elegit,  or  other  writ  by  which  on  ordinary  judgment  is  carried
into  effect. It  is  obvious,  on  a  moment's  reflection,  that  the
claim  by  the  officer  executing  these  writs  to  the  protection  of  the
courts  from  whence  they  issue,  stand  upon  very  different  grounds
in  the  two  classes. In  the  first  class,  he  has  no  discretion  to  use,
no  judgment  to  exercise,  no  duty  to  perform  but  to  seize  the
property. And  if  the  court  had  jurisdiction,  and  the  process  was
valid  on  its  face,  and  the  officer  had  kept  himself  within  the
mandatory  clause  of  the  writ,  it  is  a  complete  protection  in  all
courts. In  the  other  class  of  cases,  the  officer  has  a  large  and
important  field  for  the  exercise  of  his  discretion*  1st,  In  deter-
mining that  the  property  on  which  he  proposes  to  levy  is  the
property  of  the  person  against  whom  the  writ  is  directed^
2d,  That  it  is  subject  to  levy,  etc. So  where  the  action  was  tres-
pass in  the  State  court  against  the  marshal  for  wrongful  levy  of
an  attachment  issued  from  the  Federal  courts,  the  court  said
there  was  nothing  in  the  fact  that  the  writ  issued  from  the  Fed-
eral court,  to  prevent  the  marshal  from  being  sued  in  the  State
court  for  his  own  tort  for  levying  on  property  of  a  person  not
named  in  the  writ. Among  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,
that  one  which  first  obtains  jurisdiction  has  the  exclusive  right
to  decide  every  question  in  the  case,  but  this  only  extends  ta
suits  between  the  same  parties  or  persons  seeking  the  same  relief,
and  does  not  affect  the  parties  so  far  as  other  and  distinct  relief
is  concerned,  nor  does  it  affect  strangers  to  the  proceeding.**

§  282. The  same. Apart  from  the  eminent  authority  of  the
cases  in  confiict  with  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  Freeman  v. Howe^
24  How. 