Hamilton  was  in  possession  under  an  apparent  title  acquired,
as  we  must  assume  from  the  records,  in  entire  good  faith,  by
what  he  supposed  to  be  a  valid  judicial  sale,  under  the  sanction
of  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction.
The  only  serious  question  on  this  branch  of  the  case  is
whether,  consistently  with  the  authorities,  the  defense  is  avail-
able to  Hamilton  in  this  action  of  ejectment  to  recover  posses-
sion of  the  property.  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  present  case
comes  within  the  reasons  upon  which  rest  the  established  excep-
tions to  the  general  rule  that  title  to  land  cannot  be  extinguished
or  transferred  by  acts  in  pais  or  by  oral  declarations.  "What
I  induce  my  neighbor  to  regard  as  true  is  the  truth  as  between
us,  if  he  has  been  misled  by  my  asseveration,"  became  a  settled
rule  of  property  at  a  ver}^  early  period  in  courts  of  equity.  The
same  principle  is  thus  stated  by  Chancellor  Kent  in  Wendell  v.
Van  Rensselaer,  1  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  344:  "There  is  no  prin-
ciple better  established,  in  this  court,  nor  one  founded  on  more
solid  considerations  of  equity  and  public  utility,  than  that
which  declares  that  if  one  man,  knowingly,  though  he  does  it
passively,  by  looking  on,  suffers  another  to  purchase,  and  ex-
pend money  on  land,  under  an  erroneous  opinion  of  title,  with-
out making  known  his  own  claim,  shall  not  afterwards  be  per-
mitted to  exercise  his  legal  right  against  such  person.  It  would
be  an  act  of  fraud  and  injustice,  and  his  conscience  is  bound
by  this  equitable  estoppel."    p.  354.
While  this  doctrine  originated  in  courts  of  equity,  it  has  been
applied  in  cases  arising  in  courts  of  law.^

In  The  King  v.  The  Inhabitants  of  Butterton  (6  Durnf.  &  E.
