The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of
necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain
knowledge are not to be had ; and sometimes out of
laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demon-
strative and certain proofs are to be had. Men often
stay not warily to examine the agreement or disiagree-
ment of two ideas, which they are desirous or con-
cerned to know; but, either incapable of such atten-j
tion as is requisite in a long train of gradations,
or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on,»
or wbolly pass by, the proofs ; and so, without making^
out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or
disagreement of two ideas as it were by a view of them
as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or
the otner, as seems most likely to them upon such a
loose survey. This faculty of the mmd, when it is
exercised immediately about things, is called judg-
ment ; when about truths delivered in words, is most
commonly called assent or dissent : which being the
most lisual way wherein the mind has occasion to
employ this faculty, I shall under these terms treat of
it, as least liable in our language to equivocation.
§4. Thus the mind has two faculties, judraientis
co^versant about truth and falsehood. the presum-

First, knowledge, whereby it certainly ingthings to
perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied beso,with-
of, the agreement or disagreement of any ?^^ gerceiv-
ideas.
Digitized by VjOOQIC



96 Probability. Book 4.
