Resentment at North Korea turns to alarm It is quite a feat to make South Koreans feel nostalgic about Kim Jong-il, but his son appears to have managed it. A common charge against the late North Korean leader is that he used nuclear provocations as bait to secure negotiations and aid from the US and South Korea. Within weeks of Pyongyang's first nuclear test in 2006 the regime was in talks to suspend the programme in return for a resumption of US fuel shipments. Such deals have been condemned as appeasement by critics in Washington and Seoul. But if the Dear Leader's approach sparked resentment, that has changed to alarm at Kim Jong-eun's apparent determination to build a functioning nuclear deterrent. After a month of warnings of imminent war, North Korea has in effect rejected suggestions of talks from the US. Dialogue can only happen, the powerful National Defence Commission said last week, once the US secures the removal of sanctions against Pyongyang and removes Korea from its nuclear umbrella - conditions totally unacceptable to Washington, as Mr Kim well knows. The US has conditions of its own and is wary of being seen to come running when Pyongyang shouts. It wants North Korea to abide by previous promises to suspend its nuclear programme. But that could be just as unrealistic as North Korea's own demands. Kim Jong-il at least outwardly declared his desire to "denuclearise" the peninsula. Kim Jong-eun has enshrined nuclear weapons in the nation's constitution. Officials in Seoul worry that the young leader's inexperience adds a new dimension of risk. Kim Jong-il was presented to the ruling party as the nation's next leader in 1974, and gradually assumed power over the following two decades before officially taking office at 51. Kim Jong-eun had just 15 months to get ready, and is believed to be only 30, at most. In Washington, meanwhile, there is a "wistful" feeling about Kim Jong-il's reign, says Jonathan Pollack of the Brookings Institution. "There seems to be a sense that he knew the way out of these situations," he says. It is possible, as some analysts suggest, that North Korea's recent long-range rocket launch, nuclear test and ominous predictions of war have all been aimed at precipitating potentially lucrative negotiations that it secretly craves. Similarly, its angry rejection of talks on "the eve of war" could be part of a drive to bolster the younger Kim's image as a martial leader during the continuing US-South Korea exercises. The rhetoric may cool after April 30 when the two-month-long war drills - which Pyongyang calls preparation for an invasion - draw to a close. It also seems likely, however, that North Korea's nuclear progress has shifted its assessment of risks and rewards. December's successful satellite launch brought it closer to building intercontinental missiles, and February's nuclear test appears to have been the most powerful yet. Over the past four decades, North Korea's on-off programme has been gradually moving towards achieving a functioning nuclear weapon, and that goal must now appear closer than ever. But it is probably still some years away. Suggestions that Pyongyang can already fit a nuclear warhead on to a missile are speculative, as Barack Obama has noted . So it is possible that Mr Kim - who has promised his people economic growth as well as nuclear capability - will soften his stance to avoid further sanctions and potentially attract economic assistance, at least for a while. If Washington's conditions for talks prove too much for Pyongyang to swallow it might find a more attractive negotiating partner in Seoul. Park Geun-hye, South Korea's new president, made much during her campaign of her desire to improve relations with Pyongyang, implicitly criticising the tough approach of her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak. Although she has warned against rewarding North Korean provocations, she is showing no sign of abandoning her "trust-building" policy. If Pyongyang does come to the table, it would come as a relief to those who fear this diplomatic crisis could turn violent. It would also be straight out of the Kim Jong-il playbook. After all the early anticipation that Kim Jong-eun would prove a youthful reformer, sweeping away the repressive regime of his father, the immediate hope now is that he will prove a chip off the old block.