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And, as for unnecessary internal bickering - we need only toBossi, you are going to have to expand on your point because I do not agree with you at all.
look at the Artillery, who have effectively crippled the
Infantry battalions by robbing them of mortars
would we be forced to amalgamate with a larger regiment from say, Winnipeg, becoming another coy in the Cam Highlanders or Winnipeg Rifles? What would happen to the traditions of our unit then, would they be overridden?
Or would we remain distinct, because we are the only such regiment in Thunder Bay?
Some years ago there was talk of amalgamating two of Toronto's Regiments the Honarary Colonel of one of the Regiments said the before that happened he would petition to have his Regiment removed from the Roll of Battle. He would rather see his Regiment die in honour than acceed to amalgamation.Would co-existence within one battalion have been a suitable alternative in your eyes?
would we be forced to amalgamate with a larger regiment from say, Winnipeg, becoming another coy in the Cam Highlanders or Winnipeg Rifles? What would happen to the traditions of our unit then, would they be overridden?
Or would we remain distinct, because we are the only such regiment in Thunder Bay?
The Brockville Rifles, while maintaining their distinct cap badge and battle honours, are administratively a company of the PWOR in Kingston. Amalgamation of this nature preserves regimental history without too much of a problem.
Danjanou: not sure I agree with grouping several regiments under a single Bn HQ. I've seen pictures of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Winnipeg Light Infantry and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, from a time when Winnipeg was much smaller, and all of these regiments were at Bn strength. I think the current Militia strength crisis is just an unfortunate phase in it's long history.It would be more effecient to group multiple Coy sized regiments under one battalion, and it would preserve regimental identities. Would people prefer to see regiments disband, or amalgamations (which may or may not preserve the identity of any of the Regiments involved?)
It would be more efficient to group multiple Coy sized regiments under one battalion, and it would preserve regimental identities. Would people prefer to see regiments disband, or amalgamations (which may or may not preserve the identity of any of the Regiments involved?)
Pardon my stupidity, but how would it save money in the long run? You would sitll need the armouries (the biggest cost) but you might save some minimal dollars by dropping off 37.5 days worth of LCol and CWO; however, the cost of running a standard Reserve unit is about the same cost of five Regular Force MCpls!QuoteThe idea of one Bn HQ for several units is ideal, as it would save money in the long term, reduce duplication of effort and allow for more money to be spend on the troops(IMHO).
might save some minimal dollars by dropping off 37.5 days worth of LCol and CWO
The salient point about battalion headquarters is that the Militia is supposed to provide a framework in time of war on which a fully operational field army can be raised. While the need for battalion headquarters personnel is not apparent now, if we were ever to moblize more than a single division, the need for a framework of battalion and brigade staffs would be made more obvious. I don't see why the conversation would go beyond that very basic point.
QuoteThe salient point about battalion headquarters is that the Militia is supposed to provide a framework in time of war on which a fully operational field army can be raised. While the need for battalion headquarters personnel is not apparent now, if we were ever to moblize more than a single division, the need for a framework of battalion and brigade staffs would be made more obvious. I don't see why the conversation would go beyond that very basic point.
If military planners think this is how we need to prepare for future conflicts, then we're already ****ed. That kind of thinking is 50 years out of date.
I don't see that keeping battalion headquarters operating is 50 years out of date; it is going on in the US as we speak. How would YOU mobilize a 2 division field force, if the need arose?
-To provide the framework for mobilizationI have argued that this role is out of date.
-To augment and sustain the regular forceThis is what the militia really needs to focus on. It is only being done half-assed. What is the point of training a reservist up to a MCpl, only to see him lose all of his qualifications and be reduced to a private? There needs to be one type of soldier, the amount of TI should matter only in the training, not the abilities of either.
-To serve as a link between military and civilian communitiesThis seems to be something thrown up for the hell of it. The entire military is responsible for this, not strictly the reserves.
In the Land Forces there are 132 reserve units situated throughout Canada. You can not tell me honestly they all parade at their full strength or rather train at full strength all the time(or part of the time for that matter). The truth is the both the reserves and the Regs have way to many upper echelon for the amount of people contain within. We can start a new subject on where the Regs could be improved but for now we are looking at reserves.
If we ever went to full mobilization we should/would have enough warning to significantly ramp up reserve units or form new units. Besides the numbers contains within each unit are so low right now that if full formed units were needed right away, they would probably algamate several reserve units together to meet any emergency.
I think by allowing reserve training to become more consistent, and allowing the leadership the ability and the opportunity to actually lead they can become a much better force overall and maybe we won't see such a huge training difference between reserve and reg force soldiers at all levels.
-To provide the framework for mobilization
I have argued that this role is out of date.
Why not forge all units into one battalion. The four infantry units can provide a company each, the two armour units a mounted recce/direct fire support capability. Give mortars to the arty units and have the engineers fill in a assault pioneer role, while the service battalion and the medics can form the admin company.
viewed as a burden to the Brigade commander and much of the reserve portion of a Brigade budget will be appropriated for the regular force units.
But to do so effectively, they must be properly trained (one standard in qualifications), properly led (get rid of this MITCIP crap), and properly supported by the government (funding and job protection). It may seem like a tall order, but like I said before, that's what the leadership (civilian and uniformed) is for.
I think by allowing reserve training to become more consistent, and allowing the leadership the ability and the opportunity to actually lead they can become a much better force overall and maybe we won't see such a huge training difference between reserve and reg force soldiers at all levels.I Agree
Each brigade will have one Arty regiment. Multiple regiments will be reduced to one RHQ & various batteries spread around the brigade. Independent batteries will be absorbed into the regiment. Some batteries may be mortar tasked.while Infanteer has
1x Mortar Coy (within each Bn) and Provides Brigade Artillery Regiment.(formerly 38 CBG)
Send our reserves "come as you are" to fight? Maybe we should plan to just, oh, I don't know, train up a sizeable intake of recruits while we re-invent how to equip and fight formations again.I think doing those is part of the neccessary steps needed to ensure we can deploy a reserve formation into a modern conflict. That is why I've advocated the organizational and command structures to better streamline the reserve system to train as they would fight.
I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.
If our response to crisis is to deploy the reserve in composite battalions as-is, we will be ridden down like the proverbial grass and have nothing but registered letters and offers from the International Red Cross to deliver packages to PoWs.
Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption. I am still waiting. Is there a secret time-and-motion study that was done proving that two-thirds to three-quarters of the reserve leadership and staff at the unit and brigade level is unrequired?
I have an idea. Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year. Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.
Send our reserves "come as you are" to fight? Maybe we should plan to just, oh, I don't know, train up a sizeable intake of recruits while we re-invent how to equip and fight formations again. I await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year. If our response to crisis is to deploy the reserve in composite battalions as-is, we will be ridden down like the proverbial grass and have nothing but registered letters and offers from the International Red Cross to deliver packages to PoWs.
I have an idea. Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year. Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.
My clerk has no problems with supporting 125+ pers with BOR support.
I think we are getting sidetracked. Why are we letting issues of a clerk or two and some paperwork alter the doctrine and force structure for the Militia?
Quick question to end this Yard ape what is MCSC? in regards to Capt and Majors for staff positions? I'm assuming Militia something staff college but the acronym threw me for a loop. Never mind answered my own question Militia command and staff course or college.Militia Command & Staff Course. It is like the Toronto staff college for the army reserve.
Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption. I am still waiting.For me, this is about a greater training opportuity (Sect Comd leading sections, Pl Comds leading platoons, OCs leading Coys, Bn staff with a Bn to look after, etc). We could take all the PYs & class B dollars saved & put them into the new regional Bn HQs (at least as far as I care).
I have an idea. Strip a unit completely down to a proper company establishment, with a full-time 2I/C, clerk, and CQMS for one year. Let's see whether it collapses under the weight of administration or not.There are several reserve units that sucessfuly run off-site sub-units. There are also several succesfull independant sub-units (though there were more before the medical branch became its own command). Why can't this success be repeated in other Coy sized units? Don't forget that a company can have an Ops O/BC, Admin O, Liaison O, and Trg NCO. I would recoment the Trg NCO be added to the full time staff.
The regular force should be capable of dealing with any mission that requires anything upto & including a brigade (or two). If the reserves are required to mobilize, I would expect we need divisions or a follow-on force to relieve the already comitted regular force. In our Op Tempo over the last decade, there should have been no need for the regulars to rely on the reserves (the fact that that need did exist is due to fualt of the regular establishment & manning). There is nothing wrong with raising reserve companies (or even units) for PSOs, but we have time to do this throughoully & using only volunteers. So, our mobilization plans must make room for divisions & possibly even a Corps.QuoteI await anyone's explanation why they believe our reserve would be prepared to warfight in formations (brigades and/or divisions) in anything less than six months to a year.
I don't advocate trying to train reserves at the division or brigade level.
What I am advocating is building reserve companies at the unit level, rather then planning them as some sort of Regiment, ready to unfold the colours and march to Vimy. This way, we don't have to start from scratch when we want to build a reserve subunit to take the place of the regular force one on a deployment.Most of our new reservists are highschool students. You would need a new primary recruiting demographic before it will be come easy to deploy a company from a Bn spread over a province.
'Cause it's always easy to reduce and downsize, but very hard to increase and expand. If you think the scenario above is a bit far-fetched dont forget, and I think Mike Dorosh can confirm, each PROVINCE in the West made up it's OWN brigade group (or Militia District, to use the old term), just over 10 years ago.I think any restructure should have a growth/decay formula. If a Coy could sustain a given strength for a given period, it would be authorised to raise an addditional platoon. If a Coy were to reach authorisation for (lets say) 6 platoons it would split to two Coys. If a company fell belwo a given strength for too long, it would loose a platoon. Battalions would split or merge based on the growth of thier companies, and brigades would split or merge based on growth the the battalions.
Quick question to end this Yard ape what is MCSC? in regards to Capt and Majors for staff positions? I'm assuming Militia something staff college but the acronym threw me for a loop. Never mind answered my own question Militia command and staff course or college.Militia Command & Staff Course. It is like the Toronto staff college for the army reserve.
'Cause it's always easy to reduce and downsize, but very hard to increase and expandSo true. The reserves strength is allowable up to 18, 500 IIRC as it stands right now (what they are allowed not what they have). Any reorganization would have to take that into account and ensure that the reorganized role has spots on the TO&E for all 18,500 potential soldiers. As well plans would have to be in place to ensure that if the numbers were allowed to increase, there will be a place to put them.
But remember that your clerk isn't manning the potentially only "open/public access" military desk in the community, dealing with walk-in or file preparation recruiting inquiries, releases, pay, possibly day-to-day budget monitoring as the FMAS point of contact, probably backfilling the Trg WO on monitoring tasks in the CFTPO, as well all as dealing with unit-level and pers admin in support of unit activities and out of unit training, courses and tasks.
Every time we have the "amalgamation" discussion I hope to see someone explain the "cheaper by the dozen" assumption. I am still waiting.I agree!
For me, this is about a greater training opportunity (Sect Comd leading sections, Pl Comds leading platoons, OCs leading Coys, Bn staff with a Bn to look after, etc).
reserve participation in ongoing peace operations should be limited to individual augmentation unless we choose to stand up a contingent as the Special ForceWhile the troops(Reg F) hated the CRIC organizations as they saw militia soldiers taking their spots on a tour, I like the idea and wished it was around when I was in the reserves. It was probably one of the fews times that the reserves leadership there at all levels got to lead a full complement of sects/pls/coy with its integral ech. I hope they plan for more of this sort of augmentation if we stay in Afghanistan for any length of time(even if it's just a reserve sect in a Reg Pl).
