text:
Why Change U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy?
The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way for more than half a century, since the beginning of the nuclear age.1 With the end of the Cold War, however, the debate about the roles of U.S. nuclear weapons (and those of other countries) has entered a new phase, propelled by the transformation of the international political landscape and the altered foreign policy challenges and opportunities that these changes are bringing about.
The committee's first major study of nuclear weapons policy appeared in 1991, early in the transition out of the Cold War.2 Numerous studies exploring or proposing changes in nuclear forces and policies have been conducted since. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) completed in 1994 by the Department of Defense has been the basis of current U.S. nuclear policy.3 Among unofficial studies, the series of reports on nuclear weapons issues by the Henry L. Stimson Center and the international studies of the prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons conducted by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons have attracted particular notice.4 With the benefit of those studies and others, and the committee's own intensive re-examination of these matters—including wide-ranging discussions of nuclear weapons issues in the continuation of its long-standing series of meetings with counterpart groups in Russia, China, and Europe—the committee now offers a new assessment of the implications of the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union for the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
The remainder of this chapter first summarizes the reasons for believing that further changes in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons policies are desirable and
the prospects for near-term action on the two sides in this direction. Some dilemmas of nuclear deterrence that were instrumental in shaping nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, along with the dangers that resulted, are then briefly elaborated. The committee outlines its case for a regime of progressive constraints to continue the progress that has been made in reducing those dangers since the Cold War ended. The chapter concludes with an orientation to the remainder of the report and a caution about the economics of nuclear arms reductions.
Nuclear Weapons During and After the Cold War
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were at the center of U.S. and Soviet national security strategies. Both countries developed large, diverse, dispersed, and accurate nuclear forces that were maintained at high alert levels. (Appendix B portrays the Cold War growth of nuclear forces, as well as the beginnings of their post-Cold War decline.) The officially stated rationales for these forces, in broad terms, were on the U.S. side to deter the Soviet Union from attacking or threatening to attack the United States or its allies with either conventional forces or nuclear weapons (see Box 1.1) and on the Soviet side to deny the United States and its allies any military or political advantage from their possession of nuclear weapons, and to be able to deliver a "crushing rebuff" to any use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.
The actual events of the Cold War period are consistent with the view that the nuclear forces and policies of the two sides were successful in their stated purposes: from 1946 onward, neither side succeeded in consistently imposing its will on the other, neither waged major war against the other, and neither launched a nuclear attack against anyone. Of course, other factors were at work, including the memory of the vast destruction of World War II, nearly all of it accomplished with conventional forces. And proof of cause and effect is always elusive in international affairs, as is, even more generally, proof of why something did not happen.
But supposing that the nuclear forces and policies of the two sides were indeed major contributors to the avoidance of full-scale war between East and West in the post-1945 period, it still must be conceded that this outcome was accompanied by enormous risks. These risks included the danger that the nuclear arms competition might continue without limit, endlessly adding to destructive potentials, constantly risking some destabilizing imbalance, and forever tempting additional countries to acquire nuclear weaponry for purposes of protection, or status, in a world of nuclear-armed camps. Above all, the risks included the danger that an accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized launch of one or a few nuclear weapons, or some other escalatory dynamic arising out of political crisis or regional conflict, could lead to full-scale nuclear war and the unimaginable disaster that this would represent for civilization (see Box 1.2).5
BOX 1.1 Deterrence
Understanding the history of nuclear weapons policy and addressing the challenges of formulating new policies for the future both require an appreciation of the diverse definitions, applications, and dilemmas of deterrence. Because confusion can easily result from insufficient clarity about what is meant by the term in any particular context, the committee shall take pains to try to be clear—here and then throughout this report—about what it means by deterrence in the various forms and circumstances in which the concept has been applied.
The words "deter" and "deterrence" both derive from the Latin deterrere , to frighten from. The narrowest dictionary definition of "deter" in English, correspondingly, is "to discourage from some action by making the consequences seem frightening."* Both in everyday language and in the language of specialists in international politics and military strategy, however, ''deter" has long since had a somewhat wider meaning: it is used not only to describe discouraging an action by the prospect of consequences that are frightening, but also for situations in which the restraint arises simply from the prospect of failure to achieve the intended aims, or the prospect of costs exceeding an action's expected benefits. Some writers in the literature of military strategy distinguish explicitly between deterring an attack by the threat of "punishment" (frightening consequences) and deterring an attack by the prospect of "denial" (of the objectives of the attack).**
"Deterrence" in the political/military context can refer either to measures taken to generate a credible prospect of punishment for an action, or of denial of its objectives, or of costs exceeding its benefits (i.e., the practice of deterrence) or to the state of restraint induced by such measures and by other factors (i.e., deterrence as a condition). Of course, how much is required in the way of the practice of deterrence to achieve an adequate condition of deterrence depends, among other things, on how attractive the aggressive act would be to its prospective perpetrator in the absence of deterrent measures and on how averse the prospective perpetrator is to punishment, failure, or unfavorable cost-benefit ratios. Certain intrinsic deterrent factors against aggressive acts in general, and against nuclear attack or threat of attack in particular, will generally be operative irrespective of any practice of deterrence. These factors
include moral inhibitions, sense of kinship across national boundaries, and fear of loss of domestic political support. Although these are of variable importance from one case to the next and may not, in themselves, suffice to ensure restraint, the bigger they are in a given instance the less will be required of the practice of deterrence to augment them.
The practice of deterrence may entail creation of a credible prospect of retaliation in kind against the action that is to be deterred (e.g., the threat of invading an adversary's homeland if he invades yours) or of retaliation in a different (and possibly even nonmilitary) form (e.g., the threat of embargo of critical resources in response to an attack); it may entail erecting defenses, to decrease the chances of success of an attack and/or to increase the cost of a successful one; and often it will include a combination of these ingredients. Of course, the practice of deterrence has costs and risks as well as benefits: not only must deterrent measures be paid for, but they also may stimulate countermeasures by the putative adversary, or by others, that will necessitate still higher expenditures in the future if deterrence is to be maintained; the singling out of prospective adversaries and the brandishing of capabilities against them, which the practice of deterrence often entails, can aggravate tensions; and measures intended to enhance deterrence of premeditated attack (as, for example, by increasing the credibility of a retaliatory response) may increase the danger of war by inadvertence or accident.
This report is concerned mainly with nuclear deterrence, where "nuclear" refers to the character of the response that is contemplated, not necessarily to the kind of threat that is supposed to be deterred. In principle, nuclear deterrence could be used to deter not only nuclear attacks but also attacks with conventional forces, attacks with chemical or biological weapons, or even assaults on vital national interests by nonmilitary means.
Several terms for variants in the intended scope or mode of operation of nuclear deterrence are encountered widely enough in the nuclear weapons policy literature—and with enough variability and ambiguity in meaning—that it seems worthwhile to try to clarify them here. Specifically:
Finally, the core function of deterrence, or just core deterrence, in this report means the restricted form of extended nuclear deterrence in which coverage is intended against nuclear threats—and only nuclear threats—to one's own country and to one's allies. (This usage follows that in the committee's 1991 report, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship. The committee does not use "minimum deterrence" for this purpose, although some have done so in the literature, because as indicated above that term also has had other meanings.)
Over the course of the Cold War, the two sides negotiated a series of arms control agreements to try to limit the direct dangers of their nuclear confrontation, and they were leaders in the construction of other agreements, with wider participation, intended to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. As with the argument "from history" for the success of nuclear deterrence itself, it can be argued that the facts are consistent with the view that these arms control and antiproliferation measures succeeded. There were no accidental,
erroneous, or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons and no escalation to nuclear war from a regional crisis—although crises there were. The nuclear arsenals were eventually capped, albeit at the very high levels of 30,000 to 40,000 nuclear weapons each for the United States and the Soviet Union.6 The spread of nuclear weapons into the possession of additional countries proceeded much more slowly than most analysts of these matters had foreseen in the 1950s and 1960s. Now, with the impetus of the end of the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are shrinking significantly, with physical dismantlement of warheads proceeding at a pace of 1,500 to 2,000 per year on each side.
A closer look at what happened in some of the crises of the Cold War, however, leaves room to question whether good fortune was not as much a factor as good management in avoiding escalation to disaster on these occasions.7 A look at the sizes, compositions, and postures of the nuclear forces that remain today—and at those that will remain after the arms reduction agreements and unilateral decisions of recent years have been fully carried out—also gives cause for concern; such forces continue to be more formidable and more dangerous than necessary or appropriate for the conditions of the post-Cold War world.
The committee has concluded that, under the new circumstances, the security of the United States could be considerably enhanced by undertaking further reductions of nuclear forces globally, with accompanying changes in nuclear weapons policies and operational practices. The committee's conclusions and recommendations to this effect are based on a number of specific propositions—summarized for reference here and elaborated on in the remainder of this chapter and in Chapter 2 and 3—about the roles and dangers of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.
Changing Roles, Circumstances, and Opportunities
The principal roles generally attributed to U.S. possession of nuclear weapons are (1) deterrence of premeditated nuclear attack; (2) deterrence of major conventional war; and (3) compensation for possible inadequacies in nonnuclear forces, including for deterrence or response to attacks with chemical or biological weapons. But these roles are less demanding or less relevant in the post-Cold War world than before, because of the following:
The likelihood of all-out war between the United States and Russia has drastically diminished, and therefore the role of nuclear weapons can be narrowed significantly.
The relative importance of regional conflicts has increased in the aftermath of the Cold War, but for conflicts of this type the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States or Russia or the other declared nuclear weapons powers is likely to be unnecessary, irrelevant, ineffective, or even harmful in some cases.8
BOX 1.2 Accidental, Erroneous, or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons
During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear policies were oriented toward deterring a deliberate, premeditated attack on the United States or its allies. The risk of a premeditated attack authorized by national leaders has diminished greatly with the end of the Cold War, but the risk of other kinds of nuclear attack—accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized—has not gone down proportionately.
Although the term "accidental" sometimes has been used in this context to cover a wide array of unintended and ill-considered actions, the committee uses it here in the narrower sense of the term "accident" to connote such events as programming mistakes or mechanical or electrical failures. The United States and Russia, and presumably the other nuclear weapons states as well, have worked very hard to ensure that nuclear weapons could not be launched or detonated as a result of equipment failures or operator errors. The 1994 detargeting initiative by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin addressed this risk directly by agreeing that the United States and Russian would not target their missiles against each other on a day-to-day basis. While one cannot prove that such accidents are impossible, this type of risk probably is less worrisome than others that attend nuclear arsenals.
More serious, the committee believes, is the risk of erroneous use of nuclear weapons. Unlike accidents, an erroneous use of nuclear weapons would result from conscious decisions by military or political leaders, but these decisions would be based on incomplete or inaccurate information, faulty reasoning, misinterpretation of the intentions of other countries, and careless or hasty decision-making, perhaps influenced by the unintended consequences of prior actions. Possible examples include a decision to launch nuclear weapons in response to false or ambiguous warning of actual or impending attack, or misinterpreting a demonstration shot, unauthorized attack, or an attack on another country as a massive attack on one's own country. The reported deterioration of Russia's missile attack warning system is particularly troubling in this regard.
Another disturbing possibility is the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Although no nuclear weapons state is immune to such risks, the general decline of morale in the Russian military is cause for special concern. It is generally believed that Russian nuclear weapons are accorded high levels of protection and security, but a further degeneration of the economy, domestic politics, relations with neighboring states, or civilian control over the military could dramatically increase the chance that a group, either inside or outside the military, might try to steal, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
The capabilities of U.S. conventional forces are formidable both in absolute terms and relative to the forces of potential adversaries and, with appropriate policies and allocation of adequate resources, will remain so, making it possible for the United States to respond effectively with conventional forces across a wide spectrum of threats, including attacks on the United States or its allies using chemical or biological weapons.
The principal dangers usually ascribed to U.S. possession of nuclear weapons (and their possession by others) are (1) nuclear war by accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, or by unintended escalation; (2) the failure of arms control, leading to excessive force levels; and (3) encouragement of nuclear proliferation. These dangers have not been shrinking, in the post-Cold War world, as rapidly as the relevance of nuclear weapons to U.S. security needs. Specifically:
The post-Cold War changes in the sizes, compositions, and postures of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces—and in the doctrines governing the purposes and potential uses of these forces—have not kept pace with the changes in the post-Cold War military and political landscape. As a result, the risks of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons—which could then all too easily escalate—remain unacceptably high (possibly, on the Russian side, even higher than Cold War levels because of deterioration of the military and internal-security infrastructure and of morale).
On both sides, the continuing competitive and even confrontational assumptions underlying some official discussions of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, when coupled with the postures of the forces and the potential for destabilizing deployments of ballistic missile defenses, pose the risk that the arms control fabric woven during the Cold War and immediately thereafter could in fact unravel.
Although the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States, Russia, and the other declared nuclear weapons states can, in some instances, help inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons (by reassuring allies that they will be protected without needing to acquire their own nuclear weapons), in other circumstances the practice of nuclear deterrence is likely to aggravate proliferation dangers (by causing nonallies to feel threatened, by lending respectability to reliance on nuclear deterrence, and by undermining the credibility of the nuclear weapons states in their opposition to proliferation). The committee judges it likely, although it cannot be rigorously proved, that in the post-Cold War world the proliferation-aggravating effects of the practice of deterrence by the declared nuclear weapons states will increasingly outweigh the proliferation-inhibiting effects.
