text:
MORRIS v. SLAPPY(1983)
When respondent was charged in California Superior Court with various crimes, including rape, robbery, and burglary, all concerning the same female victim, the court assigned the Deputy Public Defender to defend respondent. The Deputy Public Defender represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. Shortly before the trial, the Deputy Public Defender was hospitalized for surgery, and six days before the scheduled trial date a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender's Office was assigned to represent respondent. After the trial was under way, respondent moved for a continuance, claiming that his newly assigned attorney did not have time to prepare the case. The attorney, however, told the court that he was fully prepared and "ready" for trial, and the court denied a continuance. Respondent was convicted on some counts but there was a mistrial on other counts on which the jury could not agree. A second trial, during which respondent refused to cooperate with his lawyer, also resulted in convictions. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions on all counts, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Thereafter, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, alleging that the California Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," and that the state trial judge abused his discretion [461 U.S. 1, 2] and violated this right by arbitrarily denying a continuance that would have permitted the Deputy Public Defender to try the case.
The state trial court did not violate respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying a continuance. Pp. 11-15.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 15. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 29.
Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, [461 U.S. 1, 3] Chief Assistant Attorney General, William D. Stein, Assistant Attorney General, and W. Eric Collins and Herbert F. Wilkinson, Deputy Attorneys General.
Michael B. Bassi, by appointment of the Court, 456 U.S. 942 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. *
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Edwin S. Kneedler for the United States; and by Richard J. Wilson and Howard B. Eisenberg for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
Dennis A. Fischer, Jeff Brown, Ephraim Margolin, Robert Altman, John J. Cleary, James R. Dunn, and Terence F. MacCarthy filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the state trial court violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying respondent's motion for a continuance until the Deputy Public Defender initially assigned to defend him was available. We granted certiorari, 456 U.S. 904 (1982), and we reverse.
The issues raised arise out of two trials in the state court, the second trial having been held on two counts on which the first jury could not agree. Respondent was convicted of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment in the first trial; he was convicted of rape and forcible oral copulation in the second. On review of all five counts, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the convictions, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Thereafter the United States District Court denied respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This denial was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," [461 U.S. 1, 4] and that the trial judge abused his discretion and violated this right by denying a motion for a continuance based on the substitution of appointed counsel six days before trial. 649 F.2d 718 (CA9 1981).
Respondent's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court set forth two grounds for relief: (a) that the state "[t]rial court abused its discretion by failing to order a substitution of counsel after [respondent and counsel became] embroiled in irreconcilable conflict," Record 3; and (b) that the trial court had not permitted him to testify in his own behalf in the second trial. Ibid. The facts shown by the record conclusively rebut both these claims and are alone dispositive, independent of the correctness of the novel Sixth Amendment guarantee announced by the Court of Appeals.
After midnight on July 7, 1976, the victim, a young woman, left her apartment to shop at a nearby grocery store in San Francisco. There she was accosted by respondent and when she complained to the store manager, he ordered respondent to leave. Respondent waited for the victim outside; when the victim left the store, respondent threw a beer bottle at her. She asked the store manager to call the police, but he told her just to walk away. She then walked home taking the long way around the block, but when she entered her apartment house, respondent was waiting for her in the lobby. From this fact, the jury could have inferred that respondent had been stalking the victim from the time she first left her apartment. Respondent forced the victim into the basement, where, she testified, he raped and sodomized her and then robbed her.
The victim managed to escape from respondent and fled from the building into a nearby all-night diner, where she was sheltered until the police came. She gave the police a [461 U.S. 1, 5] description of her assailant; he was apprehended two blocks away. He was wearing the green fatigue jacket with furtrimmed hood and the "Afro" style wig that the victim had described to the police. On his person the police found jewelry taken from the victim. The respondent told the booking officer that he had been given the jewelry by a woman whose last name he did not recall and whose address he did not know. Police found the victim's clothing scattered on the floor of the basement of her apartment building and a button from respondent's jacket on the basement steps.
Respondent was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with five felonies. 1 The court appointed the San Francisco Public Defender's Office to represent respondent and Deputy Public Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to defend the accused. Goldfine represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. The trial was scheduled for Thursday, September 23, 1976. Shortly prior to trial, however, Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery. On Friday, September 17, six days before the scheduled trial date, the Public Defender assigned Bruce Hotchkiss, a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender's Office, to represent respondent.
On the day he was assigned the case, Hotchkiss interviewed respondent in jail and advised him of the substitution. Between that date and the following Tuesday, September 21, Hotchkiss reviewed the files and investigation prepared by his colleague. On Tuesday, he conferred with respondent for three hours; on the following day he again met with respondent in the morning and afternoon. [461 U.S. 1, 6]
(a) First Day of First Trial
The first trial began as scheduled on Thursday, September 23. At the opening of trial, respondent told the court: "I only have this P. D. [Public Defender] for a day and a half, we have not had time to prepare this case. He came in Tuesday night, last Tuesday night was the first time I saw him. . . . We have not had enough time to prepare this case." App. 7.
Construing respondent's remarks as a motion for a continuance, the court denied the motion, noting that the case had been assigned to Hotchkiss the previous Friday, six days before the trial date, and that Hotchkiss stated he had "investigated the case, [and] studied it." Id., at 8. In reply, respondent repeated his claim that Hotchkiss had only been on the case for a day and a half.
Respondent then stated:
The trial judge repeated that he was confident that the Public Defender's Office was representing respondent adequately [461 U.S. 1, 7] and that Hotchkiss was an experienced counsel; the court again denied a continuance. Id., at 9.
(b) Second Day of First Trial
At the start of the second day of trial, on Friday, September 24, 1976, respondent again complained that Hotchkiss was not prepared. When the court expressed its confidence in Hotchkiss, respondent said:
When respondent continued to complain that Hotchkiss had not adequately investigated the case, Hotchkiss told the court:
At this time - on the second day of the first trial - respondent first mentioned Goldfine's name. After complaining again about Hotchkiss' alleged lack of time for preparation, respondent said: "Mr. Harvey Goldfine was my attorney, he was my attorney, and he still is. I haven't seen him in five [461 U.S. 1, 8] weeks because he's in the hospital." Id., at 24. Respondent then claimed that not even Goldfine had had enough time to prepare the case: "Mr. Harvey Goldfine didn't even have enough time to go over my case with me, he didn't even have time." Ibid. Respondent concluded these remarks with additional complaints about Hotchkiss' preparation.
(c) Third Day of First Trial
Trial resumed four days later, on Tuesday, September 28, 1976. Out of the presence of the jury, respondent presented the court with a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was unrepresented by counsel. In support of his petition, respondent claimed that Goldfine, not Hotchkiss, was his attorney. Specifically, he said that the writ should be granted on
Following the court's ruling, respondent announced that he would not cooperate at all in the trial and asked to be returned to his cell. The court urged respondent to cooperate but respondent refused, claiming that Hotchkiss did not represent him: "I don't have any Counsel, I just got through telling you, I don't have no Counsel." Id., at 32. However, respondent remained in the courtroom and the trial proceeded.
Later, respondent renewed his attack:
(d) Second Trial
A week later, a second trial was held on the charges left unresolved as a result of the mistrial and Hotchkiss again appeared for respondent. Once more, respondent ignored Hotchkiss' advice and refused to take the stand. 2 Indeed, respondent refused to cooperate with or even speak to Hotchkiss. The second jury returned a guilty verdict on the sexual assault counts. The California Court of Appeal affirmed respondent's convictions on all five counts; the California Supreme Court denied review.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Peckham, J.) construed the pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus liberally as including a claim that the trial court abused its discretion both in denying a continuance to allow Hotchkiss additional time to prepare and in denying a continuance to permit Goldfine to defend respondent. In denying the writ, the District Court stated:
In reversing the District Court's denial of the writ, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing," but argued that respondent was not seeking appointment of counsel of his own choosing; rather, he "was merely seeking a continuance of the trial date so that his attorney [Goldfine] would be able to represent him at trial." 649 F.2d, at 720.
The Court of Appeals went on to announce a new component of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right, it held, would
The Court of Appeals next stated that the trial court, having failed to inquire about the probable length of Goldfine's absence, could not have weighed respondent's interest in continued representation by Goldfine against the State's interest in proceeding with the scheduled trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct this balancing test ignored respondent's Sixth Amendment right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" and hence violated respondent's right to counsel; 4 this violation was held to require reversal without any need to show prejudice. The Court of Appeals directed that the writ issue unless respondent received a new trial on all five counts.
Not every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 -54 (1970). Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary "insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable [461 U.S. 1, 12] request for delay" violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).
We have set out at greater length than usual the record facts showing Hotchkiss' prompt action in taking Goldfine's place, his prompt study of the investigation, his careful review of the materials prepared by Goldfine for trial, his conferences with respondent, and his representation to the court that "a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the case," App. 11. In the face of the unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was fully prepared and "ready" for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance. On this record, it would have been remarkable had the trial court not accepted counsel's assurances.
Nor is there any merit to the claim that the denial of a continuance prevented Hotchkiss from being fully prepared for trial. Despite respondent's adamant - even contumacious - refusal to cooperate with Hotchkiss or to take the stand as Hotchkiss advised, in spite of respondent's numerous outbursts and disruptions, and in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, Hotchkiss succeeded in getting a "hung jury" on the two most serious charges at the first trial. Given the undisputed and overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury's failure at the first trial to convict the defendant on the more serious charges cannot reflect other than favorably on Hotchkiss' readiness for trial.
In holding that the trial judge violated respondent's right to the assistance of counsel by arbitrarily refusing a continuance that would have permitted Goldfine to try the case, the Court of Appeals misread the record and the controlling law and announced a new constitutional standard which is unsupported by any authority.
The Court of Appeals' first error was in reading the record as indicating that respondent timely and in good faith moved [461 U.S. 1, 13] for a delay to permit Goldfine to continue to represent him. The transcript clearly shows that respondent did not specifically assert a concern for continued representation by Goldfine until the third day of trial, 11 days after Hotchkiss had been substituted for Goldfine. Until then, all that respondent sought was a delay to give Hotchkiss additional time that respondent, but not Hotchkiss, thought necessary to prepare for trial. Moreover, respondent specifically disavowed any dissatisfaction with counsel; he informed the court on the first day of trial that he was "satisfied" with Hotchkiss. Id., at 12. On this record, we cannot fathom how the Court of Appeals could have construed these complaints about Hotchkiss' alleged lack of time in which to prepare as indicating an unspoken preference for Goldfine.