I continue to hold my view that reserve participation in ongoing peace operations should be limited to individual augmentation unless we choose to stand up a contingent as the Special Force.Generally, I agree. There should be no need to send a full reserve sub-unit, but at the same time I don't think there is harm in sending a reserve sub-unit as part of a regular unit.
Any crisis requiring a greater degree of mobilization of reserves should be something for which all go for the duration, and "rotation" is limited to pulling people out of the line after a tour and posting them (perhaps with a trade remuster) to a less stressful position.I think there could be a scale of mobilization lesser than this. Not everyone went for the duration of the Korean War. We could have a senario where 75% of the regulars launch to fight a war. 25 % of the regular field force (the guys in ATOF reconstitution) remains in Canada. This 25% and the mobilized Special Force will train individual replacments for the deployed force & int will stand-up the second rotation force (they will have 6 - 9 months to do this). This second rotation force may arrive when the fighting has been declared over, but an occupation force is still required. Occupation demands may require the the Special Force remain active for a few years after the wars ends.
That "lesser scale of mobilization" is what I envision as mobilization under Special Force. Instead of overstretching our existing regular and reserve forces, I would prefer a policy wherein if the government wants to get "stuck in" to a situation for more than two rotos, it pays the price to recruit, train, and deploy additional contingents under the Special Force until the commitment ends.I think we are in agreement then. However, depending on the size of the Roto 0, more than half of Roto 1 could be Special Force (and would have to have been drawn from the reserves). In a situation like this full units would train and rotate into theater. Individuals would be sent to replace casualties, but they would train with the unit before its deployment (they would have been MMO) and they would come home with the unit (even if only 1 month in theater).
Roto 0: Regular Force elements at "ready" state in ATOF cycle.
Roto 1: the next Regular Force elements at "ready", augmented by reservists (individuals, formed coy/pl groups - doesn't matter)
Roto 2+: Special Force elements - newly constituted, to be stood down at end of commitment
From Roto 2 on, Reg F elements in the "ready" state in excess of whatever we want to keep in hand for immediate reaction could certainly also be deployed. The point is to generate temporary surges under the Special Force in order to never be in a state of having "no troops to send".
So, I recomend:
A) Keep the current brigades & restructure the Infantry & Recce regiments into multi-regimental battalions. These battalions will have full-up Admin Coy & Bn HQ.
B) Each brigade will have one service battalion. Multiple battalions will be reduced to one Bn HQ & various companies spread around the brigade. There will be one maintenance company & there can be multiple S&T Coys.
C) Each brigade will have one Arty regiment. Multiple regiments will be reduced to one RHQ & various batteries spread around the brigade. Independant batteries will be absorbed into the regiment. Some batteries may be mortar tasked.
D) Each brigade will have one Engineer regiment. Multiple regiments will be reduced to one, and independant squadrons will be absorbed into the regiment
We also need to avoid undoing the very good healing process of the last few years by further separating the Res from the Regular Army in any significant way.
I have been retired for so long that you must take all this with a whole bag of salt, but:
o It seems to me that the Canadian Navy Reserve is riding a winning horse with their reserve crewed minesweepers. There are, I am told by reliable sources, problems, including too few qualified reservists for 12 ships, each needing a crew of 30+ but I am also told that some officer positions, especially CO and XO, and some PO slots may go to regulars (and no, I don't know where they will find them in an already undermanned navy, but ...). The top of the navy is pleased with the ships and their crews and their entire reserve establishment; more than one senior serving naval officer has told me that he is now happy with the navy's 'total force' project;
The British Army.... into the false sense that the Brits are all fun and games
I say let's have as many different kinds of reserves as the reserves themselves can muster â " provided, only, that they make some military sense. I remain committed to the idea that about 75% of our current policies, plans and programmes will not stand the test of a major war; I am equally certain that neither I nor any of our serving generals know which are in that doomed to fail 75%. So: Let's try 'em all ...
our reserves, it seems to me, are filled with boundless enthusiasm, incredible resilience and bags of initiative â " we should exploit that
Obviously, you haven't read the SCONDVA report last year (by John Fraser- former speaker of the house and HCol of the Seaforths(?) ).
It was pretty scathing about the recruiting system as being the single biggest problem with regards to reserve restructure. Unfortunately, little has come of it to this point (aside from the concept of conditional enrollments).
My only issue with Bde HQ is that often the size they task a unit to recruit to has little to do with the organizations we are supposed to be fielding. You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen ...Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit? Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs? What is offered for advancement and retention?
You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen.. Give me a 10% overage which allows for attrition. You want me to field an Infantry Regiment than give me the manning slate to get a Bn's worth of soldiers that can combine with another units Bn so we can have the pers to do the task assigned to that unit.
Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit? Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs? What is offered for advancement and retention?
b) get rid of the Res Svc bn unit level command structure (ie the CO/DCO/RSM) and reconstitute the Svc Bn as an Admin Coy of a Cbt A unit. The size, equiment, rank structures and MOC distr could remain pretty much the same as they are now (with a probable reduction in MSE Op since Cbt A units do not normally use them...). A problem with this would be deciding which Cbt A unit would get the sub-unit, as typically most CBGs have only one or two Svc Bns for several Cbt A units. This might lead us to discussing the "A"-word, such that we have fewer, stronger Res Cbt A units with a single unit-level HQ and several sub-units instead of several units that obly appoximate a sub-unit in strength.
On top of that, the CSS world (esp the EME world) needs to keep on with its efforts to make CSS training more realistic and achievable for Res CSS soldiers by modularization and acceptance of a trg delta, the way the Army has. Of course, if the Army owned these trades we might be able to direct these changes ourselves. Cheers.
a) attach the CSS soldiers from the local Svc Bn to the Cbt A unit (as we now do for some Res MAs at outlying units. The employing CO is responsible for day-to-day empl and admin, the parent SvcB n CO is resopnsible for tech trg, PD and tech standards. Where this would tend to fall down would be in Cbt A units that are not located within an easy drive of a Svc Bn: providing tech supervision could be difficult. A possible solution to that problem (which a couple of our units have applied for other reasons) is to change from weekly parade nights to parade weekends, with troops commuting in on Fri and out on Sun PM;I see consolidation in the service battalions as the route to take. However, I would ammalgamate all the Svc Bns within any given CBG (turning each one into a Coy of the new amalgamated Bn). I would also specialize the Coys (S&T, Maint) so that there would be greater depth of technical supervision.
Also in small communities like those in Sk the unit I was in had the opportunity to recruit veh techs, gun mechs, medics and storesman from our small city and neighbouring towns that would have been unavailable to the CF because these individuals weren't prepared to travel to a unit that focused on their trade or skill in a location 100 to 200 km away. I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit. Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals. As a result they are not avail to the CF now. And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.
We just don't have the same "specialist stream" designed to recruit and encourage such people to join.
I believe both the Territorial Army in the UK and reserve forces in the US actively recruits them and have created programs aimed a taking advantage of those skills.
In my case I am public affairs specialist in civilian llife but there appears to be a fairly limited scope to develop those skills in the Militia world (beyond being the UIO of course which is really an appointment not an MOC).Again, check out your local Res Bde HQ. In our Bde we have a Bde PAO, a PA Sgt, and an Image Tech. We have a second Bde Image Tech and two regional PAOs out in our Garrisons. These positions are in addition to our UIOs. "Connecting With Canadians" is a major role for the Army Res, and PAOs play a vital role in this. As well, any Comd worth his pay understands the value of good PA work. Our "B" Class PAO is usually busy with something all the time, ranging from supporting Unit PIOs to coverage of communty events to helping the Cmd deal with the latest "nasty" out of a unit (yes...that happens in the Res too, more often than you might think!!). Your Area HQ may have positions available, and I know that Director Land Communications (the Army PAO staff) have Res PAOs that they employ across the country, living and working in their own comunities but employed on Army-level PA projects. We have one of these officers co-loc in our Bde HQ. Check out what is out there. Cheers and good luck!
I'm not to sure I'd support plunking reservists into each regular company - to what extent does integration simply become a regular unit with a different name.This may be the only way to generate PYs that the government does not want to permanently mandate.
If it's a one year contract, what do you do if the company is deployed on operations near the end of the contract?Contracts would be tied to high readiness and promise a year of work with an obligation to work up to an additional half year. This would ensure that highreadiness units sit at 110% strength and deploy at 100% (with individual replacements on rear party).
As well, is their any sense of career management? As a company commander, you can't work towards developing leaders and building skill sets with your existing team, because after a year they are scattered in the wind.This is an argument to look at augmentation at the sub-sub unit level (or lower). The Engr transformation plan will call on one reserve section in every field troop that deploys.
The first questionYes,that is a very good question because over many years we have never ever heard a clear answer.
What current resources do Army Reserves get and what future resources will they get.
You can't evaluate a plan without numbers.
To counter, what about putting certain positions as reg, ie. Company 2ic and Ops. WO (if that position exists at Canadian Coy. level?) along with select other "cadre" staff positions necessary.
I am interested to see what other ways could minimize the financial impact of creating a 4th rifle company within the infantry battalions that are on their 'readiness' phase.
Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.I'd venture that Regimental politics has been in our blood since day 1. None of the history I read seems to look favorably on the Regimental contribution to operational efficiency in the past.
To me, it's a toss up. The change is definitely needed - it allows fragmented units to combine training assets and recruiting areas. However, amalgamation seems to balance the bad (eliminating historic units) with the good (the lineage of the units will carry on). Our path has been to put units to zero strength, which also balances the good (the units with their unique heritage still "exist") with the bad (the zero-strength units exist in stasis).
Either way, the imperative of matching the Regimental system to operational realities should be the overarching consideration - kudos to the Brits for having the institutional fortitude to do so.
Just I have been on tour with Reserves. And some were better than Regs, but most were not.
Sorry, but it's kinda the truth. My gunner I got stuck with, well. I could have put a fig 13 target, in their place.
but then we've got our ration thieves in the Regular Army as well.
IMHO there is a need to creat different tiers of reserve units/service - with those who can get more time (ideally low ranking students) getting offered more employment and operational interweaving with a regular unit.
That way IF we need a unit in a hurry you could mobilize the reserve agmentation to it - and send it off at 100% strength. These troops could be easily shifted to a lower level of readiness unit when they progress to full tiem employment (if ever...)
When I was a reservist/student I would have loved the opportunity to give more time - I would have signed a contract that would have held me to more.How much more exactly? Would the more have been all four months of the summer, and then the remaining 8 months been the regular class A stuff? The problem with such a program is that only college & university studnets would be able to take advantage of it. So, at best you have your junior leadership and the regular force would have to shut-down to fill-out the rest (Kevin, I remember you posting about your joy at the prospect of supporting the reserve concentration that never was in 03, so I know you would not be a fan of this).
Me and another guy discussed that. There could be two "classes" of reservists - one who sticks to the class "A" sign in sheet and comes when he can and another who signs a contract to do the Army thing part time.
I would like something akin to the American system for the reserves adopted
but I consider it the fair weather army. IF we can cherry pick from it and get a viable force I am all for it.
I was terrible unimpressed by the reserve attendance at the Fires in BC, ditto for the Flood and Ice Storms
The current system just does not work - even for the 2 week Ex's the attendance is low
Units have to be amalgamated just to have forces to field.
Getting a Class C can be a ***** and then unless you are sitting at the NDHQ Puzzle Palace it is only for operations.(I did a Class C tour 92/93) but we need bodies not just for set rotations - we need to be able to 100% man our units.
The ATOF cycle mentality has to be abandond and our Army must be fit to fight at all times not just 1/3 of the time...
We have trouble keeping enough revenue flowing thru the messes to even keep them open
When a unit has a SGT for a SSM. You know there is something wrong!
You cannot organize training when you don't even know how many people will show.
6A's are 12 weeks in Gagetown on Leopards.
Class B contracts are not for those who want to soldier more as those jobs are RQ, HQ, CFRC taskings. If anything they erode the quality of the soldier.
The quality of reserve soldier up to MCpl level as I have seen on operations is easily on par with their reg force counter parts
Honestly I think that if the unit is only a compnay then it should have an OC not a CO, and be pruned of its entirely useless senior ranks.
refuse to believe that a reserve company sized element can generate more admin that a regular force company - I mean we have 4-6 more days a week to get in crap
I think the scalpel needs to cut deep into the fat underbelly of the reserves and create operational effective units - not the current cardboard cutouts. The idea a Reserve Bde did a good job scraping 2 amalgamted companies is ridiculous - that is a Bn(-) not a Bde sourcing.
Your statement might have reflected the circumstances in your unit at that time, but as a general statement IMHO it is false today, not to mention pretty insulting. Most Res soldiers go to the armoury to train-the fact that they might end up in the Mess when they should be training is a leadership failure. Either not enough leaders (a much more common problem in many Res units than alot of people in the RegF seem to want to realize...) or bad leaders, which certainly exist in the Res, just as they do in the RegF. There are mess hounds in Res units, just as there are MIR commandos and oxygen thieves in Regular units. Get off the high horse.This is from my visits to some units in Ontario and in NB. And as for MIR Commandos, they are getting theirs now. No field, your gone. As of now. Any soldier that cannot do his job can be gone.
This is from my visits to some units in Ontario and in NB.
Any soldier that cannot do his job can be gone.
Reserves never did leadership courses on Leos
There should be a standard, for all units
But if it's to go out in a cold wet field. you get 25-50 %.
There would be a full Armouries. They would parade out of the Armouries and down the street then back
It was pride in the Regts
Why are they below standard, THE F***ing MESS thats why. I was in the reserves and most went there to drink. Ask any RSS, training? Whats that? I have been down to Armouries and see more people in the mess or just sign in. When a unit has a SGT for a SSM. You know there is something wrong!
There are soldiers out there that would showup and train. On one course I had to teach a driver to drive. I don't have time to teach a course on a course. Basic things can be taught. You don't have to go anywhere to teach weapons, drills, NBC, orders, etc. All you need is a class room and students.
You cannot organize training when you don't even know how many people will show.
We currently train BMQ and SQ soldiers as a subunit without any kind of "centralized" course - I realize the perils of decentralization but I wonder if they aren't a necessary evil for the Reserves? Can we not take the money that would be spent on housing and feeding reservists for 4, 8 or 12 week courses and instead appoint inspectors-general to oversee OJT within the units themselves?
We currently train BMQ and SQ soldiers as a subunit without any kind of "centralized" course - I realize the perils of decentralization but I wonder if they aren't a necessary evil for the Reserves? Can we not take the money that would be spent on housing and feeding reservists for 4, 8 or 12 week courses and instead appoint inspectors-general to oversee OJT within the units themselves?
What possible benefit would there be to taking basic over again? TOETs with the "new" weapons? Granted, but that can be done OJT as part of Warrior Training each year. The supporting trades do it every year also; many relearn the drills from scratch (they also seem to change every year, also) in any event, so add one more to the pile.
Changes in military law? Again, a one day refresher might be in order. Two weeks of drill periods doing about turn on the march by squads really doesn't seem to be a good use of time and resources, from either his perspective or the Army's.
I would check those timings again for equivalency. I recently obtained an equivalency for QL4 in my old trade after 8 years absence. No basic training or SQ at all.
I wonder if any unit has built the proposal and staffed it upwards to conduct an abbreviated refresher course for returning members. It should be a relatively simple matter of tearing apart the CTP and identifying what will be a refresher (drill, etc.), what will be comprehensively reviewed and retested (weapon handling, etc.) and what will be taught in full (any new material - Mil Law, etc). Such a proposal is unlikely to be developed by the training system, because they don't have the issue in their laps, but it might find support through the Chain of Command if sold effectively.I guess the question is, how many returning ex-soldiers does the Militia have, and would it be worthwhile for brigades to run "refresher" courses. Perhaps if you integrated these refreshers with Warrior or other standard unit training, and made them of benefit not to just the half dozen or so returning members, but for entire unit/brigade, it might be more worthwhile?
Actually it took me about a year and a half after joining again to get the equivalency and recruiting was not involved. The equivalency came straight from LFAA.
Most of the Admin in the Regular Force is or soon will be on central database programs like "Peoplesoft" , CFTPO and so on, and a lot of Reserve admin is migrating there too. The idea of orderly rooms and clerical functions could go to the boards if this is taken to its conclusion. (Soldiers can and will do their own queries, while course reports etc. get fed in by the course staff, QM records by the QM staff, the CSM swipes every soldier's "smart card" at first parade to input pay etc).
That's mainly because people don't use it properly. If you're attempting to implement a computer database in order to reduce the ammount of paperwork, and the end result is that your paperwork doubles, it's certainly not the computers fault. You may as well blame your wrench when your attempt at car repair causes more damage. A computer is a tool like any other. If used properly, it can increase efficieny greatly. The problem is that even a large number of the university educated "experts" really have no clue how to use the damn things properly.
A computer is a tool like any other.
Yup. I do duty rosters by hand despite the computer having all the data to generate them. I have suggested a template for a useful duty roster for three years running, but no one seems interested in getting the IT guys to implement it....so I get a report from our software, export it to Excel, then move the cells around to get the info I need presented in the format I need. Would take 2 seconds for a computer to do that, that's what they are supposed to be for. Instead, for a week's worth of duty, it usually takes me about an hour and half of screwing around in Excel. Then I print it out on hard copy, then I blow it up on the photocopier because we have to write changes in by hand during the week, then I photocopy the photocopies so that the subunit has a copy; then at the end of the payperiod I photocopy the large copies and shrink them back down so I can manually check the payroll (about 4 hours to do a week). So I've wasted a ton of paper and about 5 or 6 hours each week doing what the computer could do in seconds.
Bill Smy: that was an excellent post and could have been lifted directly from the "Commander's Intent" of our present or immediately previous Bde Op Plan. Trying to build leaders has been our main effort for the last three years, because without them nothing else matters. I get frustrated when I hear the endless rambling about "too many officers" or "too many Sgt Majs" in the Army Reserve. I don't know where it is that this situation exists, but we would love to have that situation in our Bde. Cheers.
I do think there is a point at which the amount of leadership in reserve units does seem to be a bit much
Many reserve units are small and barely require the admin for a company, let alone that of a battalion
If nothing else it means that any training must go through unnecessary paper work;
why not down grade units like this to company level; commanded by a Major.
Infact; I think we should adopt the British system; in which reserves(TA) are grouped into Companies of a parent regiment. This means that they can be supported by that Regiments administration at higher levels, and get trained by members of the Regiment.
It also stream lines command, as you don't have "Brigades" of 1500, or 1000 reservists using up funds on administration for the brigade.
Furthermore; would it not be a good idea to be able to train reservist in mounted warfare? If
We can discuss this till we are all nauseas,nothing will happen unless we bring in Job Protection and a I hate too say it a contract sysytem,you sign up you are in,if you break it you pay or you are in the Regs.for the rest of your contract.
The British are abandoning the practice of rotating unit roles, which doesn't suggest that it is a model that still works.
What sort of system are they going to adopt now, permanent rolling of "light" or "heavy" status?Just now (part of the reorganization & amalgamation of regiments).
I like what pbi has suggested about replacing one evening a week with one additional weekend a month. There is a concern that some people accustom to the old way of things would not be able to adjust schedules/lifestyles to the new. However, in a city a battalion of multiple companies could designate one company as the weekend company and the other company as the week night company. Both companies could come together once a month for battalion training on a weekend. And if a member's life situation changes, it would be easy to transfer between the companies.
The TA & ARNG have something that the Reserves in Canada desperately need. That is a defined role for their units. During the Cold War every member of these orgs knew exactly where they would be going and what they would be doing when the balloon went up. And they rehearsed it. As an infantry reservist during this time we had know idea what was expected of us or even if we would be involved at all
I do think there is a point at which the amount of leadership in reserve units does seem to be a bit much. Many reserve units are small and barely require the admin for a company, let alone that of a battalion. For example, my Regiment has about 25-30 regular parading soldiers. To command this we have an Lt. Col, a Major, 3 Captains, 2 Lieutenants, a Chief Warrent Officer, a Master Warrent Officer, and a Warrent. How is this an efficient formation? If nothing else it means that any training must go through unnecessary paper work; and it's fairly obvious that such a huge command structure is a financial burden. I do, however, recognize that you cannot have a Lieutenant in charge of the armouries; but at the same time; why not down grade units like this to company level; commanded by a Major.
Honestly I think we are fooling ourselves by believing in computer assisted learning progrman in the military. Very few skills can be taught or properly learned that way - the PLQ being a prime example.
SHARP WO - there is nothing stating that the overborne reserve coy's could not spin off another coy.
I know during my WAL (Warrant Assisted Learning) at the RCR BSL (while nodding off during the Course Officers lectures on the role and char of the different cbt arms etc.) I picked up many points that I dont feel a computer study system can impart
Now in 11 years the methodology of teaching junior leaders (or any course) has changed but some basic problems are imparted IMHO by CAL.
This really depends on what you use it to teach. If you use it to teach the wrong thing, such as drill, or how to dig a trench or do a section attack, then of course you are misusing it and wasting everybody's time. But, that is not generally how it is used. DL is normaly used to replace "book learning" theory that does not strictly require you to be together in a group with an instructor.
I guess this is what it comes down to... Can OJT really train properly? And at what point should OJT be used?
To put it bluntly--and as I've said on here before--the current distribution of Res F units is nonsensical. For example:
The distribution of Res F units in Canada is a remnant of a by-gone era, when the demographic patterns and trends were completely different, and the global security environment made very different demands on Canada's military.
Realistically, we should completely overhaul the Res F, so that units are located in some manner coordinated with the reality of contemporary demographics. There should be units in suburban Toronto and Vancouver; there should also be units, or elements of units, in places like Swift Current, Sask and maybe even Fort McMurray, Alta, where untapped and growing pools of person-power exist. The status quo is unsustainable,
huge urban sprawls like Toronto, which costs a crapload to live in, is decently filled with alot of 'rich people' or 'upper class' and for the MOST PART, the military is mainly comprised of lower-middle class working types ( excluding the officers ).So far, ive yet to meet anybody in the infantry thats been out of the ordinary wealthy. I have a 2 story mansion from the early 1900s where I live, and for as much as it costs and to heat in the winter, my family might be able to afford a small two bedroom house in toronto.
I should also point out that the majority of the military comes from the atlantic provinces.I don't remember the exact number but i think its like 60% or something.... and alot of the remainder coming out of the western provinces.Thats just what ive been told/heard anyway, and so far that sounds about right.
You remind me of the situation in blackhawk down (I know, I know, its the movies) where the Sgt tells his troops he's never fired at anyone before, but he's leading them anyway....
Is it necessary that you out-experience someone to lead? And if so, does that not pretty much fly in the face of the Jr. Officer ranks?
That's still irrelevant for people who work swing shifts, split shifts and other irregular schedules. If you work evenings, then days, with 4 on and 3 off, your schedule is going to be all over the place, so it is not a matter of either evenings or weekends. No way around it in some cases; so do you encourage a guy who is rock solid in job knowledge to quit in such a case, or just accept that he might only parade twice a month?Maybe the solution here is to find a means of greater integration of the supplementary reserve with the primary reserve (or a new intermediate tier). Members in this category would still belong to a unit, but they would not have the same parading requirements (they may even have an annual ceiling of training/administrative day similar to the CIC). These pseudo-supplementary reservists would be permitted to participate in DOMOPS or as staff for course taught over the summer without these days counting against their total allowed. This might accommodate members that are only able to make summer concentration exercises, or who can only attend a handful of evenings & weekends a year.
