2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of
free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already
has, and long ago had, existence ; and so, now its existence is necessary ; it is
now utterly impossible to be otherwise than that this Foreknowledge should be,
or should have been.
3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected
with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that pro-
position whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is
necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise, would be a con-
tradiction : it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble,
and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, whose existence is indissolubly
connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not neces-
sary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that inmssoluble connection
of its existence. — Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.
• 4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Fore-
knowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is
a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that
Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those even**
Vol. II. 10



74 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with tha^
whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.
