Its  attitude  towards  discipline  displays  the  German
mind  in  a  relation  sufficiently  instructive  to  merit
some  comment  here.  When  Germany  has  been
reproached  with  being  contented  to  remain  in  what
is,  by  comparison  with  other  peoples,  a  condition
of  political  infantilism,  with  allowing  the  personal
liberty  of  her  citizens  to  be  restricted  on  all  hands,
and  their  pohtical  responsibility  to  be  kept  within
the  narrowest  limits,  the  answer  of  the  political
theorists  has  generally  contained  two  distinct  and
contradictory  apologetic  theses.  It  has  been  said
that  the  German,  recognizing  the  value  of  State
organization,  and  that  strict  discipline  is  a  necessary
preliminary  to  it,  consciously  resigns  the  illusory
privileges  of  the  democrat  in  order  to  gain  power,
and  submits  to  a  kind  of  social  contract  which  is
unquestionably  advantageous  in  the  long  run.  '  The
mere  statement  of  such  a  proposition  is  enough  to
refute  it,  and  we  need  give  no  further  attention
to  an  intellectuaUst  fallacy  so  venerable  and  so
completely  inconsistent  with  experience.  It  is  also
said,  however,  that  the  German  has  a  natural  apti-
tude for  discipline  amounting  to  genius.  In  a  sense
a  little  less  flattering  than  it  is  intended  to  have,
this  proposition  is  as  true  as  that  of  the  social  con-
tract is  false.  The  aggressive  social  type  lends
itself  naturally  to  discipline,  and  shows  it  in  its
grossest  forms.  The  socialized  type  is,  of  course,
capable  of  discipline,  otherwise  a  State  would  be
impossible,  but  the  discipline  that  prevails  in  it  is
apt  to  become  indirect,  less  harshly  compulsory  and
more  dependent  on  goodwill.
