user13375: The No true Scotsman fallacy is a rhetorical trick to avert criticism of a generalization by appealing to the impurity of counterexamples i.e., "no true Scotsman would do such a thing!"
My question is whether or not a true Buddhist would ever appeal to such a juvenile rhetorical trick?
I'm thinking that no true Buddhist would ever do this as I'm sure the Buddha would not have approved of such illogical argumentation. What's the community think?

user254: The "Scotsman" type of generalisation consists of trying to formulate a rule which links two pre-existing definitions. In the example you referenced ...


Person A: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."
Person B: "But my uncle Angus is a Scotsman and he puts sugar on his porridge."
Person A: "Ah yes, but no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."


... there's a pre-existing definition of what "a Scotsman" is, and there's a pre-existing definition of what "porridge" and "sugar" are.
I get the impression that Buddhist dhamma avoids this, by (explicitly or implicitly) inventing new definitions or redefining existing definitions.
And so for example when Buddhist dhamma talks about kamma or etc. you can't assume that's a new statement about a predefined already-well-known thing, instead it may be a new definition.
Thus, to learn dhamma you need to learn (to understand) new definitions of existing words: what does "dukkha" mean when that occurs in Buddhist dhama, for example? What is considered "skilful" versus "unskilful", and so on?
I think there's an obvious example of that in the Dhammapada, e.g. in the last chapter -- the following is an example of a statement that might seem like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy:

"Holy men don't get angry."
"But uncle Angus is holy -- you can tell he's holy, by his matted hair -- and he gets angry."
"Well Uncle Angus isn't truly holy then."

... but the Dhammapada is quite clearly intending to redefine holiness:



Not by matted hair, nor by lineage, nor by birth does one become a holy man. But he in whom truth and righteousness exist — he is pure, he is a holy man.


He who is free from anger, is devout, virtuous, without craving, self-subdued and bears his final body — him do I call a holy man.



See also Sat-Dharma: Buddhism is an (arguably successful) attempt to invent new generalisations which are always true.
I think that Buddhists (even true Buddhists -- who would I be to call anyone a fake Buddhist?) are inclined sometimes to test the limits of these generalisations, for example I've seen questions like:

If dharma is meant to be evident and here-and-now, then what about the doctrine of "rebirth"?
If lying is breaking a precept, what about a white lie told to save someone's  life from a villain?

Perhaps this question is another example: trying to define (and assert) what a "true Buddhist" is.
I'm sure the Buddha would not have approved of such illogical argumentation
Also I somewhat doubt that the Buddha was a slave to logic -- "Do I exist, or don't I?", or, "Does a dog have Buddha-nature, or not?".
It wouldn't surprise me if logic can be viewed as a example of "skilful means".
It's somewhat up to the audience to make sense of what's being said.
And I think that Buddhism isn't necessarily about making well-defined, legalistic statements of a type that can be tested and disproven; it's not like, "here is a picture", where you might ask, "does this picture match a photograph in every detail: or is the picture wrong?" It's more about providing frames of reference, compass directions, doctrine to help evaluate, structure, classify, and make sense of experience -- this answer is an example of de-emphasising the supremacy of the logical/rational (calling it "fruitless quasi-intellectual speculation").

Do you believe there is one true meaning of dukkha that is valid for all Buddhist dhama?
I'm not sure whether it's that ("one true meaning of dukkha") or the opposite.

For a start, they say there's no single English-language word that's a worthy translation ("suffering? unsatisfactoriness? stress") -- so instead, for an anglophone, it's a new word to be learned (with a meaning of its own).
It seems to be defined (in the first noble truth), or maybe the 1NT is merely using it (as a then-well-known word) to characterise other experiences
It seems to be broad or all-encompassing, for example:

"Both formerly and now, monks, I declare only stress and the cessation of stress."

and:

sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā


This sounds like Buddhism as a form of perfected dogmatism... you really think that's what it is about?
Google defines "dogmatism" as ...

the tendency to lay down principles as undeniably true, without consideration of evidence

... so no, I don't think that (though I suppose I'm more willing than some are, to consider dogma).
I see it as more of a science, e.g. it identifies experienced characteristics of things, and makes generalisations about relationships between things and between characteristics.
Part of what I find welcoming (about the dhamma as explained in the suttas) is that it claims to be "inviting inspection":

Svakkhato Bhagavata dhammo sanditthiko akaliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam vedittabbo vinnuhiti

