Phys. iv. 1; 209a28. Zeno’s problem demands
some consideration ; if all being is in some place, evi-
dently there must be a place of this place, and so on
indefinitely. 3; 210 Ὁ 22. It is not difficult to solve
Zeno’s problem, that if place is anything, it will be in
some place ; there is no reason why the first place should
not be in something else, not however as in that place,
but just as health exists in warm beings as a state while
warmth exists in matter as a property of it. Soit is not
necessary to assume an indefinite series of places.
vi. 2; 288 a 21. (Time and space are continuous

. . the divisions of time and space are the same.)
Accordingly Zeno’s argument is erroneous, that it is
not possible to traverse infinite spaces, or to come in
contact with infinite spaces successively in a finite time.
Both space and time can be called infinite in two ways,
either absolutely as a continuous whole, or by division
into the smallest parts. With infinites in point of quan-
tity, it is not possible for anything to come in contact in
a finite time, but it is possible in the case of the infinites


118 THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE |


reached by division, for time itself is infinite from this
standpoint. So the result is that it traverses the infinite
in an infinite, not a finite time, and that infinites, not
finites, come in contact with infinites.
vi. 9; 2839 b 5. And Zeno’s reasoning is fallacious.
