text:
Lauren Jakubowicz
Lauren Jacubowicz is currently attending New York University School of Law
I graduated from Washington College a semester early with a double major in Philosophy and International Studies. Though I always planned on going directly to law school, my eyes were opened after my study abroad experience and I knew that I wanted to continue working a bit more before I started school again.
I have always had a passion for international current events and human rights, and am so grateful that I am working in a field that deals with those issues. While at Washington College I was a member of AOII, Omicron Delta Kappa, Order of Omega and Phi Sigma Tau. I was also the President of the Philosophy Club, Washington College Democrats, and student editor of our Philosophy Journal, Apeiron. In my spare time I love to work out and enjoy the outdoors.
My goal is not to live forever, but to create something that will.
Campus Involvement
- Majors: International Studies and Philosophy
- Concentration: Western Europe/European Union
- Languages: Intermediate Spanish; planning to learn Russian
Study Abroad
A part of the Hansard Scholar's Program I was given an outstanding opportunity to learn at the heart of the British political system. During the Fall of 2009, I studied at London School of Economics and assisted British MP of Crosby, Claire Curtis-Thomas as a Research Intern. This experience was phenomenal, and I will never forget walking the halls of the House of Commons and Lords and sitting in on weekly Prime Minister's Questions. My projects included acting as head researcher and organizer of the `Top Shelf' campaign and assistant to the `Sierra Leone Book Campaign.' My responsibilities included formal reports, an official survey, press releases, meetings with Ministers, the Metropolitan Police Authority, and other MPs.
Future plans? I graduated from Washington College a semester early, though I plan to walk with the Class of 2010 in May, and am currently working as a paralegal at Maggio + Kattar, L.C. in Washington, D.C. The firm is an immigration law firm representing individual foreign nationals and a select group of Fortune 500 and other companies as well as non-profits, universities and diverse institutions across the nation and around the world. The work I do includes drafting letters and correspondence to current clients, corporations, and the United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, and tracking, organizing and researching on current pending cases. I am currently studying for the LSATs which I will take in June and October, and plan to enter law school in the Fall of 2011 to study international and immigration law.


text:
Forum Post: Economic Democracy, Not Austerity or Keynesian "Growth" By Richard Wolff
Posted 8 years ago on May 11, 2012, 10:30 p.m. EST by PeterKropotkin
from Oakland, CA
This content is user submitted and not an official statement
Recent defeats of Dutch, Greek and French governing parties show rising opposition to their austerity policies. Across Europe and North America, similar oppositions mount. Bailing out large financial and other corporations with borrowed money has been the almost universal government plan for coping with global capitalist crisis. The result - rising government deficits and debts - was followed by "austerity policies" to reduce those deficits and debts. After suffering a crisis and then bailouts that bypassed them to favor major corporations, people now face austerity cutbacks of government jobs and services to offset the bailouts' costs. As opposition mounts, will it seek Keynesian "growth" or go beyond capitalism to economic democracy?
Keynesianism (expansionary state economic intervention) never was capitalists' preferred policy for capitalism's recurring recessions and depressions. Their Plan A was government borrowing to bail out major financial and other corporations followed by "austerity policies." Austerity repays the costs of bailouts by siphoning money away from (cutting) government jobs and services. Only when anti-capitalist movements threaten from below, as in the 1930s, do anxious capitalists abandon Plan A and shift to Plan B - eventually formalized as Keynesianism. Via government spending, Keynesian policies claim credit for jobs and income "growth" and aim to keep political control away from anti-capitalist forces. Keynesianism's dependence on radicals' pressure from below explains its strength in the 1930s versus its weakness today.
Capitalists prefer austerity for many reasons. Because universal suffrage allows politics to undo capitalism's consequences such as unequal wealth, income and power distributions, capitalists worry about how far universal suffrage will go. Majorities may, during crises, reject bailouts and austerity. The Greek and French just did. They may then demand Keynesian "growth" via government jobs and income and wealth redistribution. Or they may demand transition beyond capitalism to democratize their economies by socializing means of production, planning the economy and transforming enterprises into self-directed worker collectives. No wonder that conservative mainstream economics (so-called "neoclassical economics") celebrates capitalism as a self-healing system requiring no government intervention.
Keynesianism also frustrates crisis mechanisms that discipline workers to capitalists' advantage. Rising unemployment makes worried jobholders accept reduced wages, benefits and job security: good news for employers. As falling wages reduce costs for surviving capitalists, they anticipate rising profit opportunities. They will then invest, renewing growth and prosperity. That's how most capitalists prefer to "let the market work through" economic crises. In contrast, Keynesian government spending lessens unemployment and thus slows or prevents falling wages, benefits etc. It also usually requires increased state borrowing, money supply and/or taxes on capitalists and the rich. They oppose such tax increases, balk at lending to ever-more-indebted governments and worry about inflationary risks posed by money supply increases. "Austerity policies" (capitalists' Plan A) aim to pay for bailouts while reducing government deficits. They may also include some state charity for the worst victims of crisis. Republicans and Democrats (or, in Europe, conservatives and social democrats) squabble over how much charity to provide alongside the austerity they impose. Keynesianism is capitalists' Plan B when radicalized and organized workers demand systematic entitlement, not charity, and threaten capitalism itself. In the US during the 1930s, successful mass unionization by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and mass radicalization by socialist and communist parties built social movements with strong anti-capitalist components. In response, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) offered a deal. Instead of austerity, he would provide unprecedented government services to people (today perhaps called a "growth" plan). He would establish the Social Security and unemployment compensation systems and create and fill over 12 million federal jobs for the unemployed. Despite three times today's level of unemployment and a worse federal budget crisis, FDR funded greatly expanded government public services. Obama plans to reduce Social Security and never mentions a federal hiring program. Capitalism then faced a powerful threat from below; today it does not (yet). FDR funded his deal by taxing corporations and the rich and partly by borrowing from them (the lesser evil for them). Many of them agreed because they, too, feared the anti-capitalist opposition. FDR persuaded most of the left, in exchange for expanded state services and jobs, to downplay anti-capitalism. Many abandoned "socialism" as a goal; some redefined it to be what FDR proposed. FDR's deal built an alliance that won four consecutive presidential elections. Keynesianism - the formalized theory and policies drawn from John Maynard Keynes' work in 1930s Britain - developed after FDR's deal. It prompted a revised understanding of the Great Depression. Attention shifted away from how anti-capitalist and working-class pressure from below reoriented FDR's policies. Instead, smart economists and astute politicians were depicted using Keynes' "brilliant new economics" to moderate, manage and exit capitalist crises.
After 1945, corporations and the rich still supported Keynesian government spending (they feared depression's return), but they got reduced taxes for themselves. They also got some shift in government expenditures from social services to more capitalist-friendly defense and infrastructural improvements. Keynesians also mostly joined neoclassical economists in dismissing Marx's anti-capitalist economics. Capitalism's crises, they insisted, were well understood and managed (by Keynesianism). They were mere temporary blips punctuating capitalism's prosperous growth. Anti-capitalism was theoretically outmoded and politically suspect in cold war times. Keynesian economics was, for enthusiasts, superior to the mainstream orthodoxy that had always endorsed austerity policies for crises. Keynesianism became the new orthodoxy from the 1930s to the 1970s. Then, a capitalist boom returned dominance to neoclassical economics (renamed neoliberalism). Even after the 2007 crisis hit, Keynesians (e.g., Paul Krugman) have so far failed to regain policy-making dominance
The "great" debate between neoclassical and Keynesian economists is neither great nor much of a debate. Both sides endorse, celebrate and defend capitalism. Their "debate" - between Plans B and A, more or less government intervention to sustain capitalism - periodically revives as a substitute for seriously engaging with critical economic theories, anti-capitalist social movements and their demands for economic democracy. The debate between austerity and growth policies is a sideshow for the main event: capitalism's weakening battles with its own contradictions and with looming demands for transition beyond capitalism to economic democracy

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Table of Contents | Previous | Next
March 2007
Dear Colleague:
Keeping America competitive is one of our top priorities as a nation. Our success depends on making sure we have an educated citizenry and an educated workforce, and at the Department of Education we are committed to ensuring America's high school graduates are ready for the jobs of the 21st century. As President George W. Bush has said, "Our greatest advantage in the world has always been our educated, hardworking, ambitious people - and we're going to keep that edge."
America's rapidly changing economy requires an education system that ensures that all individuals, including individuals with disabilities, graduate from high school with the skills they need to be successful in postsecondary education and the workforce. The 2004 reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) called for states to set measurable targets for the progress of students with disabilities. Together with the No Child Left Behind Act, the IDEA is holding schools accountable for making sure students with disabilities achieve to high standards.
Employers know that hiring qualified, loyal employees is the cornerstone of sustained success. We are committed to preparing skilled youths and adults with disabilities to successfully attain and sustain quality employment and become contributing members of their communities.
A successful outcome depends on working closely with employers to understand and meet their recruiting, hiring and retention needs. Toward that end, I am pleased to share with you the latest update of Disability Employment 101, originally developed by OSERS and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for a Competitive Workforce, formerly the Center for Workforce Preparation. This popular publication has proven to be a helpful resource for employers who want to stay competitive by hiring the best people.
We look forward to continued partnerships with employers to meet America's goals of gainful employment for all and a leading position in the global marketplace.
Margaret Spellings
Our mission is to ensure equal access to education and
to promote educational excellence throughout the nation.


