That  a  libel  upon  an  iruRvidual  is  not  the  less  so  for  being
true,  I  do  not,  under  certain  restrictions^  deny  to  be  law;
nor  is  it  necessary  for  me  to  deny  it,  because  this  is  not  a
compl^nt  in  the  ordinary  course  of  law,  but  an  applica-
tion to  the  Court  to  exert  an  eccentric,  extraordinary,

VOLUNTARY  JURISDICTION,  BEYOND  THE  ORDINARY  COURSE

or  justice;— a  jurisdiction  which  I  am  authorized  from
the  best  authority  to  say,  this  Court  will  not  exercise,  unless
the  prosecutors  come  pure  and  unpolluted  ;  denying  upon
oath  the  truth  of  every  word  and  sentence  which  they  com-
plain of  as  injurious  :  for  although,  in  common  cases,  the
matter  9&ay  be  not  the  less  libellous,  because  true,  yet  the
Court  will  not  interfere  by  information,  for  guilty  or  even
equivocal  characters,  but  will  leave  them  to  its  ordinary  pro-
ce9S«  If  the  Court  does  not  see  palpable  malice  and  false-
hood on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  and  clear  innocence  on
the  part  of  the  prosecutor,  it  will  not  stir ;— it  will  say.  This
may  be  a  Libel  ;•— this  may  deserve  punishment ;— 4)ut  go  to'
a  Grand  Jury,  or  bring  your  actions  :— all  men  are  equally
mitled  to  the  protection  of  the  laws,  but  all  men  are  not


Trial  of  Curtain  BtnKe.  9

equaUfentided  to  an  extraordinary  iaterposition  and  protec*
don  beyond  the  common  distributive  forms  ofjustice.
