The fact that they are both, seeking to be released from the marriage, tie, on the simple ground that they cannot get on with each other, furnishes what may.; well be considered, as,,a strong presumption in juris et de jure, asthelawyers have it-— against their moral fitness for entering into a marriage at all " A happy mar ! riage," as an old friend of -ours used to

say, -'means a deal of discipline." The parties pefore the Court have shown at least ungoverned, if not ungovernable, tempers in the exposure they have respectively mad© of their domestic unhappihess. One thing 'is ilewc- that they ai'o better apart. Another thing, perhaps, is not less clear-—that they have, no claim to be allowed to inflict themselves upon some unhappy person of the opposite sex who may be induced to take them m- ignorance of their absolute moral unfitness for the tie.'

We should be inclined, we think, to carry the point a little further. The incapacity to marry another is, of course, no more than is involved in the exist ing law of judicial separation. It is this indeed which distinguished it from the divorce. If the parties so please, they may, notwithstanding the judicial separation, return at any time to each other, and become to all intents man I and wife as if no such decree had been | made. The judicial act is merely the

rmachineryof the Court put in motion for compeU&g one of tha parties to do wfiat both might if they chose, but cannot otherwise be brought to agree to. A separation deed, as we all know, may be torn up at any moment, and a judicial separation is not of We should be much inclined to try the experiment. of giving to the decree of the Court a -greater stringency. Parties would perhaps be less disposed to invoke ita interference on slight grounds--—the t&uffer wWcV underlies all these oases —if they found that while the Court was perfectly willing to take thenvab their word in according the separation they sought, it would not allow of a return to cohabitation without its own previous sanction. In a grave case it might be but sound policy for the Court to be able to protect the weaker party by having the power to refuse its consent. 