text:
Despite concerns about increasing competition from Android devices, Apple managed to exceed expectations for iPhone sales for its second fiscal quarter, on Tuesday reporting a healthy year-over-year jump in both revenue and profit.
For the quarter ending March 31, 2012, Apple posted revenue of US$39.2 billion, compared to $24.7 billion for the same period in 2011. The average forecast of 44 analysts polled by Thomson Reuters was for revenue of $36.81 billion. Net profit jumped to $11.6 billion from $6.0 billion.
The company sold 35.1 million iPhones in the quarter, showing 88 percent year-over-year unit growth. Analysts at Piper Jaffray had expected sales of 30.5 million iPhones. Apple also sold 11.8 million iPads during the quarter, a 151 percent year-over-year unit increase, and 4 million Macs during the quarter, a 7 percent unit increase. Sales of iPods were 7.7 million, a 15 percent unit decline.
At the close of trading Tuesday, before earnings were announced, Apple shares declined $11.42 to close at $560.28, down from its highest-ever closing price of $644.00, reached on April 10. Apple shares have declined in 10 out of the last 11 trading days, as concerns grew that the company, faced with increasing competition from Android-based phones, would reveal sagging iPhone sales. Thirty minutes after the earnings were released, shares jumped $41.81 to $602.09 in after-market trading.
AT&T, reporting earnings early Tuesday, said it activated 4.3 million iPhones in the quarter ending March 31, approximately the same as Verizon reported last week. However, that was a decline from the fourth quarter of calendar 2011, when the introduction of the iPhone 4S fueled 7.6 million activations.
Various patent battles are also hanging over Apple, which is embroiled in lawsuits against Samsung and other manufacturers of mobile devices based on Google's Android OS. On Tuesday, a judge at the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a preliminary decision, ruling that Apple's iPhone and iPad violated one out of four patents in one particular suit — a wireless communications patent from Motorola Mobility, which Google is acquiring. An ITC panel will review the decision.
Analysts taking the long view, however, still have faith in Apple. In a research note over the weekend, Canaccord Genuity technology analyst Michael Walkley reiterated his "buy" rating on the company and raised his price target to $740 from $710. The company is not without problems, and does have competition, Walkley acknowledged.
"Our recent channel checks indicated iPhone sell-through share has modestly declined in certain developed markets, and we expect this could continue as Android competitors ramp new smartphones during the June and September quarters and consumers start to hold off iPhone purchases in anticipation of the iPhone 5," Walkley wrote. "However, we believe Apple's potential smartphone share losses during the June quarter will prove temporary, as we anticipate very strong demand for an LTE iPhone 5 during the December quarter."
The bottom line, according to Walkley, is that Apple "is well positioned for strong sales and earnings growth driven by new product introductions across its portfolio."


text:
(CNN) - MSNBC host Martin Bashir said in a statement Wednesday that he would resign from the network following comments he made about former Alaska governor and 2008 Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin.
Bashir apologized on-air last month after suggesting that Palin deserved graphic punishment for comparing U.S. foreign debt to slavery. Palin later canceled an appearance on NBC's "Today."
Following intense backlash for the incendiary comments, Bashir elected to temporarily take additional time off during the Thanksgiving holiday.
"Upon further reflection, and after meeting with the President of msnbc, I have tendered my resignation. It is my sincere hope that all of my colleagues, at this special network, will be allowed to focus on the issues that matter without the distraction of myself or my ill-judged comments," he said in the statement.
"I deeply regret what was said, will endeavor to work hard at making constructive contributions in the future and will always have a deep appreciation for our viewers – who are the smartest, most compassionate and discerning of all television audiences. I would also wish to express deepest gratitude to my immediate colleagues, and our contributors, all of whom have given so much of themselves to our broadcast."
The president of MSNBC, Phil Griffin, also issued a statement confirming that Bashir would step down and wishing him the best.
"Martin Bashir resigned today, effective immediately. I understand his decision and I thank him for three great years with msnbc. Martin is a good man and respected colleague – we wish him only the best."
Palin responded to Bashir's initial comments last month.
"Everybody in life takes shots," she said "Fox News Sunday." "I don't have to accept his words – his vile, evil comments. So they don't have to affect me. I move on and I charge forth."
Also last month, the network discontinued former host Alec Baldwin's show "Up Late" after he reportedly yelled anti-gay slurs at a photographer outside his home in New York. Baldwin later apologized for the angry rant in a post to MSNBC's website.
After his show was canceled, Baldwin called on the network to also force Bashir to leave, pointing to his controversial comments.
"Martin Bashir's on the air, and he made his comment on the air!" Baldwin told Gothamist last week.
Bashir's resignation was first reported by Mediaite.
CNN's Dana Davidsen contributed to this report.
Regrettably, Mr. Bashir made this comment. However, Mr. Bashir was/is good at his job. Sarah Palin, Limbaugh, Hannity, members of Congress have all made racist and derogatory comments against the President of the Free World...all without even a little chiding, let alone be asked to resign. MSNBC should regrettably not accept Mr. Bashir's resignation!
Hahahahaha, we need to start kicking out all of these Brits from our Media
they are nothing but propagandists for socialsm
Martin is so much better, so much more intelligent, then Sarah Palin can learn in her life time. A woman who speaks LIE, has no knowledge of the subjects she speaks on. Just a big mouth and brainless. But the Fox News and the Republicans wrap there arms around her. And we wonder why the Republican party is such a failure. Just look at Palin, she represents FAILURE. It is sad to see Martin leave but hopefully his voice will continue to tell the real truth.
Ya gotta love these Bashir groupies and their murderous hatred for Palin. She's this, she's that, she's a racist pig kill her kill her..... And they always add she's nobody and going nowhere...yet they spend so much time following her around. Just like Bashir did....bully boy. bully liberals. hate hate hate.
The joke of this is all the people commenting that he shouldn't have resigned simply because they also don't like Palin. Plenty of them also comment about how Fox says racist things about the president but they can't site any examples. Was Palin's comment racist? Maybe. But if it was, then Biden's "They want to put you all back in chains" was far more racist and no one in the media talked about defecating in his mouth. Civility needs to be for all, not just the people you agree with or like.
Liberals hate conservative women and minorities. Just read the comments. The vitriol unleashed upon Sarah Palin, Michelle Bachmann, Anne Coulter, Ben Carson, Herman Cain and many others shows that liberals are consumed by hate and bitterness. Liberals also hate this country. Do they talk about the enormous contributions that the United States has made to freedom and prosperity in the world? No, they would prefer to talk ad nauseum about slavery and American Indians. It is 2013, not 1813. Maybe liberals have not noticed.
Remember when Rush said hey Obama picked up another endorsement from Halfrican actress Halle Barry? As a halfrican american I am honored to have Miss Barry's support. Talk about racist and offensive. Remember gangsta government? That was offensive. Biden's comment was not racist at all. He was making a point. There is nothing offensive or derogatory about any race in that comment. How about Osama Obama, or he's not a chrstian, he's muslim. These things are fine but bashir makes some off hand comment about palin eating blank and he's fired. No need to put any in her mouth as that's all that comes out.
When you make your living talking about anything that some consider newsworthy, sooner or later you put your foot in your mouth so deeply that you choke on it. One down, too many to go.
Hate, hate, hate. That's what Martin Bashir preaches. He pretends he and his ilk are tolerant and forward thinking, but he's really consumed by hate for those who don't agree with him. Go away you little hate filled man.
Martin Bashir, outsmarted by Sarah Palin.
"Evil, vile"... That pretty much sums her up in Joe McGinniss' "The Rogue: Searching for the Real Sarah Palin," published just prior to her stepping away from the presidential race. Yeah, she took her shots, and definitely has delivered her share; it was clear few in Alaska had any reason to like her or her husband. That doesn't excuse Bashir's comments, but even her response to him shows her selfish, disgusting nature. Funny thing: I don't get her comparing foreign debt with slavery at all. Slavery isn't something you impose on yourself.
Bashir has paid the ultimate price for crossing Sarah Palin. Sarah Palin is going to be our next president and nobody would dare try to cross her.
Fannie P: Please name one racist or derogatory comment that Limbaugh, Palin or Sean Hannity have made about the president. Name one...

subset: commoncrawl


text:
UNITED STATES v. YOUNG(1985)
Respondent was charged with various federal offenses involving a scheme to defraud a refinery by submitting false certifications that oil purchased by the refinery from respondent's company was crude oil when in fact it was less valuable fuel oil. At the trial in District Court, defense counsel in his closing argument impugned the prosecutor's integrity and charged that the prosecutor did not believe in the Government's case. No objection to defense counsel's summation was made at the time, but in rebuttal arguments the prosecutor stated his opinion that respondent was guilty and urged the jury to "do its job"; defense counsel made no objection. Respondent was convicted on several counts, and on appeal alleged that he was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's response to defense counsel's argument. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that under case law of that Circuit, such remarks constituted misconduct and were plain error, and that appellate review was not precluded by defense counsel's failure to object at trial.
The prosecutor's remarks during the rebuttal argument, although error, did not constitute "plain error" that a reviewing court could properly act on under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), absent a timely objection by defense counsel; on the record, the challenged argument did not undermine the fairness of the trial. Pp. 6-20.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 20. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 35.
Michael W. McConnell argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Louis M. Fischer.
