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I am standing in front of Candi Tikus, its red brick structure almost entirely below ground level as if the earth was purposefully dug out so that it could fit inside. A flight of stairs made from the same material acts as the only entrance way to this centuries-old site which might have functioned as a bathing place or a setting for purification rituals, although scholars have differing opinions on whom this structure was built for: the royal family or common people?
I walk down the ancient steps toward the bottom of the compound which is water-less at the height of the dry season – images I'd seen on the internet show the site filled with knee-high water. No written document or inscription has been found regarding this structure, but from its architectural style experts believe it was constructed between the 13th and 14th centuries, a time when the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit kingdom controlled this part of Java.
During its heyday, Majapahit's namesake ancient capital (on the site of Trowulan) had an extensive network of canals and reservoirs which together measured up to 26 kilometers long, and Candi Tikus was a part of this sophisticated water management system. Inspired by Mount Meru – the sacred peak in Hindu and Buddhist cosmology – Candi Tikus' main tower stood above four smaller pinnacles. Around its base are dozens of water spouts in the shape of makara (a mythical sea creature in Hindu-Buddhist culture) and lotus buds, each of them finely carved from andesite stone as opposed to red brick which made up the rest of the compound. This beauty, however, would have to fall into obscurity as the once powerful Majapahit grappled with its own demise.
Encountering the same fate that befell other Hindu-Buddhist temples and edifices as Islam gradually became the dominant religion on the island, Candi Tikus was eventually forgotten. Some ancient sites were left unattended which gave way to Mother Nature to slowly reclaim them; it was not unusual for the Europeans to discover these structures partially or entirely covered with moss and shrubs during the colonial period. Java's volcanoes and seismic activity also contributed to the complete abandonment of these sites. Many centuries- or even millennia-year-old sites ended up buried in the ground, slumbering in darkness for generations until their rediscovery – even in the 21st century a number of ancient structures and statues are still being unearthed on Java.
For hundreds of years, Candi Tikus was hidden from sight until. However, its rediscovery in 1914 was anything but suggestive of its past glory as a beautiful bathing temple. As the local farms were infested by rats, the 20th-century residents of the village of Temon in Trowulan traced back those rodents to a mysterious mound where, upon further inspection, it was revealed that an ancient brick structure was buried underneath. The rats – tikus in Indonesian – have unfortunately been associated with this structure ever since. Excavation and reconstruction were subsequently carried out by the colonial Dutch administration, and in the 1980s the Indonesian government conducted a thorough restoration of the Majapahit-era compound.
Roughly five kilometers to the northwest of Candi Tikus, passing modern-day houses, shops, roads, corn and sugarcane plantations, lies another ancient structure, a survivor from the East Javan classical period many centuries ago. Standing tall in solitude, Candi Brahu is the highest temple in Trowulan, although the lack of information on it has left scholars broadly estimating that it was built between the 10th and 15th centuries. The contrast between this imposing edifice and Candi Tikus' below-ground-level structure couldn't have been starker, but the two, like most ancient sites in Trowulan, were made from the same material: red brick.
The locals believe that Candi Brahu and nearby Candi Gentong I and II which are now in ruins once belonged to the same compound. "The smaller of Candi Gentong was a bathing temple used to purify the body of a deceased king, while the bigger Candi Gentong was where the body was laid before being moved to Candi Brahu," a young caretaker of Candi Gentong explains to James and I. "At Candi Brahu the body was then cremated," he adds. Despite that popular local belief, no remains of hydrocarbon (or ash) have ever been found within the latter's sanctum, leaving people today guessing the true purpose of this tall structure.
Unlike other ancient Hindu-Buddhist temples or structures that I have visited in Indonesia, Candi Brahu is devoid of any reliefs on its façade. Its rather austere look, however, is compensated by the curiously curving outline of its midsection, achieved through the application of layers of brick with different lengths and widths. Upon closer inspection, this part of the ancient temple wouldn't look out of place today in a world where modern architecture is the preferred style for anything from houses to offices and restaurants. Going up to the large niche on the temple's west façade is unfortunately not allowed, probably to preserve the entire structure for some people still sadly resort to vandalism – mainly engraving their names on ancient bricks or stones as has happened to a few smaller temples across Java.
Thanks to the direction its main sanctum faces, the afternoon is the ideal time to visit Candi Brahu, when its red bricks are beautifully bathed in softer hues of the sun. We stay until closing time, marveling at the band of luminous bright ocher cascading down the western face of the temple. Upon leaving I wonder how Trowulan must have looked like had most, if not all, the structures dating back to the Majapahit period survived to this day. Maybe it would have reminded me of Bagan, albeit with a more modest skyline.


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As a professional tech writer and original blogger, when I first saw that the iPhone 6 was getting a dose of Viagra, I could not have been more jolly. Most people don't know what is so great about this. I figured instead of talking and writing about it, I'd just hammer out the top, top top reasons – so you get get in line RIGHT NOW.
- Chicks. Love. Bigger. You will get laid if you flash this device around. Instantly.
- Porn! Big screen! YESS.
- Think how much that mongo thing vibrates – your wife will love it.
- SLOW MO CAMERA – film those things you always wanted to, in SLOMO
- It is weaponized.
- Stops more bullets than a normal iPhone 6.
- Can serve as dinner plate.
- Double those "happy to see me?" comments
- Excuse to wear big baggy pants like a THUG
- Holster.
- PORn
- Packs huge speakers – its a new age boom box, bitch.
- TOP NOTCH sexting with that sick forward facing camera. Full frontal sexting anyone???

subset: commoncrawl


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Here we are! The final month of the year and another round of prompts to follow. Have a look at my 2018 December watercolor prompts below.
How to participate in the 2018 DECEMBER WATERCOLOR PROMPTS -HOLIDAY INSPIRED
Read this post to get to know an overview of what the challenge is about. Tag your work with #inkstruckwatercolors on Instagram and for additional measure also tag me at @inkstruckstudio along with the prompt for me to be notified.
You can also use the LMW Facebook group to share your artwork in the daily share threads that are posted along with the prompt topic.
About the weekly prompts and monthly challenge theme
The prompts are weekly so you have no pressure in doing one everyday. You may create more than one watercolor illustration pertaining to the weekly prompt. The 2018 December watercolor prompts has the monthly theme of "HOLIDAY INSPIRED".
There are tons of inspiration around the world wide web for this particular topic.
For inspiration, please refer my Watercolor Inspiration board on Pinterest. I will be pinning ideas related to the themes I put up regularly.
The perks?
- Improve your skills in watercolour and get inspired to create with all the different ideas you see out there.
- WIN an Amazon gift card worth $15 every month. I will pick one winner every month. This is sponsored by me and not by Amazon or anyone else.
Have a look at some posts in my "Learn Watercolors" series.
Have a look at the watercolor tutorials on the blog.
Sign up for the newsletter using the form below.


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Healthy and restored ecosystems can make cost-effective contributions to meeting global challenges, including climate change. IUCN highlighted this concept at its side event on "Nature-based solutions to development needs" during the European Development Days in Brussels last week.
Luc Bas, Director of IUCN European Union Representative Office, who moderated the event, underlined the importance and benefits of better integrating ecosystem services in the development sector, and of placing nature-based solutions at the core of policy debates and action.
A number of projects implemented by or in cooperation with IUCN were presented at the event to illustrate IUCN's nature-based solutions approach:
Blue Solutions provides a global platform to collate, share and generate knowledge and to enhance capacities for conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity.
BIOPAMA helps local stakeholders in the Africa Caribbean and Pacific countries to identify priority issues in the field of ecosystem management, land use and conservation, supporting long-term needs and commitments to biodiversity and sustainable development.
Forest Landscape Restoration brings people together to identify, negotiate, and implement practices that restore an agreed optimal balance of the ecological, social, and economic benefits of forests and trees within a broader pattern of land uses.
The principles to which interventions should respond to in order to be qualified as a nature-based solution were highlighted. According to IUCN, such activities should:
Deliver an effective solution to a major global challenge using nature,
Provide biodiversity benefits in terms of diverse, well-managed ecosystems,
Be cost-effective relative to other solutions,
Be easily and compellingly communicated,
Be measured, verified and replicated,
Respect and reinforce communities' rights over natural resources, and
Harness both public and private sources of funding.
The European Commission, represented at the event by both the Environment and Development and Cooperation Directorate-Generals of the European Commission, highlighted the opportunities and challenges of financing biodiversity conservation under the new thematic programming within the EU Multiannual Financial Framework. The DG Development and Cooperation presented the new flagship programme EU Biodiversity for Livelihoods Initiative (EUBLI), which will provide a more holistic and coherent approach of the EU actions on biodiversity in the development agenda under the motto "United in biodiversity".
The presentations are available for download at the links in the top right corner to this story.
Related News


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Raymond S. Moore was born in Oklahoma, but lived in Missouri for most of his life. The son of a jeweler, he attended the Saint-Louis University and started out doing commercial work. He entered the field of comics through Phil Davis, whom he assisted on 'Mandrake the Magician'. Moore is best known as the original artist of 'The Phantom', together with writer Lee Falk. The series began with a daily newspaper strip on 17 February 1936, followed by a color Sunday strip on 28 May 1939; both are still running.
Moore's art is characterized by it's moody and dark atmosphere, and it often features beatiful women. Ray Moore had to quit the comic in 1942 to serve in the US army. Due to an injury, he had to retire from the comic in the 1940s, leaving it to his assistant Wilson McCoy. Moore, who was as mysterious as the character he co-created (he rarely gave interviews), passed away from natural causes in Mancheter, New York in 1984.


