teachers on emptiness logically disturbing...
Usually, it goes like this:

The flower before you seems real. Now get closer, you no longer see flower, but just leaves, stem. Even closer, you "see" atoms, electrons, etc.
See? the flower is "empty" of inherent existence. The same goes for "self". Try search for the "self" in your thoughts, arm, leg, etc. and you would find nothing.

Of course I could appreciate this mentally helps in someway in practice. But something falls short.
First, it feels "outdated" to me, in a post-calculus world, that it denies the validity of an aggregate object, by pointing towards an infinitesimally small part of it. Zeno paradox?
Secondly, the requirement of "look closer" (or farther) seem to assert the perceiver model. That logic (or its inverse) would seem to imply that, "in order for something A to be truly existent, that thing needs to be A in all perceivable cases". That A would then seem to be only possible as some kind of "totality", or awareness itself. So that felt like a semantics game then.
I'm sure there're better ways to explain the Buddhist emptiness logic in a more modern compatible way. Please enlighten me.

user20010: That's because there is no logic to it.  Emptiness isn't apprehended by the discursive mind.  It is perceived directly.  One could roughly equate it to smelling.  How could you logically describe the sense of smell to someone who hasn't had that perception?  Any explanation you could offer would ultimately fall short.
Buddhist philosophy isn't a philosophy in a conventional Western sense.  It isn't a set of ideas about ideas or even a set of ideas about the nature of reality.  Buddhist philosophy is derived from the experience of emptiness, not the idea of emptiness.  To come at it without that initial experiential knowledge is to undermine your understanding and set yourself up for all kinds of ridiculous misunderstandings (eg Yogacara is a kind of idealism).
When you come to see emptiness for yourself, the philosophy takes on a radically different character.  The same words start to take on an entirely different set of meaning.  Once you have developed your "emptiness sense" you open yourself up to entirely different way of understanding.  Here, there is no logic.  There is only seeing and knowing.

user13709: Richard Feynman, who definitely lived in the post-calculus world, once pondered flowers down to the atomic level and beyond. Feynman would also gladly point out the vast emptiness between those very atoms. Importantly, Feynman continuously pokes at conventional perceptions of a flower as being "real" and notes that the perception of an aggregate is an experience mediated by particles and forces that don't have precise boundaries.
And, like Feynman, the Buddha recommended a deep investigation of emptiness at the limits of perception:

MN121:12.5: There is only this that is not emptiness, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’
MN121:12.6: And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present.
MN121:12.7: That’s how emptiness is born in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure.

Both Feynman and the Buddha were empirical--they both taught observation as the foundation for understanding. Neither Feynman nor the Buddha found ultimately reality in aggregates such as flowers, which are fundamentally empty.

user254: Part of the "philosophy of science" (as it was taught me in Physics class in school) is that there are different ways of looking at things, different levels of details -- e.g. sub-atomic physics, then chemistry, biology, maybe ecology after that, astro-physics -- not to even mention sociology, psychology, maths, and so on.
So these are different "levels" (of detail), different "models" (of so-called reality).
More of that "philosophy of science" was about how they test and evolve their models.
Various models are (or are not) useful -- e.g. have "predictive ability" (predict the future), or "descriptive ability" (describe or help to make sense of past observations or so-called "facts"), and different models are (or aren't) useful in the context of different problems or different types of (experimental) observation.
I expect (without really knowing) that the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness may be similar -- i.e. that whatever model of reality we grasp is only a model -- and that grasping a specific model may be unfortunate or unhappy, or not as useful as being less attached (to a specific model or view).
For further details I might reference other questions tagged sunyata but perhaps you reviewed those already. My main question on the subject was What is the purpose of the Mahayana 'emptiness' doctrine?
And if it isn't only to do with (being an antidote to) having fixed "views", it's also to do with having (or helping you to escape from) fixed "values" -- by which I'm refer to Persig's description of value rigidity -- especially when the value, rigidity, or attachment is "harmful" or "useless", though that might be subjective or observer-centric ... or, might be universal, I mean, agreed on by "the wise" at least.

user-1: 
Usually,it goes like this - the flower before you seems real. Now get closer, you no longer see flower, but just leaves, stem. Even closer, you "see" atoms, electrons, etc. See? the flower is "empty" of inherent existence. The same goes for "self". Try search for the "self" in your thoughts, arm, leg, etc. and you would find nothing.
Of coz I could appreciate this mentally helps in someway in practice. But sth. falls short.
First, it feels "outdated" to me, in a post-calculus world, that it denies the validity of an aggregate object, by pointing towards an infinitesimally small part of it. Zeno paradox?

