they  are  not  shown  to  belong  together ;  they  imply,  but  at  the
same  time  repel,  each  other ;  they  do  not  constitute  an  organic
unity.  As  Professor  Creighton  says  :  **  Each  object  of  knowledge
is  taken  as  really  composed  of  a  contribution  from  sense  and  a
contribution  from  understanding.  These  elements  really  enter
into  it,  and  can  be  analyzed  out  of  it.  .  .  .  The  synthetic  char-
acter of  thought  ...  is  conceived  ...  as  analogous  to  a  process
of  mechanical  fabrication,  or  chemical  combination."  '

This  defect  in  human  knowing,  as  Kant  conceives  it,  comes  out
most  clearly  when  we  consider  the  contrast  between  our  cogni-
tion and  that  ideal  of  knowledge  which  he  holds  before  us  in  his
conception  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung.  The  whole  question  of
the  nature  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung  and  of  its  relation  to  the
other  features  of  Kant's  system  is  one  of  much  interest.  Thiele's
careful  study,^  to  which  I  am  much  indebted,  has  made  it  evident
that  the  conception,  as  it  appears  in  the  Kritik,  has  more  than
one  form.  According  to  his  interpretation,  there  are  three  main
stages  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine.  On  this  point  I  am
inclined  to  disagree  with  him  :  the  conception,  it  seems  to  me,
has  only  two  distinct  phases ;  and  it  has  these  two  because  at
different  times  Kant  approaches  the  problem  from  two  different
points  of  view.^  In  human  cognition,  form  and  matter  seem
to  stand  apart ;  but  in  the  ideal  of  knowledge  they  must  consti-
tute a  perfect  unity.  Now  in  one  phase  of  the  doctrine  of  intel-
lektuelle Anschauung,  Kant  starts  with  the  concept  of  matter  and
seeks  to  pass  from  it  to  the  thought  of  this  organic  unity,  while
in  the  other  phase  he  attempts  to  reach  the  ideal  by  starting  with
the  concept  of  form.  In  the  one  case,  he  tries  to  give  us  a  matter
which  contains  its  own  principle  of  form  ;  in  the  other,  a  form
which  supplies  itself  with  content.