... and, "good in the beginning".
It's more useful (practical, beneficial, applicable) than some other forms of science.
In particular I see it as a set of (personally) useful (helpful) collection of tools (observations, views), rather than an abstract (impersonal, only-theoretical) set of dogma.
Note that in science it's alright to use logic to predict reality -- that's not called "dogma", it's called a "(working) hypothesis" (see also "faith" -- Andrei's answer maybe suggests that "dogma" is more a character of later forms of Buddhism).
And there's another sense in which it's not dogmatic: i.e. it allows for two forms of right view (mundane and supramundane).
can you give an example of the virtues of illogic
Here's a strawman example:
"Either you love me, and you'll let me skip going to school and stay home; or, you hate me."
I think that's a fictional example or illustration of childish logic, which an adult needn't accept.
SN 7.2 is a sutta about not accepting an insult. I think that in a similar way the Buddha wouldn't necessarily accept someone's logic: for example, "either practice austerities and self-mortification, or backslide into abundance" (instead of which, the Buddha taught a Middle Way).
Logic (as I understand it -- I was taught maths rather than logic or philosophy) is no better than its premises (its axioms); and tends towards black-or-white statements ("Are you logical, or illogical?"); and a closed system of logic is somewhat incomplete.
Other examples of what you called "illogic", and which I'd prefer to call "not constrained by logic":

The unanswered questions
The paragraphs which describe A thicket of wrong views
More generally, views and "attachment to views" can be a type of hindrance or fetter (partly because that becomes a cause of disputes; see also the simile of dhamma as a raft)

Identifying and avoiding the "thicket of views" and characterising it as a "fetter" is an impressive and useful achievement IMO (and an example of not being a slave to logic) -- comparable to cutting the Gordian knot (except kinder and everything).
Finally my personal opinion is that the Buddha described as trackless needn't care to be constrained by logic. Not that the dhamma is self-contradictory, but I once read the following aphorism described as a prière païenne ...

Faites que je me contredise souvent : afin d'être simple et vrai.

... which says that if you have a choice between saying something logically self-consistent, versus saying what's simple and true, prefer the latter.
Also my physics teacher for example taught me to see "first and second order approximations" as useful (practical, admirable, true, and appropriate), rather than as inaccurate.

user43: I see The True Scotsman Fallacy as a joking illustration of reification. There is obviously no such thing as THE TRUE Scotsman. It's an ill-defined abstraction that has no real-world referent. Every Scotsman is different and not all of them even live in Scotland! How can we possibly say that some of them are "true" and some are "fake"?
Similarly, "TRUE Buddhist" is an ill-defined abstraction that has no real-world referent. Believing that True Buddhists actually exist or that someone is a true Buddhist while someone else is not, are two examples of reification.
So to ask "would a true Buddhist engage in The True Scotsman Fallacy" is akin to asking whether a reification would engage in reification. And of course it happens all the time! Someone considering himself a "true Buddhist" (I don't want to name any users here but I can think of a few) is by definition rather prone to engaging into a "no true Buddhist would do or say X, Y, Z" line of argument. Not to say that, even more generally, someone considering himself a sentient being is probably rather likely to have an unconscious predilection for engaging into all types of reifying views that lead to quarrels and arguments.
In fact the entire Buddhist path (according to Mahayana interpretation) can be seen as growing up from naive reification and into the "wisdom" (wisdom or prajna being a short word for "a skillful modus operandi based on special insight into the nature of phenomena with awareness of the rewards of, the dangers of, and the escape from - reification"). In this sense of course, a "true Buddhist" (from streamenterer and above, or from 1st Bhumi and above in Mahayana) would NOT engage into naive reifying definitions like "the true Buddhist" or "the true Scotsman" etc.
Which is why "a true Buddhist" would never ever consider him or her self "a true Buddhist". If this sounds like a paradox, welcome to true Buddhism ;)

13375: <p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman" rel="nofollow noreferrer">No true Scotsman</a> fallacy is a rhetorical trick to avert criticism of a generalization by appealing to the impurity of counterexamples i.e., "no <em>true</em> Scotsman would do such a thing!"</p>

<p>My question is whether or not a true Buddhist would ever appeal to such a juvenile rhetorical trick?</p>

<p>I'm thinking that no true Buddhist would ever do this as I'm sure the Buddha would not have approved of such illogical argumentation. What's the community think?</p>
 254: <p>The "Scotsman" type of generalisation consists of trying to formulate a rule which links two pre-existing definitions. In the example you referenced ...</p>

<blockquote>
  <ul>
  <li>Person A: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."</li>
  <li>Person B: "But my uncle Angus is a Scotsman and he puts sugar on his porridge."</li>
  <li>Person A: "Ah yes, but no <em>true</em> Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge."</li>
  </ul>
</blockquote>

<p>... there's a pre-existing definition of what "a Scotsman" is, and there's a pre-existing definition of what "porridge" and "sugar" are.</p>

