which  defect  the  employer  had  actual  or  con-
stractive  knowledge  in  time  to  have  remedied  it
or  to  have  discontinued  the  use  of  such  defective
place,  eta,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  dili-
gence ;  also,  that  the  fact  that  apparent  dangers  in  the
employment  contributed  to  the  injury  shall  not  be  a
defense.  We  conclude  that  such  provisions  of  the
act  mean  exactly  what  they  say.  We  do  not  feel  war-
ranted in  construing  the  act  to  mean  that  the
employer  is  absolved  from  liability  where,  by  reason
of  his  gross  ctdpabUity  in  eqtiipping  or  operating  his
plant  he  has  created  or  permitted  to  arise  a  hazard
glaring  and  imminent,  but  that  where  he  has  been
negligent  in  a  degree  less  culpable,  thereby  creating
a  danger  less  apparent,  he  shall  be  chargeable.  We
therefore  hold  that  in  actions  brought  under  the  act,
the  mere  fact  that  an  employe  with  knowledge  of  the
hazard  attempts  to  use  a  place,  tool,  implement  or
appliance  furnished  by  the  employer  for  his  use,  and
defective  under  the  circumstances  specified  by  that
part  of  the  third  section  of  the  act  now  under  consid-
eration, or  the  mere  fact  that  tte  employe  in  prose-
cuting the  work  knowingly  encounters  an  apparent
hazard  which  contributes  to  his  injury,  does  not  con-
stitute a  defense  in  actions  brought  under  the  act,
either  by  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  assumed
risk  or  the  principle  of  contributory  negligence.  As
to  whether  the  latter  principle  may  be  applied  to
defeat  an  action  depends  on  whether  his  manner  of
encountering  the  hazard,  or  his  conduct  while  encoun-
tering it,  is  characterized  by  the  exercise  of  care  com-
mensurate with  the  known  or  apparent  gravity  of  the
hazard.
A  further  analysis  confirms  us  in  our  conclusion.
