Dominique Moisi: Despite its drawbacks, democracy's slow pace does deliver IS DEMOCRATIC time too slow to respond to crises, and too short to plan for the long term? At a time of deepening economic and social crisis in many of the world's rich democracies, that question is highly relevant. In Italy, for example, prime minister Mario Monti has the legitimate ambition to carry out comprehensive reform. He is competent and honest, but faces a quasi-structural impediment: whereas leaders once had three years to convince voters of their policies" benefits, they now have three hours to convince global financial markets. In the United States, too, the political system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. The political philosopher Francis Fukuyama goes so far as to say that "vetocracy" could triumph over democracy, regardless of who wins the 2012 presidential election. But it is not because democracies have a "time problem" that their era seems to some to be over. China is rightly proud to be able to project itself into the 22nd century. But the Chinese think long-term because they are Chinese, not because they are not democrats. China's leaders can, of course, react to events without much regard for public opinion. The great majority of Chinese do not dream of democracy, even if something like a civil society is emerging that can no longer be totally controlled or manipulated, as in the past. But that is precisely the weakness of non-democratic regimes in a global age dominated by transparency: Who dreams of becoming a Chinese citizen, or even a citizen of Singapore? In the aftermath of North Korea's hereditary succession, strategic thinkers rightly emphasise China's key role in shaping the peninsula's future. But, despite the scenes of hysteria that followed the death of the "Great Leader" Kim Jong-il, most North Koreans probably dream of joining democratic South (even if many South Koreans fear that prospect). Most Chinese may not want to be governed like westerners, but it would be wrong to assume their only ambition is to spend like westerners. The more successful they are, the more individualistic they become and the more they expect the respect and consideration of those who govern them. By contrast, if China's economic growth slows, which is likely in the coming years, protest against corruption - a source of fragility for any regime - will escalate. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that, ahead of the upcoming Chinese leadership transition, new occupants for only the top two posts have been chosen, and that through a process of gradual anointment by roughly 100 people at most. The current crisis in the advanced countries not only reveals the many maladies of democratic regimes, but also acts as their incubator and accelerator. And yet the crisis may turn out to have an even greater impact on non-democratic systems that seem more efficient, but are in reality much more fragile. Democracy is more resilient in the long run. This will remain true as long as democrats remain convinced of it. Non-democratic models cannot truly challenge democracy. Only the misbehaviour of democrats can do that.