%7l^  3If.  Erskiiui's,  Speech  in


*■»


a


t^lii^es  a  judgment  of  law,  as  well  as  fact ;  because  the  d
comprehends  both,  and  the  v^erdict,  as  has  been  said,  is  co*
extensive  with  it.  Both  Coke  and  Lyttleton  give  this  precise
definition  of  a  general  verdict,  for  they  both  say,/ that  if  the
Jury  will  find  the  la^,  they  may  do  it  by  a  general  verdict^
which  is  ever  as  large  as  the  issue.  If  this  be  so,  it  follows
by  necessary  consequence,  that  if  the  Judge  means  to  direct
the  Jury  to  find  generally  against  a  Defendauit,  he  must  leave
to  their  consideration  every  thing  which  goes  to  the  constitu-
tion of  such  a  general  verdict,  and  is  therefore  bound  to  per-
mit them  to  come  to,  and  to  direct  them  how  to  form  that
general  conclusion  from  the  law  and  the  fact,  which  is  involv-
ed in  the  term  Guilty.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  say^  that  guil-
^  is  a  fact ; — it  is  a  conclusion  in  law  from  a  fact^  and  there-
fore can  have  no  place  in  a  special  verdict,  where  the  legal
conclusion  is  left  to  the  Court.
In  this  case  the  Defendslnt  is  charged,  not  with  having
published  this  pamphlet,  but  with  having  published  a  certain
ialse,  scandalous,  and  seditious  libel,  with  a  seditious  and  re-
bellious intention.  He  pleads  that  he  is  not  guilty  in  manner
and  form  as  he  is  accused  ;  which  plea  is  admitted  on  all
hands  to  be  a  denial  of  the  whole  charge,  and  consequently
does  not  merely  put  in  issue  the  fact  of  publishing  the  pam-
phlet ;  but  the  truth  of  the  whoFe  indictment,  i.  e.  the  pub-
lication of  the  libel  set  forth  in  it,  with  the  intention  charged
by  it.
