After/ a long wrangle and great expenditure of words ( 'it sometimes turns out that the two patties to i the dispute were nil the time very nearly agreed Upon main points, and that their differences were chiefly in matter* of detail, or perhaps confined to the^exact way of attaining a common object. What if it were to prove, after all, that this is not far from being the case, as concerns England and Italy, with respect to the Italian question. It is well known that therq i$ a party in this country which, thinking the opportunity favourable, "demands more than England will support it in obtaining. This party, which is active and clamorous, and make's as much noise as if it were a great deal bigger, insists upon teaming up treaties and driving Austria beyond the Alps. Its members believe that the hour is come, and the man , and they 'will hear of nothing less. They are ready to run all the risks of war. of French intervention, and of what may follow upon it, sooner than yield an iota of their demands. Their idea is fixed and immovable in its obstinacy ; argument is thrown away upon them ; if you do not go the whole length that they do, you are against them, you are an enemy, an Austrian, a traitor to the cause of liberty, unworthy of the name of Englishman, fortunately, there are grounds for believing— and grounds which daily become stronger— that this warlike faction comprises but a small minority of thinking Italians, and that there is a powerful party j which, instead of pressing on matters to a conclusion fatal to the peace of Europe and most perilous to the eventual interests of Italy, would be content with measures which England could heartily coin cide in and warmly and effectually support. Count Ca'vour's memorandum of the Ist of March may be considered an indication of progress towards a more moderate policy than he at one time was understood to advocate. It is true that he there urges, as es sential to the settlement of the question, changes in the Italian provinces of Austria such as it would be impossible to impose upon that Power— such as, perhaps, would not be conceded by her, unless she were humbled to the dust by a disastrous conflict. 