As i understand it, this is close to what you are saying?

The expression presented to you is disagreeable as it assumes that one can indefinitely "zoom in" on a perceived object to perceive it's constituent objects and this is falsified by the zeno's paradox.

The expression presented to you is disagreeable because it assumes the existence of an object which becomes an object of perception, the object exists independetly of perception, the non-perceived object then becomes an object of perception when perceived and is spoken of as consisting of infinitely small elements. As you understand the expression posits objectification beyond a percepients frame of reference as well as an objectification of perception based on a particular frame of reference. This you disagree with on account of special relativity which demonstrates that one can not attribute the perceived qualities to what is thought of as not objectified based on the six sense media.


If this is close to the criticism you raised then you can rest assured that the early texts make it explicit that there is no objectfication beyond the six sense media and there are no objects repudiating the allness of the six classes of perception.
Perception is said to be conjoined with that which is called mind/consciousness/intellect and is thought of as principally arising as one thing and ceasing as another.
Perception and consciousness are thought of as conjoined because what one perceives that one cognizes. It is also held that what one perceives that one conceives; therefore the conception[formation] is also conjoined with percepience, what one conceives that one perceives, what one perceives that one cognizes.
Mind is spoken of as being the forerunner and creator of all formations but it isn't thought of as something persisting through time as one thing, it is an epistemological truth and inferrable element. It's cause & requisite is always past formations. Mind is thought of as conjoined with that which can be thought of as having an object and to be the conceiver & perceiver of that which is thought of as an object of that which has an object. Past, present & future classes[aggregates] of perception/feeling/consciousness/genesis have objects whereas the past, present & future classes of form [the perceived] are without an object.
The sematics are intricatly connected and are way to map & model the relations of inferable elements which can be established to be coming into play as one thinks about what is internal & external to what is thought of as a nervous system.

user471: I'll try to explain this from the Theravada perspective, which I think is more or less the same as Madhyamaka emptiness, once you analyze it deeply.
In addition to this answer, please also see "Linking Madhyamaka emptiness to Theravada emptiness through papanca".
From Sutta Nipata 4.14, we read:

"I ask the kinsman of the Sun, the great seer,
about seclusion & the state of peace.
Seeing in what way is a monk unbound,
clinging to nothing in the world?"
"He should put an entire stop
to the root of objectification-classifications:
'I am the thinker.'

Objectification-classification in this translation means the same as "reification".
Ven. Thanissaro, the translator, commented on this:

On objectification-classifications and their role in leading to
conflict, see Sn 4.11 and the introduction to MN 18. The perception,
"I am the thinker" lies at the root of these classifications in that
it reads into the immediate present a set of distinctions — I/not-I;
being/not-being; thinker/thought; identity/non-identity — that then
can proliferate into mental and physical conflict. The conceit
inherent in this perception thus forms a fetter on the mind. To become
unbound, one must learn to examine these distinctions — which we all
take for granted — to see that they are simply assumptions that are
not inherent in experience, and that we would be better off to be able
to drop them.