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New: Extract Juice Bar
Left: Sproutstanding and The Leaf; right: Extract Juice Bar
Blimpie's downtown has been replaced by a juice bar. Sign of the times.
If you're into juicing and work downtown, you'll appreciate the convenience of Extract Juice Bar.
I've been avoiding Extract, though, mostly because its logo features a syringe; a visit here has about the same appeal as a visit to the doctor. (Though I suppose the juicing parallels of steroids and fruits and veggies is kind of cute.)
Extract offers ten juices, $7 each. There's a juice for various tastes, from the sweeter Morning Doodle (kale, apple, carrot, grape, lemon) to the zingy, greener tasting The Leaf (spinach, apple, ginger, parsley, celery, lime) to the minerally, is-this-healthy-enough-to-make-drinking-this-worth-it Surprisingly Sproutstanding (brussels sprouts, carrot, broccoli, cilantro, lemon, celery). These are the first fresh-pressed juices I've been served over ice, which keeps it cold, or dilutes it, depending on your perspective.
Extract also offers three, five and seven-day juice cleanses for $180, $300, $420, the priciest cleanse programs I've seen on the island.
1001 Bishop St., Suite 108, 949-945-3206


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Creating upwards of 8 kitchen based puppets that could sing and speak in their own unique ways was a tough chore. Have you ever tried to attach eyes to a feather duster? Devin and Mike stepped up to the task to bring these creatures to life for our Mother's Day short. Take a closer looksy at how we made each creation work!
Bet you didn't think the stove was so small, didja?
The trashcan looked more funky and unique with teeth!
We took care to edit out the sticks (and string!) which allowed these little felt mouths to move.


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#LEEDIR: Testing a new digital evidence file-sharing service for police
The Large Emergency Event Digital Information Repository is an eyewitness photo and video platform that can be activated for free by law enforcement and relief agencies during a catastrophic incident
One year ago this month, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated two very simple, homemade pressure-cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon.
Even before the smoke had cleared on Boylston Street, law enforcement agencies were actively seeking eyewitness pictures and videos captured by the many civilians who witnessed the explosions.
Police also wanted images and videos taken immediately prior to — and following — those bombs cooking off.
Testing, Testing, Check, Check
Good news was that the response was overwhelming — thousands of valuable digital files were submitted.
Bad news was that the response was so overwhelming that those agencies weren't able to quickly analyze the inbound information — their server infrastructure couldn't handle the volume of submissions.
So, tomorrow (Thursday, April 10, from 0900 to 1200 hours Pacific Time, 1200-1500 Eastern) an online exercise will be conducted in which a new file-sharing platform — through which eyewitnesses may share pictures and video with law enforcement — will be tested.
The Large Emergency Event Digital Information Repository (LEEDIR for short) is an eyewitness photo and video platform that can be activated (for free) by law enforcement and relief agencies during a major catastrophe such as a large-scale natural disaster or terrorist attack.
"When a large emergency event occurs, law enforcement and relief agencies can request the rapid activation of the LEEDIR platform for free to start receiving and analyzing eyewitness photos and videos," according to the LEEDIR website.
When a major event occurs, a police agency submits a brief activation form on the LEEDIR website, and makes a quick phone call to the LEEDIR hotline to request activation of the service.
After activation, the LEEDIR iPhone app, Android app, and website are available to receive uploads from citizens who want to share their photos and videos with law enforcement.
An expandable cloud-server infrastructure is then launched — in order to process virtually unlimited volumes of photo and video evidence — and participating agencies are provided access to an "administrative media management/analysis interface" for evaluation of the inbound files.
Appropriately, LEEDIR can only be launched for large-scale events involving multiple jurisdictions and/or disciplines, and have at least 5,000 people in attendance and/or cover at least five square miles (think Boston Marathon bombing, and you've got the idea).
Crowdsourcing, CitizenGlobal, and the Amazon You Don't Know About
The strategy is called crowdsourcing, and if you've watched any of the 24/7 "news channels" lately, you've seen some attempts at crowdsourcing during the search for flight MA370 —ordinary citizens scanning satellite images for signs of debris from the ill-fated airliner.
Interestingly, LEEDIR platform is a public safety / private sector partnership conceived by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and comprised of two Internet infrastructure technology companies.
It appears that CitizenGlobal is a relatively new — and by all appearances, relatively small — company with a lot of promise and potential. Amazon Web Services may be the biggest Internet technology company you've never heard of, as it has quickly become a behemoth in the web hosting space.
Together — and under the guidance of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) — the two companies are aiming to create a highly scalable server infrastructure to handle extremely large volumes, and:
1.) Enable the transfer of large size files which are often blocked by email systems
2.) Provide the ability for collaborative analysis
3.) Enable automatic video transcoding of different video codecs
4.) Provide 'cloud storage' for vast volumes of digital data
5.) Enable agencies to have managerial / curation tools for the collected files
Police agency email and website infrastructure is not set up — nor should it be — to handle the intake of massive volumes of video and image files, and the LEEDIR system may be found to fill that gap.
There's really only one way to find out if the system — announced as a concept only a few months ago — really works. Take part in the test.
Here's the basic information for tomorrow's exercise:
American law enforcement agencies (international agencies are also welcome to participate in the exercise) are encouraged to upload any video(s) and high-resolution photos — agency recruitment videos, crime prevention videos, etc. — to the LEEDIR website during the hours of the exercise. Be advised: you must follow your agency's policy, procedures, and privacy guidelines!
All files can be uploaded via Internet-connected computers, as well as wirelessly via Android and iPhone apps on mobile phones and tablet computers.
For discussion and feedback, follow the #LEEDIR hashtag on Twitter and Facebook during and after the exercise.
The test tomorrow is intended to allow police agencies to learn how to use LEEDIR as well as create the ability for future use in the event of a terror attack or major disaster. For further information on how LEEDIR works click here or check out the video above.


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© 2023 MJH Life Sciences™ and dvm360 | Veterinary News, Veterinarian Insights, Medicine, Pet Care. All rights reserved.
The fastest path veterinarians can take to unhappiness
Learn to compare yourself to other veterinarians in a healthy way.
I was a recent veterinary school graduate when I met Mrs. Anders and her 11 year-old tabby cat, Beauregard. Beauregard's regular veterinarian, Dr. Miller, was unavailable at the time of his appointment, and thus I found myself conducting this senior patient's wellness examination.
Beauregard had lost a little weight since his last visit, and I felt that we should do some blood work and a urinalysis to make sure all was well. Mrs. Anders was skeptical and said that Dr. Miller didn't usually need such diagnostic tests to know what was going on. "Dr. Miller is fantastic and I think, if she were here, she would be interested in having these diagnostics done as well," I responded.
Mrs. Anders considered my statement for a long moment. She then turned Beauregard's head to look him in the eyes and loudly whispered, "I think we should have waited for Dr. Miller."
At that moment, not only did Mrs. Anders compare me to Dr. Miller, but I compared myself to her. And it wasn't pretty. I saw her experience in medicine and surgery next to my inexperience, her unflappable nature next to my nervousness and her familiarity with this client next to my position as a practical stranger. Any comfort that I might have acquired in my short tenure at this practice disappeared like homemade brownies in the break room.
The upside and downside of personal comparison
As the driven overachievers we are, veterinary professionals are both fanatical and critical when comparing ourselves to others, and we're highly adept at tormenting ourselves when we don't like the result. Unfortunately, it's all too easy to find others who don't appear to work as hard as we do yet seem to reap greater rewards. There are always those who recall medical information more quickly, make more money, have more free time, catch lucky breaks, have more degrees, find favoritism in the practice, get more gift baskets from clients or date people who look like underwear models. There are always other clinics with more cars in the parking lot, more fans on Facebook, and nicer equipment than your clinic. As a profession full of type-A personalities, we are naturally inclined to take notice—and to become less happy because of it.
Attempting to keep up with the Joneses and comparing ourselves to others is natural. And comparison can have a benefit. Taking note of someone else's success strategy and evaluating it as a best practice you might adopt can make you better at what you do.
Dwelling on that comparison, however, is also a sure-fire way to become discontent. In this era of sharing personal highlight reels on social media, it's particularly easy to compare the setbacks in our own lives to triumphs in the lives of others.
How to escape with our happiness intact
Research highlighted by the Association for Psychological Science indicates that, while it requires conscious effort, we have the ability to disengage from this negative behavior by catching ourselves as it begins. That way, we escape the unfair and unproductive frustrations that come with holding ourselves up against what we perceive as the success of others.
If we want to be happy, it's imperative that we put our insecurities aside and focus simply on doing our best work. The performance of others means little when we consider our own ability to make a difference in the lives of pets and the people around us.
As I reflect on Mrs. Anders speaking to her cat in a Homer Simpsonesque whisper, I can't help but wish that I could go back and whisper into my own ear. I'd say, "You are doing what you are doing for the right reasons. Focus on the patient and the medicine. Think of what Dr. Miller's popularity with this client might teach you, and then move on. Oh yeah, and choose to be happy with who you are."
Ultimately, Mrs. Anders did the diagnostic testing. She even came back and saw me again, but it was weeks before my confidence returned to its previous (if precarious) position.
Learning by watching others is critical to our success in practice. But obsessing over our perceived inadequacies compared to others is folly. The fact that you have chosen to dedicate yourself to our wonderful profession indicates that you are already a special person. Focus on that, and the passions that drive you forward, and let's forget about keeping up with the Drs. Jones.
Dr. Andy Roark practices in Greenville, S.C. He is the founder and managing director of veterinary consulting firm Tall Oaks Enterprises. Follow him on Facebook and Twitter (@DrAndyRoark).


