Europe's regions go it alone at their peril Europe's regionalist and separatist movements can never get enough of the Middle Ages. Italy's Northern League draws inspiration from the communes that defeated Frederick Barbarossa, the German emperor, in 1176. Mention the Albigensian crusade of the early 13th century, and the blood of every Occitanist in southern France boils. What Scottish schoolchild is ignorant of the spider whose determination to spin a web put bravery in Robert the Bruce's heart before his 1314 victory over the English at Bannockburn? The medievalist enthusiasms of modern European regionalism are understandable. Aragon, Burgundy, Wales: this was the last era when these regions or nations enjoyed independence or a status close to it. But is nostalgia a platform for independence in modern times? Alex Salmond, leader of the Scottish Nationalist party, appears to think so. He disclosed last week that he wants a referendum on Scotland's future in autumn 2014, just after the 700th anniversary of Bannockburn. Mr Salmond is a tactically brilliant politician. He has made mincemeat of his political opponents in Scotland. When the UK government granted a measure of self-rule to Scotland in 1998, it attached a voting system designed to ensure that no political party - especially one dedicated to Scottish independence - could win an outright legislative majority in Edinburgh. Mr Salmond upset the apple cart last May by achieving exactly that result. Eight months later, his party is riding higher than ever in opinion polls, with support for his party estimated at a remarkable 51 per cent. The force is with Mr Salmond. Similar trends are visible elsewhere in western Europe. In Belgium's 2010 elections, the big winner was Bart De Wever's New Flemish Alliance, which embraces the cause of independence for Flanders. It took a world record 18 months for Belgium's linguistically divided politicians to form a coalition government. In what was already Europe's most decentralised country, the final compromise involved the devolution of still more powers to the regions. Yet it is premature to assign countries such as Belgium or the UK to the knacker's yard. For the sovereign debt and banking crises of the past two years demonstrate that there is no plausible substitute for central authorities armed with the strongest possible powers to prevent financial meltdown. As far as concerns national fiscal self-discipline, eurozone leaders are learning to live with this reality. The "fiscal compact" that will form one pillar of future economic governance is to be a pact among nation states. In Belgium it was the federal authorities, not the leaders of Flanders and Wallonia, that saved the day when the national banking system was on the brink of collapse. In Spain, vibrant regional autonomy has been a core principle of democracy since the death in 1975 of Francisco Franco, an obsessive centraliser as well a military dictator. But Spain's construction and property bubble plunged its regions and banks into crisis. It fell to the central government in Madrid to clean up the mess. Two weeks ago, word spread that the government had quietly helped the region of Valencia to make a €123m repayment owed to Deutsche Bank. Officials in Valencia acknowledged that the repayment was a week late. At more than 5 per cent, Spain's 10-year government bond yield is uncomfortably high. But matters are far worse for Catalonia, Spain's wealthiest region, which has been shut out of debt markets since last March. Catalonia would undoubtedly resist more central control over its budget, but Artur Mas, the Catalan leader, says the Spanish state's survival requires Madrid to extend financial support to his and other regions. It needs to be said that centralisation, of a greater or lesser kind, is in the DNA of the modern Spanish right. The financial crisis provides a perfect opportunity for the ruling Popular party to restore what it sees as a better balance between the centre and the regions. As for Scotland, no serious discussion has started on whether an independent state would have its own central bank, currency and national debt. What authority would regulate Scottish banks? Who would be the lender of last resort for the financial system? These are fascinating questions. So far, they lack clear answers. Until they get some, it is difficult to see how Mr Salmond's referendum will lead to the UK's break-up.