The  court  in  Matter  of  Keieman,  126  "N.  T.  78,  said:  "  It
is  a  cardinal  principle  in  the  construction  of  the  terms  of  a  wiU
that  the  intention  of  the  testator  must  be  gathered  from  the
wiU  itself,  parol  proof  being  ozdj  permissible  to  show  the  con-
ation of  the  estate  and  the  surroundings  of  the  testator;  and
that  conversations  as  to  the  intentions^  or  even  written  memor-
anda, cannot  be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  sustaining  a  will
which  is  apparently  against  the  provisions  of  a  statute,  much
less  to  destroy  a  will  which  upon  its  face  is  not  in  contravention
of  any  statute/'

In  Brown  v.  Quintard,  177  N.  T.  83,  the  court  said :  "  Ex-
traneous and  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  a  will
when  there  is  a  latent  ambiguity,  arising  dehors  the  instrument,
but  never  to  supply,  contradict,  enlarge  or  vary  the  written
words."

In  the  recent  case  of  Tousey  v.  Hastings,  194  N.  Y.  80,  the
<x>urt  uses  this  language :  ^^  Aside  from  the  danger  of  fabrica-
tion, verbal  admissions  are  regarded  as  unreliable  evidence,  be-
<»LUse  experience  shows  that  they  are  frequently  misunderstood,
imperfectly  remembered  and  inadvertently  made."  How  much
is  inference  and  how  much  recollection  neither  we  nor  the  wit-
nesses can  telL  The  opportunity  for  misunderstanding  and
misrecoUecting  what  the  decedent  said  is  quite  apparent  from
the  evidence,  and  as  the  highest  Federal  court  once  decided
^^  courts  of  justice  lend  a  very  unwilling  ear  to  statements  of
what  dead  men  had  said."    21  How.  K.  S.  493.
