While being transported through the Floridas, the slaves
were brought within the limits of the State of Georgia, and
were seized by a revenue officer under an act of congress
annuling the title of any importer of slaves. As provided
by the act, the slaves were turned over to the governor of
the State. Part of them were sold by him, and the money
deposited in the State treasury. Madrazo, claiming that
the slaves were his, and that he was not responsible for
their importation into Georgia, brought a libel in the United
States district court against the governor of Georgia for



* 114 U. S. 270.
'i Pet. no.
54



Suits to Recover Property. 55

the slaves remaining in his possession and for the proceeds
from the sale of the rest. Chief Justice Marshall plainly
regarded the action as a form of suit against the State;
and, since the libel was to reach moneys in the treasury, of
which the governor had not even possession, it is probable
that the service on him was intended as servcie on the State,
on the theory, as adopted by Justice Johnson in his dissent-
ing opinion, that the eleventh amendment does not apply
to suits in admiralty. But even if the governor could be
considered as a defendant in his personal character, Chief
Justice Marshall said, no case was made out against him
personally. The slaves had come into his possession in
perfectly lawful manner. The action, therefore, was not
against him for wrongful possession, but rather in the
nature of a suit to enforce an equitable claim to the slaves.
Since the governor had no personal interest in the slaves,
the claim was not against him. Consequently, the right of
action was not against him.