On the contrary, the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent's midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have Goldfine represent him. On this record, it could reasonably have concluded that respondent's belated requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but were a transparent ploy for delay. In our view, the record shows that the trial judge exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of the accused and extraordinary patience with a contumacious litigant. 5
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "would be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship," 649 F.2d, at 720 (emphasis added), is without basis in the law. No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be. No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney - privately retained or provided by the public - that [461 U.S. 1, 14] the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel. Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel. 6
We have gone to unusual length in discussing the facts and relevant authorities in order to evaluate the claim of abuse of discretion by the trial judge and to deal with the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Had the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.
In its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the court wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case. Of course, inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of an accused: when prejudicial error is made that clearly impairs a defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less. But in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims. Apart from all other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one calling for public testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was involved here. Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an experience for the third time need not be decided [461 U.S. 1, 15] now; but that factor is not to be ignored by the courts. The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources.
Over 75 years ago, Roscoe Pound condemned American courts for ignoring "substantive law and justice," and treating trials as sporting contests in which the "inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?" Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Ann. Rep. 395, 406 (1906). A criminal trial is not a "game," and nothing in the record of respondent's two trials gives any support for the conclusion that he was constitutionally entitled to a new trial. The state courts provided respondent a fair trial, and the United States District Judge properly denied relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court.
[ Footnote 2 ] After the jury had been charged, but before it had retired to begin deliberations, respondent asked the judge in open court to permit him to take the stand and testify. A chambers conference was then held, at which the judge denied respondent's motion to testify, concluding it had been made in bad faith: "I am denying it because I am not convinced. All you're trying to do is make a record for appeal . . . ." App. 52.
[ Footnote 3 ] The District Court also rejected the claim that the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying respondent the opportunity to testify after the jury had already been charged in the second trial.
[ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals undertook to confine its holding to cases where the defendant requests a continuance in good faith. Here, the court asserted: "The record clearly demonstrates the sincerity of Slappy's desire to be represented by Goldfine, and the state has not contended that Slappy was acting in bad faith. . . . [T]here is nothing in the record from which it can be inferred that Slappy's request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose." 649 F.2d, at 722. Nothing in the record affords any support for these "findings" of the Court of Appeals. By contrast, the State asserts that it has "always contended that Slappy was acting in bad faith when he demanded that Goldfine rather than Hotchkiss represent him." Brief for Petitioner 38, n. 23.
[ Footnote 5 ] Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying respondent's motion to testify in the second trial after closing argument had been made and after the jury had been instructed.
[ Footnote 6 ] The Court of Appeals seems to have believed that an appointed counsel with whom the accused did not have a "meaningful relationship" was the equivalent of no counsel; as a consequence, it held that no prejudice need be shown for violations of the right to a "meaningful" attorney-client relationship. Our holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" disposes of that argument.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the result.
The Court states that "[i]n its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the [Court of Appeals] wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case." Ante, at 14. Unfortunately, it could just as easily be said of the Court that in its haste to "deal with the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a `meaningful attorney-client relationship,'" ibid., the Court reaches issues unnecessary to its judgment, mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals' opinion, and disregards the crucial role of a defendant's right to counsel in our system of criminal justice. For the reasons described below, I concur only in the Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment. [461 U.S. 1, 16]
After reviewing the record of the proceedings in the state trial court, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent moved for a continuance based on the unavailability of Harvey Goldfine, the Deputy Public Defender originally appointed to represent him. 649 F.2d 718, 719-720 (CA9 1981). The court, therefore, proceeded to consider whether the trial court had denied respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to grant his motion for a continuance until Goldfine was well enough to represent him at trial. Id., at 720. In considering this question, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing." Ibid. The court stated, however, that after a particular attorney is appointed to represent a defendant, the defendant and his attorney develop a relationship that is encompassed by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Ibid. In the court's view, the attorney-client relationship is important to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it affects the quality of representation and the defendant's ability to present an effective defense. Id., at 720-721. In this regard, the court noted that unreasonable denials of continuances when a defendant has retained counsel can amount to a denial of the right to counsel or to a violation of due process. Id., at 721. The court saw no reason "to distinguish between appointed and retained counsel in the context of preserving an attorney-client relationship." Ibid.
In light of "the importance of the attorney-client relationship to the substance of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel," the court held that "the sixth amendment (as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment) encompasses the right to have the trial judge accord weight to that relationship in determining whether to grant a continuance founded on the temporary unavailability of a defendant's particular attorney." Ibid. The court stated that in considering [461 U.S. 1, 17] motions for continuances based on the temporary unavailability of counsel, "the trial court must balance the defendant's constitutional right to counsel against the societal interest in the `prompt and efficient administration of justice.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). In this case, the trial judge failed to inquire into the expected length of Goldfine's unavailability and, therefore, could not "engage in the balancing required to protect [respondent's] rights." Id., at 722. As a result, respondent had been denied his right to counsel as that right was construed by the Court of Appeals. Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals next concluded that no showing of prejudice was required for reversal of the conviction. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that this case did not involve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which it previously had held to require a showing of prejudice to justify reversal. Id., at 722, and n. 4. Instead, the court analogized this case to cases in which counsel is either not provided or in which counsel is prevented from fulfilling normal functions. Id., at 723. In such cases a defendant is not required to demonstrate prejudice. Ibid. 2
I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals misread the record in concluding, at least implicitly, that respondent made a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine's [461 U.S. 1, 18] unavailability and on his desire to have Goldfine represent him at trial. Ante, at 12-13. 3
Respondent based his initial motion for a continuance on the ground that Hotchkiss had not had enough time to prepare the case. App. 7-13. On the second day of trial, respondent again complained that Hotchkiss had not had enough time to prepare. Id., at 17. For the first time respondent also mentioned Goldfine and stated that Goldfine "was [his] attorney." Id., at 24. Respondent went on to state that he had not seen Goldfine in five weeks because Goldfine was in the hospital. Ibid. Respondent suggested, however, that Goldfine "didn't even have time enough to go over my case with me, he didn't even have time." Ibid. It is clear, therefore, that respondent was basing his inartful motions for a continuance on the inadequate preparation of his appointed counsel. Even construing respondent's statements liberally, as a court should, there is no way the trial judge reasonably could have understood that respondent's motions for a continuance were based on Goldfine's unavailability and on respondent's desire to be represented by him. Based on Hotchkiss' assurances that he was prepared, id., at 10-11; see id., at 21-23, the trial judge clearly did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance.
On the third day of trial, following an intervening weekend, respondent filed a "Writ of Habeas Corpus" with the trial court. Id., at 28. He stated that the writ was based, in part, on the ground that his attorney was in the hospital and that he did not "legally have [an] attorney." Id., at 29. During his discussion with the trial judge, respondent repeatedly stated that he did not have an attorney and that his attorney [461 U.S. 1, 19] was in the hospital. See id., at 32, 38, 41. At this point, the trial judge reasonably could be expected to have understood that respondent was moving for a continuance based on Goldfine's unavailability and on his desire to be represented by Goldfine. As the Court points out, however, respondent finally made clear the grounds for his motions 11 days after Hotchkiss had been substituted for Goldfine, ante, at 13, and 5 days after the trial had begun. I agree with the Court that the trial judge was justified "in denying respondent's midtrial motion for a continuance. . . ." Ibid. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 -591 (1964).
Because respondent did not make a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine's unavailability, I concur in the Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment. We need go no further to support a reversal. The Court recognizes as much when it states that "[t]he facts shown by the record conclusively rebut [respondent's] claims and are alone dispositive, independent of the correctness of the novel Sixth Amendment guarantee announced by the Court of Appeals." Ante, at 4. See also ante, at 14.
Despite the Court's recognition that it is unnecessary to its decision, the Court rejects summarily "the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a `meaningful relationship' between an accused and his counsel." Ibid. (footnote omitted). The Court states simply that the Court of Appeals cited no authority "for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be." Ante, at 13. In the Court's view, "[n]o court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney - privately retained or provided by the public - that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel." Ante, at 13-14. This is the extent of the Court's analysis. Properly understood, however, the interest recognized by the Court of Appeals does find [461 U.S. 1, 20] support in other cases and does not require any court to guarantee that a defendant develop a rapport with his attorney.
We have recognized repeatedly the central role of the defendant's right to counsel in our criminal justice system. See, e. g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). We have described this right as "fundamental," Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, at 344, and have stated that "[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 31. In Powell v. Alabama, supra, the Court stated:
In recognition of the importance of a defendant's relationship with his attorney, appellate courts have found constitutional violations when a trial court has denied a continuance that was sought so that an attorney retained by the defendant could represent him at trial. [461 U.S. 1, 22]
In Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298 (CA9 1961), the attorney retained by the defendant was hospitalized. Instead of granting a continuance so that either the retained attorney could represent the defendant at trial or the defendant could secure substitute counsel of his choice, the trial judge ordered another attorney to represent the defendant over the defendant's objections and in the face of the second attorney's reluctance. Id., at 299-301. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction because the defendant had been deprived of the assistance of counsel of his own choice. Id., at 301-302.
In Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (CA5 1978), the Court of Appeals found that the defendant had been denied due process when the state trial court denied a continuance and forced the defendant to go to trial with an attorney other than the one he had retained. In the court's view, "the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when [the defendant] was effectively denied his right to choose his counsel." Id., at 1327. See also Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209-211 (CA6 1981); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356-361 (CA7 1972); Lee v. United States, 98 U.S. App. D.C. 272, 274, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (1956). Cf. United States v. Burton, 189 U.S. App. D.C. 327, 330-334, 584 F.2d 485, 488-492 (1978); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (CA6 1971).
Admittedly, the cases discussed above involved retained rather than appointed counsel. This ground of distinction, however, is not sufficient to preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation by a particular attorney who has been appointed to represent him and with whom the defendant has developed a relationship. Nothing about indigent defendants makes their relationships with their attorneys less important, or less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy defendants. As was stated in a different context in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id., at 19 [461 U.S. 1, 23] (plurality opinion). Undoubtedly, we must accept the harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy. But where an indigent defendant wants to preserve a relationship he has developed with counsel already appointed by the court, I can perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least to consider this interest in determining whether continued representation is possible. 5
In Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65 (1968), the California Supreme Court considered a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order removing the defendant's attorney in a pending murder trial. The court found that the trial court had no power to remove a court-appointed attorney over the objections of the defendant and the attorney even if the decision to remove the attorney was based on doubts about the attorney's competence. [461 U.S. 1, 24] Id., at 562, 440 P.2d, at 75. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that because an indigent defendant does not pay for his attorney he has no cause to complain about the attorney's removal as long as the attorney currently handling his case is competent. It stated:
The defendant's interest in preserving his relationship with a particular attorney is not afforded absolute protection. If the attorney is likely to be unavailable for an extended period, or if other factors exist that tip the balance in favor of proceeding in spite of a particular attorney's absence, 7 the [461 U.S. 1, 26] defendant's motion for a continuance clearly may be denied. Such denials would be subject to review under the traditional "abuse of discretion" standard. As the Court of Appeals suggested, however, the balancing is critical. 649 F.2d, at 722, n. 3. In the absence of a balancing inquiry a trial court cannot discharge its "duty to preserve the fundamental rights of an accused." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S., at 72 .
After concluding that respondent had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals proceeded to consider whether a showing of prejudice was necessary to support the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 649 F.2d, at 722. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. Ibid. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which involve specific acts and omissions of counsel, require a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's conduct before relief will be granted. Ibid. This case, however, did not involve an ineffective-assistance claim. Id., at 722, n. 4. The claim in this case was based on the trial court's arbitrary deprivation of respondent's interest in continued representation by a particular attorney. This deprivation prevented "counsel from fulfilling normal functions - from forming and exploiting an attorney-client relationship with [respondent]." Ibid. As a result, the court found that this case was analogous to cases such as Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Glasser v. United States, supra, and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), in which counsel either was not provided or was prevented from discharging his normal functions [461 U.S. 1, 27] and in which no showing of prejudice was required. 649 F.2d, at 723.
I find the Court of Appeals' reasoning persuasive. The same conclusion has been reached in other cases in similar contexts. See, e. g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d, at 211-212; Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d, at 302; Harling v. United States, 387 A. 2d 1101, 1106 (D.C. 1978). If an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim were at issue here, I might agree that a showing of prejudice was required. Requiring such a showing to support ineffective-assistance claims may be appropriate because courts are able to assess an attorney's performance and the effect of that performance on a defendant's rights based on the records before them. The courts, therefore, can make reasonable judgments regarding the presence or absence of prejudice. In cases involving claims such as the one at issue here, however, courts cannot make the same judgments. The fact that a defendant has been arbitrarily denied his interest in preserving his relationship with a particular attorney, with the result that the attorney does not appear, means that there is no record on which to base judgments regarding prejudice. We recognized this problem in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, in the context of joint representation of conflicting interests. We stated:
While the Court of Appeals may have misread the record, its opinion reflects a thoughtful and dedicated effort to protect the rights of an indigent criminal defendant. Despite their poverty and the fact that they stand accused of a crime, indigent defendants are entitled to the enforcement of procedural rules that protect substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 10 The Court of Appeals should be commended, [461 U.S. 1, 29] not criticized, for carrying out its obligation to respect this entitlement.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Court of Appeals stated that there was "nothing in the record from which it [could] be inferred that [respondent's] request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose." 649 F.2d, at 722. The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the "same result would obtain if it were shown that the defendant's request for a continuance was made in bad faith." Ibid.
[ Footnote 2 ] The court limited its holding to cases in which "a trial court does not attempt to ascertain the length of continuance necessary to insure counsel's presence at trial, and the attorney with whom the defendant has an attorney-client relationship does not appear at trial . . . ." Id., at 723.
[ Footnote 3 ] Unlike the Court, ante, at 13, I find no need to reach the issue of respondent's good faith in moving for a continuance. I also do not endorse the Court's gratuitous disagreement, ante, at 11, n. 4, with the Court of Appeals' statement that there was "nothing in the record from which it [could] be inferred that [respondent's] request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose." 649 F.2d, at 722.
[ Footnote 4 ] The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice state that "[d]efense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.1(a) (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter ABA Standards). The Standards also suggest that "[n]othing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence." Id., at 4.29 (commentary). In Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (CA6 1981), the court stated that "[b]asic trust between counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel." Id., at 212. Similarly, in Lee v. United States, 98 U.S. App. D.C. 272, 235 F.2d 219 (1956), the court stated that "`[t]he relationship between attorney and client is highly confidential, demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmoniously.'" Id., at 274, n. 5, 235 F.2d, at 221, n. 5 (citation omitted).
[ Footnote 5 ] It is arguable that cases like Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298 (CA9 1961), and Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (CA5 1978), are also distinguishable from this one on the ground that they turn largely on a non-indigent defendant's right to choose his own counsel, a right that indigent defendants do not enjoy. But the considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose his own counsel, such as the State's interest in economy and efficiency, see generally Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1974), should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence. To recognize this interest and to afford it some protection is not necessarily to afford it absolute protection. If a particular jurisdiction has sufficiently important interests, such as the structure of its public defender's office, which make continued representation by a particular attorney impractical, the trial judge may take this into account in balancing the defendant's interest in continued representation against the public's interests. The fact that such interests might exist in some jurisdictions, however, is not a sufficient reason to refuse to recognize that an indigent defendant has an important interest in a relationship that he might develop with his appointed attorney. There is no need to decide on this record which state interests might be sufficient to overcome an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation by a particular attorney with whom he has developed a relationship.
[ Footnote 6 ] See also Harling v. United States, 387 A. 2d 1101 (D.C. 1978). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice state that "[c]ounsel initially provided should continue to represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings." ABA Standards 5-5.2. The Standards also suggest that continuity of representation "affords the best opportunity for the development of a close and confidential attorney-client relationship," id., at 5.54 (commentary), and reject public defender programs in which "stage" or "horizontal" representation is used. Ibid. Finally, the Standards state: "Representation of an accused establishes an inviolable attorney-client relationship. Removal of counsel from representation of an accused therefore should not occur over the objection of the attorney and the client." Id., at 5-5.3. Based on the case law, the Standards [461 U.S. 1, 25] go on to suggest that "[t]o hold that counsel can be removed from the case of an impecunious defendant regardless of objection from the client and attorney is to subject such an accused to unjustified discrimination based solely on poverty." Id., at 5.58 (commentary). It is clear that the Standards recognize the importance of the attorney-client relationship to a defendant's right to counsel.
[ Footnote 7 ] See n. 5, supra.
[ Footnote 8 ] In view of its "holding" that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to a `meaningful attorney-client relationship,'" the Court does not reach the prejudice question. Ante, at 14, n. 6.
[ Footnote 9 ] There is a difference between a requirement that a defendant suffer some prejudice and a requirement that he show some specific prejudice. In this case the claim is that respondent was deprived arbitrarily of his interest in continued representation by an attorney with whom he had developed a relationship. That attorney did not represent respondent at trial. In this light, and in light of the factors discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that a trial court's arbitrary denial of a continuance produces some prejudice to the defense without requiring a specific showing of prejudice. I would qualify the Court of Appeals' analysis in one respect. If a State could show that a defendant's attorney would have been unavailable for an extended period or that other factors existed which would have made denial of a continuance reasonable, then a trial court's failure to inquire into the length of the attorney's expected unavailability and to engage in the necessary balancing would be rendered harmless. Under these circumstances, relief should not be granted. It would no longer be reasonable to assume that the defendant had been prejudiced.
[ Footnote 10 ] Although the Court acknowledges that "inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of [461 U.S. 1, 29] an accused," ante, at 14, it nonetheless appears to suggest that the interests of a victim in a particular case should be considered by courts in determining whether to enforce the established rights of a criminal defendant. Ante, at 14-15. Such a suggestion finds no support in our cases.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in the judgment.
The narrow question before the Court is whether the state trial judge should have inquired about the probable length of attorney Goldfine's incapacitation in order to balance respondent's right to counsel against society's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals erred in construing respondent's complaints on the first day of trial as indicating a desire to be represented by Goldfine. Absent a timely request by respondent to postpone the trial until Goldfine recovered from his illness, the state trial judge had no reason to inquire into the likely length of Goldfine's unavailability. For this reason, I concur in the Court's reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I also agree with the Court that, "[h]ad the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment." Ante, at 14. It seems to me, however, that this Court, after examining the record carefully and finding it "dispositive," ante, at 4, similarly has "no occasion to consider" the Sixth Amendment issue. Accordingly, I find the Court's rather broad-ranging dicta about the right to counsel and the concerns of victims (deserving of sympathy as they may be) to be unnecessary in this case. [461 U.S. 1, 30]