text:
I plan on building one sometimes soon. I have 1 real nice GI barrels to go with this kit, only bad thing is it's a metric. Most all FN Fal or fun to build.
Is anyone building an L1A1 from one of the kits available recently?
I plan on building one sometimes soon. I have 1 real nice GI barrels to go with this kit, only bad thing is it's a metric. Most all FN Fal or fun to build.
Where did you get your receiver?
The place I ordered from still has me on hold, they keep telling me that it will be at least next month before they can get it to me.
I'm building on a L1A1 kit now. i was unable to obtain a inch pattern receiver. so I got a DS Arms Type 1 metric reciever & and a metric barrel I plan to send the receiver & barrel to Enterprise Arms for their metric to inch conversion work, modify the gas port on the barrel for the inch gas block & sight and also have them install the barrel & headspace. and finish the rest myself. The receiver, piston, trigger group,muzzle brake,charging handle, Ds Arms new Walnut Furniture Set, magazine floor plate will be my compliance parts with a gunkote finish when i'm done
I like the looks of the inch gas system with the open ears, I also like the inch magazine better than the metric. i have both. it was no problem getting the gas sytem off the cut barrel and the gas port lines up with the metric barrel looks like a little bit of drill work for the port angle
Not quite. There is a groove in the bbl, a washer secured by a crosspin holds the washer in the groove, locking it from turning. Drive out the pin, remove the washer, and unscrew the FH. IIRC the inch pattern rifles have a RH thread, but I haven't messed with one in 15 years so I may be wrong on that.
Yes, the L1A1 is RH threads. You can use a metric barrel if you have the muzzle redone for the FH. Check, but I think the angled metric gasport will work fine with the L1A1 gasblock. Unless you need to drill it bigger.
I have several L1A1 builds going at the moment. I was lucky enough to hoard a few kits back when they were plentiful. I use nothing but Entreprise L1A1 receivers too.
At least on my Aussie builds.
For my Brits I'm going to have to get creative....


text:
Friday, March 9, 2012
{ this moment }
7 comments:
Visiting from Soulemama~ oh, I love your photos! I also want to share that I had a delicious lunch at my (small) town's first ever vegan cafe ("Vegg Out") with a friend yesterday. It was food that truly nourished my soul (I am not vegan). Here's our moment:ReplyDelete
Yeah for huge paper! We di that too, on the kitchen floor. I like to use painters tape to keep the paper down. How old is your little one? She's doing a great job exploring the medium!ReplyDelete
love the huge sheets of paper for painting!ReplyDelete
We do a lot of that over here too. Want to get together for a play date...if you happen to be in Wyoming?ReplyDelete
Hey Hen thanks for visiting my blog! Vegan food is delicious, even for the non-vegans :PReplyDelete
KC Leeluu is 3 1/2. She is pretty steady with her hands, I was surprised the other day I came over to the table and noticed that she was coloring in the lines!
Maria...That would be AMAZING!! I have yet to hang out with any bloggie friends. Dare to dream.
Too fun!!ReplyDelete
Nothing quite like a big canvas to bring out joy and super-duper work just like this. I really need to do exactly this more often.ReplyDelete


text:
lolo Burn Is A Real Running Trainer
I personally love fitness training apps, especially the ones that tell me what to do at all times. My problem when working out, and this is especially true with running, is that I always want to stop. I can use RunKeeper all day, but after I get past mile 2-3, I start losing interest fast.
lolo Burn is the first running trainer that I know of that not only tracks your progress on a treadmill, but also talks to you along the way. it tells you, in a nice, calm voice (voiced by a real person named Britani, not a scary computer voice) that you need to run for X number of minutes of X speed and X incline. The lolo voice doesn't quite have the motivational skills that my old soccer coach possessed, but I also don't have to be afraid of balls being thrown at my head.
For a bit of extra push, lolo Burn also includes 24 fitness tracks (you can also use your own music) that matches beats with your running pace. The built in music is the typical stuff that you would expect to hear in a Lifetime Fitness aerobics class, but if that's your thing then you are set.
Pick up lolo Burn today for $4.99 at your local App Store, and enjoy your run!


text:
Choose your room
Check-in & rooms available from 17.00 hrs.Full English Breakfast served from 07.15 hrs until 09.00 hrs daily.Latest Check-In time strictly 22.00hrs.Award winning family run Guest House. Large Garden ,Outdoor/indoor Swimming Pool . luxury hot tub,sauna.PRIVATE CAR PARK.Easy Motorway Access.Ground Floor Rooms. Golf & Horse Riding Facilities Nearby.Ideal Position For Channel Tunnel Terminal and Cruise Terminal.Within Easy Reach of London,Folkestone, Dover & Canterbury.Ideal Location For Walkers & Cyclists. Packed Lunches available if ordered. Contractors & Motorcyclists Welcome. Washing Facilities. Long & Short Term Accommodation. Beautiful Draped Four Poster Bed.Guests are invited to relax in our beautiful conservatory overlooking the pool and garden.Completely non-smoking establishment.Bring your Laptop as Wireless internet connection available for the very reasonable price of £5 per day. A HOLIDAY WITH A DIFFERENCE. DO YOU FEEL LIKE YOU WOULD LIKE A HOLIDAY WITH MORE OF A KICK TO IT? ARE YOU LOOKING FOR A SECOND INCOME, OR JUST MORE UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE ? WHY NOT TAKE A HOLIDAY WITH US AT GARDEN LODGE AND AS WELL AS ENJOYING OUR POOL AND BEAUTIFUL GARDEN WHY NOT TAKE ONE OF OUR PROFESSIONALLY RUN COURSES WHICH INCLUDE:- FIVE DAY HANDS ON HYPNOTHERAPY TRAINING. NEURO-LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING. LIFE-COACHING COURSES. REIKI.. WORKSHOPS RUN THROUGHOUT THE YEAR ALL TUTORS AND THERAPISTS ARE FULLY INSURED AND REGISTERED. CONTACT US FOR ALL DETAILS AND PRICES OF COURSES AND ACCOMMODATION.


text:
Rizzy Home Platoon Collection New Zealand Wool Blend 5'x8' Red (PLAPL086600700508)
About this product
Designed for transitional and contemporary decor, the Rizzy Home Platoon collection features both stripes and solid color schemes. An array of colors drawn from earth to jewel tones is carefully chosen to complement today's trendy styles. The Platoon collection is hand-loomed in India by master craftsmen using New Zealand wool to provide long-lasting durability and resiliency. The dense looped pile is then hand-carved to add dimensional depth and unique subtle designs that bring beauty and warmth to your home. Committed to excellence, the Rizzy Home team brings together talent, knowledge and passion to create an unparalleled reputation within the home furnishings industry. With a wide assortment of product choice and combinations, Rizzy Home is making it easier than ever for clients to create homes and interior spaces that are honest expressions of their true personalities.
- Hand-Loomed, India
- Pattern: Border
- Area Rug
- Ultra Dense Construction
- Resists Unsightly Crushing From Furniture
- Hand Serged in Matching Wool
- Stands Up to Daily Wear & Tear Extremely Well
- Professional Cleaning Recommended


