Then,  with  Berkeley  we  have  the  keeping  up
of  Locke's  ideas,  but  the  denial  of  their  represen-
tative character.  There  is,  according  to  Berkeley,
no  world  or  set  of  material  things  or  qualities
beyond  the  ideas.  Not  only  do  ideas  not  corre-
spond to  such  an  entity  as  a  material  world ;  it
does  not  exist  in  addition  to  the  idea.  Minds,
and  ideas  in  minds,  are  all  that  is.  All  the  ob-
jects we  perceive  have  their  continued  existence
or  subsistence  only  in  mind.  The  idea  with
Berkeley  is  obviously  a  psychical  fact  or  pheno-
menon, though  he  is  generally  regarded  as  hold-
ing it  different  from  a  state  of  consciousness.  It
is  in  the  mind,  not  of  the  mind.  And  he  tells  us
that  "  ideas  "  are  "  real  things."  "  Ideas  imprinted
on  the  senses  by  the  Author  of  Nature  are  called
real  things  ;  and  those  excited  in  the  imagination,
being  less  regular,  vivid,  and  constant,  are  more
properly  termed  ideas  or  images  of  things,  which
they  copy  and  represent.  But  then  our  sensa-
tions, be  they  never  so  vivid  and  distinct,  are
nevertheless  ideas ;  that  is,  they  exist  in  the
D


50  KNOWING  AND  BEING.