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You are currently browsing the daily archive for June 13, 2011.
But first . . . Blue Marlin has sailed!! I went upriver Sunday midmorning, and soon thereafter, she headed for sea. Actually for Bonny Town, ETA July 4, 2011. Click here to see what this Niger River delta town looks like, and then you'll know why they're buying tugs–like ex-Curtis Reinauer below–and barges. The link explains the unusual house configuration. If anyone got fotos of Blue Marlin exiting the Narrows or wishes to shares fotos of the journey, please get in touch.
Click here for history, economics, and controversies related to the Niger delta. The Niger River, 14th in the world in length, flows through unlikely places such as Timbuktu–high on my "gallivant list"–and drains 10 nations. Name them?
Yesterday I volunteered on Pegasus for the Riverdale Riverfest. In fact, Robert Apuzzo just sent this foto; I'm the tall guy in faded blue on the "upper deck" in the gap between the stack and the house. I volunteer because it's fun and important. As "safety officer," I help ensure no one gets hurt, and since I like to talk, I answer questions. I've noticed people like to see the boats but also their own communities FROM the river. Ensuring "guest safety" is vital and sometimes difficult; a tugboat has industrial-strength hazards . . . it moves and steel is hard and forgiving, yet it is a fascinating opportunity: throbbing noise and vibration, power of invisible prop and rudder and versatile line, huge engine, …
Believe it or not, Riverdale IS in the Bronx! Therefore, this water too is the sixth boro of NYC. By the way, in the background are the Palisades on the Jersey side.
Cornell was there also, here coexisting with human-powered vessels (HPVs). I love to kayak myself, but I suspect people in some HPVs underestimate commercial vessel speed and over-estimate their own visibility.
Spud barge Black Diamond served as a makeshift dock, serviceable but labor-intensive but the popularity of festivals like this illustrates the value of serviceable commercial docks in many more Hudsonsonian towns and cities. Imagine not only entertainment but also food coming ashore from boats for several reasons including reducing highway congestion. Vessels in Riverdale included also Mystic Whaler (1967 reproduction of a coastal cargo schooner) and fireboat John J. Harvey. Of course, the distinctive red barge is the itinerant Waterfront Museum, aka 1914-built Lehigh Valley 79.
These festivals showcase the skill of maritime professionals and, though fun, are stressful and laborious.
Just north of Riverdale is Yonkers. This foto of Yonkers as a storm chased us upriver in 2010 shows two frequently inquired about buildings on the this part of the Hudson: the Yonkers Power Station and the "Blue Cube," which has had lives as diverse as a test lab for PhelpsDodge and a movie studio.
Yesterday a young peregrine (?) feasted on a fish high atop the Power Station.
Traffic headed up and down the Hudson is diverse: trawler Manitou from Ludington, MI,
MV Universal Amsterdam with a load of sugar, escorted here north from the George Washington Bridge by Mary Turecamo and Margaret Moran,
trawler Muddy Waters from Miami Beach, FL,
Thomas Witte towing a tall load of scrap metal for export, and much
All fotos by Will Van Dorp, except the one thanks to Robert Apuzzo.

