The  remainder  must  be  so  limited  as  to  await  the  natural  de-
termination of  the  particular  estate,  and  not  to  take  effect  in  pos-
session upon  an  event  which  prematurely  determines  it  (d).  This
is  the  true  characteristic  of  a  remainder;  and  the  law  will  not  al-
low  it  to  be  limited  to  take  effect  on  an  event  which  goes  to  de-
feat, or  abridge,  or  work  the  destruction  of  the  particular  estate;
and  if  limited  to  commence  on  such  a  condition,  it  is  void."  Thus,
if  there  be  a  lease  to  A.  for  life,  and  if  B.  do  a  certain  act,  that

(a)  3  C%>.  21,  a.     2  Blacks.  Com.  168.     Preston  on  Abstracts,  vol.  i.  114.
(b)  Reeve  v.  Long,  1  Salk.  227.
(c)  Willes,  Ch.  J.,  in  Good  title  v.  Wood,  cited  in  7  Term  Rep.  103,  note.
Stedfast  v.  Nicoll,  3  Johns.  Cas.  18.  Swift  v.  Daffield.  5  Serg.  dt  Mawie,  38.
Statute  of  Alabama^  1812.  Marsellis  v.  Thalkimer,  2  Paige,  35.  In  this  last
caae  it  was  decided,  that,  as  respects  the  rights  of  others,  a  child  born  dead,
within  sach  an  early  stage  of  pregnancy  as  to  be  incapable  of  living,  is  not
deemed  to  have  been  in  esse;  and  if  bom  within  the  first  six  months  after
conception,  the  presumption  is  that  it  was  incapable  of  living.  This  is  the
rule  of  the  civil  law.  as  adopted  in  the  Code  Napoleon,  art.  312,  314,  and  in
the  Cinl  Code  of  Louisiana,  art.  205.
(d)  Cogan  v.  Gogan,  Cro  Eliz.  360.     Plowd.  Rep.  24,  b.  29,  a.  b.
^'  The  remainder  must  not,  therefore,  be  in  the  nature  of  a  condition  at
common  law,  which  may  defeat  the  particular  estate.  2  Washburn  on  Real
Prop.  631.
