William Hague could learn from Operation Babylon As speculation grows regarding an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear installations, Israel's audacious, deeply controversial raid of June 7 1981 on Iraq's nuclear reactor is often cited as a precedent. The diplomatic files on Britain's reaction to the raid have recently been released and some of the revelations in these documents are startlingly pertinent. The bombing raid on the Osirak reactor, later known as Operation Babylon, was regarded in Israel as a great success. The then prime minister, Menachem Begin, described it as a "supreme act of self-defence" and claimed that Iraq would have acquired up to five nuclear bombs within four years, had they not attacked. The reaction in Washington was mixed. The Reagan administration initially condemned the operation. Britain's ambassador to the US, Sir Nicholas Henderson, was with the US defence secretary, Caspar Weinberger, when news of the raid broke and Weinberger remarked that Begin "had taken leave of his senses." President Reagan, though, showed more understanding. Saddam Hussein, according to the Israelis, had claimed that Iraq's nuclear plant was designed to produce weapons for use against the Jewish state; Reagan had received a letter from Begin justifying the raid on those grounds, and accepted this explanation. It later emerged that there was no substance to the allegation, but even so, some were quick to express private satisfaction. Richard Burt and Richard Perle, officials in the State Department and the Pentagon, had both told Henderson that Israel's attack was "a blow on behalf of non-proliferation." The British government, however, was unequivocal in its condemnation. Margaret Thatcher was very popular within Anglo-Jewry, partly because of her admiration for the local community and her outspoken support for Soviet Jews. She was viewed as a strong friend of Israel, while the Foreign Office was perceived as a hostile institution. Yet she outflanked the Foreign Office in rejecting Israeli claims of self-defence. Indeed, several weeks after Operation Babylon, Mrs Thatcher told the Iraqi trade minister, Hassan Ali, that the attack had been "totally wrong and contrary to international law." Moreover, she claimed that the Israeli allegations regarding Saddam's ambitions to target the Jewish state were untrue. The prime minister took an even stronger line in her correspondence with a leading friend of Israel within the Conservative Party. She claimed that Iraq, unlike Israel, had acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and had agreed to subject its nuclear facilities to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Not only was Mrs Thatcher convinced that Iraq's nuclear reactor was being used solely for peaceful purposes, she insisted that Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT, and its attack on Osirak was "a setback to the cause of non-proliferation" and later sent a telegram to Saddam congratulating him on achieving the "valuable objective" of a unanimous UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel's attack. One leading Tory supporter of Israel was convinced that Mrs Thatcher had been unduly influenced by Foreign Office Arabists. Plus ça change... Today, Foreign Secretary William Hague has been condemned by leading members of Conservative Friends of Israel for being "under the thumb of pro-Arabist" officials in the Foreign Office. However, Hague has been more sympathetic towards Israel's predicament over Iran than Mrs Thatcher was over Iraq. He has been a leading proponent of the sanctions campaign and although he has stated that an Israeli attack would be "unwise," it appears that his main concern surrounds the timing and success of an operation, rather than its legitimacy. After all, Britain itself has not ruled out the use of force against Tehran. From a Western perspective, one could argue that Israel's attack on Osirak posed more problems than would a similar operation against Iran today. There were good reasons why Mrs Thatcher was appalled by the raid. Through most of her premiership, she shared Foreign Office concerns that Moscow would gain ground in the Arab world by exploiting regional instability. Britain's moderate Arab allies were both incensed and alarmed by the Israeli strike and King Hussein of Jordan, a friend of the West, was furious with the Reagan administration for its soft response. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, fully exploited Washington's support for Israel by posing as a strong advocate of the Palestinian and Arab cause. In the Cold War atmosphere of 1981, there were fears that Arab countries would turn to Moscow for support. Few tears would be shed today, though, by Arab leaders if Iran's nuclear facilities were attacked. Following Operation Babylon, a British official wrote that Iraq's capability had been put back perhaps three to four years, adding that this would "not make anyone sleep much better at night." In a similar vein, many analysts believe that an Israeli strike against Iran may at best cause only temporary damage. Either way, an Israeli operation now appears inevitable. Perhaps we should leave the final word to Begin. On being asked whether Israel would take action against other countries with nuclear ambitions, he replied that Israel was dealing with Iraq first. The others we'll deal with another time. Israel attacked a Syrian nuclear installation in 2007. Will it do the same with Iran in 2012? Dr Azriel Bermant is Assistant Editor at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation