■' In onr opinion, therefore, our approach to India is
important only in the sense that we have at last achieved
a position that will enable ua at any time, in case of
absolute necessity, to strike a blow at England, which haa
hitherto been so far as we were concerned simply invul-
nerable. It is evident that by far the most advantageouB
policy for us to pursue in regard to India is not that of
conquest, but of freeing the Hindoos from the British
yoke. Such a policy, too, is morally a much higher one
than that of mere conquest, which could only be justified
by the irresistible force of circumstances.
'■ Taldng our stand at Merv, on the borders of Afghan-
istan, we are near enough to India for our purpose— that
is : to strike a blow at England if oeceasair. Afghani-
stan, which separates us, may be compared in position to
Eoumania, which in like manner separated us before the
last war from Turkey.
" The one did not prevent our movement on the
Danube, nor will the other stop our march to the Indus.
" Thus the conquest of Afghanistan is also quite un-
necessary—the more so, since in regard to our position at
Merv and on the Oius that counti^ is more defenceless
than on the side of British India. The population is
about equal to that of Eoumania — some five million souls
all told.
" The whole of the available strength of this population
can be concentrated against ludia, but not against ua.
