Commentary: Arming the Syrian rebels is pouring petrol on the fire So will we intervene to "secure" the storage sites? Contingency plans are said to exist. Special forces have been gearing up. But the task is a nightmare. There are literally dozens of sites. Are they to be held for days by pockets of troops? Can they safely destroy these weapons in a short period of time? How they distinguish friend from foe? Do we do this independently of the Israelis, or are we to be perceived throughout the region as their military allies? It will be obvious that any action of this kind must be absolutely a last resort, only to be considered if these weapons were about to fall into the hands of potential terrorists. Let us assume that, at least for the time being, our political leaders rule out any direct military intervention. What are they actually trying achieve? For a long time, the talk was of "removing Assad," as if he was some kind of dictator in the mould of Saddam Hussein. I have met both Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez, from whom he took over as president. His father was terrifying - utterly ruthless and a conspirator to his finger tips. Hafez al-Assad (AP) His own staff fidgeted nervously in his presence. He was indeed like Saddam - except that his cruelty was not random. It was calculated and targeted at anyone who dared to cross him. The young Assad, Bashar, is nothing of the kind. Those who knew him well when he was training at an opthalmologist in Britain report a pleasant, well-mannered and quietly professional young man. Back in Damascus, after his father's death, he was not much more than a figurehead president. To meet, he was, before all these troubles, sensible, reasonable and courteous. So the only effect of "removing Assad" would be to have him replaced by one of the ruthless generals that have held the Syrians in their grip for 40 years. If Bashar has been overestimated, his Alawite clan have been seriously underestimated. They are a mountain clan, an obscure sect loosely linked to the Shia, who number only about 10 per cent of Syria's 22 million people. Nevertheless, they have been the backbone of the Syrian army since French colonial times before the Second World War. For the past 40 years they have been strengthening their grip on the country and have been violently suppressing the opposition, led by the Muslim Brotherhood. With that history behind them, they simply dare not lose power. If they were to, they believe that they and their families would be massacred. After the events of the last two years, they could well be right. They have not held power alone. The many minorities - Christian, Druse, Kurds and others - preferred their rule to that of the Sunni majority. Indeed a fair number of Sunnis preferred an effectively secular regime to an alternative that might be run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Living in Syria, one was very conscious that it was a tough police state. The only Syrians who spoke to a foreign ambassador were those with a licence to do so. After a visit to, say, Aleppo, everyone I met would be questioned afterwards by one of the six secret police forces wanting to know what had been discussed. Syrians had come to take this in their stride, knowing that the alternative would be either an Islamic dictatorship or a descent into sectarian competition, not to say strife. This is the essential background to any decisions that the West may now take in the present crisis. Unfortunately, it is not understood. The British government talks of recent events being a red line for the international community to do more to support those members of the opposition who "want a good outcome." They want to train and arm them so as to put pressure on the regime and bring it to an end. That, regrettably, is a serious misreading of the situation. The Alawites and their supporters will fight to the bitter end. With the military support of Russia and Iran, plus the political support of China (all for their own good reasons) the regime can last a while yet. If it eventually falls, Syria will descend into chaos. That is why so many of us who know Syria have been, from the start, strongly opposed to a "regime change" policy, however dressed-up. The chaos will be intensified by the sectarian divisions in Syria and by the fact that these are revenge societies. For personal and traditional reasons, those who have suffered will be determined to exact revenge on the perpetrators or their families. Rebels from Jabhat al-Nusra wave their brigade flag on the top of a Syrian air force helicopter (AP) Eventually, one of the many opposition groups will come out on top. The strongest candidate is Al-Nusra, the jihadist group who say they are allied to al-Qaeda, who have been the most courageous and effective of the opposition fighters. They have a further and critical advantage. They and their leaders are secret, while their competitors are publicly known. I would certainly not put it past them to intimidate and, if necessary, murder their competitors or any rival leaders who challenge them. This is why I feel sure that our policy is pointing in the wrong direction. Supplying arms to the opposition would simply be pouring petrol on the fire - quite apart from the risk of the weapons falling into the wrong hands. The collapse of Syria would be a disaster, not only for that country but for Lebanon and perhaps Iraq and, indeed, more widely. As we look over this precipice, we must have the courage to take a pace back. Indeed, we should reverse the policy of arming the opposition. Instead, we should enter into a serious dialogue with the Russians and, if necessary, the Iranians, designed to reduce the flow of weapons to both sides. Only when both sides realise that a military victory is no longer possible can we hope to have the beginnings of a political process. Better a distant hope than an imminent disaster. Sir Andrew Green was the British Ambassador to Syria from 1991 to 1993.