The  accused  was  as  much  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  that  prin-
ciple in  this  case  as  if  proof  had  shown  that  he  did  give  a
rational  explanation,  and  that  explanation  were  uncontroverted
in  the  proof;  and  for  this  plain  reason  he  was  prevented  by
the  prosecutor  and  witnesses  from  giving  it.  lie  was  placed
under  the  influence  of  hope  and  of  fear,  which,  according  to
the  principle  of  evidence,  incapacitates  him  from  telling  the
truth  and  giving  a  tnie  explanation,  and,  therefore,  his  state-
ments are  excluded.  Had  he  been  given  the  chance,  he  might
have  explained.
I  do  not  discuss  the  evidence,  as  I  propose  to  do  so  in  an  oral
Bi^ument.
7\  c/.  Wharto7\^  attorney  general.
It  might  be  argued  with  more  than  mere  plausibility,  on  the
authority  of  many  late  and  leading  cases,  in  which  former  deci-
sions are  reviewed  and  the  conflict  settled  in  favor  of  the  propo-
sition, that  to  render  a  confession  inadmissible,  on  account  of
being  superinduced  by  threats  or  promises,  should  have  been
made  by  those  in  authority,  or  the  party  at  least  have  been  put
in  duress ;  and  I  only  now  incidentally  refer  to  a  few  of  them,
to  show  tliat  the  plaintiff  in  error  has  no  just  ground  to  com-
plain of  the  action  of  the  court  below  in  admitting  the  facU
and  acis  above  noticed.
**  The  chief  question,  it  is  said,  is  whether  the  inducement
hold  out  to  the  prisoner  was  calculated  to  make  his  confession
an  untrue  one ;  if  not,  it  will  be  admissible.^'  Whar.  Am.  tr.
