A Coda, of Sorts, to the Mystery Cluster Bomb From Libya The mystery of the unidentified cluster munitions found last year in Libya has deepened as the days have passed. More and more specialists have been in touch with the blog, by e-mail and a few by phone. The short of it is this: they have not seen this weapon before, and it does not appear to be in the various databases and identification books used by explosive ordnance disposal experts in the field. Let's catch up. On Feb. 1, this blog asked readers for help, and to take on a challenge: to try to identify an unusual so-called cluster bomb that was found in Libya in 2011. The submunition in question was of a class known as a Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, or DPICM, that is released from cargo canisters in the air and distributed to the targeted area below. Each bomblet carries a small shaped charge designed to penetrate light armor and to blast small metal fragments intended to wound people - thus that blandly euphemistic "dual purpose" label. Various specialists had confirmed what this DPICM was not, but no one knew exactly what it was. Many readers suggested that the submunitions were a variant of the American-made M77, but while they do fall within the same general family as the M77 they are quite a different weapon. E-mails and phone calls have since sharpened the search. Reports from the specialist who first found the weapon have confirmed the bomblets were carried in a 122-millimeter ground-to-ground rocket. Today's update includes new information from one of those men, Guy Marot, who has also provided more photographs of the weapons and their delivery rocket, which he and a team destroyed upon discovering it on the outskirts of Zintan last August. Mr. Marot led teams of ordnance specialists last year who surveyed and cleaned up unexploded munitions in Libya. In a long talk by Skype on a recent day, he offered a few observations, including what he called the three unique identifiers of the submunitions: the winglet or vane near the fuze, the straight streamer and the angled holes in the weapon's fragmentation casing. He also added fresh details. "The vanes seen in the photographs are spring-loaded," he said. The ribbon, he added, seemed "merely a mechanism to provide stability in flight and to ensure the cone projects downward." It did not, he said, appear to impart any spin on the bomblets. (Often, a mechanism at the top of a DPICM's fuze is designed to spin as the bomblet descends, which unwinds an arming screw, so the fuze will be live when the weapon makes contact with something solid, like a vehicle or the ground. The bottom portion, or cone, of a DPICM is typically designed to be stable in flight.) As for the fuze, Mr. Marot said neither he nor his team determined how it functions, because of limitations in their field equipment. "We couldn't really work out the fuze, as we didn't have any form of X-ray machine to get a full understanding of the fuzing," he said. Mr. Marot's photographs included images of the cargo rocket that had been excavated from the soil, with its unexploded cluster submuntions still contained within. Why this rocket had failed to open in flight and dispense its bomblets was not clear. Discovering the bomblet-laden rocket amounted to an important find. But the rocket, he said, did not settle the question of point of manufacture. "We tried to get some markings, but again - nothing," he said. All we got was standard designators and lot numbers and such. Mr. Marot, like many others perplexed by the weapon, said he suspected Chinese manufacture. He said he also tried last year to engage the Chinese in a conversation about the weapon, but made no headway. Ordnance disposal specialists often seek information about unusual weapons encountered in the field - the better to know how to handle and disarm them, and make post-conflict areas safe. "I approached Chinese contacts," he said. There was no response. Mr. Marot's suspicions were of a type. Thus far, China and North Korea lead the list of nations the experts in touch with At War suspect of being behind this system. Below, for example, is a snip from another specialist who looked at the photographs and accounts available to date. "Can't positively ID this item, key IDs would be the fluted body for parting spin, and the ribbon is a single piece instead of being doubled over like most countries" DPICMs. It can't be a coalition munition because of these ID features. He added: "No one seems to have used this item before and it seems to be a composite of several types of features of known DPICMs, which North Korea and the Chinese are very fond of copying for their use." That is certainly not a conclusive statement, and should not be read as one. It is an indicator only of the educated guesses of many ordnance specialists and arms-trade researchers in touch with At War. Their collective hunch is in part shaped by the verified presence of Chinese and North Korean 122-millimeter rockets and warheads in the Libyan stock. Again, that is not a conclusive indicator, but another chip in the shadowy arms-trade mosaic that helped make Libya in 2011 a very bloody place, and that has left de-miners with a cleanup that will take years. The blog has a fresh set of interviews in the works on this weapon, and will be back in a few days with more - unless one of you solves this. Tips? You can comment below, or, if you are like many of those helping and your job or employer prefers anonymity to protect your overseas work, as was the case of the specialist above, you can reach me directly at chivers@nytimes.com or thegun.book@gmail.com.