subset: commoncrawl


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Pros: Unique-looking iPod nano cases, each with screen protection, virtually full coverage of nano's sides and back, most of its front and top. Iconz has solid licensed character artwork and Click Wheel protection; Microglove full Click Wheel and top protection, plus a detachable carabiner hook, and TuffWrap unique tread-like sides and stylish front and rear contours.
Cons: All three cases offer no bottom protection, both Iconz and TuffWrap expose nano's top Hold switch, TuffWrap doesn't cover nano's Click Wheel. None of the cases includes a belt clip, though MicroGlove's hook will suffice for most users. TuffWrap's individual case price is high by comparison with equally or more protective cases.
There are occasions when really sharp-looking designs propel a case from "okay" on features to good, and three new iPod nano cases from XtremeMac fit that bill. Make from different materials, these cases all do the same general thing – protect your nano – but in very different ways, and we liked each for different reasons.
When XtremeMac first announced Iconz ($25), we were seriously excited: the company had made the incredibly smart choice to produce iPod accessories featuring licensed movie and TV characters, as well as baseball teams, and its first releases would be hard plastic iPod nano cases with your choice of Bart Simpson, SpongeBob SquarePants, Darth Vader, Batman, Scooby Doo, Tweety Bird, and Speed Racer on the front. Five MLB teams (Yankees, Red Sox, Cardinals, Giants, and Angels) would also be available in the separate Iconz Sport series. This struck us as really smart, and of course, all we wanted was for the cases to be as great as the licenses.
As it turns out, the final Iconz cases are pretty close. From an aesthetic standpoint, they score: the front graphics are detailed and very professional, a contrast with the inkjet-quality printed images we've seen on some earlier photo- and art-branded cases. The rear half of each case uses slightly frosted clear plastic, mostly showing off the nano's metal back surface. Because the art wraps around the nano's entire front half, including its Click Wheel, you'll have no clue which color of nano's inside once it's inserted unless you look at the case's bottom, which is in our judgment a good thing – the art considerably dresses up your nano, and transforms its appearance. Better yet, we found the plastic difficult to damage in a way that compromised the case's appearance.
On the protectiveness front, Iconz are good, too: Xtreme provides complete nano front and side protection, and almost complete top and back protection. There's regrettably an oversized hole for the Hold switch, and an uncovered iPod insertion/removal hole at the bottom, a choice the company has made across many of its nano cases. Regardless, our sample Speed Racer case had no problem keeping the nano inside at all times, and the hole at top is used to push the nano out, only the slightest of challenges. The Click Wheel is easy enough to use – not as easy as a matte texture, but fine nevertheless – and the screen is usable, though rendered somewhat prismatic because of the type of plastic used.
The open bottom makes it easy to use any headphone plug or Dock Connector accessory, including Apple's iPod nano Lanyard Headphones, a fact that some people will like more than others. We always prefer the option to pocket our iPods, and Iconz' open bottom and partially open top make this usage less comfortable than we'd prefer. Some people will also be concerned about the lack of a belt clip, detachable or otherwise. Ideally, we think the case could have been a two-piece pop-open design similar to Power Support's Crystal Jacket, with a detachable side-mounting belt clip, but most of the case's target audience will be plenty satisfied with Iconz the way it is. It's a very strong start to the licensed case concept, and because of its licensing, not objectionably priced in our view, either.
Of the three cases, the most protective is MicroGlove ($20), an old-fashioned neoprene sleeve with an Incase-style modernized "mask" front and detachable silver metal carabiner hook. You may recognize most of the design from SportWrap (iLounge rating: A-), an XtremeMac case and armband we've previously reviewed; this case is the same except for its back and bottom.
Each of the five available MicroGlove cases uses the same shiny black neoprene body, changing the color of the 8-shaped front hard rubber mask from purple to blue, green, orange, and red. (SportWrap's version is all-black, which we liked.) Each of the cases has an integrated soft clear screen protector and a matte Click Wheel protector, both of which let you use the nano inside without any hassles. As with SportWrap, though the location of the iPod's top Hold switch isn't marked at all (like it is on Marware's SportSuit Basic (iLounge rating: A-) case), you can easily use it through MicroGlove's fully protective top, a design choice we really prefer to having a hole at the top of the case.
Unfortunately, rather than using a part-time cover for nano's bottom, XtremeMac leaves it entirely open on MicroGlove, something that would be neither practical nor wise if the case wasn't as grippy as it is. For that reason, your nano remains inside without a problem at all times, but its entire bottom is always exposed, which we really don't like – a flap, like the one on Incase's Neoprene Sleeve (iLounge rating: A-) or better yet Marware's SportSuit Basic, would have been smarter here. A small fabric loop dangles off of MicroGlove's bottom right corner, letting you attach the included hook, which we assume will be the main draw for people considering this case: the fully open bottom doesn't lend itself as well to being pocketed or tossed into a bag. Both of these competing cases also include belt clips – Marware's is detachable – which the simple, bare-backed MicroGlove does not.
Overall, we generally liked the look of MicroGlove, but for the same price, we'd be inclined to go with Incase's somewhat more evolved Neoprene Sleeve first on looks, and Marware's SportSuit Basic on protectiveness. This is a solid neoprene option if you plan to use it with the carabiner, but we think the overall design and value proposition is better for the company's armband-equipped SportWrap version of this case.
From the first day we saw rendered images of TuffWrap, we knew we liked its looks – its edgy front, back, and sides were both eye-catching and distinctive at a time when few other rubber cases were taking visual risks. But by the time we actually received it for review, we found it a challenge to rate as high as we'd wanted: first because of unusual pricing, and second, because the case looks better than it protects.
Today, XtremeMac sells TuffWraps in three different three-packs: the white, red, and black one we received; a lavender, gray, and pink pack; and an orange, gray, and lime set. The slightly translucent colors aren't as bright or exciting as the ones the company picked for its earlier iPod shuffle TuffWrapz, but older users may prefer them for that reason. Each set sells for $25, a price that's not cheap – Apple sells five iPod nano Tubes (iLounge rating: B+) for $29 – but also not objectionable. It also sells white TuffWraps for $20 each, which we found equally surprising because of the three-pack's more respectable pricing, and what you're really getting for that $20 price.
Other than the rubber case, each TuffWrap comes with one item: a hard clear screen protector that integrates nicely into the rubber. Both the case and screen protector are easy to put on, use, and take off of the nano. While the screen protector's not perfectly clear, it's a bit better than the hard one used for Iconz and the soft one used for MicroGlove, and a rubberized edge fits safely on the nano's face without causing scratches. We liked it, and think Xtreme picked a pretty good option – film would have worked at least as well, but wouldn't lay flat with the elevated front of the case, as the hard protector does.
But by comparison with other rubber iPod nano cases we've tested, TuffWrap's protective omissions are impossible to ignore. There's no Click Wheel protection (as is found in most nano cases these days), Hold switch protection, or bottom protection. Even Marware's $10 Sport Grip (iLounge rating: B+) comes with Click Wheel film, and its $20 Extreme version (iLounge rating: B) includes an integrated rubber Wheel protector, as does Apple's iPod nano Tube design and many other cases in this category. The simple fact is that we wouldn't use a TuffWrap without an added Wheel protector, and for the same reasons as mentioned with Iconz above, feel uncomfortable with the unnecessarily exposed Hold switch and fully open bottom of this case. Speck's similarly way-too-expensive ToughSkin for iPod nano (iLounge rating: B) at least has big bumpers on its bottom in case your nano falls to the ground; in TuffWrap, the nano is roughly flush with the case's bottom. Additionally, the lack of a belt clip or other clothing attachment solution will also disappoint some people.
In our judgment, TuffWrap is a sharp-looking rubber case design that's unfortunately short of the protection and add-ons we'd expect for the price. As a $20 single case, we'd only recommend it to a limited audience, but as a three-pack for $25, it's a generally recommendable option, especially if you can find friends to buy the case or cases you don't want. Mostly because of their good looks, we really wish that we could have rated both versions higher, and think that added protectiveness will really help the next generation of XtremeMac rubber cases do better than this one.
Our Rating
MicroGlove and TuffWrap 3-Pack
TuffWrap Individual
Company and Price
Company: XtremeMac
Website: www.XtremeMac.com
Model: Iconz, MicroGlove, Tuffwrap (1-pack), Tuffwrap (3-pack)
Price: $20 (MicroGlove, TuffWrap 1-pack), $25 (Iconz and TuffWrap 3-pack)
Compatible: iPod nano


