We may remark that our solution is perfectly reconcilable with
this metaphysical hypothesis — that is to say, with the extremest
idealism. In fac^ the only difference between us is one only of
position; we reason from the standpoint of experience, the idealist
from the standpoint of the absolute. We debate the question only
within the strict boimds of experience; the idealist goes in search
of perfect integration, because, to his eyes, nothing is known so
long as we know only the relative.
Further, it is said that materialism is that doctrine which from
the inferior deduces the superior, from the worse the better. Is
not this what we have just been doing, when subordinating
mental heredity to organic ?

If the nature of the matter be considered, it will be seen that
this question has no place here. Our subject is only one case
in the vast science of the relations between the physical and the
moral That science does not inquire what is body, or what
spirit, nor is it required to subordinate either of these to the
other. It is naturally divided into two parts: the influence of the
oiganism on mental manifestations, and the influence of mental
manifestations on the organism. To the first part belongs the
question of heredity. It is thus only a small portion of a very
extensive science, which itself lies outside of metaphysics.
Heredity, thus understood, appears to us to be merely one of



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276 Heredity.
