US wanted to warn Argentina about South Georgia Thatcher refused, telling Mr Reagan in a late night phone call on May 31st, 1982 that she would "not contemplate" a ceasfire after the loss of "precious British lives." She also rejected demands to hand the Falklands over to a joint US-Brazilian peacekeeping force, saying that she had not sent British forces across the globe just to "hand over the Queen's islands to a contact group." Separately, Mrs Thatcher found herself subject to demands from the Pope John Paul II. In one telegram, he calls on God to help "secure an immediate ceasefire. Thatcher, however, stood her ground, replying that Argentine aggression "cannot be allowed to succeed." The British government also warned the Holy Father that if he cancelled a visit during the Falklands it would be "interpreted by the British public and others as a pro-Argentine gesture" While US defense secretary Caspar Weinberger proved a staunch ally of Britain from the outbreak of war on April 2 1982, authorising secret shipments of weapons vital to the task force, the US state department was anything but sympathetic to British interests. Despite secretly supplying Britain with weapons and equipment, relations with the US were strained even before the task force landings. During a meeting with Sir Nicholas on April 21, just as SAS forces were landing in South Georgia, Haig said he was considering sharing intelligence with the Argentineans. It feared support for a European colonial power would undermine ties with Latin America and hamper Washington's covert campaign against communism in the western hemisphere. During a meeting on April 21, as SAS troops were already landing on South Georgia to reconnoitre Argentinian positions, Haig explained his thinking to Sir Nicholas Henderson, Britain's ambassador to the United States. "Haig said that he had been giving further thought to our proposed operation, an event that he was sure would alter the whole scene," wrote Henderson in a cable to London. His immediate concern was the problem that it would cause for the US in their dealings with Argentina. The latter would regard it as an act of collusion between Washington and London. The Argentinians would know that they, the Americans, must have had prior knowledge of the intended invasion. Haig told me that in fact they had collateral intelligence now of the presence of the task force off South Georgia. The Argentinians would be deeply suspicious if the Americans had done nothing, having received information of British military intentions. He therefore thought that he would have to give the Argentinian junta advance notice of our intended operation. He would say that they knew about this from their own intelligence sources. He would only notify them at a sufficiently late time so that this would involve no military threat to us. If the Americans acted in this way they would be able to show even-handedness to the Argentinians and this would enable them to continue their role as go-between. In fact, any warning could have been disastrous. Neither the British nor the Americans were aware of the presence of the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe in the area, and the junta had also planned a long-range attack on an invading force using Canberra bombers. South Georgia, a mountainous wasteland of rock and ice, was defended by 140 troops who would have benefitted from even a few hours" notice of an attack. Henderson was flabbergasted. "I expressed strong objection to what Haig had told me," he wrote. It would be taken extremely adversely in London as going much further than the requirements of negotiating neutrally required. To hand on to the Argentinians US intelligence about British movements and intentions at an extremely delicate moment was to help them and was not simply to be neutral. The Argentinians might well turn such prior intelligence to their own use against our invasion force. They would certainly give the marines and other Argentinians present in South Georgia advance warning. They might well give their submarines instructions to attack our ships. They could mount a suicide air attack upon our naval forces. In what must at times have been a heated exchange, Haig and his deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger, backed down, saying it "would not do" at if prior warning led to "military difficulties" for the British. But they wanted to know how the US could preserve its status as a neutral negotiator. "I said that I must insist beyond shadow of doubt that they would not give prior notice to the Argentinians," wrote Henderson. Haig gave me an absolute assurance on that point. Pym, who had replaced Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary following the latter's resignation over the seizure of the Falklands, was equally appalled. "I am grateful to you for having averted what could have been a very dangerous development," he wrote to Henderson. "I find it amazing that it should have crossed the Americans" mind that they ought to tell the Argentinians about our impending move." In a sign that he did not trust the Americans, Pym told Henderson to be deliberately vague about the timing of the South Georgia operation, citing the uncertain weather. On May 25, four days after the British landing at San Carlos, Haig was asserting US interests again. We are fast approaching the point at which the UK will have a decisive local military advantage, with success clearly within your reach," he told Pym. At that point, the Argentines could feel compelled to turn to the Cubans and Soviets as their last hope to avert total humiliation. Should Galtieri resist these pressures, he could be swept aside and replaced by those far more hostile to fundamental western interests. Even if the Argentines do not open themselves to the Soviets and Cubans, they are virtually certain to want to continue a state of war. That, he warned, would result in an open-ended conflict and international isolation for the UK and US. The solution was for British forces to withdraw once Port Stanley had fallen.  The US would be prepared to provide a battalion-sized force for the purpose of ensuring that there would no violation of any interim agreement preceding a final settlement," he continued. Because of what has happened to our standing with the Argentines as a result of our support for you, there is no chance a US-only force would be acceptable. We would therefore need to persuade the most trustworthy major hemispheric power - Brazil - to join us. A combined force would represent a credible deterrent and assure the security of the islanders for the period of an interim agreement. Too much blood had been spilled for Margaret Thatcher even to consider such a proposal. The British weren't going anywhere.