And  each  of  them  has  a  distinct  function  like  the  parts  of
the  face ;  the  eye,  for  example,  is  not  like  the  ear,  and  has  not
the  same  functions ;  and  the  other  pai  s  are  none  of  them  like
one  another,  either  in  their  functions,  or  in  any  other  way?
Now  I  want  to  know  whether  the  parts  of  virtue  do  not  also
differ  in  themselves  and  in  their  functions;  as  that  is  clearly
what  the  simile  would  imply.
Yes,  Socrates,  you  are  right  in  that.
Then,  I  said,  no  part  of  virtue  is  like  knowledge,  or  like
justice,  or  like  courage,  or  like  temperance,  or  like  holiness.
No,  he  answered.
Well  then,  I  said,  suppose  that  you  and  I  inquire  into  their
natures.  And  first,  you  would  agree  with  me  that  justice  is
of  the  nature  of  a  thing,  would  you  not  ?  That  is  my  opinion ;
would  not  that  be  yours  also  ?

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  mine  also.
And  suppose  that  someone  were  to  ask  us,  saying,  O  Protag
oras,  and  you,  Socrates,  what  about  this  thing  which  you  just
now  called  justice,  is  it  just  or  unjust?  And  I  were  to  an
swer  just:  and  you — would  you  vote  for  me  or  against  me?

With  you,  he  said.
Thereupon  I  should  answer  to  him  who  asked  me,  that  jus
tice  is  of  the  nature  of  the  just,  would  not  you?

Yes,  he  said.
And  suppose  that  he  went  on  to  say :  Well  now,  is  there  such
a  thing  as  holiness  ? — we  should  answer,  Yes,  if  I  am  not  mis
taken  ?

Yes,  he  said.
And  that  you  acknowledge  to  be  a  thing — should  we  admit
that?

He  assented.