In our minds, we have the idea of "I am the thinker" i.e. the idea of the self. That's the primary object in existence in our reality. We also have the idea of non-self objects i.e. everything else. We objectify and classify everything around us, into non-self objects, according to their relationship to the self. For e.g. my hand, my car, not my friend, not my country.
When you look at the waters of the sea from up close in a boat, you may feel fear and insecurity, especially if you don't know how to swim and have motion sickness. To the sailor, it's a source of joy and adventure. To the fisherman, it's a source of livelihood and he sees it like a mine or oil field. To fish deep in the sea that has never left the waters, the concept of water doesn't occur to it at all, as it does not know any other reality.
Another example - a piece of cooked meat appears like delicious food to the meat eater, and it appears repulsive to the vegan. To a honey bee, it appears like dirt because it's not its food.
These examples go to show that objects do not have the meaning given to it by the mind. In fact, some of these are not even objects, except that they have been objectified by the mind.
What's a body of water to me is nothing at all (or perhaps everything) to the fish. The waters of the great sea, as a place to sail and swim, and as a body of liquid, doesn't really exist, except in my mind. It certainly doesn't exist in that way to the fish.
What's delicious food to me, is dirt to the honey bee. So, the delicious food doesn't really exist, except in my mind. The dirt doesn't really exist, except in the honey bee's mind.
This concept is called papanca, which is objectification plus classification, also known as reification. And it's related to anatta (the teaching that all phenomena is not self), because papanca is when non-self things are reified into objects and they are classified relative to the self. The idea of the self is also papanca.
This does not mean that things don't exist, except in my mind. It means that things don't exist as how my mind thinks it does.
Let's say you see images of attractive people on a screen. To an ant, it's just lights of different colors. If a mouse sees them - it's just an image of what it may perceive as humans - a threat. But to you, they are attractive people. So why are they "attractive people"? It's because that's how your mind objectified and classified them relative to yourself. That's how your mind reified them. That's papanca.
Fully enlightened persons like the Buddha and the arahants see things the way they are, without objectifying and classifying them relative to the idea of the self.
So according to Snp 4.14, to put an end to reification, you must first put an end to the root of reification, which is the mental idea of the self, the thought "I am the thinker". And the way to achieve this is to increase wisdom and weaken ignorance. That would weaken craving, clinging, becoming and birth (of the idea of the self). For this, please see this answer on the South Indian Monkey Trap.
And how do you increase wisdom and weaken ignorance? For that, we have the Noble Eightfold Path.

user43: Your confusion is clear as day to me. :) As is the true meaning of "emptiness". The challenge is how to explain it to you in a way you can understand. :)
You are stuck on this idea of "object" being something that exists ontologically. Whether it's made of parts, whether it's a transient aggregate that will eventually fall apart, right now it is real, it exists, regardless of the observer, you say.
The problem is not that it does not exist. The problem is that in the ontological reality there are no distinct objects. Whatever actually exists is delineated into "objects" by the perceiving mind.
This delineation (identification of objects in time and space, and by their characteristics) depends on the scale and perspective of observation.
You think, first the objects exist, and then we identify them. But it is the opposite, first we pick our perspective and criteria (either deliberately or, more often, because we were conditioned to see things in a certain way) and then we delineate and designate objects. So what is it that exists before delineation? Whatever it is, it's not "objects". Let's call it Emptiness ;)
Because the range of your perspectives is very limited, it seems to you that the way objects are usually designated/delineated in our society is the only way that makes sense, and therefore it seems to you that this way to designate them is identical with their ontological nature.
Take a chair, for example. When we say "chair" is empty we don't mean that nothing at all exists out there. We mean that the delineation and designation of objects by e.g. humans, ants, and some hypothetical aliens is potentially different. An ant perceives chair as part of the landscape. An alien living a different temporal scale may perceive chair as a final phase in life of a tree.
And yet, a chair is a chair, you'd say, even if some other species ignorantly misperceive it. We know that this in fact is a chair, you say - and this is where you're wrong, according to Mahayana Buddhism. This is just a habit of anthropocentric thinking, that's all.
Of course most of the objects we deal with in our social reality were specifically designed for convenient usage in some pragmatic contexts. This tricks our mind into confusing their symbolical meaning in our reality (their pragmatic function) with their essence. But if you go outside human world, ambiguity of delineation/designation will be easier to spot. Take the clouds for example, or the mountains, or the water streams, or the natural species - especially if you observe them over long time. Do they have rigid well-defined identities? No, they are notoriously hard to delineate.
It's not just delineation though, it goes even deeper than defining spatial/temporal boundaries of our objects. The thing is, in the act of identification we focus on certain properties of phenomena and ignore other aspects or properties. If we were to focus on other properties we would not just draw different boundaries, our phenomena would be delineated by other measurements than their positions or sizes in time and space. Again, think about the boundaries of species, in what space are they located?
Everything exists in some way, sure, but nothing exists as conveniently separate, clearly identifyable, qualitatively static, and with its true workings perfectly matching our idea of its external appearance - as naive people and children tend to imagine.
Nothing is as solid as it appears.
This is what's meant by Emptiness, and the more your perspective expands the deeper it gets. It's not about existence vs non-existence, it's about conceptualization, identification, recognition, delineation, designation, reification - and getting mentally and emotionally attached to spatial/temporal/conceptual abstractions.