Burck Bailey argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to review the reversal of respondent's conviction because of prosecutorial comments responding to defense counsel's closing argument impugning the prosecution's integrity and belief in the Government's case. [470 U.S. 1, 3]
Respondent Billy G. Young, as vice president and general manager of the Compton Petroleum Corporation in Abilene, Texas, contracted in 1976 and 1977 to deliver monthly supplies of "sweet" crude oil to the Apco Oil Corporation refinery in Cyril, Oklahoma. Some 205,000 barrels of oil were delivered under the contract between January and September 1977, but more than half of the oil delivered to Apco, approximately 117,250 barrels, consisted of fuel oil, an already refined product less valuable than crude oil. Compton's invoices accompanying those deliveries falsely certified that all of the oil was crude. Apco relied on those false certifications and reported to the Federal Energy Administration, in compliance with Government regulations, 10 CFR 211.66, 211.67, and 212.131 (1976), the amount of crude oil it thought it was refining each month. The Federal Energy Administration in turn relied on Apco's reports to determine the national averages of tier categories of refined oil for purposes of equalizing the cost of crude oil under its entitlement program.
Respondent's scheme to deceive Apco by selling it cheaper fuel oil masquerading as "sweet" crude oil was relatively simple. Respondent arranged with an oil brokerage firm, owned by a longtime friend, to procure fuel oil from another source and sell it to Compton under the false certification that it was crude oil. Compton would then pay the brokerage firm 10 cents per barrel commission as a fee for the "recertification." Once in Compton's storage tanks, respondent had the fuel oil disguised as crude oil before delivering it to Apco by blending condensate, a high gravity liquid taken from the wellheads of natural gas wells, with the fuel oil. 1 In September 1977, after an Apco technician performed a distillation [470 U.S. 1, 4] test on one of Compton's deliveries, Apco discovered that it had not been receiving crude oil as required by the contract, but rather a mixture of fuel oil and condensate. This discovery prompted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to launch an investigation which resulted in this prosecution.
On December 1, 1980, respondent and Compton were charged with 11 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, three counts of willfully and knowingly making false statements to a Government agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, one count of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314, and with aiding and abetting in the commission of all 15 counts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2. A jury trial was held in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 2 In his own defense, respondent testified that he had knowingly purchased fuel oil and delivered it to Apco, but he claimed that he thought such fuel oil could legitimately be certified as crude oil. He also believed that if condensate were blended with fuel oil, the result would be the equivalent of crude oil. Because Apco had not complained about the deliveries before September 1977, respondent thought that Apco was satisfied with the quality of oil he was supplying.
At the close of the case, the prosecutor summarized the evidence against respondent. Defense counsel began his own summation by arguing that the case against respondent "has been presented unfairly by the prosecution," and that "[f]rom the beginning" to "this very moment the [prosecution's] statements have been made to poison your minds unfairly." Tr. 542. He intimated that the prosecution deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence, and proceeded to charge the prosecution with "reprehensible" conduct in purportedly attempting to cast a false light on respondent's activities. Defense counsel also pointed directly at the prosecutor's table and stated: "I submit to you that there's not a person in this [470 U.S. 1, 5] courtroom including those sitting at this table who think that Billy Young intended to defraud Apco." Id., at 543-544. Finally, defense counsel stated that respondent had been "the only one in this whole affair that has acted with honor and with integrity" and that "[t]hese complex [Department of Energy] regulations should not have any place in an effort to put someone away." Id., at 547.
The prosecutor did not object to defense counsel's summation, but in rebuttal argument he responded to defense counsel's claim that the Government did not believe in its own case:
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to each of the mail fraud and false statement counts. Respondent was acquitted of interstate transportation of stolen property. Respondent was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and was fined $39,000.
On appeal, respondent alleged that he was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks made during closing rebuttal argument. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting without opinion, reversed the conviction and remanded for retrial. 736 F.2d 565 (CA10 1983). The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct and were sufficiently egregious to constitute plain error. In short, respondent's failure to object at trial was held not to preclude appellate review. Rejecting the Government's contention that the statements were invited by the defense counsel's own closing argument, the Court of Appeals stated that "the rule is clear in this Circuit that improper conduct on the part of opposing counsel should be met with an objection to the court, not a similarly improper response." Id., at 570.
We granted certiorari, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984). We now reverse.
The principal issue to be resolved is not whether the prosecutor's response to defense counsel's misconduct was appropriate, but whether it was "plain error" that a reviewing court could act on absent a timely objection. Our task is to [470 U.S. 1, 7] decide whether the standard laid down in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936), and codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), was correctly applied by the Court of Appeals.
Nearly a half century ago this Court counselled prosecutors "to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction . . . ." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Court made clear, however, that the adversary system permits the prosecutor to "prosecute with earnestness and vigor." Ibid. In other words, "while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Ibid.
The line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a gray zone. Prosecutors sometimes breach their duty to refrain from overzealous conduct by commenting on the defendant's guilt and offering unsolicited personal views on the evidence. Accordingly, the legal profession, through its Codes of Professional Responsibility, 3 and the federal courts, 4 have tried to police [470 U.S. 1, 8] prosecutorial misconduct. In complementing these efforts, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Standards for Criminal Justice has promulgated useful guidelines, one of which states that
The kind of advocacy shown by this record has no place in the administration of justice and should neither be permitted nor rewarded; a trial judge should deal promptly with any breach by either counsel. These considerations plainly guided the ABA Standing Committee on Standards for Criminal Justice in laying down rules of trial conduct for counsel that quite properly hold all advocates to essentially the same standards. 7 Indeed, the accompanying commentary points out that "[i]t should be accepted that both prosecutor and defense counsel are subject to the same general limitations in [470 U.S. 1, 10] the scope of their argument," ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-7.8, p. 4.97, and provides the following guideline:
We emphasize that the trial judge has the responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of the proceeding; "the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct." Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). The judge "must meet situations as they arise and [be able] to cope with . . . the contingencies inherent in the adversary process." Geders v. United States, supra, at 86. Of course, "hard blows" cannot be avoided in criminal trials; both the prosecutor and defense counsel must be kept within appropriate [470 U.S. 1, 11] bounds. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
The situation brought before the Court of Appeals was but one example of an all too common occurrence in criminal trials - the defense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action. Clearly two improper arguments - two apparent wrongs - do not make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. To help resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is sometimes called the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule, which the Court treated in Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
The petitioners in Lawn sought to have the Court overturn their criminal convictions for income tax evasion on a number of grounds, one of which was that the prosecutor's closing argument deprived them of a fair trial. In his closing argument at trial, defense counsel in Lawn had attacked the Government for "persecuting" the defendants. He told the jury that the prosecution was instituted in bad faith at the behest of federal revenue agents and asserted that the Government's key witnesses were perjurers. The prosecutor in response vouched for the credibility of the challenged witnesses, telling the jury that the Government thought those witnesses testified truthfully. In concluding that the prosecutor's remarks, when viewed within the context of the entire trial, did not deprive petitioners of a fair trial, the Court pointed out that defense counsel's "comments clearly invited the reply." Id., at 359-360, n. 15.
This Court's holding in Lawn was no more than an application of settled law. Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. [470 U.S. 1, 12] Instead, as Lawn teaches, the remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's response would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. In this context, defense counsel's conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor's response, is relevant. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940); Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361, 364 (1891). Indeed most Courts of Appeals, applying these holdings, have refused to reverse convictions where prosecutors have responded reasonably in closing argument to defense counsel's attacks, thus rendering it unlikely that the jury was led astray. 9
In retrospect, perhaps the idea of "invited response" has evolved in a way not contemplated. Lawn and the earlier cases cited above should not be read as suggesting judicial approval or - encouragement - of response-in-kind that inevitably exacerbates the tensions inherent in the adversary process. As Lawn itself indicates, the issue is not the prosecutor's license to make otherwise improper arguments, but whether the prosecutor's "invited response," taken in context, unfairly prejudiced the defendant.
In order to make an appropriate assessment, the reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were "invited," and did no [470 U.S. 1, 13] more than respond substantially in order to "right the scale," such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction. 10
Courts have not intended by any means to encourage the practice of zealous counsel's going "out of bounds" in the manner of defense counsel here, or to encourage prosecutors to respond to the "invitation." Reviewing courts ought not to be put in the position of weighing which of two inappropriate arguments was the lesser. "Invited responses" can be effectively discouraged by prompt action from the bench in the form of corrective instructions to the jury and, when necessary, an admonition to the errant advocate.
Plainly, the better remedy in this case, at least with the accurate vision of hindsight, would have been for the District Judge to deal with the improper argument of the defense counsel promptly and thus blunt the need for the prosecutor to respond. Arguably defense counsel's misconduct could have warranted the judge to interrupt the argument and admonish him, see Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943), thereby rendering the prosecutor's response unnecessary. Similarly, the prosecutor at the close of defense summation should have objected to the defense counsel's improper statements with a request that the court give a timely warning and curative instruction to the jury. Defense counsel, even though obviously vulnerable, could well have done likewise if he thought that the prosecutor's remarks were harmful to his client. Here neither counsel made a timely objection to preserve the issue for review. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644 (1974). However, interruptions of arguments, either by an opposing counsel or the presiding judge, are matters to be approached cautiously. At the very least, a bench conference might have been convened [470 U.S. 1, 14] out of the hearing of the jury once defense counsel closed, and an appropriate instruction given.
Here the Court of Appeals was not unaware of our holdings and those of other Circuits, but seemingly did not undertake to weigh the prosecutor's comments in context. The court acknowledged defense counsel's obvious misconduct, but it does not appear that this was given appropriate weight in evaluating the situation.
