Can  the  Court  perceive  all  this,  and  not  feel  the  monstrous
absurdity  of  attempting  to  disjoint  the  two  statutes — to  break
•ip  the  system  of  law  into  fragments,  by  giving  to  one  statute  a
different  construction  from  the  other  ?  And  why  should  this  be
/lone  !  Why  should  the  Court  make  the  legislature  thus  capri-
cious ani  contradictory  ?  Why  should  it  make  the  first  statute
differ  from  the  second  ?  Why  should  the  Court  make  the  first
nection  of  the  second  statute  contradict  the  third  and  fourth
sections  of  the  very  same  statute  ?  Surely  the  mischief  which
the  legislature  desired  to  remedy  is  as  great  in  criminal  as  in
civil  cases..  It  is  as  easy  to  corrupt  jurors  in  criminal  as  in
civil  causes.  Nay,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  done.  The  temptation
to  corrupt — the  temptations  to  be  jcorrupted  are  much  stronger
m  criminal  than  in  civil  causes.  The  evil  consequences  are  as
great,  really  much  greater,  in  the  criminal  causes.  Why  then
shall  the  Court  adopt  a  construction  of  the  statute,  which,  against
the  words  and  plain  intention  of  the  legislature,  must  confine  the
remedy  and  relief  intended  by  parliament  to  crimes  of  minor  mis-
chief and  more  difficult  perpetration,  and  exclude  the  cases  of
greater  evil  and  more  easy  commission.
