The  players,  of  course,  are  now  also  benefiting  from  the  monopoly  franchise
system.  Competition  for  players,  coupled  with  monopoly  in  providing  games,
has  permitted  the  players  to  capture  much  of  the  monopoly  revenues  that  would
otherwise  accrue  to  the  teams.  The  high  costs  of  players  represent  (approxi-
mately) the  revenue  potential  of  the  player— but  a  revenue  potential  when
teams  are  monopolies.  To  derive  our  estimates  of  the  revenue  potential  of  players
presented  above,  we  used  the  average  ticket  price  of  $4.50,  and  found  salaries
of  superstars  roughly  in  line  with  their  worth.  But  this  is  a  monopoly  price ;  in
a  more  competitive  environment  the  value  of  superstars  would  be  determined
by  a  lower  price  of  $2.50  to  $3.00.
The  sports  league  franchising  power  is  not  unique  to  basketball  but  the  various
sales  and  shifts  of  clubs  among  cities  that  have  been  detailed  for  the  Commit-
tee make  it  clear  that  this  is  a  subject  of  great  importance  in  this  particular
sport.  One  of  the  major  reasons  for  any  franchise  move  is  undoubtedly  a  mis-
taken estimate  of  the  viability  of  profitably  operating  a  club  in  a  particular  city.
As  our  analysis  shows,  some  places  are  better  markets  for  sports  contests  than
are  others.  One  cannot  escape  the  conclusion,  however,  that  even  if  the  basket-
ball leagues  are  permitted  to  merge,  there  will  still  be  substantial  shifting  of
franchises  as  those  teams  in  "poorer  sports  cities"  seek  to  better  their  fortunes
by  moving  elsewhere.
