Iran's reformists need west's support Iran's reformists have been the main losers in the battles between the Islamic republic and world powers for much of the past decade. Whether in its misguided support for radical groups abroad or the stubborn pursuit of a nuclear programme at home, the Islamic regime has had no room for those who advocate reform and more responsible behaviour. Fortunately, this depressing state of affairs has been changing in recent months. Since the June election of Hassan Rouhani reformists have made a comeback after being sidelined during the eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad. Their message today, however, is that to consolidate their gains they will need outside support. Life in Tehran has been a nightmare for many reformists for the past five years. Some of the leaders of the Green movement, which captured the world's imagination with the 2009 protests against the flawed re-election of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad, have languished in jail. Others say they might as well have. One former official who served in the reformist administrations of Mohamad Khatami, the ex-president (1997-2005) and still the most popular politician in Iran, likens his life since 2009 to being locked up in a prison camp. So oppressive was the atmosphere that he dares not think it could now be over. "We're not out of prison yet - but we've survived," is how he puts it. Reformists know that the new president was never part of the political reform movement, although he served in reformist administrations in the past, and they are aware that hardliners are waiting for Mr Rouhani to stumble before they attempt to fight back. Crucially, moreover, reformists have learnt that their ability to survive is closely linked to how the Islamic republic is getting on with western powers. And that depends on the fate of the nuclear negotiations and, in many ways, on the US. An end to the nuclear dispute will strengthen the reformists" authority; failure could condemn them to another prison camp. Reformist leaders speak with a sense of deep bitterness when they recount the factors they perceive to have been behind their demise when Mr Ahmadi-Nejad was first elected back in 2005. While reform efforts faltered during the Khatami presidency in part because radicals saw it as an existential threat to the Islamic system of Velayat-e-faqih, under which a supreme leader holds the key levers of power and should be obeyed by all, the paranoia of regime hardliners was magnified by the attitude of the Bush administration. The inclusion of Iran in George W Bush's famous "axis of evil" speech in May 2002 is often pointed to by Iranians as a turning point. It convinced Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, that Tehran was on a list of targets for regime change, a perception reinforced after the invasion of Iraq the following year. Even more damaging was the breakdown of nuclear negotiations in 2005. Iran had suspended enrichment for two years after its secret programme had been uncovered and negotiators, at the time led by Mr Rouhani, wanted to maintain some enrichment capability in a final agreement, arguing it was the only way to win the supreme leader's approval. The three European countries leading the talks - Britain, France and Germany - rebuffed Iranian demands, offering a set of incentives instead. The US, they concluded, would never sign off on such a deal, and reformists were too weak to deliver it. Since then Iran has massively expanded its nuclear programme and western governments have imposed devastating sanctions. Moderate Iranians have paid a heavy price. The US administration appears to have taken the reformists" message on board, leaving enough on the table in the interim nuclear deal to allow Mr Rouhani to claim it was a fair agreement, and agreeing to the notion of a limited, strictly monitored enrichment programme in the future. US lawmakers, on the other hand, are unimpressed by the significance of the reformist comeback. They fail to see that there is a broader political reward for the outside world in bolstering those in Iran who prefer reform and engagement to threats and defiance. If nuclear talks break down because of congressional resistance, reformists will be accused of misleading the supreme leader about American intentions, and that will only strengthen the hand of hardliners.