nuoed,  is  oot  necessarily  ho  detennitied.  The  essential  que*-  |
tioD  is  wlietber  tlie  antecedettU  of  the  phenomena  of  the  uai-
Terse  are  arbitrary  and  independent  of  the  phenomena,  or
vhether  they  iire  constant  and  connected  news<>arily  with
theiu.  The  ecicntitic  Bchool  and  seieuce  us  a  whule  are  per*
peiually  tending  to  demonstrate,  by  an  immense  and  increua-
iug  induction,  the  absolute  depeudenee  of  all  plienoiueiis
upon  their  antecedents,  as  against  the  theological  view,  which
makes  them  rest  upon  the  arbitrary  free-will  of  deity  or  of
man.  That  the  ecieiitific  method  is  gaining  ground  while  the
theological  is  losing,  is  proved  by  the  concesxions  of  tbcolo-
^anfi  themselves,  who  nearly  or  quite  all  have  latterly  adopted
a  species  of  *'  dualism,"  *  in  which  they  admit  the  eonstuncy
of  lutttral  lav  within  certain  limits  wliioh  vary  with  almost
every  individual,  and  always  cease  at  the  point  wliere,  accord-
ing to  the  complexity  of  the  operation  and  the  analytical
power  of  each  mind,  no  mechanical  principle  can  be  further
'followed  out.  It  is,  however,  asserted  on  tlic  one  side,  and
sdmitted  on  the  other,  that  this  does  not  ncccsBarily  touch
the  foundations  of  theology;  for,  even  could  all  tho  phenom-
ena of  nature  be  shown  to  result  from  unchangeable  laws,  it
is  no  more  difficult  to  conceive  a  universe  impressed  by  its
creator  with  all  its  laws  than  with  a  few  of  them,  or  none  at
■11.  As  a  philosophical  principle,  therefore,  tho  tbeologicnl
question  is  not  involved,  but  as  an  historical  fact,  the  only
point  of  view  from  which  Comte  considers  it,  it  is,  of  course,
of  the  first  importance.
