For  this  purpose  the  German  people  had  to  be  kept  in
ignorance  of  all  that  had  actually  taken  place  between
Austria  and  Germany  since  the  Serajevo  outrage.  It
was,  indeed,  impossible  to  prevent  the  growth  of  a  strong
indignation  against  Austria's  aggression  ;  but  they  knew
how  to  preserve  their  own  halo  as  the  peace-lover  whose
task  was  handicapped  only  by  a  second  peculiarity  of  the
German  mind,  a  peculiarity  no  less  laudable  than  its
pacific  temper — namely,  its  unwavering  fidelity  to  a
friend  even  when  he  has  stumbled.
Foreign  countries  were,  of  course,  mistrustful  from
the  beginning.  We  have  already  seen  examples  of  this
in  the  case  of  French  and  English  statesmen.  The
Belgian  Baron  Beyens  wrote  from  Berlin  to  Brussels
on  July  26th  :

"  The  existence  of  a  preconcerted  plan  between
Berlin  and  Vienna  is  proved  in  the  eyes  of  my
colleagues  and  myself  by  the  persistence  with  which
the  Wilhelmstrasse  denies  that  it  had  cognizance
of  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  Note  before  Thursday
last  (July  23rd)."

Even  the  mistrustful  elements,  however,  had  no  idea
how  far  this  "  preconcerted  plan  "  went.  The  Germar

17*


260         The  Guilt  of  William  Hohenzollern

people  themselves  were  still  less  critical.  Doubt,  indeed,
arose  among  their  ranks,  but,  in  general,  even  those  who
considered  William's  Government  capable  of  any  mischief
did  not  believe  it  could  be  so  boundlessly  stupid  as  to
risk  the  peace  of  the  world  and  Germany's  future  for
the  sake  of  Austria's  grievances  against  Serbia.