text:
Paper presented at the 7th Annual Roundtable in Philosophy of Social Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, March 11-13 2005.
"There must be a minimal degree of trust in communication for language and action to be more than stabs in the dark"
Sissela Bok, Lying
"Mais qu'y a-t-il donc de si périlleux dans le fait que les gens parlent, et leurs discours indéfiniment prolifèrent?"
Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours
"I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience"
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty
Consider this case. At high-school in Italy many years ago I heard my teacher of Latin say: "Cicero's prose is full of synecdoches"[1]. I had a vague idea of what a synecdoche was, and ignored until then that one could characterize Cicero's writing in this way. Nevertheless, I relied on my teacher's intellectual authority to acquire the belief that Cicero's prose is full of synecdoches, and today have a more precise idea of what my teacher was talking about. Was I justified in any sense in uncritically accepting that pronouncement by deferring to my teacher's authority? Let us have a closer look at the example. Many things were going on in this apparently trivial case of belief acquisition. I was sitting in a classroom, aware of being in a social institution – school- dedicated to knowledge transmission, and I had been properly instructed to believe what people say in school. While listening to the teacher, I was simultaneously learning a fact, that Cicero's prose was full of synecdoches, and acquiring a linguistic concept, that is, the word "synecdoche" (or, if not acquiring it, at least acquiring a rule about its appropriate use, or, better, enriching its meaning). I was learning a fact and learning a language meaning at the same time. My reliance on Italian educational institutions was strong enough to accept this on pure deferential bases.
Or consider another example. I was born in Milan on February 8th 1967. I believe this is true because the office of Vital Records in the Milan Municipal Building registered few days after that date the testimony of my father or my mother that I was indeed born on the 8th of February in a hospital in Milan, and delivered a birth certificate with this date on it. This fact concerns me, and of course I was present, but I can access it only through this complex, institution-mediated form of indirect testimony.
Or else: I know that smoking causes cancer, I've been told this and it was enough relevant information for me to make me quit cigarettes 10 years ago. I don't have the slightest idea of the physiological process that a smoker's body undergoes from inhaling smoke to developing a cellular process that ends in cancer. Nevertheless, the partial character of my understanding of what it really means that smoke causes cancer doesn't refrain me to state it in conversations and to rule my behavior according to this belief.
Our cognitive life is pervaded with partially understood, poorly justified, beliefs. The greater part of our knowledge is acquired from other's people spoken or written words. The floating of other people's words in our minds is the price we pay for thinking. Traditional epistemology warns us of the risks of uncritically relying on other people's authority in acquiring new beliefs. One could view the overall project of classical epistemology - from Plato to the contemporary rationalist perspectives on knowledge - as a normative enterprise aiming at protecting us from credulity and ill-founded opinions. Various criteria, rules and principles on how to conduct our mind have been put forward as a guarantee to preserve the autonomy and freedom of thought necessary to the acquisition of knowledge. Just as an example, a great part of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding is an attempt to establish principles of regulation of opinions, stated in terms of obligations on one's own "epistemic conduct", that strengthen our intellectual autonomy. According to Locke, four major sources of false opinions threaten our mind:
I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles
II. Received hypotheses
III. Predominant passions or inclinations
IV. Authority
(Locke, Essay, Book 4, XX, 7)
Reliance on other people's authority is thus viewed as a major threat to the cognitive autonomy that distinguishes us as rational thinkers. Exposure to received beliefs increases our risk of being "infected by falsity", the worst danger against which the overall epistemological enterprise was built.
Yet, the massive trust of others that permeates our cognitive life calls for an epistemic treatment, and has become a central issue in contemporary debates in philosophy of knowledge and social epistemology. A number of approaches have been put forward in order to account for the epistemic reliability of the "division of cognitive labour" so typical in contemporary, information-dense societies.
Most analyses that have been recently proposed in social epistemology, concentrate on the evidential grounds for trusting other people's authority: Trusting someone's authority on a given matter means assessing her trustworthiness on that matter. Trustworthiness depends on both competence and benevolence. In order to assess other people's trustworthiness one needs evidential criteria of their competence and their benevolence. For example, a scientist who trusts the authority of a colleague on a certain experimental data grounds her judgment in her knowledge of her colleague's previous records in that scientific domain (such as the number of publications in the relevant reviews of the domain, or the number of patents, etc.) plus the beliefs that she is self-interested in being truthful for the sake of their future collaborative work.[2] Yet, this "reductionist" analysis, that I will detail later, misses some central intuitions about the presumptive character of our trust in others and its motivational dimension. Trust in testimony has a spontaneous dimension that doesn't seem to be based on rational assessment of other people's truthfulness. Also, an evidential analysis of epistemic authority doesn't account for cases of partial understanding, as in the examples above, in which the overt asymmetry between the epistemic position of the authoritative source and the interlocutors is such that it cannot be treated by appealing to evidential criteria only. Here, my aim is to explore some treatments of the more familiar notion of trust in social sciences, moral and political philosophy in order to understand to what extent the notion of epistemic trust may be illuminated by these analyses. I will contrast evidential vs. motivational analyses in social sciences and claim that motivational analyses can find their places in an epistemology of trust. Motivational analyses have often been described as non-cognitive. Take, for instance Lawrence Becker's distinction between cognitive vs. non cognitive treatments on trust: "Trust is 'cognitive' if it is fundamentally a matter of our beliefs or expectations about others' trustworthiness; it is non cognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, or motivational structures […] To say that we trust others in a non cognitive way is to say that we are disposed to be trustful of them independently of our beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" [Becker 1996, 44, 60].[3] I will oppose this distinction by arguing that in the case of epistemic trust a motivational analysis of trust can be cognitive, that is, it can shed some light on our mental processes of acquisition of beliefs and knowledge. In particular, I will try to ground the cognitive bases of our epistemic trust in our communicative practices. My purpose here is to explore a broader notion of epistemic trust, one that could account of what is common in cases as different as the blind trust of the patient in her doctor, the trust needed in collaborative intellectual work and the everyday trust needed to sustain our ordinary conversations.
Intellectual trust is a central question of contemporary epistemological concerns. Yet, most debate around this notion fails to provide a proper analysis of the notion and only superficially bridge it to the parallel social, political and moral treatments of trust. The result is a lack of explanatory power of this notion in epistemology. Often one has the feeling that talking of trust in epistemology is just a way of evoking the need to varnish our study of knowledge with some moral and social considerations.[4] My belief is that intellectual trust deserves more attention, and its intricate relation with the notion of trust in use in social science needs to be better disentangled.
On the other hand, sociological and moral theories of trust in authority fail to make the distinction between epistemic vs. political authority and present themselves as simultaneously accounting for the two concepts.
There are some obvious parallels between the notion of epistemic trust and that of social and political trust. Trust in authority poses a similar puzzle in both cases. How can someone - an institution or an individual - legitimately impose her/its will on other people's and have a right to rule over their conducts? How is this compatible with freedom and autonomy? And why should we trust an authority to impose us a duty to obey for our own good?
Much ink has been spilt on this apparent paradoxical relation between trust in authority and freedom. And of course an equivalent puzzle can be reformulated in the case of intellectual trust: How can it ever be rational to surrender our reason and accept what another person says on the basis that she is saying this? What does it mean to grant intellectual authority to other people?
The very notion of 'authority' in philosophy is notoriously ambiguous between the authority that someone exercises on other people's beliefs and the authority that someone exercises on other people's actions.[5] As Friedman has rightly pointed out: "A person may be said to have authority in two distinct senses: For one, he may be said to be 'in authority', meaning that he occupies some office, position or status which entitles him to make decisions about how other people should behave. But, secondly, a person may be said to be 'an authority', meaning that his views or utterances are entitled to be believed" [Friedman, 1990, p. 57].
In both cases, the appeal to authority calls for an explanation or a normative justification of the legitimacy of the authoritative source, a legitimacy that must be acknowledged by those who submit to it. Still, I think that trust in epistemic authority and in political authority are two distinct phenomena that deserve a separate treatment.
As I said above, most accounts of epistemic trust ground its legitimacy in the evidential bases we have to assess other people's trustworthiness. Motivational accounts in the case of knowledge seem desperately unable to avoid the risk of credulity and irrationality that accompanies prima facie any a priori trust in others as a source of knowledge.
In what follows, I will briefly sketch evidential vs. motivational approaches to trust as they are discussed in social sciences and then try to use this distinction to gain a better understanding of epistemic trust.
Evidential accounts of trust
A common view of trust in contemporary social science reduces it to a set of rational expectations about the likely behaviour of others in a future cooperation with us. Take the definition that Diego Gambetta gives in his influential anthology on trust: "Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action. When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him. Correspondingly, when we say that someone is untrustworthy, we imply that that probability is low enough for us to refrain from doing so" [Gambetta, 1988, p. 218]. Thus trust is a cognitive notion, a set of beliefs or expectations about the commitment of the trusted in behaving in a determinate way in a context that is relevant to us. Following the literature, I call these analyses reductive and evidential. They are reductive accounts because they don't set trust as a primitive notion, but reduce it to more fundamental notions such as beliefs and expectations. They are evidential because they make trust depend on the probabilities we assign to our expectations towards other people's actions towards us. I may trust or distrust on the basis of some evidence that I have about someone else's future behaviour. As it has been stressed by contemporary literature on trust in social science, trust must be distinguished from pure reliance. Trust is an interesting notion in social sciences only insofar as it explains the implicit commitment that it imposes on a relationship. If it were just a matter of assessing probabilities of another person's behaviour without taking into account the effect of her behaviour on our own actions, it would not be so different from general inductive reasoning. I trust on a certain level of stability of the social world around me. I trust the person that I cross when walking on the street not to assault me. This is the minimal level of trust that a society should be able to arrange in order to perpetuate. I need to rely on some regularities of the social world in order to act. But the interest of the notion of trust in social sciences is that it takes into account not only social regularities but also commitments.
A recent explanation of trust that takes clearly in account expectations about other people's commitment – and not simply regularity - is found in Russell Hardin's analysis of trust as a encapsulated interest, that is, trust as belief that it is in the interest of the trusted to attend the truster's interests in the relevant matter [cf. Hardin 2002].
Thus, evidential accounts of social trust try to reduce it to justified expectations upon the objective probability of other people's commitments.
The key-aspect of evidential accounts that I would like to contrast with motivational accounts is that trust is viewed as a cognitive attitude, as knowledge or belief, for which we can find a rational justification in terms of the capacity we have to read and assess the commitments of others.
What about evidential accounts of intellectual trust? An evidential theory of intellectual trust assigns probabilities to our expectations on our interlocutors' truthfulness on a subject matter. And of course truthfulness is a matter of competence as well as of benevolence. But competence and benevolence are very different things. Competence seems to be a more objective trait than benevolence: I can trust you on your willingness to help me translating Herodotus even if I don't defer to your competence in Ancient Greek. Competence doesn't depend on your commitment to be trustworthy to me.
Most evidential accounts of intellectual trust explore the dimension of competence more than that of benevolence. The epistemological literature on assessing expertise insists on what are the cognitive strategies that we can adopt in order to assess the reliability of doctors, lawyers, witnesses, journalists, etc. Alvin Goldman argues that there exist "truth-revealing situations" [6] in which a novice can test the competence of the expert even if she doesn't know how the expert has come to collect her evidence. For example, the weather today is a truth-revealing situation of the expertise of the weather forecast that I have read yesterday on the New York Times. If the NYT weather forecast were systematically lower in predicting whether than the Yahoo weather forecast, I would have evidence to trust the latter more than the former even if I don't have the slightest idea about how a weather forecast is produced. That's our commonsense practice in order to calibrate our informants' expertise even if we are novices in their domain of expertise. If my doctor's therapy against my stomach ache is inefficacious, I am in a truth revealing situation to assess her competence. Of course, not every domain of expertise admits truth-revealing situations: A large portions of formal sciences such as mathematics of physics don't. In these cases, there exist alternative strategies that allow us to assess the reliability of the overall social process that sustains the epistemic dependence of laymen to experts. Such strategies have been investigated by various authors, for example Philip Kitcher who names the overall project of describing the strategies of granting expertise to others as The study of the organisation of cognitive labour. As he points out: "Once we have recognized that individuals form beliefs by relying on information supplied by others, there are serious issues about the conditions that should be met if the community is to form a consensus on a particular issue – questions about the division of opinion and of cognitive effort within the community and issues about the proper attribution of authority" [Kitcher, 1994, 114]. For example, I can have methods to track your past records within a particular domain and grant you authority on the basis of your "earned reputation" in this domain[7]. Or I can grant you authority due to your better epistemic position: I call my sister in Milan and she tells me that it is raining there and I believe her because I am able to assess her better epistemic position about the weather in Milan. These accounts insist on the rational bases of our trust in other people's epistemic authority and appeal to a conceptual framework similar to that of the evidential accounts of trust in social sciences by using the language of rational decision theory or of microeconomics[8].
Evidential accounts of trust in authority illuminate the reasons why we reliably appeal to experts in specialized domains. But, as I said, trust in epistemic authority doesn't seem to reduce only to assessment of expertise. Nor have we always the choice to trust or distrust. The examples that I give at the beginning of this paper show that it is not always a matter of deciding to defer to other people's authority: It just happens that the very nature of some of our beliefs is deferential, and that's not a phenomenon that seems to be captured by these accounts.
Motivational accounts of trust
Many authors in social science and moral philosophy claim that evidential accounts fail to provide an appropriate picture of trust, by appealing only to a set of rational expectations on other people's motivations to commit to cooperation. Our commitment to trust is not only cognitive, that is, based on the degree of our beliefs about the future actions of the trusted. Trust involves also a motivational, non-representational dimension that may depend on our deep moral, emotional or cultural pre-commitments. Thus, in the paper I have mentioned above, Becker speaks of our trust as non-cognitive if it is a disposition to be trustful "independently of our beliefs or expectations about their trustworthiness" [p. 50]. In a book entitled Authority Richard Sennett defines trust in authority as an emotional commitment. And in a seminal paper, Annette Baier defines trust as the accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will toward one, and explores the varieties of moral, emotional and cultural grounds on which we accept this vulnerability. On the same line, Otto Lagerspetz says: "trust is not the fact that one, after calculating the odds, feels no risk: It is feeling no risk without calculating the odds" [1998] These accounts try to capture the idea that in many circumstances our trust in others cannot be converted into subjective estimates of risk, because the margins of ignorance or uncertainty are too broad for such estimates to be possible. Also, as Baier points out, "trust can come with no beginnings, with gradual as well as sudden beginnings and with various degrees of self-consciousness, voluntariness and expressness" [Baier, 1986, p.240]. That is, the child who trusts her mother, the patient who trusts her doctor, the novice scientist who trusts the truth of the main results in her domain without having gone through the details of the proofs, have different degrees of control and thus of choice on their trustful attitude. As the anthropologist Maurice Bloch says in his explanation of the role of deference in rituals: "We are permanently floating in a soup of deference" Most of the time we are not aware of the reason we have to trust. We simply do so[9].
The moral philosophical literature on motivational trust tries to establish to what extent such trustful attitudes are morally justified. Baier's conclusion is that they are insofar as there are minimal reasons to think that the trusted exerting her authority on us is caring for the goods we want her to care for. For example it is justified to trust our partner in the treatment of our child even if we don't approve or understand her actions, if we have reasons to think that she cares for the child.
A more empirical literature in social psychology and economics tries to establish the effects of motivational trust on stabilizing cooperation and reliability in negotiations and in everyday life.
What about the epistemic implications of motivational accounts? Do they illuminate in any sense our trust in epistemic authority? At a first glance, motivational accounts seem better equipped to explain a broader spectrum of cases than evidential accounts do. A motivational dimension seems to be involved in the asymmetrical deferential relations of trust in epistemic authority that I've tried to suggest in my previous examples. Indeed, trust in epistemic authority doesn't seem to be a matter of choice in the most straightforward examples: The child who trusts her mother when she tells her that she needs to breathe air to survive - even if she cannot see air and cannot figure out what is the role of oxygen in our survival - doesn't have the choice to be skeptical, as well as the patient who is told by her doctor that she has contracted a potentially lethal disease. Also, we find ourselves committed to trust the intellectual authority of other people just because we are part of the same linguistic and epistemic community, we share the same institutions and we acknowledge a "division of cognitive labour" in our community. But if we accept the principle that a certain amount of "default" trust - or spontaneous trust - is needed to sustain our cognitive life in a social environment, how do we avoid the risk of credulity that such a trustful disposition seems to imply? And if the motivational trust that sustains our social relations may be based on moral, cultural or emotional pre-commitments, what about the pre-commitments underlying the motivational trust that sustains our cognitive relations? Moral commitments to trust in other people's intellectual authority typically ground the adhesion to the most irrational beliefs. Religious beliefs or allegiance to a guru's thoughts are often justified in terms of moral or emotional commitments. But that's exactly the kind of beliefs that an epistemological account of trust should try to ban in order to avoid the risk of gullibility imputed to a default trustful attitude towards the words of others.
Reidian accounts of epistemic trust
Another way to argue for the role of motivational trust in knowledge acquisition is to see it as an innate disposition to accept what other people tell us. And indeed many authors have argued that a natural tendency to trust others is the only way to justify testimonial knowledge. The locus classicus of this position is Thomas Reid's defense of trust in testimony: We are justified in believing what other people say because we, as humans have a natural disposition to speak the truth and a natural disposition to accept as true what other people tell us. Reid calls these two principles, "that tally with each other"[10], the Principle of Veracity and the Principle of Credulity. But the match between these two principles, that Reid considers self-evident, is far from being clear. The principle of veracity is not well correlated to truth: It just affirms that people are disposed to say what they believe to be true, which does not mean that they say what it is actually true[11]. Thus, an appeal to a natural trustful disposition doesn't suffice to justify our epistemic trust and protect it from credulity.