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NYC breastfeeding: a new-old plan to wean the world off formula
Remember the Nestlé formula boycott? The long-term global effort to encourage breastfeeding as a healthier choice for newborns than formula – once focused on developing nations – is now a trend among US hospitals. But a new program to decrease the use of formula in hospitals, backed by NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg, is being criticized as meddling in the decisions of mothers.
The collective howl of "nanny state" that met New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's new "Latch On NYC" program, aimed at encouraging breastfeeding over formula, seems to have overshadowed the fact that the program is part of a well-established trend supported by medial associations, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations.
The trend has echoes of the concerns behind the Nestlé formula boycott of the 1970s and 1980s in the US and Europe. That campaign contended that the Swiss company's promotion of infant formula over breast milk was unhealthy, particularly in less developed nations where unsanitary conditions and nutritional deficiencies made formula a poor substitute.
New York's move against automatically giving away free formula to new moms at hospitals is seen as a way to increase the incentive to breastfeed. It follows Rhode Island, which last year became the first state where birthing centers and hospitals voluntarily banned giving formula to new mothers in favor of educating them on the benefits of nursing. Massachusetts followed suit in July, with all 49 birth facilities voluntarily deciding to stop handing out free formula.
RELATED: Are you a Helicopter Parent? Take our quiz!
In 2005, the Massachusetts Public Health Council instituted a statewide ban on giving out free formula, but then-Gov. Mitt Romney overturned the decision a few months later.
There are currently 600 hospitals in the US that have banned the free new-mommy swag bags given at discharge from the hospital – discharge bags full of everything from formula to diapers and other baby gear. Also, hospitals can receive a "baby friendly" accreditation, which was developed by WHO and UNICEF in 1991 and is administered in the US by Baby-Friendly USA.
There is not yet enough evidence to track the direct impact of these bans, says Marsha Walker, executive director of the National Alliance for Breastfeeding Advocacy (NABA), who was involved in the legislative advocacy for the Massachusetts Breastfeeding Coalition. But she adds that there is an increased interest in hospitals providing lactation care services.
New York's first "baby friendly" hospital – Harlem Hospital – was where city officials announced the launch of the "Latch On NYC" program May 9. The initiative is aimed primarily at mothers who choose to breastfeed and helping them "to increase breastfeeding exclusivity and duration," according to the Department of Health description.
Public health officials are calling on all New York hospitals to voluntarily commit to the initiative, which asks the institutions to enforce the New York State hospital regulation, effective since 2005, that breastfeeding infants not be given formula feedings unless by "a specific order by the attending practitioner or at the request of the mother." The initiative also involves restricting nurses' access to formula and developing a better tracking system for formula distribution. Hospitals will also agree to discontinue the distribution of free or promotional infant formula as well as prohibit displaying of formula promotional materials.
Hospitals run by New York's Health and Hospital Corporation had already started banning gift bags and formula promotional materials in 2007. The current "Latch On NYC" campaign continues that trend as New York tries to increase exclusive breastfeeding for infants up to six months of age. Ninety-three percent of births in the city are at hospitals where breastfed infants are also given supplemental formula, according to the Department of Health.
Bloomberg says mothers should choose what is right for them. The program guarantees they will be able to make that decision free from corporate influence. But many mommy bloggers and pundits have criticized the program as a new round of over-reach into personal choice by Bloomberg public health policy. The city is still reeling from his proposal this spring to ban supersize sodas in the city.
Starting in September, more than half of New York's maternity hospitals (27 of 40) will ask mothers of newborns to listen to talks about why breast milk is more healthy than formula samples that hospitals traditionally have offered free of charge.
"Restricting access to samples and information from formula manufacturers is not the answer to increasing breastfeeding rates," said Mardi Mountford, the executive vice president for the International Formula Council (IFC), in a written statement. The IFC is an association of manufacturers including Abbott Nutrition, Mead Johnson Nutrition, Nestlé Infant Nutrition Perrigo Nutritionals, and Pfizer Nutrition.
"A way to help mothers is to be supportive of the feeding choice they make for their infants regardless if they choose breastfeeding, formula feeding or a combination of both," said Ms. Mountford. "For infants who are not breast fed, infant formula is the only safe, nutritious and recommended feeding option. Clinical studies and many years of consumer use have shown infant formula to be a safe alternative which supports normal growth and development in infants."
Campaigns aimed at increasing breastfeeding rates, Mountford said, should include advice and support for new mothers, including education on proper formula preparation and bottle-feeding techniques so that mothers will be fully prepared for whichever option they choose.
Ms. Walker says the criticism of Bloomberg's plan has misconstrued the purpose of the program, which is designed to put best practices into place for health-care providers who give counseling and evidenced-based advice on breastfeeding, and not to tell mothers what to do.
"It has nothing to do with how choices are made or whether or not a woman chooses to breastfeed," says Walker. "The initiative assures that if a breastfed baby needs to be supplemented with formula, it is not because the nurses don't have time or because mothers don't know how to breastfeed."
There may be medical reasons that mothers would need to use formula for newborns, says Walker, but those are rare.
Walker, who is also a certified lactation consultant, says that one of the main reasons women ask for formula from hospitals is because they are having trouble breastfeeding. The role of the hospital and health-care providers, says Walker, is to find out why a new mother is having trouble and how they can support her and the baby.
"The decision to breastfeed or not is made while moms are pregnant and well before they get to the hospital," says Walker.
That decision may be influenced by formula marketing such as "discharge bags," suggests a recent study in the Journal of Human Lactation, titled "Removal of Industry-Sponsored Formula Sample Packs from the Hospital: Does It Make a Difference?"
The study found that women who receive industry-sponsored formula when they are discharged from the hospital are less likely to breastfeed exclusively for the first six months, as recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics. And data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) show that only 13 percent of infants nationwide meet that goal.
Seventy-two percent of US hospitals gave mothers formula samples when they were discharged in 2010, a decrease from 91 percent in 2007, according to the study, conducted by staff at the Cooper University Hospital in Camden, N.J., and Boston Medical Center.
The IFC refutes research that links formula samples to decreased breastfeeding.
"Results of research into any relationship between infant formula hospital sample distribution and breastfeeding have been inconsistent; some studies show an association while others do not," says the IFC on their website.
Breastfeeding rates are on the rise nationwide, according to CDC data tracking breastfeeding from 2000 to 2009. The initiation rate increased from 71 percent in 2000 to 77 percent in 2009. Also breastfeeding at six months increased from 34.2 percent to 47.2 percent. The US Department of Health and Human Services's goal is 60 percent by 2020, according to its Healthy People 2020 objectives.
Giving mothers free samples of formula is a marketing strategy that violates the World Health Organization's International Code for Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes, which was first published in 1981 to emphasize the influence of manufactured substitutes on breastfeeding practices.
"It's a very effective marketing strategy," says Walker. "It's not a gift, it's not charity, and it's not because the hospital feels it is good for mothers."
Formula companies know that 95 percent of mothers will use the formula brand that they receive from the hospital, says Walker, because mothers think that if the hospital hands it to them, doctors endorse it.
The American Association of Family Physician's (AAFP) website, recommends that hospital staff not give formula or pacifiers to babies whose mothers choose to breastfeed exclusively. The organization also "discourages distribution of formula or coupons for free or discounted formula in hospital discharge or physician office packets given to mothers who choose to breastfeed exclusively."
The American Academy of Pediatrics board of directors also passed a resolution in July to "advise pediatricians not to provide formula company gift bags, coupons, and industry-authored handouts to the parents of newborns and infants in office and clinic settings," also stating that infant formula marketing has "direct negative effects on the continuation and exclusivity of breastfeeding."
US Surgeon General Regina Benjamin supports a mother's right to choose, but also says that mothers need access to accurate information about breastfeeding.
"The decision to breastfeed is a personal one, and a mother should not be made to feel guilty if she cannot or chooses not to breastfeed," Dr. Benjamin said in a statement last year for World Breastfeeding Week, which runs Aug. 1 to 7. "But given the importance of breastfeeding for the health and well-being of mothers and children, we need to do what we can to help mothers who want to breastfeed to do so successfully."


