In  consideration  of  these  facts,  it  seems  to  me  that  we  are  safe  in  standing  bf
the  common -sense  assertion  that  being  is  an  irrational  term,  contained  as  an  aspect
of  the  first  experience,  and  connoting  nothing  but  synonyms.  Moreover  1  bclie^t
that  it  is  fair  to  say  that  Professor  Royce,  in  other  parts  of  his  own  discussion,  ooi
only  recognises  this  ultimate  fact-aspect  of  things,  but  makes  a  very  generous  v»
of  it.  This  same  irrational,  so  impossible  at  a  time  when  logic  and  episiemologj
are  in  control,  ts  nevertheless  called  upon  to  assume  the  very  dignified  niles  of  Will
and  Freedom.  But  for  the  present  let  us  turn  to  an  examination  of  ourantbor't
criticism  of  realism.  Our  discussion  up  to  this  point  has  already  precipitated  tb«
issue,  since  realism  is  primarily  an  outgrowth  of  that  common-sense  reference  to


i


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CRITICISMS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.
449


\  hrational  factor  in  reality  which  we  have  already  defended.  Professor  Royce's
ftCcoQDt  of  the  matter  is  of  great  importance,  not  only  for  the  sweeping  character  of
its  criticism,  bat  for  the  part  which  it  plays  in  preparing  the  way  for  his  construc-
tive argument.  He  so  orders  his  dialectic  as  to  involve  pluralism  in  the  same
logical  ruin  that  befalls  the  realism  of  his  own  defining,  and  the  Absolute  is  already
^M  sight  when  this  encounter  is  over.
