We  think  that  in  a  case  like  this,  where  no  obstruction  would
have  existed  but  for  the  wrongful  conduct  of  defendant,  it  must  be
held  responsible  for  the  damage  which  is  caused  by  reason  of  the
obstruction,  even  though  it  might  not  have  happened  if  the  licensee
had  been  careful  in  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  he  exercised  the
assumed  right  granted  him  by  the  license.  The  defendant,  under
these  circumstances,  must  take  the  risk  of  such  care,  and  not  an  in-
nocent passer-by.  This  is  not  a  case  for  the  application  of  the  doc-
trine that  where  the  injury  results  from  the  negligent  mode  in  which
the  licensee  exercises  the  privilege  granted  to  him,  which  mode  is
not  part  of  the  license,  there  must  be  proof  of  negligence  showing
permission  to  use,  or  acquiesence  in  the  use  of,  the  mode  after  notice
or  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  licensor.  That  may  be  the  rule
where  the  thing  licensed  is  legal  because  of  the  license,  and  the  il-
legality consists  in  the  manner  in  which  the  license  is  carried  out.
The  difficulty  here  does  not  alone  consist  in  the  negligent  manner
of  fastening  up  the  thills,  but  the  license  itself — the  permission,  with
Fr.Adm.Law— 23


y


354  KIOLIEF   AGAINST   ADM1M3TUAT1VE   ACTION.  {VlXTt    2

or  without  a  consideration,  to  obstruct  the  street  at  all  for  any  such
purpose  as  was  the  case  here — is  the  wrongful  act  on  the  part  of  the
ilefendant  which  renders  it  responsible  for  the  damage  natural) \
sustained   from  such  obstruction.
We  do  not  say  that  this  principle  of  responsibility  would  render
the  city  liable  in  every  case  of  a  mistaken  exercise  of  power  au-
thorizing the  use  or  occupancy  of  a  public  street  by  an  individual.
