That  such  a  change  of  relationship  may,  even  at  common
law,  take  place,  seems  so  evident  that  one  would  scarcely
expect  to  find  an  express  decision  on  the  point  There  is,
however,  a  case  of  Rogers  v.  Maw,  4  D.  &  L.  66,  in  which,
referring  to  circumstances  not  unlike  those  before  us,  but
where  the  continuing  partners  had  not  covenanted  in
express  terms  with  the  outgoing  partner  to  pay  the  debts,
Pollock,  C.  B.,  remarked :  "  We  have  no  doubt  that  the
agreement  of  the  two  plaintiffs  to  take  all  the  debts  on


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themselves,  and  to  release  the  defendant  from  his  liability
as  to  the  joint  concern,  amounted  to  a  covenant  to  pay  the
debts,  and  that  as  between  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendant
the  defendant  became  surety  only."  See  also  Mu88on  v.
May,  3  Yes.  &  B.  194,  where  the  plaintiff  and  the  intestate
who  had  been  his  partner  had  become  as  between  them-
selves surety  and  principal,  although  the  plaintiff  remained
legally  liable  to  the  creditor.  That  the  new  relation  was
in  fact  constituted  is  conclusively  shewn  by  the  deed  of
dissolution.
The  plaintiffs  did  not  agree  to  release  Hutton  and
accept  McGuire  as  their  sole  debtor.  They  were,  however,
fully  acquainted  with  all  the  arrangements  between  the
parties,  the  plaintifi  Bell,  if  I  apprehend  the  evidence
correctly,  having  taken  an  active  part  in  bringing  them
about.  After  the  dissolution,  I  think  they  must  be  held
to  have  recognized  the  fact  that  McGuire  had  become
principal  debtor  and  Hutton  his  surety,  and  to  have  some-
times dealt  with  them  on  that  footing,  notwithstanding
that  on  one  or  two  occasions  they  asserted  the  contrary.
