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Amazon founder Bezos to buy Washington Post
Jeff Bezos, the Amazon.com founder who helped bring books into the digital age, is going after another pillar of "old media": The Washington Post.
Bezos, 49, struck a deal announced Monday to buy the venerable Washington broadsheet and other newspapers for $250 million. It was a startling demonstration of how the Internet has created winners and losers and transformed the media landscape.
Bezos pioneered online shopping, first by selling books out of his Seattle garage in 1995, then with just about everything else. In doing so, he has amassed a $25 billion personal fortune, based on the most recent estimates by Forbes magazine.
Meanwhile The Washington Post, like most newspapers, has been losing readers and advertisers to the Internet while watching its value plummet.
The newspaper, celebrated a generation ago for breaking the Watergate scandal, has been forced in recent years to scale back its ambitions, cut its newsroom staff repeatedly and close several bureaus.
Bezos is buying the newspaper as an individual. Amazon.com Inc. is not involved.
Bezos said to Post employees in a letter distributed to the media that he'd be keeping his "day job" as Amazon CEO and a life in "the other Washington" where Amazon's headquarters in Seattle are based.
But he made clear there would be changes, if unforeseen ones, coming.
"The Internet is transforming almost every element of the news business: shortening news cycles, eroding long-reliable revenue sources, and enabling new kinds of competition, some of which bear little or no news-gathering costs," Bezos wrote. "There is no map, and charting a path ahead will not be easy. We will need to invent, which means we will need to experiment."
Washington Post Co. chairman and CEO Donald Graham called Bezos a "uniquely good new owner." He said the decision was made after years of newspaper industry challenges. The company, which owns the Kaplan education business and several TV stations, will change its name but didn't say what the new name will be.
Bezos said in a statement that he understands the Post's "critical role" in Washington and said its values won't change.
"The paper's duty will remain to its readers and not to the private interests of its owners," Bezos said in his letter to Post employees. "We will continue to follow the truth wherever it leads, and we'll work hard not to make mistakes. When we do, we will own up to them quickly and completely."
Katharine Weymouth, the newspaper's publisher and CEO and a member of the Graham family that has owned the newspaper since 1933, will remain in her post. She has asked other senior managers to stay on as well.
"Mr. Bezos knows as well as anyone the opportunities that come with revolutionary technology when we understand how to make the most of it," she said in a letter to readers. "Under his ownership and with his management savvy, we will be able to accelerate the pace and quality of innovation."
The news surprised industry observers and even the newspaper's employees.
"I think we're all still in shock," said Robert McCartney, one of the newspaper's Metro columnists and a 31-year veteran. "Everybody's standing around the newsroom talking about it. ... I don't think much work's getting done."
The email hit staffers' inboxes at 4:17 p.m. Eastern time. It summoned them to a meeting 13 minutes later.
Graham spoke at the staff meeting of how he has known Bezos for more than a decade, and described him as a decent and patient man, said McCartney.
Graham told the staff he is convinced Bezos is committed to quality journalism and has no political agenda. There was a long standing ovation from the staff after Graham and Weymouth's remarks.
"Hard to imagine the Post without the Grahams," wrote East Asia Correspondent Chico Harlan in a tweet. "Don emailed his writers, knew their names."
Writer Gene Weingarten tweeted, "If Don Graham says this was the right thing to do, I trust him."
Fredrick Kunkle, a metro reporter and a union leader at The Post, said there is also apprehension among staff. "The Graham family has been revered in this town, rightly so," he said, adding he saw at least one person at the meeting wipe away tears. "We all have a lot of questions."
Allen & Co., which held a high-level conference for media and technology executives in Sun Valley, Idaho, last month, was named as an adviser to the deal.
To observers, Bezos is eminently qualified to be a newspaper owner: He's rich, he's innovative and he's willing to live with slim profits. That's proven by his running of Amazon since its foundation. Last month, Amazon.com Inc. reported a surprise loss in the April-June quarter even though revenue grew 22 percent to $15.7 billion.
"Some other buyers might see the Post as a thing to drain money out of," said Joshua Benton, director of the Nieman Journalism Lab at Harvard University. "There's little reason to think (Bezos would) fall into that category."
The Poynter Institute's media and business analyst, Rick Edmonds, compared Bezos' purchase of the Post to billionaire John Henry's $70 million purchase of The Boston Globe, which was announced Saturday.
The newspaper transactions remove well-loved, established publications from publicly traded parent companies which had to answer to shareholders who demanded good quarterly financial results.
"This means putting the Post in the hands of a wealthy individual who can take as long as he needs and spend as much money as he wishes in keeping the paper strong," Edmonds said. "That's a much better situation than a company with other faster-growing businesses trying to justify that same investment."
Alan Mutter, a media consultant and former newspaper editor, said this deal marks the first time a newspaper has been bought by a "digital native," not someone entrenched in the print medium.
"Here's a guy who's going to re-envision the newspaper from top to bottom and we'll see what we get," Mutter said.
The soon-to-be-renamed Washington Post company will retain Slate magazine, TheRoot.com and Foreign Policy magazine, as well as the Post's headquarters building in downtown Washington.
Newspaper revenue has shriveled during the past eight years even as many publishers charged readers more for their print editions and began imposing fees for digital access, too.
The Post Co.'s annual newspaper revenue has plunged 39 percent from $957 million in 2005 to $582 million last year. Meanwhile, the company's newspaper division has swung from an annual operating profit of $125 million to an operating loss of $54 million last year.
Readership of the print editions has also plummeted during the past decade. In 2002, The Washington Post's paid weekday circulation averaged nearly 768,000 copies, according to regulatory filings. By last year, the Post's weekday paid circulation had fallen to an average of just under 481,000, a 37 percent drop.
The hard times are reflected in the Post Co.'s stock price, which hit a high of $999.50 near the end of 2004. The shares closed Monday at $568.70, a 43 percent decline from the peak.
Benchmark Co. analyst Ed Atorino said the sales of the Boston Globe and Washington Post demonstrate that some savvy business leaders still see hope for newspapers.
"Apparently there are people in this country who think these newspapers are worth saving and hope that advertising will eventually stabilize and they can begin to make money again," Atorino said. "If the advertising doesn't come back, then game over."
Associated Press writers Brett Zongker, Marcy Gordon and Jessica Gresko in Washington, Michael Liedtke in San Francisco and Barbara Ortutay in New York contributed to this report.


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subset: commoncrawl


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"Dallas Morning News" KidBeat Columnist Nancy Churnin, who is as passionate about enriching children's lives as anyone I've ever encountered in mainstream journalism, didn't just write a marvelous advance for our performances of Georges Bizet's "Doctor Miracle" (the next one tonight at 7:30 at Dallas Children's Theater–Tickets are just $12), she took the time to experience it for herself and report back to her readers. Get the story right here.
And Nancy, come back anytime!
Suzanne Calvin, Manager/Director Media & PR


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A true top cropping yeast with low ester formation and a broad temperature range. Fermentation at higher temperatures may produce mild fruitiness. This powdery strain results in yeast that remains in suspension post fermentation. Beers mature rapidly, even when cold fermentation is used. Low or no detectable diacetyl.
Flocculation: low
Attenuation: 73-77%
Temperature Range: 55-68° F (13-20° C)
Alcohol Tolerance: approximately 11% ABV
American Wheat or Rye Beer
Berliner Weisse
Bière de Garde
Düsseldorf Altbier
Northern German Altbier


