But  a  suit  to  rescind  a  contract  is  no  more  ''upon"  the  con-
tract in  the  above  senses  than  is  a  suit  for  divorce.  It  may  be
conceded  that  the  married  state  is  a  status.  But  it  is  a  status
which  results  from  a  contract:  Civ.  Code,  sec.  65.  And  when
the  status  is  dissolved,  the  contract  is  certainly  not  left  in
force.  If  not  left  in  force,  it  must  be  dissolved  by  the  decree.
And  if  so,  the  suit  is  at  least  in  part  for  the  dissolution  of  a
contract.  This  being  so,  may  not  the  cross-demand  be  said
to  be  one  '*  relating  to  ...  .  the  contract  ....  upon  which
the  action  is  brought,"  in  the  sense  of  the  statute  ?  In  an
Iowa  case  the  court  held  that  the  lelief  was  within  the  mean-


44  DoRLAND  V.  Hamiov.  [CaL

ing  of  the  ttatute  of  that  state  in  relation  to  eoanterelaimB,
saying:  ^The  plaintiff  eeeks  to  annnl  the  marriage  contract
on  account  of  an  alleged  violation  of  it  by  the  defendant.
The  defendant,  upon  the  other  hand,  seeks  to  annul  the  same
contract  on  account  of  violations  of  the  same  by  the  plaintiff.
The  matters  arose  out  of  the  contract  set  forth  in  the  petition,
and'  are  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action":  WiUon  v.
WiUm,  40  Iowa,  238.
We  think,  therefore,  that,  upon  principle  as  well  as  upon
authority,  there  may  be  a  cross^complaint  in  an  action  for
divorce.  And  the  rule  seems  to  us  to  apply  in  actions  for  an*
nulment  of  marriage.
