thoQght  proc«Mlon  conoected  with  each  self  Is  a  contlnQtim. The  tnia-
iB  not  chopped  up  but  iDwardly  conaected  as  parta  of  a  commoo  whole
called  /or  me. Evfin  In  thp  ^reateot  coDtrastthejoiot  or  llok  between  the
two  coatrasted  members  in  a  part  of  conflclouanesa. The  straau  la-
'*  made  of  an  altemfttion  of  flights  and  perching^-"  The  perchea  repre*
seat  aeasory,  imagee  obiecte,  and  as  BubBtaotTve  are  cootiUBtcd  wttlt
Cbe  trannltiTe  flights. (Thli  happy  form  of  atAtement  should  have  been
credited  to  Wandt.)  The  fll^hu'  are  ver/  hard  (or  IntrospecUOD  to
catch  or  name  while  the  perches  are  easv  so  that  a  sensational  Ism
which  dcQles  feellogB  of  relation  as  Hume  did  is  eaHier  than  to  ascribe
It  to  ao  iictus  purtia  ot  retison. Voral  Inflections,  adverbs,  prepositions,
conJuctioDB,  interjections,  various  signs  of  direction  and  grammatical
teodeDoles  abundantly  prove  these  dumb  relfttlon-feellogs. IVords  have
both  static  and  dynamic  fringes  or  overtones  of  relationships,  and  these
may  be  the  same  for  verbal,  or  visual  Imngery  [Galtoo]. Thought  fa
an  algebra  of  relations. [Berkeley],  and  while  the  asslsniug  of  vataes
CO  the  symbols  Is  like  the  perches  of  thought,  k  Is  the  fringes  and  tran-
sitive elements  that  make  it  a  coulinuity. 'llie  reason  why  we  come  to
think  that  our  ihou^hts  huve  "extra  mental  duplicates"  or  objccta
corresponding  to  them  is  that  thoughts  of  many  selves  have  the  same
objects. If  ray  thought  has  the  same  object «»  M»we  believe  It  objec-
tive and  real. Hence  the  great  Importance  attached  to  Mi)i«neu. In
swoon  there  is  a  sense  of  being,  or  objectivity  is  general  without  any
sense  of  self,  which  latter  Is  aoded  on  awaking. Hence  the  sense  of  the
object  Is  first,  and  knowledge  that  we  know  it  or  the  consciousness  of
self  is  not  primordial,  >^o  that  all  who  like  Green  say  that  to  know  and
to  know  that  we  know  are  Identical  are  wrong,  and  thought  may  or  may
not  dUcriinlnate  between  the  object  and  itself. The  object  Is  not  the
nucleus  of  a  ntate  uf  i.-otiSL-iousne«s  but  all  that  the  thought  thinks  just
as  it  is  thought,  hence  Introspection  can  only  gather  up  a  few  of  the
crumbs  later. Again  there  Is  no  Kantian  mauifoUl  but  all  that  Is
thought  U  in  a  single  unitary  pulse. 