20830: <p>I've been a practitioner of Vipassana and Mahamudra for 2 years now. One thing quite bothering me is various explanations from different teachers on emptiness logically disturbing...</p>
<p>Usually, it goes like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The flower before you seems real. Now get closer, you no longer see flower, but just leaves, stem. Even closer, you &quot;see&quot; atoms, electrons, etc.<br />
See? the flower is &quot;empty&quot; of inherent existence. The same goes for &quot;self&quot;. Try search for the &quot;self&quot; in your thoughts, arm, leg, etc. and you would find nothing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of course I could appreciate this mentally helps in someway in practice. But something falls short.</p>
<p>First, it feels &quot;outdated&quot; to me, in a post-calculus world, that it denies the validity of an aggregate object, by pointing towards an infinitesimally small part of it. Zeno paradox?</p>
<p>Secondly, the requirement of &quot;look closer&quot; (or farther) seem to assert the perceiver model. That logic (or its inverse) would seem to imply that, &quot;in order for something A to be <em>truly existent</em>, that thing needs to be A in all perceivable cases&quot;. That A would then seem to be only possible as some kind of &quot;totality&quot;, or awareness itself. So that felt like a semantics game then.</p>
<p>I'm sure there're better ways to explain the Buddhist emptiness logic in a more modern compatible way. Please enlighten me.</p>
 20010: <p>That's because there is no logic to it.  Emptiness isn't apprehended by the discursive mind.  It is perceived directly.  One could roughly equate it to smelling.  How could you logically describe the sense of smell to someone who hasn't had that perception?  Any explanation you could offer would ultimately fall short.</p>
<p>Buddhist philosophy isn't a philosophy in a conventional Western sense.  It isn't a set of ideas about ideas or even a set of ideas about the nature of reality.  Buddhist philosophy is derived from the experience of emptiness, not the idea of emptiness.  To come at it without that initial experiential knowledge is to undermine your understanding and set yourself up for all kinds of ridiculous <em>mis</em>understandings (eg Yogacara is a kind of idealism).</p>
<p>When you come to see emptiness for yourself, the philosophy takes on a radically different character.  The same words start to take on an entirely different set of meaning.  Once you have developed your &quot;emptiness sense&quot; you open yourself up to entirely different way of understanding.  Here, there is no logic.  There is only seeing and knowing.</p>
 13709: <p>Richard Feynman, who definitely lived in the post-calculus world, once <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbFM3rn4ldo&amp;list=PLS8LbL7GIZiAHmR64oluOWzz1igsXU6GG&amp;index=2" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pondered flowers</a> down to the atomic level and beyond. Feynman would also gladly point out the vast emptiness between those very atoms. Importantly, Feynman continuously pokes at conventional perceptions of a flower as being &quot;real&quot; and notes that the perception of an aggregate is an experience mediated by particles and forces that don't have precise boundaries.</p>
<p>And, like Feynman, the Buddha recommended a deep investigation of emptiness at the limits of perception:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn121/en/sujato#mn121:12.5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN121:12.5</a>: There is only this that is not emptiness, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’<br />
<a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn121/en/sujato#mn121:12.6" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN121:12.6</a>: And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present.<br />
<a href="https://suttacentral.net/mn121/en/sujato#mn121:12.7" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN121:12.7</a>: That’s how emptiness is born in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Both Feynman and the Buddha were empirical--they both taught observation as the foundation for understanding. Neither Feynman nor the Buddha found ultimately reality in aggregates such as flowers, which are fundamentally empty.</p>
 254: <p>Part of the &quot;philosophy of science&quot; (as it was taught me in Physics class in school) is that there are different ways of looking at things, different levels of details -- e.g. sub-atomic physics, then chemistry, biology, maybe ecology after that, astro-physics -- not to even mention sociology, psychology, maths, and so on.</p>
<p>So these are different &quot;levels&quot; (of detail), different &quot;models&quot; (of so-called reality).</p>
<p>More of that &quot;philosophy of science&quot; was about how they test and evolve their models.</p>