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Our GRL article has been selected by AGU as a Journal Highlight.
On March 9, 2005, the AGU issued a press release in which our GRL article was selected as a Journal Highlight.
After the online publication of this article, Mann and Schmidt, in their usual elegant prose style, stated here that we had "managed to slip through the imperfect peer-review filter of GRL" as follows:
All of their original claims have now been fully discredited (see e.g. this previous post as well as this discussion of a paper 'in press' in the Journal of Climate by Rutherford et al). MM however, continue to promote false and specious claims. McIntyre and McKitrick (2005), in a paper they have managed to slip through the imperfect peer-review filter of GRL, now simply recycle the very same false claims made by them previously in their comment on MBH98 that was rejected by Nature. Sifting through a large number of false and misleading statements in this latest paper, there are two primary criticisms of MBH98 that they raise, both of which are demonstrably specious.
A few days earlier, Mann and Schmidt had published another diatribe against GRL – , stating that:
While GRL publishes many excellent papers and provides an important forum to the research community for rapid publication of important results, occasionally, poor papers slip through the net.
The irony of this observation, given that GRL had published MBH99, has been observed elsewhere, as for example Kevin Vranes here:
As concerns Mann himself, this is especially curious in light of the recent RealClimate posts (link and link) in which Mann and Gavin Schmidt warn us about peer review and the limits therein. Their point is essentially that peer review is limited and can be much less than thorough. One assumes that they are talking about their own work as well as McIntyre's, although they never state this. Mann and Schmidt go to great lengths in their post to single out Geophysical Research Letters. Their post then seems a bit ironic, as GRL is the journal in which the original Mann curve was published (1999, vol 26., issue 6, p. 759), an article which is now receiving much attention as being flawed and under-reviewed.
For newer readers, if you click the sidebar MBH98 under "Categories", you will see some previous comments on the claims made at realclimate. I discussed the claim that "all of their original [MM03] claims have been discredited" in An MM03 Scorecard. I discussed their arguments trying to salvage the hockey stick in Errors Matter #1, Errors Matter #2, Errors Matter #3 and Was Preisendorfer's Rule N Used in MBH98? and their argument about RE and R2 statistics inCook et al 2004.
While I am very pleased that the article was selected as a Journal Highlight, I do not claim that such a selection proves that we are "right" or that passing peer review proves that we are "right" or that AGU or GRL has endorsed our findings as being proven. However, being selected as a Journal Highlight is a pretty good retort to the argument that this article somehow "slipped through the net".


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A decade-long observational study of more than 30,000 people finds that certain vitamins and minerals may help extend your life and keep you from dying of cardiovascular disease—but only if you get those beneficial nutrients from foods, not supplements.The study, published this week in the Annals of Internal Medicine, is yet another to find that taking supplemental vitamins and minerals—either individually or in multivitamins—offers no discernible benefits in terms of reducing risks of death generally or death from cardiovascular disease and cancers, specifically. Simply put, popping pills can't take the place of eating a healthy diet—an unflashy takeaway that likely won't please the massive, $30 billion supplement industry.
Moreover, the study didn't just find a lack of benefits from supplements. It also found potential harms. Getting high doses of calcium (1,000 mg or more per day) from supplements—but not from foods—was linked to higher cancer mortality risks in the study. Likewise, people taking vitamin D supplements who didn't have vitamin D deficiencies may have higher risks of all-cause mortality and death from cancers.
It's unclear from this observational study exactly why the same vitamins and minerals had different effects based on whether they were, say, chewed from a salad or gulped in a tightly packed capsule. But, it's likely due to the fact that our bodies are tuned by evolution to best absorb and use micronutrients at the levels and ratios found in foods.
The authors of the study—a team of nutrition experts led by researchers at Tufts University—note that:
Humans consume foods and nutrients that are highly correlated. The complex interactions among nutrients are likely to play a more important role in determining health outcomes than individual nutrients.
Take the case of calcium, for example. Earlier research suggested that regular mega-doses of calcium from the diet—maybe from late-night ice cream binges—can cause the intestines to cut back on how much of the mineral it absorbs, leading to higher calcium levels in urine (more of it gets peed out) and lower calcium levels circulating in the body. In fact, it's very difficult if not impossible to get too much calcium from foods alone. Regularly swallowing a lot of calcium in a potent pill, on the other hand, doesn't seem to have the same effect on intestinal absorption, leading to increased levels of circulating calcium and the potential for harms, such as constipation and increased risk of kidney stones.
Still, more than half of all adults in the US say they use supplements. Ten percent of us report using four or more each day. Given that, it's rather important to understand the benefits and risks that they pose.
Supplemental findings
To help do that, the authors of the new study looked at data from a massive survey (National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey) taken between 1999 and 2010 from 30,899 people. More than 27,000 of those participants provided information on the supplements they took as well as inventories of the foods they recently ate. The survey also included demographic and other health data, including whether people smoked, drank, exercised, or had medical conditions, such as cancers and diabetes. The participants gave their information to trained interviewers who surveyed participants in their homes and over the telephone. The study authors then linked medical records of deaths to participants over the survey period. The study captured the deaths of 3,613 participants.
Like the general population, a little more than half of the study participants said they took supplements. Nearly 40 percent took multivitamins. The most common individual supplements people took were vitamins C, D, and E, as well as calcium and magnesium.
Based on the supplement and food reports from each participant, the researchers estimated how much of each major micronutrient participants got each day. The researchers broke the estimates down by source (food vs supplement) and noted whether they were below recommended levels, on target, or in excess.At first glance, those taking supplements seemed to fare well—showing a reduced risk of all-cause mortality during the survey. But that association vanished when the researchers considered demographic and health data. "Our results and those of others suggest that supplement users have higher levels of education and income and a healthier lifestyle overall (for example, better diet, higher levels of physical activity, no smoking or alcohol intake, and healthy weight) than nonusers," they wrote. Thus, "the apparent association between supplement use and lower mortality may reflect confounding by higher socioeconomic status and healthy lifestyle factors that are known to reduce mortality."
When the researchers picked apart effects of individual micronutrients, they found that adequate intake of vitamin K and magnesium linked to a lower risk of all-cause mortality. Also, vitamin A, vitamin K, zinc, and copper were associated with a lower risk of death from cardiovascular disease. But these benefits were restricted to intake only from foods—not supplements.
But, before any reader might be tempted to try to bulk-up their diet with foods bursting with those specific vitamins and minerals, the authors add a word of caution. As noted earlier, they suspect that interactions and ratios of nutrients play a role in health outcomes. "Thus, our findings on individual nutrients should be considered exploratory and interpreted with caution," they conclude.
The study also has several limitations, including relying on people to remember the foods that they eat (and honestly report them). Also, it's an observational study, only able to pick out correlations, not prove that nutrients cause any observed harms or benefits.
The researchers (as always) call for more research into the wildly popular use of supplements. But conclude from the data so far that, "although adequate nutrient intake from foods could contribute to reduced risk for death, excess intake from supplements might increase mortality."
Annals of Internal Medicine, 2019. DOI: 10.7326/M18-2478 (About DOIs).


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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Release: H.6 Historical Data
Sum of savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits and large-denomination time deposits.
Calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
For details, please see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Total Time and Savings Deposits at all Depository Institutions (DISCONTINUED) [WTOTTMNS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WTOTTMNS, March 21, 2023.


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Sundance Selects has acquired U.S. rights to "Like Someone in Love," written and directed by former Palme d'Or winner Abbas Kiarostami, the company announced Sunday.
The film, which made its world premiere in competition earlier this week at Cannes, stars Rin Takanashi, Tadashi Okuno and Ryo Kase. It explores the sudden relationship of a young woman and old man in Tokyo.
Also read: Cannes 2012: Kristen Stewart Embraces Topless, Beatnik Role in 'On the Road'
Marin Karmitz of MK2 and Kenzo Horikoshi of Eurospace produced, with associate producers Nathanael Karmitz and Charles Gillibert.
Earlier, IFC Films/Sundance Selects acquired another MK2 production, Walter Salles' "On the Road," which screened in competition. The two companies have previously collaborated on Kiarostami's "Certified," Gus Van Sant's "Paranoid Park," and Olivier Assayas' "Summer Hours" and his upcoming "Something in the Air."
Jonathan Sehring, President of Sundance Selects/IFC Films, said in a statement that Kiairostami's "latest film is a beautiful, mysterious masterpiece that we hope to continue to build his following with in the U.S. We are also clearly very happy to be working with our good friends at MK2 and also with Eurospace."
The deal for the film was negotiated by Arianna Bocco, svp of acquisitions and productions for Sundance Selects/IFC Films and Victoire Thevenin of MK2 on behalf of the filmmakers.
Sundance Selects is a sister label to IFC Films and IFC Midnight, and is owned and operated by AMC Networks.


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In a simple example that performs SVD on a field of sea level pressure of the equatorial Pacific, svds outperforms irlba both in speed and correlation of singular vector (e.g. $u) to the output of the base svd function. One can see in the following graph, that trailing vectors break down in their correlation while svds maintains nearly perfect correlation. Interestingly, this artifact is removed by first centering the data field.
While the effect looks dramatic above, it should be noted that the trailing vectors usually carry only a small fraction of information, and thus contribute only marginally to errors in field reconstruction. Below is a figure showing the reconstruction error of svd, svds, and irlba with increasing levels of truncation.
Finally, both methods were compared in their performance within dineof. With the non-centered field both approaches arrive to a similar RMS, but svds converges with less iterations and EOFs than irlba. With the centered data both methods produce nearly identical results.
Code to reproduce:


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Plan is set, venue is selected, the last step is to start sending gifts and start the surprise for your lover's birthday. Send birthday flowers online in Srinagar with the help of online birthday flowers delivery in Srinagar to her place with a note to guess the venue. You can also send birthday cake in Srinagar to your girlfriend along with some gifts having a clue with every gift. Make your girlfriend wonder about your where-about and feel special at the same time. The treasure hunt ending directly at the venue having a cake directly delivered to the venue will be the best gift for her.
Looking for the best gift for your lover's birthday? Make a plan to surprise her by sending gifts to her every hour and then plan a romantic evening to her favorite restaurant. Start the day and send birthday flowers to Srinagar directly to her place with online birthday flowers delivery in Srinagar. If you wish to send flowers to Srinagar at midnight along with a cake, select midnight cake delivery in Srinagar and the flowers will be delivered at 12 am. To send gifts every hour, make a list of her favorite places and use same day flowers delivery option to surprise her.


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GM & So-Cal Speed Shop
Attacking The Bonneville Salt Flats Four Cylinders At A Time
Historically Speaking
GM and So-Cal Speed Shop first teamed up in 2003 on a Saturn Red Line coupe that grabbed the G/BFALT record with 212.684 mph performance. This dynamic duo followed up that first foray onto the salt with a banner 2004 effort.Ecotec engines took down class records in G/BGL (179.381 mph), G/BFR (210.881 mph), G/BFS (309.607 mph) and G/BGS (290.567 mph). Also of note was our cover car the GM Performance Division/So-Cal Speed Shop Chevrolet Cobalt SS Bonneville Speedster, which generated an unofficial top speed of 243.127 mph in a demonstration run. The fact that there was no production versions of the Cobalt released at the time of the record pass no official record was established.
The Players For 2005
The 2005 Speed Week would see a four-pronged attack on the salt. The weapons of choice include the aforementioned Cobalt Bonneville Speedster, a radically chopped and stretched 2006 Chevrolet HHR in the G/BFCC class (G Class/Blown Fuel Competition Coupe; current record 226.835 mph), a So-Cal built belly tank lakester powered by a supercharged Ecotec will be shooting at a benchmark it set last year in G/BGL (179.381mph) and lastly, GM partnered with four female college interns and California Street Rods to build a new 2005 Cobalt slated to run in G/GALT (G Class/Gas Altered) in an attempt to break the class record that stands at 160.103.
Game On At Speed Week 2005
Right out of the gate the Cobalt SS Bonneville Speedster was a tough cookie; disintegrating a spark plug at 190-plus mph on its first pass meant there was work to be done in the pits. Datalogging showed that the rough course caused the Cobalt to catch air and the resulting over-revving of the engine may have been a culprit in the hardship. Bonneville cars are not engineered like drag cars with engine removal part of the design. There are no re-moveable noses, no quick-change engine mounts it's all guts, no glory on the salt. The GM crew busted some serious ass and had the Cobalt ready to roll on Tuesday. The car's vengefulness persisted and the second bullet suffered from oil starvation issues and popped a rod out the front of the block. Totally unfazed the crew moved to the first engine and planned a complete teardown and rebuild. They had more than a day to get the car ready for time trials. When we left for California fresh pistons were being loaded up but but Mother Nature threw down yet another gauntlet; rain that caused the cancellation of the event.
The lakester crew had an easier time of it. The belly tank speed demon ran 193 mph on its first pass and was in impound by lunchtime awaiting a second confirmation run. Any car that runs faster than the record in its class is moved to the impound area where the crew as four hours to tinker with the car. After that it's hands off and the car stays isolated until the next morning when the crew has one hour to ready the car; add gas, check fluid levels, run quick diagnostics etc. before reporting to a special staging lane. Miss the call to staging and you forfeit your chance at the record. The crew noted a coolant leak and pulled the car from impound. On Sunday the lakester was set to full kill and driver, journalist Don Sherman, unleashed a 203 mph pass which landed car back in impound. On Monday the lakester ran an off-pace 175 mph but the two-way average of 189.205 was more than good enough for the record books. On Tuesday the car ran 193 and was again in impound when the rains came.
On Sunday the HHR made its maiden voyage on the short course. Cars must run on the short course first to display they have the speed to graduate to the seven-mile long course. A run of 175 mph is the cutoff so Jim Minneker's 186 mph effort was graduation grade. Monday's long course run netted an impressive 208 mph but the condition of the course ripped the car's belly pan and by the time repair were made the event had been canceled.The college interns, Tessa Russell, Sarah Jubenville, Heather Chemistruck and Idalia Ovalle and the CSR Cobalt made a 140 mph shakedown pass and was in line to let it all fly on Tuesday when the rain rolled in.
There's a saying at Bonneville during Speed Week, "There's always October." All the GM Ecotec-powered missiles will be back on the salt October 12-15 for the World Finals at more records will fall.
|GM/So-Cal Ecotec Lakester
|New Record 189.205
|GM/So-Cal Chevy HHR
|Top Speed 208 mph
|GM/CSR Cobalt
|Top Speed 140 mph
|GM/So-Cal Cobalt SS Bonneville Speedster
|no speed


text:
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text:
Categories: Islam
Categories: Islam
Hmmm, perhaps you are right.
Islamic prayer rituals derive from paganism – the quran gives no instructions whatsoever on how to pray or do ablution. That comes from the pagansim of 7th century arabia and exposes mohammed as a charlatan.
LOL, of course the pagan Trey has no evidence brother Paul. His lying spirit told him so he believes it. Evidence is not needed, only a non-sequitur.
The irony is that Trey's religion is full of myths borrowed from paganism. One of the clearest examples is the description of God as an old man, as described in Daniel 7:
"As I looked, "thrones were set in place, and the Ancient of Days took his seat. His clothing was as white as snow; the hair of his head was white like wool."
In his "vision", Daniel saw the "Ancient of Days" and provided a vivid description of this being (who was obviously "God"), including clothing that "was white as snow", and hair that "was white as wool". But as historians have recognized, this description of a white-haired God seems to be influenced by pagan mythology. According to Hammer:
"[t]he imagery probably comes from Canaanite mythology, in which El was regarded as an aged deity with grey hair."[168]
Moreover, the imagery of a "son of man" approaching the "Ancient of Days" shares similarities with Canaanite myth. According to Hammer:
"[i]n Ugaritic texts Baal, the younger god, is described as the one who slew the dragon Itu and so gained victory over the sea, thus establishing his kingship. (In verses 13-14 the second figure is seen as the recipient of authority at the hand of the 'ancient in years' and this may reflect the ancient mythology preserved in the enthronement festival of New Year rites."[169]
More examples of borrowed pagan myths can be seen in the legends regarding Leviathan, the sea-serpent.
"There are striking parallels between the Ugarit text and certain biblical verses. In the Book of Isaiah, for instance, the prophet says: "In that day the Lord with his sore and great and strong sword shall punish leviathan the piercing serpent, even leviathan that crooked serpent; and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea" (Isaiah 27:1). That is nearly verbatim to what an anonymous Canaanite bard has to say about Baal: "When you killed Litan, the fleeing serpent, annihilated the twisty serpent, the potentate with seven heads." (http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.678408)
Yet another example of borrowing can be seen in the Genesis story of the serpent. This myth seems to be borrowed from the Epic of Gilgamesh:
"….in the Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh, man is cheated of immortality by a snake who eats a plant. If Gilgamesh had eaten it, would have made him immortal" (http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.678408)
Even the early church fathers recognized the similarities between Christianity and pagan cults like Mithraism and to explain these similarities, they concocted the absurd excuse that Satan had preempted Christianity by creating the pagan religions in order to deceive people into believing that Christianity had been borrowed from paganism:
"For the apostles, in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered unto us what was enjoined upon them; that Jesus took bread, and when He had given thanks, said, "This do ye in remembrance of Me, this is My body;" and that, after the same manner, having taken the cup and given thanks, He said, "This is My blood;" and gave it to them alone. Which the wicked devils have imitated in the mysteries of Mithras, commanding the same thing to be done. For, that bread and a cup of water are placed with certain incantations in the mystic rites of one who is being initiated, you either know or can learn." (First Apology, Chapter 66).
So, Trey should spend more time worrying about the clear examples of paganism in his religion rather than wasting time with unproven polemics against Islam.
"any historical evidence for your ridiculous claims?"
Impossible to produce evidence that the quran does not provide – perhaps you could show us where the quran tells muslims to pray 5 times, where it commands muslims to perform salat positions, where it describes ablution rituals?
These rituals are pagan and are not commanded in the quran – mohammed was a charlatan who stole pagan rituals.
"The irony is that Trey's religion is full of myths borrowed from paganism."
LOL. The same goes for you – show me where your commands muslims to perform pagan rituals……
Trey, your moronic posts are riddled with circular arguments and no proof. How do you know the Islamic prayer is borrowed from "pagan rituals"? Provide proof, not your lying spirit's "inspiration". 😉
As I showed above, your religion is riddled with pagan mythology. You can keep your talking snake, and we will keep our authentic religion, thank you very much!
So, you cannot find anything in your "holy book" that commands muslims to perform the pagan rituals that you perform?
LOL, little man Trey still doesn't seem to understand that circular arguments are not very impressive.
You still haven't explained how Islamic prayer rituals originate in pre-Islamic paganism.
By the way, have you come across any talking snakes lately? 😉
Why do these people fear Islam that they go to any length to ridicule it without any evidence even to the the extend to lie about being a Muslim and how they found it to be x, y and z and yet when you ask them a basic Islamic thing which a 5 year old Muslim would know these bigots have no reply. We Muslim do not do that you will not find a Muslim troll in any other religious thread hurling falsehood and abuse as we Muslim revere all the messagengers of the Almighty, no matter what length you people go to insult our religious beliefs and our messenger still Islam continues to grow rapidly and many non Muslims are converting to it many of whom are educated western women so how is Islam backward or how does it oppress women if your woman folk are turning to it?
Here is my latest post which is a response to Paul Bilal Williams: https://answeringislamblog.wordpress.com/2017/09/04/sujood-the-act-of-worship-which-allah-shares-with-his-creatures/
Did you know that Allah commanded creatures to prostrate themselves to other creature in the same way Muslims are commanded to prostrate to Allah? Did you know Muhammad taught one of his followers to pray to him along with Allah in order to get his invocation answered? Did you know that the Quran's story of Allah commanding the angels to worship Adam, with Allah condemning Satan to hell for refusing to do so, is nothing more than a fable, a fairy tale, which Muhammad adopted since he thought it was actual history? Don't believe me then read the post.
No. I don't know these things. Are these claims made by scholars of the Quran or are they made by an uneducated, unemployed, overwieght, bipolar guy on the internet who no one should take seriously?
Pauly Wally My Paly Waly!
Comment on another thread that has to do with reaction formation.
Sam Shamoun posted an article link here criticizing Allah(swt) for asking the angles and Satan to bow down to Adam as a respect to Adams. Even though we have explained to him(Sam Shamoun) that, it is not to worship Adam as God but is just to show respect to him.
As your article clearly reveals, Sam Shamoun suffers from reaction formation and therefore tries to equate the bowing down to Adam(AS) as "worshiping" Adam, a creature like how we worship Allah, forgetting that Allah did not ask anyone to pray to Adams 5 times a day. Allah did not ask anyone to continue bowing down to Adam at all times like how we do to Allah.
Sam forgets that, in some cultures today people still bow down to elderly as a sign of respect but not worshiping them and some Muslims do that and there is no problem with that. It is not worshiping anyone and it is not worshiping as God. In English courts and other courts, the judges are addressed your worship, your lordship, my honor etc. by Christians. Are the Christians worshiping the judges?
I did not respond to Sam Shamoun on that thread because I responded him several times on the issue but the reaction formation prompted me to cite this as an example that fits him(Sam Shamoun).
There are so many verses in the Bible where God of the Bible asks humans to do things that they will do to Him(God) to humans and we can cite them. Does that means the God of the Bible allows humans to worship creations? Paul Williams has thrown that challenge to you and Ken Temple and non of you answered him.
Ken, enough of your Biblical Canons that has no Epistle of Banabas, the gospel of Shepherd Hermas etc. in it and with so many books difference from denominations of Christians. You cannot use such Canons as criteria for Muslims.
The gospels of Thomas, Judas, Mary etc. are considered canons by other Christians. Christianity is diverse just immediately after Jesus's departure, so you cannot force yours on us as the true one. Ebionites, Arians etc. who do not believe Jesus is God has to be killed by Constantine and others.
Thanks for the concise refutations to Ken. You surely have no comment when an "inspired writer" is considered as a proof for a book and its stories to be true. That is the criteria we must accept from Ken Temple.
Well, the Hindus considered their "inspired writers" makes their Hindu scriptures the true scripture everyone must accept. I wonder if Ken Temple will accept Hindus scriptures as the true scriptures from God because of their "inspired writers"?


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Nicki Minaj and LL Cool J Release Grammy Promo
It seems that the pop stars are just excited about this year's big Grammy event as we are. Following Taylor Swift's lead, Barbie queen Nicki Minaj has popped up in a photo alongside the 2012 Grammy Awards host, LL Cool J.
File this one under 'epic pictures,' for sure. In the pic, Minaj's beaming smile lights up the room, where she's stood sporting some fashionable red fringe and bleach blond locks, leaned up against a gigantic Gramophone. Beside her, there's LL, looking oh-so-sleek in his black newsboy, black suit, black tie and black button-up — the same dress he wore in the photo with Taylor Swift.
Either Mr. Cool J is really decided on what he's wearing to the Grammys, or he didn't have time to change his digs in between shots — which leads us to wonder whether or not Nicki and Taylor were in the same place at the same time. After all, It wouldn't be the first time. When T-Swizzle was crowned Billboard's Woman of the Year at their annual Women in Music event, she rubbed elbows with the 'Super Bass' babe, even posing for a few photos.
But we digress. Music's most elite (seriously, like all of them) will come together again for an epic night of ball gowns and lengthy speeches when the 2012 Grammy Awards air live on CBS on Feb. 12 at 8PM EST. Oh, and don't worry — both Nicki Minaj and Taylor Swift are confirmed to be performing, as is Rihanna, Bruno Mars, Kelly Clarkson and many more. They don't call it 'music's biggest night' for no reason!


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What's a movie that ACTUALLY couldn't get made nowadays?(self)
I always hear that Tropic Thunder would never get made now despite the fact that it's only 13 years old and there was a lot more controversy around the Simple Jack character than there was RDJ in blackface. Same with Blazing Saddles, which while offensive is still a very clever satire and most people would probably recognize that. I bring to your attention Soul Man starring C. Thomas Howell (of E.T. and The Hitcher game). It's about a white guy who takes advantage of affirmative action and dresses up in blackface to attend Harvard Law School. There is NO WAY in hell that that would ever reach production today. I'm honestly shocked it got made back in the '80s.
What other movies would actually never get made these days?
Nobody forgets to take their phone to the bathroom. Nice try though.


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FRANCHISE TAX BD. v. LABORERS VACATION TRUST(1983)
Appellee Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California (CLVT) was established by an agreement between construction industry employer associations and a labor union to provide a mechanism for administering the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement granting construction workers a yearly paid vacation. The trust qualifies as a "welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and hence is subject to regulation under ERISA. Appellant California Franchise Tax Board filed a complaint in California state court against CLVT and its trustees, alleging two causes of action: (1) that CLVT had failed to comply with certain tax levies issued under a California statute, thereby becoming liable for damages for such failure, and (2) that, in view of the defendants' contention that ERISA pre-empted state law and that the trustees lacked power to honor the levies, a judgment be issued declaring the parties' respective rights. CLVT removed the case to Federal District Court, which, after denying appellant's motion for remand to the state court, held that ERISA did not pre-empt the State's power to levy on the funds held in trust by CLVT. The Court of Appeals reversed.
The case is not within the removal jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1441. Pp. 7-28. [463 U.S. 1, 2]
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Patti S. Kitching, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, and Edmond B. Mamer, Deputy Attorney General.
James P. Watson argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were George M. Cox and John S. Miller, Jr. *
[ Footnote * ] William D. Dexter filed a brief for the Multistate Tax Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Stuart A. Smith, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Karen I. Ward, and Allen H. Feldman for the United States; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; by Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., and Victor J. Van Bourg for the Boards of Trustees of the Carpenters Vacation and Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California et al.; and by Eugene B. Granof and George J. Pantos for the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC).
Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Christina G. Dunnell, Assistant Attorney General, and Ann Thacher Anderson filed a brief for the State of Connecticut et al. as amici curiae.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in dispute between the parties is whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), permits state tax authorities [463 U.S. 1, 4] to collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on funds held in trust for the taxpayers under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit plan. The issue is an important one, which affects thousands of federally regulated trusts and all nonfederal tax collection systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution. Nevertheless, for reasons involving perhaps more history than logic, we hold that the lower federal courts had no jurisdiction to decide the question in the case before us, and we vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions to remand it to the state court from which it was removed.
None of the relevant facts is in dispute. Appellee Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for southern California (CLVT) 1 is a trust established by an agreement between four associations of employers active in the construction industry in southern California and the Southern California District Council of Laborers, an arm of the District Council and affiliated locals of the Laborers' International Union of North America. The purpose of the agreement and trust was to establish a mechanism for administering the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement that grants construction workers a yearly paid vacation. 2 The trust agreement expressly proscribes any assignment, pledge, or encumbrance of [463 U.S. 1, 5] funds held in trust by CLVT. 3 The Plan that CLVT administers is unquestionably an "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(1), and CLVT and its individual trustees are thereby subject to extensive regulation under Titles I and III of ERISA.
Appellant Franchise Tax Board is a California agency charged with enforcement of that State's personal income tax law. California law authorizes appellant to require any person in possession of "credits or other personal property or other things of value, belonging to a taxpayer" "to withhold . . . the amount of any tax, interest, or penalties due from the taxpayer . . . and to transmit the amount withheld to the Franchise Tax Board." Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. 18817 (West Supp. 1983). Any person who, upon notice by the Franchise Tax Board, fails to comply with its request to withhold and to transmit funds becomes personally liable for the amounts identified in the notice. 18818.
In June 1980, the Franchise Tax Board filed a complaint in state court against CLVT and its trustees. Under the heading "First Cause of Action," appellant alleged that CLVT had failed to comply with three levies issued under 18817, 4 concluding [463 U.S. 1, 6] with the allegation that it had been "damaged in a sum . . . not to exceed $380.56 plus interest from June 1, 1980." App. 3-8. Under the heading "Second Cause of Action," appellant incorporated its previous allegations and added:
CLVT removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and the court denied the Franchise Tax Board's motion for remand to the state court. On the merits, the District Court ruled that ERISA did not pre-empt the State's power to levy on funds held in trust by CLVT. CLVT appealed, and the court of Appeals reversed. 679 F.2d 1307 (CA9 1982). On petition for rehearing, the Franchise Tax Board renewed its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint in this case. The petition for rehearing was denied, and an appeal was taken to this Court. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 459 U.S. 1085 (1982). We now hold that this case was not within the removal jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1441, and therefore we do not reach the merits of the preemption question. 6
The jurisdictional structure at issue in this case has remained basically unchanged for the past century. With exceptions not relevant here, "any civil action brought in a [463 U.S. 1, 8] State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Ibid. If it appears before final judgment that a case was not properly removed, because it was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed. See 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). For this case - as for many cases where there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties - the propriety of removal turns on whether the case falls within the original "federal question" jurisdiction of the United States district courts: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V). 7
Since the first version of 1331 was enacted, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 1, 18 Stat. 470, the statutory phrase "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Especially when considered in light of 1441's removal jurisdiction, the phrase "arising under" masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system. 8
The most familiar definition of the statutory "arising under" limitation is Justice Holmes' statement, "A suit arises [463 U.S. 1, 9] under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). However, it is well settled that Justice Holmes' test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction. We have often held that a case "arose under" federal law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law, see, e. g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917), and even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle, see Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 270 -272 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.). Leading commentators have suggested that for purposes of 1331 an action "arises under" federal law "if in order for the plaintiff to secure the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the applicability to his case of a proposition of federal law." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler); cf. T. B. Harms Co., supra, at 827 ("a case may `arise under' a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law").
One powerful doctrine has emerged, however - the "well-pleaded complaint" rule - which as a practical matter severely limits the number of cases in which state law "creates the cause of action" that may be initiated in or removed to [463 U.S. 1, 10] federal district court, thereby avoiding more-or-less automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts.
For many cases in which federal law becomes relevant only insofar as it sets bounds for the operation of state authority, the well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as a quick rule of thumb. Describing the case before the Court in Gully, 10 Justice Cardozo wrote:
Simply to state these principles is not to apply them to the case at hand. Appellant's complaint sets forth two "causes of action," one of which expressly refers to ERISA; if either comes within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, removal was proper as to the whole case. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(c). Although appellant's complaint does not specifically assert any particular statutory entitlement for the relief it seeks, the language of the complaint suggests (and the parties do not dispute) that appellant's "first cause of action" states a claim under Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. 18818 (West Supp. 1983), see supra, at 5-6, and its "second cause of action" states a claim under California's Declaratory Judgment Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. 1060 (West 1980). As an initial proposition, then, the "law that creates the cause of action" is state law, and original federal jurisdiction is unavailable unless it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims, or that one or the other claim is "really" one of federal law.
Even though state law creates appellant's causes of action, its case might still "arise under" the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties. For appellant's first cause of action - to enforce its levy, under 18818 - a straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes original federal-court jurisdiction. California law establishes a set of conditions, without reference to federal law, under which a tax levy may be enforced; federal law becomes relevant only by way of a defense to an obligation created entirely by state law, and then only if appellant has made out a valid claim for relief under state law. See supra, at 11-12. The well-pleaded complaint rule was framed to deal with precisely such a situation. As we discuss [463 U.S. 1, 14] above, since 1887 it has been settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.
Appellant's declaratory judgment action poses a more difficult problem. Whereas the question of federal pre-emption is relevant to appellant's first cause of action only as a potential defense, it is a necessary element of the declaratory judgment claim. Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. 1060 (West 1980), a party with an interest in property may bring an action for a declaration of another party's legal rights and duties with respect to that property upon showing that there is an "actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties" of the parties. The only questions in dispute between the parties in this case concern the rights and duties of CLVT and its trustees under ERISA. Not only does appellant's request for a declaratory judgment under California law clearly encompass questions governed by ERISA, but appellant's complaint identifies no other questions as a subject of controversy between the parties. Such questions must be raised in a well-pleaded complaint for a declaratory judgment. 13 Therefore, it is clear on the face of its well-pleaded complaint that appellant may not obtain the relief it seeks in its second cause of action ("[t]hat the court declare defendants legally obligated to honor all future levies by the Board upon [CLVT]," App. 9) without a construction of ERISA and/or an adjudication of its pre-emptive effect and constitutionality - all questions of federal law. [463 U.S. 1, 15]
Appellant argues that original federal-court jurisdiction over such a complaint is foreclosed by our decision in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). As we shall see, however, Skelly Oil is not directly controlling.
In Skelly Oil, Skelly Oil and Phillips had a contract, for the sale of natural gas, that entitled the seller - Skelly Oil - to terminate the contract at any time after December 1, 1946, if the Federal Power Commission had not yet issued a certificate of convenience and necessity to a third party, a pipeline company to whom Phillips intended to resell the gas purchased from Skelly Oil. Their dispute began when the Federal Power Commission informed the pipeline company on November 30 that it would issue a conditional certificate, but did not make its order public until December 2. By this time Skelly Oil had notified Phillips of its decision to terminate their contract. Phillips brought an action in United States District Court under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, seeking a declaration that the contract was still in effect. 339 U.S., at 669 -671.
There was no diversity between the parties, and we held that Phillips' claim was not within the federal-question jurisdiction conferred by 1331. We reasoned:
1. As an initial matter, we must decide whether the doctrine of Skelly Oil limits original federal-court jurisdiction under 1331 - and by extension removal jurisdiction under 1441 - when a question of federal law appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint for a state-law declaratory judgment. Apparently, it is a question of first impression. 15 As the passage quoted above makes clear, Skelly Oil relied significantly on the precise contours of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act as well as of 1331. Cf. 339 U.S., at 674 (stressing the need to respect "the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act"). The Court's emphasis that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to affect only the remedies available in a federal district court, not the court's jurisdiction, was critical to the Court's reasoning. Our interpretation of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in Skelly Oil does not apply of its own force to state declaratory judgment statutes, many of which antedate the federal statute, see Developments in the Law - Declaratory Judgments - 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 790-791 (1949). 16 Cf. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, [463 U.S. 1, 18] 288 U.S. 249, 264 -265 (1933) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over federal questions in a state declaratory judgment).
Yet while Skelly Oil itself is limited to the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, fidelity to its spirit leads us to extend it to state declaratory judgment actions as well. If federal district courts could take jurisdiction, either originally or by removal, of state declaratory judgment claims raising questions of federal law, without regard to the doctrine of Skelly Oil, the federal Declaratory Judgment Act - with the limitations Skelly Oil read into it - would become a dead letter. For any case in which a state declaratory judgment action was available, litigants could get into federal court for a declaratory judgment despite our interpretation of 2201, simply by pleading an adequate state claim for a declaration of federal law. Having interpreted the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 to include certain limitations on the jurisdiction of federal district courts to entertain declaratory judgment suits, we should be extremely hesitant to interpret the Judiciary Act of 1875 and its 1887 amendments in a way that renders the limitations in the later statute nugatory. Therefore, we hold that under the jurisdictional statutes as they now stand 17 [463 U.S. 1, 19] federal courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do they acquire jurisdiction on removal, when a federal question is presented by a complaint for a state declaratory judgment, but Skelly Oil would bar jurisdiction if the plaintiff had sought a federal declaratory judgment.
2. The question, then, is whether a federal district court could take jurisdiction of appellant's declaratory judgment claim had it been brought under 28 U.S.C. 2201. 18 The application of Skelly Oil to such a suit is somewhat unclear. Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question. 19 Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA specifically grants trustees of ERISA-covered plans like CLVT a cause of action for [463 U.S. 1, 20] injunctive relief when their rights and duties under ERISA are at issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law. 20 If CLVT could have sought an injunction under ERISA against application to it of state regulations that require acts inconsistent with ERISA, 21 does a declaratory judgment suit by the State "arise under" federal law?
We think not. We have always interpreted what Skelly Oil called "the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875," 339 U.S., at 673 , with an eye to practicality and necessity. "What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation . . . a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones [463 U.S. 1, 21] aside." Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S., at 117 -118. There are good reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law. States are not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject to federal regulation. They have a variety of means by which they can enforce their own laws in their own courts, and they do not suffer if the pre-emption questions such enforcement may raise are tested there. 22 The express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties, see infra, at 25, as to whom Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court was necessary to further the statute's purposes. 23 It did not go so far as to provide that any suit against such parties must also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not choose to sue. The situation presented by a State's suit for a declaration of the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction [463 U.S. 1, 22] that informed our statutory interpretation in Skelly Oil and Gully to convince us that, until Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Accordingly, the same suit brought originally in state court is not removable either. 24
CLVT also argues that appellant's "causes of action" are, in substance, federal claims. Although we have often repeated that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon," The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913), it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assn. of Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 339-340 (CA6 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
CLVT's best argument stems from our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735. In that case, the petitioner filed suit in state court alleging simply that it had a valid contract with the respondent, a union, under which the respondent had agreed to submit all grievances to binding arbitration and not to cause or sanction any "work stoppages, strikes, or slowdowns." The petitioner further alleged that the respondent and its officials had violated the agreement by [463 U.S. 1, 23] participating in and sanctioning work stoppages, and it sought temporary and permanent injunctions against further breaches. App., O. T. 1967, No. 445, pp. 2-9. It was clear that, had petitioner invoked it, there would have been a federal cause of action under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), and that, even in state court, any action to enforce an agreement within the scope of 301 would be controlled by federal law, see Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 -104 (1962). It was also clear, however, under the law in effect at the time, that independent limits on federal jurisdiction made it impossible for a federal court to grant the injunctive relief petitioner sought. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (later overruled in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)).
The Court of Appeals held, 376 F.2d, at 340, and we affirmed, 390 U.S., at 560 , that the petitioner's action "arose under" 301, and thus could be removed to federal court, although the petitioner had undoubtedly pleaded an adequate claim for relief under the state law of contracts and had sought a remedy available only under state law. The necessary ground of decision was that the pre-emptive force of 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 25 Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of 301. Avco [463 U.S. 1, 24] stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily "arises under" federal law.
CLVT argues by analogy that ERISA, like 301, was meant to create a body of federal common law, and that "any state court action which would require the interpretation or application of ERISA to a plan document `arises under' the laws of the United States." Brief for Appellees 20-21. ERISA contains provisions creating a series of express causes of action in favor of participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries of ERISA-covered plans, as well as the Secretary of Labor. 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). 26 It may be that, as with 301 as interpreted in Avco, any state action coming within the scope of 502(a) of ERISA would be removable to federal district court, even if an otherwise adequate state cause of action were pleaded without reference to federal law. 27 It does not follow, however, that either of appellant's [463 U.S. 1, 25] claims in this case comes within the scope of one of ERISA's causes of action.
The phrasing of 502(a) is instructive. Section 502(a) specifies which persons - participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor - may bring actions for particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly denies any cause of action in favor of state governments, to enforce tax levies or for any other purpose. It does not purport to reach every question relating to plans covered by ERISA. 28 Furthermore, 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(A), makes clear that Congress did not intend to pre-empt entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans. With important, but express limitations, it states that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."
Against this background, it is clear that a suit by state tax authorities under a statute like 18818 does not "arise under" ERISA. Unlike the contract rights at issue in Avco, the State's right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern [463 U.S. 1, 26] to the federal statute. For that reason, as in Gully, see supra, at 11-12, on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are many reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of ERISA why the State may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks. 29 Furthermore, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights, while 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff in Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its pre-empted state contract claim. Therefore, even though the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the State's levy in the circumstances of this case, an action to enforce the levy is not itself pre-empted by ERISA.
Once again, appellant's declaratory judgment cause of action presents a somewhat more difficult issue. The question on which a declaration is sought - that of the CLVT trustees' "power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of California," see supra, at 6 - is undoubtedly a matter of concern under ERISA. It involves the meaning and enforceability of provisions in CLVT's trust agreement forbidding the trustees to assign or otherwise to alienate funds held in trust, see supra, at 4-5, and n. 3, and thus comes within the class of questions for which Congress intended that federal courts create federal common law. 30 Under 502(a)(3)(B) of [463 U.S. 1, 27] ERISA, a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of a plan covered by ERISA may bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine whether the plan's trustees may comply with a state levy on funds held in trust. 31 Nevertheless, CLVT's argument that appellant's second cause of action arises under ERISA fails for the second reason given above. ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief by some other party does not "arise under" that provision. 32
Our concern in this case is consistent application of a system of statutes conferring original federal-court jurisdiction, as they have been interpreted by this Court over many years. Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates [463 U.S. 1, 28] the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. We hold that a suit by state tax authorities both to enforce its levies against funds held in trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan, and to declare the validity of the levies notwithstanding ERISA, is neither a creature of ERISA itself nor a suit of which the federal courts will take jurisdiction because it turns on a question of federal law. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand so that this case may be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles.
[ Footnote 2 ] As part of the hourly compensation due bargaining unit members, employers pay a certain amount to CLVT, which places the money in an account for each employee. Once a year, CLVT distributes the money in each account to the employee for whom it is kept, provided the employee complies with CLVT's application procedures. Any funds held for employees who fail to make a timely application are used to defray CLVT's administrative expenses. See generally Trust Agreement, Art. IX, App. 45-51 ("The Plan"). This system was set up in large part because union members typically work for several employers during the course of a year.
[ Footnote 3 ] Article IX, § 9.08, provides in part:
[ Footnote 4 ] At several points in 1977 and 1978, appellant issued notices to CLVT requesting it to withhold and to transmit approximately $380 in unpaid [463 U.S. 1, 6] taxes, interest, and penalties due from three individuals. CLVT did not dispute that the individuals in question were beneficiaries of its trust or that it was then holding vacation benefit funds for them. In each case, however, it acknowledged receipt of appellant's notice and informed appellant that it had requested an opinion letter from the Administrator for Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the United States Department of Labor as to whether it was permitted under ERISA to honor appellant's levy. CLVT also informed appellant that it would withhold the funds from the individual workers until it received an opinion from the Department of Labor, but that it would not transmit the funds to the Franchise Tax Board.
Appellant took no immediate action to enforce its levy, and in January 1980 CLVT finally received the opinion letter it had requested. The opinion letter concluded: "[I]t is the position of the Department of Labor that the process of any state judicial or administrative agency seeking to levy for unpaid taxes or unpaid unemployment insurance contributions upon benefits due a participant or beneficiary under the Plan is pre-empted under ERISA section 514 [29 U.S.C. 1144]." App. 71. Accordingly, on January 7, 1980, counsel for CLVT furnished appellant a copy of the opinion letter, informed appellant that CLVT lacked the power to honor appellant's levies, and stated their intention to recommend that CLVT should disburse the funds it had withheld to the employees in question.
[ Footnote 5 ] The complaint does not identify statutory authority for the relief requested; indeed, the only statute mentioned on the face of the complaint is ERISA. See infra, at 13.
[ Footnote 6 ] At least for purposes of determining whether the courts below had jurisdiction over this case, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2).
[ Footnote 7 ] ERISA may also be an "Act of Congress regulating commerce" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1337 (1976 ed., Supp. V), but we have not distinguished between the "arising under" standards of 1337 and 1331. See, e. g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
[ Footnote 8 ] The statute's "arising under" language tracks similar language in Art. III, 2, of the Constitution, which has been construed as permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to any case of which federal law potentially "forms an ingredient," see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), and its limited legislative history suggests that the [463 U.S. 1, 9] 44th Congress may have meant to "confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred," 2 Cong. Rec. 4986 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter). Nevertheless, we have only recently reaffirmed what has long been recognized - that "Art. III `arising under' jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under 1331." Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983).
[ Footnote 9 ] The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the original jurisdiction of the district courts as well as to their removal jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127 (1974) (per curiam) (case brought originally in federal court); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1961) (attack on jurisdiction of state court).
It is possible to conceive of a rational jurisdictional system in which the answer as well as the complaint would be consulted before a determination was made whether the case "arose under" federal law, or in which original and removal jurisdiction were not coextensive. Indeed, until the 1887 [463 U.S. 1, 11] amendments to the 1875 Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, the well-pleaded complaint rule was not applied in full force to cases removed from state court; the defendant's petition for removal could furnish the necessary guarantee that the case necessarily presented a substantial question of federal law. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 140 (1880); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 -204 (1878). Commentators have repeatedly proposed that some mechanism be established to permit removal of cases in which a federal defense may be dispositive. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 1312, pp. 188-194 (1969) (ALI Study); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 233-234 (1948). But those proposals have not been adopted.
[ Footnote 10 ] Gully was a suit by Mississippi tax authorities, claiming that the First National Bank had failed to make good on a contract with its predecessor corporation whereby, according to the State, the bank had promised to pay the predecessor's tax liabilities. 299 U.S., at 111 -112. It had been removed to federal court, and the motion for remand had been defeated, on the ground that the State's "power to lay a tax upon the shares of national banks has its origin and measure in the provisions of a federal statute" and that "by necessary implication a plaintiff counts upon the statute in suing for the tax." Id., at 112.
[ Footnote 11 ] E. g., Trent Realty Associates v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 657 F.2d 29, 34-35 (CA3 1981); First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen National Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 850-852 (CA8 1980); Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (CA9 1972); cf. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 422-423 (CA1 1979).
[ Footnote 12 ] Note, however, that a claim of federal pre-emption does not always arise as a defense to a coercive action. See n. 20, infra. And, of course, the absence of original jurisdiction does not mean that there is no federal forum in which a pre-emption defense may be heard. If the state courts reject a claim of federal pre-emption, that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by this Court. See, e. g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (deciding pre-emption question at issue in Trent Realty, supra).
[ Footnote 13 ] To obtain declaratory relief in California, a party must plead "facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties." Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 947, 582 P.2d 970, 972 (1978).
[ Footnote 14 ] In Wycoff Co., a company that transported films between various points within the State of Utah sought a declaratory judgment that a state regulatory commission had no power to forbid it to transport over routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, "[i]t offered no evidence whatever of any past, pending or threatened action by the Utah Commission." 344 U.S., at 240 . We held that there was no jurisdiction, essentially because the dispute had "not matured to a point where we can see what, if any, concrete controversy will develop." Id., at 245. We also added:
[ Footnote 15 ] The existence of this question was noted by the leading proponent of declaratory judgments during the interim between this Court's first indication that state declaratory judgment actions did not fall outside Art. III's "case or controversy" limitation and passage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, but the issue did not come before us. See E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 298-300 (1934).
[ Footnote 16 ] California's Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted 13 years before the federal Act. See ch. 463, 1, 1921 Cal. Stats. 689. California may well regard its statute as having a more substantive purpose than the federal Act as interpreted in Skelly Oil. According to the leading commentator on California procedure: "Declaratory relief is not a special proceeding. It is an action, classified as equitable by reason of the type of relief offered . . . ." 3 B. Witkin, California Procedure 705(c), p. 2329 (2d [463 U.S. 1, 18] ed. 1971). See also Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal. 2d 352, 362, 101 P.2d 484, 489 (1940); cf. Mefford v. Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 922, 228 P.2d 847, 849 (1951) (declaratory judgment is intended "to liquidate uncertainties and controversies"). But cf. Western Title Guaranty Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 235 Cal. App. 2d 815, 822, 45 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (1965) (citing federal cases).
[ Footnote 17 ] It is not beyond the power of Congress to confer a right to a declaratory judgment in a case or controversy arising under federal law - within the meaning of the Constitution or of 1331 - without regard to Skelly Oil's particular application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The 1969 ALI report strongly criticized the Skelly Oil doctrine: "If no other changes were to be made in federal question jurisdiction, it is arguable that such language, and the historical test it seems to embody, should be repudiated." ALI Study 1311, at 170-171. Nevertheless, Congress has declined to make such a change. At this point, any adjustment in the system that has evolved under the Skelly Oil rule must come from Congress.
[ Footnote 18 ] It may seem odd that, for purposes of determining whether removal was proper, we analyze a claim brought under state law, in state court, by a party who has continuously objected to district court jurisdiction over its case, as if that party had been trying to get original federal-court jurisdiction all along. That irony, however, is a more-or-less constant feature of the removal statute, under which a case is removable if a federal district court could have taken jurisdiction had the same complaint been filed. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 234 (1948).
[ Footnote 19 ] For instance, federal courts have consistently adjudicated suits by alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the theory that an infringement suit by the declaratory judgment defendant would raise a federal question over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (CA7 1937); Hart & Wechsler 896-897. Taking jurisdiction over this type of suit is consistent with the dictum in Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952), see n. 14, supra, in which we stated only that a declaratory judgment plaintiff could not get original federal jurisdiction if the anticipated lawsuit by the declaratory judgment defendant would not "arise under" federal law. It is also consistent with the nature of the declaratory remedy itself, which was designed to permit adjudication of either party's claims of right. See E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 15-18, 23-25 (1934).
[ Footnote 20 ] Section 502(a)(3) provides:
Even if ERISA did not expressly provide jurisdiction, CLVT might have been able to obtain federal jurisdiction under the doctrine applied in some cases that a person subject to a scheme of federal regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin application to him of conflicting state regulations, and a declaratory judgment action by the same person does not necessarily run afoul of the Skelly Oil doctrine. See, e. g., Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 -508 (1972); Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303-1306 (CA9 1975), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d, at 423, and n. 8.
[ Footnote 21 ] We express no opinion, however, whether a party in CLVT's position could sue under ERISA to enjoin or to declare invalid a state tax levy, despite the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). To do so, it would have to show either that state law provided no "speedy and efficient remedy" or that Congress intended 502 of ERISA to be an exception to the Tax Injunction Act.
[ Footnote 22 ] Indeed, as appellant's strategy in this case shows, they may often be willing to go to great lengths to avoid federal-court resolution of a pre-emption question. Realistically, there is little prospect that States will flood the federal courts with declaratory judgment actions; most questions will arise, as in this case, because a State has sought a declaration in state court and the defendant has removed the case to federal court. Accordingly, it is perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.
[ Footnote 23 ] Cf. nn. 19 and 20, supra. Alleged patent infringers, for example, have a clear interest in swift resolution of the federal issue of patent validity - they are liable for damages if it turns out they are infringing a patent, and they frequently have a delicate network of contractual arrangements with third parties that is dependent on their right to sell or license a product. Parties subject to conflicting state and federal regulatory schemes also have a clear interest in sorting out the scope of each government's authority, especially where they face a threat of liability if the application of federal law is not quickly made clear.
[ Footnote 24 ] CLVT suggests that we treat the motion to dismiss appellant's complaint it filed in the District Court as a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment under 502 of ERISA, which might then provide an independent jurisdictional basis for reaching the merits of the pre-emption issue in this case. Brief for Appellees 9-11; see First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, supra, at 423; Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1183-1184 (ND Cal. 1977). Apparently, CLVT never filed an answer or a counterclaim in this case because it stipulated that the District Court could treat its motion to dismiss as a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the court decided the case on that basis. See App. to Juris. Statement 17 (District Court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"). Under the circumstances, we decline to adopt such a broad construction of CLVT's pleadings.
[ Footnote 25 ] To similar effect is Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974), in which we held that - unlike all other ejectment suits in which the plaintiff derives its claim from a federal grant, e. g., Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914) - an ejectment suit based on Indian title is within the original "federal question" jurisdiction of the district courts, because Indian title creates a federal possessory right to tribal lands, "wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession." Cf. 414 U.S., at 682 -683 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring).
[ Footnote 26 ] The statute further states that "the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary," except for actions by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due, to enforce rights under the terms of a plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits, over which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1). In addition, ERISA's legislative history indicates that, in light of the Act's virtually unique pre-emption provision, see 514, 29 U.S.C. 1144, "a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
[ Footnote 27 ] Indeed, precedent involving other statutes granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts suggests that, if such an action were not within the class of cases over which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the proper course for a federal district court to take after removal would be to dismiss the case altogether, without reaching the merits. See, e. g., General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 287 -288 (1922); Koppers Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 337 F.2d 499, 501-502 (CA8 1964) (Blackmun, J.).
[ Footnote 28 ] In contrast, 301(a) of the LMRA applies to all "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations." We have not taken a restrictive view of who may sue under 301 for violations of such contracts, see, e. g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960); cf. Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 196-198 (CA3 1977), or of what contracts are covered by 301, see Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). See also Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 335, 313 F.2d 179, 181-182 (CA2 1962) (suit by employer for declaratory judgment as to contract obligations arises under 301). But even under 301 we have never intimated that any action merely relating to a contract within the coverage of 301 arises exclusively under that section. For instance, a state battery suit growing out of a violent strike would not arise under 301 simply because the strike may have been a violation of an employer-union contract. Cf. Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 -642 (1958).
[ Footnote 29 ] In theory (looking only at the complaint), it may turn out that the levy was improper under state law, or that in fact the defendant had complied with the levy. Cf. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936). Furthermore, a levy on CLVT might be for something like property taxes on real estate it owned. CLVT's trust agreement authorizes its trustees to pay such taxes. Art. V, § 5.21(k), App. 29.
[ Footnote 30 ] See supra, at 24, n. 26. Of course, in suggesting that the trustees' power to comply with a state tax levy is - as a subset of the trustees' general duties with respect to CLVT - a matter of concern under ERISA, we express no opinion as to whether ERISA forbids the trustees to comply with the levies in this case or otherwise pre-empts the State's power to levy on funds held in trust. The same is true of our holding that ERISA does not pre-empt the State's causes of action entirely. Merely to hold [463 U.S. 1, 27] that ERISA does not have the same effect on appellant's suit in this case that 301 of the LMRA had on the petitioner's contract suit in Avco is not to prejudge the merits of CLVT's pre-emption claim.
[ Footnote 31 ] See n. 19, supra. Section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA has been interpreted as creating a cause of action for a declaratory judgment. See Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 527 (CA3 1979). We repeat, however, the caveat expressed in n. 21, supra, as to the effect of the Tax Injunction Act.
[ Footnote 32 ] CLVT also argues that this case is directly controlled by Avco, on the theory that CLVT's trust agreement is a contract covered by 301 of the LMRA itself. Brief for Appellees 19, n. 19. We reject this argument essentially for the reasons given in n. 28, supra. In this case, the State does not rely on any contract within the scope of 301. The connection between appellant's causes of action to enforce its levy and for a declaration of rights and duties and a suit to enforce the trust agreement is too attenuated for us to say that either "arises under" 301. [463 U.S. 1, 29]