As far as the reserves go, I happen to agree with pbi on some issues. We have far too many company sized regiments in the infantry reserves. I think amalgamating regiments together to form larger regiments is a better idea.
I would also reccomen any time an amalgamation takes place that the new regiment takes on the identity of all the old regiments that formed it. We have been through this before. My regiment was formed as it is today by combining three battle proven regiments in 1936.
Change, don't fear it, embrace it and make the best of it...
Are you forgeting that the whole purpose of the reserves is to be a base upon which to build a multi-battalion force? You guys are continuing to look at our forces as something that will always just be a small entity that sends a few troops here, and a few troops there with reserves to fill in the gaps. If you think that way, then we will be caught with not only our pants down, but off and downstairs in the wash when something BIG comes along. Why are so many people unable to think that something like that can never happen again?This argument does not prove that reserve and regular regimental systems must be the same. Our standing requirement is for a regular force regimental system that is able to sustain an on going high tempo of deployed operations and a reserve force regimental system that can sustain itself, develop trained individuals & sub-units, and mobilize in time of war. Should mobilization ever occur, both regimental systems would undergo significant change to meet the needs of total war. Separate systems make more sense when better suited to the needs of their respective components in â Å"peaceâ ? and they are able to transition to the needs of mobilization (without necessarily meeting those needs prior to mobilization).
1. If you are a member of a militia unit, you WILL parade xx number of days each month. If you dont show up, you are AWL = CHARGE!
* this will take the weekend out of the weekend warrior, and enable enforceable trg and fitness standards.
2. Make all ranks above MCpl reg force RSS positions, postings so everyone is on the same page. We have surplus officers, use them to train the reserves.
3. Task each unit militia unit specifically (ie mortars, tpt, Anti armour, sigs) so that you can qualify a guy in his job, and let him practice it all the time, instead of just putting him on various courses, which he never uses again and usually forgets because he has no opportunity to practice all of his skills on a weekly basis.
4. Use the reservists all of the time for training support and administrative functions in order to free up more reg force pers for deployments. Class ABC, whatever, keep them working, so that they get better and we actually get some mileage out of them
5. Draw a big black line between the res and the regs. If you want to go reg force, you start with QL3. No more 1/2 trained quick picks that turn into disasters.
6. Offer reservists legislated job protection, and boost their pay to what the regs get when they work. Work a day, paid a day.
7.Make it clear that reservists are not deployed outside of canada unless the war measures act is invoked. Want to get deployed? Join the regs.
8. Make militia units available to local government (provincial) so that they can be used for emergencies and take advantage of provincial funding.
Its just common sense, but I sense it will not go far in this militia dominated forum.
Constructive Criticisms, and possible fixes;
2. Make all ranks above MCpl reg force RSS positions, postings so everyone is on the same page. We have surplus officers, use them to train the reserves.
4. Use the reservists all of the time for training support and administrative functions in order to free up more reg force pers for deployments. Class ABC, whatever, keep them working, so that they get better and we actually get some mileage out of them.
5. Draw a big black line between the res and the regs. If you want to go reg force, you start with QL3. No more 1/2 trained quick picks that turn into disasters.
7.Make it clear that reservists are not deployed outside of canada unless the war measures act is invoked. Want to get deployed? Join the regs.
8. Make militia units available to local government (provincial) so that they can be used for emergencies and take advantage of provincial funding.
Its just common sense, but I sense it will not go far in this militia dominated forum.
The major stumbling block with most of your criticisms of my plan is to "train reservists like the regs" this is impossible due to the limited time that most reservists have, and the limited funds available in order to train them. By signing them to a long contract in order to get the required hours out of them, we will have created another reg force soldier!
Also, the CF was required to staff with augmentees, and leave reg force guys at home, there was never any NEED for militia. It was a way to include the res and justify their existence and funding (not necessarily a bad thing)
The idea of having militia leadership is a good one, until you try to put your mo sect comd in charge of a section in which the youngest man has more experience. Instant underminig. Perhaps only restrict mo leaders to leading other reservists.
And as for using the reserves as a labor pool, well, yeah, thats my opinion and I believe it to be the best choice to free up the regs to do our job.
The comparison of Army National Guard units to Canadian Militia units is ridiculous.
The largest component of NG units is usually recently retired (and young) reg unit individuals.
Having said all of that, the downside is that NG units take the highest casualties, have the lowest morale and the most discipline problems. They are typically used in security roles (static and convoy) and stay in country the longest.
I wasn't looking solely at NG units - I factored USMCR into my comparison as well. I am making the comparison because you have consistently stated that one needs to "sign on the full time line" to be an effective soldier overseas.
I agree, in part, with some of the measures that we would most likely benefit from in Canada (training to provide more then just individual augmentees, mandatory training and attendance, stricter regulations), but lacking these does not automatically render our Reserve forces as completely deficient in what they have to offer.
As well, with regards to performance, the issues you raised may indeed be tied to the reservist issue or they may be something more structural in nature. I know Matt Fisher is going to give us a bit of insight into his reserve experience and his time with TF Tarawa, so we'll see what that says about your ideas.
This is some of what is needed more in the reserves, a collective training evaluation administered by an outside, objective entity who can really give the unit some insight as to the strength and weaknesses of the training. Tie that in with unit pride and cohesion and it could be a winning combination.I'm not sure about other LFAAs, but in LFWA this is the role of the teams from the Militia Training Support Centre at WATC. Each unit must hold at least one MTSC-assisted FTX each year (normally at level 3, or level 3 in a 4 setting if they can swing it). The MTSC team comes out, observes, runs (or helps run...) the AAR, and provides the unit and Bde with a feedback report. As well, we operate a Bde standards section with several regional dets who can perform this function (although they focus more on IT). Finally, for any collective exercise run by us here in Bde (ie: the annual BTE each spring), we set up an Observer Controller Organization that runs the AAR process throughout the ex. The last one we set up included folks from units, Bde HQ, MTSC and the MNARNG. Finally, access to MILES via Big Rush, Inc. has brought a whole new capability in evaluating training (when we can get our hands on the damn stuff...). We still have a way to go but we have made great progress over the last few years. The exercises may not be on the ridiculously grandiose (and unrealistic...) scale that they were in the 80's, but our ability to evaluate training, and to use the training area as a tactical classroom instead of a free for all, is IMHO much improved.
My thing is how i keep hearing rumours of the highland regiments being amalgamated into one or two big regiments....Now THAT would totally suck the big c*#k because then one regt's traditions/history would be gone in a flash & that would be un-Canadian. !!
Carry On! :cdn:
My thing is how i keep hearing rumours of the highland regiments being amalgamated into one or two big regiments....Now THAT would totally suck the big c*#k because then one regt's traditions/history would be gone in a flash & that would be un-Canadian. I personally love being in a highland regiment for the distiction & you can't beat marching with a pipe band & i'm sure many of you out there agree!!!
Carry On! :cdn:
Most of the units have a fairly limited history centred on WWI and WWII and most draw their lineage from other units that they merged with or amalgamated with years ago. Until this issue is addressed, I can't see the Reserves moving forward.
What then is the solution to understrength reserve battalions ? I would think the alternative would be to deactivate understrength units.
What benefit would there be to amalgamation? Do you think that the individual subunits would get any bigger just because they were renamed? Or that the units would operate any more closely? You can accomplish that without a name change.
Two world wars represents "limited history"? Most units have reached or passed their centennial years, we still have 5 to go in Calgary.
Most units draw their lineage from - well, their own unit. There was a major reorg in the early 1920s and some renaming, but as far as amalgamations go, you can see the timeline at my site at www.canadiansoldiers.com - the Regiments have been rather stable for the last 50 years. Go into ORDERS OF BATTLE and scroll down the left til you come to the scarlet links area for infantry regiments. The last amalgamations were in 1955 or so. "Most" units retain the names they had in the 1920s reorg.
What benefit would there be to amalgamation? Do you think that the individual subunits would get any bigger just because they were renamed? Or that the units would operate any more closely? You can accomplish that without a name change.
I've never understood the Reserves staunch refusal for amalgamation of units. We have this huge, bloated, 5 Division structure spread across Canada centred on Battalions and Regiments that are at worst, platoon sized, and at best, perhaps two companies. Most of the units have a fairly limited history centred on WWI and WWII and most draw their lineage from other units that they merged with or amalgamated with years ago. Until this issue is addressed, I can't see the Reserves moving forward. If the UK can do it with units with 100s of years of real history fighting for the Empire, can't we bring our Reserve Force into the 21st century?
Stepping off my soapbox.
Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse. Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away? They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.
We need more units - not less. More local traditions - not less.
Small units they can be, to keep alive the military culture in a town or small city.
This costs nothing - peanuts. The extra accoutrements and so on? Peanuts. The Colonels pay? Also peanuts, but bust him to Major if you wan't.
While we are at it, lets bring back those reserve units that we closed out of the small towns, and put some other units in the large cities that have sprung up in various places.
Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse. Who, in Thunder Bay, is going to join a regiment with the name of a city 750 km away? They might as well join the Toronto Scottish.
I'm going to be really cynical here and suggest that combining five reserve batallions into one unit on paper would only result in a bean counter somewhere deciding that this new one unit only needs the resources of one reserve unit and that four units worth of equipment and budget could be axed from defence spending.Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units). If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.
I'm sorry I didnt make myself clear. A battalion with only 40 people is a waste of resources. If a battalion cant stay at 50% it doesnt need to be kept on the rolls.The problem is, the Army will not allow the regiments to grow. Each has only been established for one or two small companies and an undersized RHQ. Rather than shutting these battalions, it would be better to re-group their sub units into one battalion.
This amalgamation thing is very attractive. Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:
- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ. Very efficient productivity gain there. Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ? What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?
Except that reserve units are currently established to raise only one or two sub-units (and often those are sub-units of only 1 or two sub-sub units). If the amalgamated units were established (and equipped) for five sub units, those bean counters that have you scared would see the need for five sub-units' worth of equipment.
Restore the unit budgets and allow them to enroll new members. Then come back and decide which ones are
This amalgamation thing is very attractive. Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:
- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ. Very efficient productivity gain there. Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ? What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?
Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS. Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes. Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?
It has never been my impression that reserve units run themselves like battalions. I would describe them as depots because of all the extra baggage.
Regardless, my point is that no one has identified exactly what it is all those people do in their offices and identified how much of it can and how much can not be eliminated from each parading location.
If the full-time staff can be consolidated and reduced and still get all the work done, there is an obvious lesson there. But perhaps they can not; we need to ask why before we do it.
This amalgamation thing is very attractive. Imagine reducing 4 infantry battalions to 1. All of the work done by the following:Very few positions would be eliminated. Instead, many would be moved to where they are more efficient. The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).
- 4 x CO
- 4 x RSM
- 4 x DCO
- 4 x part-time Ops/Trg O or Adjt
...would instead be done by the local rifle company OC and CSM (in addition to whatever they currently do, if anything), or shared by the new Bn HQ. Very efficient productivity gain there. Would the company 2I/C be the former Reg F officer, or would there be a huge economy realized by consoliding 4 down to 2 (Ops/Trg and Adjt, trimming another couple of part-timers anyways) only at the Bn HQ? What other full-time positions could be (should be) eliminated?
