Is the estate proposed tv be purchased s d si ruble one and is it worth the miney asked for it? To answer either of these two questions aojiears to me to involve the txe cisc of discretion, and to answer the second an intending purchaser nru>t know before he con cludes his bargain what price he has to giv^. Circumstances, indeed, may arise whicb render it so necessary for a man to acquire a particular piece of lindthat he could hardly be said to have any dis cretion whether to purchase it or not. He has to take it at whatever price the vendor chooses to ask. In such a case the reference to arbitration would scarcely be a delegation of discretion, because the intendi'isr purchaser lias really no discretion to delegate. He is compelled to take the property at any price, reason able or unreasonable, and he resorts to arbitration in the faint hope of getting a better bargain thm he would have if he took it at the price the vendor sets on it. In the present case it <anuot be con tended that the circumstances are such as to create anything like a necessity for the Corporation to carry out the proposed work. It seems to me that the Corporation, being in a fiduciary posi tion, were bound before they concluded the bargain for the purchase of the land to satisfy themselves that it was worth what they would have to give for it., and not to plve themselves in a position which might re sult in their having to pay a sum which if they had been asked in the first iustance they would have de clined to pay as utterly unreasonable. This seems to follow from the principles above stated, that the Cor poration were trustees, that the element of price in a bargain involves the exercise of discretion, that trustees cannot delegate a discretionary power, and that the Court applies the same rules to corporate as it does to individual trustees. I think lam justified in drawing the above conclusion. I have not indeed been able to find a direct authority that trustees aro prohibited frcm buying or selling at a valu ation, but the observations of the Master of the Rolls in the case of Emery v. 