<p>I get the impression that Buddhist dhamma avoids this, by (explicitly or implicitly) inventing new definitions or redefining existing definitions.
And so for example when Buddhist dhamma talks about kamma or etc. you can't assume that's a new statement about a predefined already-well-known thing, instead it may be a new definition.
Thus, to learn dhamma you need to learn (to understand) new definitions of existing words: what does "dukkha" mean when that occurs in Buddhist dhama, for example? What is considered "skilful" versus "unskilful", and so on?</p>

<p>I think there's an obvious example of that in the Dhammapada, e.g. in the last chapter -- the following is an example of a statement that might seem like the "no true Scotsman" fallacy:</p>

<ul>
<li>"Holy men don't get angry."</li>
<li>"But uncle Angus is holy -- you can tell <em>he</em>'s holy, by his matted hair -- and he gets angry."</li>
<li>"Well Uncle Angus isn't <em>truly</em> holy then."</li>
</ul>

<p>... but the Dhammapada is quite clearly intending to redefine holiness:</p>

<blockquote>
  <ul>
  <li><ol start="393">
  <li>Not by matted hair, nor by lineage, nor by birth does one become a holy man. But he in whom truth and righteousness exist — he is pure, he is a holy man.</li>
  </ol></li>
  <li><ol start="400">
  <li>He who is free from anger, is devout, virtuous, without craving, self-subdued and bears his final body — him do I call a holy man.</li>
  </ol></li>
  </ul>
</blockquote>

<p>See also <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/5604/254">Sat-Dharma</a>: Buddhism is an (arguably successful) attempt to invent new generalisations which are always true.</p>

<p>I think that Buddhists (even true Buddhists -- who would I be to call anyone a fake Buddhist?) are inclined sometimes to test the limits of these generalisations, for example I've seen questions like:</p>

<ul>
<li>If dharma is meant to be evident and here-and-now, then what about the doctrine of "rebirth"?</li>
<li>If lying is breaking a precept, what about a white lie told to save someone's  life from a villain?</li>
</ul>

<p>Perhaps this question is another example: trying to define (and assert) what a "true Buddhist" is.</p>

<p><strong>I'm sure the Buddha would not have approved of such illogical argumentation</strong></p>

<p>Also I somewhat doubt that the Buddha was a slave to logic -- "Do I exist, or don't I?", or, "Does a dog have Buddha-nature, or not?".</p>

<p>It wouldn't surprise me if logic can be viewed as a example of "skilful means".</p>

<p>It's somewhat up to the audience to make sense of what's being said.</p>

<p>And I think that Buddhism isn't necessarily about making well-defined, legalistic statements of a type that can be tested and disproven; it's not like, "here is a picture", where you might ask, "does this picture match a photograph in every detail: or is the picture <em>wrong</em>?" It's more about providing frames of reference, compass directions, doctrine to help evaluate, structure, classify, and make sense of experience -- <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/25023/254">this answer</a> is an example of de-emphasising the supremacy of the logical/rational (calling it "fruitless quasi-intellectual speculation").</p>

<hr>

<p><strong>Do you believe there is one true meaning of dukkha that is valid for all Buddhist dhama?</strong></p>

<p>I'm not sure whether it's that ("one true meaning of dukkha") or the opposite.</p>

<ul>
<li>For a start, they say there's no single English-language word that's a worthy translation ("suffering? unsatisfactoriness? stress") -- so instead, for an anglophone, it's a new word to be learned (with a meaning of its own).</li>
<li>It seems to be defined (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dukkha#Buddhism" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in the first noble truth</a>), or maybe the 1NT is merely using it (as a then-well-known word) to characterise other experiences</li>
<li><p>It seems to be broad or all-encompassing, <a href="https://accesstoinsight.org/search_results.html?q=formerly+and+now" rel="nofollow noreferrer">for example</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>"Both formerly and now, monks, I declare only stress and the cessation of stress."</p>
</blockquote>

<p>and:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p><em>sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā</em></p>
</blockquote></li>
</ul>

<p><strong>This sounds like Buddhism as a form of perfected dogmatism... you really think that's what it is about?</strong></p>

<p>Google defines "dogmatism" as ...</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>the tendency to lay down principles as undeniably true, without consideration of evidence</p>
</blockquote>

<p>... so no, I don't think that (though I suppose I'm more willing than some are, to consider dogma).</p>

<p>I see it as more of a science, e.g. it identifies experienced characteristics of things, and makes generalisations about relationships between things and between characteristics.</p>

<p>Part of what I find welcoming (about the dhamma as explained in the suttas) is that it claims to be "<a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn01/sn01.020.wlsh.html#fn-7" rel="nofollow noreferrer">inviting inspection</a>":</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Svakkhato Bhagavata dhammo sanditthiko akaliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam vedittabbo vinnuhiti</p>
</blockquote>

