3. It is the well-settled doctrine that the writ of prohibition will not issue in any
case where there is another practical and adequate remedy. (Re Rice, 155 U. S., 396^
403; 39 L. ed., 198, 201; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 149; Alexander v. CroUot, 199 U. S., 580;
50 L. ed,, 317; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep., 161; United States ex rel. Morris v. Scott, 25 App.,
D. C, 88; United States ex rd. Holmead v. Barnard, 29 App. D. C, 431, 432.)

There appears to be no other remedy whatever in this case. While the gas com-
pany might have the right of appeal from an order of the court below refusing the relief
prayed, there is no corresponding right of appeal from an order granting that relief, for
there is no adverse party against whom the order runs. Neither the District Commis-
sioners nor the Attorney-General, to whom notice of the proposed hearing was given, pre-
sumably as representatives of the public interests, could appeal from the order, because
they are not made by the act parties to the proceedings. Their situation is something
like that of the applicants in re Metropolitan Railway receivership, supra, who had
no appeal from the order refusing their intervention in a suit wherein they had an
indirect interest only. Should the hearing contemplated in the court proceed to a
final determination, the possible injury to the public interests, apprehended by the
representatives thereof, could not be averted.
