The  will  has  two  aspects  from  which  it  maybe  viewed,  the  physical  and
the  metaphysical.  As  the  link  between  thought  and  action  it  represents
the  contact  of  the  one  with  the  other.  If  all  thought  be  mechanical,  then
will  does  not  differ  from  other  links  in  the  chain  of  causation.  If,  on  the
other  hand,  the  universe  be  a  psychic  product,  will  is  again  but  a  passing
phase  of  the  stream  of  thought.  But  if  mind  be  an  attribute  of  matter,
whose  existence  depends  on  its  own  success  in  resisting  a  tendency  to
extinction,  then  will  is  something  definite,  which  presents  the  two  aspects
already  referred  to.  The  will,  as  the  executive  power  of  the  mind,  is
either  free,  or  it  is  determined  by  antecedent  mental  conditions  ;  or  as  a
function  of  matter,  it  is  free,  or  it  is  determined  by  present  physical  con-
ditions. Which  of  these  propositions  is  true  is  the  second  question  of  the
ages.
On  the  metaphysical  side  the  will  is  determined  by  preexistent  motives,
or  appears  to  be.  The  situation  is  such  that  the  negative  of  this  statement
cannot  be  clearly  proven.  A  will  which  acts  without  motives  is  incom-
prehensible. Motiveless  acts  cannot  be  regarded  as  mental.  It  has  been
suggested  that  there  is  an  opportunity  for  metaphysical  freedom  of  will  in
situations  and  under  circumstances  which  are  prior  to  experience.  But
even  in  cases  where  there  is  a  defect  of  experience,  an  almost  incon-
ceivable condition,  the  imagination  will  furnish  motives.  It  is  impossible
to  escape  metaphysical  determinism.
