If  now  we  introduce  a  second  thinker  with  his  likes
and  dislikes  into  the  universe,  the  ethical  situation
becomes  much  more  complex,  and  several  possibili-
ties are  immediately  seen  to  obtain.
One  of  these  is  that  the  thinkers  may  ignore  each
other's  attitude  about  good  and  evil  altogether,  and
each  continue  to  indulge  his  own  preferences,  indif-
ferent to  what  the  other  may  feel  or  do.  In  such  a


192         Essays  in  Popular  Philosophy.
case  we  have  a  world  with  twice  as  much  of  the  ethical
quality  in  it  as  our  moral  solitude,  only  it  is  without
ethical  unity.  The  same  object  is  good  or  bad  there,
according  as  you  measure  it  by  the  view  which  this
one  or  that  one  of  the  thinkers  takes.  Nor  can  you
find  any  possible  ground  in  such  a  world  for  saying
that  one  thinker's  opinion  is  more  correct  than  the
other's,  or  that  either  has  the  trurer  moral  sense.  Such
a  world,  in  short,  is  not  a  moral  universe  but  a  moral
dualism.  Not  only  is  there  no  single  point  of  view
within  it  from  which  the  values  of  things  can  be  une-
quivocally judged,  but  there  is  not  even  a  demand
for  such  a  point  of  view,  since  the  two  thinkers  are
supposed  to  be  indifferent  to  each  other's  thoughts
and  acts.  Multiply  the  thinkers  into  a  pluralism,  and
we  find  realized  for  us  in  the  ethical  sphere  something
like  that  world  which  the  antique  sceptics  conceived
of,  —  in  which  individual  minds  are  the  measures  of
all  things,  and  in  which  no  one  '  objective '  truth,
but  only  a  multitude  of '  subjective '  opinions,  can  be
found.
