text:
When Gwen Ifill asked a pressing question about AIDS during the vice-presidential debate, both candidates were utterly lost. "I want to talk to you about AIDS, and not about AIDS in China or Africa, but AIDS right here in this country, where black women between the ages of 25 and 44 are 13 times more likely to die of the disease than their counterparts," said Ifill. "What should the government's role be in helping to end the growth of this epidemic?"
Cheney did not bother trying to hide his ignorance. "I have not heard those numbers with respect to African-American women. I was not aware that it was—that they're in epidemic there [sic]," he said. Edwards resorted to dodge ball, spending his 90 seconds on AIDS in Africa, the genocide in Sudan, uninsured Americans, and John Kerry. "OK, we'll move on," said Ifill, who somehow restrained herself from rolling her eyes à la Jon Stewart.
Cheney and Edwards both suffered sharp criticism for their shockingly vacuous replies—a competent briefing on HIV/AIDS in the United States could have made these men at least conversant on the topic in less time than it takes them to do their on-air hair and makeup. Besides, in debates, even a shallow answer scores more points than saying "I dunno" or changing the subject.
That said, coming up with a sophisticated answer to Ifill's question is a tall order. AIDS researchers don't have a solid explanation for why black women in America have such a shockingly high prevalence of HIV infection and AIDS, which makes it difficult to spell out precisely how the government should respond to the problem—other than to reach out to these women more aggressively and to conduct more studies.
The data that investigators do have makes it clear that heterosexual sex is the primary mode of transmission, accounting for 74 percent of the HIV/AIDS cases reported in 2002 in black American women. Yet attempts to tease out the dynamics that drive this heterosexual spread have led to more theories than hard facts, with researchers using such different methods to gather their data that it's hard to compare their results. One particularly splashy speculation also has attracted more of the spotlight than it deserves: black men "on the down low," who identify themselves as heterosexual but secretly have sex with men.
Without question, there is a higher percentage of HIV and AIDS in the black female population in the United States. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention last year looked at data from 1999 to 2002 reported by 29 states that track HIV infections. The data are somewhat skewed because several states that have serious AIDS problems—including California, New York, and Illinois—did not at that time tally HIV infections. Still, the study found that black women accounted for nearly 72 percent of the female cases, while whites made up 18 percent and Hispanics 8.5 percent. Given that only 13 percent of Americans are black, you don't need a statistician to see the scale of the problem. (Encouragingly, the number of new HIV cases reported in women, regardless of race, did not increase during the four years that the study analyzed.)
When looking at people whose HIV infection progresses to the point of causing AIDS, the disproportionate toll on black women becomes clearer still. Black women in 2002 accounted for 67 percent of the country's AIDS cases among women. For the sake of comparison, consider that blacks had a rate of 48 cases per 100,000 blacks, while whites had a rate of 2 per 100,000 whites. There's an interesting geographic distribution of cases, too, that may offer important clues about forces propelling this particular epidemic: The vast majority of black women with AIDS live in the South and the Northeast. The CDC's HIV/AIDS statistics do not offer a breakdown of income and healthcare insurance, but that's an obvious place to look for explanations.
Ifill's question referred specifically to AIDS deaths in 25-to-44 year olds. The figure she cited actually took many AIDS researchers by surprise but seems to have come from the National Vital Statistics report issued last year that shows black women in 2001 had a rate of death from AIDS 14 times (not 13 times) higher than that of whites.
Why does such a problem exist? No compelling evidence suggests that blacks have any special genetic susceptibility to HIV. The CDC offers a laundry list of reasons of why African American men and women have relatively high rates of HIV infection and AIDS. The two most convincing explanations on the list: poverty and sexually transmitted diseases. The 2000 U.S. Census found that one in four blacks lived in poverty, and studies clearly have shown a strong link between poverty and the risk of HIV infection. Poor people also receive lower-quality healthcare, which means they will often progress from HIV infection to AIDS more quickly. And the link to sexually transmitted diseases, which create open sores that facilitate the spread of HIV, is equally clear-cut: Blacks are 24 times more likely to contract gonorrhea and eight times more likely to get syphilis.
The CDC list also includes community denial about injection drug use and homosexuality, but there is scant evidence to support the notion that those risk factors are somehow higher in blacks. In fact, injection drug use, a particularly effective way to spread HIV, is actually lower in black women than in white women: It accounted for 24 percent of HIV/AIDS cases among black females in 2002 and 34 percent among white females. It could be that black women are having sex with more men who are injecting drugs, but no compelling data back that conclusion, either.
Then there's the much ballyhooed "down low" phenomenon. Some men on the DL are becoming infected by anal intercourse with men and then spreading the infection to their female partners, a transmission route that became widely discussed earlier this year with the publication of J.L. King's On the Down Low: A Journey Into the Lives of "Straight" Black Men Who Sleep With Men. But the great unknown is how frequently this occurs, and whether it's truly different in blacks versus whites or Hispanics.
Because of a flurry of media coverage about the DL link, including an Oprah show featuring King and a New York Times Magazinestory, many who study AIDS in the black community cringe at its mention. "I'm sick of hearing about it," says Victoria Cargill, an epidemiologist at the Office of AIDS Research at the National Institutes of Health. Cargill, who also works at a clinic in poor, black Southeast D.C., says the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in women can clearly be attributed to a host of factors that have nothing to do with the DL. "I'm not saying it doesn't exist, but if we start adding up how many people this affects, this is the eye of the needle," says Cargill. "Let's start talking about the needle." CDC epidemiologist Greg Millett says that when it comes to the DL phenomenon, there simply are more questions than answers. "The truth is there are very few studies that deal with bisexual black men and even fewer that deal with the down low," says Millett, who has put together a provocative PowerPoint presentation on the topic.
A fascinating CDC study published last year specifically looked at men who have sex with men and do not disclose their sexual orientation versus those who do disclose. The study recruited participants from only six gay bars (which already tilts the results away from DL men who may not go to gay bars), but the findings were startling. More black men were nondisclosers (18 percent)—that is, on the DL—than white men (8 percent), and all nondisclosures reported having more sex with women than with men. But nondisclosers of all races were also less likely to be infected with HIV than disclosers, and black nondisclosers in particular reported significantly less unprotected anal intercourse with men than did black disclosers. Several other recent studies have found higher proportions of bisexual black men than white men, but it's unclear whether how much of an HIV "bridge" they are to black women.
Phill Wilson, executive director of the Black AIDS Institute in Los Angeles, suggests, rather, that the single biggest driver of the heterosexual spread to black women is the incarceration of black men. "The prison industry in America is an almost exact replication of the mining industry in South Africa, where you take large groups of men and move them from their families for an extended period of time," says Wilson. As studies conducted in South Africa have shown, men who leave their homes for the mines often have new sexual partners—as do the women they leave behind. The increased sexual mixing spreads HIV in both the migrant men and their regular partners. When they return home, the men may infect their regular partners—or vice versa. This pattern of sexual networking is called concurrent partnering, which means that relationships overlap, and there's nothing that HIV likes more.
Wilson and others argue that with so many men cycling in and out of the African American community, women end up at a greater risk because of similar disruptions of sexual networks and the resultant concurrency patterns: They mix with new partners when their men leave and often reunite with them when they are released. Incarceration also exposes many men to anal sex, whether by coercion or choice, and injection-drug use, the two most efficient ways to spread HIV. And if the locked-up man was the main wage earner, poverty can be a factor, too.
One superb study of concurrency in African Americans in rural North Carolina found that 53 percent of the men and 31 percent of the women reported concurrent partners during the preceding five years. Interestingly, 80 percent of the men in the study who said they had been incarcerated for more than 24 hours reported having had concurrent partners within five years; that percentage plummeted to 43 percent if a man had not been locked up for a day or longer.
Equally important, black women have a small pool of black men to choose from at any given time. "African American women are the only group in the United States where there are fewer men than women," says Gail Wyatt, an associate director of the AIDS Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles. "The availability of a partner who shares the same values is much less likely. The women are more likely to be educated than their partners. They're more likely to be employed." As a result of the shortage of black men, black women are vulnerable to becoming involved with men who are engaging in risky behaviors that they don't know about, whether it be having unprotected sex with other partners, female or male; visiting sex workers; or injecting drugs.
The muddy truth is that the high rate of HIV infection and AIDS among African American women is due to a combination of all these factors. "It's a perfect storm of issues," says NIH's Cargill.
And there's one more factor to consider, says Wilson: Politicians ignore this population. "It's both a cause and a symptom of the problem that our government really is not interested in the health and well-being of black people and in particular black women," says Wilson. "How is it that Dick Cheney can tell you how many machine guns are in Baghdad, but doesn't have a clue about issues that are killing black women a stone's throw from his office?"
Gwen Ifill, for her part, received so many queries about this particular question that she wrote out a response, refreshingly candid, that her publicist gave out to people who inquired. "I have to say I was surprised that neither the Vice President nor the Senator had an answer on this," wrote Ifill. "As a black woman, I also found it depressing. The good news is that, in the feedback I have gotten since the debate, folks got that. These debates have been very useful for smart and involved likely voters. They have gotten to see what these folks do, and don't, care about."


text: There are many different kinds of promoting providers open to men and women and business considering advertising and marketing. Advertising is certainly a broad phrase it may be everything from a tv business to someone running around the road with a major table connected to them, it differs dramatically in cost and efficiency. A tv… Continue reading Advertising Services

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Hi everyone,
Have you heard about the Chameleon?
It is re-configurable computer system running third-part cores such as the Amiga (Minimig), Commodore 64 and the Spectrum. You can use it as a stand-alone computer system or simply plug it into the back of a Commodore 64. It looks like a great device for retro-gamers, no doubt about that.
