Supreme  Court  in  1932.  The  Court  said :

The  act  has  a  generality  and  an  adaptability  comparable  to  that  found  to  be
desirable  in  constitutional  provisions.  It  does  not  go  into  detailed  definitions
which  might  either  work  injury  to  the  legitimate  enterprise,  or  through  par-
ticularization  defeat  its  purpose  by  providing  loopholes  for  escape.  The
restrictions  the  act  imposes  are  not  mechanical  or  artificial.  Its  general  phrases,
interpreted  to  attain  its  fundamental  objects,  gets  up  the  essential  standard  of
r<  asonableness.  ...  In  applying  this  test  a  close  and  objective  scrutiny  of
particular  conditions  and  purposes  is  necessary  in  each  case.  Realities  must
dominate   the   judgment.
Now  that  describes  S,  1032  to  a  "T."  That  is  the  Supreme  Court
upholding  the  validity  of  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act.  And  of  course,
as  a  legislative  model,  the  Sherman  Act  is  a  most  appropriate  and
apt  analogy  to  this  provision.  It  sets  out  a  large  legislative  policy
to  cover  an  important  and  developing  problem  in  areas  where  the
Congress  could  not  at  the  time  articulate  to  precise  standards  to
describe  all  the  restraints  of  trade  which  ought  to  be  prohibited;  and'
left  it  to  the  courts  to  work  these  problems  out  on  a  case-by-case  basis.
Indeed  the  analogy  goes  further,  because  the  Congress  recognized'
in  the  Sherman  Act  that  public  enforcement  was  not  enough,  but
there  was  a  need  to  bring  in  private  citizens  to  aid  in  the  process  of
enforcement,  and  thus  the  so-called  treble-damage  civil  provisions  of
the  Federal  antitrust  law.