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Perfect for favors, as table decorations, a simple thank you gift and more...finally a gift bag that matches your theme - adding a touch of class and style to your next Christmas event. Check out our amazingly cute Let It Snow - Snowman classic gift bag. This adorable favor box is just what you'll need to put that finishing touch on your holiday event. You'll amaze your friends and family when you present them a gift in this one of a kind classic gift bag done in a snowman design. We've even included an adorable matching gift card and satin ribbon giving your gift bag a classic custom look.
Let It Snow - Snowman - Holiday Party Gift Box:
- Favor Boxes measure: Width 4.75" x Height 7" x Depth 2.25"
- The amount of usable space inside each favor box: Width 4.75" x Height 4.75" x Depth 2.25"
- Favor boxes are shipped flat and are easy to assemble.
- To make each favor box you simply open the ends on the bottom and fold in the flaps.


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Study: Wanting Things Makes Us Happier Than Having Them
An empirical evaluation of materialism -- beware "hedonic decline"
PROBLEM: So let's concede the point that "the very pursuit of happiness thwarts happiness." But what about the pursuit of things? Treating yourself to coveted material goods is guaranteed to make you happy, right?
METHODOLOGY: In three separate studies, Marsha Richins of the University of Missouri scored consumers as rating either "high" or low" for materialism, and then evaluated their emotional state before and after making an "important purchase."
- Journaling After a Breakup Only Makes Things Worse
- Waiting to Have Kids May Reduce Risk of a Type of Breast Cancer
- Another Bad Thing About Fructose
RESULTS: In each study, the reigning materialists anticipated future purchases with strong, positive emotions, much more so than other consumers. Joy, excitement, optimism, and even peacefulness coursed through them regardless of whether they were thinking about buying a house or a toaster, next week or next year.
The materialists were also more likely "to believe that an upcoming purchase would transform their lives in important and meaningful ways." They had faith in their upcoming acquisition's power to improve their relationships, boost their self-esteem, enable them to experience more pleasure, and, of course, be more efficient. The intensity with which they felt the positive emotions was directly related to just how transformative they expected those transformations to be.
But after the purchase was made, and the materialists inevitably adapted to life in possession of said coveted item, what followed was a "hedonic decline," in which their happy feelings dissipated.
CONCLUSION: Although "materialists' perceptions that acquisition brings them happiness appear to have some basis in reality," that happiness is short-lived, Richins concluded. As such, "The state of anticipating and desiring a product may be inherently more pleasurable than product ownership itself."
IMPLICATIONS: Richin's basic theory is that materialists get a small boost of momentary happiness when they acquire something new. But they also get a happy boost just by thinking about getting something new, which happens multiple times throughout the long process of saving up money or waiting for the delivery of an online purchase. Thus, frequent little happy bumps add up to more happiness than the one big, but short-lived burst of pleasure that accompanies acquisition.
Of course, along with the highs come lows -- materialists were also more likely to experience fear and worry over all-important upcoming purchases. At the end of it all, not only are the boosts of happiness over, but materialists are more likely to have credit problems. But they do not, according to this study, experience more buyer's guilt than anyone else.
The full study, "Why Wanting Is Better than Having: Materialism, Transformation Expectations, and Product-Evoked Emotions in the Purchase Process" is published in the Journal of Consumer Research.


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Download our app to schedule your sessions on the go! For iOS and Android.
A Backside 1260 that finishes with a wackknife.


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Welcome to
Associated Podiatrist, LLP!
Since 1968, Associated Podiatrists, LLP, LLP has been working with patients to provide the best podiatric care in the Madison area. Our board certified doctors' experience in podiatry is coupled with genuine concern for their patients. Our staff is dedicated to your comfort and prompt attention. Our goal is to treat foot and ankle ailments and maintain healthy feet.
This web site provides you with an overview of Associated Podiatrists, LLP and the field of podiatry. As you navigate this web site, you'll find information about Associated Podiatrists, LLP., including our practice philosophy, physicians, office locations, insurance policies, and appointment scheduling procedures. Feel free to contact us with any questions. You can also request an appointment by clicking here.
You'll find a lot of valuable information on the web site about foot problems, diagnoses and treatments. We believe informed patients are better prepared to make decisions about their health and well being. We encourage you to review this information to help you understand any of your foot and ankle health concerns.


