series  of  changes — chemical  or  atmospheric — in
the  growth  of  the  plant.  There  is  the  definite
physical  experience  of  changes  in  sleep.  But
this  is  different  from  the  experience  which  is  a
knowledge  of  nature  or  the  consciousness  of
change."— (P.  20.)

Now  the  main  position  here  is  eminently
sound — that  is,  that  a  consciousness  of  a  series
of  events  is  not  possible  as  a  part  of  the  mere  series
of  events,  or  as  the  product  of  it.  The  conscious-
ness, or,  much  better,  the  permanent  conscious
subject,  must  be  present  to  each  of  the  events
in  the  series,  otherwise  the  series  cannot  be
known  as  a  series,  or  in  fact  at  all.  But  there  is,
as  usual,  a  change  of  terms  in  the  conclusion
drawn  from  this.  The  writer  no  longer  there
speaks  of  the  conscious  experience  merely  as  the
intelligent  experience  of  the  series,  but  experience
"  as  the  source  of  knowledge  "  ;  and  thus  doubles,
so  to  speak,  the  expression,  with  a  view  to  show
that  conscious  experience  is  not  only  to  be  dis-
tinguished from  a  mere  series  of  related  events,
but  is  that  from  which  knowledge  itself — that
is,  the  conscious  experience — springs.  And  this
fallacious  mode  of  statement  is  emphasised  by
distinguishing  further  the  events  of  which  it  is
the  experience,  and  so  doubly,  even  trebly,  con-
founding the  meaning  of  words.  If  experience —


REALITY.  97

that  is,  conscious  experience — be  not  a  mere  un-
conscious series  of  events,  neither  can  it  be  said
to  have  an  intelligent  experience  as  a  source  of
knowledge — that  is,  a  source  of  itself,  or  know-
ledge as  a  source  of  knowledge.
