Leibnitz  does  not  treat  law  as  a  set  of  arbitrary  rules,  similar
to  those  of  a  popular  game.  In  his  view  it  is  not  a  mere  external
arrangement,  the  accidental  expression  of  power.  It  arises
necessarily  out  of  the  constitution  of  society.  Austin  has  taught
us  to  distinguish  sharply  between  law  in  the  legal  sense  and  law
as  a  term  of  science,  expressive  of  the  observed  order  of  nature.
But  dwelling  at  great  length  upon  this  distinction  and  exposing
a  common  fallacy,  he  has  drawn  away  attention  from  important
truths.  He  turned,  so  far  as  he  could,  jurisprudence  into  a
narrow  channel,  and  shut  out  lawyers  from  the  larger  views  and
fruitful  inquiries  which  Leibnitz  and  Vico  pursued.  I  do  not
propose  to  discuss  here  a  question  which  I  have  elsewhere
dealt  with.  But  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  study  of
comparative  jurisprudence  brings  us  nearer  to  Leibnitz's  point  of
view.  We  now  know  that  there  exists  at  each  stage  of  society
a  Rechtsordnung  corresponding  to  the  economical  structure  and
ethical  ideas  of  the  time  ;  that  to  the  economic  skeleton  of  society
belongs  a  certain  legal  covering  ;  and  that  the  law  and  ethics  of  an
age  are  of  one  piece.  Modern  sociology  insists  upon  the  close
relationship  of  all  parts  of  the  social  organization  ;  the  interplay
of  legal,  ethical,  and  economic  forces,  and  the  harmony  resulting
therefrom.  In  his  own  language  Leibnitz  conveys  the  same  idea.
