pressed the opinion that, " as between the parties to the suit,
the justice of it (/.e., the foreign judgment) might be again
litigated, but as against a stranger it cannot." So in Scot-
land Lord JefErey held that a foreign judgment (in that case
of the Court of Chancery of the State of New York) could be
" impugned on the part of the defenders, not merely by proof
of want of jurisdiction in the Court from which it issued, or
of its having been pronounced in the absence of the defender,
or of material irregularities and informalities in the course of
the proceedings, but also by proof of its having proceeded on
error of fact, or even on error of law, more especially when
the law applicable to the case was not the proper law of the
country where the suit w^s tried and determined." ^ This
dictum was referred to with approval in Whitehead v. Thomp'
8on,^ where it was laid down that a foreign judgment is
examinable on grounds, clearly and relevantly stated, going
to impeach its validity and its justice. But even so far back
as 1679 there are indications of the more modem doctrine of
the English Courts that the judgment of a competent Court
of an ordinary European or American State cannot be ques-
tioned in England for error either in fact or in law. Thus
in Gold V. Canham^^ decided in that year. Lord Nottingham
allowed one partner to charge another with money paid
for a partnership debt under a foreign sentence, " the
justice whereof y^^ he said, " is not examinable here,^^ And in
Henderson v. Henderson^ cited supra^ Lord Denman, C.J.,
delivering the judgment of himself, Williams, Coleridge, and
Wightman, JJ., accepted this doctrine as well-established.
