Alex Salmond and Scotland's future Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National party and first minister of Scotland, has long been lauded as one of the canniest politicians in the United Kingdom. But one could be forgiven for wondering how long he will go on being regarded as the UK's most successful party leader. On October 15 Mr Salmond struck a deal with David Cameron under which Scotland's 5m people will vote in a referendum in 2014 on whether to break from the UK. The vote will be historic, one that could untie the 300-year-old Act of Settlement. But while Mr Salmond has established the referendum process, he is being less than transparent in spelling out what the consequences of secession would be for Scotland's place in Europe and the rest of the world. Mr Salmond wants to convince his people that secession would do little to affect Scotland's international relations - and that the independent state could become a member of Nato and the European Union. Yet this "don't frighten the horses" strategy last week began to come apart. When he declared that an independent Scotland would stay in Nato, two SNP allies resigned in disgust. He got into a worse mess over the EU. Mr Salmond has long suggested that he possesses private legal advice that an independent Scotland could definitely remain in the union. Yet his deputy revealed last week that he had never possessed such advice. This triggered a hostile reaction in the media, with one paper branding Mr Salmond an "EU liar." The debate on Scotland's place in the world must now be probed further. The starting point is that there can be no guarantee that an independent Scotland would be admitted to either the EU or Nato. A Scottish application to join the EU would meet many legal hurdles and significant political opposition from other member states, in particular Spain which has its own separatist fears. A raft of issues - such as what voting rights Scotland would have in the EU Council of Ministers or whether it would qualify for a share of the UK budget rebate - would need negotiation. Success in joining Nato would be similarly uncertain, with much depending on what armed forces Scotland retained on its soil. One thing can be predicted at this stage. In both its EU and Nato applications, success for Scotland would depend ultimately on whether the London government were supportive. If both London and Edinburgh were seen by Brussels to be acting in diplomatic concert, then Scotland's entry into international institutions would probably proceed reasonably smoothly. If London were hostile, Scotland would have a problem. Again however, it is Mr Salmond's slipperiness that makes it hard to predict how events would develop. For example, a critical issue after secession would be what stance Mr Salmond takes over the UK's nuclear weapons. The UK deterrent is loaded on four submarines berthed at Faslane on the Clyde. If Mr Salmond were to insist on the immediate removal of these submarines - fulfilling his pledge that Scotland becomes a nuclear-free zone - then London would face a crisis in which its status as a nuclear power would be under threat. British hostility to Scotland at the EU and Nato would be assured. But if Mr Salmond were to allow Faslane to remain a sovereign UK base, tensions could be contained, at least south of the border, if not within his own party. Mr Salmond remains vague on Trident and on much else. He cannot go on like this. When the Scots come to vote they need to know what a Yes means in practice. Would it see Edinburgh forging a constructive relationship with London, working for the smooth entry of Scotland into international institutions? Or would it be a romantic leap in the dark, with dangerous implications? Mr Salmond provides nothing by way of clarity.