This  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  Court  to
see  that  the  article  is  of  value ;  and  also  for  the  protec-
tion of  the  accused,  by  informing  him  of  the  distinct
charge  against  him»  and  famishing  him  with  the  means
of  showing,  if  subsequently  indicted  for  the  same  offence,
that  he  has  already  been  convicted  or  acquitted  of  its

30


3M  SUPREME  COURT.
StiO*  V.  Clark.
-— : — 0

commission.  State  v.  Godetf  7  Ired.  Rep.  210.  And  the
evidence  mast  correspond  witb  the  description  of  the
property  laid.  Ibid.  Many  nice  questions  have  been
raised  on  this  sabject»  and  some  of  the  cases  have  turned
upon  distinctions  savourin^z:  of  almost  too  much  refine-
ment. See  the  cote  to  the  case  of  the  King  v.  Halloway^
1  Carr.  and  Payne  127,  (1 1  Eng.  C.  L.  Rep.  341.)  Goods
may  be  described  by  the  name  by  which  they  are  known
in  trade.  King  v.  Nibbs,  R.  and  Ryan  25,  Arch.  Crim.
PI.  170.  The  same  principle  must  extend  to  articles
known  and  used  in  all  the  arts,  pursuits,  and  employments
of  life.  In  the  note  to  the  case  of  King  v.  Rallaway^
above  referred  to,  the  reporter,  after  stating  that  it  is
particularly  necessary  to  be  precise  in  an  indictmenft
with  regard  to  the  description  of  stolen  property,  says
that  it  is  best,  at  least  in  one  count,  to  call  the  thing  by
the  name,  by  which  the  witnesses  will  call  it  in  their
testimony.  This  is  certainly  in  furtlerance  of  the
main  purposes  for  which  a  definite  description  is  ne-
cessary,  that  is,  to  inform  the  accused  of  the  precise
charge  against  him,  and  to  enable  him  to  defend  himself
against  a  subsequent  indictment  for  the  same  offence.
