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Maj. Brock Gaston. [Source: State Department]CIA official Gary Berntsen and a US Army Special Forces major known as Brock (an apparent reference to Maj. Brock Gaston) lead a six-person team with the mission to enter Afghanistan and capture one of bin Laden's top aides. The exact target is not specified; the team is expected to take advantage of whatever opportunities present themselves. The team passes through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, then meets up with Northern Alliance forces in the part of Afghanistan still under their control. But from the very beginning they encounter resistance from a CIA superior officer who is based in a nearby country and is in charge of CIA relations with the Northern Alliance. Known publicly only by his first name Lawrence, he apparently had a minor role in the Iran-Contra affair and has a personal dispute with Gaston. The team stays at Ahmad Shad Massoud's Northern Alliance headquarters high in the Afghan mountains for about two weeks. However, they never have a chance to cross into Taliban territory for their mission because Lawrence is sending back a stream of negative messages to CIA headquarters about the risks of their mission. A debate ensues back at headquarters. Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center, and his assistant Hank Crumpton support continuing the mission. But CIA Director George Tenet and his assistant Jim Pavitt cancel the mission on March 25. Upon returning to the US, Berntsen, Gaston, Black, and Crumpton formally call for Lawrence's dismissal, but to no effect. Berntsen will later comment that Black and Crumpton "had shown a willingness to plan and execute risky missions. But neither CIA Director George Tenet nor President Bill Clinton had the will to wage a real fight against terrorists who were killing US citizens." [CNN, 12/15/2001; Berntsen and Pezzullo, 2005, pp. 43-64]
Entity Tags: James Pavitt, Brock Gaston, Cofer Black, Gary Berntsen, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, George J. Tenet, Hank Crumpton, Lawrence
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden
The CIA and FBI send a joint investigative team to Sudan to investigate whether that country is a sponsor of terrorism. Sudan again offers to hand over its voluminous files on al-Qaeda (see March 8, 1996-April 1996, April 5, 1997, and February 5, 1998), and the offer is again rejected. [Observer, 9/30/2001; Vanity Fair, 1/2002] The US will finally agree to see the files shortly before 9/11 (see July-August 2001).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Sudan, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ellen Glasser. [Source: City of Jacksonville, Florida]Dan Hill, a former Army Ranger, meets with an FBI agent to discuss a plan he has devised to kill Osama bin Laden, for which he will need military assistance, but the agent is skeptical and only promises to refer Hill's proposal to FBI headquarters in Washington, DC. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 230-231] Hill came up with his plan, to go to Afghanistan and kill bin Laden, after the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. However, the man Hill intends to be the mission's commander wants the assurance of US government support for the operation (see After August 7, 1998). Hill talked to Leo Morris, an agent at the Jacksonville, Florida, FBI office, about his plan, and Morris said he would get back to him after consulting his superiors in Washington. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 203-204] Fighters Now Available to Perform Mission - The plan has progressed while Hill has been waiting for the FBI to get in touch. Hill's friend Said Nader Zori, who will be participating in the mission, has been to Pakistan and assembled a group of former mujahedeen fighters who are willing to assist. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 230] Nader Zori is himself a former mujahedeen fighter who fought against the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s and subsequently emigrated to the US. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 168, 201] Finally, Hill receives a phone call from Ellen Glasser—like Morris an agent at the FBI's Jacksonville office—who says she is interested in Hill's plan, and requests a meeting with Hill and Nader Zori. Hill agrees to see her, and in the late spring of 2000 they all meet at his house. Glasser is accompanied by her husband, Donald Glasser, who also works for the FBI at the Jacksonville office. Hill Describes How His Group Will Kill Bin Laden - During the meeting, Hill outlines his plan to Glasser. According to journalist and author James B. Stewart, he tells her: "Their contacts in Afghanistan reported that bin Laden traveled frequently between meetings with Mullah Omar and other high-ranking Taliban officials in the southern city of Kandahar, and Kabul, the capital, near Farmihedda, where bin Laden kept his headquarters. He traveled with only light security: a convoy of three vehicles, bin Laden in the middle with eight armed guards—four in the front and four in the rear. The mountainous terrain provided several ambush sites. Their armed force would attack the convoy, kill the guards, and kill bin Laden." FBI Wants Bin Laden Captured, Not Killed - Glasser seems startled and says, "Oh, we don't do things like that." Hill replies: "I know you don't. That's why we'll do it." Glasser says the FBI's idea was that bin Laden would be captured and brought to the US. Hill is astonished. "How would we do that?" he asks. "What would we do with the bodyguards? How would we get him out alive?" Glasser ponders this and then asks how Hill's group would prove it had killed bin Laden. Hill says it would pack his head and hands in an iced cooler, and bin Laden's identity could be verified once his remains reached the US. Hill says this is why he needs US military assistance: It would be impossible to get bin Laden's remains out of Afghanistan over land, so it would be necessary for a C-130 transport plane with a skyhook to fly over his group's position, hook the cooler, and then reel it up into the plane's cargo bay. Agent Will Refer Proposal to FBI Headquarters - Glasser seems skeptical about the plan. She also explains, "Money's tight." However, Hill says that as long as he knows that, if his plan succeeds, he will get the $15 million reward that has been offered for capturing bin Laden, his group will finance the operation, except for the use of the C-130. Glasser then asks: "How do we know you're telling the truth? How do we know you have the contacts in Afghanistan?" Hill says he could bring some of his group's members to the US if Glasser will arrange for tourist visas. Whatever it takes, he will do it. Glasser still looks unconvinced. She tells Hill, "This would all have to be approved," and says she will refer his proposal to the Counterterrorism Center at FBI headquarters. Before Glasser and her husband leave, Hill points out to them that nuclear weapons have allegedly disappeared from the former Soviet arsenal in Uzbekistan, and he adds that evidence indicates bin Laden is becoming more powerful and sophisticated over time. "Someone has got to take him out," he says. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 230-232] Glasser will get in touch with Hill about a year later and tell him that his request for government assistance has been rejected (see (Between Spring and Summer 2001)). [Stewart, 2002, pp. 245]
Entity Tags: Daniel J. Hill, Ellen Glasser, Donald Glasser, Osama bin Laden, Said Nader Zori
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly supports the Taliban. He refers to the Taliban when he says in a press conference: "I just want to say that there is a difference of understanding on who is a terrorist. The perceptions are different in the United States and in Pakistan, in the West and what we understand is terrorism." The Taliban are closely linked to the Pashtun ethnic group, and he further refers to them as he says: "Afghanistan's majority ethic Pashtuns have to be on our side. This is our national interest.… The Taliban cannot be alienated by Pakistan. We have a national security interest there." Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid will later comment that this statement "outraged many Afghans, including all the anti-Taliban factions." Rashid will add: "Such remarks were to make Musharraf a hated figure for most Afghans, something he could not live down even after 9/11.… Musharraf became known as 'double-talk Musharraf,' speaking with one breath about how he would turn Pakistan into a moderate Islamic state, and then just as vehemently with another supporting jihad and militancy." That same month, Maj. Gen. Ghulam Ahmad Khan, an officer close to Musharraf, says publicly: "We are trying to stop the US from undermining the Taliban regime. They cannot do it without Pakistan's help, because they have no assets there, but we will not allow it to happen." [Rashid, 2008, pp. 50-51, 414]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Ghulam Ahmad Khan, Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI
Jack Roche. [Source: Agence France-Presse/ Getty Images]Jack Roche, an Australian Caucasian Muslim, tries to inform on al-Qaeda for Australia or the US, but is ignored. In April, Roche returned from a trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Malaysia, where he took an explosives training course and met with bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and other top al-Qaeda leaders. In Pakistan, Mohammed discussed attacking US jets in Australia and gave Roche money to start an al-Qaeda cell in Australia. Roche also met Hambali in Malaysia and was given more money there. Early this month, he tries to call the US embassy in Australia, but they ignore him. He then tries to contact The Australian intelligence agency several times, but they too ignore him. In September 2000, his housemate also tries to contact Australian intelligence about what he has learned from Roche but his call is ignored as well. Australian Prime Minister John Howard later acknowledges that authorities made a "very serious mistake" in ignoring Roche, though he also downplays the importance of Roche's information. Roche is later sentenced to nine years in prison for conspiring with al-Qaeda to blow up an Israeli embassy. [BBC, 6/1/2004; Los Angeles Times, 6/7/2004]
Entity Tags: John Howard, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Atef, Hambali, Jack Roche, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Warning Signs, Hambali, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia
The first Predator flight over Afghanistan on September 7, 2000 captures bin Laden circled by security in his Tarnak Farms complex. [Source: CBC]An unmanned spy plane called the Predator begins flying over Afghanistan, showing incomparably detailed real-time video and photographs of the movements of what appears to be bin Laden and his aides. It flies successfully over Afghanistan 16 times. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] President Clinton is impressed by a two-minute video of bin Laden crossing a street heading toward a mosque inside his Tarnak Farms complex. Bin Laden is surrounded by a team of a dozen armed men creating a professional forward security perimeter as he moves. The Predator has been used since 1996, in the Balkans and Iraq. One Predator crashes on takeoff and another is chased by a fighter, but it apparently identifies bin Laden on three occasions. Its use is stopped in Afghanistan after a few trials, mostly because seasonal winds are picking up. It is agreed to resume the flights in the spring, but the Predator fails to fly over Afghanistan again until after 9/11. [Washington Post, 12/19/2001; Clarke, 2004, pp. 220-21] On September 15, 2001, CIA Director Tenet apparently inaccurately tells President Bush, "The unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft that was now armed with Hellfire missiles had been operating for more than a year out of Uzbekistan to provide real-time video of Afghanistan." [Washington Post, 1/29/2002]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, George W. Bush
Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan
Damage to the USS Cole. [Source: Department of Defense]The USS Cole is bombed in the Aden, Yemen harbor by two al-Qaeda militants, Hassan al-Khamri and Ibrahim al-Thawar (a.k.a. Nibras). Seventeen US soldiers are killed and 30 are wounded. The CIA will later conclude that with just slightly more skilled execution, the attack would have killed 300 and sunk the ship. [ABC News, 10/13/2000; Coll, 2004, pp. 532; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 191] The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) immediately takes credit for the attack. This is a Yemen-based Muslim militant group widely believed to have close ties to al-Qaeda (see 1996-1997 and After). [Guardian, 10/14/2000] The IAA statement is released by its spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Masri (see Early 1997, (June 1998), and December 28, 1998 and After). Abu Hamza says that the attack was timed to mark the anniversary of the execution of the IAA's former commander (see October 17, 1999). [O'Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 184] The prime minister of Yemen at the time of the bombing will say shortly after 9/11, "The Islamic Army was part of al-Qaeda." [Guardian, 10/13/2001] The US soon learns the names of some al-Qaeda operatives involved in the attack, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash and Fahad al-Quso (see Early December 2000), and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see November-December 2000). 9/11 hijackers Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see October 10-21, 2000) and Khalid Almihdhar (see Around October 12, 2000) may also have been involved. This is a repeat of a previously attempted attack, against the USS The Sullivans, which failed and was apparently undetected (see January 3, 2000). [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later say the Cole bombing "was a full-fledged al-Qaeda operation, supervised directly by bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment." [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 190]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Khallad bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Islamic Army of Aden, USS Cole, Osama bin Laden, Ibrahim al-Thawar, Khalid Almihdhar, Fahad al-Quso, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hassan al-Khamri, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Yemeni Militant Collusion, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
Following the attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000), the CIA discusses possible policy changes in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Disappointed by US inaction, Alec Station chief Richard Blee decides "we've got to change the rules," because he thinks al-Qaeda is getting stronger and stronger. This entails enhanced support for the Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, which is the only credible opposition fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Although some CIA officers still think Alec Station's staff is "over the top," both the CIA's Near East division and Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black agree with Blee, and they decide what is needed is aid to enable Massoud to pressure the Taliban, creating the conditions for CIA operations against bin Laden. The list of assistance includes cash to bribe commanders, trucks, helicopters, light arms, ammunition, uniforms, food, and possibly mortars and artillery. The plan will cost between $50 and $150 million, and will include a permanent CIA base in Afghan territory controlled by the Northern Alliance. CIA officers will then be able to accompany Massoud's men on missions. It takes some time to arrive at these conclusions, which will be formalized into a plan (see December 29, 2000). However, the plan will not be accepted by the outgoing Clinton administration or the incoming Bush administration (see December 20, 2000). [Coll, 2004, pp. 539-541; Washington Post, 2/23/2004]
Entity Tags: Richard Blee, Counterterrorist Center, Cofer Black, Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration (43), Ahmed Shah Massoud, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Shortly after the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), the US supposedly obtains intelligence that prompts President Clinton to consider another missile strike on bin Laden. The US presidential election is in early November. Author Lawrence Wright will later write, "Clinton maintains that, despite the awkward political timing, his administration came close to launching another missile attack… but at the last minute the CIA recommended calling it off because [bin Laden's] presence at the site was not completely certain." [Wright, 2006, pp. 244] Additionally, the tie between the Cole bombing and al-Qaeda had not yet been confirmed. The first strong evidence of such a tie will come in late November 2000 when details of an al-Qaeda operative's confession are given to the FBI (see Late October-Late November 2000). The 9/11 Commission will make no mention of any planned strikes around this time in their final report while discussing the missed opportunities to strike at bin Laden. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 237] However, the Washington Post will detail the opportunity, saying the target was a "stone compound, built around a central courtyard full of al-Qaeda operatives." But the strike is canceled when CIA Director George Tenet calls National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and says about the quality of intelligence, "We just don't have it." [Washington Post, 12/19/2001] Ironically, it appears bin Laden was actually hoping to be attacked, anticipating that it would boost his reputation in the Muslim world. In the summer of 2001, the NSA will monitor two al-Qaeda operatives discussing how disappointed they are that the US did not retaliate after the Cole bombing (see June 30-July 1, 2001).
Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, Osama bin Laden, Clinton administration, George J. Tenet
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, 2000 USS Cole Bombing
Kabir Mohabbat. [Source: ZDF]In 1999, Kabir Mohabbat, an Afghan-American businessman, had initiated conversations about bin Laden between the US government and the Taliban. According to Mohabbat, the Taliban were ready to hand bin Laden over to a third country, or the International Court of Justice, in exchange for having the US-led sanctions against Afghanistan lifted. (Elmar Brok, a German member of the European Parliament, later confirms that he helps Mohabbat make contact with the US government in 1999.) The initial talks lead to a secret meeting this month between Taliban ministers and US officials in a Frankfurt hotel. Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil reportedly says in the meeting, "You can have him whenever the Americans are ready. Name us a country and we will extradite him." However, after this face-to-face meeting, further discussions are never held because, Brok believes, a "political decision" has been made by US officials not to continue the negotiations. He does not clarify when he believes such a decision was made. [Reuters, 6/5/2004 Sources: Elmar Brok]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Ahmed, Kabir Mohabbat, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency
In the wake of the USS Cole bombing, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger meets with Defense Secretary William Cohen to discuss a new approach to targeting Osama bin Laden. Berger says: "We've been hit many times, and we'll be hit again. Yet we have no option beyond cruise missiles." He once again brings up the idea of a "boots on the ground" option—a Delta Force special operation to get bin Laden. A plan is drawn up but the order to execute it is never given. Cohen and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton oppose the plan. By December 21, the CIA reports that it strongly suspects that al-Qaeda was behind the bombing, but fails to definitively make that conclusion. That makes such an attack politically difficult. Says a former senior Clinton aide, "If we had done anything, say, two weeks before the election, we'd be accused of helping [presidential candidate] Al Gore." [Time, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004]
Entity Tags: William S. Cohen, Sandy Berger, Henry Hugh Shelton, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Albert Arnold ("Al") Gore, Jr.
After the attack on the USS Cole, the military not only draws up plans to directly target bin Laden (see November 7, 2000), but also comes up with a larger plan looking at alternatives to assassination. Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared a plan to incorporate military, economic, diplomatic, and political activities to pressure the Taliban to expel bin Laden. A "Phased Campaign Concept" calls for wider-ranging military strikes against the Taliban and other targets, but doesn't include contingency plans for an invasion of Afghanistan. The concept is briefed to Deputy National Security Adviser Donald Kerrick and other officials in December 2000, but it is never acted on. The military makes no similar plans after Bush's inauguration, and the CIA's invasion plans are mostly relied upon when the US invades Afghanistan in October 2001. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; New York Times, 4/4/2004]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Donald Kerrick, Central Intelligence Agency, Gregory Newbold, Taliban
CIA Director Tenet and other top CIA officials brief President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney, future National Security Adviser Rice, and other incoming national security officials on al-Qaeda and covert action programs in Afghanistan. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt recalls conveying that bin Laden is one of the gravest threats to the country. Bush asks whether killing bin Laden would end the problem. Pavitt says he answers that killing bin Laden would have an impact but not stop the threat. The CIA recommends the most important action to combat al-Qaeda is to arm the Predator drone and use it over Afghanistan. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; Reuters, 3/24/2004] However, while the drone is soon armed, Bush never gives the order to use it in Afghanistan until after 9/11 (see September 4, 2001).
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Al-Qaeda, James Pavitt, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan
The Washington Post reports, "The United States has quietly begun to align itself with those in the Russian government calling for military action against Afghanistan and has toyed with the idea of a new raid to wipe out Osama bin Laden. Until it backed off under local pressure, it went so far as to explore whether a Central Asian country would permit the use of its territory for such a purpose." Russia and the US are discussing "what kind of government should replace the Taliban. Thus, while claiming to oppose a military solution to the Afghan problem, the United States is now talking about the overthrow of a regime that controls nearly the entire country, in the hope it can be replaced with a hypothetical government that does not exist even on paper."
[Washington Post, 12/19/2000] It appears that all pre-9/11 plans to invade Afghanistan involve attacking from the north with Russia.
