George  II.  Mead:  The  1  and  the  Me


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ganized  human  society  are  also  possible  only  in  so
far  as  every  individual  involved  in  them  or  belong-
ing to  that  society  can  take  the  general  attitudes  of
all  other  such  individuals  with  reference  to  these
processes  and  activities  and  institutional  function-
ings,  and  to  the  organized  social  whole  of  experien-
tial relations  and  interactions  thereby  constituted —
and  can  direct  his  own  behavior  accordingly.
It  is  in  the  form  of  the  generalized  other  that  the
social  process  influences  the  behavior  of  the  individ-
uals involved  in  it  and  carrying  it  on,  i.e.,  that  the
community  exercises  control  over  the  conduct  of  its
individual  members;  for  it  is  in  this  form  that  the
social  process  or  community  enters  as  a  determin-
ing factor  into  the  individual's  thinking.  In  abstract
thought  the  individual  takes  the  attitude  of  the  gen-
eralized other  toward  himself,  without  reference  to
its  expression  in  any  particular  other  individuals;
and  in  concrete  thought  he  takes  that  attitude  in
so  far  as  it  is  expressed  in  the  attitudes  toward  his
behavior  of  those  other  individuals  with  whom  he  is
involved  in  the  given  social  situation  or  act.  But
only  by  taking  the  attitude  of  the  generalized  other
toward  himself,  in  one  or  another  of  these  ways,
can  he  think  at  all;  for  only  thus  can  thinking — or
the  internalized  conversation  of  gestures  which  con-
stitutes thinking — occur.  And  only  through  the
taking  by  individuals  of  the  attitude  or  attitudes  of
the  generalized  other  toward  themselves  is  the  exist-
ence of  a  universe  of  discourse,  as  that  system  of
common  or  social  meanings  which  thinking  presup-
poses at  its  context,  rendered  possible.
