The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offensive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA's capability for that role. To the CTC, that meant proceeding with "The Plan," which it had put forward half a year earlier-hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison. On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against al Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, the CIA's managers believed that they desperately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Center's funds for the current fiscal year; the  Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation. Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for counterterrorism just two days after the principals' meeting. While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counterterrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA's managers about where it should come from. They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there-with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations. To finance the counterterrorism effort, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation. Now, in the aftermath of the millennium alert, Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA and another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism. To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA's leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against  Bin Laden and al Qaeda. He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, "said if there's going to be money spent on going after  Bin Laden, it should be given to him. My view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I didn't want to put more good money after bad." The CIA had a very different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's  Bin Laden unit did"extraordinary and commendable work," his chief of station in London "was just as much part of the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the  Bin Laden unit]." The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

Question: "Why did Clarke feel it was important to fund the CIA and counterterrorism more?"

Answer: "Because CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War"

Is this answer correct?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
yes
Granskningen efter detta hade behandlat CIA som den ledande myndigheten för alla offensiver mot al-Qaida, och huvudmännen hade vid sitt 10 mars-möte gett sitt stöd till en förstärkning av CIA:s kapacitet för den rollen. För CTC innebar detta att gå vidare med "planen", som den hade lagt fram ett halvår tidigare-uthyrning och utbildning av fler handläggare och bygga upp kapaciteten hos säkerhetstjänsten som tillhandahöll underrättelser via förbindelse. Vid vissa tillfällen, liksom i Jordanien i december 1999, vidtog dessa sambandstjänster direkta åtgärder mot al-Qaidas celler. I CTC och högre upp trodde CIA:s chefer att de desperat behövde pengar bara för att fortsätta sin nuvarande kamp mot terrorism, för de räknade med att millennievarningen redan hade förbrukat alla medel från Centern för det innevarande budgetåret; Bin Ladin-enheten hade spenderat 140 procent av sitt anslag. Tenet berättade att han träffade Berger för att diskutera finansiering för terrorismbekämpning bara två dagar efter rektorernas möte. Medan Clarke starkt gynnade att ge CIA mer pengar till antiterrorism, skiljde han sig kraftigt åt med CIA:s chefer om varifrån det skulle komma. De insisterade på att CIA hade blivit förbytt ända sedan kalla krigets slut. Deras förmåga att utföra alla uppdrag, inklusive terrorismbekämpning, var beroende av att bevara vad de hade, återställa vad de hade förlorat sedan början av 1990-talet, och bygga utifrån det med övergripande rekrytering och utbildning av nya handläggare, och återinvigning av stängda stationer. För att finansiera kampen mot terrorism hade Tenet gått till kongressledare efter ambassadbombningarna 1998 och övertalat dem att ge CIA ett särskilt kompletterande anslag. Nu, i efterdyningarna av millennievarningen, ville Tenet ha en ökning av de totala medlen för CIA och ytterligare ett extra anslag specifikt för att bekämpa terrorism. För Clarke verkade detta som bevis för att CIA:s ledning inte gav tillräcklig prioritet åt striden mot Bin Ladin och al-Qaida. Han berättade att James Pavitt, chefen för CIA:s direktorat för operationer, "sade att om det skulle gå åt till att jaga Bin Ladin, så borde det ges till honom. Min uppfattning var, att han hade haft mycket pengar till det och länge till att göra det, och jag ville inte lägga mer bra pengar efter dåligt.» CIA hade en helt annan inställning: Pavitt berättade att medan CIA:s Bin Ladin-enhet gjorde "extraordinärt och berömvärt arbete", var hans stationschef i London "lika mycket av al-Qaidas kamp som en officer som satt i [Bin Ladin-enheten]." Tvisten fick stora konsekvenser för ledningen, eftersom Clarke hade funnit Ailies i Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Fråga: "Varför ansåg Clarke att det var viktigt att finansiera CIA och bekämpa terrorism mer?" Svar: "För att CIA hade blivit förbytt ända sedan kalla krigets slut" Är detta svar korrekt? ALTERNATIV: - nej - ja
The subsequent review had treated the CIA as the leading authority for all offensives against Al-Qaeda, and the principals had at their March 10 meeting supported strengthening the CIA's capacity for that role. For the CTC, this meant moving forward with the "plan", which it had presented six months earlier-rental and training of more administrators and building up the capacity of the security services providing intelligence via liaison. On some occasions, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against Al-Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, CIA executives thought they desperately needed money just to continue their current fight against terrorism, for they expected the Millennium Warning had already exhausted all funds from the Center for the current financial year; the Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its appropriation. Tenet told me that he met with Berger to discuss funding for counter-terrorism just two days after the principals meeting. While Clarke greatly favored giving the CIA more money for anti-terrorism, he differed greatly with CIA executives as to where it would come from. They insisted that the CIA had been replaced ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to carry out all missions, including counter-terrorism, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the early 1990s, and building on it with overall recruitment and training of new administrators, and reopening closed stations. To finance the fight against terrorism, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplementary grant. Now, in the aftermath of the Millennium Warning, Tenet wanted an increase in total funds for the CIA and another additional appropriation specific to combat terrorism. To Clarke, this seemed as evidence that the CIA leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He told me that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA Directorate of Operations, "said that if it was going to take to chase Bin Laden, it should be given to him. My view was, that he had had a lot of money for it and a long time to do so, and I didn't want to put any more good money after bad." The CIA had a completely different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's Bin Laden unit did "extraordinary and commendable work", his London station chief was "as much of al-Qaeda's fight as an officer who sat in the [Bin Laden unit]." The dispute had major consequences for management, as Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Question: "Why did Clarke think it was important to fund the CIA and fight terrorism more?" Answer: "Because the CIA had been replaced ever since the end of the Cold War" Is this answer correct? ALTERNATIVE: - no - yes
ja
yes