Entity Tags: United States, Osama bin Laden, Taliban, Russia
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics
Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke submits a plan to "roll back" al-Qaeda over a period of three to five years until it is ineffectual. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The main component is a dramatic increase in covert aid to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to first tie down the terrorists and then "eliminate the sanctuary" for bin Laden. Financial support for terrorist activities will be systematically attacked, nations fighting al-Qaeda will be given aid to defeat them, and the US will plan for direct military and covert action in Afghanistan. The plan will cost several hundred million dollars. However, since there are only a few weeks left before the Bush administration takes over, it is decided to defer the decision until the new administration is in place. One senior Clinton official later says, "We would be handing [the Bush administration] a war when they took office on January 20. That wasn't going to happen." However, the plan is rejected by the Bush administration and no action is taken (see January 25, 2001). According to one senior Bush administration official, the proposal amounts to "everything we've done since 9/11." [Time, 8/12/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Northern Alliance, Bush administration (43), Al-Qaeda, Clinton administration, Osama bin Laden
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger asks CIA Director how he would go after al-Qaeda if he were unconstrained by resources and policies. He assigns Cofer Black and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center to develops a plan for the incoming Bush administration. It is dubbed the "Blue Sky Memo." The CIA presents it to counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke on December 29, 2000. It recommends increased support to anti-Taliban groups and especially a major effort to back Ahmed Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance, to tie down al-Qaeda personnel before they leave Afghanistan. No action is taken on it in the last few weeks of the Clinton administration; and the new Bush administration does not appear interested in it either. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; Tenet, 2007, pp. 130-131] The National Security Council counterterrorism staff also prepares a strategy paper, incorporating ideas from the Blue Sky Memo. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004]
Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, Richard A. Clarke, Northern Alliance, Osama bin Laden, National Security Council, Bush administration (43), Al-Qaeda, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Clinton administration, Cofer Black, George J. Tenet, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency
Gen. Anthony Zinni [Source: US Marine Corps.]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton prepares a paper with 13 options for using force against bin Laden. Several of the options describe Special Forces raids to capture or kill bin Laden. But counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke will later say that when military operations on al-Qaeda were discussed, "the overwhelming message to the White House from the uniformed military leadership was, 'We don't want to do this.'" Shelton's chief of operations will later describe the paper as a tool to "educate" National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Clarke, and others about the "extraordinary complexity" of going ahead with any of the options. The military repeatedly complains that the CIA's intelligence about bin Laden isn't good enough while the CIA complains that the military's intelligence requirements are too demanding. One CIA document notes that there is "lots of desire" for a military strike against bin Laden amongst lower-level US military officials, but "reluctance at the political level." [Los Angeles Times, 7/25/2003; Coll, 2004, pp. 533] One reason for such reluctance is the close ties between the US military and Pakistan. Author Steve Coll will later note, "The Pentagon, especially General Anthony Zinni at Centcom, who remained close to [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf personally, emphasized the benefits of engagement with Pakistan's generals." [Coll, 2004, pp. 490]
Entity Tags: Anthony Zinni, Sandy Berger, Richard A. Clarke, Steve Coll, Henry Hugh Shelton, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden
The Predator drone. [Source: US military] (click image to enlarge)Even before President Bush's official inauguration, Clinton holdover counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke pushes National Security Adviser Rice and other incoming Bush officials to resume Predator drone flights over Afghanistan (originally carried out in September and October 2000) in an attempt to find and assassinate bin Laden. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002; CBS News, 6/25/2003] On January 10, Rice is shown a video clip of bin Laden filmed by a Predator drone the year before. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] Aware of an Air Force plan to arm the Predator, when Clarke outlines a series of steps to take against al-Qaeda on January 25 (see January 25, 2001), one suggestion is to go forward with new Predator drone reconnaissance missions in the spring and use an armed version when it is ready. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The original Air Force development plan calls for three years of Predator testing, but Clarke pushes so hard that a Hellfire missile is successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. The armed Predator will be fully ready by early June 2001 (see Early June-September 10, 2001). [CBS News, 6/25/2003; New Yorker, 7/28/2003] However, Rice apparently approves the use of the Predator but only as part of a broader strategy against al-Qaeda. Since that strategy will still not be ready before 9/11, the Predator will not be put into use before 9/11. [Associated Press, 6/22/2003]
Entity Tags: Stephen J. Hadley, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden
The US considers mounting an operation to snatch Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan and discusses this with Pakistan, but this operation apparently will not be attempted before 9/11. Pakistan is asked to support the operation, which is to be conducted by US special forces inside Afghanistan, and the matter is discussed by US general Tommy Franks and Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in January 2001. However, the Pakistani government advises the US that such an operation would be counterproductive and would further inflame religious sentiment in the region. [United Press International, 8/17/2001] The plan apparently will be foiled when details about it are leaked to a Pakistani newspaper in August 2001 (see August 17, 2001).
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Osama bin Laden, Thomas Franks, Pakistan, United States
Richard Clarke. [Source: Robert Flores/ Defense Information Systems Agency]Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke submits a proposal to National Security Adviser Rice and "urgently" asks for a Cabinet-level meeting on the al-Qaeda threat. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 230-31] He forwards his December 2000 strategy paper and a copy of his 1998 "Delenda Plan"
(see August 27, 1998). He lays out a proposed agenda for urgent action: Approve covert assistance to Ahmed Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] Significantly increase funding for CIA counterterrorism activity. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] Respond to the USS Cole bombing with an attack on al-Qaeda. (The link between al-Qaeda and that bombing had been assumed for months and is confirmed in the media two days later.) According to the Washington Post, "Clarke argue[s] that the camps [are] can't-miss targets, and they [matter]. The facilities [amount] to conveyor belts for al-Qaeda's human capital, with raw recruits arriving and trained fighters departing either for front lines against the Northern Alliance, the Afghan rebel coalition, or against American interests somewhere else. The US government had whole libraries of images filmed over Tarnak Qila and its sister camp, Garmabat Ghar, 19 miles farther west. Why watch al-Qaeda train several thousand men a year and then chase them around the world when they left?" No retaliation is taken on these camps until after 9/11. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] Go forward with new Predator drone reconnaissance missions in the spring and use an armed version when it is ready (see January 10-25, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] Step up the fight against terrorist fundraising. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] Be aware that al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the US are not just a potential threat, but are a "major threat in being." Additionally, more attacks have almost certainly been set in motion (see January 25, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] Rice's response to Clarke's proposal is that the Cabinet will not address the issue until it has been "framed" at the deputy secretary level. However, this initial deputy meeting is not given high priority and it does not take place until April 2001. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 230-31] Henry Shelton, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman until 9/11, says, "The squeaky wheel was Dick Clarke, but he wasn't at the top of their priority list, so the lights went out for a few months. Dick did a pretty good job because he's abrasive as hell, but given the [bureaucratic] level he was at" there was no progress. [Benjamin and Simon, 2002, pp. 335-36; Los Angeles Times, 3/30/2004] Some counterterrorism officials think the new administration responds slowly simply because Clarke's proposal originally came from the Clinton administration. [Time, 8/12/2002] For instance, Thomas Maertenson, on the National Security Council in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, says, "They really believed their campaign rhetoric about the Clinton administration. So anything [that administration] did was bad, and the Bushies were not going to repeat it." [New York Times, 3/24/2004; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 3/25/2004] The Bush administration will finally address the gist of Clarke's plan at a cabinet-level meeting on September 4, 2001, just one week before 9/11 (see September 4, 2001). Clarke will later comment that the plan adopted "on Sept. 4 is basically… what I proposed on Jan. 25. And so the time in between was wasted."