My guess is that after "mission creep" the end-state would look something like this: each former unit, now sub-unit, would have as full-timers a 2I/C, two clerks, a CQMS, and a QMSI. Tacked onto the normal sub-unit establishment after repeated complaints and position papers would be a few supernumerary officers and NCOs with appointments to deal with all the odds and sods of work that currently must be done.I'd predict a unit structure more like an engr sqn with an Ops O in each Coy. The regular officer could be either Ops O or 2ic (depending on the experience level of the local reserve officers). The QMSI/DSM is a bn level position and would not be established in each sub unit. However, there would be a CQMS, one clerk and possibly an Ops NCO.
somewhere in each brigade, there would be 2 or 3 or 4 new battle group HQs ("BG North". "BG South". "BG Island". "BG Mainland." "BG Interior". Etc). In short, the entirety of every original unit would still be there, just reduced by one rank across the board for the part-timers, with a net increase in the number of officers and senior NCOs to staff the new HQs.The greatest benefit would show through increased trg and sp output from the bn HQs. This structure would produce a greatly increased capacity for collective trg. The sub units would continue to train their sub-sub units, however the bn HQs would train and validate sub units to operate in a bn context (as opposed the sub-unit trg and validating itself). It takes a lot of manpower and resources to train a sub unit, and these do not currently exist in reserve units. The sub unit should have the capacity to train its platoons/troops. However, during my time in a reserve unit, the SHQ was always too involved in the exercise control to gain anything as part of the trg audience. This is fixed by splitting off the bn HQ, making it more robust, and giving it responsibility for several sub units. This larger bn also needs a functioning admin element (pl/tp as the minimum, but potentially a coy/sqn) in order to support the higher level of trg that will be conducted.
No reserve unit will ever be a real battalion - let alone a multi-battalion regiment - in peacetime. ...Yes. A multi-regimental battalion that may or may not include both infantry and recce.
I'm not arguing for the histories and distinctness of the regiments to be erased. They can be maintained, just as effectively, by a Company
Merge the operational and administrative functions of the regiments, so that they become companies and are administered and trained as such by regional battalions. Easy. Knock away the entire command apparatus above company level from each unit, and give those duties to what is now "brigade", and treat a brigade like what it really is, a battalion or battle group. Everything still gets done, but the units will have easier admin, more cohesive and meaningful training, and more bodies available on the parade square. And keep the kilts, marching paces, battle honours, museums, etc.I would leave the Bde HQs in place in order to train the Bn HQ (or a Bn HQ each year). The Bde should be able to put together a trg NCE and NSE in order to train a BG in a TF context. Additionally, I don't think a bn HQ would have the staff resources to deal with the various other formations, higher HQs, and other demands that arise in a bde geographic area.
Re-organization is always attractive to those not being re-organized. Invariably, more harm than good is done, and any economies made are fleeting."Re-organization is always bad. We need to re-organize NDHQ to make things better"
Want to conserve resources? Start at NDHQ.
If we re-org to better accomplish our missions - including the traditional ones few people really understand - then yes, a properly fed and funded re-org can work.Well, good news. I think this is what we would achieve by going with sub-regional Bn HQs under the existing regional Bde HQs.
the money saved in gutting local units to fund a "mega-regional battalion" would;You are clearly not trying to argue against my proposal (which is not about saving money or shifting money). The local establishments would not be gutted as most of the full-time capacity would shift to the sub unit level. Any savings would be small (no RQMS doing the SQMS's job and the sub unit learning the false lesson that regiment will always deliver).
1. Not save any money.
2. Not put money where you and I want it if it did.
If they wanted you to to do level four - you would, they don't - so you won't.The reserves should be able to do level 4 trg, and that is why the reserves should restructure.
You can re-structure until the cows come home, but you won't do level four until they want you to, and it ain't money.So, reserves should not restructure because "they" don't want the reserves to train above sub-sub unit (pl & tp) level?
"Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?"
Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you? Just Ex with other units, and take turns.
Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you? Just Ex with other units, and take turns.I think you would need to re-org. For all the superfluous COs, DCOs, RSMs, etc, there are several missing bn pers from all units. These missing pers are typically the Cpl & MCpl that fill out the RQMS staff, run the regt tpt/pol sect (and are of the same occupation as the msn element), etc.
Lots of little units give us the ability to flush out or re-role in an emergency
If we got rid of some RHQs to give each unit 8 sub-units each, someone at those sub-units would invariably have to take off wear the disbanded RHQ left off, and start filling the recycle bins to keep the green machine happy.
...we don't disband fire departments because we havent't had a fire in a while.
"I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures."
They maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency. Odds of that happening soon? Remote. But, we don't disband fire departments because we havhaven'td a fire in a while.
The structure we have now works, if we let it. Lets sort out the people who don't, first.
Simply restrict each present regt to company size, and add a few extra to do 'Local' and away you go. The kit/accoutrements/tradition aspect of it is a minor administrative price to pay, and cheap dollar wise. The sub units can function as 'primary role is to provide a lt inf coy trained to level(?), as B Coy, Manitoba Inf Rdy Bn' or some such. Then, if we decide we need an NBCD Coy, that Regt could raise a second Coy. Need a CIMIC Coy? Another Regt gets to raise it. A building block approach.
I think that some form of tactical grouping is the the way to go.
The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation. Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War. I believe many reserve regts contributed to them. Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts. Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this? A company each from many units? I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...This is what is suggested. A battalion with multiple regiments grouped within it as companies (or possibly even as platoons).
Another way of forcing the move to Tac Groups is the evolution of "task force" structures to deal with the confused securety environment of a "three block war" AKA "full spectrum ops". In LFCA we should start seeing some movement in 06 when the summer concentration changes to reflect "Full Spectrum Ops".LFQA milcon this summer is going to run on a TF basis, with each of 34 and 35 Bde forming an all arms TF (heavy on inf). Should be interesting.
Although I have not seen any official direction, my guess is the composite LIB, AAR, FLG and Artillery formations we have been creating for training purposes will morph into one or two Task Force HQs, which may be Infantry heavy, but have elements of all the arms and services integral to its operation. Since we already stand up and train with the composite formations during the training year, raising a Task Force HQ and training with a composite Task Force during the training year is not a big change.
The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation. Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War. I believe many reserve regts contributed to them. Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts. Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this? A company each from many units? I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...
Is Sam Hughes laughing in his grave?
* Bounty training: each trained member of the reserve must report to a training area for 1 weekend in May and October annually. They go through a DAG, fire the PWT for rifle, LMG and pistol, TOETs on the other weapons, run the "new army fitness test" (see below) and have a first aid refresher. They are paid a bounty of $ 300 for the weekend and a bounty of $ 1000 for shooting marksman on the rifle and another $1000 for passing the fitness test and scoring in the top 25 percentile on the fitness test march. Tuition assistance is based on attendance at both bounty weekends and a battle school.Where do you see reservists maintaining all the other essential soldier skills? Would there still be weekend exercises?
I suppose there is another future for the militia; creation of large units and assignment of home defense roles. Second responders to radiological attack or natural disasters etc. Sort of a part time fire department/ medical clinic/ grocery store. Who knows maybe a lot of people would like to part of a homeland defence force.
Didn't they try that in the '50's with the end result being a huge flop, driving all the WWII/Korean War vets away?
What if it happened here?
Thomas S. Axworthy
National Post
Friday, October 14, 2005
Saturday's terrible earthquake in Pakistan once again demonstrated the massive destructive power of natural disasters. The same was true of Hurricane Katrina. In that case, the breakdown of law and order equally demonstrated the perniciousness of human nature.
Order -- the maintenance of rules to prevent anarchy -- is the starting point of civilization. Freedom is not free. It depends on human tolerance and responsibility, and when these collapse, as they did in New Orleans -- with lawless gangs looting and shooting at police -- the state must restore order before it can do anything else. Indeed, the city began to recover only once the National Guard and the regular U.S. military finally arrived.
George W. Bush belatedly recognized the role of the military in emergency preparedness by appointing an admiral to replace the disgraced head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency as federal co-ordinator in New Orleans. He also recently mused about the potential need for thousands of troops to quarantine regions of the United States that might be hit by Avian Flu.
What can Canada learn from Katrina and South Asia's earthquake? The lesson has to be that, although Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf were slow to send in their armies, at least they had troops to deploy. Canada's reserves have almost no capacity to respond effectively to a national or continent-wide emergency like Avian flu. We need to invest in our reserves now before such a crisis is upon us.
The militia, consisting of part-time soldiers, were once the backbone of the Canadian military. In the 19th century, the militia fought against American regulars from 1812 to 1814, repelled Fenian invaders in mid-century, fought Louis Riel in 1885 and served as the organizational spine for the great manpower buildups of the First and Second World Wars.
But in the nuclear age, when a war might have been over in hours, the focus changed to well-trained regular forces able to deter aggression, not a potential mass mobilization base.
From being the centre of defence policy, our reserves became a sideshow. In 2000, the army established the Land Force Reserve Project, with a goal of 18,500 reservists by 2005. But, the recent Senate Report, Wounded: Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect, reported that by Sept. 1, 2005, the army reserve was only 13,053 strong. More people are leaving the army reserve than are being recruited.
Why is this happening? Approximately 40% of the total reserve force consists of students and another 40% have civilian jobs. The retention rate for students after graduation is poor, and employers do not give civilian reservists adequate time off to train, nor guarantee employment if a reservist is sent on a long mission overseas.
The Senate report also identifies a lack of equipment and training for the reserves. For large weekend exercises, two or three units sometimes fight to use the same equipment.
General Rick Hillier, the most dynamic Chief of the Defence Staff in years, is promising a transformation of the Canadian military. He should start with emergency preparedness and the role of the reserves.
In these regards, we might look to the U.K. The British Territorial army has made emergency preparedness and aid to civil authorities its core functions. We should do the same with the Canadian reserves. The reserves should be manned, trained and funded for homeland emergencies. There should be at least 50,000 in the reserves (and 90,000 in the regular forces), enough to provide boots on the ground in case of emergency.
In the ice storm crisis of 1998, for example, 4,000 reserves were called out in eastern Ontario and Quebec. But the Department of Defence had to rely on American C-17 transports to move them. In a continental Avian Flu crisis, the U.S. may not have transports to lend. We desperately need air and sea lift, and we need it now.
It is especially important that the reserves be trained in nuclear, biological and chemical defence. Containment of contaminants and rapid assistance to help first responders are vital roles.
Moreover, legislation should be passed, as in the United States, ensuring that reservists do not lose their jobs. Indeed, employers should encourage reserve activity, and give them extra benefits, not penalties.
As in the 19th century, we need a large part-time army of volunteers to be available to aid our civilians should disaster strike. Katrina shows that the danger is real. Avian flu may be just around the corner.
In Canada's international policy review, much was made of "the responsibility to protect." The first responsibility of the Martin government is to protect Canadians at home.
Thomas S. Axworthy is chairman of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen's University. ( http://www.queensu.ca/csd/axbio.htm )© National Post 2005
The problem I forsee is it would take over the aim of the militia and we could become something useless to both sides.....
Am I close?
"Three-Block War"? What kinda concept is that? Who comes up with this stuff?
I believe that hierarchy of roles for the Militia (and the Primary Reserve in general) is extremely important. I do not believe that any attempt to produce a vision for the future of the Army Reserve will stand the test if it does not conform to the direction of the Minister: 1) mobilization, 2) linkage to the community, and 3) augmentation.Is mobilization even a realistic roll today? Maybe domestic mobilization, but the equipment does not exist for Reserve mobilization to fight beside the Regular Force on foreign ops. I think the augmentation roll is still viable at the individual and up to sub-unit level for both domestic and international operations. So perhaps the first roll should be "mobilization for domestic operations". I know that the National Survival roll did not work in the past, but maybe its time has come?