Here are the technical specifications from AmigaKit:
- 32MB of RAM
- VGA-output
- Turbo-function with full 6510 CPU compatibility
- Cycle-exact REU (memory expansion) with 16MB of RAM
- MMC/SD-card slot wit MMC64 compatibility and 1541-emulation
- Supports SD-card up to 1TB in size!
- PS/2 mouse and keyboard support
- Freezer
- Infrared receiver for a CDTV remote! (this is awesome)
- Battery-back real-time clock
- Stereo audio out for stereo SID emulation
- USB-link to a PC for data transfer and debugging
- RR-net connector (10mbit ethernet)
Holy smokes! That's a lot of cool features if you ask me. I really liked the implemented support for the CDTV remote. 🙂
There is a video on YouTube that gives you a demonstration of the Chameleon running the Minimig (Amiga) core. This video was made by a guy calling himself Mfilos (you can check out his blog here). During the presentation, Sysinfo (a benchmark tool for Amiga computers) is launched and you can see how fast the system is. If I remember correctly, it was comparable to an Amiga 3000. That's not bad at all. There's no AGA support though, so your stuck with OCS/ECS. Kudos for using MagicWB in the video. 😉 I've always been a MagicWB fan.
Here's the video:
As the title of this post indicates, AmigaKit have special accessory offers for the Chameleon. If you buy the system, you can for example get a discount on an original CDTV remote. If you're interested in checking out the offer, please head over to AmigaKit by clicking here. 🙂
I must say I'm a bit tempted by the Chameleon as it looks like a nice system with lot's of features. I've not forgotten about the Natami though, but haven't seen much news concerning that project lately. Are any of you considering purchasing the Chameleon?


text:
The read builtin command
read something about read here!
read [-ers] [-u <FD>] [-t <TIMEOUT>] [-p <PROMPT>] [-a <ARRAY>] [-n <NCHARS>] [-N <NCHARS>] [-d <DELIM>] [-i <TEXT>] [<NAME...>]
read builtin reads one line of data (text, user input, …) from standard input or a supplied filedescriptor number into one or more variables named by
Since Bash 4.3-alpha,
read skips any
NUL (ASCII code 0) characters in input.
<NAME…> is given, the line is word-split using IFS variable, and every word is assigned to one
<NAME>. The remaining words are all assigned to the last
<NAME> if more words than variable names are present.
If no
<NAME> is given, the whole line read (without performing word-splitting!) is assigned to the shell variable REPLY. Then,
REPLY really contains the line as it was read, without stripping pre- and postfix spaces and other things!
while read -r; do printf '"%s"\n' "$REPLY" done <<<" a line with prefix and postfix space "
If a timeout is given, or if the shell variable TMOUT is set, it is counted from initially waiting for input until the completion of input (i.e. until the complete line is read). That means the timeout can occur during input, too.
-a <ARRAY>
|read the data word-wise into the specified array
<ARRAY> instead of normal variables
-d <DELIM>
<DELIM> as data-end, rather than
|on interactive shells: use Bash's readline interface to read the data. Since version 5.1-alpha, this can also be used on specified file descriptors using
-i <STRING>
|preloads the input buffer with text from
<STRING>, only works when Readline (
-e) is used
-n <NCHARS>
<NCHARS> characters of input, then quits
<NCHARS> characters of input, ignoring any delimiter, then quits
-p <PROMPT>
|the prompt string
<PROMPT> is output (without a trailing automatic newline) before the read is performed
|raw input - disables interpretion of backslash escapes and line-continuation in the read data
|secure input - don't echo input if on a terminal (passwords!)
-t <TIMEOUT>
|wait for data
<TIMEOUT> seconds, then quit (exit code 1). Fractional seconds ("5.33") are allowed since Bash 4. A value of 0 immediately returns and indicates if data is waiting in the exit code. Timeout is indicated by an exit code greater than 128. If timeout arrives before data is read completely (before end-of-line), the partial data is saved.
-u <FD>
|use the filedescriptor number
<FD> rather than
stdin (0)
When both,
-a <ARRAY> and a variable name
<NAME> is given, then the array is set, but not the variable.
Of course it's valid to set individual array elements without using
read MYARRAY[5]
Reading into array elements using the syntax above may cause pathname expansion to occur.
Example: You are in a directory with a file named
x1, and you want to read into an array
x, index
1 with
read x[1]then pathname expansion will expand to the filename
x1 and break your processing!
Even worse, if
nullglob is set, your array/index will disappear.
To avoid this, either disable pathname expansion or quote the array name and index:
read 'x[1]'
Return status
|no error
|error when assigning to a read-only variable 1)
|invalid option
|timeout (see
|invalid filedescriptor supplied to
|end-of-file reached
read without -r
Essentially all you need to know about
-r is to ALWAYS use it. The exact behavior you get without
-r is completely useless even for weird purposes. It basically allows the escaping of input which matches something in IFS, and also escapes line continuations. It's explained pretty well in the POSIX read spec.
2012-05-23 13:48:31 geirha it should only remove the backslashes, not change \n and \t and such into newlines and tabs 2012-05-23 13:49:00 ormaaj so that's what read without -r does? 2012-05-23 13:49:16 geirha no, -r doesn't remove the backslashes 2012-05-23 13:49:34 ormaaj I thought read <<<'str' was equivalent to read -r <<<$'str' 2012-05-23 13:49:38 geirha # read x y <<< 'foo\ bar baz'; echo "<$x><$y>" 2012-05-23 13:49:40 shbot geirha: <foo bar><baz> 2012-05-23 13:50:32 geirha no, read without -r is mostly pointless. Damn bourne 2012-05-23 13:51:08 ormaaj So it's mostly (entirely) used to escape spaces 2012-05-23 13:51:24 ormaaj and insert newlines 2012-05-23 13:51:47 geirha ormaaj: you mostly get the same effect as using \ at the prompt 2012-05-23 13:52:04 geirha echo \" outputs a " , read x <<< '\"' reads a " 2012-05-23 13:52:32 ormaaj oh weird 2012-05-23 13:52:46 * ormaaj struggles to think of a point to that... 2012-05-23 13:53:01 geirha ormaaj: ask Bourne :P 2012-05-23 13:53:20 geirha (not Jason) 2012-05-23 13:53:56 ormaaj hm thanks anyway :)
Rudimentary cat replacement
A rudimentary replacement for the
cat command: read lines of input from a file and print them on the terminal.
opossum() { while read -r; do printf "%s\n" "$REPLY" done <"$1" }
Note: Here,
read -r and the default
REPLY is used, because we want to have the real literal line, without any mangeling.
printf is used, because (depending on settings),
echo may interpret some baskslash-escapes or switches (like
Press any key...
Remember the MSDOS
pause command? Here's something similar:
pause() { local dummy read -s -r -p "Press any key to continue..." -n 1 dummy }
-sto suppress terminal echo (printing)
-rto not interpret special characters (like waiting for a second character if somebody presses the backslash)
Reading Columns
Simple Split
Read can be used to split a string:
var="one two three" read -r col1 col2 col3 <<< "$var" printf "col1: %s col2: %s col3 %s\n" "$col1" "$col2" "$col3"
Take care that you cannot use a pipe:
echo "$var" | read col1 col2 col3 # does not work! printf "col1: %s col2: %s col3 %s\n" "$col1" "$col2" "$col3"Why? because the commands of the pipe run in subshells that cannot modify the parent shell. As a result, the variables
col2 and
col3 of the parent shell are not modified (see article: Bash and the process tree).
If the variable has more fields than there are variables, the last variable get the remaining of the line:
read col1 col2 col3 <<< "one two three four" printf "%s\n" "$col3" #prints three four
Changing The Separator
By default reads separates the line in fields using spaces or tabs. You can modify this using the special variable IFS, the Internal Field Separator.
IFS=":" read -r col1 col2 <<< "hello:world" printf "col1: %s col2: %s\n" "$col1" "$col2"Here we use the
var=value command syntax to set the environment of
read temporarily. We could have set
IFS normally,
but then we would have to take care to save its value and restore it afterward (
OLD=$IFS IFS=":"; read ….;IFS=$OLD).
The default
IFS is special in that 2 fields can be separated by one or more space or tab. When you set
IFS to something besides whitespace (space or tab), the
fields are separated by exactly one character:
IFS=":" read -r col1 col2 col3 <<< "hello::world" printf "col1: %s col2: %s col3 %s\n" "$col1" "$col2" "$col3"See how the
:: in the middle infact defines an additional empty field.
The fields are separated by exactly one character, but the character can be different between each field:
IFS=":|@" read -r col1 col2 col3 col4 <<< "hello:world|in@bash" printf "col1: %s col2: %s col3 %s col4 %s\n" "$col1" "$col2" "$col3" "$col4"
Are you sure?
asksure() { echo -n "Are you sure (Y/N)? " while read -r -n 1 -s answer; do if [[ $answer = [YyNn] ]]; then [[ $answer = [Yy] ]] && retval=0 [[ $answer = [Nn] ]] && retval=1 break fi done echo # just a final linefeed, optics... return $retval } ### using it if asksure; then echo "Okay, performing rm -rf / then, master...." else echo "Pfff..." fi
Ask for a path with a default value
Note: The
-i option was introduced with Bash 4
read -e -p "Enter the path to the file: " -i "/usr/local/etc/" FILEPATH
The user will be prompted, he can just accept the default, or edit it.