Entity Tags: Henry Hugh Shelton, Northern Alliance, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice, Clinton administration, Al-Qaeda, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Thomas Maertenson, Taliban, Ahmed Shah Massoud
Abdul Haq, a famous Afghan leader of the mujaheddin, convinces Robert McFarlane, National Security Adviser under President Ronald Reagan, that Haq and about 50 fellow commanders could lead a force to start a revolt against the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan. However, Haq wants to do this under the authority of Zahir Shah, the popular former king of Afghanistan, whom the US does not support. The CIA fails to give any support to Haq. Says one CIA official to McFarlane a few months later, "We don't yet have our marching orders concerning US policy; it may be that we will end up dealing with the Taliban." Haq goes ahead with his plans without US support, and is killed in October (see October 25, 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/2/2001]
Entity Tags: Robert C. McFarlane, Taliban, Abdul Haq, Zahir Shah, Central Intelligence Agency
John McLaughlin. [Source: CIA]According to a later account by CIA Director George Tenet, Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin expresses frustration at the lack of action about Osama bin Laden during a meeting of deputy cabinet officials. McLaughlin reportedly says, "I think we should deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban. They either hand bin Laden over or we rain hell on them." According to Tenet, "An odd silence followed. No one seemed to like the idea. Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, called John after the meeting and offered a friendly word of advice: 'You are going to get your suspenders snapped if you keep making policy recommendations. That is not your role.'" [Tenet, 2007, pp. 145]
Entity Tags: John E. McLaughlin, Richard Armitage, George J. Tenet
Rahmatullah Hashimi. [Source: PBS]Taliban envoy Rahmatullah Hashimi meets with reporters, middle-ranking State Department bureaucrats, and private Afghanistan experts in Washington. He carries a gift carpet and a letter from Afghan leader Mullah Omar for President Bush. He discusses turning bin Laden over, but the US wants to be handed bin Laden and the Taliban want to turn him over to some third country. A CIA official later says, "We never heard what they were trying to say. We had no common language. Ours was, 'Give up bin Laden.' They were saying, 'Do something to help us give him up.'… I have no doubts they wanted to get rid of him. He was a pain in the neck." Others claim the Taliban were never sincere. About 20 more meetings on giving up bin Laden take place up until 9/11, all fruitless. [Washington Post, 10/29/2001] Allegedly, Hashimi also proposes that the Taliban would hold bin Laden in one location long enough for the US to locate and kill him. However, this offer is refused. This report, however, comes from Laila Helms, daughter of former CIA director Richard Helms. While it's interesting that this information came out before 9/11, one must be skeptical, since Helms' job was public relations for the Taliban. [Village Voice, 6/6/2001] Hashimi will mention to a reporter in June 2001 that he was in the US for a total of six weeks. [United Press International, 6/14/2001] According to one article at the time, Hashimi meets with "several senior officials from the State Department, CIA and National Security Council but also from the non-governmental organization Council on Foreign Relations." Secretary of State Colin Powell is reportedly irate at the meetings because he had not been informed that high level officials would be meeting with Hashimi in the US. He blames CIA Director George Tenet "having laid on a red carpet for [Mullah] Omar's adviser." [Intelligence Newsletter, 4/19/2001] Hashimi reportedly directly meets with Tenet. [Irish Times, 11/19/2001]
Entity Tags: Taliban, US Department of State, Osama bin Laden, National Security Council, Rahmatullah Hashimi, Laila Helms, Colin Powell, Central Intelligence Agency, Council on Foreign Relations, Mullah Omar, George W. Bush, George J. Tenet
Mary McCarthy. [Source: Associated Press]CIA Director George Tenet will claim in his 2007 book that he attempts to get new covert action authorities to fight bin Laden at this time. He says he wants to move from a defensive to offensive posture, but needs policy backing at a higher level to do it. He meets with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and gives him a list of expanded authorities the CIA is seeking to go after bin Laden. The authorities would permit the CIA or its partners to kill bin Laden without trying to capture him first. Tenet claims that he tells Hadley, "I'm giving you this draft now, but first, you guys need to figure out what your policy is." The next day, Mary McCarthy, a CIA officer serving as National Security Council (NSC) senior director, calls Tenet's chief of staff and asks the CIA to take the draft back. She says something to the effect, "If you formally transmit these to the NSC, the clock will be ticking (to take action), and we don't want the clock to tick just now." Tenet withdraws the draft. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 143-144] A deputy cabinet level meeting in July 2001 discusses the idea, but no action results (see July 13, 2001). The authorities will be granted a few days after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Mary McCarthy, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Stephen J. Hadley, Osama bin Laden
Dan Hill, a former Army Ranger who has devised a plan to kill Osama bin Laden, is told by the FBI that his request for US military assistance, which he needs for his plan to go ahead, has been rejected. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 245] Hill and his friend Said Nader Zori have assembled a group of former mujahedeen fighters who are ready to go into Afghanistan to attack and kill bin Laden. The two men met with Ellen Glasser, an agent at the FBI office in Jacksonville, Florida, in the late spring of 2000 to discuss the plan and request military support, and Glasser said she would refer the proposal to FBI headquarters in Washington, DC (see (Between May and June 2000)). [Stewart, 2002, pp. 230-231] Since then, Hill has been pushing the FBI's Jacksonville office for a response to his request, but felt he was getting nowhere. Meanwhile, Nader Zori has been told by his sources in Afghanistan that something big is going to happen, probably during the holy month of Ramadan. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 244-245] (Ramadan this year will begin on November 16 and end on December 16. [New York Times, 12/13/2001; New York Times, 12/17/2001] ) Now, about a year after his meeting with Glasser, Hill receives a phone call from the FBI agent, informing him that his plan has been rejected. "Nothing can be done," she says. Hill is upset and tells Glasser that bin Laden "is not screwing around." He tells her about a report he wrote with his friend Rick Rescorla, which warned of the terrorist threat the US faced. [Stewart, 2002, pp. 245] Rescorla is the vice president for security at the Wall Street investment firm Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and works at the World Trade Center. [Washington Post, 10/28/2001; National Review, 9/20/2002] In their report, written after the 1993 WTC bombing, Hill and Rescorla warned that terrorists could carry out an attack that involved crashing a cargo plane into the Twin Towers (see Shortly After February 26, 1993). [Stewart, 2002, pp. 193-194] Hill tells Glasser that an attack involving terrorists deliberately crashing an aircraft is "going to strike New York, Philadelphia, or Washington, DC. Or maybe all three." He says the attack is likely to take place around Ramadan and so his plan to kill bin Laden needs to be put into action right away. But Glasser apologizes and again says, "Nothing can be done." Hill subsequently phones Rescorla and tells him that his plan will have to be called off. Rescorla tells Hill he is unsurprised at the FBI's response. "The FBI is a bunch of incompetent duds," he says. "And don't bother going to the CIA. It's just as bad." [Stewart, 2002, pp. 245]
Entity Tags: Ellen Glasser, Osama bin Laden, Daniel J. Hill, Rick Rescorla
Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. [Source: CNN]The Taliban begins blowing up two giant stone Buddhas of Bamiyan—ancient statues carved into an Afghan mountainside, which are considered priceless treasures. They face great international condemnation in response, but no longer seem to be courting international recognition. Apparently, even ISI efforts to dissuade them fail. [Time, 8/12/2002; Time, 8/12/2002] Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf wrote Taliban head Mullah Omar a four-page letter urging him not to blow up the statues, and the letter was secretly hand-delivered to Omar by IS Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, but the letter had no effect. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 409] Omar had previously announced the statues would not be harmed and even opened a National Museum in 2000. The change in policy appears to be due to bin Laden's growing influence. Journalist Kathy Gannon will later write, "bin Laden's hardliner rhetoric set the policy, and he campaigned vigorously for the destruction of the statues." The destruction of the statues further isolates the Taliban internationally, leaving them more dependent on bin Laden's generosity. [Gannon, 2005, pp. 79-81]
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Mahmood Ahmed, Taliban, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pipeline Politics, Pakistan and the ISI, Mahmood Ahmed
Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley chairs an informal meeting of some counterparts from other agencies to discuss al-Qaeda. They begin a broad review of the government's approach to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan. According to the New York Times, the approach is "two-pronged and included a crisis warning effort to deal with immediate threats and longer-range planning by senior officials to put into place a comprehensive strategy to eradicate al-Qaeda." Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke again pushes for immediate decisions on assisting Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Hadley suggests dealing with this as part of the broad review. Clarke supports a larger program, but he warns that delay risks the Alliance's defeat. Clarke also advocates using the armed Predator drone. However, despite an increasing number of alarming warnings following this meeting, there is little follow-up. "By June, a draft of a presidential directive authorizing an ambitious covert action plan is circulating through the upper echelons of the administration, but there seem[s] little urgency about putting the plan into effect." [New York Times, 3/24/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; New York Times, 4/4/2004]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Stephen J. Hadley, Northern Alliance, Al-Qaeda, Ahmed Shah Massoud
The Russian Permanent Mission at the United Nations secretly submits "an unprecedentedly detailed report" to the UN Security Council about bin Laden, his whereabouts, details of his al-Qaeda network, Afghan drug running, and Taliban connections to Pakistan and the ISI. The report provides "a listing of all bin Laden's bases, his government contacts and foreign advisers," and enough information to potentially locate and kill him. It is said to contain an "astonishing degree of information." The US fails to use the information in any noticable manner. Alex Standish, the editor of the highly respected Jane's Intelligence Review, concludes that the attacks of 9/11 were less of an American intelligence failure than the result of "a political decision not to act against bin Laden." [Jane's Intelligence Review, 10/5/2001; Times of India, 10/8/2001] In May 2002, Jane's will further comment,"it is becoming clear that this was only the most high profile of a number of attempts by the Russians to alert the US and other members of the Security Council to the extent of the inter-dependence between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the ISI. According to [our] Russian sources, there was a regular flow of information from Moscow to the US dating back to the last years of the Clinton presidency. It seems apparent, however, that although this intelligence was being received by the CIA and other US agencies, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm within political - as opposed to military - circles for the launch of pre-emptive strikes against either the Taliban or al-Qaeda. However, given the detailed intelligence being provided by the Russians - and the fact that bin Laden was making very clear threats to launch further strikes against US targets - it seems bizarre, to say the least, that no high-level political decision was taken to focus US intelligence efforts on al-Qaeda and its international network…" [Jane's Intelligence Digest, 5/28/2002]
Entity Tags: Russia, Al-Qaeda, United Nations, Osama bin Laden
In December 2000, the US and Russia cosponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring member states to "freeze without delay" the funds of those on a list of designated terrorists. The resolution passed, and the UN and European Union (EU) release the list on this day. It contains the names of five alleged al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden's security coordinator, brother-in-law, and financial handler. Yet strangely, the US itself does not freeze the assets of these five leaders, and will only so one month after 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). [United Nations, 3/8/2001; Los Angeles Times, 10/15/2001] The Guardian will report after 9/11, "Members of Congress want to know why treasury officials charged with disrupting the finances of terrorists did not follow" the UN and EU. [Guardian, 10/13/2001]
Entity Tags: European Union, United States, United Nations, Russia, US Department of the Treasury, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Terrorism Financing
Jane's Intelligence Review reports that the US is working with India, Iran, and Russia "in a concerted front against Afghanistan's Taliban regime." India is supplying the Northern Alliance with military equipment, advisers, and helicopter technicians and both India and Russia are using bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for their operation. [Jane's Intelligence Review, 3/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Tajikistan, Taliban, Russia, Northern Alliance, Iran, Uzbekistan, India
Peter Jouvenal. [Source: Dominc Medley]British cameraman Peter Jouvenal is reporting on Afghanistan at this time and using a young Afghan known only as "Ahmed" to run errands. Ahmed also has a job running errands for Osama bin Laden at the same time. Jouvenal will later recount that Ahmed was helping bin Laden by "meeting people in Pakistan and taking them across the border, taking messages around for Osama, buying his food, taking messages to the Internet and logging on and receiving, printing, sending." Ahmed buys bin Laden's meals most every day. But Jouvenal says that "somewhere on the line Ahmed tied up with the CIA" and decided that working for bin Laden was too dangerous. Ahmed asks Jouvenal for help to get a visa for himself and his family to defect to the US, which Ahmed eventually gets. He also tells Jouvenal that al-Qaeda is planning to hijack an airplane in the US in an attempt to get Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman released from prison. [Bergen, 2006, pp. 287-289] There are some similarities between Ahmed's case and the case of "Max" who leaves Afghanistan around the same time and warns of a hijacking, but there are differences as well (see March-April 2001). It is not known if they are the same person. Regardless, Ahmed's case contradicts CIA assertions that they never had any asserts close to bin Laden. It is not known why the CIA did not use Ahmed to track bin Laden's location or poison his food. One month later the White House will be warned of the hijacking plot, but it is unknown if this came from Ahmed or other sources (see May 23, 2001).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed (Afghan courier), Osama bin Laden, Peter Jouvenal, Omar Abdul-Rahman
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden, Other Possible Moles or Informants
Ahmed Shah Massoud speaking before European Parliament. [Source: Robert Sanchez/ Black Star]Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, has been trying to get aid from the US but his people are only allowed to meet with low level US officials. In an attempt to get his message across, he addresses the European Parliament: "If President Bush doesn't help us, these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon." [Dawn (Karachi), 4/7/2001; Time, 8/12/2002] A classified US intelligence document states, "Massoud's intelligence staff is aware that the attack against the US will be on a scale larger than the 1998 embassy bombings, which killed over two hundred people and injured thousands (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998)." [Defense Intelligence Agency, 11/21/2001 ] Massoud also meets privately with some CIA officials while in Europe (see Early April 2001). He tells them that his guerrilla war against the Taliban is faltering and unless the US gives a significant amount of aid, the Taliban will conquer all of Afghanistan. No more aid is forthcoming. [Washington Post, 2/23/2004]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Northern Alliance, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Ahmed Shah Massoud
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden
Gen. William F. Kernan (2002) [Source: Wikipedia]General William Kernan, commander in chief of the Joint Forces Command, later mentions: "The details of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan which fought the Taliban and al-Qaeda after the September 11 attacks, were largely taken from a scenario examined by Central Command in May 2001." [Agence France-Presse, 7/23/2002] This seems to contradict other accounts suggesting the military made no Afghanistan invasion plans or preparations after Bush took office (see December 2000).