Ultimately, it would prove difficult for the United States—the world's most powerful nation in conventional armaments—to continue to
maintain that its security requires the possession of a strong nuclear deterrent while denying the validity of that argument for other nations.
These post-Cold War conditions and the likely long-term trends mean, in the committee's view, that the conspicuous role given to nuclear weapons during the Cold War can be greatly reduced without significant adverse effect on the probability of all-out war or on this country's capability to cope effectively with regional conflicts where its interests are at stake, and with significant security benefits in terms of improvements for relations with Russia and for the cause of nonproliferation and in terms of reduced risks of erroneous or unauthorized nuclear-weapon use and of inadvertent escalation. In addition, the trends that have made such changes possible and desirable are likely enough to continue that serious study of further longer-term changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy is warranted.
The committee has concluded, accordingly, that the United States should pursue a two-part program of change in its nuclear weapons policies. The first part of the program is a near- to midterm set of mutual force reductions—together with accompanying changes in nuclear operations and declaratory policies and with measures to improve the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials worldwide—to diminish further confrontational and potentially destabilizing aspects of force postures, to reduce the risks of erroneous, unauthorized, or accidental nuclear-weapons use, and to help curb the threat of further nuclear proliferation. The second part of the program is a long-term effort to foster international conditions in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be seen as necessary or legitimate for the preservation of national and global security.
Prospects for Progress on the U.S. and Russian Sides
In its early phases the first part of the program is largely a bilateral U.S.-Russian one, and cooperation between the two countries is essential to its success. Remarkable progress in this bilateral effort has already been made. A decade ago few could have imagined the scope of the agreements that have been reached or are being considered to cut the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union (see Box 1.3). The approach to further arms control taken in the NPR in 1994, however, was not sufficiently ambitious. The NPR's mandate was to rethink all aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and it did resolve some pressing force structure questions; but, in the end, it did not go very far toward addressing the most fundamental issues about appropriate numbers, roles, and postures of U.S. nuclear forces in light of the changes brought by the end of the Cold War. Specifically, the NPR did not recommend reductions in strategic forces beyond those already agreed to in the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), and it did not alter the "weapons of last resort" mission for U.S. nuclear forces that allows their first use in response to non-
BOX 1.3 U.S. and Soviet/Russian Accomplishments in Nuclear Arms Reductions and Operational Arms Control
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Bans all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
1990 Last Soviet nuclear weapons test
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I signed
Reduces the number of deployed strategic warheads from about 11,000 for Russia and 13,000 for the United States to about 8,000 on each side.
1991-92 U.S. and Soviet/Russian unilateral initiatives to reduce nonstrategic weapons
All U.S. ground-launched and sea-launched nonstrategic nuclear weapons to be withdrawn to the United States and all Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons to be withdrawn to Russia. Thousands of U.S. and Russian weapons to be destroyed.
1991 U.S. takes all strategic bombers and "Looking Glass" airborne command posts off alert
1992 Last U.S. nuclear weapons test
1992 U.S. and Russia begin Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with funding from the Nunn-Lugar Act
1992 Lisbon Protocol
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus agree to adhere to START I as nonnuclear weapons states and to return all nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia.
1993 U.S. and Russia sign agreement for the disposition of excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons
Low-enriched reactor fuel derived from 500 tons of Russian weapons-usable HEU to be shipped to the United States for sale on the world market.
1993 START II signed
Limits the number of deployed strategic warheads to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side. Ratified by the United States in January 1996 but not yet ratified by Russia.
1994 START I enters into force
With formal adherence of Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus to the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states.
1994 U.S.-Russian summit agreement not to target nuclear missiles on one another.
1995 Indefinite extension of the NPT
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by the five nuclear weapons states
1997 U.S.-Russian summit agreement to begin START III negotiations upon entry into force of START II
Agreement in principle to limit each side to no more than 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads.
nuclear attacks.9 (Past and current U.S. positions on these and other aspects of nuclear policy are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.)
The March 1997 Helsinki summit agreement to seek a START III treaty with a level of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads on each side is a welcome sign of the importance the U.S. and Russian presidents attach to continuing reductions in the two countries' strategic forces.10 What remains to be seen is how quickly other influential officials and institutions in the two countries will go along.
With respect to Russia, there are reasons for concern that progress will not be easy. The post-Cold War diminution in Russian military power, particularly the weakening of its conventional armed forces made evident by their poor performance in Chechnya, have led many Russian military and political leaders to reemphasize the importance of nuclear weapons.11
Some in Moscow see nuclear weapons as providing specific policy options against a range of purported threats, as the response to the prospective enlargement
of NATO has made clear. Commentators—including high-level figures such as former Minister of Defense Rodionov—have stressed that, if NATO moves toward Russian borders, Russia might move nuclear weapons westward. This emphasis on the military utility and policy relevance of nuclear weapons, if maintained at a high rhetorical pitch, may make it difficult for Russian policy-makers to pursue further deep reductions, unless the reductions can be portrayed as "correcting" inequalities of past agreements—as the Russians argue that START III should "correct" START II. The utility and relevance arguments also may make it difficult for Russian leaders to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament.
U.S. leaders must take this developing Russian perspective seriously in designing future U.S. nuclear weapons policy, since most if not all of the desirable adjustments require corresponding Russian actions. Conditioning START III negotiations on entry into force of START II gives substantial leverage to the Duma, where opposition to arms reductions is strong.
In addition, the severe funding shortages plaguing Russian government operations may limit Russia's ability to bear the costs of nuclear force reductions. Despite the progress made to date, funding for further reductions may be hard to justify domestically if soldiers' wages are inadequate or unpaid. Cooperation with the West for nuclear security and the implementation of force reductions has been helpful and these efforts, in which the United States has played a leading role since 1991 through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, complement other U.S. nuclear policy initiatives. The scope of the problem—particularly improved security for fissile materials—is larger than can be addressed by the cooperative efforts undertaken thus far. It is very much in the West's own security interests to continue this nuclear cooperation, but ultimately, the broader dilemma must be addressed by Russia. Because this committee and other National Research Council committees have offered detailed analysis and recommendations on these problems in other reports, this report concentrates on other nuclear policy issues.12
Fortunately, several ways to address the military problems perceived by the Russians are available, some dependent on Russian actions alone and others requiring action on a reciprocal (and in some cases negotiated) basis. The Russians themselves, for example, have recognized the need to downsize and modernize their conventional forces. If this military reform effort can be gotten under way, it will address the weakness of the conventional forces from within. Adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is another path that has been opened to address Russian concerns, including, perhaps, those arising from the prospective enlargement of NATO.
On the nuclear side, timely and flexible pursuit of further strategic arms reductions should help overcome the obstacles to Russian ratification of START II (about which more is said in Chapters 2 and 3). Attention to nonstrategic and reserve nuclear weapons in these further discussions should also be helpful.13 If the United States and Russia, in full cooperation with NATO, were able to agree
to foreclose forward deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe in a mutual, reciprocal, and verifiable manner, this step should contribute to deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in Europe. It would be a clear signal that both Russia and NATO are committed once and for all to denuclearization of the former East-West confrontation.
The Wider and Longer-Term Issues
It is essential that the near-term program for nuclear weapons policy also address the critical global problem posed by the continued risk of further nuclear proliferation. The effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons must employ new approaches and a determined international consensus. Deterrence practiced by two powerful and opposing alliance systems was dangerous enough. Multiple confrontations among the dozens of states that could acquire nuclear weapons, if they chose to do so, could prove unmanageable. If dozens of states do acquire nuclear weapons, it will increase the risk that terrorists or even criminal organizations may obtain them as well. Strengthening the consensus against nuclear proliferation, finding ways to engage the three undeclared nuclear weapons states in arms reductions, increasing the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials worldwide, and dissuading those few countries still bent on acquiring nuclear weapons must be top U.S. priorities.
As for the second, long-term part of the program, the United States is committed through its adherence to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (referred to hereinafter as the Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT) to pursue the goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and, along with the other declared nuclear weapons states, reaffirmed that commitment at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The committee recognizes that fundamental modifications of international political relationships not now foreseeable will be required to achieve such a goal. Surmounting the multilateral challenge posed by the near-term goal of deep force reductions and changes in nuclear operations, however, will contribute to progress on this second part of the program by demonstrating that a cooperative effort is feasible and by developing the technical monitoring and verification systems required.
The unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the offense-defense balance in military conflict, since even a single large nuclear warhead that managed to penetrate deployed defenses could destroy a great city. As a result, the standards that defensive measures must meet in order to defend a nation against nuclear weapons are much higher than those sufficient for defense against more traditional military threats, and in fact are unlikely to be attainable against significant offensive forces equipped with countermeasures.
Delivery means for nuclear weapons are diverse, and, to be effective, national defenses must protect against all of them. This means that attempts to defend the United States or its allies against nuclear attacks on their populations could be overcome with much less effort than would have to be invested in the defenses. ''Offense dominance" thus prevailed from the time that the Soviet Union acquired the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and in the committee's judgment no subsequent developments have altered that basic situation.
In an era in which the hostility of the U.S-Soviet relationship made it seem imprudent to rely on good intentions to preclude nuclear attack and in which, early on, invulnerable basing modes for significant parts of each side's nuclear forces made it impractical to execute a disarming first strike if conflict seemed imminent, the apparently inescapable impotence of defense reinforced inclinations to rely on deterrence through the threat of retaliation. No more effective alternative was apparent.
Analysts and political leaders alike soon came to recognize, however, that nuclear deterrence itself was (and is) burdened with an array of contradictions and dilemmas. For example, deterrence is only likely to succeed if there are credible plans for what to do if it fails, but constructing such plans is exceedingly difficult. More specifically, for deterrence to work, the prospective attacker must believe that the threat to retaliate might actually be executed. To increase the credibility of the response, the deterrer constructs a war plan (and the nuclear forces to support it) in which, after suffering an initial attack, the deterrer would gain relative to the undamaged attacker. But this condition is very difficult to satisfy, especially if one assumes that the initial attacker has held back some nuclear weapons for a further strike against the retaliator.
Each side in such a confrontation is motivated to try to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent threat by decreasing the vulnerability of its retaliatory forces to a first strike while increasing its capacity to destroy, in a second strike, the remaining nuclear forces of the initial attacker (in order to limit the damage from a counterretaliation). But this simultaneous pursuit of invulnerability of one's own nuclear forces and counterforce capabilities against the nuclear forces of one's adversary is likely to look, to the adversary, like an attempt to gain the capability to carry out a first nuclear strike with relative impunity. Neither side would want to allow the other to achieve such a first-strike capability (or to suffer the delusion that it had achieved it) since, in the kind of hostile relationship that gives rise to the practice of nuclear deterrence in the first place, even the impression that there is a decisive advantage to striking first is extremely dangerous, especially during a crisis.
A theoretical alternative to the invulnerability/counterforce approach to shoring up the credibility of the threat to retaliate is to arrange things so that the retaliation would be automatic, as, for example, an arrangement to launch all or part of one's retaliatory nuclear forces automatically upon receipt of electronic
warning that an adversary has launched a nuclear attack. Such a launch-on-warning posture, if an adversary believed it had actually been implemented, certainly would increase the credibility of the retaliatory threat. But the increase in credibility would come at the cost of an increased chance of initiating nuclear holocaust accidentally, as a result of false warning or other malfunction in the automated command-and-control system. Survivable basing combined with delayed automatic response would remove some, but not all, of these problems.
The dilemmas at the heart of nuclear deterrence, then, arise in part because attempts to make the threat of retaliation credible can be seen as aggressive advantage seeking by the other side. This raises tensions and stimulates countervailing measures, hence arms races, or increases the chance of nuclear war from crisis instability or accident.
There is also the dilemma of deciding "How much is enough?" in the sense of how many nuclear weapons, of what destructive power, delivered with what degree of assurance, against what set of targets will suffice to deter a country's potential adversaries, in all the diversity and unknowability of their motivation and mental state. There is the related dilemma of whether an amount judged to be enough, for purposes of making the retaliatory threat, would ever be seen as proportionate or appropriate by the leaders who have to decide whether to carry out the threat after deterrence has failed. The dilemmas of secrecy, wherein the adversary needs to know something of the plans for retaliation in order to be deterred, but must not know too much lest this enable him to take countermeasures that would reduce the retaliation's effectiveness—and, hence, the effectiveness of the threat—also arise. Finally, there is the dilemma, discussed earlier, that the assertion by some countries of a need and right to practice nuclear deterrence may eventually encourage additional countries to assert the same need and right, leading to proliferation of nuclear weapons and, hence, a more dangerous world.
These inherent dilemmas of the practice of nuclear deterrence were compounded, during the Cold War, by the U.S. threat of first use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. Because of the difficulty of convincing both the Soviet Union and U.S. allies that the United States would really use nuclear weapons in this circumstance, and because of the difficulty of devising reasonable targeting strategies for this eventuality given the large-scale destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the U.S. search for ways to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent was even more energetic and wide ranging than it would otherwise have been. In the beginning this aim was accomplished through a massive superiority in strategic weapons, which gave the United States a reasonable prospect of a successful first strike. This strategic superiority was soon augmented by U.S. deployment of thousands of nonstrategic ("tactical") nuclear weapons in Europe. As the Soviet Union attained a survivable nuclear force in the 1960s, however, the threat of a massive U.S. response to limited Soviet attacks was no longer credible. The United States responded by bolstering its conventional defenses and those of its allies, by diversifying and expanding its