We share the Court of Appeals' desire to minimize "invited responses"; and we agree that the prosecutor's response constituted error. In addition to departing from the Tenth Circuit's "rule" prohibiting such remarks, 11 the prosecutor's comments crossed the line of permissible conduct established by the ethical rules of the legal profession, as did defense counsel's argument, see supra, at 6-10, and went beyond what was necessary to "right the scale" in the wake of defense counsel's misconduct. Indeed the prosecutor's first error was in failing to ask the District Judge to deal with defense counsel's misconduct.
As we suggested earlier, the dispositive issue under the holdings of this Court is not whether the prosecutor's remarks amounted to error, but whether they rose to the level of "plain error" when he responded to defense counsel. In this setting and on this record the prosecutor's response - although error - was not "plain error" warranting the court to overlook the absence of any objection by the defense. [470 U.S. 1, 15]
The plain-error doctrine of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) 12 tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement. The Rule authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only "particularly egregious errors," United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982), those errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S., at 160 . In other words, the plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S., at 163 , n. 14. Any unwarranted extension of this exacting definition of plain error would skew the Rule's "careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed." Id., at 163 (footnote [470 U.S. 1, 16] omitted). Reviewing courts are not to use the plain-error doctrine to consider trial court errors not meriting appellate review absent timely objection 13 - a practice which we have criticized as "extravagant protection." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 , n. 12 (1977); Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 190 (1963).
Especially when addressing plain error, a reviewing court cannot properly evaluate a case except by viewing such a claim against the entire record. We have been reminded:
When reviewed with these principles in mind, the prosecutor's remarks cannot be said to rise to the level of plain error. Viewed in context, the prosecutor's statements, although inappropriate and amounting to error, were not such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Frady, supra, at 163; United States v. Atkinson, supra, at 160. 14 [470 U.S. 1, 17]
The prosecutor responded with his "personal impressio[n]," Tr. 549, that respondent intended to commit a fraud to answer defense counsel's accusation that no member of the prosecution team believed that respondent intended to defraud Apco. Indeed, the prosecutor made a point to preface his statement by summarizing defense counsel's acerbic charge and candidly told the jury that he was giving his "personal impressions" because defense counsel had asked for them.
Notwithstanding the defense counsel's breach of ethical standards, the prosecutor's statement of his belief that the evidence showed Apco had been defrauded should not have been made; it was an improper expression of personal opinion and was not necessary to answer defense counsel's improper assertion that no one on the prosecution team believed respondent intended to defraud Apco. Nevertheless, we conclude that any potential harm from this remark was mitigated by the jury's understanding that the prosecutor was countering defense counsel's repeated attacks on the [470 U.S. 1, 18] prosecution's integrity and defense counsel's argument that the evidence established no such crime.
Finally, the prosecutor's comments that respondent had not acted with "honor and integrity," and his calling attention to the jury's responsibility to follow the court's instructions were in response to defense counsel's rhetoric that respondent alone was the sole honorable actor in "this whole affair," id., at 547, and that the jury should not find respondent guilty simply because he could not understand applicable, but complex, federal regulations. The prosecutor was also in error to try to exhort the jury to "do its job"; that kind of pressure, whether by the prosecutor or defense counsel, has no place in the administration of criminal justice, see, e. g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c) and 4-7.8(c). Given the context of the prosecutor's remarks and defense counsel's broadside attack, however, we conclude that the jury was not influenced to stray from its responsibility to be fair and unbiased. 15
The concerns underlying our reactions against improper prosecutorial arguments to the jury are implicated here, but not to the extent that we conclude that the jury's deliberations were compromised. The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its [470 U.S. 1, 19] own view of the evidence. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88 -89.
The prosecutor's statement of his belief that respondent intended to commit a fraud contained no suggestion that he was relying on information outside the evidence presented at trial. He supported his comment by referring to respondent's own testimony that Compton received 85 cents a barrel for its deliveries to Apco and that respondent personally received a bonus of one percent of Compton's net profits, see Tr. 501-503; he then summarized portions of the evidence adduced at trial before suggesting to the jury that the record established the fraud charged. Although it was improper for the prosecutor to express his personal opinion about respondent's guilt, see Berger v. United States, supra, at 88; ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b), when viewed in context, the prosecutor's remarks cannot be read as implying that the prosecutor had access to evidence outside the record. The jury surely understood the comment for what it was - a defense of his decision and his integrity - in bringing criminal charges on the basis of the very evidence the jury had heard during the trial.
Finally, the overwhelming evidence of respondent's intent to defraud Apco and submit false oil certifications to the Government eliminates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor's remarks unfairly prejudiced the jury's deliberations or exploited the Government's prestige in the eyes of the jury. Not a single witness supported respondent's asserted defense that fuel oil mixed with condensate could be certified and sold as crude oil, and several witnesses flatly rejected such a proposition, see Tr. 352-353, 393-395. Indeed, respondent's crude oil trader testified that he had never heard of a firm legally blending fuel oil with condensate and stating that the mixture was crude oil. See id., at 359. It was undisputed that respondent failed to advise Apco of what he was actually supplying and that the oil supplied did not meet the contract requirements. See id., at 358-359. [470 U.S. 1, 20]
Moreover, the evidence established beyond any doubt whatever that respondent deliberately concealed his scheme to defraud Apco. Apart from enlisting the aid of an oil brokerage firm to "recertify" the fuel oil as crude oil, respondent on three separate occasions, when questioned by two Apco officials and by FBI agents, falsely denied that he was supplying fuel oil instead of crude oil, see id., at 293-294, 357-358, 379, 496, 516. Under these circumstances, the substantial and virtually uncontradicted evidence of respondent's willful violation provides an additional indication that the prosecutor's remarks, when reviewed in context, cannot be said to undermine the fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.
On this record, we hold that the argument of the prosecutor, although error, did not constitute plain error warranting the Court of Appeals to overlook the failure of the defense counsel to preserve the point by timely objection; nor are we persuaded that the challenged argument seriously affected the fairness of the trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, ordering a new trial based on the prosecutor's argument, is reversed.
[ Footnote 2 ] Prior to trial, the District Court accepted Compton's plea of nolo contendere and imposed a fine.
[ Footnote 3 ] See, e. g., ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C) (1980), which provides in pertinent part:
[ Footnote 4 ] See, e. g., United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1296 (CA3 1984); United States v. Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 846 (CA1 1983); United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1051 (CA4 1983); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 58-61 (CA2 1983); United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 655-656 (CA9 1982); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 665-666 (CA5 1979).
[ Footnote 5 ] The remaining text of ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 (2d ed. 1980) provides:
[ Footnote 6 ] Of course, when defense counsel employs tactics which would be reversible error if used by a prosecutor, the result may be an unreviewable acquittal. The prosecutor's conduct and utterances, however, are always reviewable on appeal, for he is "both an administrator of justice and an advocate." ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3-1.1(b) (2d ed. 1980); cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
[ Footnote 7 ] ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 4-7.8 provides:
[ Footnote 8 ] Learned Hand observed: "It is impossible to expect that a criminal trial shall be conducted without some showing of feeling; the stakes are high, and the participants are inevitably charged with emotion." United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 529-530 (CA2 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936).
[ Footnote 9 ] See, e. g., United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d, at 1296; United States v. Maccini, 721 F.2d, at 846; United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d, at 1052; United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (CA11 1983); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 688-689 (CA7 1982); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 862 (CA9 1981); United States v. Schwartz, 655 F.2d 140, 142 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1060-1061 (CA2 1979); United States v. Kim, 193 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 381-383, 595 F.2d 755, 767-768 (1979).
[ Footnote 10 ] Assuming the prosecutor's remarks exceeded permissible bounds and defense counsel raised a timely objection, a reviewing court could reverse an otherwise proper conviction only after concluding that the error was not harmless. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
[ Footnote 11 ] Until this decision, the Tenth Circuit's "rule" appeared largely as dicta in earlier opinions. See, e. g., United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1343 (CA10 1979); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 503 (CA10 1975); United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (CA10 1973); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1163 (CA10 1973). But see United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 143 (CA10 1974) (court recites rule in context of rejecting Government's argument that the prosecutor's concededly improper remarks were harmless error in light of defense counsel's conduct).
[ Footnote 12 ] Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides:
The Committee's use of the disjunctive in the phrasing of the Rule is misleading, for as one commentator has noted, this "may simply be a means of distinguishing for definitional purposes between `errors' (e. g., exclusion of evidence) and `defects' (e. g., defective pleading)," and in either case the Rule applies only to errors affecting substantial rights. 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 52.022., p. 52-4, and n. 7 (2d ed. 1984).
[ Footnote 13 ] In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), for example, the Court held that "counsel for the defendant cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no objections, and after a verdict has been returned seize for the first time on the point that [the prosecutor's] comments to the jury were improper and prejudicial." Id., at 238-239.
[ Footnote 14 ] The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's improper remarks constituted "plain error" solely because the prosecutor ignored that court's [470 U.S. 1, 17] rule prohibiting such responses. A per se approach to plain-error review is flawed. An error, of course, must be more than obvious or readily apparent in order to trigger appellate review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Following decisions such as United States v. Frady, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, and United States v. Atkinson, federal courts have consistently interpreted the plain-error doctrine as requiring an appellate court to find that the claimed error not only seriously affected "substantial rights," but that it had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Only then would the court be able to conclude that the error undermined the fairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice. To do otherwise could well lead to having appellate courts indulge in the pointless exercise of reviewing "harmless plain errors" - a practice that is contrary to the draftsmen's intention behind Rule 52(b), see n. 12, supra, and one that courts have studiously avoided and commentators have properly criticized, see, e. g., 8B J. Moore, supra, 52.022., at 52-3 to 52-4; 3A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 856, p. 344 (2d ed. 1982). It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit seems to have retreated from its position that improper prosecutorial remarks are per se "plain error." Mason v. United States, 719 F.2d 1485, 1489-1490 (1983).