Entity Tags: William Kernan, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, George W. Bush
John Walker Lindh.
[Source: Alexandria, Virginia, Sheriff's Department]John Walker Lindh, a young Caucasian man from California who has converted to Islam, travels to Peshawar, Pakistan, in an attempt to fight for Islamic causes. He had been studying the Koran for about six months elsewhere in Pakistan, but otherwise had no particularly special training, qualifications, or connections. Within days, he is accepted into al-Qaeda and sent to the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan. Seven other US citizens are already training there (see April-August 2001). He inadvertently learns details of the 9/11 attacks. In June, he is told by an instructor that "bin Laden had sent forth some fifty people to carry out twenty suicide terrorist operations against the United States and Israel." He learns that the 9/11 plot is to consist of five attacks, not the four that actually occur. The other fifteen operations are to take place later. He is asked if he wants to participate in a suicide mission, but declines. [Mahoney, 2003, pp. 162, 216; Bamford, 2004, pp. 234-36] News of Upcoming Attacks Are Widespread in Camps - Although Lindh does not tell this information to any US officials, the fact that he learns this much so quickly is indicative of how widely news of the upcoming attacks are spreading in the al-Qaeda training camps. For instance, early 2001, bin Laden gave a speech at one of the camps talking about an attack on the US that would kill thousands (see Early 2001). In the summer, bin Laden specifically urges trainees to pray for the success of an upcoming attack involving 20 martyrs (see Summer 2001). By July, a source will tell the CIA that (see July 2001) What Could an Informant in the Camps Learn? - Author James Bamford comments, "The decision to keep CIA employees at arm's length from [al-Qaeda] was a serious mistake. At the same moment the CIA was convinced al-Qaeda was impenetrable, a number of American citizens were secretly joining al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—and being welcomed with open arms." [Bamford, 2004, pp. 161]
Entity Tags: John Walker Lindh, James Bamford, Al-Qaeda, Al Farooq training camp, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Warning Signs
Secretary of State Powell announces that the US is granting $43 million in aid to the Taliban government, purportedly to assist hungry farmers who are starving since the destruction of their opium crop occurred in January on orders of the Taliban. [Los Angeles Times, 5/22/2001] Powell promises that the US will "continue to look for ways to provide more assistance to the Afghans." [Los Angeles Times, 4/13/2004] And in fact, in the same month Powell asks Congress to give Afghanistan $7 million more, to be used for regional energy cooperation and to fight child prostitution. [Coll, 2004, pp. 559] This follows $113 million given by the US in 2000 for humanitarian aid. [US Department of State, 12/11/2001] A Newsday editorial notes that the Taliban "are a decidedly odd choice for an outright gift… Why are we sending these people money—so much that Washington is, in effect, the biggest donor of aid to the Taliban regime?" [Newsday, 5/29/2001] However, there were allegations that the drug ban was merely a means for the Taliban to drive up prices (see July 2000). In fact, according to a March 2001 State Department report, "Prospects for progress on drug-control efforts in Afghanistan remain dim as long as the country remains at war. Nothing indicates that either the Taliban or the Northern Alliance intend to take serious action to destroy heroin or morphine base laboratories, or stop drug trafficking." [USA Today, 10/16/2001]
Entity Tags: US Department of State, Colin Powell, Taliban
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Drugs
According to a 2006 book by journalist Bob Woodward, in the months before 9/11, CIA Director Tenet believes that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is impeding the effort to develop a coherent strategy to capture or kill bin Laden. Rumsfeld questions al-Qaeda communications intercepts by the NSA and other other intelligence. [New York Times, 9/29/2006] Woodward writes in his book, "Could all this be a grand deception? Rumsfeld had asked. Perhaps it was a plan to measure US reactions and defenses. Tenet had the NSA review all the intercepts, and the agency concluded they were of genuine al-Qaeda communications." As a result of these doubts, on June 30, 2001, a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials contains an article entitled, "Bin Laden Threats Are Real" (see June 30, 2001). [Woodward, 2006, pp. 50] However, apparently this does not quell the doubts. For instance, in mid-July 2001, Tenet is told that Deputy Defense Secretary and close Rumsfeld ally Paul Wolfowitz still doubts the surge of warnings and suggests that bin Laden may merely be trying to study US reactions to an attack threat (see Mid-July 2001).
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, George J. Tenet
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Hunt for Bin Laden, Presidential Level Warnings
A confidential informant tells an FBI field office agent that he has been invited to a commando-training course at a training camp operated by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The information is passed up to FBI headquarters, which rejects the idea of infiltrating the camp. An "asset validation" of the informant, a routine but critical exercise to determine whether information from the source was reliable, is also not done. The FBI later has no comment on the story. [US News and World Report, 6/10/2002] Around this time, John Walker Lindh, a Caucasian US citizen who recently converted to Islam, goes to one of the training camps for the first time and learns details of the 9/11 in a matter of weeks (see May-June 2001). Also around this time, seven men from Lackawanna, New York, go to a training camp in Afghanistan and hear clues about the 9/11 attacks before they drop out after only a few weeks (see (June 2001)).
Entity Tags: John Walker Lindh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Other Possible Moles or Informants
The US considers substantially aiding Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Northern Alliance. As one counterterrorism official put it, "You keep [al-Qaeda terrorists] on the front lines in Afghanistan. Hopefully you're killing them in the process, and they're not leaving Afghanistan to plot terrorist operations." A former US special envoy to the Afghan resistance visits Massoud this month. Massoud gives him "all the intelligence he [has] on al-Qaeda" in the hopes of getting some support in return. However, he gets nothing more than token amounts and his organization isn't even given "legitimate resistance movement" status. [Time, 8/12/2002]
Entity Tags: Northern Alliance, United States, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Al-Qaeda
Two major terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and the Egypt-based Islamic Jihad, formally merged into one. This completes a merging process that had been going on for years (see August 11-20, 1988, December 1, 1996-June 1997, and February 22, 1998). The technical name of the new entity is Qaeda al-Jihad, though it is widely called al-Qaeda. Bin Laden remains in charge, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Islamic Jihad, remains second in command. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002]
Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Islamic Jihad, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden
Reclusive top Taliban leader Mullah Omar says the Taliban would like to resolve the Osama bin Laden issue, so there can be "an easing and then lifting of UN sanctions that are strangling and killing the people of [Afghanistan]." [United Press International, 4/9/2004]
Entity Tags: Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden
An Indian magazine reports more details of the cooperative efforts of the US, India, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran against the Taliban regime: "India and Iran will 'facilitate' US and Russian plans for 'limited military action' against the Taliban if the contemplated tough new economic sanctions don't bend Afghanistan's fundamentalist regime." Earlier in the month, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a meeting of the Confederation of Independent States that military action against the Taliban may happen, possibly with Russian involvement using bases and forces from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well. [IndiaReacts, 6/26/2001]
Entity Tags: Iran, Bob Kerry, India, Vladimir Putin, Taliban, Tajikistan, Russia
According to a later Guardian report, "reliable western military sources say a US contingency plan exist[s] on paper by the end of the summer to attack Afghanistan from the north."
