districts,  and  wished  that  the  movements  in  the  Milanese
and  in  Provence  should  be  considered  merely  a  slight  acces-
sory, as  not  much  more  than  a  diversion  to  the  chief  design,
while  Villeroy  and  his  friends  chose  to  consider  the  Duke
of  Savoy  as  the  chief  element  in  the  war.1  Sully  thoroughly
distrusted  the  Duke,  whom  he  deemed  to  be  always  put
up  at  auction  between  Spain  and  France  and  incapable  of
a  sincere  or  generous  policy.  He  was  entirely  convinced
that  Villeroy  and  Epernon  and  Jeannin  and  other  earnest
Papists  in  France  were  secretly  inclined  to  the  cause  of
Spain,  that  the  whole  faction  of  the  Queen,  in  short,  were
urging  this  scattering  of  the  very  considerable  forces  now
at  Henry's  command  in  the  hope  of  bringing  him  into  a
false  position,  in  which  defeat  or  an  ignominious  peace
would  be  the  alternative.2  To  concentrate  an  immense
attack  upon  the  Archdukes  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands
and  the  debateable  duchies  would  have  for  its  immediate
effect  the  expulsion  of  the  Spaniards  out  of  all  those  pro-
vinces and  the  establishment  of  the  Dutch  commonwealth
on  an  impregnable  basis.  That  this  would  be  to  strengthen
infinitely  the  Huguenots  in  France  and  the  cause  of  Pro-
testantism in  Bohemia,  Moravia  and  Austria,  was  unques-
tionable. It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  the  stern  and
ardent  Huguenot  should  suspect  the  plans  of  the  Catholics
with  whom  he  was  in  daily  council.  One  day  he  asked
the  King  plumply  in  the  presence  of  Villeroy  if  his  Ma-
jesty meant  anything  serious  by  all  these  warlike  prepa-
rations. Henry  was  wroth,  and  complained  bitterly  that
one  who  knew  him  to  the  bottom  of  his  soul  should  doubt
him.3  But  Sully  could  not  persuade  himself  that  a  great


1  Aerssens  to  Barneveld,  9  March
1G10.    Same  to  same,  24  March  1610.
