As to the French, the Administration
believed that Brianfl could face Koch and
Polncar#, could take a high stand against
military action, provided it was disclosed
thft such adtidn would offend the I'nited
States, when through the United States
Germany had made a proposal which wa.->
worthy of consideration. The State Depart
ment thought that it detected two elements
in French opinion, one which demanded pay
ment or punishment, a second which was
not interested' in payment but sought
tnrough punishment to put Germany oui
of the running for a generation or two at
the least. It hoped to strengthen the hands
of the former and block the course of the
latUr. *
Secretary Hughes's Nofe Did Not
Rally Expected British Support
In the case of the British tin- Administra
tion expected prompt welcome In London
for any course which might hopefully open
the way to postponement of military a-tion
and reopening of discussions. It assumed
that since Britain was even more Interested
than the United States in restoring economic
order in Europe and in forestalling any new
disturbances, British policy would rally to
American and act to restrain French Im
jatience, provided only Germany seized upor.
Mr. Hughes's proffered opening to make a
real proposal, something tangible and solid.
In the last analysis, however, all depended
upon what the Germans would offer. If
their offer were reasonable, then the Ad
ministration could meet all criticism from
all directions with the evidence furnished
by the proposal Itself. Tt did not purpose
to pass directly upon the proposal, but, pre
serving the fiction of diplomatic procedure,
to art Informally and take no step until the
British, French, Italian and Belgian Govern
ments had said that they were willing to
receive the German proposals, not as flna'.