Multichar-IFS: Parsing a simple date/time string
IFS contains both, a colon and a space. The fields of the date/time string are recognized correctly.
datetime="2008:07:04 00:34:45" IFS=": " read -r year month day hour minute second <<< "$datetime"
Portability considerations
- POSIX® only specified the
-roption (raw read);
-ris not only POSIX, you can find it in earlier Bourne source code
- POSIX® doesn't support arrays
REPLYis not POSIX®, you need to set
IFSto the empty string to get the whole line for shells that don't know
while IFS= read -r line; do ... done < text.txt
See also
- Internal: The printf builtin command
There's something slightly fishy going on with how the read arguments are parsed. In reality it's arbitrary expansions.
$ x='['; y=']'; z='+++'; while read -r "a${x}v${z%+}$y"; do :; done < <(printf '%s\n' {a..d}); echo "${a[@]}"; a b c d
The string is expanded, passed into read, and then eval'd. So expansions are happening twice here assuming it's double not single quoted.
Another example pre-initializing the variable in the arithmetic context:
$ while read -r "var[${x:=5}, x++]"; do :; done < <(printf '%s\n' {a..c}); for i in "${!var[@]}"; do printf '(%d, %s), ' "$i" "${var[$i]}"; done; (5, a), (6, b), (7, c), (8, ),
However, if that's all there was to it you wouldn't expect this to work:
while read -r "var[$((x++))]"; do ...
There's some unique evaluation mode going on here since Bash knows not to perform arithmetic expansion before passing the resulting string into read otherwise the result would simply be to make all assignments to var[0].
PS... the preview is deleting all the "pluses". Hopefully the above is understandable.
sorry for the delay
This is not "double-expansion" per se, the behaviour is completely understandable (but I think you know it).
Thanks for this very interesting spotlight, I never thought that much about it!
Read, has some gotchas.
Yes, it's not related directly to
read, but to Bash's design regarding pipelining. AFAIR, there was a discussion on the mailing list to align the behaviour to what Korn does - running the last element of a pipeline in the current execution environment.
ABS is a good collection and a good work showing how to use the shell, but don't over-estimate it's technical side.
thank you bash for running a sub-shell when piping, now we cannot read anymore multiple variables at the same time !
grep -w regexp file | read a b c
there is no solution to replace this KSH functionality. The command:
read -r a b c «<$(command)
solution is bourne and korn shell (88 & 93) incompatible.
Both bash and ksh93 can do process substitution like
read a b c < <(some command) (note that there is a space between the first <, which redirects STDIN, and the second <, which indicates to run the command and connect it to a named pipe, providing the pipe in place of the
<(cmd) expression).
You can use that in place of a pipe pretty much any time. I use it all the time for things like
diff <(sort file1 | grep -v '^#') <(sort file2 | grep -v '^#'), which compares two files, ignoring comments and sorting the lines in the files before comparing. :)


text:
Wilson Combat Professional - All Stainless! - SOLD!
This beauty just arrived! It's the ever popular Professional model in all stainless steel. It is absolutely striking in appearance. The lettering on the slide is black & really stands out against the stainless. The gun has an ambidextrous safety. Lovely!
This is my favorite size for all round use. I personally shoot a Professional & shoot it just as well as my 5" Wilson.
This gun is priced at $2765. Call Joe Rankin at 601-953-6615 for additional information.
Below is some information from the Wilson Combat website:
Professional Model
We take pride in innovation at Wilson Combat, which often includes listening to our customers and designing and building what they ask for. The Wilson Combat Professional model pistol is a direct result of consumer requests, and has been a customer favorite since its introduction – a custom handgun with a full-size frame mated to a compact barrel/slide assembly.
In standard configuration, it includes our Tactical Combat Sights with tritium inserts for low light conditions, fully CNC machined internal parts, and a hand-fitted match barrel. The compact slide delivers a shortened sight radius for faster sight acquisition and less overall length that aids in concealment. The full size frame provides a longer grip length that is more comfortable and sure for many shooters, plus it allows for a standard magazine with full 8 round capacity.
If you shoot a full-size 1911 pistol, this built-for-carry gun is going to feel great in your grip – the frame is the size you have become accustomed to holding. And after experiencing the ease and speed of getting on target with the compact slide and shorter sight radius, you will agree – this is a fine firearm to have on your side.
Like all Wilson Combat® firearms, we custom build the Professional to meet your exact specifications - every part is hand-fit for reliability, performance, and accuracy.
Some of the features of this handgun include:
All carbon-steel construction
Single-side tactical safety
High-Ride Beavertail Grip Safety, with raised Posi-Release™ tab
Armor-Tuff® finish for the frame and slide, in matching or contrasting colors
Diamondwood grips are standard
Padded pistol rug (soft case) with Wilson Combat logo; outside flap-covered storage for 7 additional magazines on one side and 2, 6.5"x6.5"x1.5" zippered, padded pockets on the other side.
Frame Assembly
Hammer: #337B Ultralight
Grip Safety: #298B High Ride Beavertail
Ejector #34 Extended
Thumb Safety: #6BN Extended Tactical
Trigger: #190 Ultralight Crisp 3 1/2#-3 3/4# pull
Magazine Well: Handfit and Contoured
Feed Ramp: Polish & Bbl. Throated
Magazine Release: #31T Extended Tactical
Checkering: Frontstrap - High Cut 30LPI, Flat Main Spring Housing - 30LPI
Grips: #351 Series, Specify Wood
Slide Assembly
#463 Tactical Combat Pyramid
Polish and Adjust Bullet Proof®
Ejection Port:
Lower & Flare Back
#26 Firing Pin Spring; #10SC20 HD Recoil
Heavy Tapered, handfit
Custom Fit Slide/Frame Rails
Cocking Serrations on Rear of Slide
Finish & Extras
De-Horn for Carry
Armor-Tuff Finish
2 #47D 8rd Magazines
Instructional Video & Color Manual
#146 Nylon Pistol Rug
Test Fire and Zero


text:
(This is a prepublication draft - it's forthcoming in Univ. Chicago Press volume Science Unlimited (eds. Pigliucci and Boudry).
The term 'scientism' is applied to a variety of positions about science. One is the view that the only legitimate questions about reality are those answerable by science. Another is that, to the extent that anything can be known about reality, science alone is capable of providing that knowledge. Critics of religious, New Age, spiritualist, and other, popular forms of divine or supernatural belief are often accused of scientism by their proponents. The accusation typically involves the thought that critics have crossed a line or boundary demarcating those topics or subjects that are the proper province of science, and those that are beyond its capacity to adjudicate. The accused are often found guilty of hubris, of an arrogant failure to recognize that there are 'more things in heaven and Earth' than are dreamt of in their science, of supposing science is best placed to answer questions that, in reality, can only be answered by employing other disciplines, forms of inquiry, or 'ways of knowing'. Within discussion of religious, spiritual, New Age, and popular divine or supernatural beliefs, this boundary marking the 'limits of science' almost always plays an immunizing role: to explain why science constitutes no threat to such beliefs. 'You scientists', say the believers, 'may come this far, but no further.'
Before we look at some specific examples of this sort of criticism, I want to outline some of my own views regarding the limits of science. As a philosopher, you might expect me both to want to carve out some intellectual territory for philosophers to occupy, and also to resist the thought that philosophical questions and problems are either non-questions and non-problems or else questions that will be answered and problems that will be solved, if at all, through an application of the scientific method. I won't disappoint. However, while I acknowledge that there are limits to science, I will argue these limits typically offer little comfort to religious, New Age, and other folk looking for ways to immunize their beliefs against scientific refutation.
There is a further reason why I want to sketch out a case for supposing that philosophy is essentially a non-scientific enterprise: it will allow me to compare and contrast my own views with those of Richard Dawkins - who is perhaps Public Enemy Number One among those leveling the charge of 'scientism' - and give me an opportunity to explain why Dawkins's position isn't as crudely scientistic as commonly supposed.
The limits of science
If science has limits, where do they lie? Below are two kinds of question to which, it's very widely supposed, science can't supply answers.
(i) Moral questions
For those wishing to challenge the suggestion that science can answer every legitimate question, moral questions are often a first port of call. Hume drew our attention to the is/ought gap. Morality is concerned with what we ought, or ought not, to do. The empirical sciences, on the other hand, appear capable, in isolation, only of establishing what is the case. And it appears that premises concerning what is the case - certainly premises of the sort that pure empirical science is capable of establishing - fail rationally to support moral conclusions: conclusions about what one ought or ought not to do. But then it appears science can't supply answers our most fundamental moral questions. For science alone can neither directly reveal facts about what one ought or ought not to do, nor allow us legitimately to draw conclusions about what we ought or ought not to do.
Defenders of scientism respond in a variety of ways. Some suggest that there's something illegitimate about moral questions (that they're meaningless, perhaps). However, moral questions don't appear to be meaningless. Indeed, we consider them among the most meaningful and pressing of questions. If they are ultimately illegitimate or meaningless, the onus is very much on the defenders of scientism wishing to take this route to show that that's the case. Alternatively, some defenders of scientism concede that while such questions are legitimate, and while science may not be able to answer them, there certainly isn't any other way of answering them. Another option is to deny there is any is/ought gap: to insist that the kind of facts science reveals are capable of justifying our most fundamental moral beliefs. Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, recently developed a version of that view (Harris, 2012).
I won't take a view here regarding the is/ought gap, other than to note there's at least a prima facie case for supposing moral questions are questions science alone is ultimately incapable of answering. But of course, even if that conclusion is correct, it doesn't follow that science is morally irrelevant. Science remains capable of playing an important role in justifying and challenging many moral beliefs, most obviously those whose justification depends in part upon empirical assumptions. If I believe women ought not to have the vote because I believe both that people of low intelligence ought not to have the vote and that women are of low intelligence, then my justification can be straightforwardly shown to fail by scientific evidence that women are not of low intelligence. Similarly, if I believe it's morally right to enable human beings to flourish, then a scientific investigation into what actually enables humans to flourish becomes morally relevant. Science might also reveal that, say, at least some of our moral intuitions are not to be trusted, by showing that what is actually shaping our intuitive moral responses is, in some cases, morally irrelevant. However, note that these suggestions concerning how science might play an important role in revealing moral truths and falsehoods are consistent with Hume's conclusion that science alone is incapable of justifying any moral position.
