"  He  had  no  illusions  regarding  the  anti- Austrian
and  pro-Serb  feelings  of  San  Giuliano  and  of  the
Italians,  but  was  firmly  convinced  that  for  military
reasons  and  reasons  of  domestic  politics  Italy  could
hardly  think  of  active  intervention.  Herr  von
Merey  (the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Rome)  believed,
and  he,  the  Minister,  considered  this  opinion  well-
founded,  that  San  Giuliano' s  main  object  was  to
bluff  Austria  and  seek  shelter  for  himself  from  Italian
public  opinion."

After  such  proofs  of  levity  and  stupidity,  the  German
Government  ought  to  have  felt  serious  qualms  about
entering  with  such  an  ally  into  an  adventure  which
threatened  to  lead  to  "  a  general  conflagration."

William  himself,  however,  remained  at  first  still  opti-
mistic.
Jagow  telegraphed  to  him  on  July  25th  a  report  from
Flotow  in  Rome,  which  had  been  sent  off  from  there  on
the  evening  of  the  24th.  It  says  :

"  In  a  conference,  fairly  excited  and  lasting  several
hours,  with  the  Premier  Salandra  and  the  Marquis
di  San  Giuliano,  the  latter  laid  it  down  that  the
spirit  of  the  Triple  Alliance  Treaty  demanded  that
in  so  momentous  a  step  by  Austria  she  should
previously  have  come  to  an  arrangement  with  her
allies.  As  this  had  not  been  done  with  Italy,  Italy


Italy  153

cannot  consider  herself  bound  as  regards  any  further
consequences  of  this  step.
"Besides"  (he  said)  "Article  7  of  the  Triple
Alliance  Treaty  (which  I  have  not  at  hand  here)
demands  that  in  alterations  in  the  Balkans  the
contracting  parties  should  previously  come  to  an
arrangement,  and  that  if  one  of  the  contracting
parties  brings  about  territorial  changes,  the  other
should  be  compensated.