[ Footnote 15 ] The jury acquitted respondent of the most serious charge he faced, interstate transportation of stolen property. This reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor's remarks did not undermine the jury's ability to view the evidence independently and fairly.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In his rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor from the Criminal Fraud Section of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., (1) repeatedly stated his personal opinion that the respondent Billy G. Young was guilty of fraud, (2) used his prosecutorial "experience in these matters" in discussing the consequences of Young's conduct, [470 U.S. 1, 21] and (3) admonished the jurors that, if they voted to acquit, they would not be "doing your job as jurors." App. 8-11. The Government would justify the prosecutor's remarks as "invited" by the defense counsel's own improper arguments. In reversing Young's conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected this justification and emphasized that "`[w]e can give no comfort to the proposition that unprofessional conduct upon the part of defense counsel opens the door to similar conduct by government counsel.'" 736 F.2d 565, 570 (1983), quoting United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 143 (CA10 1974). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that "improper conduct on the part of opposing counsel should be met with an objection to the court, not a similarly improper response." 736 F.2d, at 570.
This surely is a sensible conclusion and falls well within the authority of the courts of appeals to define reasonable rules of courtroom conduct. Because Young's counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misconduct, however, a reversal was proper only if the misconduct constituted plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) - that is, if it either (1) had a prejudicial impact on the verdict when viewed in the context of the trial as a whole, or (2) "seriously affect[ed] the . . . integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 , n. 11 (1982); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940). The Court of Appeals noted the contours of this inquiry, and its opinion could perhaps be read as implicitly concluding that the prosecutor's misconduct substantially prejudiced the outcome of the trial or seriously affected the integrity of the proceedings. The court did not address the application of the plain-error standard to the facts of this case, however, but instead cryptically concluded that the challenged remarks "speak for themselves" and constituted "plain error." 736 F.2d, at 570. Accordingly, I would [470 U.S. 1, 22] remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a proper plain-error inquiry. 1
This analysis leads me to concur in much of the Court's opinion. Specifically, I agree fully with the Court's conclusion that federal prosecutors do not have a "right" of reply to defense improprieties, but must instead object to the trial judge and request curative action. Moreover, I join with the Court in concluding that federal courts may set reasonable rules of rhetorical conduct and that prosecutorial violations of such rules constitute error. And I concur that the judgment below cannot stand. However, I must respectfully but completely disagree with two other aspects of the Court's resolution of this case. First, the Court appears to adopt an "invited error" analysis, under which it only grudgingly acknowledges that the prosecutor acted improperly in this case. This approach leads the Court to minimize the gravity of the prosecutor's gross misconduct. Second, instead of remanding this case to the Court of Appeals, the Court reaches out to conduct the plain-error inquiry on its own. Even if the Court's conclusion is correct - and I have substantial [470 U.S. 1, 23] misgivings about the thoroughness of the Court's analysis - I believe this unexplained departure from our usual practice misconceives the Court's institutional role and constitutes poor judicial administration.
This Court only infrequently gives plenary consideration to cases involving standards of prosecutorial conduct. When we do, it is important that we attempt to set forth with clarity the standards by which federal prosecutors must guide their trial conduct.
The Court granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve, inter alia, the question "[w]hether a prosecutor may rebut [improper] closing defense argument . . . by responsive argument that would be inappropriate in the absence of such provocation." Pet. for Cert. (I). The Government contends that we should recognize "a prosecutor's right to respond" to improper defense arguments and that, in light of this "right," we should hold that such responses "are not improper" even if standing alone they would be impermissible. Brief for United States 15-16.
Today the Court rejects this asserted "right" of reply, emphasizing instead that prosecutors have no "license to make otherwise improper arguments" in response to defense rhetoric, ante, at 12, and holding that the prosecutor's responses in this case "constituted error," ante, at 14. See also ante, at 12, (rejecting "judicial approval - or encouragement - of response-in-kind"), 14, 16-20. As the Court observes, "[c]learly two improper arguments - two apparent wrongs - do not make for a right result." Ante, at 11. Instead, the Court instructs, the proper recourse is an objection to the trial judge and "prompt action from the bench in the form of corrective instructions to the jury, and when [470 U.S. 1, 24] necessary, an admonition to the errant advocate." Ante, at 13. 2
The Court today also reaffirms the authority of lower courts to define and enforce reasonable rules of prosecutorial conduct. 3 As the Court notes, the prosecutor in this case departed from Tenth Circuit precedents requiring prosecutors to object to defense misconduct rather than respond in kind; this action in and of itself "constituted error." Ante, at 14. [470 U.S. 1, 25]
I fully agree with these conclusions. The Court goes on to suggest, however, that courts should apply an "invited error" analysis in determining the consequences of prosecutorial violations of these standards. Under this analysis, courts not only should determine the possible effect of the misconduct "on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly," but also should consider (1) "[d]efense counsel's conduct," and (2) whether the prosecutor "responded reasonably" under the circumstances. Ante, at 12. The conclusion is that prosecutorial misconduct, if "invited" by defense misconduct, will be excused if it "did no more than respond substantially in order to `right the scale.'" Ante, at 12-13. See also ante, at 14.
I believe the Court's "invited error" analysis is critically flawed: it overlooks the ethical responsibilities of federal prosecutors and threatens to undercut the prohibition of prosecutorial misconduct in the first place. In addition, the Court's analysis is misapplied to the facts of this case.
To begin with, while the Court correctly observes that both sides are subject to ethical rules of rhetorical conduct, it fails completely to acknowledge that we have long emphasized that a representative of the United States Government is held to a higher standard of behavior:
Moreover, the Court's suggestion that lower courts should evaluate prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether it was "reasonabl[e]" and "necessary to `right the scale,'" ante, at 12, 14, is palpably inconsistent with the Court's conclusion that such misconduct "constitute[s] error." Ante, at 14; see also ante, at 11, 14, 16-20. As the Court observes, prosecutorial rhetoric of the sort in this case has "no place in the administration of justice and should neither be permitted nor rewarded." Ante, at 9. Such errors in appropriate cases might be determined to be harmless, but it is a contradiction in terms to suggest they might be "reasonabl[e]" or "necessary to `right the scale.'" Ante, at 12, 14.
There was certainly nothing "reasonabl[e]" in this case about the prosecutor's responses to the concededly improper defense arguments. The defense counsel's most serious assertion was that the prosecutor did not believe Young had [470 U.S. 1, 27] intended to defraud Apco. 5 The prosecutor's initial statement that he personally believed that Young had indeed intended to defraud Apco, while itself error, see ante, at 16-18, might be characterized as falling within the bounds of restrained reply. 6 But the prosecutor was not content to leave matters there. First, he repeatedly emphasized his personal opinion that Young was guilty of fraud. 7 Second, he made predictions about the continuing effects of Young's conduct based on his prosecutorial "experience in these matters." 8 Third, he warned the jurors that they would not be "doing your job as jurors" if they failed to convict Young. 9 [470 U.S. 1, 28]
These arguments, which separately and cumulatively so clearly violated the disciplinary rules of our profession, 10 deserve stern and unqualified judicial condemnation. Yet the Court reserves the force of its ire for criticism of the defense counsel's behavior: the Court castigates the defense counsel's "attacks," "opening salvo," "going `out of bounds,'" "misconduct," "obviously vulnerable" position, "obvious misconduct," "accusation[s]," "acerbic charge[s]," "breach of ethical standards," "improper assertion[s]," "repeated attacks," and "broadside attack[s]." Ante, at 12, 13, 14, 17, 18. In comparison, the Court appears only reluctantly to concede that "we agree that the prosecutor's response constituted error" because his remarks were "inappropriate," "should not have been made," and were "not necessary." Ante, at 14, 16, 17. This disparity of tone illustrates one of the major abuses of the "invited error" doctrine, an abuse often noted by the commentators. 11 Rather than apply the doctrine as a [470 U.S. 1, 29] limited corrective, courts frequently employ it as a rule of unclean hands that altogether prevents a defendant from successfully challenging prosecutorial improprieties. Such use of the doctrine results, as it has today, in minimizing the gravity of virtually unchecked prosecutorial appeals going far beyond a "fair" response to the defense counsel's arguments. 12
In further support of its analysis, the Court contends that while the underlying "concerns" of the legal and ethical strictures against improper prosecutorial arguments "are implicated here," they are not implicated in a serious way. Ante, at 18. The Court maintains, for example, that the prosecutor's arguments "contained no suggestion that he was relying on information outside the evidence presented at trial." Ante, at 19. I doubt very much, however, that the prosecutor ever testified or presented evidence about "my experience in these matters." App. 10. Moreover, the proscription against prosecutorial assertions of personal belief is obviously not concerned solely with references to nonrecord evidence. As the Court itself recognizes, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Ante, at 18. Thus "improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88 . 13 The [470 U.S. 1, 30] Court today acknowledges these risks, but then decrees that the prosecutor's assertions in this case cannot be construed as having "exploited the Government's prestige in the eyes of the jury." Ante, at 19. This cavalier assertion is wholly at odds with a longstanding presumption to the contrary, see Berger v. United States, supra, and the Court should at least provide a more reasoned basis for this striking departure.
