Put politicians back in charge of the Bank of England Second, if an independent central bank had the task of managing inflation, inflation would be regarded by the Government as "someone else's problem," so the Government would feel free to pursue inflationary policies in other areas. I mentioned in particular that where there were independent central banks, governments tend to raise spending and public sector pay. No further comment required. Third, I argued that an independent central bank would tend to want to act only on evidence in respect of politically controversial supply-side measures that might affect the underlying growth rate of the economy or the natural rate of unemployment - otherwise the central bank would be perceived as siding with or against the Government on partisan matters, and its perceived independence would be undermined. Consequently, monetary policy would involve errors (it would lag behind) in periods in which government action affected the sustainable growth rate or the natural rate of unemployment. Many commentators today suggest that during the late 1990s and early 2000s the Bank of England missed significant structural changes in the economy, but they rarely observe the role of its independence in that. Given how vindicated the anti-central bank independence argument has been by events, given that the original raison d"être for independence - preparing for euro entry - has now long since passed, and given the broader policy failings of the Bank of England (inflation targets missed; financial stability not maintained) history alone provides grounds for reconsidering the framework. But matters go further than this - indeed, right to the heart of the argument for central bank independence. At the centrepiece of the argument in favour of central bank independence is the following idea: unemployment will be kept down if workers believe that inflation will in the future be low, but will not always stay down if inflation is in fact kept low. In other words, those in charge of monetary policy have the incentive to make promises they won't keep. Central bank independence is supposed to work as follows. Sometimes, to keep inflation low and serve the long-term interests of the economy, it might be necessary to take decisions that will lead to millions becoming unemployed in the short term - e.g. raising interest rates as inflation rises, even if the economy is already doing badly. The idea is that politicians may be unwilling or unable to do this, because such action will be so unpopular that politicians trying to do the right thing get kicked out - at least until inflation becomes totally out of control, as in the 1970s and early 1980s in Britain. An independent central bank, by contrast, is supposed to be able to take such decisions because it is specifically tasked with caring only about inflation and the long term, rather than about short-term unhappiness or other political considerations. This is supposed to mean it is more "credible" - i.e. that when the independent central bank promises inflation will be thus and so, we believe it. Except that it doesn't work like that at all, as we've seen in the past four years. The Bank of England did not, in 2008 or 2011, decide that it would raise interest rates sufficiently to keep inflation to the 2pc target, even though doing so might have led to hundreds of thousands of extra unemployed. Independent central banks face exactly the same temptation to promise one thing and deliver another that politicians do. Indeed, it seems to me now that matters go the opposite way. If you are going to take a decision that involves half a million people losing their jobs, it's much easier done if you have the backing of having been elected. A pure technocrat may not feel entitled to take such a decision if there is any other option - no matter how short-termist - available. This may matter a lot soon. For, if there is some recovery in growth, inflation may go up again. In the past four years, whenever the economy has not actually been in recession, inflation has gone to 5pc and rising. How much inflation might there be if the economy starts to motor along at 3pc or more? If inflation starts to get out of control, it could be very difficult to get it down without creating unemployment in the process. Controlling inflation is much less expensive, in unemployment terms, if credibility is higher - if people believe your inflation promises. The Bank of England's credibility is gone, and without a democratic mandate it will surely be unwilling to raise rates early, creating yet another recession, as inflation rises. It's easier to take tough decisions that affect millions of people's lives if millions of people have voted for you to take those decisions. Soon, we may need tough decisions taken on inflation, and our undemocratic technocrats have proven they are too weak to take them. Cancel Bank of England independence and put accountable politicians back in charge. Then, at least, if they let us down we can kick the rotters out. Andrew Lilico is director of Europe Economics