In the past, various attempts to define the missions and tasks to be assigned to the Militia have become exercises of "cherry picking", choosing those that were popular at the time, or which were thought to be financially viable, ignoring government policy.
I fully agree with a_majoor in the finding a niche concept. (I can hear Infanteer cringe)
Like it or not our system cannot keep functioning in the current manner. We need to lift the IRU task for domestic ops off the regular force and have a solid local system in place much like the US ARNG. It makes no sence to ship an Artillery Reg't from Manitoba to BC to fight a fire and likewise for floods and icestorms.
Local troops shoudl be immediately (within 12hrs) be able to be deployed towards a thread of that nature.
However I think the LFRR must focus on identifiying some units for DOMOPS only - thus they can be tailored for certain roles (WMD taskings etc.)
I suppose there is another future for the militia; creation of large units and assignment of home defense roles. Second responders to radiological attack or natural disasters etc. Sort of a part time fire department/ medical clinic/ grocery store. Who knows maybe a lot of people would like to part of a homeland defence force.
The 8CH in Gagetown was a 90/10 Sqn. Most that were with them, well it sucked.
We would want to be very careful not to repeat the mistakes made during 10/90, which in LFWA at least seemed to generate boundless hatred and suspicion on both sides as to what wicked purpose the integration process was actually serving.So, how could the Forces go about making new 10/90 battalions work? Are there any other ideas that could be included into any such radical transformation?
I saw an argument once (that I jumped in to support) which questioned the need of sustaining every reserve regiment as a battalion. Instead, a regiment would exist as a company (or 2, 3 , or 4 if big enough). Battalion head quarters would be "regiment neutral" much like our current brigade HQs. This approach could be applied to armoured and infantry regiments, and it would ensure no regiment became "lost."These ideas are compatible with 10/90 battalions (especially if the bn were entirely based in one city). Consider the Winnipeg Battalion which would consist of Wpg Bn HQ, A Coy (Reg F), B Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles), C Coy (The Queens own Cameron Highlanders of Canada), and D Coy (Winnipeg Grenadiers) [yes, I know the Grenadiers are not currently active]. The FGH could even be an element if the Bn does not have to be branch pure. The Bn HQ would be a mix of regular and reserve pers.
I looked around and asked why they didn't amalgamate units. I suggested creating a "Toronto Regiment,"I've heard many arguments on why reserve regiments should maintain thier Bn structures & not be grouped within other regiments in one battalion. So far, I have not been convinced that it would be bad to have several company sized regiments within one battalion. I'm even more convinced that this approach would work in big cities, and especially where multiple regiments already reside in the same building.
Are you saying that the 10/90 Bn concept could have been an effective force structure that would have given greater flexibility, efficiency, and/or capability to the Army (or at least to the Army Reserves)? Or, are you saying that the 10/90 Bns maybe were not the right force structure, but they could have been forced to work imperfectly if everyone made the effort?
Are you saying that the 10/90 Bn concept could have been an effective force structure that would have given greater flexibility, efficiency, and/or capability to the Army (or at least to the Army Reserves)? Or, are you saying that the 10/90 Bns maybe were not the right force structure, but they could have been forced to work imperfectly if everyone made the effort?
yesSo......As MCG asked........Which is it?
I was commenting on how we make things work.When you suggested that 10/90 did not work because lower levels worked against it, you seem to imply that 10/90 was a good plan that should have been a success.
So, I'll re-state my original question: how could the CF go about making new 10/90 battalions improve the overall capabilities of the Regular and Reserve Forces (or at the very least improve the capabilities of the Reserve Forces with out eroding from the capabilities of the Regular Forces)?
If new resources were ONLY directed to 10/90 (or in the CPC proposal 20/80) battalions/units/task forces then current capabilities could be maintained.I tend to think that if new resources are ONLY directed to creating 10/90 battalions, then we would be neglecting existing deficiencies of the regular force in order to create these battalions. If you intended to say that ONLY new resources are directed to 10/90 battalions, then I would agree that such a move would not erode from the regular force structure (not the same as regular force capabilities).
Today I could se a 10/90 or 20/80 Bn of light Infantry, with most of the 10 or 20 going to support coy where training and experience counts the most,If the intent of the 10/90s is to be firefighter battalions, this would likely be the be one of the best options. Far better than a regular force rifle company sitting outside the managed readiness cycle. Sure, it does not provide for the high readiness vanguard sub-unit. However, this would ensure that capable CSS support for a unit would be available in the location of the 10/90 Bn (able to support regular IRU troops or local reservists) & that the local CO would know how to use it (this was an occasional frustration on PEREGRINE where CSS did not seem to be understood at the unit level).
Then train the unit for what it well be doing on tours. Not for what it may do.Would we start deploying reserve battalions if they were 10/90?
We don't deploy reserve battalions now, but individual reservists still get deployed.
This gets to another question. What is the roll/function of a 10/90 battalion (in relation to domestic operations, international operations, and force generation)? Is to to provide better trained soldiers & sub-units to augment regular force deployments, or is it to proved a battalion sized surge capability? Should a 10/90 battalion be providing the vanguard sub-units to IRU calls within its AO, or should we continue to generate that vanguard from the regular force while expecting the 10/90 Bn to provide the comd & CSS to the vanguard and then add follow-on sub-units from itself?
The Regular troops would have a breather from operations while posted in the 20/80...Some posters on these forums would argue that the Reg F neither need nor want a breather from operations, DOMOPS included.
it might be wise to limit contracts to one year and encourage a flow of reserve troops through the 20/80 (although not a mass turnover of 50% or more).
So, you are assuming the Total Force Battalion would consist of all full-time reservists?
If we had Job protection ...you could do 12 ntm....just like the states!!
Never been asked. One or two companies. Every company I've ever worked for in Winnipeg supported me when on tour. I've never seen one paper passed to see if it was what people wanted. Most companies dont even know what reserves are.
If anyone has any proof on this matter....it would be nice to see. I've looked everywhere and never seen any work or papers on Job protection for the reserves.
The US still gets their men and women to join and even with the fact that job protection is not 100%.American society is more historically supportive of their military and, IMO, far more patriotic.
I'm looking for a piece of paper...proof that the government even asked people if this was a good idea....or was it just a person saying ...naaa..won't work. As that is what I think it is.
Didn't know I had to add all my jobs on this site....by bad. Ill try and fix that one up.
Perhaps the entire battalion doesn't have to be at 12 NTM. Perhaps a dedicated sub-unit, on rotation.Yes. That lead sub-unit is referred to as the vanguard.
Then it may as well be Reg F.Your right. However, I think it is a waste of resources to have a full time battalion (regular or reserve) that has as its sole roll the DOMOPS. Generally, all that is required of an IRU sub-unit is manual labour (not a skill set which would warrent a full bn trg full time to prepare for).
Yes. That lead sub-unit is referred to as the vanguard.
Your right. However, I think it is a waste of resources to have a full time battalion (regular or reserve) that has as its sole roll the DOMOPS. Generally, all that is required of an IRU sub-unit is manual labour (not a skill set which would warrent a full bn trg full time to prepare for).
I'm enjoying this discussion, but thought I'd add a side note re:job protection for reservists.
Job protection for reservists would be a double-edged sword. Sure, you'd have a job to come back to, but you also may be denied employemt in the first place if the employer knows your a reservist. I understand that this happens regularly in the US. If you are employed by the Canadian Fed Gov, you will not only likely be able to go and keep your job, but you will get all of your raises upon return.
Employers are funny people, and entreprenuers are even funnier - they don't like to be told that they HAVE to hold a job for someone who goes on tour of their own volition.
I myself had no problem holding my job when I went on tour, but some of my buddies did. I kept my employer informed right from the point that I put my name in. I had a job to come back to, and they even gave me a raise/promotion upon return. BTW, I wasn't working for the Gov either.
If reservists had legislated job protection, I doubt he would ever hire another one.
you cannot run a business when your employees are rotating in and out on someone elses time table.
DOMOPS encompasses a wide range of potential tasks, and I am fairly sure the proposal was this unit was there to assist in all contingencies, from an Ice Storm to an FLQ type crisis.a_majoor,
About the only DOMOPs roll that could justify a Bn in full-time trg is aid-to-civil power. Do we need full time battalions in every major city for the event that they need to be employed against the citizens? I think that is a waste. The likely needs can be met by part-time pers, and there are enough regular force if we ever need to call on this.
Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea.I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves. DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it.
Which is why I am not 100% for the full blown 20/80 Bn idea. A 200 some odd 50/50 would be a fine compromise, able to serve as a command node and support element for the arriving IRU and follow on forces. The remainder of the time can be split between MLOC, contingency planning/training and perhaps providing continuation training or support for the local P Res units (many P Res units have support issues, so there is a good training fit there).
I would propose that the 10/90 or 20/80 (or something in between) makes more sense when its purpose is to raise the training standard within the reserves. DOMOPS would certainly be a task of a 10/90, but it would not be the end-all/be-all of it.
As mentioned above, such a 10/90 organization would be complimentary to proposals (seen in the Reserve Regimental restructure thread) to combine multiple coy sized regiments within one battalion structure. The HQ & HQ Pl could be a 50/50 structure, the Admin Coy could be a 80/20 structure, and the rifle coys could just see a reinforced RSS manning. This would allow the reserves to start better developing battalion level staff (with field experience at that level) outside of the summer concentrations.
Every DOMOPS capability, that might be gained from a DOMOPS focused 50/50 company, could also be gained from a 10/90 battalion that was primarily part-time. However, that same 50/50 company would not provide a comparable trg benefit as a 10/90.
There is a whole world of possibilities opening before us, but we have to get out of the "perpetuating the units of the CEF" box to take full advantage of them.
-Stop tip-toeing around the idea of amalgamation. A number of the Res units on the order of battle today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA has done it frequently for decades. For the great majority of Res soldiers (IMHO) the pain would be brief if the issue were managed properly;This has to be done very carefully if we hope to maintain regimental pride, esprit de corps, etc., but it CAN be done, IMHO. A number of regiments today were created as an offshoot of another regiment. The Candian Scottish and the Seaforths are an excellent example. The CScotts were created from the men and officers of the Seaforths. Only later did they become the Canadian Scottish. You could amalgamate those 2, retaining each name but one CO/RSM/HQ. A CSM/OC for each Coy, etc. The uniforms would not have to change, which admitidly doesn't fit with 'amalgamation', but there is no financial or organizational reason to do so. Why mess with something unnecesarily?
Is there any reason to believe that the "100/400" battalion proposed has to be a combat arms battalion?When I have seen Service Battalions strip Cbt Arms troops from Cbt Arms Units to fill Driver positions and such for a ROTO (because their people refused to go - it might be too dangerouse), I would say "NO!" to this proposal. I would think that an Engineer Unit would be much more in line of what is required. After that, I would say a Sigs Unit, to provide Comms to any 'Relief' efforts that may take place. Service Battalion Truckers and that would not be as useful as these two.
The current reserve system produced the current reserve leadership. How many of them will stand up and say "The system that produced me is broken"?
I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!
Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."
Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?
At the national level, resources are assigned to the areas to provide for one night a week, one weekend a month of training for the period of Sept-May every year (Four nights at 1/2 day each, 1 weekend at 2 1/2 days). (December is funded for 3 nights only, since most folks have other plans for Christmas than freezing in Meaford or Wainwright). This makes the famous 37.5 days of training per year.
I don't see why not. The Reg Force spouts this at the schools every single day!Oh no... coffee all over the desk...crap....
Sgt: "We don't want a mindless drone, troops! We need a thinking soldier that can read and write and study! For this reason, there will be no review, we will not spoon feed you."
