Oil's Long Goodbye and a Species' Quest for Self Control Mick Womersley, a professor of human ecology at Unity College in Maine, has offered a provocative and powerful reaction to my post on new work pointing to the abundance of oil now that new methods have been developed to extract it from deposits that were previously too costly to tap. You can read his "Your Dot" dispatch below. It's a very different reaction to the newly realized oil abundance than that of George Monbiot, the British environmental columnist, whose latest column is "We were wrong on peak oil. There's enough to fry us all. I've been attracted to Womersley's work and ideas before (see "Home Energy Economics 101"). Womersley, along maintaining with blogs on sustainable living and his small farm, sends his students out into rural Maine communities to conduct energy audits and help cut energy bills for struggling families and retirees. The current oil and gas boom in continental North America poses a difficult policy question: How are we to reduce climate emissions in an era of continuing, and even increasing, oil and gas supplies? Most of us who worry about these things had admittedly been relying on "peak" oil to help in this long-term project. Now with the boom in domestic supply we are left to bemoan the use of hydraulic fracking and tar sands. Former Senator Tim Wirth, quoted in Andy's "Fresh Look" piece, argues against this rush to judgment. The new supplies may provide "a window of time" to sort out our climate response. The new supplies are a "reality" climate thinkers must take into account. My primary job is to teach undergraduate-level classes in climate mitigation, adaptation, and sustainability, and I've been thinking and teaching along similar lines for some years now. There's a chain of logic I've used to explore this situation in my writing and classes. It goes this way: The first part of the chain is that we know that climate change is happening, we know what is most likely to happen, and we can both anticipate the pace of events and the pace of necessary mitigation and adaptation measures. There remains a good deal of uncertainty, and there's always the possibility that we hit some type of tipping point or threshold effect. But in general, we know enough to act, and can even begin to measure the pace of our actions. The second part of the chain says that it's very unlikely that any action at all will take place in the absence of strong western democratic leadership. In the same way we wouldn't imagine that the world's various dictatorships and ruling juntas would be the authors of an eventual solution, why would we imagine the Chinese Communist Party, or the United Russia party would be so nice as to solve the problem for us? Our primary hope must be that the western democracies, led by the United States and Europe, will eventually lead the world to negotiate and implement a global policy. How long this takes will simply determine how much of the eventual policy mix will be for mitigation and how much for adaptation. It's become fashionable among younger and more radical activists I've met to link climate to capitalism and to express disdain for the western system. There's some overlap between the Occupy movement and the more radical climate campaigners. And who can blame them for rejecting the West, given the current polarization in the United States and European political scene and the lingering recession? But I've read my George Orwell. And I spent the first half of the Thatcher decade in the British military and the second half in the American environmental counterculture. A rare and heady mix, to be sure, but what I eventually emerged with was this reluctant sense that despite all its horrible faults - My Lai and Guantanamo, water-boarding and drone strikes, not to mention the current American political polarization between Occupy and the Tea Party - empirically speaking, the West has the only viable governmental systems on the planet that comes even close to the practical democracy that will be needed to solve the problem. I don't expect the process of surviving the coming climate decades to be tidy or pretty or even safe. The best analogy I can think of in American history is the ending of slavery. From the earliest Quaker abolitionist John Woolman in the 1700s to Barrack Obama in 2008 leads a thread of American thought that says that a black man or woman is equal under God and the law, and could even be President of the United States. But that thread leads through the bloody Civil War, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights era. America muddled through, but it wasn't straightforward. We shouldn't expect climate change to be so, either. But without the West it would be much, much worse. The final part of the chain is to ask what makes a strong West, a West that is capable of promoting democracy and an eventual climate solution? There are lots of answers to this question. Openness, transparency, and freedom of speech are a good start - where would our wonderfully vocal protesters on both sides of the Tea Party/Occupy spectrum be without these rights? Education is another answer, and how I make my living. We need to know more about the technology of mitigation and adaptation, but we also need to know the humanities bits too - the whys as well as the hows. The more we know, the more we understand, the more likely we are to find ways to muddle through. The public remains woefully uneducated about climate risk, and we need to get on that. We also clearly need leadership, our current ones being unable to move beyond their own petty partisan squabbling. There are probably other equally important factors I haven't mentioned. But we're certainly not going to get there if the West becomes economically and/or militarily weak, and in that point is perhaps the cusp of Wirth's, and my own, argument. If, despite all the missed opportunities, betrayals, and abuses, the West remains humanity's best hope, then we'd better take a long hard look at the effect that energy dependence has had on Western economic and military power. For two generations the Western nations have been increasingly reliant on the Middle East and now Russia for oil and gas. This dependence led directly to the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s, while the boom of the 1990s came only after the western intervention in Iraq during the First Gulf War. Even the 9/11 attacks were related to the placement of foreign forces in Saudi Arabia during and after that war. Oil and gas prop up the current Russian government, a dictatorship in all but name. Should we expect nice treatment from such people, were the shoe on the other foot? Environmentalists who call for unilateral climate emissions reductions must expect just that, as long as the western economy is so weak. I think this view over-optimistic, to say the least, if not almost child-like in term of naïveté. If we want to help humanity survive climate change, we need the West to remain economically and militarily strong. The new Western supplies of oil and gas are a reprieve of sorts, a one-time chance to get our house in order before the coming decades of climate stress and strife. An increase in the North American regional Keynesian multiplier will, and probably already has occurred, just because we're buying our own energy, aiding recovery. The trick would be to stay in this habit. What we should - actually, must - spend this bounty on is developing the renewable and energy efficient replacements for coal, oil and gas supplies. We need to use it to outfit ourselves with the physical capital in efficient buildings and transport, solar panels, wind turbines, and so on, that will be needed when, as we must, we decide we don't need fossil fuels anymore, and we need to use the power and prestige it gives us to promote democracy around the world, but especially in Russia and China. If all we spend it on is another consumer bubble, then we'll have squandered ours, and humanity's, last best chance. We have perhaps twenty years to achieve this. Some readers will argue that we can't afford to even begin to burn the new supplies, especially the tar sands, without risking the Venusian or Cretacean apocalypses mentioned above. It certainly seems reasonable to imagine we do lack the kind of self-control needed to use just enough of the shale oil, gas and tar to pay for the climate-and-democratic transition I describe, but I think this is a bit like the dieter who believes he must stop eating almost all food to lose weight at all. Few such dieters achieve their goals. We know, more or less, what the impact of each unit of emissions will be, and can at least proceed intelligently, if not in complete control. It's probably a more exact science than dieting, although there is always that danger of a tipping point. The new gas supplies will most likely reduce, not increase, emissions, through replacing coal in electrical generation, a process that is already under way, even in the absence of a climate bill. That will be a great help. The new Environmental Protection Agency regulations in the pipeline will drive this process yet further. If we don't have it already, we'd better develop that self-control, because the fossil sands and shales will always be there. If the West is too weak to lead, they will get used up. The Chinese are already making moves to grab Africa's resources. If we are weak, they will want ours too, by hook or crook. Only a strong West could afford to set them aside.