A strong commission is the key to a stable Europe The fact that creditors ignore its advice does not mean it is wrong, writes Mujtaba Rahman Everyone loves to bash the European Commission. In normal times, it is portrayed as remote, inefficient and unaccountable. But since the eurozone debt crisis, more serious charges have been made about its understanding of finance and financial markets. The most recent is the International Monetary Fund's internal review of its own involvement in the first Greek bailout. It blasts the commission's lack of experience of overseeing countries" structural adjustment, and of crisis management more generally. Criticism of the commission has, in fact, defined the commentary on the debt crisis. When there is scrutiny of the IMF, the European Central Bank and the commission - the troika that organised the Greek bailout - the commission is always portrayed in the least favourable light. Despite several policy blunders by the IMF, eurozone members continue to have confidence in its technical competence. Meanwhile, the ECB's programme of outright monetary transactions , or bond-buying, is credited with reducing the risk of a eurozone break-up. The commission, for its part, has not done everything right but it has done a far better job than its critics claim. This is especially true given Europe's complex political structure and the constraints that member states impose on the commission as a result. Most importantly, unlike its troika partners, the commission is not ideological but pragmatic. Given the interdependence of eurozone economies, it has emphasised the importance of mitigating contagion. This necessitates a more supportive stance towards bailouts, which has led Germany to perceive the commission's leadership as spendthrift and Mediterranean. However, as guardian of the treaties, the commission has had to place the broader European good above the narrow self-interest of a small number of powerful creditors. The commission also understands European politics, and their interaction with economics, in a way the IMF does not. The Cyprus debacle is a perfect example. Wary of contagion, the commission put forth proposals that would have avoided imposing losses on Cypriot bank depositors. The IMF, given its desire to reduce the final tab so that its "debt sustainability" criterion would be met, was less against imposing such losses. The IMF knew it could win: its involvement was needed to secure the agreement of both the German and Finnish parliaments. In the end, the Cyprus package did, as the IMF wished, hit depositors. There has been no direct economic contagion; but the intervention did necessitate the introduction of capital controls, which are clearly inconsistent with a monetary union. Most importantly, the intervention complicated political discussions on "bailing in" investors, undermining elements of the eurozone's proposed banking union. Furthermore, given recent local financial sector developments, it is likely Cyprus will need more money before too long. As bailout politics quickly become linked in Europe, this could have a negative impact on discussions of Greece and Portugal as they seek to graduate from their first bailouts this year. This is the type of political spillover the commission factors into its crisis management policy advice. The fact that creditor countries choose to ignore it does not mean it is wrong. One can look more critically at the way the IMF and eurozone member states handled Greece, too. The IMF acknowledges it overestimated Athens" long-term political commitment to the bailout programme; yet the commission receives no credit for correctly foreseeing the government's inability to implement reforms. In fact, the structural problems in Greece were such that shock therapy was the only viable way forward. The longer the reform programme lasted, the more likely the commitment of the Greek political elite would have waned. Although the IMF now acknowledges there was little option but shock therapy, because eurozone states were unwilling to lend any more money, it still argues imposing haircuts on private investors in Greek sovereign debt early on would have been beneficial for the economy. However, the broader political, economic and financial implications at that time were - and remain - unknowable. Germany, France and other powerful states continue to advocate a eurozone built on country co-operation rather than strong institutions such as the commission. But this is self-serving. Such demands created flaws in the design of the eurozone, which led to the build-up of imbalances and the onset of the crisis. Even now, reforms at both country and European levels remain fragile as a result. Country-level decision-making has proved an unfit basis for broader European stability. Ultimately, a eurozone that is both durable and successful will require more powerful - and accountable - supranational institutions. Of all those that exist, a strong European Commission is the best placed to fulfil that role. The writer is a former commission official, director of Europe at the Eurasia Group and author of the forthcoming "Inside the Crisis"