In  the  middle  ages  local  markets  were
sometimes  so  far  isolated  by  difficulties  of
communication  and  carriage  that  a  very  con-
siderable difference  in  price  would  be  long  in
attracting  supplies  from  other  markets.  Such
exceptional  markets  may  occasionally  have
been  looted  by  speculators,  whose  resources
were  large  in  proportion  to  the  market.  In
dealing  with  necessaries,  it  would  be  enough
to  buy  up  a  large  part  of  the  available
supply,  to  withhold,  export  at  a  loss,  or  even
destroy  a  part,  in  order  to  realise  substantial
profits  (see  Jevons,  Theory  of  Political  Econ-
omy, 1879,  167  seq.,  and  the  estimate  there
quoted,  which,  though  resting  on  an  insufficient
inductive  basis,  is  the  guess  of  a  shrewd  man  of
much  experience).  Such  events  may  have
occurred  to  justify  the  popular  hatred  of
FoRESTALLERS  AND  Regrators  and  Accajpa-
reurs,  and  the  legislation  on  the  subject  from  the
lex  Julia  de  Annona  downwards.  But  the
enterprise  could  rarely  be  attempted  with
success,  and  Adam  Smith  (bk.  iv.  ch.  v.)  did
good  service  in  pointing  out  the  useful  function
of  corn  dealers  as  mitigating  the  severity  of  a
scarcity,  and  in  condemning  all  such  legislation.
It  is  very  difficult  to  believe  that  a  pacte  de
Famine,  in  eighteenth-century  France,  can  have
been  successful,  unless  by  the  aid  of  legislation
restrictive  of  trade.
The  modern  market  for  necessaries  is  co-
extensive with  the  world.  The  modetn
harvest  continues  from  January  to  December.