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The Linux Foundation became a sponsor for the FOSS Outreach Program for Women earlier this year, choosing seven interns to hack on the Linux kernel from June through September. And, the results are in: the intern group ranked among the largest contributors to Linux kernel 3.12.
I asked Lisa Nguyen, one of the seven women interns, what it was like to work full time on the Linux kernel, with Linux developers, remotely for four months. In this interview, Lisa shares with me why she didn't tell anyone she was applying, what surprised her most about hacking on the kernel, and why she gets up in the morning hungry for more.
The FOSS Outreach Program for Women is sponsored by the GNOME Foundation: mentorships are available any time and internships every four months. Each intern recieves a $5,000 stipend and $500 travel voucher to attend a conference. To see a list of organizations that will participate in Round 7, go to the wiki.
Did you talk to a friend or mentor about applying to the Outreach Program for Women internship?
I didn't say anything to anyone until after I applied for the FOSS OPW program. It wasn't my intention to keep it a secret, but I spent so much time reassuring myself that I had something to offer as a potential Linux kernel intern. There were many times when I thought, "Well, maybe I'm not good enough so why bother?" Then the next day I thought, "What do I have to lose if I don't try?" It was annoying to have conflicting thoughts for days. Eventually, I told myself that I wanted to improve my current situation, so I went for it.
What surprised you about the Linux kernel?
- I haven't been treated differently because I'm a woman. The kernel community is friendly as long as you read documentation, ask specific questions, have patience, and accept feedback from others. I haven't been told to "RTFM" or discouraged from sending multiple versions of my patchsets.
- The amount of email that a Linux kernel maintainer gets is insane. Recently, I noticed one maintainer's inbox full of 27,000+ unread emails, and that alone made me appreciate and respect all maintainers even more. For those who wonder why it takes days before their patches get reviewed, this could be a very good reason, so please be patient.
- Everything takes time. Really. I've been told that it may take years for one person to master one subsystem out of hundreds. The kernel can be very overwhelming for anyone, and it's important to start small. Doing simple cleanup fixes has helped me understand code better over time.
- The code that I saw in the Linux kernel contradicted what I learned in school. In school I was forced to avoid using goto statements, yet I saw them everywhere in the kernel!
What was your previous knowledge of the Linux kernel? Of open source software?
My knowledge of the Linux kernel was through a textbook in my operating systems class. That's it. I had no hands-on experience with the kernel since I was a Windows user.
My knowledge of open source software was very limited back then. I only knew some open source software by their names, such as LibreOffice and Ubuntu, from friends who have used them, yet I didn't bother to look more into it at the time. My knowledge in Linux didn't expand until two years ago when I took my first Intro to Linux course and became a Linux user since then.
What does open source mean to you?
One word: collaboration.
It's amazing to see people coming together from all over the world to create products and services that will benefit everyone, and Linux does that. Every contributor has a voice in the open source community. Some people might take criticism more personally than others, and some people may get into debates for weeks or months, but that is to be expected. If everyone agreed on everything in seconds, I'd be worried. As much I prefer to stick to my own coding style, I won't dismiss another person's opinion to use a ternary operator in a return statement to save one line of code.
What keeps you hungry in software development? What's your dream job?
Being around inspiring people who respect me as a person.
I felt like I won the jackpot when I scored a job as a software engineer at Linaro not long ago, which I'll be starting in mid-November. For me to be hired and mentored by Kevin Hilman, a well-known ARM kernel maintainer, was more than I expected. I get to work full-time remotely and travel around the world as a part of my job. Everyone I met at Linaro Connect in Santa Clara, CA, including the VP of Engineering and the COO of Linaro were fun to talk to. I couldn't be more excited to land this wonderful dream job. Talk about being mindblown.
Do you have a mentor or friend who inspires you?
Many people inspire me!
My love of science started when I was in second grade, and it was taught by a female science teacher who made the subject sound exciting! Also, I woke up early as a kid to watch Mr. Wizard's World at 6:00am every morning before school. I thought it was awesome to watch a group of boys and girls perform scientific experiments with Don Herbert. I didn't see any discrimination there!
During my childhood, my aunt Cindy used to work as a network administrator. I thought what she did looked so cool that I wanted to be like her. Cindy taught me how to type when I was nine years old, and I shadowed her at her old workplace multiple times. My parents bought a mini computer for me that I played with everyday after school. I took Cisco Networking courses during my senior year in high school, and they were taught by a female instructor with a CCNA. It wasn't until college that I started noticing how the computer science field was male-dominated. I came from a place where gender didn't matter. Everyone had equal opportunity in my mind, and I was confused to figure out why many men hesitated to work on a group project with me. Did they think I had cooties? I'm not sure.
When I applied for the FOSS OPW program, the mentors provided a safe hacking space for someone like me who had never worked on the Linux kernel before. In the beginning, I found out that some applicants had Masters degrees, were long-term Linux users, and bragged about their accomplishments. I immediately thought, "Oh no, I don't have a chance now." I felt depressed for a few days until I chose to make myself stand out from the rest. I stopped thinking about how everyone else seemed more qualified, and before I knew it, I became one of the most memorable women in our IRC. I thanked every single person who gave me feedback and helped me troubleshoot issues. I said Hi to everyone whenever I logged into the IRC. These simple gestures made a huge difference, and I walked away with new friends and trust from multiple Linux kernel maintainers.
To give back to the Linux community, I volunteered as a session coordinator at LinuxCon North America last September for two days and networked with The Linux Foundation staff. Right now, I'm helping mentors review patches and answer questions from new OPW kernel applicants who applied for this winter round. It feels so good to put in my Reviewed-by tags, especially when I've only done kernel development since last May. Whenever I have a question, I have many Linux kernel maintainers, Linux users, and Linux loving friends to ask for a second opinion.
What is your take on women in tech?
There can never be enough women in tech.
I feel sad when I meet women who are unable to overcome their bad experiences in math and science, and they automatically assume that I was born with a special talent, which is completely false. Technical information is still difficult for me to understand, yet I developed a strategy to translate technical terms into my own words so they would stick in my brain. I was discouraged often to become a computer scientist in the past. Either I could let bad experiences haunt me and let critical people dictate my life, or I can continue encouraging more women to pursue a career in a STEM field. If I can be social and technical at the same time, then any woman can. I had people who didn't believe that I was a computer science major because I sounded like an average person who didn't fit into any geeky stereotypes.
What was your favorite subject in school and why?
I've always loved math because it allowed me to use my problem solving skills. I've been mistaken as a math major many times, and it still happens occasionally. I used to obsess about certain math problems that I couldn't easily solve, and they'd be on my mind wherever I went. If I ate dinner with a friend at a restaurant, I wrote steps down with a pen on napkins. I used to work as a math and computer science tutor at multiple colleges for years as well.
If it wasn't math, then it was art. I skipped a lot of lunch periods in high school to draw big portraits in charcoal and pastel in the art room, so I could be in touch with my creative side.
Are hobbies important?
I am a bingo fiend. Yes, I hang out with the elderly at the bingo halls sometimes, and they share the most interesting life stories. They've inspired me to take risks because life is too short. Cliche as it sounds, it's true. It's very important to maintain other interests, especially some non-technical ones, to feel more balanced.
Lately, I've been losing sleep from listening to piano versions of my favorite songs on YouTube, but music relaxes me. I still doodle every now and then and laugh at silly jokes with friends. I must have a clear mind before I dive into the kernel.


text: When Rachel Carson wrote her famous book Silent Spring, she envisioned a world in which chemical pollutants killed off wildlife, to the extent that singing birds could no longer be heard. Pesticides aside, we now know that humans have challenged birds with another type of pollution, which also threatens to silence their beautiful songs – noise. A man-made world is a loud one. Between the din of cities and the commotion of traffic, we flood our surroundings with a chronic barrage of sound. This is bad news for songbirds. We know that human noise is a problem for them because some species go to great lengths to make themselves heard, from changing their pitch (great tits) to singing at odd hours (robins) to just belting their notes out (nightingales). We also know that some birds produce fewer chicks in areas affected by traffic noise. Now, Julia Schroeder from the University of Sheffield has found one reason for this. She has shown that loud noises mask the communication between house sparrow mothers and their chicks, including the calls that the youngsters use to beg for food. Surrounded by sound, the chicks eat poorly. "City noise has the potential to turn sparrow females into bad mothers," says Schroeder. Her work is important because it shows how exactly man-made noise could affect birds. Only a handful of other studies have done this. We know that house finches spend so much effort on making themselves heard that their songs are shorter, and thus less sexy. Zebra finches fail to hear their partners' calls, eroding the bonds between otherwise monogamous mates. There are other possibilities: noise could stop birds from proclaiming their territories or warning of danger. Schroeder cut through the competing hypotheses by studying a unique group of sparrows living in Lundy Island, a small body of land in the Bristol Channel, England. Sparrows are short-distance fliers so the Lundy population is fairly self-contained, and scientists have been studying them for 12 years. They know every individual, and have tracked them through their entire lifespan. Eggs are regularly swapped between nest boxes, so parent birds become unknowing surrogates for unrelated chicks. These "cross-fostering" experiments allow scientists to tease apart the influence of the sparrow's environment from that of their parentage. In March 2001, a set of electrical generators were switched on in the island. They run continuously from 6 am to 9 pm, and produce 70 decibels of noise – about as much as a rowdy primary school classroom. You have to speak up to be heard. Schroeder compared a set of sparrow nest boxes within this zone of noise to those at three distant quiet zones. The noise wasn't obviously harming the parent birds. It didn't affect how many eggs the females laid, how intently they attended to their clutch, or how much they weighed. And the nestboxes near the generators attracted birds or all ages and from all walks of sparrow life, so it wasn't the case that the fittest birds took up the quiet real estate and left the noisy dregs for the weaker ones. For the chicks, it was a different story. They had a 25 per cent chance of living long enough to fledge if they lives in a quiet environment, but just a 21 per cent chance if they lived in a loud one – a small but significant difference. Those that survived weighed less if they lived in noisy neighbourhoods. This might be because, as Schroeder found, mother birds visited their chicks less often and provided them with less food. Schroeder acknowledges that she only looked at nest boxes in one noisy site, which may differ from the quiet ones in ways that have nothing to do with noise. However, she thinks that this is unlikely, since noisy nests were just as far from the sparrows' feeding grounds as the quieter ones. And any widespread problem, like exhaust pollution, would have affected the parent birds as well as the chicks – Schroeder found that only the chicks were affected. "If what we suggest takes place in cities too, it is likely to play an important role in the sparrow population dynamic, and is probably one cause of the dramatic population crash that we are currently observing," says Schroeder. Indeed, even though the house sparrow has spread to cities all over the world, it has started to disappear in Western Europe and North America. There are probably many reasons for this decline, but parental care is one of them. In a recent study, Gabor Seress from the University of Pannonia, Hungary, found that suburban sparrows provide their young with less food than rural birds, and the chicks grow smaller as a result. Schroeder's study suggests that chronic noise could contribute to this difference. She now wants to work out exactly why the chicks get less food amid the generators' hubbub. Maybe the parents can't hear them begging. Maybe the chicks don't beg enough because they can't hear their parents return (their eyesight is poor at an early age). Maybe the noise drives off potential insect prey. "It will be interesting to compare stress hormone levels of parent birds and chicks from nestboxes in the noisy area, with those breeding elsewhere," she says. "It would be interesting to experiment with noise-insulated nest-boxes." (I wrote about how birds cope with noise for New Scientist years ago, so have a look at the feature (PDF) for some background.) Reference: Schroeder, Nakagawa, Cleasby & Burke. 2012. Passerine Birds Breeding under Chronic Noise Experience Reduced Fitness. PLoS ONE citation tbc Image by David Lofink


