Abrasive admiral whose flotilla swiftly retook the Falklands Admiral Sir John "Sandy" Woodward, who has died aged 81, commanded the naval element of the British task force that recaptured the Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentina in April 1982. A clever, astringent submariner who neither courted nor secured popularity, he remained to the end nagged by a belief that he had been denied both his rightful share of credit for the victory and the highest prizes of his service - he never became First Sea Lord. Born in Cornwall on May 1 1932, Woodward was raised in modest circumstances before entering the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, and rising through the service. In a navy ruled successively by one or other brotherhood of specialists - aviators, gunners, navigators and the like - it was the turn of submariners. With the rank of rear admiral he was off Gibraltar, exercising the First Flotilla of destroyers and frigates, as the Falklands crisis broke. Margaret Thatcher was determined to send a task force, initially to reinforce diplomacy and if necessary to retake the islands. As the fleet's commander-in-chief, the exceptionally gifted Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse appointed Woodward to the seagoing command. His appointment caused some surprise within the service, because most captains expected a naval aviator to be given the job. The carriers Hermes and Invincible would be the key component of the task force, and it seemed logical that their operations should be placed in expert hands - Rear Admiral Derek Reffell was an obvious candidate. Woodward was respected for his brains but his brashness made him an awkward colleague in a joint-service operation. Moreover, the command structure for the deployment confused senior officers as well as the public. It was widely supposed that he was in overall charge, whereas in reality this responsibility rested firmly with Fieldhouse at his Northwood headquarters outside London. Once hostilities began, Royal Marines officers became bewildered and angered by peremptory signals from Woodward, who seemed eager to intervene in land operations, for which he had no mandate. Without authority, he also ordered the submarine Conqueror to sink the cruiser General Belgrano. Northwood immediately countermanded this, pending the prime minister's endorsement, which was then given. It is sometimes now forgotten how hazardous was the entire British operation, undertaken to meet political imperatives before serious planning had been done about how the mission could be accomplished. Fieldhouse told Woodward when they met before sailing: "This is going to be a sad and bloody business. I only wish I could give you more ships. His assertion was swiftly validated when the destroyer Sheffield was fatally damaged by an Exocet missile. Thereafter, even before the British put ashore a brigade of marines and paratroopers at San Carlos on May 21, a succession of warships was damaged by bombs. An early decision by Woodward was bitterly criticised, especially by Royal Marines officers ashore: he would keep his aircraft carriers at a safe distance - usually about 200 miles - even at the cost of limiting the operational range of his Sea Harrier planes. Yet most historians and strategic analysts have since concluded he was correct. If it seems hard to fault his handling of his ships, Woodward's handling of people was another matter. A senior officer at San Carlos sighed at the time: "I never used to be able to understand all those world war two rows between generals but now I do. I've seen officers who get along perfectly well if they can talk face to face get into the most frightful wrangles when separated by 10 miles and obliged to communicate by signal. I was shown some of Woodward's more abrasive "buck up" messages to the land force and to his own captains. When they faced immense stresses, of which the admiral seemed oblivious, these provoked fierce anger. A naval staff officer at San Carlos said in exasperation: "If Woodward would just get in a helicopter and come here and see for himself what is going on, he might not talk nonsense to everybody." Rows of that kind explain why, when the task force came home in triumph, not all those who had served in the South Atlantic wished to see laurels heaped on Woodward. This was unfair: he had borne a huge responsibility and acquitted himself with credit. I said as much when answering bitter letters that he sent me complaining he had been denied his rightful recognition. I added in my last response to him, some three years ago: "Sandy, surely it is enough to know that posterity - and historians like me - agree that you did the right things, without also demanding that you should be applauded as the most popular boy in school - which you were not."