<p>Various models are (or are not) useful -- e.g. have &quot;predictive ability&quot; (predict the future), or &quot;descriptive ability&quot; (describe or help to make sense of past observations or so-called &quot;facts&quot;), and different models are (or aren't) useful in the context of different problems or different types of (experimental) observation.</p>
<p>I expect (without really knowing) that the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness may be similar -- i.e. that whatever model of reality we grasp is only a model -- and that grasping a specific model may be unfortunate or unhappy, or not as useful as being less attached (to a specific model or view).</p>
<p>For further details I might reference other questions tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/sunyata" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;sunyata&#39;" rel="tag">sunyata</a> but perhaps you reviewed those already. My main question on the subject was <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/30396/254">What is the purpose of the Mahayana &#39;emptiness&#39; doctrine?</a></p>
<p>And if it isn't only to do with (being an antidote to) having fixed &quot;views&quot;, it's also to do with having (or helping you to escape from) fixed &quot;values&quot; -- by which I'm refer to Persig's description of <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/search?q=%22value+rigidity%22">value rigidity</a> -- especially when the value, rigidity, or attachment is &quot;harmful&quot; or &quot;useless&quot;, though that might be subjective or observer-centric ... or, might be universal, I mean, agreed on by &quot;the wise&quot; at least.</p>
 -1: <blockquote>
<p>Usually,it goes like this - the flower before you seems real. Now get closer, you no longer see flower, but just leaves, stem. Even closer, you &quot;see&quot; atoms, electrons, etc. See? the flower is &quot;empty&quot; of inherent existence. The same goes for &quot;self&quot;. Try search for the &quot;self&quot; in your thoughts, arm, leg, etc. and you would find nothing.</p>
<p>Of coz I could appreciate this mentally helps in someway in practice. But sth. falls short.</p>
<p>First, it feels &quot;outdated&quot; to me, in a post-calculus world, that it denies the validity of an aggregate object, by pointing towards an infinitesimally small part of it. Zeno paradox?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As i understand it, this is close to what you are saying?</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The expression presented to you is disagreeable as it assumes that one can indefinitely &quot;zoom in&quot; on a perceived object to perceive it's constituent objects and this is falsified by the zeno's paradox.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The expression presented to you is disagreeable because it assumes the existence of an object which becomes an object of perception, the object exists independetly of perception, the non-perceived object then becomes an object of perception when perceived and is spoken of as consisting of infinitely small elements. As you understand the expression posits objectification beyond a percepients frame of reference as well as an objectification of perception based on a particular frame of reference. This you disagree with on account of special relativity which demonstrates that one can not attribute the perceived qualities to what is thought of as not objectified based on the six sense media.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>If this is close to the criticism you raised then you can rest assured that the early texts make it explicit that there is no objectfication beyond the six sense media and there are no objects repudiating the allness of the six classes of perception.</p>
<p>Perception is said to be conjoined with that which is called mind/consciousness/intellect and is thought of as principally arising as one thing and ceasing as another.</p>
<p>Perception and consciousness are thought of as conjoined because what one perceives that one cognizes. It is also held that what one perceives that one conceives; therefore the conception[formation] is also conjoined with percepience, what one conceives that one perceives, what one perceives that one cognizes.</p>
<p>Mind is spoken of as being the forerunner and creator of all formations but it isn't thought of as something persisting through time as one thing, it is an epistemological truth and inferrable element. It's cause &amp; requisite is always past formations. Mind is thought of as conjoined with that which can be thought of as having an object and to be the conceiver &amp; perceiver of that which is thought of as an object of that which has an object. Past, present &amp; future classes[aggregates] of perception/feeling/consciousness/genesis have objects whereas the past, present &amp; future classes of form [the perceived] are without an object.</p>