Reid affirms that if we deny any legitimacy, or at least, naturalness to our trust in others, the result would be skepticism. We believe "by instinct" what our parents and teachers say long before having the capacity to critically judge their competence. But that is just a way of acknowledging the pervasiveness of the lore of inheritance and upbringing to shape one owns' concepts and beliefs without explaining it. It is a fact that we are influenced by others, not only in infancy but in the acquisition of most of our beliefs. But acknowledging this fact is not sufficient explanation of why we are justified to comply with our trustful tendencies.
Modern defences of a Reidian epistemology[12] appeal to the existence of natural language as the material proof that the two principles (credulity and veracity) indeed tally with each other: Most statements in any public language are testimonial and most statements are true; if they were not it is difficult to imagine how a public language could have ever stabilized. [cf. Coady, 1992]. The very possibility of a common language presupposes a general truthful use of speech.
Tyler Burge relies on the "purely preservative character" of linguistic communication to argue that we have a priori justification to rely of what we understand other to be saying. Language, as memory, is a medium of content preservation[13].
I have discussed these positions elsewhere[14]. Here let me just mention that, although these positions give us some hints of the 'passive', non-intentional trust that characterizes our role of cognizers in a social community, their appeal to some structural features of language is less convincing in solving the paradox of epistemic trust, that is, how it is compatible with intellectual autonomy. That is, what concerns us here is: "how intellectual autonomy is possible, given what we know about the power of one's inheritance and surroundings to shape one's concepts, opinions and even the way one reasons?" [Foley, 2001: 128]
Epistemic trust out of self-trust
A different line of defense of the legitimacy of trust in others has been recently pursued by Richard Foley in his book on Intellectual Trust in Oneself and in Others [Cambridge, 2001]. Foley derives it from the justification we have to trust ourselves. We grant a default authority in our intellectual faculties to provide us with reliable information about the world. This is our only way out of skepticism. But if we have this basic trust in our intellectual faculties, why should we withhold it form others? We acknowledge the influence that others had in shaping our thoughts and opinions in the past. If acknowledging this fact doesn't prevent us to grant authority to ourselves, it should not prevent us to grant authority to others, given that our opinions wouldn't be reliable today if theirs were not in the past. And even in cases of interaction of people from different cultures whose influence upon our thinking is poor or nonexistent, we can rely on the general fact that our cognitive mechanisms are largely similar to extend our self-trust to them [cf. Foley 2004, ch. 4]. This strategy of simulation of other minds leads Foley to a sort of "modest epistemic universalism" according to which "It is trust in myself that creates for me a presumption in favor of other people's opinions, eve if I know little about them"[15] [cf. ibidem p.108].
I find Foley's position attractive as it preserves intellectual autonomy and ends in justifying just the minimal trust necessary to sustain our epistemic life, avoiding the "deferential incontinence" and thus gullibility that is imputed to Reidian solutions. But Foley's analysis lacks the motivational dimension that I think an explanation of epistemic trust should include in order to account for very heterogeneous cases such as deliberate deference to an intellectual authority, passive trust to the authority of our cultural heritage and default trust that we grant to others in spontaneous conversation. What his account misses is the idea that in many contexts trusting others doesn't seem to be depend on what we know or discover about them, as for instance that they are similar to us. Rather, trusting others is a matter of commitment to their trustworthiness in the social as well as in the epistemic cases. One could go further, and suggest that we owe this kind of commitment even to self-trust, that is, that the authority on my own mental states does not depend on something that I discover about myself. Self-trust is the product of a responsible and deliberative commitment about the consequences of assuming some beliefs as my beliefs. Richard Moran defends this line in his recent book, Authority and Estrangement[16]. According to Moran, this act of commitment is constitutive of my self-knowledge. I would not expand further, but I think it shows how problematic is to ground our trust in authority in self-trust. How can we capture the motivational dimension of epistemic trust we need to have a full-fledged notion of trust in authority? As we have seen, we cannot follow moral/social accounts of trust and ground a motivational account in emotional or moral pre-commitments, because this would unavoidably lead to irrationality. Still, grounding it in some innate dispositions or deriving it from self-trust misses the whole point of understanding the nature of our commitment to trust in other people's authority.
In the last section, I will explore a different strategy, and consider one on the most straightforward contexts in which commitment, trust and knowledge bloom together, that is, human communication.
Conversation, trust and communication
One fundamental fact about the social transmission of knowledge that is surprisingly under-exploited in the epistemological literature on intellectual authority is that every social contagion of beliefs goes through a process of communication that ranges from street-level conversation to more institutionalized settings of information exchange. Our almost permanent immersion in talks and direct or indirect conversations is the major source of cognitive vulnerability to other people beliefs and reports, even when the exchange is not particularly focused on knowledge acquisition[17]. Communication is a voluntary act. Each time we speak we are intentionally seeking the attention of our interlocutors and thus presenting what we have to say as potentially relevant for them. Each time we listen, we intentionally engage in an interpretation of what has been said, and expand cognitive effort in order to make sense of what our interlocutor had in mind. In this last section of my paper, I will argue that it is the intentional, voluntary character of human communication that guarantees our intellectual autonomy even in those cases in which our epistemic position obliges us to defer to other people's authority. And the making and breaking of epistemic trust is related in many ways to our conversational practices.
There are many different styles of discourse that imply different degrees of reciprocal trust. Of course, the set of norms and assumptions that we tacitly accept when engaging in intellectual conversation[18] are not the same we endorse in a party conversation where the common aim we tacitly share with our interlocutors is entertaining and social contact. Still, a basic reciprocal commitment, I will claim, has to take place in any genuine case of communication. And the cognitive dimension of this basic commitment has interesting consequences for our reciprocal trust.
Intentional analyses of communication have been a major contribution to philosophy of language and pragmatics in the last 40 years. We owe to Paul Grice[19] the modern pragmatic analysis of linguistic interpretation as the reconstruction of the speaker's intentions. Simply decoding the linguistic meaning of the words conveyed in an act of communication is not enough to make sense of what the speaker wanted to tell us. Successful communication involves cooperation among interlocutors, even when the ultimate aim of one of the parties is to deceive the other: Without at least a common aim to understand each other, communication would not be possible. Thus communication is a much richer and constructive activity than simply decoding a linguistic signal. According to Grice, we infer what the speaker says on the tacit assumption that she is conforming to the same set of rules and maxims that guide our cooperative effort to understand each other. Among these maxims, two of them are worth considering for the present purposes: One is a maxim of quality of the information conveyed: "Do not say what you believe to be false" that Grice considers as most important. This doesn't mean that the participants in a conversation are actually truthful. But they act as they were telling the truth, that is, they conform to the maxim, otherwise the minimal common aim to understand each other would not be realized. So they need at least to pretend to be cooperative. On the hearer's side, the presumption that the speaker is conforming to the maxim doesn't imply that the hearer comes automatically to believe what the speaker says. She interprets the speaker on the presumption that the speaker is conforming to the maxims, and that leads her to infer what she meant, even if, later, she may be led to revise her presumption on the basis of what she knows already or what she has come to believe during the conversation.
The other maxim that I would like to consider is that of relevance. Contemporary pragmatic theories have developed a notion of relevance as the key notion that guides our interpretations. For example Sperber and Wilson's pragmatic approach, known as Relevance Theory, says that each act of communication communicates a presumption of its own relevance. A relevant piece of information, in a given context, is one that optimizes the balance between the cognitive effort I have to invest to process it and the benefits I have to entertain it in my mind. A potential communicator presents herself as having something to say that is relevant for us, otherwise we would not even engage in conversation. Communication is a very special case of behavior. It is always intentional and it requires, to be successful, to be recognized as intentional. I don't automatically give attention to every cognitive stimulus that is potentially relevant for me, but I cannot refrain to allocate at least a minimal attention to an overt act of communication that is addressed to me, because the very fact that it is addressed to me is a cue that it worth attention. The presumption of relevance that accompanies every act of intentional communication is what grounds our spontaneous trust in others. I trust a communicator who intentionally asks for my attention to convey something that is relevant for me, and adopt a stance of trust that will guide me to a relevant interpretation of what she has said (that is, an interpretation that satisfies my expectations given what she says and what she may assume we are sharing as common ground contextual information). In this rich and constructive process of building new representations and hypothesis on the presumption that they will be relevant for me, the speaker and the hearer are both responsible for the set of thoughts they generate in conversation, that is, what Sperber and Wilson call their "mutual cognitive environment". But the hearer doesn't automatically accept as true the whole set of common ground thoughts that have been activated in the conversation. She may decide to entertain them in her mind for the sake of conversation, and trust the speaker that this is relevant information for her. Our mutual cognitive environments, that is, the set of hypotheses and representations that we activate in our mind when we communicate in order to understand each other, do not overlap with the set of what we actually believe. In conversation, our interior landscape enriches itself of new representations that have been created on the presumption of their relevance for us, a presumption we are justified to have because we have been intentionally addressed by our interlocutor. We trust our interlocutor in their willingness to share a mutually relevant cognitive environment, that is, to build a common ground that maximizes understanding and favors the emergence of new, relevant thoughts. But our previous knowledge and a more fine-grained check of the content communicated can end up in rejecting much of what has been said. Trusting in relevance of what other people say is the cognitive vulnerability that we accept in order to activate in our mind new thoughts and hypothesis that are shared with our interlocutors. There is never an automatic transfer of beliefs from one's head to another's. The "floating of other men's opinions in our brains"[20] is mediated by a process of interpretation that make us activate a number of hypothesis on the presumption, guided by the hearer, that they will be relevant for us. These online thoughts that serve the purposes of conversation are not accepted by default as new beliefs. They are worth considering given the trust we make in our interlocutors. There may be even worth repeating without further checking because of their relevant effects in certain conversational contexts. But they can be easily discharged if their probability is too low given what we know about the world or what we have come to know about the interlocutor. We trust our interlocutors to be relevant enough to be worth our attention. Our trust is both fundamental and fragile: It is fundamental because I need to trust in other people's willingness to be relevant for me in order to make sense of what they are saying. It is fragile because a further check can lead me to abandon most of the hypotheses I generated in conversation and withdraw credibility to my interlocutor.
Our mental life is populated by a bric-à-brac of drafty, sketchy semi-propositional representations that we need in order to sustain our interpretations of the thousands of discourses to which we are permanently exposed. We accept some of them as beliefs, we use others in our inferences and we throw a lot of them as pure noise. This doesn't make us gullible beings: We trust others to cooperate in generating relevant sets of representations, and we share with them the responsibility of these representations. Of course, our epistemic strategies vary in the course of our life. The trust of a child in the relevance of what her parents say may lead her to automatically believing the content of what is said, that is, understanding and believing may be simultaneous processes in early childhood[21]. As we grow up, we develop strategies of checking and filtering information.
A presumption of trust in other people's willingness to deliver us relevant information is thus the minimal default trust we are justified in having towards testimony. This stance of trust ends up enough often to an epistemic improvement of our cognitive life[22].
But our efforts in interpretation are not always rewarded. Trust in relevance guides our process of interpretation and may lead us to invest supplementary effort in trying to make sense of what our interlocutor is talking about. It is on the basis of our default trust, that we often invest too many resources with the only aim of making sense what the other person is talking about. Sometimes my supplementary efforts are rewarded, sometimes they end up in a too generous interpretation of what I was told. The overconfidence people sometimes have in the relevance of esoteric discourse depends on the direct proportionality between the effort people invest in interpreting others and the trust they have to receive relevant information. Trust in relevance may act as a bias that leads us to over-interpret or excessively rationalize what others say.
In a beautiful novel by Jerzy Kosinsky, Being There, adapted as a perhaps better known film with Peter Sellers, Chance Gardiner is a mentally impaired gardener who becomes an heir to the throne of a Wall Street tycoon, a presidential policy adviser and a media icon just by pronouncing few, enigmatic sentences about gardening.
As a result of a series of fortuitous accidents, Chance finds himself living in the house of Mr. Rand, a Wall Street tycoon and a close friend of the President of United States. In a dialogue with the President visiting Mr. Rand's house, when asked to comment about the bad season at Wall Street, Chance says: "In a garden, growth has its season. There are spring and summer, but there are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer again. As long as the roots are not severed all is well and will be well" (p. 54). Looking for a relevant interpretation, and trusting (in this case mistakenly) to Chance's willingness to be relevant, the President interprets it as an important statement about the fundamental symmetry between nature and society, and quotes him on television the day after.
We all have experiences of over-trust generated out of an over-investment in interpretation. And, conversely, an excessive investment in interpreting what a person says that reveals ill-founded may make our withdraw of trust more definitive.
Trust and comprehension are thus intimately related. An epistemology of trust should account for this relation. Our first epistemic objective in acquiring knowledge from others is to understand what they say and make sense of their thoughts within the context of ours. We are never passively infected by other people's beliefs: we take the responsibility to interpret what they say and share with them a series of commitments on the quality of the exchange. The social dimension of knowledge is grounded in our cognitive activity as interpreters, an activity we always share with others.
Baier, A. [1986] "Trust and Antitrust", Ethics, vol. 96, no. 2, pp. 231-260.
Becker, L.C. [1996] "Trust as Non-cognitive Security about Motives", Ethics, 107, 43-61.
Blais, M. [1987] "Epistemic Tit for Tat", Journal of Philosophy, 7, pp. 363-75.
Coady, C.A.J. [1992] Testimony, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Elgin, Catherine [1996] Considered Judgment, Princeton University Press
Foley, Richard [2001] Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, Cambridge University Press.
Gambetta, D. [1988] Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, on line edition at: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/trustbook.html
Goldman, A. [1991] "Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society," The Journal of Philosophy 88: 113-131.
Hardin, Russell [2002] Trust, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Holton, R. [1994] "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 63-76.
Kitcher, P. [1992] "Authority, Deference and the Role of Individual Reason" in E. McMullin (ed.) The Social Dimension of Scientific Knowledge, University of Notre Dame Press.
Kitcher, P. [1994] "Contrasting conceptions of social epistemology" in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 111-134.
Lackey, Jennifer [1999] "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission" The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 49, n. 197, pp. 471-490
Lagerspetz, O. [1998] Trust. The Tacit Demand, Kluwer.
Matilal, B.M., Chakrabati, A. (1994) Knowing from Words, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Moran, Richard [2001] Authority and Estrangement, Princeton University Press
Raz, Joseph [1986] The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford
Raz, Joseph [1990] (ed.) Authority, New York University Press
Recanati, Francois [1997] " Can We Believe What We Do not Understand?" Mind and Language, 12, 1,
Sennett, R. [1980] Authority, W. W. Norton, London.
Sperber, Dan [1997] "Intuitive and Reflexive Beliefs", Mind and Language, 12, 1, pp. 67-83.
Sperber, Dan, Wilson, D. [1986/1995] Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[1] This example is a reformulation of a Francois Recanati's example in his paper: "Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?" Mind and Language, 1997, that I have discussed at length in another paper: "Croire sans comprendre", Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Universite de Caen, 2000. The problem of deferential beliefs was originally raised by Dan Sperber in a series of papers: "Apparent Irrational Beliefs", "Intuitive and Reflexive Beliefs" Mind and language, 1997.
[2] Another possible rational motivation to be trustworthy in the case of science is the high cost of cheating in the scientific community and the fear of risking permanent exclusion (see M. Blais [1987])
[3] It is interesting to notice that Becker liquidates much of the recent debate around the epistemic role of motivational trust by introducing credulity, as the disposition to believe what another person says and to banish skeptical thoughts, and reliance, as a disposition to depend upon other people in some respects (pp. 45-46), both of them that lie outside the reach of a rational motivation to accept other people's intellectual authority.
[4] Take for example Hardwig analysis in his paper: "The Role of Trust in Knowledge". There are exceptions to this critics, as for example R. Foley's book Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge UP, 2001) in which a detailed analysis of trust in the authority of others is provided in ch.4.
[5] For an analysis of this ambiguity, cf. R. B. Friedman (1990) "On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy" in J. Raz (ed.) Authority, New York University Press.
[6] Cf. A. Goldman "Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society," The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 113-131.
[7] Kitcher [1992] defines this kind of authority: "earned authority".
[8] Cf. for an example of use of the economics framework A. Goldman and M. Shaked [1991] and P. Kitcher [1993] ch.8.
[9] Bloch explains rituals as a collective moment of awareness of the deference to the tradition. Cf. M. Bloch (2004): "Rituals and Deference", in H. Whitehouse and J. Laidlaw (eds.) Rituals and Memory: Towards a Comparative Anthropology of Religion, Altamira Press, London.
[10] Cf. Reid [1764] Inquiry into the Human Mind, § 24.
[11] See on this point K. Leherer: "Testimony, Justification and Coherence", in Matilal & Chakrabarti (eds.) pp. 51-67.
[12] For an overview of contemporary Reidian epistemology, see R. Foley [2001]
[13] Cf. T. Burge: "Content Preservation", Philosophical Review, 102, pp. 457-487.
[14] Cf. G. Origgi [2004] "Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?", Episteme, vol. 1, n.1, pp. 1-12.
[15] As Foley says, a stronger epistemic universalism would imply that other people's opinions are necessarily prima facie credible. Cf. ibidem, p. 107.
[16] Cf. R. Moran [2001] Authority and Estrangement, Princeton University Press, especially ch. 2.
[17] On the fortuitous character of lot of our knowledge, cf. R. Hardin: "If it Rained Knowledge", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, pp. 3-24; and [2004] "Why Know?' manuscript. Cf. also Jennifer Lackey: "Knowledge is not necessarily transmitted via testimony, but testimony can itself generate knowledge" [Jennifer Lackey (1999) "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission", The Philosophical Quarterly, 199, p. 490, vol. 49 n. 197]
[18] For an analysis of the mutually accepted norms that rule intellectual conversations, see P. Pettit and M Smith [1996] "Freedom in Belief and Desire", The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 9, pp. 429-449.
[19] Cf. P. Grice [1957] Meaning, …
[20] Cf. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W. Yolton, London 1961, 1, p. 58
[21] Interesting recent results in developmental psychology show that even young children are not gullible and have strategies for filtering information. See F. Clément, P. Harris, M. Koening (2004) "The Ontogenesis of Trust", Mind&Language, vol. 19, 4, pp. 360-379.
[22] D. Sperber and D. Wilson have explained the details of the correlation between relevance and truth in D. Sperber, D. Wilson (2002): "Truthfulness and Relevance" Mind,
Friday, March 11, 2005
What Does it Mean to Trust in Epistemic Authority?
Publié par Unknown à l'adresse 9:09 AM 22 commentaires
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)


