Fantasy Focus: Projecting Playing Time A colleague of mine, Todd Zola, once said something to this effect: "If I could know in advance the rate stats (average/on-base percentage/slugging) for the entire player pool, or the number of games each would play, I'd rather know the playing time." I took that to mean three things: (1) Playing time is often harder to predict than performance; (2) Opportunity often trumps skill; and (3) Performance often begets playing time, so you could infer that a less established player was both playing well and staying healthy if you knew he had 550 at-bats. Another colleague, Ron Shandler, has said, "Draft skills, not roles." I took that to mean that just because a guy has a job for now doesn't mean he'll keep it. Eventually, the better skills win out, and when they do, they earn you more profit. While these statements may seem contradictory on their face, I think both contain important truths. Playing time is hard to predict, as it often depends on reading the mind of management, and management takes into account factors that are not typically relevant to the fantasy owner, including defense, contract status and probably even more nebulous factors like personality and the degree of respect one gets in the clubhouse. After all, a baseball team is a workplace of sorts, and in most there's an element of politics. Shandler's statement starts with the premise that you can't read management's mind, but that it's in its interest to play the best players, so align yourself accordingly. Zola's seems to say to the extent you can know who's getting the at-bats, that's even more important than knowing how good these guys are, given that management is for the most part going to play the best players anyway. The bottom line is that predicting opportunity, while difficult, is an important part of the task we set for ourselves each March and, aside from the Matt Kemps and Albert Pujolses, who we know will play every day, goes a long way to determining who wins and loses in deeper leagues. To that end, here are a few worthwhile indicators of playing time, beyond our usual performance metrics: Defense Even though Austin Jackson struggled with a .249/.317/.374 line with 181 strikeouts in his second season, I paid $16 for him because he's one of the best defensive center fielders in baseball. That means it would take a monumentally bad showing at the plate for him to lose playing time and assures me of a higher floor than most players would with his hitting skill set. Other players whose defense assures them at-bats are Drew Stubbs (though with Dusty Baker you never know) and Peter Bourjos, among others. Contract A lot of people are nervous about Joe Nathan closing in Texas, both because of the hitter-friendly environment, his shaky 2011 and the good options to take his place (Mike Adams, Alexi Ogando). But the Rangers just gave Nathan a two-year, $14.5 million deal, plus a buyout if they don't pick up an option for Year 3. That is closer money, and that means management trusts Nathan and will not remove him from that job barring incontrovertible evidence that he's not up to it. Contrast that with Rafael Betancourt of the Rockies, who's got little closing experience, and signed an $8.5 million, two-year deal. Yes, management believes in him and wants him to close (and he's certainly shown the skills to do it), but he's being paid like a top setup man, and so I'd expect his leash to be a bit shorter. And someone like Carlos Marmol - who's getting closer money, but from a previous regime - is on even shakier ground. Forget about most of what management says in the press (there's usually a political dimension to that), but pay attention to how it acts, and it acts with its checkbook. A few other players who have a leg up to due the team's investment in them include Juan Uribe (3 years, $21 million), Adam Dunn (4 years, $56 million), Yoenis Cespedes (4 years, $36 million from the A's, a small-market team that is not going to spend that kind of money to sit him for long) and Mark Ellis (looks washed up, but 2 years and $8.75 million means they probably intend to get him 500 at-bats). And this list is by no means comprehensive. Contracts are not guarantees, however. Occasionally, as when in 2009 the Tigers realized Gary Sheffield's $14 million salary was a sunk cost, a team will simply cut a player and eat the loss. But for the most part, if a player has a big contract, for more than one year, and it was given to him by current management, there's a great incentive to give him an opportunity to earn it - or at least not make it look quite so terrible. An interesting case this year is Alfonso Soriano, who's still owed $54 million for three years, but went .244/.289/.469 last year and played poor defense in left field. If he doesn't play substantially better, I could see the new regime giving up on him before the end of June. Politics No matter how talented a player is, a 22-year-old hot shot is almost never going to have the clout or presence of a 33-year-old veteran who has the respect of his teammates and manager. You'll see young players like Colby Rasmus, Logan Morrison and Chris Heisey often sitting in favor of less productive veterans. Managers like Tony La Russa (ex-manager in his case) and Dusty Baker seem especially prone to this tendency. This dynamic is especially pronounced when it comes to naming a closer, or promoting a setup man to close after the initial closer flames out. Very often, the team will turn to someone with experience closing over its best relief pitcher. That Kevin Gregg has had 20 or more saves the last five seasons cannot otherwise be fathomed. Likewise, this year, the mediocre Brian Fuentes seems to be the early favorite to close in Oakland.