"So  far  afl  relates  to  land,  the  word  recover  in  the
passage,  (sec.  2,  3  &  4  Wm.  lY.  ch.  27)  clearly  mean&
the  same  thing  as  obtain  posaeaaion  or  aeisin  of.  The
clause  assumes  one  party  to  be  in  wrongful  seisin  or  pos-
session of  land  to  which  another  has  the  right,  and  tnen
limits  the  time  within  which  the  right  must  be  asserted.'

In  the  case  of  Peaceable  v.  Read,  already  referred  to,
Lord  Kenyon  says :

"  In  Taylor  doe  dem,  Atkina  v.  Horde,  Lord  Mansfield
said,  *  that  in  order  to  advance  justice,  he  would  enable
the  real  owner  in  such  a  case  to  consider  himself  kept
out  by  wrong  or  not  at  his  election.*  So  a  tenant  in
common  may  rely  on  the  possession  of  his  co-tenant  as
his  own,  unless  there  be  an  actual  ouster  in  fact  or  the
jury  find  it  from  circumstances."

In  the  same  case  LeBlanc,  J.,  said,  at  p.  578  :

"The  case  is  no  more  than  this,  that  one  tenant
in  common,  without  ousting  his  companion,  or  setting
up  any  adverse  claim,  levies  a  fine  of  the  whole  in
1796,  and  afterwards  receives  all  the  rents.  Primd
facie  the  receipt  of  rent  by  one  tenant  in  common
shall  be  taken  to  be  for  all,  and  according  to  the
right,  and  it  rests  upon  him  to  shew  that  it  was
received  for  himself  only.  Of  this  there  is  no  evi-
dence. The  levying  a  fine  of  the  whole  by  one  has
been  settled  to  be  in  itself  no  ouster  of  the  other,  and
nothing  appeal^  to  shew  that  at  the  time  it  was  levied
Pearsall  claimed  adversely  to  the  lessor.  Therefore  there
was  no  evidence  to  leave  to  the  jury  from  whence  to
presume  an  actual  ouster  at  the  time  of  the  fine  levied."

This  language  applied  to  the  entry  by  Sir  James  Stuart
would  shew  before  the  present  Statute  of  Limitations  that
it  must  be  considered  of  right  and  not  of  wrong,  and
therefore  did  not  work  as  against  the  other  tenants  in
common  an  extinguishment  of  title  and  bar  of  action,  his
possession  not  having  been  continued  for  twenty  years.  So
also  when  Prentiss  entered,  treating  his  entry  of  right  oi
of  wrong,  defendant  claiming  under  him  had  tiot  acquired
a  statutory  title,  as  the  full  twenty  years  had  not  elapsed
after  such  entry  before  action.