Cpl: "Sgt, was that not the way you were taught? How can the system that created you, in all your glory, be bad for me? And how can you teach me when you are unable to spell "Battalion"?
I hear and read a lot about the waste of overborne reserve units, but not much thought about how underborne units fare under the weight of administrivia.
January 2006
With an Overstretched Military, U.S. Should Create 'Home Guard'
By David Abshire and Jonah Czerwinski
The United States holds an enormous stake in Iraq. Although initiated to counter a perceived terrorist threat, the U.S. presence in Iraq has in many ways made near-term gains in the war on terror more difficult and thrown America's homeland security into question. But a creative solution with roots reaching far back into American history may be the answer.
Today, the presence of coalition troops in Iraq provides terrorists with a virtually constant training ground to develop battleground experience. As when Mujahedeen battled the Soviets in Afghanistan 20 years ago, which spawned Al Qaeda's evolvement through the 1990s, Iraq today has itself become a "cause for Jihad."
In fact, Iraq has eclipsed Afghanistan as a terrorist seedbed. A recent CIA report suggests that the urban nature of the war in Iraq affords assailants opportunity to learn how to carry out assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and other kinds of attacks that were never a staple of the fighting in Afghanistan during anti-Soviet campaigns.
Today, insurgents in Iraq average 90 attacks daily - the highest amount since Saddam Hussein was overthrown.
The length of engagement and nature of daily conflict provide rich propaganda for terrorist recruiters - especially al-Qaeda and its associates - to use in the all-important battle for hearts and minds among the youth of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.
The advent of the Internet ignited terrorist communications. The CIA's National Intelligence Council finds that terrorists are enabled to converse, train, and recruit through the Internet, and their threat will become "an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters." According to a study by Gabriel Weimann, a professor at Israel's University of Haifa, terrorist websites have increased from around a dozen to 4,500 in the last four years.
The July bombings in London further bolster the notoriety of terrorist organizations. British engagement in Iraq was among several reasons cited by those claiming responsibility. This sort of propaganda upends the notion that by fighting terrorists in Iraq, we avoid facing them in the streets of New York, Atlanta or Los Angeles.
The stresses are internal, too. While America's military in Iraq struggles in this context, it is composed largely by an overstretched National Guard and Reserve Force. Repeat call-ups, extended tours, low recruitment and re-up rates, and poor supply reflect a massive crack in the system. The Army National Guard recruitment for 2005 missed its goal by more than 12,000 and the Army Reserve recruitment was off by more than 5,000. Moreover, troops at home are not fully equipped for homeland security scenarios because the inventories from non-deployed units are being sent overseas.
The original purpose of the Guard has transformed - so should its organization, supply, and support. If the military draft was the Achilles' heel to the Johnson war effort, the overextension of Reserves and National Guard may become ours today.
A home-front strategy is perhaps the most important aspect in a layered defense, regardless of how Iraq fares. President Bush should convene a group of bipartisan best minds to increase credibility with the public and Congress about the looming crisis in our military. Recognizing that we never anticipated and prepared for the new kind of warfare that came with 9/11, this bipartisan group will review home-front capabilities, mobilization, tactics and strategy. This bipartisan group should collaborate with the Commission on National Guard and Reserves, recently established by Congress.
Without waiting for the commission, however, the president should dramatically reinforce the National Guard.
This is not just a matter of changing policy and practices. The National Guard touches every community in the nation, their small businesses and families. A strengthening of the National Guard and Reserves should include their support groups, families, small businesses, the wounded, and the children and spouses left behind. An emergency grant from Congress matched with a review of existing laws and programs should provide better support structures, such as medical services to those most affected by deployed National Guard units.
The president also needs to make a call for national service. Doing so requires creating a voluntary, well equipped, well organized, congressionally funded and locally based corps. A non-expeditionary "Home Guard" is a strategic solution rooted in American history. Today's application should be composed of citizens from the community, who wear uniforms, train on weekends, and help prevent the chaos from a natural disaster or a weapon of mass effect. In the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, there would be an immediately deployable group of trained citizens from each community under control of the state governors ready to share the burden with the Red Cross, police, FEMA, local fire departments and National Guard.
A Home Guard would help mobilize the nation as we did during the Second World War. In some communities, where a percentage of first responders are in Iraq, such a trained force would help manage the shock following a terrorist attack or major natural disaster. Trained in the elements of security, engineering, civil affairs, and basic medicine, the Home Guard would recruit citizens already possessing these critical skills as well as individuals retiring out of the National Guard, active military and the Reserves. For the shorter term, enlistments in the National Guard could be followed by extended duty in the Home Guard. Citizens would have the opportunity to shift experience while retaining earned rank. Even more efficient would be the use of medically discharged or disabled veterans, who can still offer knowledge, skill and low-intensity service.
The untapped talent in the Civil Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary could serve as a starting point for building the Home Guard. Along our border, it would become a constructive outlet in place of ad hoc voluntary militia attempting to provide border protection in some states. Leaders drawn from their local communities would be trained in crisis communications and crowd control.
Hurricane Katrina proved the lynchpin role played by the National Guard and Reserve. The poor federal response underlines the need for a Home Guard. The aftermath also gives America some idea of the necessary preparation to react following an attack with a weapon of mass effect. This Home Guard would connect the first responders with the very people they serve. In fact, the Home Guard would become a highly organized group of newly recruited first responders
David Abshire is president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. Jonah J. Czerwinski is senior research associate and director of homeland security projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
There will be change, but it will likely be much more incremental and will probably be more organizational in the context of existing cap-badges e.g. rather than merging units, grouping them in some fashion to streamline the number of actual unit HQs (since our important force generation in the Reserves involves soldiers and junior leaders, not unit-level resources) and reduce the hollowness of the Res F as a whole.
Much has been touched on geographic groupings here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,25713.0/all.html
One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity. A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.
One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity. A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.
get rid of some of the honouraries and senates, and then go with the bigger plan.
I guess my stir of the pot is that this seems to be a typically Canadian dodge, and that there may be valid reasons for going a step farther. I think that the Reg/Res integration has more to it than simply at the soldier level- something that I think we're going to see is something much more like the US terms of service, where people go to active or reserve status with relative ease- ... If the transition means changing your uniforms, you're less likely to do it than if you can simply transfer from the 1st Battalion, RHPBR to the 4th Battalion.This is the concept that differentiates this thread from the other Reserve regimental restructure thread (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,25713.0.html) (and in a way bridges the gap to the Regular Force Regimental formation (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,28042.0.html) thread).
I would, however, take issue with using the example of the amalgamation of 3 arty units, and largely for the reasons that I put forward in my original posting. The key difference between the success of that endeavour and the task that's upcoming for the infantry is exactly the issue that I was suggesting needed to be addressed head on- that of hat badge. Those of us wearing a corps cap badge already take advantage of the benefits. I myself have been in 3 different units, without much impact through the change- again, the hat badge remained the same.
There just doesn't seem to be the same propensity to carry over in the infantry. I could be wrong- my sample size is relatively small- but that's the hunch that I get.
the proposed Territorial Defence Battalions.Is that the name being applied to the Conservative's big city emergency-responce battalions?
Is that the name being applied to the Conservative's big city emergency-responce battalions?
......referred to as "Tee-Dee-Bee-Gee". Sounds pretty '70's to me....
i've heard the term "Territotial Defence Battle Groups", inferring a combined arms team. Not quite sure if the Army Reserve is ready to be referred to as "Tee-Dee-Bee-Gee". Sounds pretty '70's to me....
I wouldn't use the "battle group" moniker as it is as unrealistic as calling reserve formations "Brigade Groups".Well, there is a CANLANDGEN that says we (the army) must use "battle group" for combined arms manoeuvre units. I'd rather go with "battalion group" but that was also ban from use.
The term being used is "Territorial Defence Battalion".Yeah, we've already got that. The name needs some fixing.
Yeah, we've already got that. The name needs some fixing.
Once upon a time, I was posted into a Toronto Reserve unit as the "RegF guy."
I looked around and asked why they didn't amalgamate units...
Man, having those nails driven into your palms and feet really stings!
Funny that you got that reaction. I served in the RRegtC 1974-1982, leaving as a WO. Many were the times my fellow Sgts and I stood around the bar in the WOs &Sgts holding forth on how there should just be one decent sized Res Inf Bn in Toronto instead of five understrength "company equivalents". It made sense to us then, and I bet that it makes sense to a lot of Res today, who are not as bound by old thinking, and do not see a RegF devil behind every tree.
Funny that you got that reaction. I served in the RRegtC 1974-1982, leaving as a WO. Many were the times my fellow Sgts and I stood around the bar in the WOs &Sgts holding forth on how there should just be one decent sized Res Inf Bn in Toronto instead of five understrength "company equivalents". It made sense to us then, and I bet that it makes sense to a lot of Res today, who are not as bound by old thinking, and do not see a RegF devil behind every tree.
1. No cap badges wil disappear;
I think it's because that kind of compromise would be more acceptable to regimental assoc., honoraries vets etc. They would be able to accept the changes without feeling that their regimental eexistenceis gone.
Funny that you got that reaction.
Any change that will make a unit more effective (ie - more realistic training) will be supported by the majority of the troops. Most changes, however, face resistance from those that see the Reserves as a social club, the regimental mafias, and to a lesser degree, the Honouraries. They will have to be brought on side, or otherwise de-fanged.The troops tend to be onside, and see the logic of having a unit large enough to do realistic AND.....dare I say.....fun, training. But you cannot deny there are impediments to militia evolution. ::)
Two: Why does Toronto - the center of the known universe - not have the largest militia Regiments in Canada? There are 4,558,800 people in Toronto, and 4,168,123 people in British Columbia. Who parades the most Reservists?
Maybe because there's more regiments in Toronto then in BC...Er let me think there is C.4th's ,Can Scot's,B.Cr's,15th Field RCA,5 Tribe RCA,Rocky Mountain ram buggers and not last but the best,6Fd and 44Fd Sqn CME.,oh and not lets forget 12Svc,12Med and that same on the Island,the only reason we are good is because we on the left coast make do with what we get from Upper Canada!
1. No cap badges wil disappear;
Well, I have been around for a long time ( as pbi can attest to ), and I strongly advocate the tactical grouping of units. There are tons of reasons to do so, and few sound reasons not to do it. May unit succession go to the most worthy, not the last person standing. Our PRes units have not won a battle honour since 1945! The CLS will wisely, cut through the chaff and do it. It is long past time that we in the Reserve got on with transformation. Do I want my capbadge to disappear. No, but it won't with tactical grouping as we have done in 38 CBG with the Arty and Svc Bns.
You can't expect people outside of the mega cities to drive two hours to parade.
Another quick thought/question. I have been hearing a lot lotely about the reserve battalion possibly being set up in calgary/victoria etc. I know a lot of guys in my unit are seriously considering this as an option, incl trained guys that have been deployed on roto 1. As its in their area it means less of a change or for whatever reasons they have. This could be a large pool of troops to deploy. They would have more current training and could be thrown into the mix. After my experience on my last tour I would in know way advocate sending them under reserve leadership, however if they trained together as a formed body for long enough it might be one more cohesive force to deploy. Just a thought
I think you may be referring to the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups that are being considered for formation in various major urban centres across the country. These are not "new" units; they are intended to be groupings of existing Reserve units tagged for force employment in domestic ops. As such, it's likely they'll see additional training in things related to domestic ops, and could deploy in whole or in part on domestic ops under CanadaCom. But I doubt that they would constitute organizations that are deployable on expeditionary ops. If that's the understanding that you and your buddies have, it's probably unrealistic. You may want to discuss the matter with your chain of command for further details.
