A Maze of Complication in the Afghan Poppy Fields The governor of the Zhare district in southern Afghanistan wanted to express a few helpful ideas for how to tackle Afghanistan's opium poppy problem. Perhaps, he suggested, disabling water pumps needed to irrigate fields would eliminate the crop. Or maybe cementing over irrigation wells to impoverish some poppy farmers permanently would send a message to others who grow the crop. The government could even cement a few poppy farmers into the wells to scare others into submission, the governor, Hajji Niaz Muhammad Sarhadi, said during a briefing with American military commanders. Or maybe the Americans could launch airstrikes against poppy fields, he suggested. The American officers shifted in their seats, trying to look unfazed. Polite to a fault, they did not want to offend the governor. They also wanted no part of his plans. A visit this spring with an American Army brigade in southern Afghanistan offered a firsthand look at the conundrum for American soldiers posed by Afghanistan's seemingly intractable opium poppy problem, which was detailed in an article in The New York Times on Sunday. After a decade of false starts and shifting policies, perhaps no issue draws out the internal contradictions of the war effort as does the failing effort to tackle the opium trade, a business that enriches both America's enemies and allies. Americans soldiers in southern Afghanistan's poppy belt ignore the vast fields of the crop because cutting it down risks pushing farmers to the Taliban. But at the same time, the American government pays the Afghan government $250 for every hectare that Afghan officials destroy. Poppy, meanwhile, remains the main cash crop. In the Zhare district of Kandahar Province, ground zero for the Obama administration's troop surge in 2010, poppy was everywhere as the harvest approached this year. It encircled the American and Afghan army outposts that dot the landscape. It grew knee-high in fields owned by members of village militias raised by American forces to fight off the Taliban. In the neighboring Maiwand district, where the Taliban dominate, there was even more poppy. On a recent helicopter flight, Col. Brian Mennes, the commander of the American Army brigade in the area, said he saw enough poppy "to supply every addict in Europe." At the time, there was little evidence of the blight that would later make the harvest a poor one. The result: American soldiers fighting the final phase of the war are caught between the Afghan villagers whose hearts and minds they are making one last effort to win and the Afghan government they are there to support - and in whose name they are trying to win over the villagers. "Going after it, it just pokes the beehive," said Maj. Gen. James L. Huggins Jr., the commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. The United States and its allies prefer to focus on interdiction at the trafficking stage of the trade. But the Afghan government continues to eradicate poppy fields, financed by the United States. Compounding the problem, Afghan officials often make inequitable decisions about where they eradicate, ignoring allies who grow the crop and focusing instead on personal enemies or those who are not tied into the local power structure, Americans officers say. That often means the most marginalized subtribes are targeted. In an interview, General Huggins cited the Pashtun Ishakzai subtribe, which has deep ties to the opium trade - and, by extension, to the Taliban. If we continue to pummel the Ishakzai until they are such a disaffected tribe, which is what they are now, what other options do they have except to run illicit drugs and support the Taliban? By contrast, opium farmers with government ties often do not have their fields bulldozed. Or they are allowed to cut deals, like having a few acres plowed under while most of their crop remains untouched. The challenge for American troops of trying to support the Afghan government while treading carefully around poppy was clear at a meeting in April between American and Afghan military officers and Mr. Sarhadi, the governor. Mr. Sarhadi explained that he was conducting his own eradication campaign because the official plan from the Interior Ministry in Kabul never arrived. He wanted American and Afghan soldiers to help clear hidden bombs from the fields. One of the government's tractors had already been destroyed by a hidden bomb, he said. The American officers deflected his request by shifting the discussion to how the Afghan government's eradication efforts could be better planned. Brig. Gen. Murtaza Sarwari, the commander of Afghan forces in Zhare, pointed out that most police stations in the district appeared to be in or next to poppy fields. "If it belongs to them or they have cultivated it themselves - then we have a bigger problem!" he said, smiling. The governor, who works closely with the police, did not laugh. He said there were other areas that were more important to eradicate. He did not explain why. The governor also brushed aside attempts by Colonel Mennes, the American commander, and the Afghan officers to urge restraint for fear of prompting a backlash among farmers. General Sarwari suggested letting farmers harvest what they had already grown and then cutting off their water if they planted poppy again. Many farmers borrow money for seeds and are sharecroppers - a single harvest lost often leads to financial ruin. Farmers can at least replant with something else. They won't have entire lives destroyed," he said. This embarrassment is going to make it all the way to Kabul. If we ruin the people's lives, they will find out and it will create huge problems. The governor would have none of it. He said he wanted to "send a message to the people." Then came the suggestions about cementing wells and airstrikes. The meeting ended inconclusively. Mr. Sarhardi's haphazard poppy eradication program continued in the following days. There have since been no reports of farmers cemented into wells or airstrikes on poppy fields. A few days after the briefing, Colonel Mennes, in an interview, offered another solution: Legalize poppy, buy the crop and use it to make medicine. The idea is not novel - Turkey, at Washington's urging, did the same thing in the 1970s, curbing its problem with opium and heroin trafficking. Farmers in Australia and India also legally grow poppy. But Western officials in Afghanistan say the country's weak government would not be able to keep track of the crop, rendering a growing program useless. Colonel Mennes was less certain. The threat of force might do the trick and keep the price down, he suggested. "Get the business plan to the elders and say, "See this guy right here, Col. Brian Mennes? He and his guys are going to try and kill you and mow down as much as they can,"" he said. To avoid that fate, villagers could be told: "You grow it, you harvest it, we collect it and we pay for it," Colonel Mennes said. What did you make last year? $150,000? We can only pay $75,000. But Brian Mennes is not going to try and kill you every day. Correction: May 30, 2012 A picture caption misstated when Afghan and American soldiers patrolled through poppy fields in the village of Barakzai. It was in April, not March.