[Guardian, 9/26/2001]
On this date, CIA Director George Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black give the White House an urgent al-Qaeda briefing that, if heeded, Black later believes could have stopped bin Laden. Tenet and Black strongly suggest that both an overall strategy and immediate covert or military action against bin Laden are needed (see July 10, 2001). According to a 2006 book by journalist Bob Woodward that is likely paraphrasing Black, one of Woodward's sources for his book, "Black calculated that if [the White House] had given him $500 million of covert action funds right then and reasonable authorizations from the president to go kill bin Laden, he would have been able to make great strides if not do away with him.… Over the last two years—and as recently as March 2001—the CIA had deployed paramilitary teams five times into Afghanistan to work with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, a loose federation of militias and tribes in the north. The CIA had about 100 sources and subsources operating throughout Afghanistan. Just give him the money and the authority and he might be able to bring bin Laden's head back in a box." [Woodward, 2006, pp. 77-78; New York Daily News, 9/29/2006]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black
The Bush administration again denies the CIA expanded authorities to go on the offensive against bin Laden. These authorities would include permission to assassinate bin Laden without making an attempt to capture him alive first. In March 2001, the CIA wanted to give a draft request about this to the Bush administration, but officials weren't ready so the draft was withdrawn (see Early March 2001). On July 13, three days after a dramatic CIA presentation about a likely upcoming al-Qaeda attack (see July 10, 2001), a meeting of deputy cabinet officials is held to discuss the CIA's expanded authorities request. However, no decisions are made. Tenet will later comment, "the bureaucracy moved slowly." The Bush administration will grant these authorities a few days after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency
Niaz Naik. [Source: Calcutta Telegraph (left)]Three former American officials, Tom Simons (former US Ambassador to Pakistan), Karl Inderfurth (former Deputy Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs), and Lee Coldren (former State Department expert on South Asia) meet with Pakistani and Russian intelligence officers in a Berlin hotel. [Salon, 8/16/2002] This is the third of a series of back-channel conferences called "brainstorming on Afghanistan." Taliban representatives sat in on previous meetings, but boycotted this one due to worsening tensions. However, the Pakistani ISI relays information from the meeting to the Taliban. [Guardian, 9/22/2001] At the meeting, Coldren passes on a message from Bush officials. He later says, "I think there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action." [Guardian, 9/26/2001] Accounts vary, but former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik later says he is told by senior American officials at the meeting that military action to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan is planned to "take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest." The goal is to kill or capture both bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, topple the Taliban regime, and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place. Uzbekistan and Russia would also participate. Naik also says, "It was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately by the Taliban." [BBC, 9/18/2001] One specific threat made at this meeting is that the Taliban can choose between "carpets of bombs"
—an invasion—or "carpets of gold"
—the pipeline. [Brisard and Dasquie, 2002, pp. 43] Naik contends that Tom Simons made the "carpets" statement. Simons claims, "It's possible that a mischievous American participant, after several drinks, may have thought it smart to evoke gold carpets and carpet bombs. Even Americans can't resist the temptation to be mischievous." Naik and the other American participants deny that the pipeline was an issue at the meeting. [Salon, 8/16/2002]
Entity Tags: Uzbekistan, Tom Simons, Russia, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar, Lee Coldren, Niaz Naik, Osama bin Laden, Karl Inderfurth, Taliban, Bush administration (43)
King Abdullah II. [Source: David Bohrer/ White House]CIA Director George Tenet will later reveal that on this day, he learns in a briefing that King Abdullah II of Jordan is offering to help the US with troops to defeat bin Laden in a decisive military manner. He offers to send two battalions (roughly between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers) of "Jordanian Special Forces to go door to door in Afghanistan, if necessary, to deal with al-Qaeda. The offer was a wonderful gesture but would have to have been part of a larger overall strategy in order to succeed. To King Abdullah, bin Laden was the greatest threat in the world to his nation's security…." [Tenet, 2007, pp. 156] There is a claim that al-Qaeda plotted an assassination of King Abdullah II, which was aborted when he learned of the plot in the summer of 2000. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 133] After 9/11, it will be reported that in July 2001, Jordan warned the US that al-Qaeda was planning an attack inside the US (see July 2001). It will also be reported that in the late summer of 2001, Jordan warned the US of a major al-Qaeda attack inside the US using aircraft. They say it is codenamed "The Big Wedding," which is al-Qaeda's codename for the 9/11 attacks (see Late Summer 2001).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, George J. Tenet, Jordan
In his 2007 book, CIA Director George Tenet will write that on this day, "From Afghanistan came word that the Taliban intelligence chief, Qari Amadullah, was interested in establishing secret contact, outside the country and without Mullah Omar's knowledge, "to save Afghanistan." [Tenet, 2007, pp. 156] However, it is unclear if the offer was acted upon because Tenet has nothing more to say about it. The 9/11 Commission will later report that in July a deep schism developed in the Taliban and even al-Qaeda leadership over the wisdom of going through with the 9/11 attacks. Apparently, even top Taliban leader Mullah Omar was ideologically opposed to the attacks at this time, though he may have changed his mind before 9/11. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 251-252]
Entity Tags: Mullah Omar, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Taliban, Qari Amadullah
Abdul Haq, a famous Afghan leader of the mujaheddin, returns to Peshawar, Pakistan, from the US. Having failed to gain US support, except for that of some private individuals such as former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Haq begins organizing subversive operations in Afghanistan. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/2/2001] He is later killed entering Afghanistan in October 2001, after his position is reportedly betrayed to the Taliban by the ISI.
Entity Tags: Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Abdul Haq, Robert C. McFarlane
A US plan to snatch Osama bin Laden inside Afghanistan (see January 19, 2001) is revealed in the Pakistan press, after the US asks Pakistan for assistance with the plot. An article that runs in the Pakistan newspaper The News also says that the US and Pakistan have discussed a sting operation in Afghanistan using US special forces, but that Pakistan has advised Washington against it. After a UN resolution tightening sanctions against the Taliban, General Tommy Franks, commander-in-chief of US Central Command, discussed the plan with his Pakistani counterparts and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf during a visit to Islamabad in January 2001 (see January 19, 2001). [United Press International, 8/17/2001] There is some suggestion that the operation is attempted, but only partially successful, after 9/11 (see (September 26, 2001)).
Entity Tags: US Central Command, Osama bin Laden, Thomas Franks, Pervez Musharraf
It is reported in Russia and Pakistan that the Taliban has named bin Laden commander of the Afghanistan army. [United Press International, 8/30/2001]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Osama bin Laden
President Bush's cabinet-rank advisers discuss terrorism for the second of only two times before 9/11. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002] National Security Adviser Rice chairs the meeting; neither President Bush nor Vice President Cheney attends. Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke later says that in this meeting, he and CIA Director Tenet speak passionately about the al-Qaeda threat. No one disagrees that the threat is serious. Secretary of State Powell outlines a plan to put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting al-Qaeda. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld appears to be more interested in Iraq. The only debate is over whether to fly the armed Predator drone over Afghanistan to attack al-Qaeda (see September 4, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 237-38] Clarke's earlier plans to "roll back" al-Qaeda first submitted on January 25, 2001 (see January 25, 2001) have been discussed and honed in many meetings and are now presented as a formal National Security Presidential Directive. The directive is "apparently" approved, though the process of turning it into official policy is still not done. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] There is later disagreement over just how different the directive presented is from Clarke's earlier plans. For instance, some claim the directive aims not just to "roll back" al-Qaeda, but also to "eliminate" it altogether. [Time, 8/12/2002] However, Clarke notes that even though he wanted to use the word "eliminate," the approved directive merely aims to "significantly erode" al-Qaeda. The word "eliminate" is only added after 9/11. [Washington Post, 3/25/2004] Clarke will later say that the plan adopted "on Sept. 4 is basically… what I proposed on Jan. 25. And so the time in between was wasted." [ABC News, 4/8/2004] The Washington Post will similarly note that the directive approved on this day "did not differ substantially from Clinton's policy." [Washington Post, 3/27/2004] Time magazine later comments, "The fight against terrorism was one of the casualties of the transition, as Washington spent eight months going over and over a document whose outline had long been clear." [Time, 8/12/2002] The primary change from Clarke's original draft is that the approved plan calls for more direct financial and logistical support to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups. The plan also calls for drafting plans for possible US military involvement, "but those differences were largely theoretical; administration officials told the [9/11 Commission's] investigators that the plan's overall timeline was at least three years, and it did not include firm deadlines, military plans, or significant funding at the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks." [Washington Post, 3/27/2004; Reuters, 4/2/2004]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Al-Qaeda, Northern Alliance, Donald Rumsfeld, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice
Attendees to an important cabinet-level meeting on terrorism have a heated debate over what to do with the armed Predator drone, which has been ready for use over Afghanistan since June 2001 (see Early June-September 10, 2001). Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke has been repeatedly pushing for the use of the Predator over Afghanistan (in either armed or unarmed versions), and he again argues for its immediate use. Everyone agrees that the armed Predator capability is needed, but there are disputes over who will manage and/or pay for it. CIA Director Tenet says his agency will operate the armed Predator "over my dead body." [Washington Post, 10/2/2002] Clarke recalls, "The Air Force said it wasn't their job to fly planes to collect intelligence. No one around the table seemed to have a can-do attitude. Everyone seemed to have an excuse." [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] National Security Adviser Rice concludes that the armed Predator is not ready (even though it had been proven in tests during the summer), but she also presses Tenet to reconsider his opposition to immediately resume reconnaissance flights, suspended since September the year before. After the meeting, Tenet agrees to proceed with such flights. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The armed Predator is activated just days after 9/11, showing that it was ready to be used after all. [Associated Press, 6/25/2003]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Drone Use in Pakistan / Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Massoud's two assassins pictured just before their assassination attempt. One holds the rigged video camera. [Source: CNN]General Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, is assassinated by two al-Qaeda agents posing as Moroccan journalists. [Time, 8/12/2002] A legendary mujaheddin commander and a brilliant tactician, Massoud had pledged to bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan. The BBC says the next day, "General Massoud's death might well have meant the end of the [Northern] alliance" because there clearly was no figure with his skills and popularity to replace him. [BBC, 9/10/2001; BBC, 9/10/2001] "With Massoud out of the way, the Taliban and al-Qaeda would be rid of their most effective opponent and be in a stronger position to resist the American onslaught." [St. Petersburg Times, 9/9/2002] It appears the assassination was supposed to happen earlier: the "journalists" waited for three weeks in Northern Alliance territory to meet Massoud. Finally on September 8, an aide says they "were so worried and excitable they were begging us." They were granted an interview after threatening to leave if the interview did not happen in the next 24 hours. Meanwhile, the Taliban army (together with elements of the Pakistani army) had massed for an offensive against the Northern Alliance in the previous weeks, but the offensive began only hours after the assassination. Massoud was killed that day but Northern Alliance leaders pretend for several days that Massoud was only injured in order to keep the Northern Alliance army's morale up, and they are able to stave off total defeat. The timing of the assassination and the actions of the Taliban army suggest that the 9/11 attacks were known to the Taliban leadership. [Time, 8/12/2002] Though it is not widely reported, the Northern Alliance releases a statement the next day: "Ahmed Shah Massoud was the target of an assassination attempt organized by the Pakistani [intelligence service] ISI and Osama bin Laden" (see September 10, 2001). [Radio Free Europe, 9/10/2001; Newsday, 9/15/2001; Reuters, 10/4/2001] This suggests that the ISI may also have had prior knowledge of the attack plans.
