Pentagon plans for action against Assad regime remain on track All the signs are that the Pentagon will now implement its plans for an immediate "short sharp" strike on the Syrian regime's military targets this weekend. Throughout this crisis, the White House has operated on the probable assumption that it will carry out a 48-hour strike starting late Saturday or Sunday. There is nothing to suggest that this timetable has slipped. The only issue throughout this crisis has been whether the British government could overcome its own parliamentary obstacles to meet the Pentagon deadline for action. In the hours before the attack begins, there will be a few issues to clear up. First, the UN inspectors will leave Damascus, where they have been collecting evidence of last week's chemical attack, and will report to secretary-general Ban Ki-moon. They may want days or even weeks to analyse their evidence. But this will not get in the way of Pentagon planning. The US published its own unclassified intelligence report on Friday, one considerably more detailed than the document published by the UK on Thursday. The US has come to the view with "high confidence" that the Assad regime carried out last week's chemical attack. In US secretary of state John Kerry's view, the UN inspectors can provide no additional information on who was culpable. That is not in their mandate. There is then the question of the legal basis for the missile strike. The US could force a vote to authorise military action at the UN Security Council - where it has initiated a debate. But the US looks as though it has given up on the idea of calling a vote. The US, like the British government, will base its legal case on the (admittedly somewhat contested) doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Besides, as Mr Kerry said on Friday, it knows that Russia will veto any UNSC resolution. That then leads us to a range of questions as the attack proceeds. First, what kind of assault have the US opted for? There seems little doubt that this will be an operation targeting some of the Assad regime's military assets such as command and control bunkers. Will it do serious damage against a battle hardened-regime? Or will it prove to be a damp squib? Second, how accurate will the assault be? The 2011 Nato-led Libyan operation showed that the US and its allies today have impressive precision in missiles and air-launched weapons. There were few civilian casualties in that campaign. But will that accuracy be replicated this time? Third, what will the role of the French be? As the Cameron government ponders the humiliation of not being shoulder to shoulder with its US ally, its senior figures will watch closely to see how much real firepower France brings to the operation. Unlike the UK, France has been cautious about cutting armed forces spending and had clear success in this year's Mali operation. The fear that France is replacing the UK as the leading military power in Europe is one that will rage through Whitehall over the next few days. Finally, will the Assad regime retaliate? The central assumption of western military planners is that the regime will not. Instead, it will focus all its efforts on keeping military assets out of the line of fire. But there is a school of thought that argues that the Assad regime is no longer a rational strategic actor. An asymmetric attack on Jordan - closely allied to the US and Britain - might be an attractive option for regime leaders.