Why does the West refuse to act over the Kashmir stand-off? A similar tense stand-off in 2002, when hundreds of thousands of troops massed on the border, came close to starting the world's first nuclear war, which was only averted as a result of the intense diplomatic pressure brought to bear by America and Britain. Indeed, given the potentially disastrous consequences an Indo-Pak nuclear war would have for the rest of the world, it is surprising that our politicians and diplomats do not invest more effort in trying to persuade these two enemies to set aside their differences and disarm. In an age when the perils of nuclear proliferation are very much at the top of the international security agenda, with Washington and its allies taking a robust stand against rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, there seems little enthusiasm for applying similar pressure against India and Pakistan, who between them possess in excess of 200 nuclear warheads - significantly more than Britain's 160 operationally available atomic weapons. So far as India is concerned, this is mainly due to the desire of Western leaders to maintain good relations with a country that has recently emerged as one of the world's major economic success stories. Raising awkward questions about India's nuclear arsenal is not the best way to secure lucrative business deals. In the case of Pakistan, though, the picture is more complex. With more than 100,000 Nato troops fighting the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan's allegiance is deemed essential if the campaign is to stand any chance of success. For this reason the West has been reluctant to confront Islamabad about its ongoing efforts to expand its weapons stockpile, as well as the Pakistani military's well-documented support for numerous Islamist terror groups, from the Haqqani network, which continues to organise attacks against Nato forces, and extremist Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which are committed to liberating Kashmir from Indian control. The Pakistani military's obsession with Kashmir was certainly very much in evidence during a recent visit I made to a front-line military base at Malakand on the North West Frontier, where the young Winston Churchill was based during his brief spell fighting the local Pashtun tribes in 1897. In the old British officers" mess - where Churchill acquired a liking for whisky and soda - I found the display cabinets filled with trophies commemorating the Pakistanis" involvement in various military campaigns against India, while portraits of six of their officers, who had been killed in recent border clashes with the Indians, had pride of place on the mess walls. Pakistan's fixation with Kashmir certainly lies at the heart of all our difficulties in that region. It is because of Kashmir that Pakistan continues to tolerate militant Islamist groups, and it is because of Kashmir that Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear warheads. And this perilous state of affairs is likely to continue so long as the West refuses to do anything to resolve arguably the world's most deadly dispute.