Egypt's Ordinary Coup: The New Yorker Since the removal of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, on July 3rd, the Obama Administration has purposefully declined to state whether this event was "a coup d"état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role," because an affirmative answer would legally require the suspension of aid. Given Egypt's strategic importance, the United States government would like to have good relations with the new administration in Cairo, and has emphasized the role played by popular protest in Morsi's overthrow and the legitimacy this putatively confers upon his successors. According to the Egyptian media, fourteen million Egyptians demonstrated against President Morsi, which, if this count is correct, would make these the largest protests in the country's history, and possibly some of the largest demonstrations anywhere in the world. For some commentators, this is the only aspect of Morsi's overthrow that matters, and, if they recognize the role of the military in the process, they argue that the event is unusual enough that it should be treated as sui generis. And yet there is no denying that the military overthrew President Morsi in a coup, according to any conventional definition of the term. From my perspective as an academic who specializes in understanding military coups (I've interviewed participants in ten coup attempts, researched case histories of hundreds of coup attempts, and crunched the numbers on all four hundred and seventy-one coup attempts in the latter half of the twentieth century), there was in fact very little unusual about this particular coup. Statistical analysis shows coup attempts are more frequent in countries that are less economically developed, with governments that are neither highly democratic nor highly dictatorial, and which have recently experienced at least one other coup attempt. In other words, coup attempts happen in countries like Egypt. The conspirators in this attempt were from the top of the military hierarchy, as they are in the plurality of coup attempts, and they succeeded, as in two-thirds of coups attempts mounted by senior officers. This coup's execution also followed the classic formula, with a general on television stating that the military as a whole has decided to remove the incumbent and has done so for the benefit of the nation. Such an announcement, which appears at first to be merely an announcement of the coup's successful conclusion, is actually its key moment, with control over broadcasting facilities a necessary element in the success of almost every coup attempt. There is not even anything unique in how recent events in Egypt fulfill the definitions of both a revolution and a coup. Popular protests and coups have combined to bring regime change in the Russian Revolution (1917); the Iranian Revolution (1979); the People Power Revolution, in the Philippines (1986); the end of communism in Romania (1989); the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad, in Ecuador (2000); and, of course, the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (2011), just to name a few examples. Successful revolutions are often accompanied by coups because mass protest alone is insufficient to defeat a government that retains military support, as the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989 found out. If a leader is determined to stay in power, and willing to use force to do so, protesters will succeed only if either the entire state-security apparatus collapses or the ruler loses his ability to use this force - that is, the military turns on him in a coup. When popular protest and military action coincide to remove an incumbent, it is common to see military actors maintain that they are merely the instrument of the popular will. Such claims are made by all erstwhile coup makers, however, and should be understood simply as rhetoric designed to legitimate their actions. There is nothing inherently democratic about a coup, no matter how popular. But then, the same can be said about revolutions. Popular protest has given rise to unpopular governments, and military overthrow has been followed by democracy. For example, Portugal's 1974 coup ended authoritarianism in that country and gave birth to a stable democratic regime; since the end of the Cold War, military coups have routinely been followed by competitive elections. Whether democracy survives in Egypt will have more to do with what happens now than with the mechanics of how Morsi was removed. In many ways, Egypt's biggest challenge stems from the state of its economy rather than the legitimacy of its governing institutions. In the past two years, growth has slowed substantially, unemployment has gone up fifty per cent, and the budget deficit has doubled. Egypt needs twenty billion dollars over the next year just to keep its economy afloat, and it will require major reforms to put the economy on a sounder footing. However, the military has consistently blocked attempts at substantive economic reform because this would require the privatization of its own assets: various commercial enterprises that may include up to one third of the Egyptian economy. While the exact holdings of the Egyptian armed forces are classified military secrets, these go far beyond the publically acknowledged ownership of arms factories, supposedly necessary for national defense, to real estate, gas stations, beach resorts, and day-care centers. The military produces televisions, jeeps, washing machines, butane cylinders, olive oil, bottled water, and pasta. These and other state-run enterprises are subsidized and operated for political reasons, rather than with an eye on the bottom line, and therefore increase the ballooning deficit by an undisclosed amount. It is here that the international community has the greatest leverage and can do the greatest good for the future of Egyptian democracy. The Egyptian people have shown repeatedly that they are willing to take to the streets to protest poor economic performance, and a fragile democracy will have a difficult time surviving such large-scale demonstrations. If the international community, and the United States in particular, wishes to ensure a stable and democratic Egypt, they should make their loans conditional on substantive economic reform that benefits the Egyptian people. Such reforms will undoubtedly be painful for the military, but the international community needs to make clear that such pain is the price for its support. Achieving such reform will not be easy. Military enterprises are entrenched in a network of powerful and connected civilian interests, so any proposed economic changes are sure to encounter resistance. The twelve billion dollars in recently pledged aid from the Gulf countries will buy the new government some breathing room and allow supporters of the status quo to argue that change really isn't necessary. In addition, the U.S. may be more interested in preserving its relationship with the Egyptian military. However, it would be a mistake to miss this opportunity for change, and it is difficult to see how ignoring Egypt's deep economic problems can be justified by anything more than wishful thinking. There is room for negotiation and compromise in this process; the focus should be on those reforms that allow democracy to survive, with the longer-term project of establishing civilian control over the military left to the people of Egypt to tackle over time. In the not-so-distant past, both Turkey and Brazil had weak democracies, overshadowed by dominant military forces that controlled a good deal of the state and the economy; this year, each country experienced widespread protest and demonstrations without any question of the military either intervening or even weighing in on the matter. Democracy is more like a weed than a hothouse flower: it can survive even in conditions that seem to contemporary observers to be hostile. The challenge for the people of Egypt, as it was for the citizens of Brazil and Turkey before, is how best to get democracy to take root. Naunihal Singh is an assistant professor in the Department of International Security Studies at the Air War College, in Montgomery. The views expressed here are the author's and do not represent those of the Air War College, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense. Photograph by Hussein Malla/AP.