nonstrategic nuclear deployments and developing limited and selective nuclear options, and by deploying thousands of strategic warheads of greater accuracy to improve the prospects for successful counterforce attacks.
The expansion of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals to tens of thousands of warheads was thus not a consequence of a carefully thought out, fully understood process based on an overarching nuclear doctrine. Although each side articulated the overall purposes that it intended nuclear weapons to serve, details of the nuclear doctrines that ostensibly governed planning and operations for the deployed nuclear forces often followed nuclear deployments rather than shaped them. The size and composition of the two sides' forces were driven by the interactive dynamic generated by the dilemmas of deterrence as just outlined, frequently controlled by technological and financial limitations and opportunities, but further complicated by the interactions of domestic and international politics and by tendencies toward worst-case assessment in the face of uncertainties about the capabilities and intentions of the other side. The result was a nuclear arms race in which the numbers, sophistication, and alert levels of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces grew to levels difficult to comprehend by anyone other than those who were involved in the process—and often incomprehensible even to them.14
This committee has concluded that the continuing dilemmas and dangers of nuclear deterrence as practiced in the past by the United States can and should be alleviated in the post-Cold War security environment by confining such deterrence to the core function of deterring nuclear attack, or coercion by threat of nuclear attack, against the United States or its allies. That is, the United States would not threaten to respond with nuclear weapons against conventional, chemical, or biological attacks. The committee believes that Russia and the other nuclear weapons states can be persuaded to reach a corresponding conclusion.
With regard to chemical and biological weapons in particular, as discussed in Chapter 2, the committee has determined that their indiscriminate and often unpredictable effects, as well as the potential for defenses against them, make CBW weapons of restricted utility in achieving strategic advantage in war. If chemical or biological agents were used as weapons of terror by state or non-state actors, the committee concludes that nuclear weapons would be ineffective as a deterrent in advance of such an attack because they would be recognizably difficult to deliver in a timely and targeted manner against the perpetrator. Precise and technically capable conventional weapons could effectively provide the response and would avoid the broader consequences of nuclear use.
In all likelihood the United States will consider it necessary to continue to rely on the core function of deterrence as long as nuclear weapons continue to
exist in the possession of states that conceivably might consider using them against this country or its allies. The committee assumes that some—although it is hoped not all—other nuclear weapons states will similarly consider it necessary to retain some nuclear weapons for "core deterrence." The size and scope of the efforts deemed necessary to fulfill the core function, however, presumably will shrink in parallel with what the committee hopes is the declining plausibility, over time, that any state would consider mounting a nuclear attack against anyone. There are strong reasons to make every effort to hasten the arrival of international conditions in which threats of nuclear attack are simply no longer thinkable. Under such conditions, the practice of deterrence with all its dilemmas and dangers would no longer be necessary.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, this very existence will exert a deterrent effect—existential deterrence—against unrestricted conventional wars among the major powers, since it will be recognized that such conflict in a world with nuclear weapons might well lead to their use, with intolerable destruction as the result. Indeed, even the existence of the idea of nuclear weapons—more specifically, the ability of many states to make them—is enough to create an existential deterrent effect against large-scale conflicts of all kinds. That is not to say that this effect would necessarily always be sufficient to prevent conflict in the future, as it has not always been in the past. But it could provide part of the assurance required, in an international system much different than today's, that all-out wars of any kind are unlikely to occur.
If, in the meantime, only the core function of nuclear weapons retains validity, fundamental changes in the nuclear force structures and operational practices of the major nuclear powers become both possible and desirable. The core function can be performed by far smaller nuclear forces than the United States now deploys, provided that these forces are survivable and can reach their targets.
There is also both symbolic and political value in having the United States actively pursue further reductions and changes in nuclear operations. As the first country to develop nuclear weapons, the only country to explode them in war, and the country that has consistently taken the lead in efforts to control them, the United States has a unique interest and irreplaceable role in reinforcing the norm that nuclear weapons will not be used for coercive purposes.
Benefits of the Proposed Changes
Nuclear force reductions and certain changes in nuclear operations would increase U.S. and global security in important ways.
First, reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and revising operations for the mission of fulfilling only the core function will decrease the continuing risk of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons for several reasons. Smaller arsenals will be easier to safeguard and protect from accident, theft, and unauthorized use, not only by virtue of reduced numbers of weapons to
monitor at a smaller number of sites but also by permitting retention of only those weapons with the most modern safety and security features. Reducing alert rates, decreasing capacities to use nuclear weapons quickly and with little warning, abandoning plans for the rapid use of nuclear weapons, and deploying cooperative measures to assure states that forces are not being readied for attack should reduce the probability and consequences of erroneous nuclear-weapons use—for example, on false warning of attack—particularly during a crisis. (Of course it is extremely important to take care that reductions in deployed nuclear warheads and dismantlement of the warheads made surplus as a result do not lead to countervailing increases in the dangers of theft and unauthorized use as a consequence of inattention to the challenges of safe storage of these weapons and the nuclear materials removed from them.)15
Second, further reductions will bolster the nuclear nonproliferation regime. If U.S. foreign and defense policy continues to rely heavily on nuclear weapons while attempting to deny others the right even to possess such weapons, the effectiveness of U.S. arguments against proliferation will be weakened. U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions will not in themselves dissuade a state bent on acquiring nuclear weapons; today's undeclared nuclear powers and would-be proliferators are driven above all by regional security concerns. In such cases, the denial of material and technical resources and a combination of political and economic incentives and disincentives would provide the greatest leverage. But U.S. and Russian progress in arms reductions helps shore up global support for anti-proliferation measures; and failure to make such progress can strengthen the influence of those arguing for nuclear weapons acquisition in countries where this is under internal debate.
Third, continued actions by the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals—and the roles and missions assigned to the arsenals—will help induce the other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons states to join the arms control process. At the levels planned under the NPR, for example, under which it is estimated that the United States and Russia each would retain a total of about 10,000 nuclear warheads, deployed and in reserve, the other nuclear powers have little motivation to submit their much smaller arsenals to any form of control.
Is It Prudent to "Hedge"?
A central consideration in the NPR's conclusions was the perceived need to retain U.S. flexibility in the event of the reversal of reform in Russia. As a result, at present the United States has opted to maintain a "hedge" to provide the ability to reconstitute nuclear forces if the need arises.16 Under START II, both sides would retain the capability in a crisis to deploy thousands of additional warheads by increasing warhead loadings on existing missiles and bombers. But in reality the United States has a far greater potential for uploading than Russia because of the technical capabilities of U.S. delivery vehicles.
The committee believes that the time has come to reconsider the need for such a hedge. Deploying yet more firepower in the event of renewed political antagonism with Russia would not improve the practical deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear forces. Moreover, the ability to overtly increase strategic readiness—by dispersing bombers and by moving a larger fraction of the ballistic missile submarine force to patrol areas—would provide a hedge against surprise. Increases in U.S. nuclear force levels would be necessary only if massive growth in the Russian force imperiled the survivability of the U.S. arsenal. For the foreseeable future Russia has no realistic capability to make such reconstitution possible.
The hedge strategy could become a self-fulfilling prophecy: the substantial stock of reserve warheads that the United States considers prudent could look to Russia very much like an institutionalized capability to break out of the START agreements. Russian legislators, worried about the breakout potential of U.S. forces and the high monetary cost of compliance, are already resisting the ratification of START II, which requires Russia to eliminate all of its multiple-warhead land-based ICBMs.17 To the extent that the United States regards a return to hostile relations as a concern, it should focus on decreasing the probability of such developments.18
Creating a Regime of Progressive Constraints
In view of the foregoing, the committee believes that the United States and the other declared nuclear powers can preserve the core deterrent function of nuclear weapons with deployment levels substantially lower than those in current plans. In addition, substantial adjustments can be made in the operational practices governing existing nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers can also achieve higher standards of security for their nuclear warheads and for fissile materials worldwide.
The transformation of Cold War deterrent practices to adjust to new international security circumstances requires a balanced program to make many types of changes. The next two chapters develop the arguments for a revised set of U.S. policies that would lead to very low levels of nuclear forces and significantly reduced risk of their use. In addition to force reductions, key features of this proposed set of policies include:
Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons for any purpose and the restriction of retaliation solely to attacks involving the use of nuclear weapons.
Termination of alert practices in which weapons are deployed in configurations ready for immediate use (within a few minutes or hours). Any return of nuclear weapons to continuous-alert status would be renounced; preparing nuclear weapons for immediate delivery would be a result, as well as a signal, of serious military intent to use them.
Emphasis on force structures that would guarantee the survivability of a significant portion of the remaining delivery vehicles.
Termination of the previous emphasis on preparing for immediate, large-scale retaliation and mass targeting. Targeting preparations would be done as part of contingency planning under the presumption that any actual use of nuclear weapons would be specifically targeted in response to the circumstances at the time.
The development and acceptance of high standards of physical protection and accounting for nuclear warheads and for all fissile materials.
The remainder of this report elaborates the arguments and findings summarized in this chapter. Chapter 2 reviews current U.S. nuclear weapons policy, U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, and the problem of global nuclear proliferation, laying the foundation for Chapter 3's recommendations for a regime of progressive constraints. These recommendations include proposals for the operational transformation described above and for successive U.S.-Russian force reductions. These reductions would begin with a quick cut to about 2,000 deployed strategic warheads each as envisioned in the Helsinki summit, then move to reductions to a total inventory of about 1,000 warheads each, and finally to a total inventory of a few hundred warheads on each side. Chapter 4 takes up the long-term agenda, exploring the conditions under which it might be possible to prohibit nuclear weapons altogether and the possible paths to reach that goal.
In drawing conclusions and making recommendations, the committee was motivated primarily by concerns about national security, international stability, and international obligations—and much less with economics. Advocacy for cuts in U.S. nuclear weaponry has often raised hopes that these reductions might also be a substantial factor in reducing the military budget. Recent studies of past expenditures by the U.S. nuclear weapons program, which include the cost of both the nuclear explosives and of the delivery systems, show how great the past costs have been.19
In the present study, however, the committee is not predicting that nuclear force reductions would save a great deal of money. The cost directly attributable to nuclear weapons would indeed decrease as the role of nuclear weapons is reduced. But there are additional costs associated with such a shrinkage, including the direct costs of dismantling and the verification and other costs associated with the arms control regime necessary to maintain compliance. Most important, however, is the question of the level of conventional forces that this county deems necessary in the face of a deemphasis on nuclear weapons. This is a matter well beyond the scope of this study, and the state of international relations over decisions about overall military requirements will have much more impact on future military budgets than the changes in nuclear weapons posture recommended here.
The debate began among Manhattan Project scientists and, separately, in the top leadership of the U.S. government, even before the Trinity nuclear test in 1945. See, for example, Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Touchstone, 1988).
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991).
The Nuclear Posture Review did not lead to a public report; its contents were communicated, however, through a widely disseminated set of unclassified briefing charts.
The Henry L. Stimson Center's reports include Beyond the Nuclear Peril: The Year in Review and the Years Ahead (1995), An Evolving US Nuclear Posture (1995), and An American Legacy: Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (1997) (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center). The principal Pugwash and Canberra reports are, respectively, J. Rotblat et al. (eds.), A Nuclear Weapons Free World: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993); and Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 1996).
The distinction among accidental, erroneous, and unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons is elaborated in Box 1.2.
See Appendix B.
See, for example, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Risking 'The Destruction of Nations': Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States," Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 4; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security, vol. 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
By "practice of deterrence" the committee means the measures taken to generate a credible prospect of punishment for an action, or of denial of its objectives, or of its costs exceeding its benefits. See Box 1.1 for a further discussion.
This "last resort" formulation, which was promulgated during the Bush administration and formally adopted by NATO in 1990, is the current variant of the first-use-if-necessary policy on the employment of nuclear weapons that served as U.S. and NATO policy throughout the Cold War. See NATO Press Communique S-1(90)36, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th July 1990."
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Parameters on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces," March 21, 1997.
See, for example, "Strategic forces now in forefront of Russia's defence—commander," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1, The Former USSR, December 19, 1996, No. SU/2799, pp. S1/1-S1/2.
For recent assessments of some of the major U.S. cooperative programs in this area, see Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) and An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center (1996). Two CISAC studies of the particular problem of excess weapons plutonium are Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994) and Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (1995). All were published by the National Academy Press.
See Box 2.1 for definitions of strategic, nonstrategic, and reserve weapons.
For example, see Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970) and Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect (New York: Time Books, 1995).
As noted above, the problems of safeguarding surplus nuclear warheads and nuclear materials are not treated in detail in this report, notwithstanding their great importance, because they were the focus of a separate, two-volume CISAC study as well as the NRC study Proliferation Concerns.
"A significant shift in the Russian government into the hands of arch-conservatives could


text:
The main role of the acid-labile subunit (ALS) is to stabilize the IGFBP3/IGF complexes. Pathogenic variants in the gene coding for ALS (IGFALS) results in IGF1 and IGFBP3 deficiency, short stature, delay puberty and insulin resistance. The aim of these study was to identify the genetic cause in a patient with suspected ALS deficiency. The proband is the third son of non-consanguineous parents, evaluated for the first time at 17.3 years due to short stature (−2.84 S.D.) and delayed puberty (Tanner 2) and a bone age of 16 years. He showed IGF1 basal concentrations of 45 ng/ml (reference range: 193731 ng/ml) and undetectable IGFBP3. GH concentrations after Clonidin test suggested GH insensitivity (11.2-19.3-10.7-7.25 ng/ml). No increases in IGF1 and IGFBP3 concentrations were found after 2 weeks of GH administration (0.1 and 0.2 U/kg per d). Neither the parents nor the four siblings had abnormal IGF1 or IGFBP3 concentrations. Since the findings in the proband suggested ALS deficiency, but ALS measurement was not available, Sanger sequencing of IGFALS was performed in the patient and his family. An apparently homozygous missense variant (c.1871C>T, p.Pro624Leu; NP_001139478.1) in exon 2 was found in the index case and on one allele in his father. This missense variant has been reported by the Exome Aggregation Consortium in only 1 allele among 44,672 individuals, but not in a clinical context. In silico analysis with PolyPhen-2 predicts that it is probably damaging with a high score. Since this point mutations was not found in the mother, MLPA analysis of the IGFALS gene was performed. The index case, as well as his mother and siblings, and not the father, showed a deletion encompassing at least a major part of exon 2, on one of their alleles.
Conclusion: To our knowledge, these is the first report of a large deletion in the IGFALS gene. The patient was the only one in his family with two affected alleles (p.[Pro624Leu];[deletion]) which is consistent with the phenotype. Identification of pathogenic variants in IGFALS is a useful tool to confirm the diagnosis of ALS deficiency as a probable cause of growth retardation in children with low IGF1 and very low IGFBP3. We suggest deletion/duplication analysis should be considered in the genetic analysis of ALS deficiency.
27 - 29 Sep 2018
European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology

