Iraq war: General Sir Mike Jackson recalls the lead-up to the conflict A ceasefire was signed by the Coalition and Iraqi commanders: a ceasefire endorsed by UNSCR 678, which also imposed clear conditions regarding military and other activities of the Saddam regime. While the operation was clearly militarily decisive, it was not politically decisive as the then US president, George Bush Snr, declined to direct further military action to deal with the underlying political problem: the regime in Baghdad. The conditions of UNSCR 687, inter alia, laid down restrictions on weapon holdings, particularly regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A further UNSCR 688, condemned the regime's repression of its own people; France, the UK and the US interpreted 688 to permit the establishment of no-fly zones over Kurdistan and southern Iraq. Little or no adherence to these resolutions was evident by Saddam, who reacted brutally to Shia unrest in southern Iraq in the aftermath of Gulf 1. There followed 12 years of evasion by the regime. The UN Human Rights Commission defined violations against the Iraqi people as 'extremely grave. It is impossible to know how long this strategic stand-off would have lasted. It is also almost impossible to overestimate the shock of 9/11 on the American body politic. Subsequent to that terrible day, and in addition to the military action taken against the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, it was clear that George W Bush, the US president, and his administration had finally lost patience with the Iraqi regime - albeit that any connection, even indirect, between the regime and al Qaeda was unlikely. As 2002 wore on, it became increasingly obvious that US military action - unilateral if need be - against Saddam was a matter of when rather than if. The early spring of 2003 appeared to be the time window. The US looked for allies and found many, not least the UK which at the commencement of Gulf 2, as it inevitably became known, provided around a third of the ground forces and significant air and maritime contributions. For the British Armed Forces, therefore, by the autumn of 2002 there was a real sense of probability that the US were going to take military action, and that the UK would join the Coalition. However, there was political nervousness on the part of the British Government which wanted to avoid giving the impression that war with Iraq was inevitable; rather, an intense international diplomatic effort could provide a solution. The British political decision to engage militarily was taken somewhat late in the day, which inevitably foreshortened the Armed Forces" preparation time. Much of the debate in Britain centred on the so-called 'second resolution": second that is, to UNSCR 1441 which was a form of final warning to Saddam. International lawyers were divided as to whether defiance of 1441 was a trigger to military action. That said, a successor resolution to 1441 would have been not the 'second resolution," but the eighteenth regarding the security consequences of the invasion of Kuwait - and the previous 17 had been defied or got around. Part of the context of the time was the contentious issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Saddam had previously used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, and against his own people. The intelligence picture was that the regime very probably still had such weapons, and that there was at least a possibility that they would be used against Coalition forces. The fact that none were subsequently found does not alter the sense of imminent and mortal danger which Coalition forces had at the time - to the extent of wearing full protective clothing in the desert heat, and conducting frequent chemical defence drills. The military planning to be ready to implement a political decision was complicated. Until quite late on, the British preference was for a largely autonomous axis of advance from the north, through Turkey. When it became clear - as late as the New Year - that Turkey would not permit use of her territory for this purpose, a very rapid rethink took place which gave the UK the role of advancing from Kuwait into south-eastern Iraq with the focus on Basra. This required our logisticians to move at least as many people and rather more equipment tonnage to Kuwait in half the time of the similar strategic deployment in Gulf 1. It was a singular achievement. I had a very high degree of confidence that the manoeuvre operation against Saddam's forces - known to the military as Phase 3 - would be swift and decisive, despite the untutored view of some that Baghdad would be another Stalingrad. My own estimate was three weeks; in the event it took a few more days. It was again a militarily decisive operation; but the strategic political outcome could only be achieved by Phase 4: moving Iraq to consensus government, the rule of law, sound institutions, and economic regeneration. In other words, the military action of short duration would be but a precursor to - pace Donald Rumsfeld - a nation-building programme of very considerable duration. Sadly, the so-called neo-cons of Washington did not anticipate the complexity of Phase 4: that there would be a political vacuum in the aftermath of successful military action, as there had been in Kosovo, and to a lesser extent, Bosnia. Such plans as there were for Phase 4 were discarded by Washington, a portentous move compounded by the inexplicable decisions to disband the Iraqi security forces and to sack Baath party members, however junior. The inevitable political vacuum was swiftly filled by sectarian forces: the minority Sunni predominance of the previous regime was immediately followed by the majority Shias flexing their muscles. The result was ugly sectarian violence, with the Coalition forces doing their best - with varying success - to hold the ring. Iranian involvement as a Shia power further complicated the situation. We learn, not for the first time, that an intervention such as Iraq requires all the sinews of Government; it is not merely a job for soldiers. They may have to defeat a regime's forces as a precursor, but the rebuilding of a stable consensus-based state requires politicians, diplomats, economists, engineers, lawyers, police, aid workers and more. This in turn requires an intervening power to harness, coordinate and, above all, direct the various departments of government to the joint achievement of the strategic end. The UK has not always fully met this imperative. Is the outcome worth the cost in blood and treasure? It is a difficult and complex question, not least because the obvious comparison - what would Iraq be like after another decade and more of Saddam - is unknowable. Iraq has huge potential: an energetic and well-educated people, two great rivers, mineral riches. Provided sectarian differences can be solved by politics rather than violence, there is a great future for all its people, Kurd, Shia and Sunni alike. With its pivotal position in the Middle East, a stable and secure Iraq is a prize indeed. This is the strategic goal for which so much has been staked. The 22 and a half years from Gulf 1 through Gulf 2 to the present day, are in my view a continuum; such a strategic goal takes amounts of time, commitment, and cost which Western democracies find uncomfortable. Uncomfortable it may be, but there is no short cut if we are to promote a more stable world in which the rule of law prevails rather than a tyrant's diktat. Ten years on is a poignant moment. I fear my words may bring little, if any, comfort to those who bear the loss of loved ones, to those who have been physically and mentally scarred. They have been very much in my mind, even more so as I have been writing. It is in some ways too early to come to a final judgement but I believe we can conclude, albeit tentatively, that it was indeed worth it. In all of this, what the British Armed Forces have achieved since the end of the Cold War, not only in Northern Ireland and Iraq, but also in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali - an extraordinary roll-call - is a matter of great personal pride. I know that pride is widely shared.