Similarly, the prosecutor's admonition that the jurors would not be "doing your job as jurors" if they voted to acquit was neither invited nor excusable, as the Court concedes. Ante, at 18. Many courts historically have viewed such warnings about not "doing your job" as among the most egregious forms of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e. g., Annot., 85 A. L. R. 2d 1132 (1962 and Supp. 1979). How possibly, then, can the Court characterize remarks such as these as a "defense" by the prosecutor "of his decision and his integrity in bringing criminal charges"? Ante, at 19.
Although Young's counsel did not object to the prosecutor's arguments, those arguments nevertheless constitute plain error that require reversal of Young's conviction if they may be said either (1) to have created an unacceptable danger of prejudicial influence on the jury's verdict, or (2) to have "seriously affect[ed] the . . . integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S., at 160 . The Tenth Circuit did not address the application of these standards to the facts of this case, see n. 1, supra, reversing instead simply on its conclusory finding that the prosecutor committed "plain error."
When we detect legal error in a lower court's application of the plain-error or harmless-error rules, as here, the proper [470 U.S. 1, 31] course is to set forth the appropriate standards and then remand for further proceedings. We have followed this procedure in countless cases. 14 But the Court today reaches out without explanation and inappropriately decides the issue itself. Its analysis is flawed in several respects, and these flaws demonstrate the wisdom of leaving such inquiries in the first instance to the lower courts.
First, the Court's conclusion that the prosecutor's arguments could not have prejudiced Young rests in large part on its "invited error" analysis. The gravamen of its reasoning apparently is that, since the defense misconduct supposedly canceled out much of the prosecutor's excesses, the prosecutor's remarks were tied to the record evidence, and the jurors "surely understood" the prosecutor's rhetoric "for what it was," the prosecutor's unethical behavior could not likely have had a prejudicial impact on the jurors' deliberations. Ante, at 19. I have already demonstrated the fallacy of these underlying premises.
Second, the plain-error inquiry necessarily requires a careful review of the entire record to determine the question of possible prejudice. The Court in two brief paragraphs summarizes its review of the record and proclaims that the evidence of Young's guilt was "overwhelming" and supported the conviction "beyond any doubt whatever." Ante, at 19, 20. The Court invokes a curious analysis in support of this pronouncement: the fact that the jury acquitted Young on [470 U.S. 1, 32] "the most serious charge he faced . . . reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor's remarks did not undermine the jury's ability to view the evidence independently and fairly." Ante, at 18, n. 15. If the evidence against Young was so "overwhelming," it is difficult to perceive why the jury would have returned a partial acquittal. The jury's decision can just as naturally be interpreted to suggest that the evidence was close and the verdict a compromise, thus supporting a belief that the prosecutor's assertion of personal knowledge and his exhortation to "do your job" did in fact have a prejudicial impact. Moreover, the Court minimizes the fact that mail fraud and the making of false statements are specific-intent crimes and that good faith therefore stands as a complete defense. See, e. g., United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (CA7 1982) (mail fraud); United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-1288 (CA5 1976) (false statements). The question of Young's specific intent to defraud necessarily turned on witness credibility, and in this context the prosecutor's misconduct may well have had a prejudicial impact on the jurors' deliberations. Although the Court is surely correct in emphasizing the impropriety of the crude oil condensate blending scheme that Young participated in, there was significant evidence that, if believed, might well have suggested Young's innocent though ignorant motives. 15 [470 U.S. 1, 33]
Third, the Court altogether fails to consider whether the prosecutor's gross misconduct and flouting of the professional cannons "seriously affect[ed] the . . . integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S., at 160 ; see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S., at 162 , n. 11; Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926). From the citations in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see 736 F.2d, at 570, it would appear that prosecutorial improprieties of the sort committed in this case may present a recurring problem. This Court is in no position at this time to pass judgment on the gravity of the problem and the panel's apparent concern that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case compromised the integrity and public reputation of the Circuit's administration of justice. Clearly a remand to address the question is necessary. 16
These deficiencies in the Court's plain-error analysis reinforce the conviction that it was poor judicial administration [470 U.S. 1, 34] for the Court to embark on its inquiry in the first place. Our traditional practice has been to leave fact-bound questions of possible prejudicial error to the lower courts on remand. See supra, at 30-31, and n. 14. Two important considerations undergird this practice. First, the function of this Court is not primarily to correct factual errors in lower court decisions, but instead to resolve important questions of federal law and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts. Our institutional role properly is focused on ensuring clarity and uniformity of legal doctrine, and not on the case-specific process of reviewing the application of law to the particularized facts of individual disputes - one of the functions performed quite capably by the federal courts of appeals. This allocation of responsibilities can result in subtle but vitally important differences in institutional outlook, differences that should not be shortcut simply because a majority decides the evidence of a particular defendant's guilt is "overwhelming" and "established beyond any doubt whatever." Ante, at 19, 20.
Second, if the Court is to be evenhanded in its willingness to review lower courts' plain-error and harmless-error determinations, we will be required to undertake such analyses with ever-increasing frequency. Yet this Court simply is not institutionally capable of conducting the sort of detailed record analyses required in properly administering the plain-error and harmless-error doctrines.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Tenth Circuit's statement that the prosecutor's remarks were "sufficiently egregious as to constitute plain error" could be read as concluding that the evidence of Young's guilt was not overwhelming. 736 F.2d, at 570. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit's pointed discussion about the frequency with which "[t]he issue has come before this Court . . . in recent years" could be construed as suggesting that the Government's recurrent violations have seriously threatened the integrity of courtroom proceedings in that Circuit. Ibid. Although these are possible readings of the opinion below, the societal costs of reversing a conviction and requiring a retrial justify the requirement that an appellate court discuss the basis of its reasoning that prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious as to constitute plain error. Cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 528 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (courts should exercise supervisory powers to reverse convictions "only after careful consideration, and balancing, of all the relevant interests"). This Court's primary function is to ensure that such considered evaluation has been conducted by the court below. See infra, at 30-31, 33-35.
[ Footnote 2 ] In its 39-page brief, the Government devotes just one footnote in its effort to demonstrate the unreasonableness of requiring prosecutors to object to defense misconduct rather than according them a "right" of reply. See Brief for United States 23, n. 18: "We do not believe that the alternative proposed by the court of appeals (Pet. App. 11a) - objecting to an improper defense argument and requesting an instruction to the jury to disregard that argument - is sufficient to dispel the unfairness engendered by an argument like respondent's here. Such an instruction would not answer the factual assertion of prosecutorial hypocrisy that was made here." As the Court notes today, however, an objection followed by admonition or instruction is typically presumed to be sufficient to dispel prejudice. Ante, at 13. This presumption surely applies to the United States Government as well as to the accused.
[ Footnote 3 ] We have long recognized that the courts of appeals may prescribe rules of conduct and procedure to be followed by district courts within their respective jurisdictions. In Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973), for example, the Court observed that within the federal system an "appellate court will, of course, require the trial court to conform to constitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution." And in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648 , n. 23 (1974), the Court emphasized that "appellate courts, by proper exercise of their supervisory authority," should "discourage" prosecutorial misconduct. See also Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam) (courts of appeals have "broad powers of supervision" over federal proceedings); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence").
[ Footnote 4 ] Excusing a federal prosecutor's courtroom misconduct merely on the ground that the prosecutor was responding to his adversary suggests, it seems to me, that a trial is something like a schoolyard brawl between two children. Such an excuse smacks of the "sporting theory of justice," a theory long recognized as "only a survival of the days when a lawsuit was a fight between two clans." Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A. B. A. Rep. 395, 404-406 (1906). If unethical arguments by the prosecutor in response to defense remarks constitute error, as the Court concedes, it is unclear why the error should be excused because the prosecutor wanted to "right the scale."
[ Footnote 5 ] "The indictment says that Billy Young is charged with intending to devise a scheme to defraud Apco and to obtain money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses. And I submit to you that there's not a person in this courtroom including those sitting at this table who think that Billy Young intended to defraud Apco." App. 5. The defense counsel also argued that the Government had tried the case "unfairly," and that Young was "the only one in this whole affair that has acted with honor and with integrity." Id., at 4-7.
[ Footnote 6 ] "I think he said that not anyone sitting at this table thinks that Mr. Young intended to defraud Apco. Well, I was sitting there and I think he was." Id., at 8.
[ Footnote 7 ] I think he got 85 cents a barrel for every one of those 117,250.91 barrels he hauled and every bit of the money they made on that he got one percent of. So, I think he did. If we are allowed to give our personal impressions since it was asked of me. . . . I don't know what you call that, I call it fraud. You can look at the evidence and you can remember the testimony, you remember what they said and what he admitted they said. I think it's a fraud. . . . That's the whole point of the prosecution, it was a fraud." Id., at 8-9.
[ Footnote 8 ] "He said - Mr. Bailey said Apco didn't lose, says doesn't think anyone will come back. Well, what he thinks they won't come back but my experience in these matters is when the government does something like this they're going to come back. All that money that Apco got for this stripper and new oil, Al Green at the Apco trust he's going to get some kind of invoices. That's what I think." Id., at 10.
