If  we  could  view  the  situation  under  discussion  as  involving
two  causes  of  action  in  the  ordinary  sense,  the  Code  provisions
governing  the  matter  are  subdivisions  1  and  3  of  section  2647,
St.  1898.  The  one  permits  joining  two  or  more  causes  of  action
arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  or  transactions  connected
with  the  same  subject  of  action.  The  other  permits  joining  two
or  more  causes  of  action  for  "injuries  with  or  without  force,
to  person  or  property."  Both  are  subject  to  the  limitation  that
the  causes  must  belong  to  one  class,  affect  all  the  parties,  not
require  different  places  of  trial,  and  be  stated  separately.  It  is
manifest  without  discussion  that  the  two  causes  of  action,  so-
called,  in  the  situation  before  us  amply  satisfy  the  letter  of  all
those  requirements.  Do  they  satisfy  the  real  meaning  of  the
term  "several  causes  of  action"  as  used  in  the  statute?


Sec.  3.]  Joinder  op  Causes  op  Action.  413

There  is  room,  as  an  original  matter,  to  hold  that  the  statute
contemplates  the  existence  of  causes  of  action,  each  to  redress
a  wrong  of  some  sort  so  far  independent  of  the  redress  of  any
wrong  involved  in  any  other  cause  of  action,  that  a  recovery  in
one  will  not,  necessarily,  militate  against  a  recovery  at  the  same
time  in  the  other.  Would  not  such  a  holding,  leaving  no  room
for  exceptions,  be  construing  the  written  law  restrictively,  con-
trary to  the  ordinary  rule  requiring  remedial  statutes  to  be  lib-
erally construed?  If  a  restrictive,  rather  narrow  construction
were  necessary  to  carry  out  a  manifest  intent,  then  it  would  be
legitimate.
