EUROPE'S charge-sheet against Antonis Samaras has lengthened with each turn of the Greek crisis. As leader of the-then opposition New Democracy, his refusal to support the first bail-out was seen as crippling. Later on, when he backed the unity government of Lucas Papademos, Mr Samaras was evasive about the second rescue. And by forcing early elections this year, he was blamed for opening the door to extremists of all stripes. Would it not be better, some thought, if Greece just left the euro? These days, as prime minister, Mr Samaras has started to command a measure of respect. After a meeting of euro-zone finance ministers this week, their president, Jean-Claude Juncker, went out of his way to praise the Greek leader: "I am impressed...The Greek government is behaving, I do think, in an admirable way." The visit to Athens this week by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, (see article) is the clearest signal yet that "Grexit" is no longer on her mind. One reason for embracing Mr Samaras is that he is the lesser evil, given the alternative of Alexis Tsipras, the radical leftist. Another is that keeping Greece in the euro is less awful than the chaos of Grexit. A third factor is that Mr Samaras seems to embrace Europe's terms for assistance. Eurocrats detect a seriousness of purpose about him, not least in appointing a respected economist, Yannis Stournaras, as finance minister. Then there is the factor that nobody will admit to: the policy of demanding harsh, front-loaded austerity has done unnecessary harm. Greece's recession this year will, yet again, be much deeper than forecast in April, and so will next year's, according to the IMF's latest figures. The euro zone would never stoop to the mea culpa offered by the IMF in its latest World Economic Outlook, which admits to underestimating badly the effect of austerity in reducing economic output. The euro zone can, after all, always blame the indolence of earlier Greek governments. Still, when confronted with deeper-than-expected recessions, Spain and Portugal won an extra year to meet their target of bringing budget deficits below 3% of GDP. Backed by the IMF's boss, Christine Lagarde, Greece may well be granted the extra two years it wants to meet its objective of achieving a large primary budget balance (ie, before interest payments) in 2014. A deal is likely to be reached in November. But first Greece must overcome the political deficit among euro-zone states: they may no longer want to push Greece out, but neither do they want to lend it more billions to keep it in. The conundrum breaks down into three parts. First, Greece must find €13.5 billion ($17.4 billion) worth of savings and taxes in 2013 and 2014 to fill a gap made worse by the paralysis of two general elections this spring. Though it claims such budget-cutting is too much, too soon, Greece seems close to agreement with the troika (the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank). Second, granting Greece a two-year reprieve means finding another €10 billion to €20 billion. Greece contends, implausibly, that it requires no additional loans from the euro zone, yet at the very least it needs the benevolence of the ECB. The bank would have to let Greece issue more short-term bills (most will end up on the ECB's balance-sheet via Greek banks) and agree to roll over a big chunk of Greek debt it holds. The ECB says a rollover would amount to illegal monetary financing. The third, and most serious problem is that the economic outlook for Greece is so poor that it will probably miss by a long shot the target of bringing debt down to 120% of GDP by 2020 - the level set to justify a big haircut on private bondholders this year, and at which the economy is deemed able to survive without outside help. Greece thinks confidence would make its economy rebound. So the IMF, though sceptical of the degree of austerity demanded by the lords of the euro zone, now finds itself cast as the pitiless enforcer because of its reluctance to make the numbers fit the euro zone's limits. It has quietly pushed the euro zone to write off some of Greece's debt. Unless America can convince the IMF to go soft by accepting a rosier forecast, the Europeans may have to lend Greece more money (difficult), forgive some of its debt (almost impossible), or both. As always, they will try to fudge, at least until Germany's general election. One idea is to bring forward loan disbursements to keep Greece going, with the promise to look at any shortfall later on. Another is to declare Greece's long-term outlook too uncertain even for economists to predict; the euro zone could then pledge to deal with Greece's long-term debt if growth disappoints. And if the IMF refuses to keep lending to Greece, the euro zone could take on the burden on its own, ignoring the IMF, as it once did for Latvia. It all began in Athens Fate decreed that the euro-zone crisis should start in Greece. Lies about its public finances instilled the belief, particularly in Germany, that the euro's problem was excessive debt, and the solution was tough spending cuts. Yet the woes of Spain show that even running a budget surplus is no insurance against economic meltdown. As well as worrying about excessive austerity, the IMF's report raises concern about "policy uncertainty" - including fears about the break-up of the euro - which makes a recession deeper and recovery slower. The IMF sets out a sensible to-do list, such as creating a banking union that includes a single euro-zone supervisor. These issues will be the focus of a European summit on October 18th-19th. Greece may be right in thinking that the biggest boost to its economy would be to end the "drachma drama." But restoring confidence must also involve creditor countries, above all Germany. The euro's problem is not just dysfunctional states, like Greece, but also a dysfunctional currency zone.