Pandemic preparedness: Coming, ready or not THE threat of a global pandemic is rising again. In China an influenza virus never before seen in people had, as The Economist went to press, infected at least 82 and killed 17. Meanwhile a new type of coronavirus, the family that brought severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), is festering in the Middle East. The risk of such an outbreak turning into a pandemic is low, but the danger, if it does, is huge: in 1918 50m-100m people were killed by Spanish flu, compared with 16m in the first world war and 30m so far from AIDS. Fortunately, the world is better prepared for an outbreak than ever before (see article). SARS in 2003, the H5N1 bird flu of 2005 and the H1N1 swine flu of 2009 have prompted action. By 2011, 158 countries had pandemic-preparedness plans. America has poured money into the development of new vaccines and antiviral drugs. Researchers have a better understanding of influenza and other risky pathogens. Rapid amplification of DNA segments helps scientists identify viruses quickly. Full genomic sequencing allows them to explore worrying strains. Mathematical models predict where a new disease might emerge and how it might spread. Going viral Yet all this may not be enough. No one has yet managed to predict an influenza outbreak. H1N1 exposed many problems, from the slow deployment of vaccines to simple breakdowns in communication. Thankfully that virus was not especially deadly. But an independent commission, charged with reviewing the response of the World Health Organisation (WHO), issued a bleak assessment: "The unavoidable reality is that tens of millions of people would be at risk of dying in a severe pandemic." Reducing that risk means, among other things, more government spending - an unwelcome prescription at a time of austerity, but a necessary one, for protection against pandemics is a valuable public good. First, governments and companies should continue to expand the availability of vaccines. America's Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority deserves praise for working with Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline and other drug firms to create new vaccines and faster ways of making them. Such contracts often guarantee the American government a share of production. Some vaccines are donated to other countries. But poor countries, in particular, need reliable access to vaccines. GlaxoSmithKline has signed a deal with the WHO to donate 7.5% of its vaccine production to poor countries, in the event of a pandemic. More firms should follow suit. Second, governments should encourage more basic research on dangerous pathogens. In 2011 studies of mutations that might make H5N1 more contagious inspired global controversy - critics feared the papers would provide a cookbook for a biological attack. America suspended funding of such projects, a moratorium that dragged on foolishly. Now officials are implementing new ways to oversee research of dangerous viruses. Concern over security must not slow urgent work. Studying a deadly virus is risky. Not studying it is riskier. Third, patent laws for viruses need reform. Last year a scientist in Saudi Arabia sent a sample of the coronavirus to Ron Fouchier, a prominent academic in the Netherlands. Dr Fouchier then patented his sequencing of the virus's genome. Saudi officials, who did not authorise the shipment, were furious. America's Supreme Court is currently hearing a case involving genome patents (see article). A good starting-point would be that natural DNA cannot be patented, but therapies exploiting the discovery of specific genes can be. Faced with a distant but deadly threat, the world is not doing badly. But it needs to be better prepared still, because viruses move a lot faster than governments do.