(ii) Philosophy
On my view, philosophical questions are for the most part conceptual rather than scientific or empirical and the methods of philosophy are, broadly speaking, conceptual rather than scientific or empirical.
Here's a simple conceptual puzzle. At a family get-together the following relations held directly between those present: Son, Daughter, Mother, Father, Aunt, Uncle, Niece, Nephew, and Cousin. Could there have been only four people present at that gathering? At first glance, there might seem to be a conceptual obstacle to there being just four people present - surely, more people are required for all those familial relations to hold between them? But in fact that appearance is deceptive. There could indeed be just four people present. To see that there being just four people present is not conceptually ruled out, we have to unpack, and explore the connections between, the various concepts involved. That is something that can be done from the comfort of your armchair.
Many philosophical puzzles have a similar character. Consider for example this puzzle associated with Heraclitus. If you jump into a river and then jump in again, the river will have changed in the interim. So it won't be the same. But if it's not the same river, then the number of rivers that you jump into is two, not one. It seems we're forced to accept the paradoxical - indeed, absurd - conclusion that you can't jump into one and the same river twice. Being forced into such a paradox by a seemingly cogent argument is a common philosophical predicament.
This particular puzzle is fairly easily solved: the paradoxical conclusion that the number of rivers jumped into is two not one is generated by a faulty inference. Philosophers distinguish at least two kinds of identity or sameness. Numerical identity holds where the number of objects is one, not two (as when we discover that Hesperus, the evening star, is identical with Phosphorus, the morning star). Qualitative identity holds where two objects share the same qualities (e.g. two billiard balls that are molecule-for molecule duplicates of each other, for example). We use the expression 'the same' to refer to both sorts of identity. Having made this conceptual clarification, we can now see that the argument that generates our paradox trades on an ambiguity. It involves a slide from the true premise that the river jumped in the second time isn't qualitatively 'the same' to the conclusion that it is not numerically 'the same'. We fail to spot the flaw in the reasoning because the words 'the same' are used in each case. But now the paradox is resolved: we don't have to accept that absurd conclusion. Here's an example of how, by unpacking and clarifying concepts, it is possible to solve a classical philosophical puzzle. Perhaps not all philosophical puzzles can be solved by such means, but at least one can.
So some philosophical puzzles are essentially conceptual in nature, and some (well, one at least) can be solved by armchair, conceptual methods.
Still, I have begun with a simple, some might say trivial, philosophical example. What of the so-called 'hard problems' of philosophy, such as the mind-body problem? The mind-body problem, or at least a certain versions of it, also appears to be essentially conceptual in character. On the one hand, there appear reasons to think that if the mental is to have causal effects on the physical, then it will have to be identical with the physical. On the other hand, there appear to be conceptual obstacles to identifying the mental with the physical. Of course, scientists might establish various correlations between the mental and the physical. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that science establishes that whenever someone is in pain, their C-fibres are firing, and vice versa. Would scientists have then established that these properties are one and the same property - that pain just is C-fibre firing - in the way they have established that, say, heat just is molecular motion or water just is H2O? Not necessarily. Correlation is not identity. It strikes many of us as intuitively obvious that pain just couldn't be a physical property like C-fibre firing - that these properties just couldn't be identical in that way. Of course, the intuition that certain things are ruled out can be deceptive. Earlier, we saw that the appearance that the concepts son, daughter, etc. are such that there just had to be more than four people at that family gathering was mistaken: when we unpack the concepts and explore the connections between them it turns out there's no such conceptual obstacle. Philosophers have attempted to sharpen up the common intuition that there's an armchair obstacle to identifying pain with C-fibre firing or some other physical property into a philosophical argument. Consider Kripke's anti-physicalist argument, for example. Kripke's argument turns on the thought that the conceptual impossibility of fool's pain (of something that feels like pain but isn't because the underlying physical essence is absent), combined with the conceptual possibility of pain without C-fibre firing (I can conceive of a situation in which I think I am in pain though my C-fibres are not firing), conceptually rules out pain having C-fibre firing as an underlying physical essence (which it would have if the identity theory were true) (Kripke, 1991, Lecture III). Has Kripke here identified a genuine conceptual obstacle to physicalism? Perhaps. Or perhaps not: perhaps it will turn out, on closer examination, that there is no such obstacle here. The only way to show that, however, will be through logical and conceptual work. Just as in the case of our puzzle about whether only four people might be at the family gathering and the puzzle about jumping into one and the same river twice, a solution will require we engage, not in empirical investigation, but in reflective armchair inquiry. Establishing more facts about and a greater understanding of what happens in people's brains when they are in various mental states, etc. will no doubt be scientifically worthwhile, but it won't, by itself, allow us to answer the question of whether there exists such a conceptual obstacle.
So, many philosophical problems - from some of the most trivial to some of the hardest - appear to be essentially conceptual in nature, requiring armchair, conceptual work to solve. Some are solvable, and indeed have even been solved (the puzzle about the river). Others aren't solved, though perhaps they might be. On the other hand, it might turn out that at least some philosophical problems are insoluble, at least by us. Perhaps, as some 'mysterians' propose, while some philosophical problems have solutions, they are solutions that lie beyond our human cognitive and conceptual grasp. Alternatively, perhaps some philosophical problems have no solution, period, because the problems result from certain fundamental conceptual commitments that are either directly irreconcilable or else generate unavoidable paradoxes when combined with certain empirically discovered facts.
So there are perfectly good questions that demand answers, and that can be answered, though not by empirical means, let alone by that narrower form of empirical investigation referred to as 'the scientific method'. In order to solve many classic philosophical problems, we'll need to retire to our armchairs, not to the lab.
But is that all there is to philosophy? What of the grander metaphysical vision traditionally associated with academic philosophy? What of plumbing the deep, metaphysical structure of reality? That project is often thought to involve discerning, again by armchair methods, not what is the case (that's the business of empirical enquiry) but what, metaphysically, must be so. But how are philosophers equipped to reveal such hidden metaphysical depths by sitting in their armchairs with their eyes closed and having a good think?
I suspect this is the main reason why there's considerable suspicion of philosophy in certain scientific circles. If we want to find out about reality - about how things stand outside our own minds - surely we will need to rely on empirical methods. There is no other sort of window on to reality - no other knowledge-delivery mechanism by which the nature of that reality might be revealed.
This is, of course, a traditional empiricist worry. Empiricists insist it's by means of our senses (or our senses enhanced by scientific tools and techniques) that the world is ultimately revealed. There is no mysterious extra sense, faculty, or form of intuition we might employ, while sat in our armchairs, to reveal further, deep, metaphysical facts about external reality.
If the above thought is correct, and armchair methods are incapable of revealing anything about the nature of reality outside our own minds, then philosophy, conceived as a grand metaphysical exploration upon which we can embark while never leaving the comfort of our armchairs, is in truth a grand waste of time.
I'm broadly sympathetic to this skeptical view about the value of armchair methods in revealing reality. Indeed, I suspect it's correct. So I have a fairly modest conception of the capabilities of philosophy. Yes, I believe we can potentially solve philosophical puzzles by armchair methods, and I believe this can be a valuable exercise. However, I am suspicious of the suggestion that we philosophers should construe what we then achieve as our having made progress in revealing the fundamental metaphysical nature of reality, a task to I which suspect such reflective, armchair methods are ultimately hopelessly inadequate.
So perhaps there's at least this much right about scientism: armchair philosophical reflection alone can't reveal anything about reality outside our own minds. However, as I say, that doesn't mean such methods are without value. After all, scientists sometimes employ the same methods, and with scientifically valuable results. Galileo is credited with constructing a thought experiment by which he established that the Aristotelean theory that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones in direct proportion to their weight is mistaken. Galileo noted that Aristotle's theory predicted that two balls, one heavier than the other, should fall at different speeds: the heavier falling faster. This theory could be empirically tested of course, and some suppose Galileo tested it by dropping objects from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa. However, Galileo himself records no such experiment. What Galileo did do was perform a thought experiment. He imagined the hypothetical balls of different weights now chained together. Being now combined into a single, even heavier object, Aristotle's theory predicts the balls combined should fall even faster than they did individually. However, because the lighter ball previously fell more slowly than the heavier, Aristotle's theory also predicts the lighter ball should pull tight on the chain behind the heavier ball and act as a brake on it. But then the balls combined should fall more slowly than did the heavier individually. In short, Aristotle's theory, in combination with some modest assumptions about the effects of the chain, generates a logical contradiction. Thus it cannot be true.
Of course, Galileo's thought experiment did not allow Galileo to predict what would happen when such balls are released. It didn't reveal how reality is (such objects, when released, might fall at the same speed, at different speeds, or might transform into a pair of doves and fly off into the sunset - we can't know what they will or won't do without observing at least some instances). It just revealed that Aristotle's theory, in so far as it contains or generates logical contradictions, can't constitute a correct description of it.
So, while thought experiments and other forms of armchair reflection can't tell us anything substantive about how things stand in reality, they can at least allow us to make significant scientific progress by showing that certain theories about reality are false. Is Galileo's thought experiment an example of science, or philosophy? In so far as it targets a scientific theory - a theory about how physical objects behave - perhaps it belongs more properly to science. However, note that the same armchair method employed by Galileo is also regularly employed by philosophers (for further discussion of the legitimacy of armchair methods see Sorrell in this volume).
