This  is  a  single  instance.  We  find  the  same  similarity  and  the
same  difference  in  the  accounts  given  of  other  psychological  phe-
nomena. For  example,  the  idea  of  self  depends  according  to  Con-
dillac on  the  sense  of  touch.  By  this  sense  the  statue  becomes  more
than  a  mere  modification  of  sensations.  According  to  Maine  de
Biran,  the  idea  of  self  depends  upon  the  fact  that  our  effort  meets  a

1  op.  dt.,  II,  Ch.  XI.
*Ibid.,?.  39.
3 Ibid.,  p.  29.
BIRAN    AND    CONDILLAC  /I

limit  in  the  muscular  sensation  of  our  own  body.  The  similarity
is  obvious.  It  is  unnecessary  to  go  into  further  detail  to  emphasize
the  close  connection  between  Maine  de  Biran's  philosophy  and
sensationalism.  Each  is  a  form  of  empiricism,  a  development  of
certain  phases  of  Locke's  system.  Each  is  really  a  theory  of
knowledge  which  involves  a  realistic  ontology.  The  great  differ-
ence between  Biran  and  Condillac  is  in  the  idea  of  self-activity,
which  is  almost  absent  from  the  philosophy  of  the  latter,  while
it  is  the  leading  idea  in  Biran's  system.  The  supervention  of  the
self,  as  an  active  principle,  upon  the  phenomena  of  the  "affective
system  "  produces  the  phenomena  of  the  "  sensitive  system,"  and
it  is  the  increasing  influence  of  the  active  principle  that  explains
the  higher  psychological  facts.  With  Condillac,  on  the  other
hand,  the  problem  is  to  show  how  the  higher  mental  functions  are
built  up  out  of  pure  sensations,  without  the  intervention  of  any
higher  principle.  Biran's  work  is  in  a  certain  sense  a  return  from
Condillac  to  Locke,  but  there  is  a  difference  between  the  treatment
of  self-activity  in  the  philosophy  of  Biran  and  in  that  of  Locke.