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You are currently browsing the daily archive for February 14, 2013.
From a moving vantage point in the center of the Upper Bay, I look south and see Shawn Miller pushing a deck barge to facilitate some trucking on the sixth boro.
To the north, it's Gabby L Miller crossing with 1WTC in the background. At Blue Friday plus
80 days (i.e., 80 days since that day after Thanksgiving Atlantic Salvor brought antenna segments into the harbor), this is what the top of 1WTC looks like.
The new Curtis Reinauer lay at anchorage. Here are a few shots of the old Curtis . . . now working in West African waters.
Joan Turecamo, one of the last upstate NY Matton-built vessels, heads to Gowanus Bay.
Finally . . . it's Rae, moving a recycling scow probably back to Newtown Creek. Rae's my age!.
All fotos by Will Van Dorp.
Unrelated: Here's a foto and article from today's NYTimes about dead ship Triumph. The caption mentions that USCG tugs are towing the vessel into Mobile. Predictably, the alleged tugs are not identified. For info on the tugs, click here.


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THERMTRON PRODUCTS, INC., v. HERMANSDORFER(1976)
Title 28 U.S.C. 1441 (a) provides that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction" may be removed by the defendant to the federal district court, and 1446 provides the removal procedure. Section 1447 (c) provides for remand to the state court on the ground that the case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," and 1447 (d) imposes a general bar against appellate review of a remand order. After two citizens of Kentucky had brought a damages action against petitioners, an Indiana corporation and its employee, a citizen of Indiana, petitioners removed the action to the Federal District Court under 1441 (a) and 1446. Thereafter respondent, the District Judge, though conceding that petitioners had the statutory right to remove the action to federal court, ordered the case remanded to the state court for trial, solely on the ground that his heavy docket would unjustly delay the plaintiffs from going to trial on the merits. Petitioners then filed in the Court of Appeals an alternative petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition on the ground that the action had been properly removed and that respondent lacked authority to remand the case on the ground that he had asserted. The Court of Appeals denied the petition after concluding that (1) the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the remand order and (2) the Court of Appeals because of 1447 (d) had no jurisdiction to review that order. Petitioners concede that 1447 (d) prohibits appellate review of all remand orders issued pursuant to 1447 (c), whether erroneous or not, but maintain that the bar does not apply to remand on a ground not authorized by 1447 (c). Held:
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 353. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Frank G. Dickey, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
C. Kilmer Combs argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions in this case are whether a Federal District Judge may remand a properly removed diversity case for reasons not authorized by statute, and, if not, whether such remand order may be remedied by writ of mandamus.
On April 9, 1973, two citizens and residents of Kentucky filed an action in a Kentucky state court against Thermtron Products, Inc., an Indiana corporation without office or place of business in Kentucky, and one Larry Dean Newhard, an employee of Thermtron and a citizen and resident of Indiana, seeking damages for injuries arising out of an automobile accident between plaintiff's automobile and a vehicle driven by Newhard. [423 U.S. 336, 338] Service on the defendants, who are petitioners here, was by substituted service on the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth, pursuant to Kentucky law. Later that month, petitioners removed the cause to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 1 and 1446. 2 The [423 U.S. 336, 339] case was assigned a number, and the defendants filed their answer and later proceeded with discovery. On February 5, 1974, respondent judge issued an order in the case which recited that the action "was removed from the Pike Circuit Court, Pike County, Kentucky, on April 30, 1973, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1446," that his court had reviewed its entire civil docket and found "that there is no available time in which to try the above-styled action in the foreseeable future" and that an adjudication of the merits of the case would be expedited in the state court. Record 31. The order then called upon the defendants to show cause "why the ends of justice do not require this matter [to] be remanded to the Pike Circuit Court . . . ." Ibid. In response to the [423 U.S. 336, 340] order, petitioners asserted that they believed they could not have a fair and impartial trial in the state courts, that the cause had been properly removed pursuant to the applicable statutes, that petitioners had a federal right to have the cause tried in the federal court, that respondent had no discretion to remand the case merely because of a crowded docket, and that there was no other legal ground for the remand.
On March 22, 1974, respondent filed a memorandum opinion and order remanding the case to the Pike Circuit Court. The opinion noted petitioners' contention that they had a "right" to remove the action by properly invoking 28 U.S.C. 1441, and remarked that "[t]he court must concede that fact." Record 36. That right, the opinion then stated, nevertheless had to be "balanced against the plaintiffs' right to a forum of their choice and their right to a speedy decision on the merits of their cause of action." Ibid. Because of the District Court's crowded docket and because other cases had priority on available trial time, 3 "plaintiffs' right of redress [423 U.S. 336, 341] is being severely impaired," which "would not be the case if the cause had not been removed from the state courts." Id., at 37. Remarking that the purpose of the removal statute was to prevent prejudice in local courts and being of the view that petitioners had made no showing of possible prejudice that might follow from remand, respondent then ordered the case remanded. 4
Petitioners then filed in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit their alternative petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition, requesting relief on the ground that the action had been properly removed and that respondent had no authority or discretion whatsoever to remand the case on the ground asserted by him. Based on the petition and respondent's response, the Court of Appeals denied the petition after concluding (1) that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the order for remand and (2) that the Court of Appeals [423 U.S. 336, 342] had no jurisdiction to review that order or to issue mandamus because of the prohibition against appellate review contained in 28 U.S.C. 1447 (d). We granted the petition for certiorari, 420 U.S. 923 (1975), and now reverse.
Title 28 U.S.C. 1441 (a) provides that unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction," may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States. 5 Section 1446 provides the procedure for removal; 6 and a case removed under that section may be remanded only in accordance with 1447 which governs procedure after removal. Section 1447 (c) provides in part:
The issue before us now is whether 1447 (d) also bars review where a case has been properly removed and the remand order is issued on grounds not authorized by 1447 (c). Here, respondent did not purport to proceed on the basis that this case had been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." Neither the propriety of the removal nor the jurisdiction of the court [423 U.S. 336, 344] was questioned by respondent in the slightest. 8 Section 1447 (c) was not even mentioned. Instead, the District Court's order was based on grounds wholly different from those upon which 1447 (c) permits remand. The determining factor was the District Court's heavy docket, which respondent thought would unjustly delay plaintiffs in going to trial on the merits of their action. This consideration, however, is plainly irrelevant to whether the District Court would have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in that court, to the removability of a case from the state court under 1441, and hence to the question whether this cause was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction" within the meaning of the statute.
Removal of cases from state courts has been allowed since the first Judiciary Act, and the right to remove has never been dependent on the state of the federal court's docket. It is indeed unfortunate if the judicial manpower provided by Congress in any district is insufficient to try with reasonable promptness the cases properly filed in or removed to that court in accordance with the applicable statutes. But an otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 [423 U.S. 336, 345] (1910); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170 (1858).
We agree with petitioners: The District Court exceeded its authority in remanding on grounds not permitted by the controlling statute. 9
Although the Court of Appeals, erroneously we think, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter its remand order, the Court of Appeals did not mention 1447 (c), did not suggest that the District Court had proceeded under that section, properly or improperly, and did not itself suggest that this case was not removable under 1441 or that it had been improvidently removed from the state court for want of jurisdiction or otherwise. In the face of petitioners' position that the remand was for reasons not authorized by the statute, the Court of Appeals acted solely on the ground that under 1447 (d) it had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the remand order issued by respondent in this case.
We disagree with that conclusion. Section 1447 (d) is not dispositive of the reviewability of remand orders in and of itself. That section and 1447 (c) must be construed together, as this Court has said of the predecessors to these two sections in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, supra, at 380-381, and Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199, 202 (1940). These provisions, like their predecessors, "are in pari materia [and] are to be [423 U.S. 336, 346] construed accordingly rather than as distinct enactments . . . ." Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, supra, at 380. This means that only remand orders issued under 1447 (c) and invoking the grounds specified therein - that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction - are immune from review under 1447 (d).
Section 1447 (d) has its roots in the Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552. Prior to 1875, orders of remand were not reviewable by appeal or writ of error for want of a final judgment. Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507 (1875). Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 472, provided that if the trial court became satisfied at any time during the pendency of a case brought in or removed to that court that the case did not really or substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, the action was to be either dismissed or remanded to the court from which it was removed as justice might require. The section expressly provided that the order dismissing or remanding the cause was to be reviewable on writ of error or appeal. 10 The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, however, while not disturbing [423 U.S. 336, 347] the provision for dismissal or remand for want of jurisdiction, not only repealed the provision in 5 of the 1875 Act providing for appellate review of remand orders but contained a provision that "improperly removed" cases should be remanded and that "no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." 24 Stat. 553. 11 (Emphasis added.)
These provisions for the disposition of removed cases where jurisdiction was lacking or removal was otherwise improper, together with the prohibition of appellate review, were later included in 28 and 37 of the Judicial Code of 1911, appeared in 28 U.S.C. 71 and 80 (1946 ed.), 36 Stat. 1094, 1098, and endured until 1948 12 when [423 U.S. 336, 348] 28 U.S.C. 1447 was enacted - minus, however, the prohibition against appellate review. The omission was corrected in 1949 when the predecessor of the present subsection (d) came into being. 13
Until 1948, then, district courts were authorized to remand cases over which they had no jurisdiction or which had been otherwise "improperly" removed, and district court orders "so remanding" were not appealable. It was held that a case remanded for want of jurisdiction under 80, which itself contained no prohibition of appellate review, was an "improperly" removed case under 71 and hence subject to the reviewability bar of that section. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374 (1937). But under the plain language of 71, a case was "so remanded" and within the reviewability prohibition only if it had been improperly removed. Insofar as we are advised, no case in this Court ever held that 71 prohibited appellate review by mandamus of a remand order not purporting to be based on the statutory ground. 14 [423 U.S. 336, 349]
Sections 1447 (c) and (d) represent the 1948 recodification of 71 and 80. They were intended to restate the prior law with respect to remand orders and their [423 U.S. 336, 350] reviewability. 15 There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute. [423 U.S. 336, 351]
There is no doubt that in order to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues, United States v. Rice, 327 U.S., at 751 , Congress immunized from all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds specified in 1447 (c), whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court. But we are not convinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute. That justice may move more slowly in some federal courts than in their state counterparts is not one of the considerations that Congress has permitted the district courts to recognize in passing on remand issues. Because the District Judge remanded a properly removed case on grounds that he had no authority to consider, he exceeded his statutorily defined power; and issuance of the writ of mandamus was not barred by 1447 (d).
In so holding we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established general rule that 1447 (d) and its [423 U.S. 336, 352] predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute. But this Court has not yet construed the present or past prohibition against review of remand orders so as to extinguish the power of an appellate court to correct a district court that has not merely erred in applying the requisite provision for remand but has remanded a case on grounds not specified in the statute and not touching the propriety of the removal. We decline to construe 1447 (d) so woodenly as to reach that result now.
There remains the question whether absent the bar of 1447 (d) against appellate review, the writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to require the District Court to entertain the remanded action. The answer is in the affirmative.
A "traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953). "Repeated decisions of this Court have established the rule . . . that the writ will lie in a proper case to direct a subordinate Federal court to decide a pending cause," Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258, 270 (1873), or to require "a Federal court of inferior jurisdiction to reinstate a case, and to proceed to try and adjudicate the same." McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S., at 280 .
In accordance with the foregoing cases, this Court has declared that because an order remanding a removed [423 U.S. 336, 353] action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal, "[t]he remedy in such a case is by mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of error to review what has been done." Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall., at 508. Absent statutory prohibitions, when a remand order is challenged by a petition for mandamus in an appellate court, "the power of the court to issue the mandamus would be undoubted." In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S., at 453 . There is nothing in our later cases dealing with the extraordinary writs that leads us to question the availability of mandamus in circumstances where the district court has refused to adjudicate a case, and has remanded it on grounds not authorized by the removal statutes. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940); Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927). On the contrary, these cases would support the use of mandamus to prevent nullification of the removal statutes by remand orders resting on grounds having no warrant in the law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] Title 28 U.S.C. 1446 provides: "(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle him or them or removal together with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon him or them in such action. "(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and [423 U.S. 336, 339] is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. "If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. "(c) The petition for removal of a criminal prosecution may be filed at any time before trial. "(d) Each petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding, except a petition in behalf of the United States, shall be accompanied by a bond with good and sufficient surety conditioned that the defendant or defendants will pay all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the removal proceedings should it be determined that the case was not removable or was improperly removed. "(e) Promptly after the filing of such petition and bond the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded. "(f) If the defendant or defendants are in actual custody on process issued by the State court, the district court shall issue its writ of habeas corpus, and the marshal shall thereupon take such defendant or defendants into his custody and deliver a copy of the writ to the clerk of such State court."
[ Footnote 3 ] The condition of respondent's docket and the priority for trial of cases on the docket were explained by respondent in the memorandum opinion and order, Record 36-37: "At the close of business on February 28, 1974 there were pending on the dockets for which this Court has primary responsibility a total of eighty (80) criminal actions and three hundred ninety-four (394) civil actions. These cases have been assigned various priorities. The first priority is granted criminal actions. Social Security and Black Lung cases[*] have a priority second only to criminal cases. Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529, 538 (6th Cir. 1972). A third priority is granted those actions in which the United States is a party. The lowest priority, as a matter of necessity, is assigned private civil actions. Consequently, the period between the filing of such actions and the time in which they are assigned for trial must, regrettably, continually be extended." "[*] At the present time the Eastern District of Kentucky is experiencing an influx of Black Lung related actions. The Department [423 U.S. 336, 341] of Health, Education and Welfare predicts that a total in excess of four thousand (4,000) of these actions will ultimately be filed in this District."