Richard Dawkins on science and philosophy
I turn now to Richard Dawkins. To what extent is Dawkins wedded to scientism? In 2013 I engaged in a public discussion with Dawkins on this subject. (Dawkins and Law, 2013) Dawkins began by acknowledging that 'philosophy does seem to me to be a subject' (he contrasted philosophy with theology, which Dawkins does not consider a subject, and which he has elsewhere likened, much to the annoyance of many theologians, to fairy-ology). Moreover, when presented with an example of a conceptual puzzle similar to my example above involving familial relations, Dawkins said 'that's something you get out a pencil and paper, ... you do a scientific investigation in your head' (my italics). According to Dawkins, this sort of armchair, conceptual activity is science: 'Plenty of good science goes on in armchairs'. When I suggested to Dawkins that the mind-body problem was, at root, a conceptual puzzle that cannot be solved by empirical enquiry, a problem that will be solved, if at all, by armchair methods, Dawkins responded: 'That has the ring of sense to me' (Dawkins and Law 2013, at 39 mins 50 secs). Further, when I suggested that, given my understanding of what philosophy should be, 'maybe I'm going to turn out to be a scientist', Dawkins replied: 'Well of course you are' (2013, 35 mins)
So, Dawkins is not dismissive of philosophy as I understand it and in the form I would wish to defend it. Dawkins also acknowledges that, for example, the mind-body problem is a philosophical puzzle - a puzzle we will need to employ armchair, conceptual methods to solve if it's to be solved at all. However, Dawkins's conception of 'science' is sufficiently flexible to encompass all these activities, so that even philosophers engaged in purely conceptual, armchair inquiry qualify as 'scientists'. Having said that, I suspect that, insofar as philosophy is understood as an activity aimed at revealing how things stand in reality, Dawkins would dismiss armchair philosophy as a waste of time. But then I suspect he'd be right to do so.
Not only does Dawkins unambiguously acknowledge that '[p]erhaps there are some genuinely profound and meaningful questions that are forever beyond the reach of science' (2006, 80) he also seems happy to concede that moral questions may fall into this category. About moral questions, Dawkins says: 'we can all agree that science's entitlement to advise us on moral values is problematic to say the least' (2006, 80) (he may not even consider such questions answerable at all).
We have looked at two kinds of questions - moral and philosophical - that Dawkins appears prepared to acknowledge empirical methods can't, or probably can't, answer, and that (at least in the case of some philosophical questions) other methods might. I don't doubt there are other examples of questions that science (understood as a form of empirical enquiry) alone cannot, or cannot fully, answer but other methods might.[1] However, I'll stick with just these putative illustrations.
The Veil
I turn now turn to religious, New Age and popular divine or supernatural belief, and the suggestion that those who are critical of such beliefs from a scientific perspective are often guilty of scientism.
A thought often employed by those who make the accusation of scientism in defence of such beliefs is that reality is divided by something like a veil. On one side of the veil lies the empirically observable, investigable, material world. On the other side lies a divine or supernatural realm. This realm is variously supposed to be populated by beings such as the deceased (who are supposed to have 'passed over' to the other side not just figuratively, but literally), angels, spirit guides, demonic beings, and of course gods. Occult forces and energies are also supposed by some to operate behind such a veil. Knowledge of what 'lies beyond' is often supposed to depend on the ability of at least some of us to peer, if only dimly, through this veil and obtain glimpses of what's on the other side. Usually, some sort of super-sense is invoked. TV's Psychic Sally, for example, claims that she can sense the presence of those who have 'passed over' and can communicate with and relay messages back from the other side. Others believe they are able to sense the presence of guardian angels or other spirit guides or beings. Sometimes, the 'doors of perception' to what lies beyond are supposedly opened with chemical assistance. The Delphic oracle of ancient Greece received communications from the god Apollo while perched on a tripod placed over vapors rising from a chasm. Some religious people believe also that at least some of us possess a reliably functioning god-sense or sensus divinitatis by means of which the Judeo-Christian God reveals himself. Many self-styled 'spiritual' folk claim to have experienced some sort of transcendent, spiritual realm. It's by means of such subjective experiences, and perhaps also signs given and wonders performed on this side of the veil by those on the far side, that we can obtain at least some knowledge of those residing 'beyond'. The empirical sciences, by contrast, are incapable of penetrating the veil. The proper province of those sciences lies this side of the veil. There's usually acknowledgement, from those who believe in the veil, that their beliefs concerning what lies beyond cannot be 'proved' by scientific means. But then, they quickly add, neither can these beliefs be refuted by such means. The veil effectively immunizes beliefs about what lies beyond against any sort of scientific, empirical refutation.
A version of this thought that there are these two domains, of which the methods employed by empirical science are suited to investigate only one, is presented by paleontologist Stephen J. Gould, who maintained that science and religion are 'non-overlapping magisteria'. Science is concerned with the age of rocks, etc., whereas religion is focused on the 'rock of ages'. Religion is not well-equipped to address questions about, say, the way the Earth was formed and life appeared. That is the proper business of science. But then, similarly, the empirical sciences are in no position to address questions about meaning and value or the existence of, say, souls or God. Such 'big questions' are the proper province of religion, not science. Gould writes that science
tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts. Religion, on the other hand, operates in the equally important, but utterly different, realm of human purposes, meanings, and values—subjects that the factual domain of science might illuminate, but can never resolve. (2002, 4)
Gould specifically mentions the existence of souls as something the investigation of which lies beyond the proper remit of science:
But I also know that souls represent a subject outside the magisterium of science. My world cannot prove or disprove such a notion, and the concept of souls cannot threaten or impact my domain. (2012, 575)
On Gould's view science and religion are not in, and cannot come into, conflict. Science is no threat to religious belief, properly understood, though of course it is a threat to Young-Earth creationist beliefs about the age of rocks. Young Earth Creationism is an example of religions entering territory that is the proper province of science.
Is it true that beliefs concerning gods, souls, the supernatural, and so on, and are immune to refutation, or at least to scientific refutation? No. Here are three reasons why.
First, it is possible to refute beliefs about what lies beyond the veil by showing that the beliefs involve some sort of logical contradiction or conceptual muddle (a point Gould might of course concede). Suppose someone claims to have discovered a round square in the jungles of Brazil. Will the world's mathematicians mount an expedition to Brazil to investigate? Of course not. They can know, from the comfort of their armchairs, that there's no such thing in the jungles of Brazil. In the same way we might refute a scientific theory by showing that it generates logical contradictions (we have already noted Galileo's armchair refutation of Aristotle's theory about falling objects). But then god beliefs might also generate contradictions of this sort. Take belief in some sort of divine agency that is supposed both to have beliefs and desires on which it acts, but also to be non-temporal: a being that does not exist in time, as we do, but is the creator of time. Perhaps we can show this belief doesn't make sense, given that psychological states such as belief and desire necessarily have temporal duration. In which case, we might refute, from the comfort of our armchairs, belief in such a deity, despite the fact that the deity in question supposedly resides behind the veil (I don't claim this particular refutation succeeds; I merely point out that such refutations of beliefs regarding what lies behind the veil is at least possible). Would such a refutation be 'scientific'? I'd call it philosophical, but note that we have already seen Dawkins's use of 'science' is sufficiently elastic to allow such armchair, conceptual refutations to qualify as 'scientific'.
Second, beliefs about what is behind the veil, though not directly observable, are potentially empirically refutable given they have consequences for what we should or should probably observe on this side of the veil. Scientists regularly confirm and disconfirm hypotheses about unobservables. Hypotheses about the distant past of this planet - such as that dinosaurs once roamed the Earth - also concern tracts of reality that are necessarily unobservable by us. Yet such hypotheses can be confirmed, and indeed refuted, by observation. That's because there are things it's much more likely we would observe (certain kind of fossilized skeleton, etc.) if the hypothesis were true than if it were false. Similarly, hypotheses about subatomic particles concern tracts of reality that are unobservable, but again we can observationally confirm or refute hypotheses about electrons, the Higgs Boson, etc. because these hypotheses also have consequences so far as what is empirically observable.
But then, similarly, hypotheses about what lies behind the veil in some divine or supernatural realm may be empirically confirmed or refuted in so far as they, too, have consequences so far as what we should expect to see on this side of the veil. If I posit a cosmic doodah behind the veil, and say no more about it than that it's an ineffable thingummyjig, it appears I've made a claim that's hard to refute observationally, given that it has no obvious observational consequences. However, as we add more content to our beliefs about what 'lies beyond', those beliefs do become potentially empirically confirmable or refutable. Belief in a god that answers petitionary prayers, for example, has been scientifically investigated. Two large-scale multi-million dollar studies of the effects of petitionary prayer on heart patients (one performed under the leadership of Herbert Benson, a cardiologist who previously suggested 'the evidence for the efficacy of intercessory prayer … is mounting' (Benson, 2006)) found prayer had no beneficial effect on patients. This was not mere absence of evidence of the beneficial effects of prayer, it was evidence of the absence of such effects, and thus evidence against the existence of a god who produces such beneficial effects in response to petitionary prayer.
Despite the fact that they are considered to concern powers, beings, and so on behind the veil, various New Age, spiritual, and other claims have also been scientifically investigated. Take for example the claim that meditating while holding crystals can, by means of some power operating behind the veil, bring about higher concentration powers, energy levels, and increased spiritual well-being. That meditating while holding crystals has such effects was scientifically investigated in a double blind controlled experiment conducted at the Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit Goldsmith's College, University of London (French, O'Donnell, and Williams 2001). No such effect was found (no difference in response from those holding real crystals and those holding fake crystals). Again, this was evidence against the existence of any such power operating behind the veil.