<p>The sematics are intricatly connected and are way to map &amp; model the relations of inferable elements which can be established to be coming into play as one thinks about what is internal &amp; external to what is thought of as a nervous system.</p>
 471: <p>I'll try to explain this from the Theravada perspective, which I think is more or less the same as Madhyamaka emptiness, once you analyze it deeply.</p>
<p>In addition to this answer, please also see &quot;<a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/28981/471">Linking Madhyamaka emptiness to Theravada emptiness through papanca</a>&quot;.</p>
<p>From <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.4.14.than.html" rel="noreferrer">Sutta Nipata 4.14</a>, we read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;I ask the kinsman of the Sun, the great seer,<br />
about seclusion &amp; the state of peace.<br />
Seeing in what way is a monk unbound,<br />
clinging to nothing in the world?&quot;<br />
&quot;He should put an entire stop<br />
to the root of objectification-classifications:<br />
'I am the thinker.'</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Objectification-classification in this translation means the same as &quot;reification&quot;.</p>
<p>Ven. Thanissaro, the translator, commented on this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>On objectification-classifications and their role in leading to
conflict, see <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.4.11.than.html" rel="noreferrer">Sn 4.11</a> and the introduction to <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.018.than.html" rel="noreferrer">MN 18</a>. The perception,
&quot;I am the thinker&quot; lies at the root of these classifications in that
it reads into the immediate present a set of distinctions — I/not-I;
being/not-being; thinker/thought; identity/non-identity — that then
can proliferate into mental and physical conflict. The conceit
inherent in this perception thus forms a fetter on the mind. To become
unbound, one must learn to examine these distinctions — which we all
take for granted — to see that they are simply assumptions that are
not inherent in experience, and that we would be better off to be able
to drop them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In our minds, we have the idea of &quot;I am the thinker&quot; i.e. the idea of the self. That's the primary object in existence in our reality. We also have the idea of non-self objects i.e. everything else. We objectify and classify everything around us, into non-self objects, according to their relationship to the self. For e.g. my hand, my car, not my friend, not my country.</p>
<p>When you look at the waters of the sea from up close in a boat, you may feel fear and insecurity, especially if you don't know how to swim and have motion sickness. To the sailor, it's a source of joy and adventure. To the fisherman, it's a source of livelihood and he sees it like a mine or oil field. To fish deep in the sea that has never left the waters, the concept of water doesn't occur to it at all, as it does not know any other reality.</p>
<p>Another example - a piece of cooked meat appears like delicious food to the meat eater, and it appears repulsive to the vegan. To a honey bee, it appears like dirt because it's not its food.</p>
<p>These examples go to show that objects do not have the meaning given to it by the mind. In fact, some of these are not even objects, except that they have been objectified by the mind.</p>
<p>What's a body of water to me is nothing at all (or perhaps everything) to the fish. The waters of the great sea, as a place to sail and swim, and as a body of liquid, doesn't really exist, except in my mind. It certainly doesn't exist in that way to the fish.</p>
<p>What's delicious food to me, is dirt to the honey bee. So, the delicious food doesn't really exist, except in my mind. The dirt doesn't really exist, except in the honey bee's mind.</p>
<p>This concept is called <em>papanca</em>, which is objectification plus classification, also known as reification. And it's related to <em>anatta</em> (the teaching that all phenomena is not self), because <em>papanca</em> is when non-self things are reified into objects and they are classified relative to the self. The idea of the self is also <em>papanca</em>.</p>
<p>This does not mean that things don't exist, except in my mind. It means that things don't exist as how my mind thinks it does.</p>
<p>Let's say you see images of attractive people on a screen. To an ant, it's just lights of different colors. If a mouse sees them - it's just an image of what it may perceive as humans - a threat. But to you, they are attractive people. So why are they &quot;attractive people&quot;? It's because that's how your mind objectified and classified them relative to yourself. That's how your mind reified them. That's <em>papanca</em>.</p>