<p>... and, "<a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/1302/254">good in the beginning</a>".</p>

<p>It's more useful (practical, beneficial, applicable) than some other forms of science.</p>

<p>In particular I see it as a set of (personally) useful (helpful) collection of tools (observations, views), rather than an abstract (impersonal, only-theoretical) set of dogma.</p>

<p>Note that in science it's alright to use logic to predict reality -- that's not called "dogma", it's called a "(working) hypothesis" (see also "faith" -- <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/3694/254">Andrei's answer</a> maybe suggests that "dogma" is more a character of later forms of Buddhism).</p>

<p>And there's another sense in which it's not dogmatic: i.e. it allows for two forms of right view (mundane and supramundane).</p>

<p><strong>can you give an example of the virtues of illogic</strong></p>

<p>Here's a strawman example:</p>

<p>"Either you love me, and you'll let me skip going to school and stay home; or, you hate me."</p>

<p>I think that's a fictional example or illustration of childish logic, which an adult needn't accept.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn07/sn07.002.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SN 7.2</a> is a sutta about not accepting an insult. I think that in a similar way the Buddha wouldn't necessarily accept someone's logic: for example, "either practice austerities and self-mortification, or backslide into abundance" (instead of which, the Buddha taught a Middle Way).</p>

<p>Logic (as I understand it -- I was taught maths rather than logic or philosophy) is no better than its premises (its axioms); and tends towards black-or-white statements ("Are you logical, or illogical?"); and a closed system of logic is somewhat incomplete.</p>

<p>Other examples of what you called "illogic", and which I'd prefer to call "not constrained by logic":</p>

<ul>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_unanswered_questions" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The unanswered questions</a></li>
<li>The paragraphs which describe <a href="https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/sacca4/samma-ditthi/index.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">A thicket of wrong views</a></li>
<li>More generally, views and "attachment to views" can be a type of hindrance or fetter (partly because that becomes a cause of disputes; see also the simile of dhamma as a raft)</li>
</ul>

<p>Identifying and avoiding the "thicket of views" and characterising it as a "fetter" is an impressive and useful achievement IMO (and an example of not being a slave to logic) -- comparable to cutting the Gordian knot (except kinder and everything).</p>

<p>Finally my personal opinion is that the Buddha described as <a href="https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/q/1992/254">trackless</a> needn't care to be constrained by logic. Not that the dhamma is self-contradictory, but I once read the following aphorism described as a <em>prière païenne</em> ...</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Faites que je me contredise souvent : afin d'être simple et vrai.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>... which says that if you have a choice between saying something logically self-consistent, versus saying what's simple and true, prefer the latter.</p>

<p>Also my physics teacher for example taught me to see "first and second order <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_approximation" rel="nofollow noreferrer">approximations</a>" as useful (practical, admirable, true, and appropriate), rather than as inaccurate.</p>
 43: <p>I see The True Scotsman Fallacy as a joking illustration of <em>reification</em>. There is obviously no such thing as THE TRUE Scotsman. It's an ill-defined abstraction that has no real-world referent. Every Scotsman is different and not all of them even live in Scotland! How can we possibly say that some of them are "true" and some are "fake"?</p>

<p>Similarly, "TRUE Buddhist" is an ill-defined abstraction that has no real-world referent. Believing that True Buddhists actually exist or that someone is a true Buddhist while someone else is not, are two examples of reification.</p>

<p>So to ask "would a <em>true Buddhist</em> engage in The True Scotsman Fallacy" is akin to asking whether a reification would engage in reification. And of course it happens all the time! Someone considering himself a "true Buddhist" (I don't want to name any users here but I can think of a few) is by definition rather prone to engaging into a "no true Buddhist would do or say X, Y, Z" line of argument. Not to say that, even more generally, someone considering himself a <em>sentient being</em> is probably rather likely to have an unconscious predilection for engaging into all types of reifying views that lead to quarrels and arguments.</p>

<p>In fact the entire Buddhist path (according to Mahayana interpretation) can be seen as growing up from naive reification and into the "wisdom" (wisdom or <code>prajna</code> being a short word for "a skillful modus operandi based on special insight into the nature of phenomena with awareness of the rewards of, the dangers of, and the escape from - reification"). In this sense of course, a "true Buddhist" (from streamenterer and above, or from 1st Bhumi and above in Mahayana) would NOT engage into naive reifying definitions like "the true Buddhist" or "the true Scotsman" etc.</p>

<p>Which is why "a true Buddhist" would never <em>ever</em> consider him or her self "a true Buddhist". If this sounds like a paradox, welcome to <em>true Buddhism</em> ;)</p>
