"Little America" book excerpt: Obama's troop increase for Afghan war was misdirected Excerpted from "Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan." The day after he arrived in Kabul in June 2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, then the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, gathered his senior officers to discuss the state of the war. They barraged him with PowerPoint slides - the frequency of Taliban attacks and their impact; the number of local security forces; and an evaluation of the Afghan government's effectiveness in each province. The metrics were grim, the conclusion obvious: The Americans and their NATO allies were losing. The part of the country that concerned McChrystal most was the city of Kandahar and the eponymous province that encompasses it. Founded by Alexander the Great in 330 B.C., Kandahar city has long been the symbolic homeland of ethnic Pashtuns. In the 1990s, just as every other band of conquerors had done for the past thousand years, the Taliban used it as a springboard from which they captured Kabul and much of the rest of the nation. If the Americans were going to retake Afghanistan, they needed to start with Kandahar. But the Pentagon had not sent most of the new U.S. forces that had arrived in Afghanistan to Kandahar. The first wave - a Marine brigade comprising more than half of the 17,000 additional troops President Obama authorized in February 2009 - had been dispatched to neighboring Helmand province, which McChrystal and his top advisers considered of far lower strategic significance. "Can someone tell me why the Marines were sent to Helmand?" the incredulous McChrystal asked his officers. The answer - not fully known at the time to McChrystal and his officers - would reveal the dysfunction of the U.S. war effort: a reliance on understaffed NATO partners for crucial intelligence, a misjudgment of Helmand's importance to Afghanistan's security, and tribal politics within the Pentagon that led the Marines to insist on confining themselves to a far less important patch of desert. The consequences were profound: By devoting so many troops to Helmand instead of Kandahar, the U.S. military squandered more than a year of the war. Had the initial contingent of Marines been sent to Kandahar, it could have obviated the need for a full 30,000-troop surge later that year, or it could have granted commanders the flexibility to combat insurgent havens in eastern Afghanistan much sooner, allowing them to meet Obama's eventual withdrawal deadlines without objection. Instead, U.S. forces will begin heading home this summer with much of the east in disarray and security improvements in Kandahar still tenuous. Helmand is faring considerably better, but the gains there are having only a modest impact on Afghanistan's overall stability. Without the diversion into Helmand, U.S. troops could have pushed into more critical areas of the country before a clear majority of Americans concluded that the war was no longer worth fighting. Before the U.S. military death toll neared 2,000. Before the conflict became the longest in American history.