1  take  it  for  granted  that  no  nation  would  embark  in  the  quixotic  enterprise
of  conquering  this  country. '  Any  army,  therefore,  thrown  upon  onr  coast  would
pmh  forward  with  some  definite  ot^ect  to  be  attained  by  a  prompt  movement
and  by  vigorous  exertions.  Our  experience,  more  than  half  a  century  ago,  de-
monstrated that  an  invading  force  could  command  little  more  than  the  position
it  actually  occupied.  The  system  of  fortifications  adopted  in  Europe  is  not  ap-
plicable to  our  condition.  There  military  movements  must  be  made  upon  great
■Tftnues  of  commooication,  natural  or  artificial,  and  these  are  closed  or  defended
by  fortresseB  constructed  with  all  the  skill  that  science  and  experience  can  sup.
ply.  and  with  all  the  means  that  wealth  and  power  can  command.  An  invading
anny  must  carry  these  positionB  by  eeccdade  or  by  siege,  or  leave  sufficient  de-
(adunenta  to  blockade  them,  or  mnst  turn  them  and  move  on  with  all  the  diffi-
culties attending  the  interruption  of  their  communication,  and  with  the  dangers
wbich  such  a  force  in  their  rear  mnet  neceasarily  occasion.  Works  of  this
character  are  keys  to  many  of  the  European  states,  whose  political  safety  de-
pends upon  their  preservation.  Their  poeeeseion  enables  their  governments  to
meet  the  first  shock  of  war,  and  to  prepare  their  orrH^tgements,  political  or  mili-
tary, to  resist  or  avert  the  coming  storm.  And  although,  during  some  of  the
vars  which  arose  out  of  the  French  revolution,  when,  from  causes  which  hiatoiy


8  MILITABT  AKD  NATAL    DEl'EXCES.