subset: commoncrawl


text:
#The confusion of medicine and engineering
# what to choose between medicine and engineering
# what is a better career choice? Medicine or Engineering.
Medical Vs Engineering has always been a confusion when students are looking forward to choosing their career paths. Unfortunately, in Pakistan there are very limited options for students in public sector universities but the private sector is filled with multiple options. Thanks to the immense opportunities in both the field to which students get attracted and pursue their careers. According to a wise man, it is better for a man to listen to his or her inner voice at first before making any decision.
In Pakistan this decision is solely dependent on the Students ability to score in grade 10th (matriculation and O level Examination). This is solely the decision which can make or break a student's dream. After scoring well in these examination students come to the point where they evaluate the pros and cons of both the fields. Evaluating job opportunities is also one important factor that all the students and their parents would like to give a thought to. Also, in Pakistan most of the families are biased in between choosing engineering and medical. Is one family having more people with Engineering Degrees they would like all others to follow the same path and vice versa.
In this fight between Engineering and Medical, It is observed that Engineering has been a popular choice in the countries abroad, as there are more engineering universities than medical ones.
This is not as easy as one two three to decide what to choose. Because the fields require completely different abilities let say, Engineering is more of understanding the phenomenon, being analytical, high intelligent quotient and many others. It requires students to be creative and innovative enough to drive something unique out of it.
Engineering is a popular choice may be because, after completing a Four-year program, students can get a job against a reasonable pay cheque. But for medicine it takes quite a long time as 6 to 8 years for completion of degree and specialization. Now after all this student starts to earn in this field.


text:
I'm a plant murderer
posted December 13th, 2019 at 5:27 PM
15 CommentsPost a Comment
This used to happen to me
Dec 13, 2019 at 5:56pm
Until I learned I was watering them too much.
Mmm, strange
Dec 13, 2019 at 6:01pm
So maybe try another type of plant, you know likely to die. There are some extreme style plants short of a flame thrower you will likely not kill them.
Master Yoda
Dec 13, 2019 at 10:38pm
Death is a natural part of life.
Google it
Dec 13, 2019 at 11:08pm
Scientists believe that plants scream when they're stressed.
You tortured them for they were murdered.
Get a Christmas tree
Dec 14, 2019 at 12:16am
It's a perfect culturally acceptable plant to kill. It even comes pre amputated so you don't even have to feel bad about killing it.
Dec 14, 2019 at 12:44am
A spider plant. They are easy to keep alive! My rule for all my plants generally is to wait till the soil is dry, then water. Repeat.
Dead huh
Dec 14, 2019 at 1:27am
You need a shovel?
Bury those poor dead plants.
Have you tried Weed ?
Hardy plants.
I have some seeds I can send you.
Usually overwatering is the problem
Dec 14, 2019 at 7:05am
Try leaving more time between watering than you think! Like if you want to water them on Monday...wait until Wednesday..
Mr. Homer
Dec 14, 2019 at 9:45am
2 words: snake plant.
Dec 14, 2019 at 9:47am
I have a green thumb, but that really equals detailed and dedicated plant care. Nearly dead plants are given to me, I tend to their specific needs and they come back to life. Check each plant by name and look up what they prefer, less or more water etc. (Over watering is a common error). Same with sunlight. Fertilize as indicated per plant. Pests, must get rid of them if infested.
They aren't decor, they live and so have needs. I've seen people put a plant into a dark corner or right beside a hot gas stove because it looks good there, then wonder why it's dead a month or so later.


text:
- 23.24 Oz. Designed for women, stylish and personalized.
- Full canvas upper, round toe.
- Metal eyelets for a classic look.
- Soft inner lining adds to comfort, lightweight ensures easy movement.
- Lace-up closure for an adjustable fit.
- Designer Tip: To ensure the highest quality print, please note that this product's recommended uploaded image size in pixels (W x H): 1401 x 962 or higher.
- Left foot and right foot are mirrored (we will copy left shoes to right shoes if your design includes text).
Please allow 4-6 days production. Shoe sizes run small. Please round up half sizes and add 1 size for proper fit.
Women's Canvas Tennis Shoes


text:
PRINCESS ANNE — Members of the Antioch Angel Corps are this year's recipient of the Del-Mar-Va Council, Boy Scouts of America "Somerset Outstanding Citizen Award." It will be presented at the annual dinner to be held 6 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 10 at the Somerset County Civic Center in Princess Anne.
Consisting of members of Antioch United Methodist Church, the Antioch Angels are a community partner of Chesapeake Housing Mission which serves the Lower Shore. Locally it is best known for placing ramps on the homes of the elderly and handicap, or doing repairs and renovations. It was involved with building the ramp and helping with the addition to the home of Valentina Downing, the Princess Anne woman who is now raising her two grandchildren after they were gravely injured and their mother killed by her estranged boyfriend.
Each summer they take their talent and mission spirit to rural Kentucky to do housing repairs and other charitable work.
"Bottom line, they are making the homes of the less fortunate more livable and secure," stated a BSA spokesperson. The Antioch Angel Corps "see themselves as servants in the community, caring for their friends and neighbors."
The Citizen Award dinner is the opportunity for the community's leadership to gather and celebrate the successes of The Antioch Angels as it recognizes a person or organization that uses the character traits taught in Scouting to make the community a better place.
The event is expected to draw over 200 people and raise over $20,000 to help support scouting programs and services. Tickets are $40 and event sponsorships are available. Register online at www.dmvc.org/ocad or call 443-523-7639.
Past Somerset County honorees have included Danny Thompson, the late Ted Phoebus, Bill and Sharon Harris, Jane Riggin and the late Donnie Price, Scott Tawes, the late Austin Cox Sr., Fred Lankford, and the late Wade Ward.


