The  general  right  of  the  sheriff  to  change  his  levy,  to  en-
large, or  restrict,  or  abandon  it,  is  unquestionable.  Having
made  a  mistake,  he  is  not  bound  to  persevere  in  it.  If  he
withdraws  or  abandons  the  levy,  it  is  absolutely  discharged,
even  though  his  action  was  improper,  and  he  thereby  became
liable  to  the  plaintiff  in  the  execution:  Commonwealth  v.  Cont-
nevy  18  Pa.  St.  445;  and  having  levied  on  goods  themselves,  he
may,  upon  claim  by  another,  either  abandon  it,  or  restrict  it
to  the  defendant's  interest:  Patterson  v.  Anderson^  40  Id.  363;
80  Am.  Dec.  579.  This  is  what  the  sheriff  did  in  the  present
case.  When  he  made  the  levy  he  does  not  seem  to  have  been
aware  of  plaintiff's  interest  in  the  organs,  and  he  accordingly
levied  on  them  as  the  property  of  Dinkle.  On  being  informed
of  plaintiff's  claim,  he  changed  his  levy  by  reducing  it  to
Dinkle's  interest  in  the  organs.  It  is  true,  he  did  not  notify
the  purchasers  in  possession  of  this  change,  but  they  are  not
here  complaining  of  omission,  and,  as  already  seen,  they  are


6S6  Dixon  v.  Whits  Scwing  Machinb  Co.       (PewL

tbe  only  enefl  whose  rights  were  interfered  with  by  the  levj
itself  in  either  form.
In  accordance  with  his  action  in  changing  the  character  of
the  levy,  the  sheriff  also  changed  his  return.  His  right  to  do
so  is  equally  beyond  question.  The  effect  of  so  doing  is  an-
other matter.  The  sheriff,  as  the  executive  officer  of  the  court,
is  charged  with  the  duty  of  making  return  to  the  mandates  of
its  writs,  but  what  return  he  shall  make  is  within  his  own  con-
trol. The  court  cannot  dictate  what  it  shall  be:  Va$tine  v.