text:
Such a Hell Blazer Dress
€40.00 €81.00
Such a Hell Blazer Dress
€40.00 €81.00
Colour: green
EU Size: 34
- 34
- 36
- 38
- 40
- 42
Raise hell, bby girl. The Such a Hell Blazer features a V-neckline, notched lapels, double breasted button closure, belt at waist with rectangle buckle closure, and mini silhouette.
Details and CareFabric: 100% Polyester. Model Wears US Size 6/ UK Size 10. Machine Washable.
Size Chart
Not sure about your size? We've got you. Click below for the size chart.
Shipping and Returns
Delivery info
Delivery option Delivery times Delivery cost Europe and International Delivery Europe up to 9 business days and International 7-16 business days €9.99 per order
Click here for further information.
Returns info
We're bummed things didn't work out for you, but here's the good news: you get 60 days to return your items starting from the day you receive your dispatch email.
Click here to view our full Returns Policy.


text:
Get Email Job Alerts
Based on this Search!
CRNA Neurosurgery locum tenens jobs in Texas are constantly in demand in a seemingly always underserved healthcare system. Enjoy your CRNA Neurosurgery assignment in the beautiful state of Texas. To get started, just simply browse below. Apply today, and pack your bags for your exciting next CRNA Neurosurgery job tomorrow. Why wait? Locum Jobs Online is your #1 source for landing your dream assignment.


