The  contention  of  the  plaintiff  in  error  embraces  three  prop-
ositions: 1.  These  offices  are  not  incompatible,  because  the
legislature  has  not  yet  declared  them  to  be  io]  2.  K  they  are
incompatible,  an  acceptance  of  the  second  office  is  an  implied
resignation  and  vacation  of  the  first;  3.  An  express  resigna-
tion of  the  first  office,  before  answer  and  hearing,  is  a  sufficient
pompliance  with  the  constitutional  provision.
The  constitution  plainly  prohibits  any  person  holding  an
office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States  from  holding,
at  the  same  time,  an  office  in  this  state  to  which  a  salary  is
attached;  and  it  as  plainly  provides  that  the  legislature  may,
by  law,  declare  what  offices  are  incompatible.  The  prohibi-
tion and  the  permission  or  direction  are  contained  in  the  same
section,  but  in  separate  sentences  of  it.  Is  the  former  inopera-
tive by  reason  of  the  latter?  Does  the  section,  as  a  whole,
mean  that  no  person  can  hold  these  offices,  at  the  same  time,
if  the  legislature  shall  declare  them  incompatible?  We  can-
not so  construe  it.  The  prohibition  may  be  enforced  without
legislative  aid,  and  no  action  or  inaction  of  the  legislature  can
destroy  it.  This  construction  does  not  render  the  last  sen-
tence of  the  section  useless,  because  that  relates  to  offices  not
within  the  constitutional  prohibition,  and  authorizes  the  legis-
lature to  declare  them  incompatible:  Commonwealth  v.  Ford,
6  Pa.  St.  67.
