III.  Appellee  advances  the  theory  that,  as  the  parties  each
moved  for  a  directed  verdict,  this  operated  as  a  waiver  of  the
jury  by  both,  and  that  the  findings  of  the  trial  court  upon  the
„  _  ,^^ .  facts  are  to  be  given  the  effect  of  finality  which

^ons  for^^i?***  ^'^  ^^  ^^  accorded  to  a  jury  verdict.  In  view  of
do^not  wSfve*  *^®  conclusious  reached  in  the  preceding  para-
jTiry.  graphs,  the  question  so  raised  is,  perhaps,  not

of  material  importance;  but  to  avoid  any  misapprehension  on
the  subject,  we  have  to  suggest  that,  while  the  rule  invoked  by
counsel  is  followed  in  some  jurisdictions,  this  court  is  clearly
and  definitely  committed  to  the  other  view.  See  the  recent  case
of  Manska  v.  San  Benito  Land  Co.,  191  Iowa  1284,  where  most,
if  not  all,  the  precedents  cited  by  appellee  are  considered,  and
it  is  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  consent  by  both  parties,  separate
motions  for  a  directed  verdict  are  not  tantamount  to  a  consent
that  the  jury  be  discharged  and  that  the  issues  of  fact  be  decided
by  the  court.  And  for  still  stronger  reason,  it  ought  not  to
be  said  that  the  denial  of  a  motion  by  one  party  for  a  directed


Dec,  1921]   Owens  Co.  v.  Leiand  Farmers  Blev.  Co.  771

verdict  in  his  favor  deprives  him  of  his  right  to  except  and
assign  error  upon  the  direction  of  a  verdict  in  favor  of  his
adversary.
What  we  have  said  indicates  the  necessity  for  a  reversal
of  the  judgment  appealed  from,  without  discussion  of  other
alleged  errors.  For  the  reasons  stated,  the  judgment  of  the  dis-
trict court  is — Reversed.
Evans,  C.  J.,  Preston  and  Stevens,  J  J.,  concur.
J.  L.  Owens  Company,  Appellant,  v.  Leland  Farmers  Elevator

Company,  Appellee.