text:
1. Ecological Function: The pores in gabion mesh pad create the conditions
for the flow of water body, which is conducive to the natural exchange between
water and soil, creating a living environment for water organisms and
microorganisms, thereby enhancing the self-purification capacity of water body
and protecting Improves the water quality and water quality Filling material
Pore Laying soil or naturally deposited soil through artificial laying creates
conditions for greenery and vegetation, grows plants naturally even without
sprinkling seeds, optimizes and beautifies environment, improves and restores
ecology surroundings.
2, the water permeable function: with gabion cages built into the retaining wall and the laying of the slope protection, cages filled material for the loose body, there are more pores, which is conducive to the masonry after filling and slope protection in the soil The discharge of pore water, once the infiltration of surface water into the soil, can be used to quickly discharge the masonry, effectively reducing the water table, thereby reducing the pressure behind the wall and the groundwater under the slope. Green grid structure In the landslide control and debris flow prevention and control projects, the timely discharge of water reduces the risk of wall damage, while the wall deformation capacity can effectively buffer sudden external impact.
3, stable function: Twisted grid structure, local damage, will not cause the overall damage crates. Green Grid has moderate deformation characteristics of the mesh, the entire project even into the whole, without sub-seam, even if there is uneven subsidence, the overall structure will not produce cracks or serious problems.
4, simple construction: green grid technology according to the intent of the design, the factory production of semi-finished products, the construction site is assembled according to the design stereotypes, and then laying in the well-organized slope or excavation of a good foundation pit shop Into the slope protection or brick wall into a cage retaining wall, filling filling, with the cover Serve. Simple operation By climate interference is small, and suitable for mechanized operation, you can ensure the construction quality and speed up the progress of the project. In a construction unit construction process, due to the impact of the weather, the construction unit will be masonry stone wall workers transferred over to do green grid slope protection.
5, beautiful effect: green grid structure easy combination and color diversity, we can provide a wide range of structural design, to meet the landscape requirements of different regions. At the same time combined with planting lawn, the kind of flowers presented to us will be a green retaining wall or slope protection.
6, the service life: Galvanized steel, PVC, Galvanized, stainless steel and other technology, the steel surface coating more stable, can effectively reduce the network of oxidation, corrosion resistance, anti-static, anti-aging, antioxidant properties, Longer life.


text:
Advocating Linux in the Classroom
August 2, 2009 by Clair Ching
Filed under advocacy
Writing about Moodle and iTalc reminded me that the first time I heard about Linux was in college. One of my classmates reported about Linux, GNOME and KDE. I didn't really understand everything they said but I had an awareness of Linux after that. Then I learned that there was a documentary about Linux showing in the university's film center so I watched that with some classmates and teachers too. It wasn't so difficult for them to talk about Linux since we were, after all, in an academic setting where we should talk about these things. …read more
FOSS and Education: iTalc and Moodle
August 2, 2009 by Clair Ching
Filed under applications
If you're running a training center, whether it concerns distance education or not, you need tools to help you manage your classes and facilitate discussions, especially for those who are into distance education learning programs. Issues that need to be addressed include: course management as well as ensuring that the training room is managed well so that learners can focus on the lessons and not be distracted by other applications.
Let the Training Room Come into Order with iTalc
Today, I've learned about iTalc. It is an application that lets you manage your training room's computers by ensuring that your …read more
Dell Latitude 2100 for K-12 Students
May 20, 2009 by Clair Ching
Filed under Geeky Fun
School's starting in my country in two weeks' time and now I read about Dell Latitude 2100s as K-12 friendly. Interestingly enough these nifty netbooks have rubberized casings so that it won't easily slip from the hands of students. And the units are quite colorful too.
Some nifty features:
optional touchscreen
webcam (say, "Hi, Teacher!")
labeling window – personalize your netbook so they know who owns which unit
network activity light that warns teachers if their students are using the WiFi connection instead of focusing on their studies
you could get it with Ubuntu, instead of Windows
3-cell or 6-cell battery
option to choose between an …read more
Linux in libraries and schools
April 12, 2008 by Clair Ching
Filed under Geeky Fun, The Free World.
In this case, it's Ubuntu Linux, the Kubuntu flavor because of better control, as they say.
Sounds like Ubuntu Linux is one of the more common distros installed, from the looks of it. The article talked about the students' use of the kiosk which runs Kubuntu. Also mentioned were the good points of using Linux in Westall Secondary School in Melbourne.
For the uses, the following were listed:
Book reservation
Access the college intranet
Other things that were mentioned to be good effects of the change:
The response time of the machines became faster compared with Windows.
Students are not hacking the kiosks in order to …read more


text:
Learn more about these different git repos.
Other Git URLs
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@
# get the data
r = get(self.get_url)
# take the first task
- builds = filter(lambda x: x["build_id"] not in exclude, r.json())
+ builds = list(filter(lambda x: x["build_id"] not in exclude, r.json()))
if not builds:
log.debug("No new tasks to process.")
- return [ImportTask.from_dict(build) for build in builds]
+ return [ImportTask.from_dict(build) for build in builds[:limit]]
except Exception as e:
log.exception("Failed acquire new packages for import:" + str(e))
Fixes: #807
Looks good to me. Just a nitpick, I would move the condition one line up, so the p definition and it's appending to pool is not separated.
However, looking into the code again, the self.try_to_obtain_new_tasks is called with limit parameter which IMHO correctly specifies the number of tasks, that can currently be handled. The problem is, that try_to_obtain_new_tasks doesn't use that parameter. Maybe it would be worth it, to use it?
rebased onto b7bac68
I changed the method try_to_obtain_new_tasks so it uses argument limit.
I'd prefer distgit: prefix in commit message, but +1
Merged as 9a2e4b5
Pull-Request has been closed by praiskup


text:
Number of coronavirus deaths in the UK jumps by more than 560 in 24 hours
PUBLISHED: 14:58 01 April 2020 | UPDATED: 14:58 01 April 2020
The number of people who have died from coronavirus in the UK has jumped by 563 to 2,352 in 24 hours - the highest day-on-day increase yet.
It took 17 days for the number in the UK to pass 200, and has taken a further 11 days to pass 2,000.
Latest figures released by the Department for Health show there have been 152,979 coronavirus tests carried out in the UK as of 9am on April 1, 9,773 more than yesterday.
The number of confirmed cases of Covid-19 in the UK stands at 29,474, an increase of 4,324 in 24 hours.
In Norfolk there are 148 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 116 in Suffolk.
Of those who been diagnosed with the virus, 18 have died in hospital.
On Tuesday, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) announced that at least three more people who had contracted COVID-19 had died in the east of England outside of hospital.
The ONS explained its figures are based on the number of deaths registered in England and Wales where COVID-19 was mentioned on the death certificate as "deaths involving COVID-19", which can be included where a person has other health conditions. The number includes all deaths, not just those in hospitals, although there is usually a delay of at least five days between a death occurring and registration.
The breakdown for the east of England includes Norfolk and Waveney, Bedfordshire, Luton, Milton Keynes, Hertfordshire, West Essex, Cambridgeshire, Peterborough, Mid and South Essex, Suffolk and North East Essex.
If you value what this story gives you, please consider supporting the Eastern Daily Press. Click the link in the orange box above for details.


text:
Kenji Imai (1932 - )
Film DeathsEdit
- Kill! (Burai barase!) (1969) [Yakuza]: Stabbed to death by rival gangsters.
- Quick-draw Okatsu (Yoen dokufuden: Hitokiri okatsu) (1969) [Shiozaki]: Stabbed to death with a sword by Junko Miyazono.
- Watch Out, Crimson Bat! (Mekurano Oichi midargasa) (1969) [Lord]: Sliced with a sword by Yôko Matsuyama.
- Sympathy for the Underdog (Gamblers in Okinawa; Bakuto gaijin butai) (1971) [Mad Dog Jiro]: Shot to death by rival gangsters in the backseat of a car while trying to warn his brother, Tomisaburo Wakayama.
- Outlaw Killers: Three Mad Dog Brothers (Hito-kiri Yota: Kyoken San-kyodai) (1972) [Yakuza]: Beaten to death with a metal pipe by Bunta Sugawara during a brutal fight in a construction yard.
- The Last Samurai (Okami yo rakujitsu o kire) (1974) [Samurai]: Stabbed to death by Hideki Takahashi .
- Karate Bullfighter (Kenka karate kyokushinken) (1977) [Assassin]: Beaten to death by Sonny Chiba.
- The Tattooed Hit Man (Yamaguchi-gumi gaiden: Kyushu shinko-sakusen) (1977) [Yakuza] Shot to death by Hiroki Matsukata.
- The Killing Game (Satsujin yugi) (1978) [Oyama] Shot in the forehead by Yûsaku Matsuda.
- Machine Gun Dragon (Yokohama ankokugai mashingan no ryu) (1978) [Cop]: Shot to death by Bunta Sugawara.
- The Resurrection of the Golden Wolf (Yomigaeru kinrô) (1979) [Sakamoto]: Shot to death by Yûsaku Matsuda.
Community content is available under CC-BY-SA unless otherwise noted.


