The  defendant's  points  for  argument  were,  that  the  fourth  plea  ad-
mitted an  indorsement  in  fact  by  writing  on  the  back  of  the  bill,,  but
avoided  the  efifect  of  it,  by  showing  that  such  indorsement  could  not
transfer  the  right  to  sue  upon  the  bill,  for  that  a  corporate  body  can-
not, unless  specially  authorized  by  act  of  Parliament,  transfer  any
property  or  right,  except  by  or  under  its  common  seal ;  and  if  there
were  any  such  special  authority  enabling  them  so  to  do,  the  plaintiffs
should  have  shown  it  by  their  replication ;  that  the  fifth  plea  was  a
sufficient  answer,  because  the  doctrine,  that  an  acceptor  is  estopped
from  denying  that  the  bill  is  the  bill  of  the  supposed  maker,  does  not
apply  to  an  indorsement  of  the  bill  by  the  maker,  inasmuch  as  the  es-
toppel rests  on  the  ground  that  the  bill  was  accepted  after  it  was  made,
and  with  full  knowledge  by  the  acceptor  of  the  manner  of  making  it ;
whereas  the  indorsement  may  be  subsequent  to  the  acceptance,  and  con-
sequently not  admitted  by  it ;  also,  that  the  objection  was  not  an  objec-
tion of  fact,  which  could  be  met  by  an  estoppel,  but  an  objection  of
law,  arising  out  of  the  fact  that  the  company  were  a  corporate  body,
and  not  authorized  to  indorse  bills.
The  judgment  of  the  court  was  now  delivered  by

Parke,  B.  We  think  our  judgment  in  this  case  must  be  for  the
plaintififs.  [After  stating  the  pleadings,  his  Lordship  proceeded :]  On
the  argument,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  defendant  very  properly  gave


470  LIABILITY  OF  PAUTiES.  (Part  3

up  the  fourth  plea,  and  admitted  that  the  judgment  of  the  court  upon
that  must  be  against  him.
