" Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything
have a knowledge of that thing?

" Theaet. He cannot.
" Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impres-
sions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that
only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being
can be obtained ?

" Theaet. Clearly.
" Soc. And would you call the two processes by the
same name, when there is so great a difference between
them?

" Theaet. That will not be right.
"Soc. And what name would you give to seeing,
hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

"Theaet. I should call all that perceiving — what
other name could be given them ?

"Soc. Perception would be the collective name of
them?

" Theaet. Certainly.
Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 149

" Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attain-
ment of truth any more than of being ?

"Theaet. Certainly not.
" Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science
and knowledge?

" Theaet. No.
" Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the
same as knowledge or science ?

"Theaet. That is evident, Socrates; and knowledge
is now most clearly proved to be different from per-
ception.
