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follows,  then,  that,  by  degrading  and  leffening  the
confequence  of  the  perfons  employed  in  the  high
offices  of  government,  you  will  not  only  render  their
ftations  mean,  and  therefore  no  longer  likely  to  be
folicited  by  men  who  are  really  refpeclable ;  but  you
will  clip  the  wings  of  the  moft  confpicuous  and  digni-
fied branch  of  the  legiflature.  You  will  render  that
feeble  and  inefficient,  which  ought  to  be  the  ftrongeft:
an dfcy  thus  {tripping  adminiilration  of  all  power  to  do
good,  in  the  way  of  open,  direct,  and  conftitutional
influence,  you  will  drive  it  to  the  wretched  fhifts  of
fubterfuge  and  intrigue *J|

Other  and  better  arguments  in  defence  of  a  liberal

and  honourable  allowance  to  your  few  great  Officers

of  State,  have  been,  and  will  be,  urged  elfewhere.
Solely  for  your  fakes,  and  to  obviate  your  mifcon-

ceptionsand  prejudices,  I  ventured  thus  far  to  digrels

from  my  immediate  purpofe.     It  is  not,  I  believe,

ufual  in  political  controversies  of  this  fort,  to  argue

only  on  the  real  merits  of  the  queftion  ;  but  I  made

it  a  point  thus  fairly  to  meet  this  queftion  of  influence,

which  is  the  only  plaufible  objection  that  I  remember

ever  to  have  heard  urged  againft  great  falaries.  If  they

cannot  be  defended  on  that  ground,  I   do  not  fay

they  are  utterly  indefenfible,  but  they  are  clearly  lefs

defenfible.     If,  however,  you  ftill  think  the  greater

weight  of  the  argument  lies  on  the  lide  of  thofe  who

*  See  many  fuller  and  ftronger  arguments  in  behalf  of  influence
in  the  Crown,  in  Paley's  Moral   Philofophy,  Book  vi.  cap.  vii.