Entity Tags: Ahmed Shah Massoud, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Northern Alliance
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
Pakistani ISI Director Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who is visiting Washington (see September 4-11, 2001), meets with CIA Director George Tenet. In his 2007 book, Tenet will claim that he "tried to press" Mahmood to do something about Taliban support for bin Laden, since the Pakistani government has been supporting the Taliban since its creation in 1994. But Mahmood was supposedly "immovable when it came to the Taliban and al-Qaeda." Tenet will say that Mahmood's sole suggestion was the US should try bribing key Taliban officials to get them to turn over bin Laden. However, "even then he made it clear that neither he nor his service would have anything to do with the effort, not even to the extent of advising us whom we might approach." [Tenet, 2007, pp. 141-142]
Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, George J. Tenet, Osama bin Laden, Taliban
Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden, Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Mahmood Ahmed
The US military never uses its elite units to hunt Osama bin Laden or any other al-Qaeda leaders before 9/11. US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is said to have less than 1000 operatives, mainly Navy Seals and Army Delta Force, which are the most trained and qualified personnel in the US for hunting fugitives. Professor Richard Shultz at Tufts University's Fletcher School will be commissioned by the Pentagon shortly after 9/11 to research why such special forces were not used before 9/11 to hunt bin Laden or other al-Qaeda leaders. He will find that US military leaders always said they needed better intelligence. They did a lot of planning but took no action. Shultz will say, "It's your strike force, and yet it was never used once for its primary mission before Sept. 11." JSOC forces will have more successes after 9/11, including playing roles in the capture of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 (see June 8, 2006). [San Francisco Examiner, 3/2/2007]
Entity Tags: Richard Shultz, Navy Seals, Special Operations Command, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment--Delta
Another deputies meeting further considers policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and makes further revisions to the National Security Presidential Directive regarding al-Qaeda. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] By the end of the meeting, a formal, three-phase strategy is agreed upon. An envoy is to go to Afghanistan and give the Taliban another chance to expel Osama bin Laden. If this fails, more pressure will be put on the Taliban, including more support for the Northern Alliance and other groups. If the Taliban still refuse to change, the US will try to overthrow them through more direct action. The time-frame for this strategy is about three years. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] CIA Director George Tenet is formally tasked to draw up new authorities for the covert action program envisioned and request funding to implement it. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The directive is then to be sent to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for approval. President Bush is apparently aware of the directive and prepared to sign it (though he hasn't attended any of the meetings about it), but he will not sign it until October. [MSNBC, 5/16/2002; Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2002; Washington Post, 4/1/2004]
Entity Tags: Northern Alliance, Osama bin Laden, Taliban, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet, Al-Qaeda
Newsweek will report in 2006, "The intelligence community generally agrees that the number of true A-list al-Qaeda operatives out there around the time of 9/11 was no more than about 1,000, perhaps as few as 500, most in and around Afghanistan." [Newsweek, 6/28/2006] John Arquilla, a Special Operations expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, makes a higher end estimate, claiming "there were probably 3,000 core al-Qaeda operatives" around the time of 9/11. [Newsweek, 8/28/2007] US intelligence will later conclude that about 20,000 people passed through al-Qaeda training camps from 1996 to 9/11, and many of them will keep some level of affiliation with the group. However, only about 180 operatives have pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden by 9/11. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will say, "Al-Qaeda is an elite organization that takes very few members." [New York Times, 9/10/2002; US News and World Report, 6/2/2003] Ali Soufan, an FBI agent focusing on al-Qaeda before 9/11, will later claim that at the time of 9/11, al-Qaeda had about 400 members. [Soufan, 2011, pp. xxiii] Author Terry McDermott will later comment: "Over 20-plus years, tens of thousands of men went through the Afghan training camps. In the same period, nearly a dozen attacks attributed to Islamic fundamentalists occurred around the world. But most of these men and most of these attacks had little, other than overlapping intent, to do with al-Qaeda. Most were independent groups running independent, often local, operations. In the attacks that were instigated by al-Qaeda, the same handful of people were involved in virtually every one. Even foot soldiers were recycled to new operations. The organization was so small that almost everybody in it at one time or another had personal interactions with top leadership." [McDermott, 2005, pp. 194, 201-202]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna, Terry McDermott, Ali Soufan, John Arquilla
British Prime Minister Tony Blair states, "We knew about al-Qaeda for a long time. They were committing terrorist acts, they were planning, they were organizing. Everybody knew, we all knew, that Afghanistan was a failed state living on drugs and terror. We did not act.… To be truthful about it, there was no way we could have got the public consent to have suddenly launched a campaign on Afghanistan but for what happened on September 11."
[London Times, 7/17/2002] In a book released one month later, Clinton's former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger will similarly state, "You show me one reporter, one commentator, one member of Congress who thought we should invade Afghanistan before September 11 and I'll buy you dinner in the best restaurant in New York City."
[Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 219]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Sandy Berger, Tony Blair
Key Events
Day of 9/11
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases
Projects and Programs
Before 9/11
Counterterrorism before 9/11
Warning Signs: Specific Cases
The Post-9/11 World
Investigations: Specific Cases
Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants
Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures
Al-Qaeda by Region
Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots
Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues
Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy
Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases
Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases
'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq
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Klesick Family Farms), and I thought I'd share how easy it is to prepare! My mom used to boil corn, which definitely works....but we've found that grilling it is a SUPER easy way to prepare it, and brings out a lot of flavor. PLUS, it comes in it's own handy packaging - no need for aluminum foil on the grill! Even on a cold fall or winter day, this is a great way to prepare it:
1. Soak corn (with husks on, but silk tips trimmed off) for 10-15 minutes.
2. Place them on a pre-heated grill on Medium heat
4. The corn should be cooked after about 30 minutes. The pre-soaking method steams it at the same time as it grills.
5. Carefully (with hot mitts) shuck the corn, and enjoy!
Do you have a favorite corn on the cob recipe??
Recent Posts
Friday, October 22, 2010
Easy corn on the cob
Posted by Winkydinks

subset: commoncrawl


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After much thought, I have decided to spend more energy in/on other parts of my life, which means stepping away from The Sparks Project online. The journey has been very educational and enriching, and I want to thank all of you readers and visitors for your interest and support.
I send you love and light as this hummingbird takes flight to the next flower. 😉
special powers
take heart
Happy 2016
Today's inspirational spark:


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WHITSETT � There have been times Stanford Smith couldn�t tell his daughter�s cooking from his wife�s. And that�s a compliment, seeing as both women have been honored as Times-News� Cooks of the Month.
Stanford�s wife, Hasseena Smith, was Cook of the Month in September 2012, and his daughter, Kaamilya Furman, is Cook of the Month for April.
Kaamilya graduated from Johnson & Wales University in Charlotte last May. It was through her studies there that she gained the confidence to experiment with ingredients and concentrate on presentation.
