Instead of aideeipting- the depart
ment's suggestion of great offensive'
plans or originating- some plan that
promised to stop the egress of Ger
man submarines, his mind was closed
to the above and as many other ex
tracts show, to every plan looking to
the great offensive which in the fa3J
of 1918 was the most effective foe of
the susbmarine.
Sims' cable to the president sug
gested that the proper policy to pur
sue was to adopt the recommenda
tions he had made to the department,
"most of which had been decided upon
and put into operation before Ad
miral Sims suggested them," Secre
try Daniels declared.
"He added," the secretary contin
ued, "that we should adopt an or
ganization similar in all respects to
the British squadron and virtually
transfer all naval authority to his
headquarters in London. He was
careful not to say, though, he re
garded the Queenstown base and sur
roundings as the "critical area," that
expressed were in al-1 cases "an inde
pendent opinion based on specific
facts collected in the admiralty and
other government departments." The
second was as follows:
"Depend upon the fact, which I
believe to be true, that regardless of.
