tate  settled  to  her  separate  use,  and,  that  although  she  had
no  power  to  bind  herself  personally,  she  might  with  the
concurrence  of  the  trustee  specifically  charge  her  sepa-
rate estate,  and  courts  of  equity  would  enforce  the
charge  against  the  property.  But  her  contract,  in  order
to  create  a  charge  must  refer  expressly,  or  by  necessary
implication,  to  the  separate  estate  as  a  means  of  pay-
ment, this  \mng  in  the  nature  of  an  appointment  or  ap-
propriation. Knox  V.  Jordan,  58  N.  C,  175;  Frazier
V  Broiviiloiv^  88  N.  C,  237.  Since  the  adoption  of  the
Constitution  of  1868,  she  has  or  can  have  the  legal  as
well  as  the  equitable  estate,  but  this  of  itself  does  not
give  her  the  unrestricted  disposition  of  her  property.
Its  only  effect  was  to  do  away  with  the  necessary  con-
currence of  the  trustee  by  vesting  in  her  the  legal  title.
Her  common  law  disabilities  still  continued.  The  Act
of  1871-72,  now  Section  1820  of  The  Code,  is  restrictive,
and  not  enabling.  Its  effect  is  to  require  the  written
consent  of  the  husband,  instead  of  the  trustee,  in  all
cases  not  specifically  excepted.  This  consent  of  the  hus-
band does  not  give  validity  to  all  contracts,  but  simply
to  such  as  before  the  statute  she  might  have  made  with-
out his  consent.  Pippen  v.  Wesson,  74  N.  C,  437;
Huntley  v.  Whitnen  77  N.  C,  392;  Arringtoh  v.  Bell,
94  N.  C,  247;  Roundtree  v.  Gay,  74  N.  C,  447;  Hall  v.