text:
La Vie En Rose-Crew
A sophisticated crew cut in light-cushion poly blend, La Vie En Rose features its namesake at the forefoot with a heather green toe and white/pink stripes up top. This is Life in Pink.
- Machine Wash in 40 °C / 104 °F.
- Avoid Bleaching or Ironing the socks.
- Socks will last longer if you keep them out of the dryer.
Small: Women's Shoe Size 5-7.5
Medium: Women's Shoe Size 8-10.5
We Also Recommend


text:
Nigerian recording artist Naira Marley debuted another amazing banger titled "Dido Lobo", produced by Rexxie.
Following the massive success of his previous single and video for ' Tesumole, ' which surpassed millions of views on the YouTube streaming platform.
Nevertheless, Naira Marley was one of the hottest artists to have dominated the mainstream and numerous music charts in Nigeria and the diaspora.
Listen to the Snippet below and wait for the main track will be out soon!


text:
Yo she's hot
I'd love to rub my clit all over her cunt while sucking his dick
Two divine and sexy honeys are making out with each other. They looks so hot in their stockings and lingerie.
intense ass fucking, like how she squirts on the dude's dick
You're not just my favorite actress, you're my best ass.
I giggled when he started tbagging her
© 2019 panaceamediaproductions.com - All rights reserved.


text:
1:1 Teaching Assistant
Empowering Learning
Islington, London
£9 - £10 per hour
1:1 Teaching Assistants and Learning Support Assistants - Islington, North London SEN School Islington, North London Full-Time £65-£80 a day depending on experience Empowering Learning are currently recruiting for 1:1 Teaching Assistants and Learning Support Assistants to work for an SEN School based in Islington. We have multiple vacancies for this position, as the School are looking for staff to work across different key stages. These positions will be supporting pupils with a huge mix of needs, some of these include Severe/Moderate Learning Difficulties, Complex Needs, Physical Disabilities, PMLD, SEMH, EBD, ASD, Down Syndrome and Cerebral Palsy. We are looking for dynamic and adaptable 1:1 Teaching Assistants and Learning Support Assistants, that will be able to support pupils on a daily basis in the classroom, from Primary level to Secondary level.


text:
Joe is a cheeky, sociable, and confident type. He loves singing, dancing around the house and going to school. Also, he likes going swimming and being outdoors. Joe has a good sense of adventure, and enjoys exploring new places and meeting new people.
Joe has Down Syndrome.
Age: 5
Height: 99cm
Clothes size: 3-4 (trousers) 4-5 (tops)
Shoe Size: 8 jr
Eye colour: Blue
Hair colour: Red


text:
"The draft is white people sending black people to fight yellow people to protect the country they stole from the red people." – Hair The Musical
It's the 50th anniversary of Hair the Musical and it's a celebration you won't want to miss. This love-rock, hippie musical takes you on a psychedelic trip back to the 60's to a key point in history for the hippie youth of America.
The opening scene introduced 'the tribe' who had long hair, floral clothing, bandanas, and bare feet. The show jumped straight into a number of musical acts which introduced that characters and set the tone of the show.
With themes of race, politics, protest, war, drugs, nudity and sex – we can only imagine the shock for audiences back when the show was first released. However, whilst in current times that shock factor isn't there, it doesn't mean we still can't appreciate the show for what it was and the statement it made.
The plot was simple, the dialogue was minimal and although some may feel this was a weakness in the show – we would definitely argue that the plot was secondary to the incredible music and staging.
Paul Wilkins plays the role of Claude, a torn individual unsure about acknowledging his patriotic duty in Vietnam or if he should be resisting the draft and burning his card. His performance was strong, engaging and charming.
Jake Quickenden plays the exceptionally flamboyant and free-spirited Berger. His character was interesting to watch – from experiencing his crass humour to seeing his darker more tormented side, his presence on stage definitely stood out.
Daisy Wood-Davis plays the loving student activist Sheila. Her performance was delightful and her softer voice felt like a relief in-between the more boisterous acts.
Marcus Collins brought a real force of energy to the stage as Hud, his vocals and acting were marvellous. Even though there was a technical hic-up during his opening number, his entire performance was faultless.
Aiesha Pease, who played Dionne, lead the vocals in the opening scene Aquarius. This performance sent a message to the audience straight away that we received loud and clear – that this show has some incredible talent and they aren't here to mess around.
On the whole the show has some amazing talent, staging and music. So, relax and enter the theatre with an open mind and we can guarantee it'll be a night to remember!
Hair – The Musical is at the Liverpool Empire until Saturday. Get your tickets HERE.
For other UK tour dates see HERE.


text:
Arc'teryx Gamma MX Hoody Review
Compare prices at 3 resellers Pros: Athletic fit, intelligent pocket placements, stylish look
Cons: Fitted cuffs, shorter waist cut, expensive
Manufacturer: Arc'teryx
Our Verdict
Compare to Similar Products
Our Analysis and Test Results
The Arc'teryx Gamma MX Hoody is a trim-fitting softshell jacket that offers excellent weather protection and warmth. It has features that are well thought out and user-friendly, and is stylish enough to wear both in the mountains and out to dinner. This jacket performs best during lower exertion activities in cold weather.
Performance Comparison
Weather Protection
The "MX" in Gamma MX stands for mixed weather, and this is a jacket that does better than most in these challenging conditions. The jacket uses a proven stretch fabric Arc'teryx has long used in their Gamma line, a fabric that effectively blocks wind, snow, and light rain. This stretch-woven Fortius 2.0 fabric keeps the elements at bay, beading water off in light precipitation thanks to its DWR treatment. However, with prolonged exposure to moisture, like all softshell jackets, this one will wet through, and at a faster rate than shells with a heavier coating.
With a large helmet-compatible hood, the Gamma MX Hoody is capable of sealing around the face, and the high zipper closes securely around the chin with a comfortable brushed fleece backing. The wrist cuffs utilize a fitted gasket that is somewhat stretchy. This fit our wrists quite comfortably and sealed effectively, though it is tough to fit these cuffs over even lightweight gloves.
The Gamma MX uses a proprietary fabric comprised of polyester/nylon/elastane called Fortius 2.0. It has been one of our lead reviewer's favorites for traveling in colder temperatures during moderately aerobic activities like ice climbing and ski touring. The fabric is air permeable and effectively passes moisture through to keep the body cool and dry during activity, though the fleece-backed lining does inhibit this to some extent. We found that during extended activity we were noticeably wetter between the inner lining of our softshell and the exterior of our fleece mid-layer than when we wore a softshell without a lining. Unlined jackets do a better job of keeping the moisture passing through without wetting out interior materials.
Arc'teryx is known for well-fitting garments that feel tailored in all of the right places. The Gamma MX is no exception. It is a trim, athletic fit, despite descriptions from Arc'teryx claiming a regular fit. They also describe this jacket as being hip length, though we found that it barely covered our waist. Given that the arm length and torso are also close-fitting, (to the point of being snug when layered over a mid-layer), consider sizing up for this jacket.
The stretch-woven panels of the Gamma MX move well with the body. Despite having no means to secure the cuffs other than a fitted gasket, we did not experience any drop in the cuff while reaching overhead. The hem, however, rises considerably. For us, this exposed baselayers and skin and pulled the jacket from under a harness while climbing.
The Gamma MX jacket has a verified weight of 21 ounces for a medium. It is, however, a much more capable jacket than others that weigh the same or more. It's also bulkier, but the soft and flexible fabric expertly masks this. That being said, when stuffed in a pack, it takes up much more room than a lighter weight model, so be prepared.
Like the rest of the Gamma models we have worn, the Gamma MX has well-thought-out features that climbers and skiers can appreciate. The full-sized hood accommodates both ski and climbing helmets and has a three-way cinch system with hidden cord locks to ensure a tight seal around the face. The collar is lined with soft fleece, and a rubber gasket backs the zipper. There are two handwarmer pockets, as well as two Napolean style chest pockets that are easy to access if you are wearing a harness or a pack.
The left shoulder features a small zippered pocket that we like for stashing a GU gel pack or our ski pass. There are no interior pockets. While the wrist closures are not adjustable, they do form a pretty good seal around the wrist. Those wishing to wear gloves, however, likely will prefer a jacket with adjustable cuffs, though the sleeves are fitted enough to accommodate gloves going over the top as well.
Style-wise, we are continually impressed with the Gamma MX. It is clean-cut, has a tailored, athletic fit, and is equally fashionable on the cliffs or at the coffee shop. It is available in attractive colors that are not out of place in an urban setting.
This is one of the most expensive jackets we tested. Arc'teryx is known for its excellent design and tailoring, and the contrast between the fit of this jacket and a less expensive one is certainly noticeable. However, a lighter shell with a light new fleece base layer is likely a less expensive and more versatile option.
The Arc'teryx Gamma MX Hoody is a softshell jacket with an additional fleece backing for protecting and insulating from the wind and light precipitation in colder weather activities. For the mountain enthusiast who also wants to look good and stay protected from the elements when in the harshest conditions that a softshell jacket can (or should) handle, the Gamma MX might be just the shell you need. It's impeccable construction ensures this layer will be able to withstand many years and adventures.
— Ryan Huetter


