The  above  view  makes  beauty  and  the  moral  Beauty  aa
qualities  of  things  purely  subjective.  The  subject  °  ^^°  "'^*
apprehends  a  moral  quality  in  an  object  or  in  a  situa-
tion because  the  object  or  situation  suggests  to  him
an  aspect  of  his  own  life  ;  the  beauty  of  the  object
lies  in  the  suggestion,  as  does  also  the  moral  quality.
We  demand,  however,  that  beauty  shall  be  objective,
that  is  to  say,  that  it  shall  rest  in  the  thing  which
we  regard  as  beautiful.  Lotze  tells  us  that  there  is
no  equivalent  in  an  object  for  the  pleasure  which
the  impression  of  beauty  gives  to  us ;  there  is  no
point,  therefore,  in  saying  that  a  thing  enjoys  its  own
beauty  in  the  same  way  as  we  enjoy  it.  At  the  same
time,  that  in  the  object  which  suggests  to  us  a  moral
quality  is  somewhat  in  the  thing  itself,  and  is  of  worth
or  value.  '  The  attempt  may,  however,  be  made
to  apprehend  that  which  objectively,  in  the  things,
lies  at  the  basis  of  the  beautiful  impression,  as  a
predicate  significant  in  itself,  inserted  as  of  great
worth  into  the  entire  structure  of  the  world,  and
belonging  to  the  world's  completeness ;  so  that
the  impression  of  beauty  is  produced  by  something
that  is,  apart  from  the  world  and  even  in  itself,  of
absolute  worth.'  ^

We  must  now  enquire  what  it  is,  in  an  object.  Beauty  as
that  comes  before  us  as  worth  or  value.     Reality,
Lotze  tells  us,  has  three  fundamental  aspects,  neither
of  which  can  be  reduced  to  the  other.     There  is,

'  Outlines  of  Aeslhelics,  sec.  3.  ^  Ibid.  (Eng.  trans.),  sec.  6.