�That�s what I love � the presentation,� she said. �You do, after all, eat with your eyes.�
When Kaamilya was a senior at Eastern Guilford High School, Kathy Jo Mitchell came to speak to her class about Johnson & Wales University. Mitchell�s talk, Kaamilya said, inspired her to attend the school. The tips and tricks she learned at the university have encouraged her to pursue a career in food services and strengthened her ability as a chef.
�She doesn�t play around when she�s in the kitchen,� Hasseena said. �She does well with properly putting a menu together and making sure each dish complements the next. Kaamilya has learned and taught me how to make some salad dressings and sauces from scratch with items we have here in our kitchen cabinets.�
Kaamilya, along with her mother, are on the hospitality committee at Clapp�s Chapel AME Church in Whitsett and prepared a meal on Feb. 24 to celebrate Heritage Day. Those in attendance wore African attire and Kaamilya and Hasseena made Jamaican Jerk Chicken, potato croquettes, green beans and baked chicken.
�Everyone really seemed to enjoy the food and complimented us on it,� Hasseena said.
During a recent visit to their home, Kaamilya prepared two of her mother�s favorite dishes, Bourbon chicken with homemade bourbon sauce and potato croquettes.
�They are so delicious,� Hasseena said, observing the preparation of the potato croquettes, or as she referred to them � �potato cakes.�
Both Hasseena and Kaamilya also prepare healthier versions of drinks and dishes because some family members have suffered from high blood pressure, high cholesterol and heart disease. Kaamilya went to the cabinet and pulled out organic sugar, which she uses in recipes.
Kaamilya currently works at the Food Lion on Ramada Road in Burlington in the deli as a cashier and cake decorator; cake decorating was one of the skills she learned at Johnson & Wales.
When she�s not preparing food for others, though, Kaamilya described her food tastes as �plain Jane.� �I like simple foods, not fancy.�
Since she has such a passion for food, Kaamilya would like to be a caterer someday.
�I love watching others sample my food,� she said with a smile.
We�re looking for Cooks of the Month
Do you know someone worthy of being recognized as Cook of the Month? If so, contact Charity Apple at email@example.com or (336) 506-3057. We are looking for cooks for May, June and July at the moment.
Cook of the Month is published on the next to the last Wednesday of each month in Accent�s Food section.
Sweet Bourbon Chicken
5 boneless, skinless chicken breasts, diced
� cup butter, melted
� cup whiskey
1 medium onion
2 tablespoons parsley
� cup lemon juice
� tablespoon brown sugar
� cup honey
Mix all ingredients well and marinate chicken for one to four hours. Melt butter in pan; add chicken until tender. Remove chicken when it begins to crisp up. Cook chicken in small batches.
For sauce, use the same marinade ingredients listed above, but with � cup heavy cream, and heat on stovetop until it begins to thicken. Top chicken with sauce and serve.
Orange-Filled Slices
3 oranges, sliced in half and remove pulp. Fill with strawberry Jell-O make for a beautiful presentation. You can also add Yogurt (plain) with diced strawberry chunks mixed and filled into oranges.
�n Cook�s note: You can make this either with Jell-O or yogurt.
Beer-battered Fried Shrimp
2 cups flour, seasoned with tablespoon of salt and pepper
3 cups beer (any, except dark)
3 cups all-purpose flour
3 teaspoons salt
2� pounds shrimp, shelled and deveined
In a bowl, whisk beer into flour until smooth and stir in salt. Make several shallow cuts across each shrimp.
Dredge shrimp in seasoned flour first, then in batter to coat completely, letting excess drip off. Fry in a 350-degree F. fryer, working in batches and turning until golden brown, about 3 minutes. Drain excess oil and season with salt.
Spicy Sour Dressing
� cup vegetable oil
12 garlic cloves, thinly sliced
2 cups peeled carrots, finely diced
2 cups red peppers, finely diced
3 tablespoons rice vinegar
2 limes
2 cups golden brown sugar
6 tablespoons chili paste or Sriracha hot sauce
Heat the oil in a heavy medium skillet over medium heat. Add garlic and saut� until golden, about 2 minutes. Add carrot and bell pepper; saut� 2 minutes.
Add vinegar, lime juice and sugar. Bring to a boil, stirring until sugar dissolves.
Remove from heat and cool. Add paste or Sriracha and season; blend until smooth.
Potato Croquettes
2 pounds russet potatoes
3 large eggs
1 tablespoon chopped parsley
� teaspoon chopped tarragon
2 tablespoons unsalted butter
1/8 teaspoon black pepper
� cup flour (or as needed)
� cup breadcrumbs (or as needed)
Peel potatoes. Cut into 2-inch pieces and boil until tender; drain until potatoes are dry. Mash the potatoes and cool them. Lightly beat 1 egg into the cooled potatoes along with herbs, butter, salt and pepper and mix well. Now you can begin to roll potatoes to your desired size. Lightly beat remaining eggs into bowl and set aside. Spread flour and bread crumbs onto pan. Working in batches roll croquettes in flour to coat and gently shake off excess and then dip in egg. Let excess drip off then roll into bread crumbs and return to tray. Chill potatoes for about 30 minutes and you can begin to fry them.


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text:
Experience our universe as youve never seen it before
13.7 billion years old. 93 billion light-years across. It contains over 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of billions of stars. This infinite, vast and complex Universe has been the subject of human fascination and scientific exploration for thousands of years. The wonders of the Universe might seem alien to us and impossible to understand, but away from the telescopes, the labs and the white coats, Professor Brian Cox uses the evidence found in the natural world on Earth to brilliantly explain the truth of the cosmos.
Professor Cox will show how the vast and unfathomable phenomena of deep space can be explained, and even experienced, by re-examining the familiar here on Earth. He is determined to answer the most profound questions we can ask about ourselves and the world in which we live, but in a uniquely understandable way. The laws of light, gravity, time, matter and energy that govern us here on Earth are the same as those applied in the Universe. Using his expert knowledge and his infectious enthusiasm, Professor Cox shows us that if we can understand the impact of these governing laws on Earth it will bring us a step closer to an understanding of our Universe.


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Early nightfall claimed another victim last week.
I had planned to ride to the Walk/Bike Nashville social last Wednesday night after work. Though in a part of town I don't visit often, the venue was only 4.5 miles away from my office, the night was relatively mild, and I had prepared by wearing the right clothes.
I considered taking the Bat, with its generator light in front, but it starts feeling heavy if I ride more than 10 miles or so. I decided to take Kermit Allegra, since the Mini Monkey Light is impossible to miss and I also have a great fender taillight that I installed over the summer. And I'd just replaced the batteries on my headlamp, which had been burnt out for a while.
Unfortunately, my headlamp was not up to snuff on the dark side streets I'd mapped out (to avoid busy roads at rush hour). At worst it was as above; at best it was as below, when the inadequate streetlight was broken by individual house lights.
I rode this bike most of last winter without an issue, but I think this was the first time I've ridden it in the dark, alone, on side streets that I was not familiar with. On my route home, and on the routes I use for most places I go regularly, there might be a few dim blocks, but I am so familiar with them that I know whether a shadow is a pothole or a branch or a crack in the concrete. In those circumstances, light that functions mostly to let me be seen is workable, if not ideal. Not so on these roads. When I realized I had passed two miles braking for obstacles (imagined or real), I decided it was time to turn around, go home and get my car.
Lights that illuminate the street well have been elusive for me. I find that handlebar lights don't have a wide enough beam, and front fork lights are often diffused by the fender, as displayed above. Again, these issues are workable if I keep to familiar and/or busier routes, but it's frustrating to have my rides limited in this way. What front light do you use that allows you to both see and be seen? I'm thinking of trying a side wheel mount light like the one on Dottie's Oma, which works on the dark sections of the Lakefront Path. If anyone can recommend an aftermarket front light worth considering, I'm all ears. Money is…well, it's an object, but I'd rather spend $50 on a light that works than get five crappy ones that don't end up helping the situation.


text: Starting a small business? Repairing a car? Seeking more information about a health concern? Learning to box? One of the busiest departments at the library, Business Science and Technology houses collections covering many aspects of business, personal finance, mathematics, computers, physical sciences, medicine, psychology, gardening, technology, cooking, sports, games, home repair, automotive repair, and military science.


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MIDNIGHT eastern time to be exact.
I can't hardly wait!!
I truly enjoy conceptualizing fun and unique ways to use our sets. Here are some variations of stamps using HULLABALOO.
- The gift bow can be used as a butterfly (stamp it back to back)
- There are 2 confetti options
- There are 2 gift bow options
- There is a solid circle that fits perfectly inside the open round balloon
- The solid triangle does not fit perfectly in the open triangle...there will be a tiny thin space between the two images. I love the look that you get, so I decided to design them this way.
- There are 2 balloon string options
- The smiley face is a separate stamp
- Use the solid rectangle to create a pattern
- The triangle stamps can be used as banners or party hats
- LOL...looking at this now, I forgot to stamp the smile onto the solid yellow circle (oopse) Please imagine a smile face there :)
And here is a card using all of the geometric images from the set. I imagine you could recreate this with different colors to work for anyone at any age.
There's still time to comment on our design team blogs for yur chance to win one of the new sets. Check out yesterday's blog hop post if you missed it.
Have a nice weekend, friends