If  then  there  is  a  tacit  understanding  Detween  them,  such  as  we  have
mentioned,  it  is  difficult  for  the  acutest  moral  perception  to  discover  any
moral  impropriety  in  the  debtor's  doing  what  the  law  does  not  prohibit,
but  on  the  contrary  recognises  and  enforces ;  and  wJiat  it  was  expected
by  the  excluded  creditor  he  would  do  when  overtaken  by  misfortune  or
embarrassment.  The  individual,  also,  who  lends  his  money  or  his  name
to  facilitate  the  business  and  prosperity  of  another,  does  so  in  the  confi-
dence, predicated  upon  almost  invariable  usage,  that  the  party  obtaining
assistance  in  that  manner,  when  overtaken  by  pecuniary  distresses,  will
not  permit  him  to  suffer ;  and  the  breach  of  this  implied  confidence  by
placing  all  creditors  upon  an  equality,  it  seems  to  us  would  indicate  much
more  of  moral  turpitude  in  the  debtor,  than  if  he  were  to  give  the  prefer-
ence denounced  in  the  article  reiferred  to.  Besides  this,  the  individual
who  sells  property  to  another  on  credit,  seldom  does  it  from  any  principle
of  benevolence  or  feeling  of  kindness  towards  the  purchaser,  but  generally
almost  solely  for  the  profit  or  other  advantage  he  expects  to  derive  from
the  transaction ;  but  he  who  lends  his  money  or  his  name,  generally  does
it  without  any  prospect  of  advantage  to  himself,  and  with  motives  entirely
disinterested.  Now  if  a  mere  security,  who  has  become  so  without  anv
consideration,  and  with  no  other  motive  than  to  do  the  principal  a  kind.