[ Footnote 9 ] "I don't know whether you call it honor and integrity, I don't call it that, Mr. Bailey does. If you feel you should acquit him for that it's your pleasure. I don't think you're doing your job as jurors in finding facts as [470 U.S. 1, 28] opposed to the law that this Judge is going to instruct you, you think that's honor and integrity then stand up here in Oklahoma courtroom and say that's honor and integrity; I don't believe it." Id., at 10-11.
[ Footnote 10 ] See, e. g., ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C) (1980), stating in relevant part:
[ Footnote 11 ] See, e. g., J. Stein, Closing Argument - The Art and the Law 88 (1982); Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, [470 U.S. 1, 29] 50 Texas L. Rev. 629, 657-658 (1972); Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L. Rev. 505, 531-533 (1974).
[ Footnote 12 ] Under this sort of application of the invited-response rule, "[t]he prosecutor may deduce . . . that he would do well to watch carefully for certain mistakes that the defense counsel may make, and, instead of objecting if that course is open to him, attempt to take advantage of that mistake . . . ." Comment, Limitations Upon the Prosecutor's Summation to the Jury, 42 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 73, 81 (1951).
[ Footnote 13 ] See also United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (CA6 1979) ("Implicit in [a prosecutor's] assertion of personal belief that a defendant is [470 U.S. 1, 30] guilty, is an implied statement that the prosecutor, by virtue of his experience, knowledge and intellect, has concluded that the jury must convict. The devastating impact of such `testimony' should be apparent").
[ Footnote 14 ] See, e. g., Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 -790 (1979) (per curiam); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977); Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 23 (1976) (per curiam); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 444 (1969); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 274 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967); Ferguson v. United States, 375 U.S. 962 (1964) (order). See also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 102 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (question of an error's possible prejudice is "[n]ormally . . . a question more appropriately left to the courts below," in part because "[t]here may be facts and circumstances not apparent from the record before us").
[ Footnote 15 ] Young's defense was that he believed that the blending of crude oil condensate with Number 4 fuel oil, an "unfinished" oil under Government regulations, would yield a blend that could still properly be certified as "crude" under then-extant regulations. Young maintained that Kenneth Ross, then an officer at Prime Resources Corporation, had convinced him that such certification was permissible. Tr. 78, 514. Ross denied that he had so persuaded Young, and the dispute turned on the jurors' credibility determinations. There was substantial testimony from Government witnesses that the blending of crude oil condensate with other oil was a common industry practice, albeit not the blending of condensate with fuel oil. Id., at 55, 59, 69, 361, 392. There was also testimony that the highest-quality crude condensate, when mixed with Number 4 fuel oil, yielded a blend superior to some lower-quality crudes. Id., at 55-56, 384, 427. Moreover, Apco received this blend for seven months, tested it, and [470 U.S. 1, 33] reported no untoward results; it was only when another company attempted to pass off unadulterated low-quality fuel oil that Apco became concerned. Id., at 364-366, 412. Young, who had an eighth-grade education, maintained that he had thought Government regulations permitted his manner of certification; Government witnesses agreed that it was difficult to "make a lick of sense" out of the complex standards. Id., at 367. Finally, Government witnesses themselves testified that they did not believe that Young had intended to defraud Apco, that many others had been aware of the scheme, and that others had taken advantage of Young. Id., at 57-58, 78-80.
[ Footnote 16 ] The Court suggests that plain error may be found only where the error "had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations." Ante, at 17, n. 14. Plain error also may be grounded, however, on those errors that "seriously affect the . . . integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). I believe that certain extreme circumstances, such as egregious misbehavior or a pattern and practice of intentional prosecutorial misconduct that has not been deterred through other remedies, may well so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to support reversal under the plain-error doctrine. Cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S., at 527 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (supervisory powers).
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963), the Court recognized that even in the absence of an objection, trial error may require reversal of a criminal conviction on either of two theories: (1) that it reflected prosecutorial misconduct, or (2) that it was obviously prejudicial to the accused. Id., at 186-187. In that case, after determining that the challenged error did not satisfy either standard, id., at 188-189, the Court concluded that it saw "no reason to require such extravagant protection against errors which were not obviously prejudicial and which the petitioner himself appeared to disregard." Id., at 190. 1 It therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in that case. [470 U.S. 1, 36]
In this case the Court has unanimously concluded that the prosecutor's response to defense counsel's closing argument constituted error. 2 It has thus decided against the Government the principal question that its petition for a writ of certiorari presented. 3 The Court has also unanimously concluded that "the prosecutor's comments crossed the lines of permissible conduct established by the ethical rules of the legal profession." Ante, at 14; see also ante, at 25-26 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, at least one of the elements that was absent in Namet is present here.
With respect to the second element - prejudice - there is disagreement and, I submit, some confusion within the Court. The majority opinion carefully avoids denying that the prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial to the accused. Instead, it concludes that the error did not "unfairly" prejudice the jury, ante, at 19, partly because the error was invited by defense counsel's misconduct and partly because the Court is convinced that respondent is guilty. 4 JUSTICE BRENNAN, on the other hand, correctly explains why this Court should permit the Court of Appeals to decide whether [470 U.S. 1, 37] the error was "plain" or "harmless." He therefore would send the case back to that court to perform that task. 5
In my opinion, it is perfectly clear that the Court of Appeals has already made that determination. I do not understand how anyone could dispute the proposition that the prosecutor's comments were obviously prejudicial. Instead, the question is whether the degree of prejudice, buttressed by the legitimate interest in deterring prosecutorial misconduct, is sufficient to warrant reversal. On that question, the factor of judgment necessarily plays a critical role. 6 I am persuaded that a due respect for the work of our circuit judges, combined with a fair reading of their opinion in this case, warrants the conclusion that they have already done exactly what JUSTICE BRENNAN would have them do again.
The Court of Appeals' opinion took note of defense counsel's failure to make an objection to the improper argument, but nevertheless accepted the contention on appeal that "the prosecutor's conduct substantially prejudiced the Appellant at trial." App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. After reviewing relevant portions of the transcript that "speak for themselves," id., at 10a, and considering other Tenth Circuit cases dealing with "prejudicial statements made by the prosecution during [470 U.S. 1, 38] argument to the jury," ibid., the Court of Appeals expressly concluded that "the above quoted remarks were sufficiently egregious as to constitute plain error." Ibid. I have no doubt that the judges of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit are familiar with the difference between "harmless error" and "plain error." 7 Rather than asking those judges to supplement the opinion they have already written, I would simply affirm their judgment.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Court appended the following footnote:
[ Footnote 2 ] Ante, at 14, 16-20; ante, at 26-30 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[ Footnote 3 ] The principal question asked:
[ Footnote 4 ] Ante, at 17-19. I do not, of course, suggest that it is improper for the Court to evaluate the probable impact of the error on the outcome of the case. It is important to remember, however, that the question is not whether the judge is persuaded that the defendant is guilty, but "rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total setting." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
[ Footnote 5 ] Ante, at 30-35 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[ Footnote 6 ] The Court has commented on the difficulty of applying the harmless-error standard:
[ Footnote 7 ] Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is entitled "Harmless Error and Plain Error," reads as follows:


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Colossoma macropomum
Black Pacu
Characidae. Subfamily: Serrasalminae
Native to the Rio Orinoco and Amazon basins in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil. Introduced populations are thriving around the world, in countries as diverse as the West Indies and Taiwan.
Inhabits main river channels and flood plains, moving into flooded forests during the rainy season. It tends to prefer shallow, slow-moving areas with overhanging or floating vegetation. Juveniles spend the first few months of life in the flood plains, where food is plentiful and predation is less of a danger.
Maximum Standard Length
It can easily top a metre (40″/100cm) in length and weigh over 20kg. Captive specimens tend to be a bit smaller than this, but expect it to reach at least 24″ (60cm).
Aquarium SizeTop ↑
Sadly, adult specimens are all too often seen living in cramped conditions. If you want to house one of these for life, you're going to need an enormous tank of at least 120″ x 36″ x 36 (300cm x 90cm x 90cm) – 2550 litres in size, preferably larger. Youngsters can be grown on in smaller tanks but will grow quickly when well-fed.
The size of the tank and filtration used are much more important than the choice of decor. Strictly speaking, decor isn't necessary for a tank containing an adult as it's a very active species. At any rate, try not to clutter up the tank space too much. There's also little point adding plants as they'll be eaten immediately. Opt for a few water-worn boulders and perhaps some large chunks of driftwood or beech branches. Ensure that any such furnishings are too heavy to be moved around or secured to the tank in some way.
A large and efficient biological filter is needed to cope with the amounts of waste produced by a fish of this size. If possible choose a sump–type arrangement, as this allows most of the equipment to be located outside the tank. A large specimen can easily destroy glass heaterstats, thermometers etc. as it charges around. Otherwise, buy the biggest filter you can afford (pond filters are worth considering) and perform regular large water changes.
Water Conditions
Temperature: 72-82°F (22-28°C)
pH: It's an adaptable species provided extremes are avoided. Somewhere within the range 5.5-7.5 is ok.
Hardness: 1-15°H
Stomach analyses of wild specimens show it to be primarily a herbivorous species, feeding on fruits, nuts and seeds. It is an opportunist, though, and also takes insects, zooplankton and small fish. In the aquarium, offer it a varied diet consisting of quality dried pellets or floating sticks, along with plenty of fruit and vegetables. Spinach, lettuce leaves, and fruit and vegetables such as apple, banana, peach, grapes, courgette, peas, cabbage and carrot all work well.
