British hostage murder: SBS moved quickly but hostages were shot before they entered compound Three days later, members of the Vinelife church in Manchester were asked to pray for Mr McManus, who was a "family friend" of a prayer leader at the church, and his colleague. For more than two months, prayer was all that the church had to go on. During that time, neither the Nigerian nor British authorities had any firm intelligence about the fate of the hostages. Indeed, it was not even certain that the two men were still alive. One detail of the abduction was particularly troubling: the two men had kept a large amount of cash in their apartment but it was ignored by the abductors. That was seen as an ominous sign that whoever had taken Mr McManus and Mr Lamolinara was motivated by something other than money, but the picture remained worryingly unclear. Then, in early August, a video was sent to a French news agency in Lagos. Barely a minute long, it showed the two men, bearded and blindfolded, kneeling before men carrying automatic weapons. In the film, Mr McManus asked the British Government "to meet the demands of al-Qaeda," but, significantly, there was no demand for money. The tape deepened British officials" fears that the men were in the hands of Boko Haram, regarded as hardcore Islamists linked to al-Qaeda. We're not talking about Somali pirates or ransom gangs. These guys are ideologically-driven Islamists, part of the international AQ network," said a British source. Following the appearance of the video, Whitehall's Cobra committee, which oversees national security operations, met to consider the kidnapping. In all, the committee discussed the case about 20 times, initially chaired by civil servants but later overseen by senior ministers, including David Cameron. In early December, a second video was released in which the hostage-takers declared that Mr Cameron had two weeks to authorise "negotiations" . What would be the subject of talks was not clear - the group made no clear demands. But they were clear about one thing: if that vague condition was not met, the hostages would be killed. Despite the threat, the Government, in agreement with Italy and Nigeria, decided to let the deadline pass because intelligence officials assessed that it was a "bit of macabre theatre" rather than a serious threat. But it did add urgency to the task of locating the hostages. It is understood that Nigerian intelligence officials tracked the group to the city of Sokoto, about 100 miles north-east of Birnin Kebbi. GCHQ, Britain's signals intelligence service, was also at work, identifying and monitoring the telephone calls of the gang. Once they were located, the option of using British special forces to attempt a rescue became a viable option for Mr Cameron. Two weeks ago, a Squadron Group of the Special Boat Service deployed to Nigeria. The SBS was chosen to carry out the mission as it was the "Stand-By Squadron" for counter-terrorism. The post is rotated through the four SAS and four SBS squadrons every six months. In all, about 40 British special forces personnel went to Nigeria, travelling in civilian clothes and aboard commercial airlines, their weapons and gear shipped in British diplomatic bags. The commanding officer of the SBS, which recruits almost exclusively from the Royal Marines, set up his Task Group Headquarters at the British Embassy in Lagos. As well as intercepted telephone calls, the SBS also had access to surveillance video of the house where the hostages were being held from aircraft flying over the city. Images were fed back to the SBS command post and the monitor screens of the Cobra briefing room in Whitehall. For days, the SBS and their Nigerian counterparts watched, and waited. On Wednesday, what officials called "a window of opportunity" opened. Intercepts of mobile phone calls disclosed that the terrorists were about to move and then kill their hostages. The local SBS commander briefed his chief, the Director of Special Forces, a major-general who is both one of the most admired combat commanders in the Army and a personal friend of the Prime Minister. He judged that the situation was now "go, no-go," meaning intervention was required. That judgment was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who gave the final authorisation on Thursday after an 8am Cobra meeting. Conventional planning would prefer an assault at night, preferably just before dawn. But for reasons that remain unclear, the SBS was forced to make a daylight assault. In a sign of haste, insiders said the soldiers carried out an "emergency response" plan, rather than the more comprehensive "deliberate response" plan. The SBS team travelled in trucks close to the hostage site in a shanty town, beginning the raid at 11am Nigerian time. "The security agencies tried to break into the house but there was resistance," said Mahmoud Abubakar, who lives on the same street. The people inside were shooting at them and they returned fire. They exchanged fire for some time. At least two terrorists were shot dead at this stage but for all the speed and training of the British forces, it was not enough. When the terrorists in the room with the hostages heard the gunfire they shot both Mr McManus and Mr Lamolinara in the head at close range. A senior official at Nigeria's State Security Service said: "The hostage-takers shot the hostages before they [the Special Forces] even entered the compound. All the terrorists have been killed as well.