Shall We Call It the "Bronze Standard"? President Obama usually deserves high marks for his efforts to curb the spread of dangerous nuclear technology. But his administration's decision not to insist on an important nonproliferation provision in nuclear cooperation agreements is a serious retreat. Under American law, countries are required to negotiate detailed agreements before they are allowed to buy American nuclear reactors, fuel and services. The United States has signed many of them and many more are expected as additional countries pursue nuclear power. The Obama administration set a rigorous new standard in 2009. It signed an agreement with the United Arab Emirates in which the U.A.E promised, in exchange for access to American technology, to forswear uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Those are the processes for making nuclear fuel for reactors - or weapons. In 2010, P. J. Crowley, then the State Department spokesman, hailed the U.A.E. agreement as the "gold standard." But as it negotiates agreements with Vietnam and Jordan, the administration has jettisoned that marker. Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman and Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher told Congress in a letter last month that they will deal with enrichment and reprocessing on a "case by case" basis by "taking into account a partner's domestic policies and laws, proliferation concerns and negotiability." Jordanians had no doubt what that meant. As The Jordan Times reported, "Washington has dropped its reservations over Jordan's right to uranium enrichment." American officials now say that asking for too much could cost America's nuclear industry valuable new business. American suppliers are facing stiff competition from companies in France and Russia that make no demand that their clients forgo enrichment and reprocessing. Officials also insist that once American businesses have contracts in hand, Washington can still use its nuclear trade rules and suasion to urge countries signing nuclear deals to limit enrichment and reprocessing and meet other nonproliferation standards so there is no diversion. But if the administration doesn't make curbing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing an explicit priority, it will never happen. As for the business rationale, the Bush and Obama administrations and the nuclear industry made similar claims when they cast proliferation concerns aside and gave India an overly generous nuclear deal in 2008. The Indians are still mainly buying from others because they have yet to institute a sufficient liability regime to protect American firms. The blowback from not pressing others to accept the same deal as the U.A.E could also be significant. If Vietnam is given easier terms, charges will inevitably arise that Washington is tougher on the Arab world. If the provision is not in the agreement with Jordan or others in the Mideast, the U.A.E. has the right to renegotiate its deal. Congress must approve these nuclear deals. Representative Howard Berman has warned the White House that he will oppose any nuclear-cooperation agreement with Vietnam that does not forswear enrichment and reprocessing. Senator Richard Lugar is also insisting on the U.A.E. model for all agreements going forward. Other lawmakers should stand with them. If there is any chance of controlling the spread of this dangerous technology, Washington must set the standard. Bronze isn't good enough.