The  new  Franco-German  frontier  was  so  formidably
fortified  there  could  be  no  question  of  a  German
army  penetrating  it  quickly.  And  yet  this  appeared  to
be  necessary  for  Germany  in  a  war  on  two  fronts,  if
she  was  to  dispose  of  France  as  quickly  as  possible,  in
order  to  be  able  to  turn  with  all  her  strength  on  Russia
alone.
It  did  not  seem  possible  to  break  through  quickly  on
the  Alsace  front.  The  northern  French  frontier  was
therefore  all  the  more  tempting.  Strangely  enough,
the  French  had  only  fortified  the  Alsace  frontier  very
strongly.  They  felt  themselves  so  secured  by  Belgium
that  they  did  not  sufficiently  fortify  the  northern  frontier.
And  even  in  July,  1914,  when  the  danger  of  war  arose,
and  all  the  world  was  arming  and  concentrating  troops,
the  French  Army  devoted  its  attention  mainly  to  the
east  and  not  to  the  north.
The  northern  frontier  was  France's  weak  spot.  If
Germany  made  a  surprise  break-through  at  this  point,
she  might  hope  to  overcome  all  resistance  in  a  few
vigorous  blows,  occupy  Paris,  and  not  only  Paris  but
also  Calais,  the  sally-gate  against  England.
From  the  purely  military  point  of  view,  then,  the
break-through  via  Belgium  was  certainly  the  obvious
thing  to  do.  It  is  true  that  the  example  of  Alsace-
Lorraine  might  have  shown  how  dangerous  may  be  the
effect  of  militarist  opportunism  gaining  the  upper  hand
over  a  far-seeing  national  policy,  which  not  only  considers


The  Declaration  of  War  on  Belgium       235

the  military  but  also  the  political  and  economic,  and,
above  all,  the  moral  strength  and  driving  power  of  a
nation.
German  policy  had  set  out  to  gain  England's  neu-
trality and  Italy's  co-operation  in  the  decision  by  arms
of  the  conflict  of  the  Central  Powers  with  Russia  and
France.