[ Footnote 4 ] Apparently respondent entered similar orders of remand in other diversity cases removed to his court. Petitioners stated in their petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals that they believed "upon information only, that the Respondent herein has entered similar Orders of Remand in approximately 28 other actions, which actions either were removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, at Pikeville, in 1973, or which actions constitute all cases removed to said Court during the year 1973." Id., at 8-9. At oral argument before this Court, petitioners' counsel stated that during 1973, 14 cases had been removed from the Pike Circuit Court to respondent's court and that in every case respondent had issued orders to defendants to show cause why the cases should not be remanded to the state court. Petitioners' counsel further stated that respondent had entered orders of remand to the state court in all but two of those cases. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
[ Footnote 5 ] See n. 1, supra.
[ Footnote 6 ] See n. 2, supra.
[ Footnote 7 ] Title 28 U.S.C. 1443 provides: "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the [423 U.S. 336, 343] district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: "(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; "(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." Title 28 U.S.C. 1447 (d), as amended in 1949, was further amended in 1964 to provide expressly for review "by appeal or otherwise" of orders remanding cases that had been removed pursuant to 1443. 901 of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 266. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
[ Footnote 8 ] So far as the record reveals, it has not been questioned in this case that the cause is between citizens of different States, that it involves a claim of over $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, that it is within the so-called diversity jurisdiction of the District Court and that it could have been initially filed in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. It also seems common ground that there is no express statutory provision forbidding the removal of this action and that the cause was timely removed in strict compliance with 28 U.S.C. 1446.
[ Footnote 9 ] Lower federal courts have uniformly held that cases properly removed from state to federal court within the federal court's jurisdiction may not be remanded for discretionary reasons not authorized by the controlling statute. Romero v. ITE Imperial Corp., 332 F. Supp. 523, 526 (PR 1971); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Engineers Ben. Assn., 256 F. Supp. 68, 77 (EDNY 1966); Davis v. Joyner, 240 F. Supp. 689, 690 (EDNC 1964); Vann v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp. 377, 381 (EDNC 1958).
[ Footnote 10 ] Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 472, provided: "That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a State court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just; but the order of said circuit court dismissing or remanding said cause to the State court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the case may be."
[ Footnote 11 ] The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 553, provided in part: "`Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any circuit court of the United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.'"
[ Footnote 12 ] Title 28 U.S.C. 71 (1946 ed.), which was effective until the 1948 revision, provided in part: "Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any district court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal from the decision of the district court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." Title 28 U.S.C. 80 (1946 ed.), which was also effective until the 1948 revision, provided: "If in any suit commenced in a district court, or removed from a State court to a district court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said district court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not [423 U.S. 336, 348] really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this chapter, the said district court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just."
[ Footnote 13 ] As amended in 1949, 28 U.S.C. 1447 (d) (1946 ed., Supp. III) provided: "(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." The subsection took its present form in 1964, when Congress amended the subsection to provide for review of cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1443. See n. 7, supra.
[ Footnote 14 ] Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199 (1940), upon which respondent relies, plainly did not do so. There, various suits were [423 U.S. 336, 349] filed in the Ohio state courts against Armour and an individual. Armour's removal petitions, filed in the state courts in accordance with the then-controlling procedure and asserting the right to remove because of a separable controversy between it and the plaintiffs, were denied by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the controversy with Armour was separable and that its removal petitions should have been granted. The trial court complied, and the cases were removed; but a motion to remand was then granted in the Federal District Court on the ground that in its view there was no separable controversy and hence no federal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Armour's mandamus petition, holding that the District Court had no power to determine the separable-controversy issue because that question had been finally determined by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals deemed inapplicable the prohibition against review by appeal or mandamus where the action of the District Court flouted not only the doctrine of res judicata but also the statutes directing courts to give full faith and credit to the decisions of state tribunals. The view of the Court of Appeals was that the prohibition against review contained in 71 barred review of erroneous decisions but not of those beyond the power of the District Court. In reversing, this Court could not agree with "[t]he suggestion that the federal district court had no power to consider the entire record and pass upon the question of separability, because this point had been finally settled by the Supreme Court of Ohio." 311 U.S., at 204 . Although the Ohio Supreme Court had held that the state trial court should have relinquished jurisdiction, the federal court was required by the controlling statute to consider its own jurisdiction, which it had proceeded to do in determining that "the controversy was not within the jurisdiction of that court" and that the case should be remanded. The remand order was thus deemed by this Court to be strictly within the power conferred upon the District Court by the statute, inasmuch as it was based on a determination of jurisdiction over the case. Mandamus was therefore barred by 71. It is apparent that Kloeb does not control this case. Kloeb did not hold that mandamus would not lie to challenge an order based [423 U.S. 336, 350] upon grounds that the District Court was not empowered by statute to consider. To the contrary, Kloeb held that the District Court was not bound by the state court's jurisdictional determination, and that the District Court's remand order, entered for want of jurisdiction in compliance with the controlling statute, was not reviewable by mandamus. In contrast to Kloeb, where the remand for want of jurisdiction was expressly authorized by the statute, here the District Court did not purport to comply with the removal and remand statutes at all. Its remand was on wholly unauthorized grounds.
[ Footnote 15 ] When the Judicial Code was revised in 1948, 28 U.S.C. 1447 (e) (1946 ed., Supp. II) (now 1447 (c)) provided: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case." There was no express provision, as there had been under former 71, prohibiting review of such order. The Reviser's Note stated: "Subsection (e) [now subsec. (c)] is derived from sections 71 and 80 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. Such subsection is rewritten to eliminate the cumbersome procedure of remand." Note following 28 U.S.C. 1447. There was no intent to change the prior law substantively, although the prohibition of appellate review of remand orders contained in 71 of the old Code was inexplicably omitted. The omission was quickly rectified by the 1949 amendments to the Code. Section 1447 (c) (1946 ed., Supp. III), which had been 1447 (e) (1946 ed., Supp. II) in the 1948 revision, took its present form and 1447 (d) (1946 ed., Supp. III) was enacted. The House Report on the 1949 amendments explained the addition of 1447 (d): "This section strikes out subsections (c) and (d) of section 1447 of title 28, U.S.C., as covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and adds a new subsection to such section 1447 to remove any doubt that the former law as to the finality of an order of remand to a State court is continued." H. R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 15. The plain intent of Congress, which was accomplished with the 1949 [423 U.S. 336, 351] amendment, was to recodify the pre-1948 law without material change insofar as the provisions of 71 and 80 of the old Code here relevant were concerned. That the word "improperly" in the old law was changed to "improvidently" in 1447 (c) (1946 ed., Supp. III) with reference to the criteria for remanding cases removed from state and federal court is of no moment. "[N]o changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the 1948. revision [of the Judicial Code] unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed." Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957) (footnote omitted). What this Court said in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374 (1937), with respect to the in pari materia construction of 71 and 80 of the pre-1948 Judicial Code is equally true today of 1447 (c) and (d) in light of the identical substantive content of the two sets of statutory provisions.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
The Court begins its discussion in this case by asking the wrong questions, and compounds its error by arriving at the wrong answer to at least one of the questions thus posed. The principal, and in my view only, issue presented [423 U.S. 336, 354] for review is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that it was without jurisdiction to review the order of remand entered by the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. If no jurisdiction existed, it of course follows that there was no power in the Court of Appeals to examine the merits of petitioners' contentions that the order of remand exceeded respondent's authority, and that its order denying relief must be affirmed. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). As I think it plain that Congress, which has unquestioned authority to do so, Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850), has expressly prohibited the review sought by petitioners, I dissent.
The Court of Appeals not unreasonably believed that 28 U.S.C. 1447 (d) means what it says. It says:
Congress' purpose in barring review of all remand orders has always been very clear - to prevent the additional delay which a removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsideration of an order of remand. The removal jurisdiction extended by Congress works a significant interference in the conduct of litigation commenced in state court. While Congress felt that making available a federal forum in appropriate instances justifies some such interruption and delay, it obviously [423 U.S. 336, 355] thought it equally important that when removal to a federal court is not warranted the case should be returned to the state court as expeditiously as possible. If this balanced concern is disregarded, federal removal provisions may become a device affording litigants a means of substantially delaying justice.
It is clear that the ability to invoke appellate review, even if ultimately unavailing on the merits, provides a significant opportunity for additional delay. Congress decided that this possibility was an unacceptable source of additional delay and therefore made the district courts the final arbiters of whether Congress intended that specific actions were to be tried in a federal court.
I do not doubt that the district courts may occasionally err in making these decisions, and certainly Congress was not unaware of these probabilities. All decisionmakers err from time to time, and judicial systems frequently provide some review to remedy some of those errors. But such review is certainly not compelled. Congress balanced the continued disruption and delay caused by further review against the minimal possible harm to the party attempting removal - who will still receive a trial on the merits before a state court which cannot be presumed to be unwilling or unable to afford substantial justice - and concluded that no review should be permitted in these cases. Congress has explicitly indicated its intent to achieve this result; indeed "[i]t is difficult to see what more could be done to make the action of [remand] final, for all the purposes of the removal, and not the subject of review . . . ." Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56, 57 (1887). Yet the Court today holds that Congress did not mean what it so plainly said.
The majority attempts to avoid the plain language of 1447 (d) by characterizing the bar to review as limited to only those remand orders entered pursuant [423 U.S. 336, 356] to the directive of 1447 (c), i. e., those cases "removed improvidently and without jurisdiction." But such a crabbed reading of the statute ignores the undoubted purpose behind the congressional prohibition. If the party opposing a remand order may obtain review to litigate whether the order was properly pursuant to the statute, his ability to delay and to frustrate justice is wide ranging indeed. By permitting such a result here, the Court effectively undermines the accepted rule established by Congress and adhered to for almost 90 years.
Nor is it any more than a naive hope to suppose, as the Court apparently does, that the effect of today's decision will be limited to the unique circumstances of this case. According to the Court, this case is beyond the reach of 1447 (d) by virtue of the fact that respondent appears to have expressly premised his remand of the case before him on a ground not authorized by Congress, a conclusion purportedly drawn from the face of respondent's order. I may agree, arguendo, that an order of remand based upon the clogged docket of the district court and a desire to obtain for the parties a trial in some forum without unreasonable delay, however salutary the motivation behind it, is not within the discretion placed in district courts by Congress. But I fail to see how such an order of remand is any more unauthorized than one where the district court erroneously concludes that an action was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." Surely such an error equally contravenes congressional intent to extend a "right" of removal to those within the statute's terms. Yet such an error, until today, never has been thought subject to challenge by appeal or extraordinary writ.
The Court seems to believe the instant case different because it has determined to its satisfaction that respondent's order was not merely an erroneous application [423 U.S. 336, 357] of 1447 (c), but was based upon considerations district courts are not empowered to evaluate. I think the Court's purported distinction both unworkable and portentous of the significant impairment of Congress' carefully worked out scheme. The Court relies upon its belief that respondent's order made clear that he was not acting in accordance with 1447 (c). But there was no requirement that respondent issue any explanation of the grounds for his remand order, and there is no reason to expect that district courts will always afford such explanations. If they do not, is there now jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to compel an explanation so as to evaluate potential claims that the lower court was not acting pursuant to subsection (c)? And what if the district court does state that it finds no jurisdiction, using the rubric of 1447 (c), but the papers plainly demonstrate such a conclusion to be absurd? Are potential challengers to such an order entitled to seek the aid of the court of appeals, first to demonstrate that the order entered by the lower court was a sham and second to block that order pursuant to today's decision? If the Court's grant of certiorari and order of reversal in this case are to have any meaning, it would seem that such avenues of attack should clearly be open to potential opponents of orders of remand. Yet it is equally clear that such devices would soon render meaningless Congress' express, and heretofore fully effective, directive prohibiting such tactics because of their potential for abuse by those seeking only to delay.
The majority's only support for its conclusion that 1447 (d) no longer means what everyone thought it did is the fact that the predecessor statute provided:
Even if one were to accept the majority's theory that "so remanding" somehow limited the otherwise universal prohibition against review, there is no such phrase in the current statute. The majority attempts to avoid this by contending that Congress "intended to restate the prior law with respect to remand orders and their reviewability." Ante, at 349-350. But this assertion flies in the face of the fact that in revising and codifying Title 28, Congress intended to, and did, work significant changes in prior law governing the Judicial Code and the judiciary. The House Committee made clear that the proposed revisions to the removal provisions effectuated a substantially altered and less cumbersome scheme of removal, in which several prior avenues to federal court had been removed so as to restrict federal jurisdiction. H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6, A133-A134. [423 U.S. 336, 360] And with respect to the section at issue here, 1447, the House Judiciary Committee noted that the new
The Court stresses that the 1949 reintroduction of the bar to review, apparently inadvertently omitted from the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, was intended to enact the same rule of finality previously in effect. Ante, at 350 n. 15. I agree with this interpretation, but not with the Court's application of it. The "former law as to finality" which was continued by subsection (d) is that which had been in effect from 1887. Congress has made all judgments "remanding a cause to the state court final and conclusive." In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890); Bryant, supra. Until today it has not been doubted that
Finally, I perceive no justification for the Court's decision to ignore the express directive of Congress in favor of what it personally perceives to be "justice" in this case. If anything is clear from the history of the prohibition against review, it is that Congress decided that potential [423 U.S. 336, 361] errors in individual cases did not justify permitting litigants to challenge remand orders. To carry out its policy of avoiding further interruption of the litigation of removed causes, properly begun in state courts, see Rice, supra, at 751-752, Congress decided to place final responsibility for implementation of its removal scheme with the district courts. It is not for this Court to strike that balance anew.
Congress has demonstrated its ability to protect against judicial abuses of removal rights when it thought it necessary to do so. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). And it is apparent that the judiciary is not without the means of dealing with such errors as pose some danger of repetition. * Rather than leaving future repetition of cases such as this to Congress, the Court sets out to right a perceived wrong in this individual case. In the process of doing so it reopens an avenue for dilatory litigation which Congress had explicitly closed. Because I am convinced that both the Court of Appeals and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioners' claims, I would affirm the judgment below.
[ Footnote * ] The panel of the Court of Appeals below indicated its intention to report respondent's actions "to the Circuit Council for the Sixth Circuit, which has supervisory powers over the District Court." [423 U.S. 336, 362]


