** Such a war would really be the war of the
^' Britifh Miniftry only againft the French Re-
^* public; and fhould this truth appear foif a
^^ moment doubtful, it would not perhaps be
^^ impoffible for France to render it foon evident
^^ to a Kation which, in giving its confidence,

** never



i



39

^ never renounced the excrcife of reafon, and
** its refpeft for juftice and truth/'

Notwithftanding the rudenefs of M. Chauvc-
lin's language in relation to Minifters, this Me-
morial certainly contained great conceilions,
efpecially if we confider them as made volunta-
rily at the commencement of a negotiation, and
when the progrefs of their arms had received
no check. The ofFenfive meaning of the Decree
of the 19th November is formally and exprefsly
difavowed. The queffion with a great ftatef-
man, if fuch an one had fortunately for Britain
prefided over her councils at this period, would
doiibtlefs have been, not whether the explana-
tion offered by M. Chauvelin w?is a juft intec*
pretation according to the ordinary rules of
grammatica) conftui£tion, but whether the pub-
lic and unequivocal difavowal of its fuppofed
meaning did not indicate a real relu£iance on
the part of France to come to a rupture with
England ; whether (he did not ftill wifh to re«-
inflate matters on the footing of friendfhip, or,
if that 'were imprafticabje, at leafl of civility
and'neutrality. If France really wifhed to break
with England, it is the groflfefl of folecifms to
believe that fhe would have degraded herfelf-r^^
for in the light of a degradation it oiufl in that

cafe



40

cafe have appeared to hei^-by ftich a diftrowal.
