"Ghosts of Empire," by Kwasi Kwarteng Universal History Archive/Getty Images A map of the world showing, in red, the extent of the British Empire in 1901. The question of whether, say, India or Nigeria are "better off" because of British imperialism contains an inherent contradiction: before colonialism there were no states called India or Nigeria. But to prove the horrors of imperial rule - or to dispute the historians who recommend that the United States self-consciously adopt Britain's former "burden" - one has only to examine the catastrophic choices of British colonialists that continue to influence events today. "Our only justification for 200 years of power was unification," says a character in Paul Scott's Raj Quartet, reflecting on the ugliness of partitioning the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. But we've divided one composite nation into two and everyone at home goes round saying what a swell the new viceroy is for getting it sorted out so quickly. While it is true that colonial policy was often formulated in London, it is equally true that Britain could become the greatest power on earth only by delegating power - either to Britons who served as imperial representatives or to local forces intent on doing the empire's bidding. But Kwasi Kwarteng, in this fine book, argues that the empire granted far too much authority to the wrong people. "Accidents and decisions made on a personal, almost whimsical, level have had a massive impact on international politics," Kwarteng writes. "Ghosts of Empire" explores six cases where this impact was felt: Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, Hong Kong, Kashmir and Burma. This is a list without many success stories, and Kwarteng, who is a Conservative member of Parliament with Ghanaian parents and who claims to want to transcend "sterile" debates about the empire, ends up making a damning case. "The British Empire is a bizarre model to follow for fostering stability in today's world," he says. Indeed, much of the instability in the world is a product of its legacy of individualism and haphazard policy making. Kwarteng's examples all provide him with common themes. Although the kingdom of Iraq, which arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, was under an imperial mandate only until 1932, the British retained significant control until the late 1950s. Yet by repeatedly putting its faith in unpopular rulers who could be depended upon to ensure a steady supply of oil, London inadvertently set off several nationalist explosions. A string of army coups, starting in 1958, eventually led to Saddam Hussein. Kwarteng convincingly argues that the trust placed in the pro-Western Hashemite rulers was largely a function of the snobbery and arrogance of the people who actually administered the empire. One sees the same arrogance in London's treatment of Africa. Britons in Nigeria had an innate distrust of educated "natives" and decided to grant resources and autonomy to more traditional tribal chieftains, who were intent on pursuing local, not national, interests. Britain's decision to join the Islamic north of the country with non-Muslim settlements in the south fed tribal conflicts and insurgencies that have lasted to this day. In Sudan, meanwhile, British authorities ruled the north and south separately, ultimately to calamitous effect. Southern Sudan has recently become a separate country after decades of bloodshed, and the last 10 years have seen unconscionable war and genocide in the Darfur region, which was mindlessly tacked on to Sudan during World War I. Kwarteng quotes Rudyard Kipling, who, with astonishing condescension, wrote that the Sudanese "will honestly believe that they themselves created . . . the easy life which they were bought at so heavy a price." Here as elsewhere, Kwarteng is critical but not patronizing, allowing the reader to grasp the motivations of the British while simultaneously seeing the shortcomings of their decisions. Isaac Chotiner is the executive editor of The Book: An Online Review at The New Republic.