Behaviour and CompatibilityTop ↑
Small fish will likely be eaten, but in general it's quite peaceful with bigger species. It can bother sedentary or shy companions with its constant activity, though. Obviously, a truly enormous tank is needed to incorporate it into a community. If this kind of space is available, suitable tankmates include Arowana, other similarly-sized characins, big cichlids, and large catfish from the Pimelodid, Doradid and Loricariid groups.
It's a shoaling species when juvenile, becoming more solitary as it matures. It can be kept in a group in the aquarium, but again, this is largely dependant on the amount of space available. In smaller quarters, adults can become a bit of a nuisance, chasing and nipping the fins of both its own kind and other species.
Sexual Dimorphism
Mature females are a little rounder-bellied than males.
Not achieved in the hobby, although it's being bred in some numbers for food in both South America and various Far Eastern countries. The fish are often induced to spawn via the use of hormones.
NotesTop ↑
Known as the tambaqui in its native countries, this is the second largest species of scaled fish found in the Amazon basin. This alone should tell you much of what you need to know about its suitability as an aquarium inhabitant. In reality, it's debatable as to whether the species should be considered an aquarium subject at all. While pacu rarely reach their maximum size in captivity, they're still easily capable of growing to a couple of feet in length. The myth that fish will only grow to match the size of the tank they're kept in, is just that.
Unfortunately, it's regularly offered for sale as a cute 2-3″ fish, often labeled with enticing names such as "vegetarian piranha" (pacu are included in the same subfamily as piranha, and resemble them superficially). As a result many public aquaria have large displays of adult specimens that have been "donated" by fishkeepers, often to the extent where they refuse to accept any more. A more depressing, but equally common scenario is that the fish are dumped into rivers and ponds when they outgrow their tank. In colder climates, they will obviously not survive, but populations exist in various states of the USA and several other countries as a result of releases by irresponsible aquarists. The species has subsequently been banned from sale by many wildlife authorities in the US.
Pacu have developed amazing dentition to allow them to crush fruit, nuts and seeds. Their teeth are cusped and resemble human molars, and they also have very powerful jaws. Although they are rarely aggressive, they can inflict a really nasty bite, so take care when performing tank maintenance.
The species is widely used in aquaculture projects in South America. It is ideally suited for this, being tolerant of a wide range of water chemistry and possessing the ability to survive in oxygen-depleted conditions. Much research is being undertaken to find the most ecologically sound way of farming it, as it is suffering from gross overfishing in many of its native waters. If wild stocks become further depleted, there could be serious implications not only for the species itself, but also entire ecosystems. The seeds of many of the fruits eaten by pacu are indigestible, and are excreted intact. Some experts believe the fish play a significant role in seed dispersal of plants from areas of flooded forest. Sustainable commercial farming of pacu is therefore considered a priority. Not only will this prevent further depletion of wild stocks, but it will provide an alternative source of income for farmers. The hope is that it may also encourage them to take up aquaculture instead of agriculture, which is having a devastating effect on many parts of the Amazon rainforest.
As a food fish, pacu is apparently very tasty. Its natural diet of fruit and nuts is said to enhance the flavour of the flesh. As the fish is so large, cuts are often sold on the bone in a similar way to pork ribs. One further commercial use of the species is as a sport fish, both in its natural environment and artificially-stocked lakes. It's been introduced into several Far Eastern countries for this purpose, including Thailand and Malaysia.


text:
List Changes Announced
by Lisa Albergo reporting for AFANA from Chicago
With the trade period soon to commence, several more clubs have announced changes to their lists.
Christian Howard, Tom Young and Brett Goodes have been delisted by the Western Bulldogs. Young was originally drafted by Collingwood and played nine games 2011-12 before being traded to the Bulldogs where he played a further 15 games. Goodes debuted in 2013 and played 15 games. He recently played in the Bulldogs VFL premiership win. Howard was drafted in 2009 but a hip injury wiped out the first half of 2010 and he spent the remainder of the year in the VFL. He debuted in 2011 and played six games. The young defender/wingman had an excellent preseason in 2012 before a knee injury sidelined him for six weeks. He came back to play 11 games. Named as an emergency six times, he managed only one game in 2013 and just seven more in 2014.


text: Virginia M. Bliss, 92 of Pierson, went to be with her Lord, whom she loved on Friday, January 20, 2012 at Spectrum Health – United Memorial Campus, Greenville. Mrs. Bliss was born April 22, 1919 in Grand Rapids, MI the daughter of Phylo and Ila Bell (Sales) Fletcher. She was preceded in death by her loving husband, Leland Bliss on July 5, 2010 after 72 years of marriage. She spent her life as a loving wife, mother and person. Surviving are her children, Janet Glidden of Cutlerville, Lanette Stevens of Edmore, Muriel Kay Hoover of Grand Rapids, Irving (Elizabeth) Bliss of Sand Lake, Hazel (David) Hawley of Cedar Springs, Ila (Ron) Fisk of Sand Lake, Leland (Debra) Bliss of Cedar Springs, Sherrie (Jeff) Peters of Cedar Springs; 110 grandchildren, great grandchildren and great great grandchildren; brother-in-law, Arthur (Delores) Bliss; sister-in-law, Althea Welch; many nieces and nephews. The family received friends on Monday from 6-8 pm at the Bliss-Witters & Pike Funeral Home, Cedar Springs, where services were held on Tuesday 11:00 am. Pastor Larry Young officiating. Interment in the spring at Solon Township Cemetery. Arrangements by Bliss Witters & Pike Funeral Home, Cedar Springs


text:
And for a change A HEART ATTACK!
Please Be Sure To
Tweet My Blogs
To Spread The Facts World Wide
Please Be Sure To
Tweet My Blogs
To Spread The Facts World Wide To Give Others HOPE
I Have Been Fighting Cancer since 1997 & I'M STILL HERE!
I Have Cancer, Cancer Does NOT Have Me
I just want to say sorry for copping out at times and leaving Lee and friends to cope!
Any help and support YOU can give her will be hugely welcome.
I do make a lousy patient!
If YOU want to follow my fight against Cancer from when it started and I first presented with symptoms see The TAB just below the Header of this Blog. called >DIARY of Cancer< just click and it will give you a long list of the main events in chronological order.
Thoughts and comments will be in chronological order in the main blog and can be tracked in the >ARCHIVE< in the Right Sidebar. You may find the TABS >MEDICAL LINKS< and also >CANCER LINKS< of help.
YOU are welcome to call me if you believe I can help in ANY way. .
Posted by: Greg Lance-Watkins
tel: 01594 – 528 337
on: http://GregLanceWatkins.com
TWITTER: Greg_LW
Health/Cancer Blog: http://GregLW.blogspot.com
TWITTER: Greg_LW
Health/Cancer Blog: http://GregLW.blogspot.com


text:
- Publishers
- Vertical
- series: Black Jack
Comic book series : Black Jack
Artist: Osamu Tezuka
Writer: Tezuka, Osamu
Publisher: Vertical
Black Jack
artist: Osamu Tezuka
Writer: Tezuka, Osamu
series: Black Jack
volume: 13
publisher: Vertical
publish date: 2011
language: English
coloring: black/white
size: 200x150mm
pages: 320:
Black Jack is a mysterious and charismatic genius surgeon who travels the world performing amazing and impossible medical feats. Through highly trained, he freelances without a license because he distains the medical establishment. This leads to run-ins with the authorities and unscrupulous, sometimes criminal, individuals. Because Black Jack keeps his true motives secret, his ethics are perceived as questionable and he is considered a selfish, uncaring devil.


text:
This is a tasting that I've thought a lot more about since leaving the city, and one in which I wish I could have spent more time analyzing each bottle with some wine books and dizionari nearby. Our host was the genteel Giuseppe Capuano of Vias Imports Ltd.. Despite the fact that he is from San Lazzaro di Savena in Emilia-Romagna and quite attached to the native grapes of his home region, he took us on an incredible tour of the white wines of Italy and her islands. East, west, north, south, Sicily, Sardinia... Even the German-speaking vineyards of Alto Adige/Südtirol were represented.
A restaurant would be well-advised to steal the following list to make a special wine flight dinner to celebrate the white wines of Italy. I can imagine the following going quite well with a multi-course meal, rearranged a little to ensure optimal regional food pairing.
2011 Istituto Agrario di San Michele all'Adige, Nosiola Trentino DOC, $23
The institute is an agricultural college in northern Italy focused on wine production, founded in 1874. Think about this as trying something from UC Davis. The grape is Nosiola, and it's very mild on the nose with lots of bright lemon on the palate. Great acidity and minerality, and certainly a perfect start to the tasting.
2011 Strasserhof Kerner, Valle Isarco DOC, $27
There's a good bit of German/Italian overlap in language, family names, and grapes in the far north. My first Kerner was the 2003 Klaus Zimmerling Kerner Trocken Landwein, brought back by California Girl after her 2005 vacation in Germany. This one was rich with honey, overripe peach, and a rich mineral aftertaste. Later notes of nutmeg. This used to be a popular destination for Germans in search of affordable, delicious wine before the Euro currency unification.
2011 Luisa Friuliano, Isonzo del Friuli DOC, $21
Wet stone and a mild floral note, with bright acidity. This grape used to be known as Tocai Friulano until the EU came along and the name was banned to avoid confusion with Hungarian Tokaji.
2011 Luisa Ribolla Gialla, Isonzo del Friuli DOC, $22
Somehow this was my first exposure to Ribolla Gialla, and I look forward to exploring this grape in the future. Exotic and fascinating with a nose of jasmine and orange peels, but a light and delicate body.
