As  long  as  the  moral  sense  was  simply  spoken  of
as  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  it  could  be  conveniently
regarded  as  the  consequent  of  external  actions.
But  if  it  is  an  internal  sense  distinct  from  pleasure,
it  is  easier  to  relate  it  to  what  he  calls  our  internal
powers  or  affections  than  to  action.  The  moral
sense,  then,  is  to  be  the  regulator  of  all  our  powers:
"  its  dignity  and  commanding  nature  we  are  imme-
diately conscious  of,  as  we  are  conscious  of  the
power  itself " ;  ^  and  by  means  of  it  Hutcheson
attempts  to  reduce  human  nature  to  a  scale  of
morality.
but  its  It  is  to  be  noted  that,  in  the  classification  he

preference  offcrs,^  what  are  commouly  called  the  virtues  of
candour,  veracity,  &c.,  are  accounted  not  as  virtues
themselves,  but  only  as  immediately  connected  with
virtuous  affections :  these  are  identified  with  the
'kind'  or  benevolent  affections,  directed  to  the
happiness  of  sentient  beings.     Within  the  latter

1  System,  i.  93.  2  Ibid.,  i.  61.
^  Ibid.,  i.  68  ff.  With  this  may  be  compared  the  elaborate
classification  of  motives,  according  to  their  moral  quality,  in  Dr
Martineau's  'Types  of  Ethical  Theory,'  ii.  176 if.
