Charlemagne: Playing East against West IN JUNE 1709 Peter the Great fought a decisive battle against the Swedish king, Charles XII, at Poltava, in what is now Ukraine. Ukrainians fought on both sides. Ivan Mazepa, a Ukrainian Cossack Hetman, had sided with Sweden in a quest for Ukrainian independence. But the battle ended in Sweden's defeat: Russia swept westward, dominated all of the Baltics and turned Poland into a satellite. Today's Russia, which lavishly celebrates Poltava, cannot help but reflect that the same powers are trying to claw away Ukraine, a country of 46m people that has oscillated between Russia, Poland and Lithuania for much of the past 500 years, but which Russia considers to be its subordinate. Perhaps not since the end of the cold war has Europe hosted such a raw geopolitical contest. On November 28th the heads of European Union member states will gather in Vilnius, Lithuania's capital, for a summit of the "Eastern Partnership." This project was championed by Poland and Sweden in 2008 as a way of engaging with six former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) after Russia blocked Georgia's and Ukraine's path to NATO. The success or failure of this venture depends on whether Ukraine, by far the largest and most important of the six, signs an association and free-trade agreement with the EU. Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt, the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden, have put their reputations on the line. Ukraine is of particular importance to Poland, for historical reasons, but also as an emblem of Poland's dominant role in eastern Europe. For Mr Bildt, signing the agreement with Ukraine is a test of Europe's pulling power and its ability to enact its own foreign policy. Both Sweden and Poland have tried to persuade Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, of the existential importance of a Ukrainian deal for Europe. America has also weighed in, promising to support Ukraine if it signs. Russia, which had little faith in the ability of Brussels to pull the deal off, grew increasingly nervous as the prospect of Ukraine signing the agreement seemed to become more real. Suddenly, it was as much of a "red line" as NATO's expansion. To prove the point, Russia ordered Armenia, which is militarily dependent on it, to turn down the EU agreement and "choose" the Russia-led customs union instead. It pressed Ukraine to do the same. Losing Ukraine to Europe has long been a Russian nightmare. Although Ukraine declared its independence 23 years ago, Russia has never fully internalised it. Kiev, the capital, was the cradle of Russian statehood. "We have common traditions, common mentality, common history, common culture We...are one people," Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, recently said. The very name of Ukraine, which means "on the edge," reflects its position as Russia's western frontier. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, national-security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, explained two decades ago: "Russia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both ...Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire." The "loss" of Ukraine would push Russia's western border back to where it was in the 17th century. It would also make a mockery of Mr Putin's project for a Eurasian union and his mission as a gatherer of Russian lands. The fact that this could happen under Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine's president, whom Mr Putin had backed in 2004 against Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the Orange Revolution, is doubly humiliating. Mr Yushchenko may have been an enemy, but Mr Yanukovych is now seen in Moscow as a traitor. Yet nobody had done as much to alienate "brotherly" countries as Mr Putin has himself. Russia's move to block Ukrainian imports last August and its threat of a fully fledged trade war against Ukraine united the public. A recent opinion poll shows that nearly 60% of Ukrainians support European integration. Now the biggest obstacle in the way of Ukraine's convergence with the EU is not Russia but Ukraine itself - a country with no tradition of statehood but with chronic corruption, dysfunctional governance and a parasitic elite. The formal stumbling block was the refusal of Mr Yanukovych to let Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and his political arch-rival, out of jail, even for medical treatment in Germany. Careful what you wish for Hiding behind Ms Tymoshenko's back, Mr Yanukovych delayed a decision, haggling with both Russia and the EU. His drift towards Europe has not been based on sharing European values. Mr Yanukovych cares a great deal more about his own hold on power and enrichment than he does about Ukraine's destiny. But the country is on the brink of bankruptcy and Mr Yanukovych faces re-election in just over a year. Neither Russia nor the West is ready to bail him out simply for saying no to the other. Russia is offering goodies, and giving him leeway in corruption and election rigging, but wants Mr Yanukovych to sign up to the customs union, which would turn him from the master of Ukraine into its manager. The West is also happy to help, but only if he signs the association agreement and subjects Ukraine to reforms and rules. A week before the summit, it was still unclear which way Ukraine would turn. What is clear is that whoever wins Ukraine will also inherit a giant headache. If Mr Yanukovych's mendacity in the run-up to Vilnius is any guide, dealing with Ukraine afterwards will only get harder. As Andrew Wilson, an expert on Ukraine, says, "we will continue to face massive problems of bad faith, double-dealing and reluctant implementation." Even if the Swedes and Poles triumph in Vilnius, they would be foolhardy to celebrate.