Between  the  *'  What  "  which  has  been  asked  for  and
the  "  How  '*  which  has  been  given  in  reply  there  stands
a  great  gulf,  which  the  older  metaphysic  pointed  to
through  the  difference  between  Quiddity  and  Quality,
and  sought  to  bridge  through  the  supposition  of  a
substantial  in  the  substance,  which  should  dispense
with  the  real  subject,  this  first  point  of  relationship
for  the  mere  relation  conception  of  quality. '  ^

'  If  this  "  What  "  IS  no  more  than  the  "  How  "  of
quality,  then  we  have  no  content  which,  according  to
Herbart's  own  demands,  can  carry  absolute  position,

^  Herbart's  'Ontologie,'  Rhine  Schriflen,  vol.  i.  pp.  114,  115.
XXX  LOTZE'S  PLACE

and  quality  will  always  seek  a  something  upon  which
to  fasten,  and  a  something  which  it  will  everywhere
fail  to  find. '  ^  Lotze  takes  it  as  self-evident  that  there
must  be  a  real  within  our  experience  which  will
explain  its  phenomenal  character.  He  considers  also,
with  Herbart,  that  this  real  must  be,  in  the  first
instance  at  all  events,  of  the  nature  of  a  plurality.
He  maintains  further,  quite  as  Herbart  had  done,
that  this  real  must  rest  in  itself.  But  he  will  not
hold  with  Herbart's  view  that  this  ultimately  real
is  an  unknowable  something  behind  experience.