<p>Fully enlightened persons like the Buddha and the arahants see things the way they are, without objectifying and classifying them relative to the idea of the self.</p>
<p>So according to <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.4.14.than.html" rel="noreferrer">Snp 4.14</a>, to put an end to reification, you must first put an end to the root of reification, which is the mental idea of the self, the thought &quot;I am the thinker&quot;. And the way to achieve this is to increase wisdom and weaken ignorance. That would weaken craving, clinging, becoming and birth (of the idea of the self). For this, please see <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/28524/471">this answer</a> on the South Indian Monkey Trap.</p>
<p>And how do you increase wisdom and weaken ignorance? For that, we have the Noble Eightfold Path.</p>
 43: <p>Your confusion is clear as day to me. :) As is the true meaning of &quot;emptiness&quot;. The challenge is how to explain it to you in a way you can understand. :)</p>
<p>You are stuck on this idea of &quot;object&quot; being something that exists ontologically. Whether it's made of parts, whether it's a transient aggregate that will eventually fall apart, right now it is real, it exists, regardless of the observer, you say.</p>
<p>The problem is not that it does not <em>exist</em>. The problem is that in the ontological reality there are no distinct objects. Whatever actually exists is delineated into &quot;objects&quot; by the perceiving mind.</p>
<p>This delineation (identification of objects in time and space, and by their characteristics) depends on the scale and perspective of observation.</p>
<p>You think, first the objects <em>exist</em>, and <em>then</em> we identify them. But it is the opposite, first we pick our perspective and criteria (either deliberately or, more often, because we were conditioned to see things in a certain way) and then we delineate and designate objects. So what is it that exists before delineation? Whatever it is, it's not &quot;objects&quot;. Let's call it Emptiness ;)</p>
<p>Because the range of your perspectives is very limited, it seems to you that the way objects are usually designated/delineated in our society is the only way that makes sense, and therefore it seems to you that this way to designate them is identical with their ontological nature.</p>
<p>Take a chair, for example. When we say &quot;chair&quot; is empty we don't mean that nothing at all exists out there. We mean that the delineation and designation of objects by e.g. humans, ants, and some hypothetical aliens is potentially different. An ant perceives chair as part of the landscape. An alien living a different temporal scale may perceive chair as a final phase in life of a tree.</p>
<p>And yet, a chair is a chair, you'd say, even if some other species ignorantly misperceive it. We know that this in fact is a chair, you say - and this is where you're wrong, according to Mahayana Buddhism. This is just a habit of anthropocentric thinking, that's all.</p>
<p>Of course most of the objects we deal with in our social reality were specifically designed for convenient usage in some pragmatic contexts. This tricks our mind into confusing their symbolical meaning in our reality (their pragmatic function) with their essence. But if you go outside human world, ambiguity of delineation/designation will be easier to spot. Take the clouds for example, or the mountains, or the water streams, or the natural species - especially if you observe them over long time. Do they have rigid well-defined identities? No, they are notoriously hard to delineate.</p>
<p>It's not just delineation though, it goes even deeper than defining spatial/temporal boundaries of our objects. The thing is, in the act of identification we focus on certain properties of phenomena and ignore other aspects or properties. If we were to focus on other properties we would not just draw different boundaries, our phenomena would be delineated by other measurements than their positions or sizes in time and space. Again, think about the boundaries of species, in what space are they located?</p>
<p>Everything exists <em>in some way</em>, sure, but nothing exists as conveniently separate, clearly identifyable, qualitatively static, and with its true workings perfectly matching our idea of its external appearance - as naive people and children tend to imagine.</p>
<p>Nothing is as solid as it appears.</p>
<p>This is what's meant by Emptiness, and the more your perspective expands the deeper it gets. It's not about existence vs non-existence, it's about conceptualization, identification, recognition, delineation, designation, reification - and getting mentally and emotionally attached to spatial/temporal/conceptual abstractions.</p>
