Securil-/  Cou.-icil,    ^  r'atior.al  S -a c l-. r i t^/  Decision  ;vIerr.orandum  was  issued  on
I\.tay  28,    1969,    outiining  this  country's  policy  toward  Japan,    and  particula.rly
our  negotiating  strategy  with  respect  to  the  reversion  of  Okinawa.      This
memorandum  set  forth  our  desire  to  retain  nuclear  vveapoas  on  Okinav/a
but  stated,    as  a  fallback  position,    tliat  v/e^vould  be  prepared  to  consider
the  withdraT/al  of  these  weapons  while  retaining  the  storage  aad  transit
rights.     Shortly  after  this  memorandum  was  completed,   and  prior  to  the
negotiations  v/-ith  the  Japanese,    an  article  by  Kedricl;  Smitii  appeared  in.
the  New  York  Times  on  June  3,    19i9,    stating  that  the  President  had
decided  to  remove  nuclear  weapons  from  Okinawa  once  zja.  overall  plan  to
return  the  Island  had  been  agreed  upon.      The  article  noted  that  the  President's
decision  had  not  yet  been  communicated  formally  to  the  Japanese  Government.
The  consequences  of  this  disclosure,    attributed  to  well-placed  informants,
in  terms  of  compromising  negotiating  tactics,   prejudicing  the  Government's
interest,    and  complicating  our  relations  with  Japan  were  obvious,    and
clearly  preempted  any  opportunity  we  might  have  had  for  obtaining  a  more
favorable  outco.-ne  during  our  negotiations  with  the  Japanese.
