The court say: "When two legislative purposes, each
of which render the law eflfective, are suggested, the courts
may not ordinarily supply or substitute a word in order to
give one of such preference over the other; but where the
alternative is presented of attributing to the enactment a
rational purpose and effect, or of regarding it as a dead
letter on the statute book, the courts, when necessary, exer-
cise great latitude in the endeavor to avoid the latter con-
tingency. The view that a solemn legislative provision is
a useless and lifeless thing, should only be entertained
when no reasonable intendment can be fairly deduced
therefrom, after diligent and industrious search, aided by
all pertinent rules of statutory interpretation."

In support of this view, the court, with other authori-
ties, quotes from Potter's Dwarris on Stat. Const., page 128,
as follows:

•'The interpretation which renders a treaty (or statute)
null and void cannot be admitted; it. is an absurdity to
suppose that after it is reduced to terms it means nothing.