Well nothing is concrete about how these units are going to work. There will be a significant number of troops on Class B though. most of them will be dagged green. The army has hinted that these units could be used to fill any shortfalls for operational tours overseas. Yes the main focus is domestic ops but don't kid yourself about the need for more troops on the ground and what the CF will need to do to get more of them there.
While these ideas all have merit, no one had addressed the most important equation.
"Were will we get the manpower to fill these new battalions, companies"?
Obviously, the messaging about these TDBGs is getting very muddied. There seem to be lots of folks who are thinking these are going to be new, standing/full-time/Reg F organizations. But based on a briefing I had recently, that's not really what's being considered (unless there have been some VERY recent and quite dramatic changes!)
39 CBG is adopting a "Tactical Grouping" plan that will see (I believe) all of our Cbt Arms units under "Shared HQ's" until they achieve a 200 pers parade state, i.e. the Rocky Mountain Rangers and Seaforth will share a HQ until one or the other parades 200 pers, at which point they will regain their independant HQ. Same for the Arty, Armd (are they just Recce now?), and Eng.
Very interesting. When I was in, I always pondered about the RMRang and BCDs amalgamating to become either the Rocky Mountain Dragoons, or the British Columbia Rangers, depending on which trade won out. Mind you, switching trades for most of the troops probably wouldn't have been very popular!
Is there any talk of full amalgamation into the "Seaforth Rangers" or the "Rocky Mountain Highlanders"?
(oh, as if the sheep jokes weren't bad enough now! ;D)
I tend to agree with one a point Michael made. it might be better to amalgamate thren watch a regiment be disbanded and die.
let's be honest how many Militia Bn's and Regiments do we have that are Coy and Sqn strength. Realistically wouldn't we be better served by say some 18-20 Militia Infantry Regiments of roughly ar at least close to Bn strength (400-600 pers) and a similar reduction in Armoured, Arty and other units.
If such as thing is to happen, and I think it's a realistic possibility, then better it happen on "our" terms rather that some whim of a politician .
Methinks I've opened the proverbial can of worms here, but then again maybe it's worthy of a debate.
Simpley put, we have to many chief and not enough indians. My unit, a Res. Infantry Regiment has the following (roughly)
1 LCOL, 3 Maj, 6 Capt, 6 Lt/2Lt and 1 CWO, 4 MWO, 2 WO, and countless Sgt...
However, we have the junior ranks to field a company. We like every other Res unit are top heavy. Yes Recceguy you are very correct in pointing out the fact that these people have knowledge and expereince and are exteremly valuable in an admin. function. But a significant degree of high ups in the Reserve world are living in the days of the Cold War still, they have no knowledge or expereince of of the current RMA. Until just a few years ago the focus of our training was advance to contact across the flats of meaford.
At the same time, there is a number of people within higher who do seek info on the contemporary nature of what we do, there are those who are in tune. This is not intended to be a bashing session of Sr NCO/Officers.
But from a business stand point, do you forsee a civilian company with 100 workers having 20 executives and senior management types?
The structure of the Res units in terms of higher has the staffing to support full size battalions. So in terms of economics we need to boost the ranks, or trim the top. The two are out of proportion, as dapaterson put it, there are "CSM" out there filling the role of PL WO's on steroids.....
There are greater systemic issues that prevent the realization of this trimming. Such as the voluntary nature of the job, we need to be top heavy because we need people to plug holes at the top, as frankly you would be left with MCpl commanding Pl if we did not have the surplus at the top. Its a catch 22. Like i said before, its a can of worms.
In terms of augmenting the reg force, its done mainly through section sized or smaller contributions from a single reserve unit. Res CSM, PL WO, COY CMD do not deploy in those roles.
My CSM has two 60% manned platoon to worry about. Granted he has the NES dead beats to deal with as well. So I guess that bring him up to having almost 2 full platoon.
Careful about generalizations. Reserve OCs, CSM's, Pl Comds and Pl WOs do deploy. It's been done before. It's being done now (KAF D&S Pls) and it will be done again, quite possibly on a much larger scale than we're accustomed to seeing.
A lot of Reg F rifle coys aren't much better off these days.
Thus far my generalization is pretty accurate. 1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity.
George, you have greatly mis-quoted me...
Ok, you are right. of the 2000 Canadian in Afghanistan apx 200 or so are reserve, and you've sited that the D+S PL WO is Res. (I have buddies in that platoon right now)
Thus far my generalization is pretty accurate. 1 for 2000.... heck even if there was 3, the point is pretty clear.... they tend not to deploy in such a capacity.
Roto 13 in Bosnia is an exception as well, when a Res Coy went over... and on the point you make refering to it likley more common in the future... we're looking at a Coy of Res at a given time... so again.... 1 Maj, a few Capt/Lts 1 CSM and 3 WO..... or about 1/3 of my Res Units higher ups.... multiplied by the countless res units out there... drops in the bucket....
Roto 13 in Bosnia is an exception as well, when a Res Coy went over... and on the point you make refering to it likley more common in the future... we're looking at a Coy of Res at a given time... so again.... 1 Maj, a few Capt/Lts 1 CSM and 3 WO..... or about 1/3 of my Res Units higher ups.... multiplied by the countless res units out there... drops in the bucket....
Well the UK Reserves (all services) don't get a pension - or medical care & dental care (unless they are mobilised). If they are wounded on ops they are repatriated - discharged - and they have to make an appointment with the local hospital for after care (or in some cases for further operations)
When i was in Kabul in 2005... there was a plethora of Res Force WO/Officers filling vital tasks, CIMIC, FST, Staff Officer Positions....
However they did not deploy as Infantry platoon cmd/2IC, or Company Cmd.... There was a LCol who was the CO of a Toronto Area Regt who was part of CIMIC, who dropped in rank to Maj and commanded the 12 person CIMIC team.... Majors normally command more then 12 people....
My point related back to previous comments regarding CWO/RSM and Maj/Coy Cmd from Res force never/very seldomly deploying in such a capacity.
CIMIC is a Reserve task, meaning that the norm is that all CIMIC pers are Res Force. (I'm sure there could be the odd exception to this)
Everyone points to ROTO 13 as the example. I would suggest we would have been pooched even more so on ROTO 14 if it wasn't for those Reservists.
Couldn't agree more it was like pulling teeth just to get kit and I DAGGED Green. It is really difficult as a individual augmentee from outside the area basically you are on your own at times.
Perhaps they are sailors and airman/women first.
I wonder how many Reserve augmentees from the L Eddys, Seaforths 48th etc were offered a Ortona cocktail a few days ago.
To the first I would suggest it has more to do with training by that I mean the Navy/Airforce crses are more in line with their Reg Force counterparts.
I guess I am being a little argumentative for fun now.
...the Conservative strategy calls for the regular force "footprint" to be increased across the country. A Northern Sovereignty Support Centre will be established in Goose Bay, N.L., and the 439 Combat Support Squadron at Canadian Forces Base Bagotville, Que., will be expanded and redesignated as an "expeditionary" unit to better support domestic and international operations [with only Griffon helicopters? Maybe they will get some of the new Chinooks - MC]. In particular, the squadron would support deployments of the military's rapid-reaction Disaster Assistance Response Team...
Military wants more troops in cities
Redleafjumper's efforts were for Prince George, not Prince Rupert.Thanks for the correction. I should have done a search prior to posting in order to refresh my recollections.
I just love how they close all these bases and then want to open more. Do you think they'll just rent a big office/warehouse in most cases? Also, Victoria and Vancouver? Aren't they close enough to share? ???
The way it looks like we're doing things in Halifax is basing the TDBG on the existing reserve units with a small full time (part reg force part class c) HQ structure. IMHO the way to look at this is like we're giving the reserves a more national guard like capability.
Although Victoria and Vancouver look close on a map, there is a lot of water and an hour and a half ferry ride between the two.
In addition, a lot of estimates show that should 'The Big One' hit BC, the ferry terminals, harbours, rail lines into BC and Vancouver International Airport will be heavily damaged, if not destroyed. If it ain't on the Island in advance, it ain't getting there for several critical days..... (based on 8 to 8.5 sustained over 30 to 60 sec).
Well I guess they should have one in Charlottetown or Summerside, PEI and maybe Stephenville, NF as well. ;) Might as well cover all bases.....no pun intended....well, maybe a bit. ;D
Now, it's possible I was mistaken in how I interpreted the talk we got... If we do train for armed domestic response to security threats and such, that's entirely different- but a lot of that could be incorporated into our normal infantry training anyway.
I would tend to think that this is the case. You would be conducting 'military' training, not what you might have thought. You would also still be available to attend your regular Parade nights. This is where your dedication is really shown, when you also attend regular Parade nights. (As you would be on a Class B, you would not be entitled to sign a Class A Pay Sheet as you are already being paid for that time.) There is a lot more to the plan than what you have envisioned.
I would suggest everyone take a step back and breathe for a minute. The TDBG working group had its first meeting only last week. Any "details" at this point are moving targets at best...
Ah, OK. The info we got gave the impression that plans were advanced far beyond that...
Obviously you should have a sit down with someone from the OR and have them explain how you are paid. Classes A, B, and C are all paid differently. You should also realize that each covers different time frames in how your wages are calculated. Class A for instance pays you one of two ways; for a full day, anything over six hours, or for a half day for anything under six hours. Class B and C pay you at monthly rates. A RMS Clerk can sort out all your questions, and hopefully not confuse you any more.
So if I read RecceDG's interpretation of the rumours, and yes they are only rumours...
This whole thing is really just nothing more than a DRU (with a different name of course)... and a Class B headshed ... and more RSS.
Ah yes, vehicles... When the reserve COs were at one time clamouring for the same scale of issue as RegF units I would ask them one question -
Where is your maint platoon to keep up this new kit?
The math is simple. 1 mech can maint 5 vehs.
No mech, no veh.
I've discussed this in other threads so I won't go into too much detail. But why not re-organize the under strength Militia brigades into full strength battle groups. Each brigade group would become a battle group with each battalion/regiment reduced to sub-unit size and maintained as a sub-unit. (I would split 38 & 39 CBGs into two battle groups each for ease of organization. I don't know if the increased personnel numbers that are promised would support this or not.) This is just for conversation sake:
38 Canadian Battle Group
- 38 CBG Headquarters (non-unit specific)
- Royal Winnipeg Rifles (rifle company)
- Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (rifle company)
- Lake Supior Scottish (rifle company)
- Fort Garry Horse (recce squadron)
- 26th Field Regiment (artillery battery)
- 116th Independent Field Battery (air defence troop)
- 38 Field Engineer Troop
- 17 Service Battalion (service company)
- 17 Field Ambulance (medical platoon)
Where I have questions is where are all these new people going to come from, and where are we going to put them?
RecceDG: Thanks for your clarification
With regards to more headquarters, you would have additional battle group (former brigade group) headquarters but you wouldn't have any regimental headquarters. So significantly less Lieutenant Colonels and senior officers and NCMs and more junior ranks. There would only be one LCol and one RSM in the whole province. That was the whole concept. Each unit would be maintained only as a sub-unit, rather than a unit heaquarters with only one sub-unit.
Why should some retired CO's be driving decisions on what is best for the CF now? We've addressed the idea of regional battalions several times here. We could, IMO, improve the reserves with regional battalions (though I would not go so far as to replace the CBGs).
I'd be very surprised if that ever happened. No one wants to walk through the Regimental minefield, the recent press over the SD&G's/ Brocks tactical grouping illustrates why...
I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.
The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit.That is how I always saw it done (but I'm going back half a decade now). At the time, there were often complaints from those in the "under command" unit that they were often given second class treatment in that there was a perception that good courses & tasks went to those in the "commanding" unit.
...In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks. ...