For though the die's falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it,
yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The invol-
untary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the causes may not be
observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that
float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the
unevennesses on the surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confu-
sion in the minds of those who insist upon it, that the Will acts in a proper
indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determination
in such cases as have been mentioned.
. 1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it
distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be
indifferent about the objects presented, on£ of which is to be taken, touched,
pointed to, &c, as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas
the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be indifferent with respect
to his own actions ; whether he does not, on some consideratipn or other, prefer
one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determi-
nation and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conyersant



FREEDOM OF THE WIJX. 39

about the objects presented 5 but the acts t6 be done concerning these objects.