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Author's note: If you don't believe that software is manufactured then go directly to your TRS80, do not collect $200.
I'm becoming increasingly impatient with people stating that "open source is about free software" because it's blatantly untrue as a primary driver for corporate adoption. Adopting open source often requires companies (and individuals) to trade-off one cost (license expense) for another (building expertise). It is exactly the same balance we make between insourcing, partnering and outsourcing.
When I probe companies about what motivates their use of open source, they universally talk about transparency of delivery, non-single-vendor ownership of the source and their ability to influence as critical selection factors. They are generally willing to invest more to build expertise if it translates into these benefits. Viewed in this light, licensed software or closed services both cost more and introduce significant business risks where open alternatives exist.
This is not new: its basic manufacturing applied to IT
We had this same conversation in the 90s around manufacturing as that industry joltingly shifted from batch to just-in-time (aka Lean) manufacturing. The key driver for that transformation was improved integration and management of supply chains. We review witty doctoral dissertations about inventory, drum-buffer-rope flow and economic order quantity; however, trust my summary that it all comes down to companies need supply chain transparency.
As technology becomes more and more integral to delivering any type of product, companies must extend their need for supply chain transparency into their IT systems too. That does not mean that companies expect to self-generate (insource) all of their technology. The goal is to manage the supply chain, not to own every step. Smart companies find a balance between control of owning their supply (making it themselves) and finding a reliable supply (multi-source is preferred). If you cannot trust your suppliers then you must create inventory buffers and rigid contracts. Both of these defenses limit agility and drive systemic dysfunction. This was the lesson learned from Lean Just-In-Time manufacturing.
What does this look like for IT supply chains?
A healthy supply chain allows companies to address these issues. They can:
- Change vendors / suppliers and get equivalent supply
- Check the status of deliveries (features)
- Review and impact quality
- Take deliverables in small frequent batches
- Collaborate with suppliers to manage & control the process
- Get visibility into the pipeline
None of these items are specific to software; instead, they are general attributes of a strong supply chain. In a closed system, companies lose these critical supply chain values. While tightly integrated partnerships can provide these benefits, they carry a cost premium and inherently limit vendor choice.
This sounds great! What's the cost?
You need to consider the level of supply chain transparency that's right for you. Most companies are no more likely to refine their own metal than to build from pure open source repositories. There are transparency benefits from open source even from a single supplier. Yet in some cases like the OpenStack community, systems are so essential that they are warrant investing as core competencies and joining the contributing community. Even in those cases, most rely on vendors to package and extend their chosen open source software.
But that misses the point: contributing to an open source project is not required in managing your IT supply chain. Instead, you need to build the operational infrastructure and processes that is open source ready. They may require investing in skills and capabilities related to underlying technologies like the operating system, database or configuration management. For cloud, it is likely to require more investment fault-tolerant architecture and API driven deployment. Companies that are strong in these skills are better able to manage an open source IT supply chain. In fact, they are better able to manage any IT supply chain because they have more control.
So, it's not about cost…
When considering motivations for open source adoption, cost (or technology sizzle) should not be the primary factor. In my experience, the most successful implementations focus first about operational readiness and project stability, and program transparency. These questions indicate companies are thinking with an IT supply chain focus.
PS: If you found this interesting, you'll also like my upstream imperative post.