text:
CRS: Armenia's Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications for U.S. Interests, June 8, 2007
From WikiLeaks
About this CRS report
This document was obtained by Wikileaks from the United States Congressional Research Service.
The CRS is a Congressional "think tank" with a staff of around 700. Reports are commissioned by members of Congress on topics relevant to current political events. Despite CRS costs to the tax payer of over $100M a year, its electronic archives are, as a matter of policy, not made available to the public.
Individual members of Congress will release specific CRS reports if they believe it to assist them politically, but CRS archives as a whole are firewalled from public access.
This report was obtained by Wikileaks staff from CRS computers accessible only from Congressional offices.
For other CRS information see: Congressional Research Service.
For press enquiries, consult our media kit.
If you have other confidential material let us know!.
For previous editions of this report, try OpenCRS.
Wikileaks release: February 2, 2009
Publisher: United States Congressional Research Service
Title: Armenia's Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications for U.S. Interests
CRS report number: RS22675
Author(s): Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Date: June 8, 2007
- Abstract
- This report discusses the campaign and results of Armenia's May 12, 2007, legislative election and examines implications for Armenian and U.S. interests. Many observers viewed the election as marking some democratization progress. The Republican Party of Armenia increased its number of seats to a near-majority and termed the results as a mandate on its policies. The party leader, Prime Minister Serzh Sargisyan, was widely seen as gaining stature as a possible candidate in the upcoming 2008 presidential election.
- Download


text:
The Stats: UnderworldAbandon
is the second book to Meg Cabot's series. It hits shelves May 8.
The Gist: When we last let Pierce, she just found out that is was her grandmother that's been trying to kill her and John Hayden, aka the keeper of the dead, is her only hope for safety. John more or less kidnaps her and keeps in the Underworld. While there, Pierce learns more about John's past and the people who share his dark domain. She realizes however that despite the fact John is keeping her safe in his world, it's her family back on Earth that's in danger now.
Our favorite part...we loved it when John and his friends crashed the Mardi Gras Festival. Fun instances are guarenteed any time misplaced citizens of the Underworld try to act normal at a modern day party.
More From Seventeen
You'll love it if...you're a fan of Meg Cabot's witty style and her characters' hopeless romantic whims.


text:
To enter, contestants need to produce an original 3D animation using a trial version or a full version of the iPi Soft Motion Capture software, and send a link to the animated video to firstname.lastname@example.com.
Please provide brief description which motions were captured with iPi Mocap.
Read the complete competition terms and conditions.


text:
Kiki Sprinkles
IT'S SHOW TIME | PEACHY PINK + NEON RED - Cake Topper
Regular price $14.00
Shipping calculated at checkout.
Our large acrylic number cake toppers will get the party started.
Featuring white 3D detailing for some extra flair, this cake topper will be the total icing on your cake.
For some extra fun, pair with a number of our cake topper collection and take your celebration to the next level!
Topper lengths (including stake) approx 14.5cm
Topper width approx 4.5cm
-widths will vary slightly depending on chosen number-
Each and every cake topper are hand made, small variances all add to their magical charm and make each one your very own.
Cake toppers are to be wiped clean with a damp cloth only. Do not submerge in water.
YAY! Being made from a light weight acrylic, your cake toppers can be used again and again! The perfect addition to your party collection.
NOTE: Not recommended for under 3 years of age


text:
James uses a number of different repositories to both store message data (email, news messages) and user information. User repositories store user information, including user names, authentication information, and aliases. Mail repositories store messages that have been delivered locally. Spool repositories store messages that are still being processed. Finally, news repositories are used to store news messages.
Aside from the type of data they store, repositories are distinguished by where they store data. There are three types of storage - File, Database, and DBFile.
File-based repositories store all data in the file system. In general, these repositories are extremely simple to configure, but may compare poorly in terms of performance when compared to other repository types. File repositories are not recommended for large or performance-critical configurations. In the default configuration, all repositories are file repositories.
File repository paths typically begin with the prefix "file". Paths are relative to the application base directory, unless the path begins with a slash. As an example, assume that James is running in /usr/james/phoenix/apps/james. Then "file://var/mail/spool/" would refer to the directory /usr/james/phoenix/apps/james/var/mail/spool. And "file:///var/mail/spool/" (note the extra '/') would refer to the directory /var/mail/spool.
All repository types (mail, spool, user, and news) have file-based implementations. No special configuration is required to enable file-based repositories
Database repositories store all data in an administrator-supplied database. Configuration is somewhat more complex, requiring that the administrator adjust the data-connections section. Detailed directions are included in the sample configuration file. The administrator will need to know the JDBC driver class, the appropriate URL for use with his database, and a valid username/password for the database.
If the administrator wants to configure a database other than MySQL, it will be necessary to add the jar or zip file containing the JDBC driver classes to the lib subdirectory of the installation directory. This will allow Phoenix to properly load the driver when it is initializing the database repository. The MySQL driver is pre-packaged with James.
Database repository paths typically begin with the prefix "db". The format is "db://<data-source>/<table>" where <data-source> is the name of the data-source defined in the data-connections section. And <table> is the particular table associated with the repository.
Mail, spool, and user repositories have JDBC-based implementations.
This is a special repository type used only for mail repositories. DBFile repositories store the body of a mail message in the file system, while headers are stored in the database. This allows the administrator to minimize the size of data stored in the database, while conserving most of the performance of the database repository.
Only mail repositories have dbfile-based implementations.


text:
Restorative Dentistry
Laser Decay Diagnosis
Realizing that as many as 50% of the potential cavities are missed by the old poke and probe method, Dr. Briggs switched to the completely painless Diagnodent® decay detector. Using technology, the decay diagnosis is made with a special laser designed to not hurt you, your teeth, or your gums. It finds even the smallest decay in your mouth.
In the past, x-ray technology and dental probe needles were the only way for dentists to find cavities. Unfortunately, both methods required the decayed area to be fairly large to be noticed by x-rays, and to be confirmed with the diagnosis needle (as shown in the first image). The Diagnodent® decay detector is a blessing for dentists and patients alike, which will prevent unnecessary pain, costs, time, and anxiety.
The small Diagnodent® laser works by emitting a harmless laser on the surface of teeth, which measures differences in tissue structure on teeth. When small cavities are detected, the Diagnodent® laser provides an audio cue, and a scaled number of the size of the cavity (as shown in the second image). A great advantage of this early detection method is that tiny cavities can be corrected before they become a problem, which saves you money. This new laser decay diagnosis device is the perfect tool to quickly evaluate the health of any patients' teeth.
You can be assured that you are receiving the right care when you come to Briggs Family Dentistry, where no cavity will be undetected.