as  well  as  upon  her  death,  to  her  heirs  by  consanguinity^
there  woald  seem  to  be  a  pretty  stroDg  inrerencet  that  the
testator  did  not  mean  those  persons  to  take,  in  the  quality
of  his  wife's  heirs,  that  is,  by  succession  after  his  death ;
because  then  upon  the  marriage  of  the  wife,  the  whole
property  would  go  to  the  testator's  own  heirs  and  next  of
kin,  for  the  interval  between  the  wife's  marriage  and
death.  Perhaps  that  of  itself  would  not  be  sufficient  to
prevent  the  application  of  the  rule,  in  Shellt/s  case  to  this
devise.  But  when  to  those  considerations  is  added  this
other,  that  the  testator  expressly  excepts  from  the  wife's
heirs,  to  whom  the  limitation  is  made,  a  certain  sister  of
the  wife,  one  cannot  be  mistaken  in  saying,  that  the
words  wore  not  used  as  words  of  limitation  of  an  estate
to  the  wife,  but  as  words  of  purchase,  denoting  who  were
to  take  in  remainder  after  the  wife.  For  by  the  excpp*
tion  it  is  manifest,  that  the  sister  was  understood  by  the
testator  to  be  within  the  general  terms  of  description  and
that  she  might  take,  but  for  the  exception.  If  she  did  take,
it  would  be  as  one  of  the  wife's  heirs,  and  others  in  equal
degree  must.in  like  manner,come  in  under  the  same  words.
But  by  excluding  that  sister,  and  leaving  the  others  in
equal  degree  to  take,  the  testator  shews  that  he  did  not
mean  them  to  take  as  heirs,  by  descent  from  his  wife,
since  the  course  of  descent  cannot  thus  be  altered,  by  ad«
mitting  some,  and  excludiog  other  heirs.  The  wife's  es-
tate therefore  was  only  that  expressly  limited  to  her  du-
ring life  or  widowhood,  and  the  heirs  took  by  purchase
in  remainder.