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Shiny Frog's Delibar app, for iPhones running iOS 4 and higher, combines the social and antisocial bookmarking features of Delicious and Pinboard. Save, manage, and share web pages stored in the cloud, and integrate with services like Mobilizer and Instapaper.
The Delibar app has the ability to sync across multiple computers and accounts and has a bookmarklet that can be used with Safari. It's currently available in the App Store for $2. [Delibar via Macworld]


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2013 Outdoor Summer Concerts and Festivals Guide
Editor's Note:
This is 2013's summer lineup. To see 2014's lineup, go here.
Summer in Portland promises a typically incomparable roster of talent appearing at our top alfresco concert venues: the Oregon Zoo, McMenamins Edgefield, Noon Tunes, to say nothing of the summer festivals. With everyone from the National to Pink Martini to Lyle Lovett to, yes, "Weird" Al Yankovic heading our way, and with the promise of healthy rays of sun, there's no time like the present to start making plans for your summer sound safari—especially when many of the shows are close to selling out.
McMenamins Edgefield Concerts on the Lawn
Tickets at etix.com
- July 10—Garrison Keillor's A Prairie Home Companion's Radio Romance Tour
- July 27—The Flaming Lips
- Aug 2—Pink Martini
- Aug 3—Pink Martini
- Aug 10—Michael Franti & Spearhead
- Aug 13–Steely Dan. Sold out.
- Aug 14—Yeah Yeah Yeahs
- Aug 29—Fun. with special guests Tegan and Sara. Sold out.
- Aug 31—Death Cab for Cutie Plays Transatlanticism and More. Sold out.
- Sept 1—MGMT
- Sept 6—Onerepublic and Sara Bareilles
- Sept 21–The National with guests Frightened Rabbit. Sold out
Oregon Zoo Summer Concert Series
Tickets at ZooConcerts.com
- July 18—"Weird" Al Yankovic
- July 26—Randy Newman
- July 27—Leann Rimes
- July 28—Indigo Girls
- Aug 3—Lyle Lovett
- Aug 4—Trombone Shorty, JJ Grey & MOFRO
- Aug 8—Lee Brice
- Aug 10—Todd Snider's Traveling Folk Show with Shawn Mullins, Hayes Carll, and Sarah Jarosz
- Aug 16—Los Lobos
- Aug 25—Chris Isaak
- Sept 6—The Doobie Brothers
Maryhill Winery
Tickets at Ticketfly
- July 14—Counting Crows with the Wallflowers
- Aug 17—Daryl Hall and John Oates
- Aug 24—Willie Nelson and the Family
Free concerts at Washington Park's Rose Garden ampitheater
- Aug 1—Portland Gay Men's Chorus
- Aug 2—Portland Summerfest Opera: Otello by Giuseppe Verdi
- Aug 3—PDX Jazz presents the Carlton Jackon-Dave Mills Big Band
- Aug 4—Portland Festival Symphony
- Aug 5—Obo Addy's Legacy: DiaTribe—From the Village to the Streets
- Aug 6—Black Prarie
- Aug 7—Vagabond Opera
- Aug 8—Sean Ghazi
- Aug 9—NW Dance Project's In Good Company
- Aug 10—Caña Son
Summer Free For All Concert Series
- July 11—Ashleigh Flynn (Wallace Park)
- July 12—Tony Starlight (Fernhill Park)
- July 22—Brownish Black (Sellwood Riverfront Park)
- July 23—Nancy King (Mt. Tabor Park)
- July 30—Dr. Theopolis (Mt. Tabor Park)
Read our full preview, and see the complete concert lineup.
Sundown at Ecotrust Concert Series
Free outdoor concerts at 721 NW 9th
- July 10—Onuinu and Adventure Galley
- July 17—Portland Cello Project and Adam Sheare
- July 24—Crystal Bowersox and Wayward Vessel
- July 31—Radiation City and Genders
Music On Main Street
Free outdoor concerts on Main St. next to Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall
- July 10—Joey Porter's Tribute to Stevie Wonder
- July 17—The Satin Chaps
- July 24—Y La Bamba
- July 31—Sassparilla
- Aug 7—The Portland Timbre and Boka Marimba
- Aug 14—Steelhead
- Aug 21—Brownish Black
- Aug 28—Caleb Klauder Country Band
Free concerts at Pioneer Square
- July 11—Redwood Son
- July 16—Brian Copeland Band
- July 18—Small Souls
- July 23—Jesse Layne
- July 25—Freewill Band
- July 30—The Sale
- Aug 1—Twangshifters
- Aug 6—Just Lions
- Aug 8—Sunderland
- Aug 13—Strange Tones
- Aug 15—Catherine Feeny
July 18–21—Northwest String Summit
Yonder Mountain String Band headlines this bluegrass festival as it celebrates its 12th anniversary.
July 19-21—Wildwood Music Fest
The Cave Singers, Deadstring Brothers, and Sassparilla headline this Americana and blue festival.
July 26–28—What the Festival
Portland's hottest new party returns for a second year, featuring electronica acts A-Trak, Purity Ring, Yacht, and more DJs than you can count. Read our feature.
July 26–28—Capitol Hill Block Party
There's a range of talent at this year's Block Party, from the Flaming Lips and Girl Talk to Cults, Dirty Projectors, and Danny Brown.
July 26–28—Northwest World Reggae Festival
Prezident Brown, Etana, Nkulee Dube, and more.
July 19–21—PDX Pop Now!
Catch Y La Bamba, Sons of Huns, Magic Mouth, Hausu, and tons of other local acts at the festival's 10-year anniversary. Read our feature.
Aug 2–4—Pickathon
Feist and Andrew Bird head up this year's roster of indie, roots, and americana artists, which also includes Ty Seagall, King Tuff, and Shabazz Palaces.
Aug 2–4—Watershed Fest
Country stars Luke Bryan, Toby Keith, and Brad Paisley strum their guitars at this three day country fest.
Aug 31–Sept 2—Bumbershoot
Death Cab For Cutie, Fun., Heart, Bassnectar, Kendrick Lamar, MGMT, and oh so many more cut across genres.
Sept 6–8—Sisters Folk Festival
Headliners of this blues/bluegrass festival include John Cleary, John Fullbright, Cheryl Wheeler, and Ray Bonneville.
Sept 3–8—MusicFest NW
Filling Portland with sounds will be up-and-coming acts such as Chromatics, Surfer Blood, and Typhoon, alongside national headliners Young the Giant, Animal Collective, Neko Case, and the Head and the Heart.


