It  would  be  singular  indeed,  if  the  complainant  could  be
assisted  to  set  aside  the  bar  of  the  statute,  by  showing  that
third  persons  had  made  re})eated  attempts  to  set  up  the  title
on  which  she  relies,  and  had  failed  in  those  attempts.  It  is
true,  the  bill  charges  that  they  did  recover  some  verdicts.
208  RHODE  ISLAND.
Moore  v.  Greene  et  ci,

which  were  set  aside,  or  appealed  from,  or  reviewed,  so  that
no  final  judgment  was  rendered  thereon ;  and  it  attributes
these  failures  to  causes,  which  being  disrespectful  to  the
Courts  and  Judges  of  the  State  of  Rhode  Island,  should  hard-
ly have  been  stated,  without  some  evidence  to  support  them  ;
and  I  find  no  such  evidence  on  the  record.
My  opinion  is,  that  there  was  the  necessary  seizin  and  pos-
session to  constitute  a  bar,  unless  the  complainant  can  bring
the  case  within  the  proviso  of  the  statute,  by  showing  some
disability.
The  facts  upon  this  point  are,  that  the  seizin  of  those  under
whom  the  respondents  claim,  began  in  1767.  In  1777,  Betsy
Waterman,  the  complainant's  mother,  became  of  age,  and  her
title  would  become  barred  in  1787.  Why  was  not  her  title
then  barred  ?  The  complainant's  counsel  makes  several  an-
swers.
That  she  was  then  under  coverture.  But  it  is  settled  that
cumulative  disabilities  cannot  be  allowed.  A  party  can  avail
himself  only  of  the  disability  which  existed  when  the  title
was  acquired.  There  are  many  decisions  that  if  an  infant
marry,  her  right  of  action  is  barred  when  the  time  allowed  to
her,  as  an  infant,  has  expired,  although  she  may  then  be  un-
der coverture.  But  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  decision  of  the
Supreme  Court  in  Mercer^s  Lessee  v.  Selderi^  1  How.  37.