text:
Search this site
Jackets today in stock!
Jackets from crocodile, python
Leathercraft examples
Corsets, Vests
Fur Vests
Sheepskin Coats
How to order?
+7(915)330 1923
+7(916)114 8778
About us
№109 Exclusive ladies leather bag with flowers "Home on the tree"
№134 Handmade floral leather bag.
№136 Python skin belt, bag of python with flowers.
№140 Black leather bag shoulder wide strap.
№144 Clutch of genuine leather suede beige black.
№145 Womens beautiful clutch of genuine leather, painted suede silver black color.
№148 Crossbody ladies genuine leather with fringe
№149 Womens genuine leather crossbody bag fringe.
№150 Bag small crossbody genuine python skin.
№160 Exclusive backpack of genuine leather embroidered flowers BP57
№161 Ladies floral genuine leather backpack rucksack BP55
№162 Bright women's backpack from genuine leather BP56
№168 Exclusive Backpack of genuine crocodile python skin.
№81 Handmade handbag from python.
№82 "Tondzu" beautiful big handbag with flowers.
Corsets, Vests
№101 Sleeveless Jacket of real lama fur,leather with hood.
№139 Exclusive genuine leather short vest perforation, weaving.
№185 Vest of black leather voluminous flowers perforation.
№186 Luxury women's summer vest of genuine leather floral bright
№56 Dress of leather women's black color with vest.
№86 Beautiful leather vest with flowers for women.
№87 Python leather vest-bolero with flower.
Fur Vests
№130 Sheepskin vest with leather sleeves.
№131 Vest of white fur lama, suede.
№132 Handmade genuine silver fox fur coat hooded "Zicer"
№133 Brown color bolero, corset, mittens "Lika"
№135 Exclusive sleeveless vest of lama fur black color.
№151 Sleeveless Vest of genuine sheepskin, small belt bag
№152 Short fur sheep skin vest for women.
№153 Genuine sheepskin vest with lace, leather, two pockets.
How to order?
Jackets from crocodile, python
№1 Women leather jacket from python of "Vitalia"
№10 Short women's crocodile leather jacket "Sofy"
№102 Luxury crocodile-alligator-python hide skin jacket "Spika"
№106 Youth leather jacket of crocodile-alligator skin, python, stingray "Toliman"
№11 "Queen" exclusive python and crocodile leather jacket for ladies
№12 "Passion" jacket of python for ladies
№13 "Kino" stylish leather python and crocodile jacket for women
№141 Unigue crocodile python skin jacket for woman "Tauretari"
№146 Crocodile python skin womens leather jacket "Astridot"
№159 Genuine Crocodile Python skin jacket handmade "Melania"
№2 Handmade women's leather jacket of python "Agneta"
№3 Luxury women's jacket from python skin "Pani"
№32 Short python, crocodile leather jacket "Astrid"
№33 Exclusive women's jacket from genuine crocodile, python skin "Nargiel"
№34 Jacket of python, crocodile skin "Astrid"
№36 Crocodile python leather jacket for women "Android"
№38 Crocodile-python skin beautifull jacket "Astra"
№4 Men jacket from crocodile,python skin
№40 The best crocodile snake skin jacket with mink fur "Lux corde"
№41 The best crocodile python iguana jacket for women "Aola"
№42 Stylish women's crocodile python stingray "Altar"
№44 Abstraction leather jacket from crocodile-python-stingray "Andromeda"
№45 Modern leather jacket from suide-python "Lucid dream"
№47 Exclusive women's jacket from crocodile-python-stingray "Pulsar"
№5 Luxury women's leather jacket from python skin "Emerald tear'
№6 Jacket from genuine python "Apollo"
№7 Jacket of suede and real crocodile skin "Dictator"
№8 Exclusive python leather jacket with crystals "Somnium"
№9 "Tyss" jacket of crocodile and leather-print for ladies
Jackets Made-to-Order and Sold!
№107 Bright summer leather jacket for ladies teens "Sun"
№108 Elegant fitted leather jacket for women's "Onyx"
№110 Fur mink short jacket for ladeis "Markiza"
№111 Fitted multicolor leather suede jacket "Avatar"
№112 Goth leather jacket embroidered beads, crystals "Batory"
№113 Elegant leather suit dark blue color "Covir"
№114 Leather skirt costum with collar for woman.
№115 Youth woman leather jacket with skulls "Tit"
№116 Black corset, bolero from genuine leather fur of carakul "Stych black"
№117 Ladies short jacket of genuine leather with flowers "Dudar"
№118 Black leather lace jacket for women "Black blood"
№119 Red Black leather jacket with lace "Puazon"
№120 Blue black leather jacket short "Sivil"
№121 Skirt suit of leather green color "Pary"
№15 Handmade women's short leather jacket "Spring"
№16 "Esse" exclusive suede jacket with flowers for ladies
№17 Gothic leather jacket for women "Dead of water"
№18 Denim women's jacket with embroidery
№19 Exclusive leather jacket-vest with mittens "Forgotten future"
№20 Bright leather jacket with crystals for ladies "Butterfly"
№21 Leather jacket-vest with lace for women "Heart for Sofalee"
№22 "Aristocracy" women's leather jacket.
№23 Exclusive black leather jacket-vest with hood
№24 Suit of leather, corset, bolero,bracelets "Stych"
№25 Gothic leather jacket for ladies "Rumania"
№26 Aristocratic women's leather jacket "Serpantin"
№27 Luxury leather jacket for ladies "Krime Modus"
№28 "Baroque" exclusive leather ladies jacket
№29 "Bella" exclusive leather ladies jacket
№31 Gothic women's silver leather jacket "Milana"
№35 "Anticipation" exclusive short black jacket for women
№37 Short black leather jacket "His shadow"
№43 Black women's leather jacket with lace "Black night"
№46 Luxury leather jacket with a painted "Aliot"
№48 Fashionable female leather jacket "Asterion"
№50 Nice leather jacket "Priest" for ladies
№51 "Amore Psyhea" is embroidered leather jacket for ladies.
№52 Ladies exclusive leather jacket with collar of fur fox "Tiger's eye"
№53 Fur karakul and leather jacket for women "Amethyst"
№54 Short leather jacekt for ladies "Lacrimosa"
№55 Sport leather jacket blue color.
№60 Beautiful leather-fabric jacket "Carnelian"
№61 Wonderful jacket and skirt from genuine suede "Odry"
№62 "Arma" leather jacket with lace.
№63 Jacket from genuine suede with application "Dualitatem"
№64 Beautiful blue leather jacket "Ruf"
№83 Beautiful women's leather short jacket "Pandora"
Jackets today in stock!
№100 Casual style leather jacket with straight skirt "Art"
№103 Black-blue leather jacket for ladies "Inbrunykach"
№104 Genuine suede leather jacket for women "Prominences of time"
№105 Exclusive leather women's jacket with flowers "Lucem vitae"
№137 Vest Sleeveless Jacket from genuine leather suede with lacing for women "Balestre".
№138 Black Beige color jacket of real leather suede for ladies "L'Amore".
№142 Black leather women's jacket collar, mittens "Mizar-1"
№143 Black genuine leather jacket for women "Mizar-US"
№147 Light womens leather jacket "Ego"
№154 Black genuine leather jacket with lace "Black night"
№155 Women's jacket of genuine black leather "Conti"
№156 Chic leather jacket blue black color short sleeves "Paloma"
№157 Multicolor bright genuine leather jacket for women "Monpase"
№158 Unique genuine leather jacket "Silver on black" for ladies
№163 Women's genuine leather jacket black red color "Cyberpunk"
№164 Short genuine leather jacket for women "Snowdrop astral"
№165 "Game of Thrones" exclusive genuine leather jacket beige brown color.
№166 "Collider" leather jacket for women white black color.
№167 Exclusive women's genuine leather jacket "Z-US-7"
№169 "The Night's Queen" exclusive genuine leather for women gothic style.
№171 Lux leather jacket black red for women "Gloria"
№172 Black gothic real leather jacket for women "The dark matter"
№173 Black jacket of genuine leather, lace "The Black Water"
№174 Gothic Jacket of genuine leather "The dark matter" for women
№175 "Cersei" genuine black leather jacket for women, handmade, luxury one a kind of jacket by Sofalee.
№176 "Black on black" exclusive women's leather jacket.
№177 "Shining of black moon" women's jacket of genuine leather, chic black leather flowers, painted, embellished.
№178 Purple black genuine leather jacket "Mizar-C4"
№179 "Mizar-2020" exclusive women's jacket of genuine leather.
№180 Bolero Jacket of genuine leather, short sleeves for women.
№181 Womens costume suit of genuine leather for women exclusive handmade by Sofalee shaman indian united states!
№182 Genuine leather luxury floral jacket for women "Catarina"
№183 Stylish women's genuine leather jacket "Punk"
№184 Beautiful womens jacket of genuine leather floral "Verona"
№187 Bolero genuine leather black future style.
№188 Mystical jacket of genuine leather gray black, wings, pendant, fringes. Handmade clothes.
№189 "Dreams" genuine leather jacket multicolored for women
№190 Black real leather Corset Bolero wide Bracelets for women
№191 Womens genuine leather jacket "Multiple bright orgasm"
№192 Jacket of genuine sheepskin leather cyberpunk style "BR-3737"
№193 LeatherCraft women's jacket black red color BRP-447
№194 Women's Cyber Punk genuine leather jacket "Mizar-19"
№195 Long sleeves women's Bolero Corset
№196 Stylish genuine leather jacket red crystals "Romania"
№197 "Acrux-X" exclusive genuine leather women's jacket.
№198 "Sevil" exclusive women's jacket of genuine leather by Sofalee
№199 Exclusive women's jacket of genuine leather black red "Cyberpunk-Orion"
№200 Genuine leather jacket cyberpunk style "US-2020"
№201 White black genuine leather jacket with collar "Cyber-77S"
№202 Jacket in red-black color genuine leather "Mirax-2020"
№203 Women's Jacket of genuine leather with embroidery, hooded "Kvitka"
№30 "Clover"exclusive leather green jacket for women by Sofalee
№39 Saphir mink ladies jacket beautiful design "Avgustina"
№57 Luxury leather jacket with flowers "Flowers of life"
№84 Jacket from genuine suide with flowers "Leonella"
№85 Jacket from genuine leather for women "Wild".
№88 Exclisive women's leather-suede jacket with short sleeve "Laura"
№89 Luxury women's leather suit :jacket, skirt, hood "Aurica"
№90 Futuristic jacket of genuine leather black color "Mizar"
№91 Leather jacket with high collar white-black color "Sirius"
№92 Leather jacket futuristic-russian style "Acrucs"
№93 Unique women's leather jacket black-red color "Orion"
№94 Exclusive women's jacket white-black color "Eridan"
№95 Leather women's jacket in fantastic realism style "Mizar-2"
№96 Black leather jacket with 3D details "Mizar-3"
№97 Punk style leather jacket for girl "UES-73"
№98 Luxury leather skirt flared suit "Beatrice"
№99 Nice leather jacket black-blue color "The Blue Rivers"
Leather jackets
Sheepskin Coats
№122 Long blue sheepskin coat with fur of polar fox.
№123 Ladies genuine sheepskin coat "Shaman"
№124 Purple white womens sheepskin coat, bag.
№125 Short sheepskin coat with fox fur collar.
№126 Long real sheepskin coat for women "Ramstein"
№127 Ladies coat of red fox fur with hat, bag, gaiters.
№128 Black silver fox fur coat hooded "Mary"
№129 Long hooded coat of polar fox fur "Maria"
№14 Sheepskin coat with python leather "Pink python"
№49 Exclusive genuine sheepskin coat "Comanche"
№58 Bright genuine sheepskin coat with lama collar "Elfo"
№59 "Pink python" luxury warm shepskin coat with hood for women
№65 Sheepskin with blue fur of mink.
№66 Women's short sheepskin jacket "Star"
№67 Exclusive sheepskin coat with fur of fox for women "Zicer"
№68 Long sheepskin coat with hood for women "Celt"
№69 Luxury ladies warm sheepskin coat "Flaks"
№70 Nice sheepskin short coat with collar of fox "Lion"
№71 "Flame"sheepskin coat pink color.
№72 Ladies sheepskin coat with painted "Yersy"
№73 Varicolored women's sheepskin short coat "Caramel"
№74 Blue sheepskin coat with lama for ladies "Zena"
№75 Nice women's sheepskin coat with lama "Kuran"
№76 Long green sheepskin coat "Lhasa"
№77 Black sheepskin coat from genuine sheepskin "Red Fox"
№78 Genuine sheepskin coat with fur of blue mink "Anna"
№79 Sheepskin jacket from genuine sheepskin, red fox.
№170 Genuine leather shorts for women
Size Guide
Corsets, Vests
№186 Luxury women's summer vest of genuine leather floral bright
Vest of genuine leather multicolored floral style for women.
Genuine leather women's vest lacing on the sides. It's perforation vest very comfortable thing.
Waistcoat perforated, natural leather lining.
Chic waistcoat authentic leather.
A product for women of girls.
Theme-interweaving of plants and flowers.
gilet pour femme en cuir reweaving véritable concepteur multicolore fait main exclusif
Weste für Damen echtes Leder
Jackets from crocodile, python
Jackets today in stock!
Jackets made-to-order!
Corsets, Vests
Leather Bags
Sheepskin Coats
How to order?
About us
Moscow: +7(915)330 1923 +7(906)719 7430
WhatsApp +7(916)114 8778 e-mail:
Skype sofalee1
2009-2020 All rights reserved
Sign in
Report Abuse
Powered By
Google Sites