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This view shows color variations in bright layered deposits on a plateau near Juventae Chasma in the Valles Marineris region of Mars. A brown mantle covers portions of the bright deposits. The view covers an area about 1.2 kilometers (three-fourths of a mile) across.
The image comes from an observation made by the High Resolution Imaging Science Experiment (HiRISE) camera on NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter on May 2, 2007.
Researchers have found that these bright layered deposits contain opaline silica and iron sulfates, consistent with low-temperature, acidic aqueous alteration of basaltic materials. They conclude that aqueous activity affected this plateau after formation of the nearby canyons. Although the source of water and sediment remains uncertain, the strong correlation between fluvial landforms and bright layered deposits in this region argues for sustained precipitation, surface runoff, and fluvial deposition occurring during Mars' Hesperian Era on the plateaus adjacent to Valles Marineris and along portions of canyon walls.
This image is one product from HiRISE observation PSP_003579_1755, centered at 4.7 degrees south latitude, 296.4 degrees east longitude. Other image products from this observation are available at http://hirise.lpl.arizona.edu/PSP_003579_1755.
The University of Arizona, Tucson, operates the HiRISE camera, which was built by Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp., Boulder, Colo. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a division of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, manages the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter for the NASA Science Mission Directorate, Washington. Lockheed Martin Space Systems, Denver, is the prime contractor for the project and built the spacecraft.


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While pondering a sad experience someone I dearly love is going through I started thinking about all the ways we give and show our love to each other. All love begins with our positive thoughts that if maintained lead to positive words and actions which then inspires more positive thoughts…….And so the momentum continues to grow.
This is always true when we are coming from a positive good feeling vibrational place even if it is not fully received by the other party involved. It's not possible to control how others will react to what is given because that has everything to do with where they are vibrationally and very little to do with anything else. In other words no matter what is given to a person who sits in a strongly negative place it will be very hard for them to appreciate and receive anything good that's offered to them. This is a classic example of when a person twists something to reflect what they mostly believe in.
This is a very natural occurrence done by almost everyone to some degree depending on their general outlook on life. For example a person who tends to look at mostly positive aspects in life will be more likely to see the positive aspects of both positive and negative circumstances, whereas a person who tends to notice mostly negative aspects will be more likely to see the negative in both negative and positive circumstances.
Everything that we observe and experience in our lives comes through the filter of our own personal perspective and experience so it's a very good idea to know how we generally feel about things and whether we are usually more positively or negatively focused. It can be quite enlightening to make a list of about 8 to 10 subjects with a mix of important and not quite as important items and honestly think about what our most common emotional response or feelings are in these circumstances. ( For example, Positive, Mostly Positive, Neutral, Slightly Negative, Mostly Negative, or Negative.) This quickly lets us know where we generally sit and is an indication of how we tend to see the world around us.
Of course there will be things we struggle to feel positive about and that's okay. It's not about making ourselves feel bad about where we are but more about becoming more aware of who we are mostly being right now compared to who we really are or who we want to be and giving ourselves the power to make a different choice if that's something that's important to us.
So the idea is we have the choice to see anything positively, to pick out the positive aspects even from strongly negative circumstances just as we have the ability to see and pick out the negative aspects of a situation.
If we do want to make changes in our lives, it can take some training if we have positioned ourselves to see and notice negative aspects as this is what will always highlight itself to us. Not because the negative aspects are more important or stronger than the positive aspects, but more because this is what we have become accustomed to seeing and focusing upon and are therefore attracting more similar feeling situations into our experience through our own attention to them. It requires awareness and conscious effort to re-orientate ourselves in a more wanted direction but can definitely be achieved with time. All it takes is the desire to live a better, more fulfilling and enjoyable life, and the knowing it can be achieved by anyone who makes the effort to do so. And let's face it, even though our lives are great, who among us wants less love, less fulfilling relationships and less enjoyment out of our life! Probably not too many people I'm guessing……
So let's do the best we can to see and give the best we possibly can no matter where we currently are or what is showing up. It is my knowing that this will get every single one of us to where we truly want to go, eventually……
And so it will…….


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16-year-old Helena Muffly wrote exactly 100 years ago today:
Thursday, October 20, 1911:Got out of school early this afternoon. I gathered some walnuts after I got home. Mollie gave me a kick in the back while milking another cow this evening. I've named Ruth's twin calves, one Brutus and the other Caesar, but I can't tell which is which.
Her middle-aged granddaughter's comments 100 years later:
Ouch! It sounds like the kick hurt. Grandma's cow Mollie had her first calf in August. And, Grandma had been pleased with how well Mollie adjusted to being milked, For example on September 27 she wrote:
"Was in doubts and fears as to how Mollie would act when I commenced to milk her. Pop milked her last night, but I had to do it after that, so I got up early this morning, resolving to come off conquering and I did. Hurrah. She didn't kick."
But apparently something upset Mollie while Grandma was milking the next cow—and she gave Grandma a kick.
There have been huge changes in how cows are milked over the last hundred years. In 1911 most farmers had just a few cows that were milked by hand. Today most cows are milked by machines in milking parlors (and some are even milked by robots.)


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Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Scientist: Zhang Zhihe
Oh, yeah, baby, gimme some of that sweet, sweet video action. No, really -- apparently, the reason for the incredible panda baby boom of the last two years is, um, porn:
"It works," Zhang Zhihe, a leading Chinese expert, said about showing uninitiated males DVDs of fellow pandas mating. It is one of many techniques tried over the decades to get captive pandas -- notoriously poor breeders -- to do it, and do it right. The efforts to understand and simulate conditions for mating have paid off in China, the panda's native habitat. The audio-visual approach "is the same idea as chimpanzees seeing people smoke and then copying it," says Prasertsak Buntragulpoontawee, a Thai researcher.
I think the Bloodhound Gang would approve of this development.


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Providing CPR can be exhausting, as you grow tired, you will become less effective. Whenever possible, it is best to share the work with another rescuer. It is not important if the other person is CPR trained because you can tell him what to do. The rescuer tells and shows the other person (the second rescuer) what to do while they do the chest compressions and then while the rescuer does the breaths, the second rescuer prepares and is ready to start compressions as soon as the rescuer has completed the two breaths.
It is a good idea to try to swap over every two minutes. If you become tired and no one is able to help you, consider just doing chest compressions to have a rest from the breaths.
The latest CPR guidelines are the 2021 UK and European Resuscitation Council guidelines.