Supreme Court: Discrimination laws do not protect certain employees of religious groups The case involved a Michigan schoolteacher who said Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church violated the Americans with Disability Act in 2005 when it fired her after she tried to return to work after being diagnosed with narcolepsy. The church said Cheryl Perich was not fit for ecclesiastical office and that her threat to sue violated Lutheran teachings that disputes be handled within the church rather than in civil courts. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote for the court that such decisions are reserved to religious organizations. "The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important," Roberts wrote. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Obama administration had backed Perich's suit against the Redford, Mich., religious school. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit had said the lawsuit could go forward. But other appellate courts have acknowledged a "ministerial exception" grounded in the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom that precludes discrimination laws from intruding upon the employment relationship between religious institutions and their leaders. Wednesday's ruling marked the first time the Supreme Court had acknowledged such an exception. Requiring a religious group to accept or retain unwanted ministers, the justices said, deprives the group of "control over the selection of those will will personify its beliefs." Perich had claimed that the exception did not pertain to her. She joined the school as a "lay teacher" and then underwent religious training. Perich agreed that she became a "called" teacher in 2000 and sometimes taught religious classes along with secular classes such as math, and she occasionally led chapel services. She estimated that the "religious" part of her school day was only about 45 minutes. But Roberts said there was little doubt that Perish was a member of church leadership. Such a determination "is not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch," Roberts wrote. He said Perich "held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service," and even claimed a special ministerial housing allowance on her taxes. Roberts noted that the EEOC and Perich "foresee a parade of horribles" that could result from the court recognizing a ministerial exception to employment discrimination suits. Employees of religious institutions, for example, might be retaliated against for reporting criminal misconduct or testifying before a grand jury in a criminal trial. He said those questions could be addressed when and if they arise. "We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct," he wrote. He also said the court was not adopting "a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister." Justice Clarence Thomas said he would leave those matters up to the church. In a concurring opinion, he said civil courts should "defer to a religious organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as a minister." Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Elena Kagan wrote separately to make clear that they did not think the term "minister" was central to courts determining who is covered by the exemption. Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists rarely use the title, they wrote. "Courts should focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies," Alito wrote. The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.