Other claims concerning the divine also appear to be evidentially challenged. Take, for example, the claim that this world is the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely malevolent deity whose malice is without end. If there were such a deity behind the veil, surely things should look very different on this, the empirically observable, side? Yes there's pain and suffering, but surely there's far too much love, laughter, ice cream, and rainbows for this to be the creation of such a supremely wicked being. But if we can, quite reasonably, rule out such a deity on the basis of observation, why can't we similarly rule out the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and supremely benevolent deity on much the same basis (there's far too much suffering in the world for this to be the creation of such a god). Assuming this is an effective refutation of these two god beliefs[2], is it a scientific refutation? It's certainly empirically-based. However, if we understand a scientific refutation to involve the scientific method and scientific institutions developed over the last few hundred years, then it appears not to be scientific. It's a variety of that still highly effective 'common sense' kind of refutation that might have been offered long before the development of those methods and institutions. Another example: I might effectively empirically refute your claim to have a cat under your shirt by carefully going round you and patting your shirt. If I find no suspicious lumps and hear no 'meows', it's reasonable for me to believe there's no cat there, despite my not having actually looked under your shirt. Is this successful refutation of your claim 'scientific'? I'd say not.
This is not to the say that the argument from evil against the existence of omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely benevolent god can't take a scientific form. Much of the suffering the world contains has been revealed by science. Examples include hundreds of millions of years of animal suffering before humans have shown up, and two hundred thousand years of approximately a third to a half of every generation of human children dying (typically pretty horribly, from disease, malnutrition, and so on) before reaching the age of five.
Another way in which science, or empirical inquiry, might threaten beliefs concerning what lies behind the veil is by providing evidence that we are highly prone to error when it comes to forming such beliefs on the basis of, say, subjective experiences involving a sense of presence (much like the experiences TV's Psychic Sally reports). Perhaps, if I seem to see a snake lying in front of me, it is, other things being equal, reasonable for me to believe there's a snake there. But if I am then told by a reliable source that I have been given a drug that causes highly convincing-looking snake hallucinations, it's no longer reasonable for me to believe there's a snake before me. Of course there might still be a snake present, and indeed, my belief that there's a snake might have been brought about by my reliably functioning perceptual faculties (perhaps I have been misled about having been drugged and am just observing a real snake in the usual way), but, still, given this new evidence, surely it's no longer reasonable for me to continue to believe there's a snake there. But then, similarly, science might reveal we humans are constitutionally prone to false beliefs in the presence of invisible agents (gods, ghosts, spirits, angels, demons, the deceased, etc.) when those beliefs are merely grounded in a subjective sense of presence.[3] Under those circumstances, surely I can no longer reasonably maintain my belief in such an agent given only such a subjective sense of presence. Here is evidence, not that there are no gods, ghosts, or whatever, but that my subjective sense that there are can no longer be trusted. If a subjective sense of presence is my only basis for belief, then I should cease believing.[4]
To sum up, while there may be 'limits to science', certainly when understood as a form of empirical inquiry grounded in methods and institutions developed only over the last few hundred years or so, it does not follow that religious beliefs, New Age beliefs, beliefs about the supernatural, and so on are immune to refutation, let alone scientific refutation.
Dawkins's argument in The God Delusion
Dawkins's book The God Delusion has provoked many accusations of 'scientism', some of which I'll examine shortly. The central aim of Dawkins's book is to show that there very probably is no God. Dawkins is critical of design arguments - such as fine-tuning arguments - that aim to justify belief in God by pointing to features of the universe that might seem highly improbable if not a product of some sort of intelligent design. In response to such arguments, Dawkins insists that, when theists appeal to god to explain such otherwise supposedly improbable features of the universe, they overlook the fact that the god to which they appeal must be at least as complex, and thus at least as improbable, as that which he is invoked to explain:
A designer god cannot be used to explain organized complexity because any god capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right. God presents an infinite regress from which he cannot help us escape. (2006, 136)
If the existence of the universe having such features by chance is highly improbable, then, says Dawkins, the existence of a god having the kind of complexity to account for it must be even more improbable. So, by introducing god, we merely postpone the problem of accounting for such complexity. But then the universe's complexity provides no justification for introducing god. Worse still, if the theist is right and the probability of such complexity just happening to exist is low, then, by the same logic, the probability of God existing must be even lower.
Dawkins suggests this argument is 'scientific', but is it? Why does Dawkins suppose God must be at least as complex as that which he is invoked to explain? Perhaps because, if something is to qualify as having been designed by God, it must be represented in the mind of God, and the structural complexity of what is designed must be there in the representation if it is to qualify as a designed feature. However, this thought about what must be true of representations appears to be delivered by armchair, conceptual reflection on the nature of representation, rather than by empirical inquiry. In which case, isn't Dawkins' argument philosophical rather than scientific? Perhaps not: because Dawkins classes even such armchair philosophical reflection as 'science', his argument still qualifies as 'scientific' as Dawkins uses that term.
Is Dawkins's very elastic use of 'science' - on which even armchair philosophical reflection qualifies - legitimate? I don't particularly object to Dawkins using the term in this way so long as he is clear about what he means. The fact that Dawkins's Foundation is called The Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science suggests that even Dawkins understands reason to extend beyond the scope of mere science (otherwise, why not just call it The Richard Dawkins Foundation for Science?). So where, according to Dawkins, does science end and the rest of what falls under the umbrella of 'reason' begin? That isn't clear to me.
Is Dawkins's argument cogent? I won't assess it here. A number of theists have attempted to refute it, include Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga. My interest lies, not in attempts to directly refute Dawkins's argument, but in the charge of 'scientism'.
McGrath's response to The God Delusion
Theologian Alister McGrath, author of The Dawkins delusion - Atheist Fundamentalism and The Denial of the Divine, is one of the leading religious critics of The God Delusion. McGrath has penned numerous articles attacking Dawkins's book and argument. A fairly typical example is 'The Questions Science Cannot Answer - The Ideological Fanaticism of Richard Dawkins's Attack on Religious Belief is Unreasonable to Religion - and Science', published in The Times newspaper in 2007. In that article, McGrath begins by pointing out that even scientists such as Peter Medawar acknowledge there are questions science can't answer:
In The Limits of Science, Medawar reflected on how science, despite being 'the most successful enterprise human beings have ever engaged upon', had limits to its scope. Science is superb when it comes to showing that the chemical formula for water is H2O. Or, more significantly, that DNA has a double helix. But what of that greater question: what's life all about? This, and others like it, Medawar insisted, were 'questions that science cannot answer, and that no conceivable advance of science would empower it to answer'. They could not be dismissed as 'nonquestions or pseudoquestions such as only simpletons ask and only charlatans profess to be able to answer'. This is not to criticise science, but simply to calibrate its capacities. (2007b)
McGrath then accuses Dawkins of being ideologically committed to science, of supposing that 'science has all the answers'. However, we have already seen that Dawkins clearly acknowledges in the book McGrath is here attacking that 'perhaps there are some genuinely profound and meaningful questions that are forever beyond the reach of science' and suggests that moral questions may fall into this category. So McGrath is attacking a straw man. We have seen that Dawkins allows room for philosophy too (though his understanding of 'science' is broad enough to allow even a priori armchair philosophical theorizing and reflection to qualify as science).
McGrath's charge of 'scientism' not only misrepresents Dawkins, it is also, more importantly, irrelevant to the question of whether or not Dawkins's argument against the existence of McGrath's God is cogent. Suppose McGrath is right that there are questions science cannot answer, and that other methods can. Does it follow that Dawkins's argument against the existence of God fails? Clearly not. Dawkins's argument might still be sound.
McGrath then attempts to refute Dawkins's argument against the existence of God, not by identifying some specific flaw in it, but by simply insisting we can't prove there's no God. However, Dawkins himself points out in the The God Delusion that McGrath's earlier attack on Dawkins seem to turn on the 'undeniable but ignominiously weak point that you cannot disprove the existence of God.' (2007, 80) In The God Delusion, Dawkins clearly and explicitly agrees with McGrath that we can't conclusively 'prove' there's no God, but then points out that doesn't mean belief in God is immune to scientific skepticism. For, as we have already noted, God hypotheses can have observable consequences: '[a] universe with a superintendent would be a very different kind of universe from one without. Why is that not a scientific matter?' (2007, 80) Dawkins notes in The God Delusion that, in response to this question, McGrath previously offered no answer. It's ironic, then, that, even in this later attack now aimed squarely at The God Delusion itself, McGrath still offers no answer.
Elsewhere, McGrath does at least explain why he supposes there can at least be no conclusive 'proof' or 'disproof' of the existence of God. In The Dawkins Delusion, he says:
Any given set of observations can be explained by a number of theories. To use the jargon of the philosophy of science: theories are under-determined by the evidence. The question then arises: What criterion be used to decide between them, especially when they are 'empirically equivalent'. Simplicity? Beauty? The debate rages, unresolved. And its outcome is entirely to be expected: the great questions remain unanswered. There can be no scientific 'proof' of ultimate questions. Either we cannot answer them, or we must answer them on grounds other than the sciences. (2007a)
The suggestion seems to be that, consequently, the 'ultimate question' of whether or not God exists cannot be settled by science (by the way, notice McGrath understands 'science' more narrowly than Dawkins - he supposes that what 'science' can settle is settled, in every case, by observational evidence).