text:
Real 'Green' Agenda.
Blogged with Flock
Labels: Real 'Green' Agenda.
I am tired of the way that the myth of man made global warming is always presented as fact in the media. There is another side to the story, and it looks like governments all over want to spend lots of our money on futile attempts to control the weather. We've been on this planet long enough to have got used to the fact that the climate has always changed, and will continue to do so, so let's get used to it again. click on 'ARCHIVES' for previous posts.
Blogged with Flock
Labels: Real 'Green' Agenda.
Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]


text:
DUX Artistic Wall Tile | Dumas Umemoto
DUX is a premiere collection of artistic wall tiles of different forms and materials created by the Dumas Umemoto design studio. The driving force behind the creative process in the studio is raw copper and cast recycled aluminum. The character and organic qualities of these materials allow for a display of textures, depth and reflection and shadows and light resulting in unique product carefully handmade by artists and skilled craftsmen.
Visit dumasumemoto.com
Related Books
Materialized by
Related Objects


text:
Thank you so much for taking the time to join in our last Challenge "Summer fun", we enjoyed seeing all your beautiful creations.
Before I tell you about the next challenge, we have a winner to announce
To obtain your winners Badge Click Here, it will bring you to the button page to choose.
Please email us at sdelightsATtiscali.co.uk to claim your prize within 2 weeks!
*Remember you need to add this challenge image to your post or sidebar and linked back to this challenge:
New Challenge:Sketch 1-Host Janice
Here is how you play...-You do NOT have to use Scrapper's Delights Digi Stamps to play along, but we would love to see them.
If you do use one of Scrapper's Delights products you may add your project twice so as to have another chance at winning some fantastic gifts!
-You may move or rotate the sketch in any direction, change or replace the shapes, but the sketch MUST be recognizable within your project.
-You need to share a direct link to your creation, not just your main blog page, using the Linky Tools feature at the end of the post.
-If you'd like to be considered to be a Guest Designer for next month then please add GD/ before your Title.
If you would like to use one of Scrapper's Delights products you can click on the badge....All products are fantastic quality and at wonderfully affordable prices XXX
My Store
Here are some Lovely inspiration from my wonderful Design Team
using the sketch...
Using Pixie Corner Digi Set 1


text:
Debbie Zeisler of Millsap, Texas, adopted a dog in Parker County in north Texas, last year, and he ended up saving her life. Bear, a Shiloh German shepherd at the Weatherford-Parker County Animal Shelter, was a seizure dog.
"All I remember is going down the stairs," she recalled. "Then I woke up, and my dog was gone."
But Bear didn't abandon his his mistress; he was going door-to-door, looking for help.
"He scratched on doors," animal control supervisor Karen Kessler said. "He went until one neighbor notices him."
Today Bear was honored with the 30th National Hero Dog award by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Los Angeles, the Associated Press is reporting.
The award organization says the dog recognizes signs of imminent seizures and will lean on Zeisler's legs so she can sit down before they happen. The seizures started after a horse riding accident 18 years ago.


