Farming in Colombia: Conflict's harvest NAVIGATING Colombia's mountainous countryside was even harder than usual for three weeks in the summer, when thousands of farmers blocked roads to protest about poor conditions in rural areas. The immediate causes of their anger were expensive fertiliser and recent free-trade deals with the United States and Europe. But their protest has drawn attention to deeper problems in Colombia's countryside, caused by decades of armed conflict and official neglect. In the scramble to quell the protest the government has negotiated with coffee growers, milk producers and potato and rice farmers, giving in to many of their demands in the face of plunging approval-ratings and looming elections next year. On October 7th it imposed temporary tariffs and quotas on imports of potatoes, onions, beans, tomatoes, powdered milk, fresh cheese, milk and whey. And on October 19th, facing the threat of new protests, it began purchasing 3,000 tonnes of potatoes directly from farmers at better-than-market prices. Meeting every week in different cities, farmers and government officials are hoping to formulate a national agricultural policy by the end of the year. But they are trying to solve a problem before a diagnosis has been made. Colombia has not conducted a nationwide agricultural census since 1970. The government is ploughing ahead with plans to carry one out next year (although the head of the national statistics agency, DANE, resigned on October 7th, arguing that a census should not be held in an election year). President Juan Manuel Santos says the country can wait no longer, arguing that it is "flying without instruments" in setting agricultural policy. In the four decades since the previous agricultural census, Colombia's conflict involving leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and the armed forces has flared. The most notable effect on the countryside has been the exodus of as many as 5.7m people. Since 1985 an estimated 6.5m hectares (16m acres) of farmland have been abandoned or illegally seized. A lesser-known result of the conflict has been inefficiency. A two-year study led by Ana María Ibáñez of the University of the Andes in Bogotá found that farmers who have not been direct victims of the conflict, but who live with the presence of armed fighters, tend to favour fast-growing crops that offer several harvests a year. Many also turn cropland into pasture for cattle, which are easily sold if things become nasty. They stay away from permanent crops, such as cocoa, coffee, rubber and fruit trees, which require more investment and time to yield a harvest, though they are more profitable in the long run. This strategy seeks to "minimise the risk of the conflict but does not maximise profits," Ms Ibáñez says. That leads to low investment and low productivity. Colombia has made tremendous progress over the past decade in reducing the scale and intensity of the conflict. Since last year Mr Santos's government has been engaged in peace talks with the FARC rebels, aiming for a permanent ceasefire. The one point on which they have reached a draft agreement is rural development. Ending the conflict would not necessarily reverse the subsistence mentality. Even in areas where guerrillas are no longer so active, farmers continue to favour crops that offer a quick turnaround out of what Ms Ibáñez says is "pure inertia." It is also a matter of finance. After years of thin earnings, few farmers have the funds to swap their crops for something more profitable. In a post-conflict Colombia, policies would have to reach beyond reconstruction and reparations in the countryside to get farmers back on their feet. A healthier harvest is still many seasons away.