2011 Argillae, Orvieto DOC, $17
The name means "spirit of the soil" in Latin, and this one was a powerhouse of acidity. I found it a little harsh and bitter, but perhaps better enjoyed with food that will balance it out properly.
2011 Cataldi Madonna, Trebbiano d'Abruzzo DOC, $17
Light and gentle with a delicate body. A little small and lost in the shuffle, but something that I'd like to serve with quail and white asparagus for a calm first course.
2011 Terredora di Paolo, Fiano di Avellino DOCG, $24
This wine is entirely soil-driven, with elements of mineral and ash, chalk, and balanced acidity. Fruit comes and goes, but geology is forever.
2011 Statti Greco, Calabria IGT, $23
Clean and fresh, with a light and mild body. I've had stronger Grecos in the past, but it's nice to see a more austere presentation.
2010 Feudi del Pisciotto Marengo Grillo, Sicilia IGT, $33
Nutty with fresh-baked cookie notes and an acidic finish. The oak gives some serious structure to this particular bottle.
2011 Nuraghe Crabioni Vermentino di Sardegna, Sardegna DOC, $21
Rustic and exotic with characteristics of flowers, nuts, and fruit. Deep, firm body and a strong mouthfeel. Everything I could have possibly wanted from a Sardinian wine.
2011 Colle dei Bardellini Pigato, Riviera Ligure di Poenente DOC, $19
My first experience with Pigato, and Greg pointed out that if you ever detect the aroma of pencil eraser in your wine, there's a 50/50 chance that it's Pigato. I wasn't really sure what to make of this particular wine (I think my bottle was a bit oxidized), but I'm holding that tasting note in my pocket to win a blind tasting in the future.
2011 Maison Anselmet Chambave Muscat, Vallée d'Aosta DOC, $27
We concluded the tasting with an odd wine from a very stubborn and independent winemaker. Only 6,000 bottles of this were made, and the result is a Muscat that has the characteristic aromas of honey and honeysuckle, but is completely dry. I think everyone was expecting sweetness and was pleasantly surprised at the flavor. I'm not sure how I would serve this (there's a perfect cheese just out of my mental grasp), but I found it to be another true delight from this master class.
Check out these other great reviews of the same tasting! The V.I.P. Table "A Regional Tour of Italian Whites", The Reverse Wine Snob "Excellent Italian Whites - Exploring the White Wines of Italy Including Two Bulk Buy Selections", Vindulge "Learning about the white wines of Italy with Snooth – one region at a time", Wine Julia "#SnoothPVA: Indigenous Varietal Italian White Wines From North to South", My Vine Spot "#SnoothPVA: White Wines of Italy"
Note: This trip was provided by Snooth.


text:
I'm going to need a bigger trophy shelf.
But I jest.
In all sincerity, thank you Lorenza for nominating me for the Versatile Blogger Award. Acknowledgement by one's peers is a wonderful thing, and while they say there's no such thing as bad publicity, one positive outshines a dozen negatives. Being included in such a creative and talented group, I'm privileged and at a loss for words.
Well not exactly at a loss.
Lorenza and I crossed paths recently. I believe it was shortly after I was nominated for the coveted Blogging Survivalist Award (a fictitious accolade I made up and shamelessly bestowed upon myself). A follow-for-follow later, we connected, and I've been a fan of her blog 'Life…and Stuff' ever since. Lorenza is a wonderful writer with a knack for commentating on life's challenges, the journey of self-discovery, and the importance of friends (Fluffy and Buffy). Please check it out here. Cat lovers are also welcome.
As with any Blogging Award, there are rules to be followed. For the sticklers, you will find them here. The condensed version is simpler; acknowledge, thank & promote, tell us 7 things, nominate.
Before confirming that my blog was indeed worthy of the nomination, I opted to follow a completely unrelated rabbit trail, researching the term 'versatile', just to ensure I knew what I was accepting.
Aside from the standardized Merriam-Webster interpretation, to my delight, I found an older, slightly obscure definition, a synonym of sorts, for the term 'versatile'.
No, not incontinent (I know what you're thinking), inconstant.
A light went on.
The Inconstant Blogger Award.
Perfection. The title reflected my blog explicitly.
I delved further.
And found three varying definitions for 'inconstant'.
'Variable or irregular'. Yes, definitely fits my writing style.
'Likely to change frequently without apparent or cogent reason'. Okay, not a glowing tribute, but I can live with it.
'Not staying the same, especially in emotion, behaviour, or choice of sexual partner'. Wait –what? Where was I going with this?
Damn those rabbit trails.
No longer will I wander. After all, who am I to tinker with an official accreditation?
Versatile Blogger Award it is.
Here are seven random facts about me,
I rarely eat breakfast.
I hate the first draft of anything I write; chapter, article, letter, paragraph, sentence. I mean hate.
I love the movie Polar Express, but the elves freak me out. There are way too many of them. Every time I watch I can't help but envision an invasion.
I graduated from the same University as Martin Short, John Candy, Eugene Levy and Ivan Reitman.
I saw Madonna in concert back in the 80's. I still have the t-shirt.
I was a member of a Ukrainian Polka Band in my early 20's. At a gig in Cleveland Ohio, an old fella collapsed and died on the dance floor in the middle of our set. It was his last waltz.
One time I called into work sick, when I wasn't really sick.
My Nominees:
Although I'm bound by a strict code to nominate 15 other bloggers, I've limited my selection to 5. Congratulations to the nominees below, all our true blog-worthy recipients. Please stop by and say hello.
www.scrabbledrambles.com Tiziana's thought-provoking blog on literature, media, writing, and all things that broaden the mind.
www.theredheadednerd.blogspot.com Science fiction, fantasy, heavy metal music, Emily's vibrant blog packs a punch.
www.lydiaoye.wordpress.com 'Live, Love, Share', Lydia's wonderful take on life, writing and social media.
www.thedailyrejectionblog.wordpress.com For anyone who has never dealt with (writing) rejection, this blog is not for you. Tips on surviving the rejection letter and staying motivated.
www.stacybenedict.com Science fiction and an intriguing Urban Fantasy series in progress, Stacy's page sparkles.
Until next time,


text:
IT spending will hit $3.7 trillion this year and $3.8 trillion by 2014, thanks in part to increased investments in enterprise software and IT services, according to research company Gartner. Overall spending would be higher, in fact, were it not for low-priced tablets and other mobile devices bringing down the computer prices.
Gartner's outlook for IT spending is rosier today than it was in Q3; the firm predicts a 4.2 percent boost now, up from 3.8 percent. "Uncertainties surrounding prospects for an upturn in global economic growth are the major retardants to IT growth," said Richard Gordon, managing vice president at Gartner. "This uncertainty has caused the pessimistic business and consumer sentiment throughout the world. However, much of this uncertainty is nearing resolution, and as it does, we look for accelerated spending growth in 2013 compared to 2012."
Broken down by segment, Gartner anticipates spending on computing devices will hit $666 billion in 2013, a 6.3 percent increase over the $627 billion spent in 2012. The growth will slow to 4.2 percent at $694 billion in 2014, thanks in part to the influx of low-priced tablets and devices. These reductions will be partially offset by marginal increases in spending on mobile phones and printers.
"The tablet market has seen greater price competition from Android devices as well as smaller, low-priced devices in emerging markets," Gordon said. "It is ultimately this shift toward relatively lower-priced tablets that lowers our average selling prices forecast for 2012 through 2016, which in turn is responsible for slowing device spending growth in general, and PC and tablet spending growth in particular."
Enterprise software makers stand to see the significant gains from increased IT spending. Gartner expects a 6.4 percent increase in spending on software this year, up from $278 billion in 2012 to $296 billion in 2013. The figure will hit $316 billion in 2014, a 6.8 percent increase. The key markets for 2013 will include security, storage management and CRM. "However, beginning in 2014, markets aligned to big data and other information management initiatives, such as enterprise content management, data integration tools, and data-quality tools will begin to see increased levels of investment," according to Gartner.
Research company Forrester is similarly bullish about increased spending on enterprise software, citing SaaS (software as a service) and data-driven smart apps as the major growth engines, TechCrunch reported. The SaaS market will increase 25 percent in 2013 to $59 billion and will reach $75 billion in 2014, according to Forrester, while the smart-computing software market -- data analytics and business intelligence apps -- will generate $41 billion in spending this year and $48 billion in 2014.
As more companies move to the cloud in coming years, business will boom for IT service providers. Companies spent $881 billion on services last year and will spend $927 billion on them in 2013, a 5.2 percent increase. Come 2014, IT-services spending will hit $974 billion, growth of 5.1 percent.
The global telecom services market continues to be the largest IT spending market at $1.6 trillion in 2012. Spending will hit $1.7 trillion in 2013 and will remain flat going into 2014 and beyond. The reason: Increased investment in mobile data services will result in lower spending on fixed and mobile voice services markets. By 2016, Gartner forecasts that mobile data will represent 33 percent of the total telecom services market, up from 22 percent in 2012.
Finally, spending on data center systems will edge up to $147 billion in 2013, a 4.5 percent increase over the $141 billion spent in 2012. The figure will hit $154 billion in 2014, Gartner anticipates.
This story, "Gartner: Big data will help drive IT spending to $3.8 trillion in 2014," was originally published at InfoWorld.com. Get the first word on what the important tech news really means with the InfoWorld Tech Watch blog. For the latest developments in business technology news, follow InfoWorld.com on Twitter.