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In my previous post I had mentioned how extremely proud I was of the Technology teams here at AOL in delivering a truly state of the art Data Center facility with some incredible ground breaking technology. As I mentioned the facility was actually in production use faster than we could get the ribbon cutting ceremony scheduled. I thought I would share a small slice of the pictures of the internal Ribbon Cutting Event.
Alex Gounares, former fellow Microsoft alum and AOL CTO and I presided over the celebration. In this photo, Alex and I talk over some of the technologies used in our cloud with one our cloud engineers. As the facility is based upon pre-racked technologies and modular facility and network build components it allows for significant cost and capital optimization. this allows us to build only when demand and growth dictates the need. All machines in the background are live and have been live for a few weeks.
After receiving two very large scissors which were remarkably sharp and precise for their size we were ready to go. A few short words about the phenomenal job our teams performed and it was time for some ribbon to kiss raised floor.
At the end of the day the real reason why this project was such a success really breaks down to the team responsible for this incredible win. An effort like this took incredibly smart people from different organizations working together to make this a reality. The achievement is even more impressive in my mind when you think about the fact that in many cases our 90 day to live timeframe included design and execution on the go! My guess is our next one may be significantly faster without all that design time. The true heroes of ATC are below!
(Special thanks goes out to Krysta Scharlach for the permission and use of her pictures in this post)


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