But are 'God exists' and 'God does not exist' 'empirically equivalent'? Do these two 'worldviews' fit the observational data equally well? Dawkins's point is, of course, that they are not empirically equivalent. Given that hypotheses about unobservables (subatomic particles, the distant past of this planet, etc.) can indeed be empirically confirmed and disconfirmed beyond reasonable doubt by reference to what is observable, why shouldn't God beliefs also be similarly empirically confirmable or disconfirmable? Given we can empirically disconfirm the belief that there's a God who answers petitionary, and that the belief in a God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnimalevolent also appears to be empirically disconfirmable, why should we suppose that McGrath's belief in a God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent is not empirically disconfirmable? McGrath offers no explanation. He simply declares, without argument, that his God is off-limits to science.
William Reville on religion and 'scientism'
In a 2014 article titled 'Philosophers must Oppose The Arrogance of Scientism', William Reville, Professor Emeritus of biochemistry, defends religion against Richard Dawkins and others whom Reville also accuses of scientism. These scientists dismiss religion, thinks Reville, because they are fundamentalist materialists who think 'nothing exists but the material'. However, 'materialism is a philosophy that has not - and probably cannot - be proven.' Reville adds:
It is reasonable to be a materialist. But, since materialism is unproven, materialists must accept that, no matter how improbable it seems to them, there is a possibility they might be wrong and a supernatural dimension might exist. Materialists are therefore obliged to respect the position of religious people who believe in the supernatural but accept all that science has and will discover. (2014)
Reville thinks the supernatural is off limits to science:
Science studies the natural world. It is materialistic in its method but not in its philosophy. Science does not deny the supernatural, it simply has nothing to say about it. Science and religion address different aspects of reality and do not contradict each other, as noted by the eminent science writer Stephen J Gould in his book Rocks of Ages. (2014)
Now, as we have seen, Dawkins actually justifies his rejection of belief in God by an argument. Reville does not address or even mention that argument, but instead simply declares that God, being supernatural, is off-limits to science. Perhaps Reville is right and it is possible a supernatural realm exists. However, that's not to say it's remotely probable. Many supernatural claims are highly improbable, and in some cases have been shown to be so through an application of the scientific method. The supernatural is not off limits to science. But then, if supernatural claims are often empirically investigable and can, in fact, be empirically refuted, why shouldn't Dawkins and others succeed in refuting - perhaps even in empirically refuting - a particular God claim? Reville does not explain.
Reville does encourage philosophers like myself to make clearer to scientists that science has limits:
One very important function of philosophy is to identify scientific questions. This is important in order to keep science from going off the rails. Philosophy is not doing its job. (2014)
While, as a philosopher, I am happy to acknowledge science has its limits, I see no reason to agree with Reville that supernatural claims are in principle off-limits to science. Indeed, they are not off-limits, and neither are many God claims.
Some other illustrations
I have provided two illustrations of how the charge of 'scientism' has been made in a baseless and indeed irrelevant way against critics of religious and/or supernatural beliefs. It is not difficult to find further examples.
Here, for example, is Bishop James Heiser:
[T[he efforts of scientists to disprove the existence of God is not a pursuit of Science, but Scientism. (Heiser, 2012)
As should now be clear, efforts to disprove the existence of God do not necessarily involve an embrace of scientism.
In their paper 'Has Science Disproved God?', Ashton and Westacott write:
It is important to note that science, unlike scientism, should not be a threat to religious belief. Science, to be sure, advocates a 'naturalistic' rather than 'supernaturalistic' focus, and an empirical method for determining truths about the physical world and the universe. Yet the proper mandate of science is restricted to the investigation of the natural (physical, empirical dimension) of reality. It is this restriction that scientism has violated... (Ashton and Westacott, 2006, 16)
This is another example of authors just assuming the supernatural is off-limits to science and then using that assumption to immunise their religious belief against any potential scientific threat. As we have seen, empirical science is more than capable of investigating many supernatural claims, and has done so successfully. To suppose otherwise is not to be guilty of scientism.
G.K. Chesterton scholar Dale Ahlquist writes:
Too often a prominent physicist or biologist is believed when he declares that empirical science has disproved the existence of God... The fallacy is, of course, that empirical or experimental science is limited to the work of discovering and applying truths about the material world. If there is a spiritual presence in the material world, physical science will not discover it; and if we discover it, physical science will have no idea of what it means. Chesterton would have none of such scientism.
What can people mean when they say that science has disturbed their view of sin? Do they think sin is something to eat? When people say that science has shaken their faith in immortality, do they think that immortality is a gas? (Ahlquist, 2104)
But immortality doesn't have to be material - and certainly doesn't have to be a material substance like a gas - in order to be scientifically investigable. Neither does God. Again, an unjustified and mistaken characterisation of the remit of science is used by the author to immunise religious belief against any potential scientific refutation.
In 'Has Science Done Away With God?', Catholic apologist Matt Fradd asks:
Hasn't science disproved God? No, and it is not within the ability of science to do so. Science is a method that one can use to discover information about the natural world... Examining God's material creation using a method which, by its very nature, is limited to the material universe cannot provide evidence against the existence of an immaterial God.... The view that science can or should provide the answer to every question is known as scientism. (Fradd, 2012)
Fradd asserts that it is beyond the remit of science to 'disprove God'. But no justification for this claim is given. We're just told those who suppose otherwise are guilty of scientism.
In the hands of some - including many theologians - the charge of 'scientism!' has become a lazy, knee-jerk form of dismissal, much like the charge of 'communism!' used to be. It constitutes a form of rubbishing, allowing - in the minds of those making the charge - for criticism to be casually brushed aside. No doubt some things really are beyond the ability of science, and perhaps even reason, to decide. But there's plenty that does lie within the remit of the scientific method, including many religious, supernatural, New Age, and other claims that are supposedly 'off-limits'. However, because the mantra 'But this is beyond the ability of science to decide' has been repeated so often with respect to that sort of subject matter, it is now heavily woven into our cultural zeitgeist. People just assume it's true for all sorts of claims for which it is not, in fact, true. The mantra has become a convenient, immunising factoid that can be wheeled out whenever a scientific threat to belief rears its head. When a believer is momentarily stung into doubt, many will attempt to lull them back to sleep by repeating the mantra over and over. The faithful murmur back: 'Ah yes, we forgot - this is beyond the ability of science to decide.... zzzz.'
Literature Cited
Ahlquist, D. 2014. 'Scientism'. Available online at http://www.chesterton.org/scientism/
Ashton, J. and Westacott, M. 2006. 'Has Science Disproved God?' In Whitney, B.L. The Big Argument, Does God Exist? Green Forest AZ.: New Leaf Publishing
Barrett. J.L. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Lanham Sylvialand: AltaMira Press.
Benson, H. et al. 2006. 'Study of the Therapeutic Effects of Intercessionary Prayer (STEP) in Cardiac Bypass Patients: A Multicenter Randomized Trial of Uncertainty and Certainty of Receiving Intercessionary Prayer', American Heart Journal 151: 934–42.
Boyer. P. 2002 Religion Explained, The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. New edition. London: Vintage.
Dawkins, R. 2006. The God Delusion. London: Bantam.
Dawkins, R. and Law, S. 2013. 'In Conversation with Richard Dawkins - Hosted by Stephen Law'. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvkbiElAOqU
Fradd, M. 2012. 'Has Science Done Away With God?' Available at http://mattfradd.com/has-science-done-away-with-god/
French, C. Williams, L. and O'Donnell, R. 2001. Unpublished paper presented to the British Psychological Society Centenary Annual Conference in Glasgow in 2001
Gould, S.J. 2002. Rocks of Ages. London: Vintage.
Gould, S.J. 2012. 'Nonoverlapping Magisteria', In Pojman, L. and Rae, M.(eds.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Boston MA, Wadsworth. pp. 568-577.
Harris, S. 2012. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. London: Black Swan.
Heiser, J. 2012. 'Will Science Disprove God's Existence?' The New American. http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/12926-will-science-disprove-gods-existence
Kripke, S. 1981. Naming and Necessity. New edition. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
McGrath A. 2007a. The Dawkins Delusion. London: SPCK.
McGrath, A. 2007b. 'The Questions Science Cannot Answer - The Ideological Fanaticism of Richard Dawkins's Attack on Religious Belief is Unreasonable to Religion - and Science' in The Times newspaper, February 10th.
Reville, W. 2014. 'Philosophers must Oppose The Arrogance of Scientism', The Irish Times, January16th.
[1] So, for example, I am not persuaded by those forms of 'scientism' that insist that, say, humanities subjects like history should employ nothing but the scientific method understood narrowly, so as to exclude the kind of understanding one acquires through an imaginative identification with others, in some cases achievable only through the use of music, poetry, painting and other forms of artistic expression. While there's much that science can contribute to history as a discipline, that's not to say that history is, or should be replaced by, science narrowly conceived. For further of this issue discussion see Kitcher in this volume.
[2] Notwithstanding the construction of theodicies and appeals to 'sceptical theism' that might, in each case, be invoked to try to deal with this apparent evidence against these two god claims, I believe it is.
[3] That we humans are indeed constitutionally prone to false belief in invisible agency has been noted by many scientists, including evolutionary psychologist Justin Barrett, who has also postulated a mechanism to account for this tendency - an evolved Hyper-Active Agency Detecting Device. See Barrett 2004 and Boyer 2002.
[4] Notice my argument here is not that where a religious or other seemingly supernatural experience can be correctly explained naturalistically (in the style of Barrett and Boyer, for example - see preceding note), it ought not to be trusted. Such naturalistic debunking arguments may or may not be cogent. Rather, my argument is a defeater argument: if I have good grounds for thinking that, in the circumstances in which it appears to me that P, that appearance is quite likely to be misleading, then I ought not to rely on that appearance - I ought not to believe that P. Such defeater arguments don't require my particular experience actually to be produced by an unreliable mechanism (I might actually be seeing a real snake via a reliable perceptual mechanism, and not be drugged), or indeed have a correct naturalistic explanation (God might, on this occasion, actually be supernaturally revealing himself to me). Even if I am actually perceiving a snake, or am actually experiencing God, by what is in actual fact a reliable belief-grounding mechanism, the fact remains that I shouldn't believe given the evidence that I'm in a situation where such experiences are very often deceptive.


