But  if  his  said  daughter  should  die  unmarried  or  intestate,  then  what
was  ther-^by  left  to  her  should  go  to  and  be  equally  divided  among
the  children  of  his  brother  the  Rev.  Stafford  Lightbume.  The  daugh-
ter having  died  intestate,  the  bill  was^filed  in  the  Court  of  Chancery
by  the  children  of  the  brother,  claiming  to  be  entitled  under  the  dis-
position over  in  the  event  of  the  daughter  dying  unmarried  or  intes-
tate, and  it  was  held  that  the  bill  could  not  be  maintained.  The  bill
was  dismissed,  there  was  an  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords,  and  the
House  of  Lords  confirmed  the  decree  dismissing  the  bill.
It  was  objected  to  these  cases  and  to  Ross  v.  Ross,  1  Jac  &  W.
154,  and  others  which  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  go  through,  and
to  this  case  of  Lightbume  v.  Gill,  that  they  all  referred  to  persohal
estate.  But,  upon  this  question,  I  confess  myself  unable  to  see  the
distinction  between  cases  relating  to  personal  and  cases  relating  to
real  estate.  Such  dispositions  of  personal  estate  are  void  because  they
are  inconsistent  with  the  absolute  interest  and  defeat  the  course
of  devolution  which  the  law  has  provided.  Upon  what  ground  can
it  be  held  that  the  same  principle  does  not  reach  to  the  like  disposi-
tions of  real  estate  ?  I  should  feel  great  difficulty  in  maintaining  such
a  distinction  even  if  authority  were  wanting  upon  the  point;  but  au-
thority is  not  wanting  upon  it.