text:
The gallery has been updated with pictures of Sophie at the British Academy Scotland Awards.
You must be logged in to post a comment.
Follows the story of Claire Randall, a married combat nurse from 1945 who is mysteriously swept back in time to 1743, where she is immediately thrown into an unknown world in which her life is threatened. When she is forced to marry Jamie Fraser, a chivalrous and romantic young Scottish warrior, a passionate relationship is ignited that tears Claire's heart between two vastly different men in two irreconcilable lives.
Tonight! Join @MCMComicCon at 7:30pm (GMT) for an #Outlander watchalong to celebrate Season 5 on Blu-ray & DVD. Get your feet up, grab a drink and welcome to the long-awaited wedding of Bree and Roger🥂 #happyfriday https://t.co/nTB4p3AC3J
I'm told women get more followers if they post pictures of their melons 🍉 https://t.co/V4WJOiI6vK
The Famillllyyyyy is backkkk!!!! ♥🥳
Founded by Kay
Header by Kay
Theme by Sin21
Hosted by FanSt – DMCA
Established on September 4, 2018


text:
|£1225 Basic
|What's Included
|Delivery time
35 Hour(s)
As an influencer marketing strategist, I am able to find the correct influencers for your brand, engage with them and negotiate the best price for your brand. I am also able to use previous campaigns you may have worked on to learn what has previously worked for your brand or individual products, and take these learnings into consideration when planning a fully realised campaign for you. I have great relationships with key influencers who cover various topics. If I do not have any influencers in my little black book who would suit your needs, I am happy to use my strong relationship building skills to network and outreach to find the perfect team for your campaign.
I am also highly skilled in social media marketing, both paid and organic, and have used these skills in various industries including the music industry, retail, tourism, finance, and legal.
Main Skill: Influencer Marketing
Other Skills: SMM - Social Media Marketing, Content Marketing, Music Promotion, Other - Digital Marketing
I will get your product or service in front of relevant, engaged audiences.
English Proficiency native
Replies in 24 hours
Profile not verified
With Skillbox 1 Year(s)
Services you may be interested in


text:
Date range
Content type
- News update Remove News update filter (-)
Your search results
- News update Remove News update filter (-)
- 2020 Remove 2020 filter (-)
Showing 1 – 10 of 11 Results
Sort by
Sleeping on Cold, Concrete Floors and Insufficient Access to Medical Care: The Inhumane Conditions Inside CBP Detention FacilitiesJanuary 21, 2020News updateImmigrants' Rights
Solitary Confinement, Fear and Sexual Assault — Advocating for Alejandra's Release from ICE DetentionMarch 11, 2020News updateImmigrants' Rights
Voting by Mail Will Protect Our Health – and Right to VoteApril 21, 2020News updateVoting Rights
Here's What Happened at the ACLU of Arizona County Attorney Candidate TownhallMay 6, 2020News update
Reimagining the Role of PoliceJune 5, 2020News update
COVID-19 Cases are Increasing Across Arizona Detention Centers. ICE Must Release Them All.June 11, 2020News updateImmigrants' Rights
As COVID-19 Cases Increase in Arizona, Local Sheriffs Must Take Initiative to Contain the SpreadJune 29, 2020News updateImmigrants' Rights
I'm a High School Senior. Here Are My Thoughts About Going Back to SchoolAugust 3, 2020News updateEducation Equity
ACLU of Arizona Mourns the Loss of Founder Alice BendheimSeptember 8, 2020News update
Adel's Hidden Agenda: ACLU Exposes Maricopa Prosecutor's HypocrisyAugust 26, 2020News updateSmart Justice


text:
Download limit exceeded. PLEASE PURCHASE UNLIMITED DOWNLOAD ACCESS. Thank you.
Please link to us on your website, blog, or profile page. Thank you.
Sample HTML codes you can copy and paste into your site:
Giana Sisters 32k download
Download Old Games
Please share Giana Sisters 32k on Facebook!
Please share Old-Games.com on Facebook!
Please share Giana Sisters 32k on Twitter!
Please share Old-Games.com on Twitter!
Back to Giana Sisters 32k review page.
Browse other Arcade action games.
Back to Old Games Homepage.
©2020 San Pedro Software Inc. Contact: , done in 0.002 seconds.


text:
The brand-new watch endgame flick The Avengers Endgame by Chuck Palahniuk occurs after the activities of the initial manual in the collection. When the film ends, all the different characters coming from the very first book are scattered around the world. All of the characters that seemed in the authentic manual were actually overlooked of the motion picture.
Unlike the brand-new manual where the characters seemed as zombies and also were enjoyable but possessed little bit of to do with the story, the movie model of The Avengers Endgame delivers back all of the personalities from the very first publication as well as also tosses in some new ones. This is the very first time considering that the beginning of the Wonder witty that you have the capacity to view virtually every character coming from the whole entire series.
I have to putlocker avengers endgame point out that the motion picture was very little of a film. It seemed like the supervisor didn't know exactly how to make a Marvel comic work. It likewise failed to feel like they took note of the real account of the series or even some of the activity.
To become honest, The Avengers Endgame takes place rather promptly and the first couple of pages were extremely confusing. The personalities existed in an incredibly complex manner in which caused me to have to go to the back to enter into some of the extra intricate details. The action sequences were exciting yet they reoccured as well swift for my taste.
In the end, The Avengers Endgame is actually not comparable to it sounds. For me it was actually a mixed bag that had its good parts as well as bitter pills yet nothing that made me seem like I had to proceed analysis.
The end of watch avengers endgame full movie online guide possessed an excellent cliffhanger that created me wish to continue the following publication. But, unfortunately, the other component of guide concentrates on the flick instead of the genuine manual. It is only after checking out completion of this tale that I discovered that it would certainly behave to carry on along with the collection.
I can mention that I suggest this publication to any person that is actually trying to find something a little bit of various to read. The activity is a lot more thorough than the majority of Wonder comics but that does not imply it is actually much less satisfying. I think folks that appreciate manuals that have activity and a little bit of humor are going to enjoy this tale.
In the next portion of my review I will certainly be uploading my total evaluation of The Avengers Endgame. I feel that it is entitled to a comprehensive assessment, therefore do not be actually startled if I launch guide at a later time.
For the time being, if you are actually a follower of comics that pay attention to action and also wit, I presume you are going to appreciate this publication. The action is good and the activity cultures went over as realistic, but the action scenes of the other books in the series were actually almost as really good.
I directly strongly believe that this book falls short of the others in the collection. Actually, I found the activity to be a little boring. That does not suggest it wasn't entertaining.
Regarding guide on its own, it is a mixed bag that possesses its great parts and bad parts. It does not possess a considerable amount of humor, which I believe is a large error for guide, yet the story was effectively created. This is among those publications that I could finish in a solitary resting, however if you are not a large fan of the Marvel comic cosmos, I would suggest reading it in its own totality.
In general, The Avengers Endgame through Chuck Palahniuk is actually a strong book. While it has many elements that correspond to others in the collection, it was a rejuvenating change of pace for me and also the activity arenas were quite realistic.
A three part Avengers Endgame assessment. The film occurs throughout the mid-1990s and is actually a part two throughout of the previous movie, Iron Male. This motion picture gets where the final one ended, along with Tony Stark going to an additional comics character to get his fortune back.
It is actually exciting that the Avengers perform not know who Battle Machine is actually until after he receives recorded stealing from all of them. It produces you wonder if he is excellent or negative, much like with Iron Male.
In Avengers Endgame, Tony Stark is delivered a possibility to utilize innovation in order to develop more War Makers as well as by doing so to save numerous lives. An integrated circuit dental implanted in War Equipment's brain permits him to make use of all of his power as the very soldier battles.
However, he has to experience a collection of tests as well as be checked through S.H.I.E.L.D. while he remains in deeper sea testing in order to view if he is actually a good or negative Super Soldier. Most of the various other characters, featuring Dark Dowager, accompany this plan given that they wish to save an individual life, however it is Tony that don't see eye to eye along with some of them.
It seems that what I liked regarding Avengers Endgame is that they portrayed Tony Stark as a crazy wizard. In fact, the flick produces me assume that these types of ventures have ended up being too prevalent at presents.
Nowadays, our team can easily currently handle computers technology via the web. This will be exciting if it held true, however in truth, we don't definitely possess just about anything that evolved.
Nevertheless, the primary personalities still do possess plenty of exclusive results in the course of the activity sequences. This is actually one of the much better ones out there if you are looking for a terrific activity film.
Properly, I can't actually give it any much better than this, but I carry out have some issues. One criticism I possess with the activity scenes is actually that the bad guys are actually just about never ever seen as well as when they are actually, they are actually usually shown at the end of the flick or in a really bit part.
The new flick The Avengers Endgame through Chuck Palahniuk takes place after the activities of the very first publication in the series. All of the characters that appeared in the authentic manual were left behind out of the film.
The closing of the book had a fantastic cliffhanger that created me want to proceed the next book. However, the various other part of the publication focuses on the film somewhat than the true manual. I believe individuals who enjoy publications that possess action and a little bit of wit will certainly appreciate this story.