An  Idea  of  reason  can  never  become  knowledge,  because  it  con-
tains a  concept  (of  the  supersensible)  for  which  the  corresponding
perception  can  never  be  given."  ^

The  natural  inference  from  this  passage  seems  to  be  that  the
ideal  of  knowledge  is  no  more  fully  realized  in  the  aesthetic,  than
in  the  rational,  Idea.  Just  as  the  latter  needs  perception,  in  order
that  it  may  become  valid  knowledge,  so  the  former  needs  concep-
tion. There  is  a  defect  even  in  our  apprehension  of  the  beauti-
ful ;  the  adequate  concept  (formal  element)  is  lacking.  Even  if  we
were  willing  to  grant  that  in  his  doctrine  of  the  beautiful  Kant
comes  somewhat  nearer  to  the  perfect  harmony  of  subject  and
object,  still  we  cannot  help  feeling  that  there  is  an  essential  dif-
ference between  aesthetic  contemplation,  as  he  conceives  it,  and
his  ideal  of  intellektuelle  Anschannng.
And  when  we  turn  to  the  teleological  faculty  of  judgment,
there  seems  to  be  still  less  reason  for  maintaining  that  the  dualism
of  the  earlier  works  is  overcome.  For  Kant  frequently  reminds
us  of  the  difference  between  our  cognition,  with  its  inevitable
dualism,  and  the  ideal  of  a  perceptive  understanding,  in  whose

^Kr.d.  ^:,  H.,  V,  353.
