And,  after  all,  this  does  not  bring  us  to  the  point  at  which  we
wish  to  arrive.  For  form  without  content  is  obviously  nothing,
while  it  is  not  quite  clear  that  the  content  of  the  'statue's'
experience  is  entirely  without  form,  since  it  appears  to  have
some  sort  of  pattern,  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  world
from  which  it  proceeds.
We  may  perhaps  get  a  nearer  approximation  to  what  we
want  by  imagining,  instead  of  a  statue  with  senses,  a  being
with,  say,  three  instinctive  impulses,  and  the  power  of  move-
ment, but  without  senses.  Endow  this  being  with  the  single
capacity  of  feeling  satisfaction  or  the  reverse.  Place  it  in  an
environment,  which  is  of  such  a  kind,  that  movement  in  one
direction  will  tend  to  satisfy,  or  lead  to  the  satisfaction  of,  one
impulse,  movement  in  another  direction  to  satisfy  a  second,  and
movement  in  a  third  direction  the  third.  In  this  case  the
experience  would  consist  of  three  different  satisfactions  succeed-
ing each  other  in  a  quite  random  manner,  since,  on  the  hypo-
thesis, there  is  no  consciousness  of  the  respective  movements.
Endow  now  this  being  with  memory  and  a  single  sense — that
of  sight  is  easiest  to  work  with — and  observe  the  difference.
Since  an  instinctive  impulse,  as  such,  is  capable  of  being  deter-
mined by  a  specific  object,  the  three  instinctive  impulses  being
assumed  of  equal  strength,  whichever  is  first  determined  by  the


vi ]  Instinct- Interest  and  'Meaning'  133

apprehension  of  an  object  seen,  will  tend  towards  satisfaction.
Neglecting  the  behaviour  of  such  a  being,  we  see  that  its  experi-
ence is  an  experience  of  a  situation  or  object,  seen  and  also  felt.
