It  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  jury  would  have
considered  it  justifiable,  even  for  the  purpose  of  husbandry,
to  have  selected  the  time  when  the  fire  in  question  was
caused  for  making  a  fire  in  that  particular  locality.     At  all
events,  the  propriety  of  so  doing  would  have  been  a  neces-
sary inquiry.     To  dispense  with  it  in  a  case  like  the  present
would  bti  to  accord  to  a  person  who  endangers  his  neigh-
bour s  property  by  unnecessarily  kindling  a  fire  upon  his
own  a  degree  of  immunity  greater  than  that  extended  to  a
man  who  uses  fire  only  for  the  necessary  purpose  of  bringing
his  farm  into  cultivation.     Yet,  where  the  fire  has  not  been
intentionally  set,  it  would  seem  out  of  place.     One  cannot
readily  imagine  a  case  of  the  kind  where  such  an  inquiry
would  be  relevant.
It  would  be  necessary  to  extend  the  rule  settled  by
Dean  v.  McCarty  farther  than  the  principle  on  which  it
rests  would  warrant,  before  it  could  be  applied  to  a  case  in
which  the  fundamental  fact,  viz.,  the  necessity  for  making
the  fire,  was  wanting.  But,  if  the  initial  dissimilarity
of  the  two  classes  of  cases  be  passed  over  and  attention
given  to  after  events,  it  will  still  be  found  that  different
criteria  of  negligence  must  be  applied.  In  the  one  class,
the  fire  being  used  as  an  instrument  of  husbandry,  the
object  is  to  manage  and  direct,  and  even  extend  it,  that  it
may  do  its  work  eflfectually.  In  the  other,  the  fire  is
merely  an  aggressor,  and  prudence  requires  its  suppression.
