It  is  said  that  the  appellant  should  not  be  held  to  be  guilty
of  contempt  for  refusing  to  dismiss  a  suit,  in  which  he  him-
self was  not  the  plaintiff,  but  in  which  the  Meriden  Britannia
Company  was  plaintiff.  It  is  true  that  the  latter  company  is
a  Connecticut  corporation.  But  when  the  attachment  suit
was  begun,  the  company  could  be  brought  into  court,  under
our  statute,  by  service  upon  appellant  as  its  business  manager
and  agent.  Through  the  presence  of  its  agent  here,  it  was
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Illinois  courts,  so  far  as  suits,
or  proceedings  for  contempt,  against  it  are  concerned.  A  cor-
poration can  only  be  punished  for  contempt  through  its  offi-
cers, or  those  acting  in  aid  of  it:  First  Congregational  Church
etc.  V.  City  of  Mriscatinej  2  Iowa,  69;  Rapalje  on  Contempts,
sees.  1,  48.  We  think  that  it  was  sufficient,  under  the  cir-
cumstances of  this  case,  to  compel  the  appellant,  as  manager
of  the  company,  to  answer  to  the  contempt  proceeding,  with-
out making  the  company  itself,  eo  nomine,  a  party  to  such
proceeding,  because  it  is  admitted  by  the  appellant  upon  the
face  of  this  record  that  he  caused  the  attachment  suit  to  be
instituted,  that  it  has  since  been  prosecuted  under  his  order
and  direction,  that  it  has  always  been  in  his  power,  since  said
suit  was  begun,  to  dismiss  it,  and  that  it  has  always  been  in
his  power,  as  the  manager  of  said  company,  to  cause  such  suit
to  be  dismissed.
The  judgment  of  the  appellate  court  is  affirmed.
RjECUVERS.  —  As  to  the  jurisdiction  of  receivers  appointed  in  one  state  to
proseoute  actions  in  other  states:  Note  to  Allejf  v.  Caavarl  ^  ^rx  St,  Rep.
