These conclusions are also reached by
our author through analyses of the Finan-
cial History of England, France, Prussia,
Austria, etc. These I omit as unnecessarily
wearisome to the reader since I give that
of our own country. However, I will here
quote the following : " What must be noted
is the reiteration and sequence of the same
points (f aits J under varying circumstances,
at all times, in all countries and under all
governments," and also this table showing
all the panics and their practical coincidence
in the past eighty-five years, in



France


England


and the United States.
1804


1803




1810


1810




1813-14


1815


1814


1818


1818


1818


1825


1825


1826


1830


1830


1829-31


1836-39


1 836-39


1837-39


1847


1847


1848


1857


1857


I8S7


1864


1864-66


1864




1873


1873


1882


1882


1884


1889-90


1890-91


1890-91



20 Introduction.
Truly these thirteen panics in the three
countries have been practically simultane-
ous and one common cause must have orig-
inated them. The only cause common to
all was overtrading to such an extent that
neither credit nor money were to be had,
so that a forced liquidation or panic inevit-
ably ensued.
The above table effectually does away
with the theory that new tariffs are directly
productive of panics. For most certainly
new tariffs did not occur in England, France,
and the United States just before or during
all the panic years enumerated, and yet,
practically simultaneously in free-trade Eng-
land, high-protection France, and sometimes
low-tariff, sometimes high-protection United
States have panics occurred for eighty years.
