Can we build bridges with the new Iran? Compare and contrast the women clad in black abayas, who flit like silent ghosts along the streets of Saudi Arabia, with their elegant and confident sisters in Tehran, who allow their hair to tumble from the smallest veils on offer. Watch how the heaving shops of Bata market in Riyadh fall silent five times a day for prayers, with Saudi Arabia's religious police chivvying worshippers into the nearest mosque. And then notice how, in Tehran, no such ritual is played out. Saudi Arabia must run a de-radicalisation programme to inoculate its youth against the virus of al-Qaeda's pitiless interpretation of Sunni Islam. In Shia Iran, meanwhile, these efforts are not required. Go to Cairo and encounter the visceral anti-Americanism of the city's students. Outside Tehran University, by contrast, you can find bookshops stuffed with English dictionaries and thick blue volumes entitled American Accent Training: A Guide to Operating and Pronouncing American English. Who would have guessed that an instruction manual on how to speak like an American would find a market in Iran? The mystery disappears when you meet Iranian students and discover that the country they all want to visit is America. So beneath the surface impression created by its rulers, the basis for normal relations between Iran and the West is clearly present. "Normal," of course, would not mean devoid of tension, clash or argument; but it would mean devoid of the threat of war. Today, Iran has a newly elected president, Hassan Rouhani, who promises to lead a government of "moderation." In his first press conference since taking office, Mr Rouhani said on Tuesday that he possessed the "political will" to "solve" the confrontation over Iran's nuclear ambitions "and also take into consideration the concerns of the other sides." He added that he was willing to negotiate "with seriousness and without wasting time, if the other sides are ready." Mr Rouhani, articulate and worldly-wise, could not be more different from his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Indeed, the last president might have been specifically designed to reinforce every Western prejudice about Iranians: Mr Ahmadinejad seemed to combine irrationality with fanaticism, mysticism with belligerence. But while the words of the new leader are refined and carefully chosen, experts question whether the substance has really altered. Iran, after all, has been negotiating over the nuclear issue on and off for a decade. In the past 18 months, it has held four meetings with a group of six world powers, including America, and no progress has been made. So Mr Rouhani's offer of more negotiations does not represent a change of policy. "It's a good thing that he has proposed more talks, I wouldn't want to negate that, but I wouldn't want to raise any expectations," says Ali Ansari, professor of Iranian history at St Andrews University. In any case, presidents do not necessarily count for much in Iran. The key decision-maker on all big issues, particularly the nuclear programme and relations with the West, is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. By rhetoric and action, this obdurate 74-year-old has always appeared an implacable foe of the West. The central issue at the heart of the nuclear argument is Iran's "right" to enrich uranium, a sensitive process that could be used to make the fissile core of a nuclear weapon. Back in 2004, Ayatollah Khamenei told Mr Rouhani in the specific context of enrichment: "I would never abandon the rights of the country as long as I am alive." That conversation between two men who now form the apex of Iran's power structure was reported in the memoirs of a former Iranian diplomat, Hossein Mousavian. Put delicately, it suggests little willingness to compromise. Peter Jenkins, a former British ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, says that American demands may rule out any accommodation. "The signs in Washington are that the Americans are still going to be looking for quite drastic limitations on the scale of Iran's enrichment programme," he says. Even if Mr Rouhani could deliver a compromise, this would not satisfy an "absolutist" US position, he adds. Will the new president be anything more than the skilled and articulate voice of Ayatollah Khamenei's policies? Prof Ansari cautions against viewing Mr Rouhani as a power-broker in his own right. "If we widen the lens and look at the hinterland around Rouhani, it's best to see him fundamentally as a prime minister, not a president," he says. He chooses the cabinet, but he's got to coordinate with the Supreme Leader in everything he does. How far can he push those boundaries? We have to give it time, but we also have to be realistic about what his position allows. As for the picture of Iran's Westernised youth, that must also be carefully qualified. A European scholar of the Middle East who spent last summer at a university in Iran says that reformist students have a nuanced view of the West. "They admire Western democracy and when they speak about changes in Iran, they always make the West a reference point for what they would like to achieve," she says. But they do not want to copy the West completely. They are proud of Iran. It is not as if the West is a complete model for them. They would like to achieve something better by combining Western freedom with Islamic values. Moreover, reformist and hardline students have one point of agreement. The only thing they have in common is that they think that Iran is misjudged by the West. They are obsessed by the thought that Iran is misunderstood. Mr Rouhani and the Supreme Leader share the overriding aim of guaranteeing the survival of the Islamic republic. The biggest threat comes from the cumulative failure of Iran's economy. Sanctions and official incompetence have combined to wreck the vital oil industry, with exports falling by 40 per cent in a single year. As recently as 2011, Iran was the second biggest oil producer in Opec after Saudi Arabia. It has now fallen to fifth place, overtaken by Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This fall in output represents a loss of billions of dollars to the Iranian regime. Despite oil prices above $100 per barrel, Mr Rouhani will find himself in the extraordinary position of introducing austerity budgets. The logic is inescapable: if the Islamic republic is to survive, the economy must be rescued. But that will only happen if sanctions are lifted. And these measures will only go if the nuclear issue can, somehow, be defused. There is one cause for optimism: the cultural and social basis for a normal relationship between Iran and the West is already present. If this were to be achieved, the benefits to everyone would be immense.