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House upholds health, tax vetoes
ST. PAUL -- Money talk became emotional Sunday as Minnesota representatives sustained two vetoes -- one that ends a health program for the state's poorest and sickest residents and the other that would have raised taxes $1 billion.
ST. PAUL -- Money talk became emotional Sunday as Minnesota representatives sustained two vetoes -- one that ends a health program for the state's poorest and sickest residents and the other that would have raised taxes $1 billion.
With the Legislature facing a midnight tonight deadline for adjourning, the House votes cement Gov. Tim Pawlenty's position that he will cut state programs on his own to balance the state budget. There were no signs late Sunday that any overall budget deal was forthcoming.
Tears were plentiful in a hushed House chamber during touching stories of near-death and poverty-laced childhood experiences during debate on Pawlenty's $381 million veto of the General Assistance Medical Care program. The veto would eliminate the program in 2011, ending state-funded health care for up to 35,000 poor, childless adult Minnesotans.
The 87-47 House vote fell three short of the number needed for an override. Immediately after losing the health-care vote, Democrats who control the House moved on to the tax decision, which fell five votes short of an override, 85-49. In both cases, only Democrats voted to overturn the vetoes.
Pawlenty's line-item GAMC veto was his biggest cut in what could end up being Minnesota's largest-ever budget-cutting exercise. If Democratic legislative leaders and Republican Pawlenty do not reach a budget deal tonight, the governor says he will cut budgets on his own.
The Legislature sent Pawlenty spending bills totaling $34 billion for the budget, when tax collections only are expected to reach $31 billion. With the GAMC and other cuts he already has made, Pawlenty still would need to cut more than $2.5 billion from the two-year budget beginning July 1.
Rep. Tom Huntley, DFL-Duluth, said that people will die in the streets if they do not get medical and mental health care provided by GAMC.
However, Rep. Rob Hamilton, R-Mountain Lake, said Democrats in control of the Legislature give other items priority over health care for the poor.
"We are willing to build hockey arenas and bike trails and dog parks over your needs," Hamilton said, talking to three GAMC recipients in the House gallery.
"You should be outraged," he said.
One of the recipients is Robert Fischer, a 13-year Duluth resident who at one time operated a successful Twin Cities suburban business. But Fischer told a rally urging the health-care override that he lost his business, then his home and then his health. He lived on the streets for three years.
Fischer quietly told dozens of people outside the House chamber that that GAMC saved him. "I was able to completely turn my life around."
Huntley said that GAMC recipients, who earn $7,800 a year or less, need state help.
"They don't sleep under the bridge because they are lazy, they sleep under a bridge because they have serious problems in their life," Huntley said.
After the health-care debate, the House remained divided over raising taxes.
Democrats said that the tax bill would provide $1 billion to help fill the gap between spending and available money. They said the revenue would help the state's economy.
"We've got tough times," Rep. Paul Marquart, DFL-Dilworth said, adding that a $1 billion tax increase is fair considering many programs will be cut
Marquart, chairman of the House property taxes committee, said lawmakers need to compromise between not cutting programs and not raising taxes.
"Both sides cannot have their way," he said.
If Pawlenty is allowed to make unilateral cuts, he added, local governments face big cuts in state payments. Especially hard hit will be rural communities, he said.
Republicans, however, countered that raising taxes hurts the economy.
Rep. Morrie Lanning, R-Moorhead, complained about the state's budget process, and raises taxes does not help.
"What we need is major reform," Lanning said. "We are on a spending course in this state that is not sustainable."
Rep. Dean Urdahl, R-Grove City, said schools were supposed to get some of the money raised by new taxes, but the Legislature has done a good job providing for schools.
"I don't know what 'enough' is in education funding," Urdahl said.
House Majority Leader Tony Sertich, DFL-Chisholm, said lawmakers have two choices: "Go it alone with the governor on these cuts to education, to health care, to nursing homes, to disabled Minnesotans - or a balanced approach, a compromise."
The tax bill would raise income taxes on wealthy Minnesotans, increase alcohol taxes and place a new tax on credit card companies that charge more than 15 percent interest.
While representatives were in closed-door meetings before the veto debates, state union workers rallied outside the House chamber with "override" chants.
Among those rallying was the John and Lori Westmoreland family from Moose Lake. Rural Minnesota, especially, is hurting because of state spending cuts, Lori Westmoreland said, watching daughters Lilly and Leah wave join the chants.
Democratic legislative leaders and Republican Pawlenty exchanged budget offers late Saturday and early Sunday, but there was no obvious activity toward a budget deal most of Sunday.
House Minority Leader Marty Seifert, R-Marshall, said odds are against a budget deal, leaving Pawlenty the job of unilaterally cutting budgets.
Pawlenty signed into law bills funding all areas of state government, but used his line-item veto authority to eliminate $387 million in spending.
The governor late Saturday signed bills funding agriculture and veterans programs and public schools, the last of the budget bills funding state government.
Pawlenty vetoed a bill that would have funded state government services beginning July 1, when the new budget period begins, even if a balanced budget was not reached.
The health-care debate was unusually emotional.
Rep. Lyndon Carlson, DFL-Crystal, could not keep tears from filling his eyes. While he said that he planned to talk about there people close to him affected by health problems, he broke down and urged people to vote to override the veto. "This probably is the most important vote I have taken in my political career."
Rep. Andrew Falk, DFL-Murdock, said he fears for the future of eight hospitals in his district. "These are our people."
Rep. Roger Reinert, DFL-Duluth, told colleagues that the scripture he heard in church Sunday morning was: "Love each other as I have loved you." That is why, he said, he voted to restore the health program.
"I care about Minnesotans and Duluthians who I know are struggling," Reinert said.
On a practical level, he added, it would affect Duluth's three major hospitals, all in his House district. They would lose $20 million from the veto, he said.
"We are talking of hundreds of jobs," Reinert added.
House Majority Leader Tony Sertich, DFL-Chisholm, said that a vote to override would show that health care is a priority.
"I hope the poorest of the poor and the sickest of the sick have health care," Sertich said.
People living on less than $8,000 a year cannot go to hospitals far away, Sertich said, so if rural hospitals fail, those on GAMC will not be able to receive health care.
"How long can they delay going to the emergency room?" Sertich said poor Minnesotans are asking.
Hamilton said that Democrats in charge of the Legislature have not set priorities.
"It shouldn't be about the money, it should be about priorities," he said of the debate. "If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority."


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File this under info we're not sure we wanted to know: A worldwide survey of 100,000 people found that 43 percent of men and 33 percent of women are keeping a major secret from their significant others. The researchers behind the project didn't define what makes a "major secret," unfortch.
Frankly, the term "major" is relative—it could mean everything from blowing too much cash when he's out with the boys to a secret porn habit to, um, cheating. But really, it could be anything.
The results weren't all possible freak-out causers, though: 48 percent of the guys polled said they believe it love at first sight, compared with only 28 percent of women. Forty-four percent of guys also said they want their partners to be more romantic. Aww.
More From Cosmopolitan
But, back to the important stuff: The secrets.
While it's not possible to make your guy spill his secrets, you should pay attention to other signs that he's keeping something from you. If all else fails, just ask him what's up—he might 'fess up if you catch him off guard.
Want more from Meagan? Follow her on Twitter.


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Fire's wretched start to season continues
Sunday's 4-1 loss to Chivas USA left Chicago Fire players and coaches struggling to explain the worst start in the club's 16-year history.
"It's embarrassing what happened today," said veteran defender Gonzalo Segares. "I've got no words to explain how things were so bad. We had a pretty strong first half. We just couldn't put goals away, and not putting away easy goals is definitely a bad recipe."
After a good first half, the last-place Fire (0-3-1, 1 point) fell behind on a goal by Chivas' Edgar Mejia in the 57th minute.
Seven minutes later, Patrick Nyarko scored the Fire's first goal of the season, slipping a shot under sliding goalkeeper Dan Kennedy after forward Sherjill MacDonald held off the Chivas defense to muscle a pass to Nyarko.
"I'm just not thinking about that right now," Nyarko said of ending a 333-minute team drought. "It's pretty hard. I feel like we have a much better team than we've shown early on in the season and I'm just trying to figure out ways to get the guys going and get out of this slump because I believe we're a better team and we can get out of this."
"We should have had at least 2 or 3 (goals)," Segares said. "We're just not putting them away.
"It's frustrating. It's even more frustrating giving up a goal and having to come back from 1-0 when we could've been up 2 or 3 . Things are just not working. We've got to bounce back from this. It's just really frustrating."
Chivas didn't settle for a draw on the road, however. Joaquin Velazquez scored off a set piece in the 73rd minute, and Juan Agudelo followed with a goal in the 75th after he won a 50-50 ball from Jeff Larentowicz. A Jalil Anibaba own goal in the 89th minute finished a 4-goal second half for Chivas (2-1-1, 7 points).
"You have to look at everything," Fire coach Frank Klopas said. "Right now it just seems like we're not getting things done. So we have to evaluate and make some decisions and do what's best for the team."
Part of the problem was several Fire players were out due to injuries and national-team commitments, including captain Logan Pause, goalkeeper Sean Johnson, midfielders Dilly Duka and Joel Lindpere and defender Arne Friedrich.
"I don't use that as an excuse," Klopas said. "I thought we prepared well for the game. We were ready. If you look at the game, we dominated the first half."
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