Possessing as she does both the western and eastern

shores of the Caspian, the southern border of that sea

forms a break in the direct line of her communications,

the command of which is, however, at present vested

in Persia. Few of our readers are probably aware of

the extent to which Bussian influence prevails in that

country. We can assure them, and it is of importance

to our arguments, that in all but name and a certain

tradition of independence, Persia may be regarded as a

feudatory of Russia. And it is only of a yet lingering

pride in past power and grandeur that we may take

advantage if we will. By demonstrating to Persia that

we have the force and the wish to render her truly in-

dependent, and so securing such concurrence as it may

still be possible for her to give, we might yet constitute

the eaBtem shore of the Caspian the left of Russian

advance on India. By the occupation as allies of

Teheran and the south bank of the Caspian, we should

be in a position to strike in upon the Russian commu>

nications with Orenburgh and Krasnovodsk, forcing

her thus to form front to her right flank, and exposing

her left to the attacks of the revolted Turcoman hordes.
With the arrangement of our own bases and lines of

communication, the European aspect of the Eastern

question must be considered.
o 2



84 THE EASTEIIN MENACE.
