Zinni feared that  Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against  Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. 

After reading the above, is "Use AC-130 gunships" the correct answer to the question "What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
yes
Zinni fruktade att Bin Ladin i framtiden skulle förlägga sig till städer, där amerikanska robotar kunde döda tusentals afghaner. Han oroade sig också för att Pakistans myndigheter inte får tillräcklig varning, tror att robotarna kom från Indien, SVARAR TILL AL QAEDAS INITIELLA FÖRSÄKRING 135 och gör något som alla senare skulle ångra. Diskutera potentiella återverkningar i regionen av hans militära ansvar, Zinni sade, "Det var lätt att ta skott från Washington och gå ifrån det. Vi var tvungna att bo där." Zinnis tydliga förkärlek skulle ha varit att bygga upp antiterrorismkapacitet i grannländer som Uzbekistan. Men han berättade att han inte kunde trumma upp mycket intresse för eller pengar för ett sådant ändamål från Washington, delvis, tänkte han, eftersom dessa länder hade diktatoriska regeringar. Efter beslutet där rädsla för oavsiktlig skada var en viktig faktor- att inte använda kryssningsrobotar mot Kandahar i december 1998, Shelton och officerare i Pentagon utvecklade planer för att använda ett AC-130 kanonskepp istället för kryssningsrobotanfall. Konstruerad speciellt för specialstyrkorna, kan den version av AC-130 som kallas "Spooky" flyga in snabbt eller från hög höjd, oupptäckt av radar; styrd till sin zon av utomordentligt komplex elektronik, den kan snabbt avfyra precisionsstyrda 25, 40 och 105 mm projektiler. Eftersom detta system kunde rikta in sig mer exakt än en salvo kryssningsrobotar, hade det en mycket lägre risk att orsaka sidoskador. Efter att ha gett Clarke en genomgång och uppmuntrats att fortsätta, gav Shelton formellt Zinni och general Peter Schoomaker, som ledde specialoperationsledningen, i uppdrag att utveckla planer för ett AC-130-uppdrag mot Bin Ladins högkvarter och infrastruktur i Afghanistan. Den gemensamma staben utarbetade ett beslutsdokument för utplacering av specialoperativa luftfartyg. Även om Berger och Clarke fortsatte att visa intresse för detta alternativ, användes aldrig AC-130:orna. Clarke skrev vid den tiden att Zinni motsatte sig deras användning, och John Maher, Joint Staff ställföreträdande chef för operationer, enades om att detta var Zinnis position. Zinni själv minns inte att han blockerade alternativet. Han sa att han förstod specialoperationsledningen hade aldrig trott att intelligensen var tillräckligt bra för att rättfärdiga att AC-130:or flyttades till position. Schoomaker säger tvärtom att han ansåg alternativet AC-130 genomförbart. Den mest sannolika förklaringen till de två generalernas olika minnen är att de båda ansåg att en seriös förberedelse för en sådan operation skulle kräva en långsiktig omfördelning av specialoperationer till Mellanöstern eller Sydasien. AC-130:orna skulle behöva baser eftersom flygplanets otankade räckvidd bara var drygt 2000 mil. Efter att ha läst ovanstående, är "Use AC-130 gunships" rätt svar på frågan "Vad gjordes för att minimera oavsiktliga skador i Kandahar i december 1998?"? ALTERNATIV: - nej - ja
Zinni feared that in the future Bin Laden would be located in cities, where American missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He also worried that Pakistan's authorities are not receiving sufficient warning, believing that the missiles came from India, ANSWERS TO AL QUAEDAS INITIAL INSURANCE 135 and doing something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take shots from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's clear preference would have been to build up anti-terrorism capabilities in neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told me that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, in part, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. Following the decision where fear of accidental damage was an important factor- not using cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers of the Pentagon developed plans to use an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile attack. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of AC-130 called "Spooky" can fly in quickly or from high altitude, undetected by radar; steered to its zone of extraordinarily complex electronics, it can quickly fire precision-controlled 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Since this system could target more accurately than a salvo cruise missile, it had a much lower risk of causing side damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and encouraged to continue, Shelton formally commissioned Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who led the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision-making document for the deployment of specialised operating aircraft. Although Berger and Clarke continued to show interest in this option, the AC-130s were never used. Clarke wrote at that time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, Joint Staff deputy chief of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself doesn't remember blocking the option. He said he understood the special operations management had never thought the intelligence was good enough to justify moving AC-130s to position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he considered the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the different memories of the two generals is that they both believed that serious preparation for such an operation would require a long-term redistribution of special operations to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unfueled range was just over 2,000 miles. After reading the above, "Use AC-130 gunships" is the correct answer to the question "What was done to minimize accidental damage in Kandahar in December 1998?"? ALTERNATIVE: - no - yes
ja
yes