pkt]o6ophical  oourage  which,  when  it  disoo-
Ten  the  fountains  of  truth  and  falsehood,
leaves  others  to  follow  the  streams.  He
states  as  strongly  as  Butler,  that  "  the  same
cause  which  aetermines  us  to  pursue  hap-
piness for  ourselves,  determines  us  both  to
esteem  and  benevolence  on  their  proper  oc-
casions^ven  the  very  frame  of  our  na-
ture."* It  is  in  vain,  as  he  justly  observes,
for  the  patrons  of  a  refined  selfishnesA  to  pre-
tend that  we  pursue  the  happiness  of  others
for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  which  we  derive
from  it ;  since  it  is  apparent  that  there  could
be  no  such  pleasuos  if  there  had  been  no
previous  affection.  ''Had  we  no  affection
distinct  from  self-love,  nothing  could  raise  a
desire  of  the  happiness  of  others,  but  when
viewed  as  a  mean  of  our  own."t  He  seems
to  have  been  the  first  who  entertained  just
notions  of  the  formation  of  the  secondary
desires,  which  had  been  overlooked  by  But-
ler. "  There  must  arise,  in  consequence  of
our  original  desires,  ucondary  desires  of
every  thing  useful  to  gratify  the  primary  de-
sire. Thus,  as  soon  as  yre  apprehenq  the
use  of  wealth,  or  power,  to  gratify  our  origi-
nal desires,  we  also  desire  them.  From  their
universality  as  means  arises  the  general  pre-
valence of  these  desires  of  weahh  and
power."!^  Proceeding  farther  in  his  zeal
against  the  selfish  system  than  Lord  Shaftes-
bury, who  seems  ultimately  to  rest  the  rea-
sonableness of  benevolence  on  its  subser-
viency to  the  happiness  of  the  individual,  he
represents  the  moral  faculty  to  be,  as  well
as  self-love  and  benevolence,  a  calm  general
impulse,  which  may  and  does  impel  a  good
man  to  sacrifice  not  only  happiness,  but  even
life  itself,  to  Virtue.