text:
"A simple love story that transcends cultural barriers. . . . Convincing and rich in detail. . . . Filled with an earthy poetic grace." —Chicago Tribune
"Luminous. . . . Eloquent. . . . [Waiting] provides. . . a crash course in Chinese society during and since the Cultural Revolution, and a more leisurely but nonetheless compelling exploration of the less exotic terrain that is the human heart." —The New York Times Book Review
"[Ha Jin's] writing is steeped in wit, rich metaphorical underpinnings and. . . endless and wonderful detail." —The Atlanta Journal Constitution
"Extraordinary. . . . A remarkably austere love story, suffused with irony and subtlety." —Chicago Sun-Times
"Waiting has the stripped down simplicity of a fable. . . It casts a spell that doesn't break once. . . . Jin has the kind of effortless command that most writers can only dream about." —The New York Times Magazine
"Achingly beautiful. . . . Ha Jin depicts the details of social etiquette, of food, of rural family relationships and the complex yet alarmingly primitive fabric of provincial life with that absorbed passion for minutiae characteristic of Dickens and Balzac." —Los Angeles Times Book Review
"A vivid bit of storytelling, fluid and earthy. . . . Reminiscent of Hemingway in its scope, simplicity and precise language. . . . A graceful human allegory." —Chicago Sun-Times
"A subtle beauty. . . . A sad, poignantly funny tale." —The Boston Sunday Globe
"Impeccably deadpan. . . . Waiting turns, page by careful page, into a deliciously comic novel." —Time
"Spare but compelling. . . . Jin's craftsmanship and grasp of the universal language of the human heart make the book a worthwhile read." —USA Today
"A wry, lovely novel. . . . Unexpectedly moving. . . . So quietly and carefully told that . . . we read on patiently, pleasantly distracted, wondering when something will happen. Only when we've finished do we understand just how much has, and how much waiting can be its own painful reward." —Newsday
"Enlightening . . . a delicate rendering of the universal complications of love. . . . Ha Jin's natural storytelling quietly captures the texture of daily life in a dual Chinese culture. . . . No detail is extraneous in this sad, funny, and often wise novel." —The Village Voice Literary Supplement
"Remarkable . . . compellingly ingenious . . . gorgeously cinematic." —The Philadelphia Inquirer
"A wonderfully ironic novel . . . complex and sad as life. . . . It captures the difficulties of love in totalitarian China with sharp prose and a convincing portrayal of human vagaries." —Minneapolis Star Tribune
"Subtle and complex . . . his best work to date. A moving meditation on the effects of time upon love." —The Washington Post
"[Jin] reveals some startlingly original insights on human life and love . . . in a narrative that dazzles the reader with its simplicity and grace." —The Providence Sunday Journal
"[Waiting is] a masterpiece of realism and a work of ironic allegory, its mystifying, foreign world full of characters who grow more familiar with every page. . . . Through an accumulation of small, deft brushstrokes, 20th century China is superimposed onto the landscape of an ancient, painted scroll." —The Plain Dealer
"A high achievement indeed." —The New York Review of Books


text:
Rosanna Olivarez's spaces
All Spaces
2016-17 Archive Frugoli ELA
5/6 Eagle Band
The RHMS 5/6 Eagle Band is a group dedicated to the solid beginning of a musical education. During the first two weeks of class, students will learn how band class functions and will be able to sample instruments in order to select the right one for them. This ensemble will perform three concerts of exciting and challenging music and celebrate the end of the year with a movie party!
7th English
I'm looking forward to a great year with the students. For copies of materials handed out in class, please check your child's Google Classroom account. Additional information may also be found at my additional website: https://sites.google.com/a/campbellusd.org/mrs-bertolucci-s-website/. Thank you.
After School
Sports Schedules will be announced the week of September 7th. Our Athletic Director is coordinating schedules with the Directors at other Middle Schools and schedules will be announced soon!
Rolling Hills Middle School offers competitive sports for boys and girls; the sports offered are: cross-country, soccer, volleyball, track and field, basketball, field hockey and wrestling. Sport try-outs are advertised at school and on the morning announcements.
Music energizes and enlivens learning.
Rolling Hills Middle School offers beginning, intermediate, and advanced band courses, and students have the opportunity to try a variety of instruments. Also, the RHMS band performs in several afternoon events, local community parades, and regional competitions. They are graded on a range of musical elements, including instrument practice, playing tests, written tests, daily participation, and performances.
Caitilin Weber
Welcome to Mrs. Weber's classroom page! Here you can find assignments, important links, documents, and resources.


text:
T.I. "Clifford Harris" To Testify In Murder Trial!
local 12 reports "More testimony is expected today in a murder trial that will bring a big name in music back to Cincinnati. Rap artist T.I. is expected to testify on Friday about what happened the night his personal assistant died. 35-year-old Hosea Thomas is accused of killing Philant Johnson in May of 2006. The incident apparently started with a fight at a Roselawn club where T.I., whose real name is Clifford Harris, performed. The fight spilled onto I-75. "
Please click the "Report" button below if the video on this page is not working properly.
Comments will only be displayed by verified emails. No Spamming or Racism.


text:
Banana Berry Muffins
Total TimePrep: 20 min. Bake: 20 min./batch
Makes1-1/2 dozen
- 4 cups bran flakes
- 1/2 cup buttermilk
- 1/2 cup butter, softened
- 1 cup sugar
- 2 large eggs, room temperature
- 1-1/2 cups mashed ripe bananas (about 3 medium)
- 1 teaspoon vanilla extract
- 1-1/2 cups all-purpose flour
- 1-1/2 teaspoons baking powder
- 1/2 teaspoon salt
- 1/4 teaspoon baking soda
- 1 cup fresh or frozen blueberries
- 1/3 cup finely chopped pecans
- 1/3 cup packed brown sugar
- 3/4 teaspoon ground cinnamon
- In a large bowl, combine bran flakes and buttermilk; set aside.
- In another large bowl, cream butter and sugar until light and fluffy. Beat in 1 egg at a time, beating well after each addition. Beat in bananas and vanilla (mixture will appear curdled).
- Combine the flour, baking powder, salt and baking soda; gradually stir into creamed mixture just until moistened. Stir in bran mixture. Fold in blueberries. Fill greased or paper-lined muffin cups three-fourths full.
- Combine the pecans, brown sugar and cinnamon; sprinkle over batter. Bake at 350° for 20-25 minutes or until a toothpick comes out clean. Cool for 5 minutes before removing from pans to wire racks. Serve warm.
Freeze option: Freeze cooled muffins in airtight freezer containers. To use, thaw at room temperature or, if desired, microwave each muffin on high for 20-30 minutes or until heated through.
Editor's NoteIf using frozen blueberries, use without thawing to avoid discoloring the batter.
Nutrition Facts1 muffin: 218 calories, 8g fat (4g saturated fat), 38mg cholesterol, 249mg sodium, 37g carbohydrate (21g sugars, 3g fiber), 3g protein.
Recommended Video
Mar 31, 2014
This recipe is AMAZING! I've made this several times, in so many ways. Sometimes I omit the berries, cut the sugar in half, and I ALWAYS add some grated zucchini. I've also made these by omitting the bananas and berries and made them with butternut squash, grated carrots, and pumpkin pie spice. YUMMY! I will be keeping this recipe for a LONG LONG TIME!
Jul 25, 2012
These were very very good. I used raisins in place of the blueberries because the person I was making them for likes raisins, I used All Bran cereal because that's all we had and I didn't use the topping but when I make them myself for myself, I will use blueberries and the topping. Very very good. Thank you!
Oct 2, 2010
I would have to rate it as 5 stars. It is not only delicious but with the bran & blueberries it is highly nutritious. I took it to a prayer meeting and everyone wanted the recipe.


text:
During years, I have been taught that art of selling had a lot to do with the ability to ask intelligent questions, and then to present one's offer in the context of the answers provided by your counterpart.
However, with hindsight, when I look back at my most significant sales - or at least those I am the most proud of - 3 spring to my mind. And I have to recognize that what they have in common has little to do with my ability to ask "intelligent questions". These transactions shares a common characteristic, though: they were all generated via a story loaded with emotion.
- More than 20 years ago, as I was working as a sales executive with a computer manufacturer, one of my customers was a large insurance company. One day, as a bold move, I decided to call the CEO of the company and I provided him with some evidence that, without a fast move from his company in terms of increasing their IT processing power, they might find themselves confronted with difficulties during their beginning-of-the-year premium collection process. 3 weeks later, I was signing a $6m transaction with this insurance company.
- About fifteen years ago, I experienced a situation with a business intelligence (BI)project manager with a mobile phone operator who wanted to equip his sales people with customer intelligence capabilities on their laptops. After a few words, it appeared clear to me that this project manager had a competitive technology in mind and that the only thing he wanted from me was just a low price, which he could leverage to make his preferred vendor drop his own price. In a state of desperation, I decided to tell the project manager the horror story of another mobile telephone operator who had launched a similar initiative, and who had experienced a resounding failure. Why? Simply because the sales executives had not made the effort to use the new capabilities. Too far from their good old habits. Too much disruption. After telling this story, and presenting some elements that he might consider to avoid falling in the same trap, my counterpart revisited the specs of his project, and eventually made the decision to buy... from me.


text:
Shots fired into Odenton home
Police investigating incident
Investigators are trying to determine who fired shots into an Odenton home.
Anne Arundel County police officers were called to the 2400 block of Winding Ridge Road in Odenton for a report of destruction to property around 11:30 p.m. Thursday.
A 27-year-old Odenton man told police he heard something outside and then glass breaking.
After inspecting the front door, he discovered five bullet holes, police said.
No one was injured in the incident.
The shooter fled the scene in an unknown direction, possibly in a white Chevrolet or GMC work vehicle, police said.
Several officers searched the area, but were unable to find the vehicle.
Police said detectives are actively investigating the incident, which does not appear to be random.
Anyone with information is asked to contact the Western District at 410-222-6155.