Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another. The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate. We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of defense. We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget. The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees. The majority party's representation on this committee should never exceed the minority's representation by more than one. Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee. In this way the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the new committee's work. Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise. The committees should be smaller-perhaps seven or nine members in each house-so that each member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work. The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees of Congress. One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development. The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated. The Senate does not have even this. Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security. 
Do you have any questions?
What is the recommendation for the term and size of the commitee?
Rekommendation: Kongressens tillsyn över underrättelse- och terroristbekämpning-är nu dysfunktionell. Kongressen borde ta itu med detta problem. Vi har övervägt olika alternativ: En gemensam kommitté enligt den gamla modellen från gemensamma kommittén för atomenergi är en. En enda kommitté i varje kongresshus, som kombinerar auktorisering och godkännande av myndigheter, är en annan. Den nya kommittén eller de nya kommittéerna bör genomföra fortsatta studier av underrättelsemyndigheternas verksamhet och rapportera problem som rör utvecklingen och användningen av underrättelser till alla ledamöter av kammaren och senaten. Vi har redan rekommenderat att den totala nivån på finansieringen av underrättelsetjänsten ska offentliggöras, och att det nationella underrättelseprogrammet ska tilldelas den nationella underrättelsechefen, inte försvarsministern. Vi rekommenderar också att underrättelsekommittén har en underkommitté som är särskilt inriktad på tillsyn och som är befriad från det tidskrävande ansvaret att arbeta med budgeten. Resolutionen om att inrätta den nya strukturen för underrättelsekommittéer bör ge kommittén eller kommittéerna befogenhet att väcka talan. Majoritetspartiets representation i detta utskott bör aldrig överstiga minoritetens representation med mer än en. Fyra av de ledamöter som utses till detta utskott eller utskott bör vara en ledamot som också tjänstgör i var och en av följande ytterligare kommittéer: Beväpnade tjänster, domstolsväsendet, utrikes frågor och försvarsanslagsunderkommittén. På så sätt kan de andra stora kongressintressena sammanföras i det nya utskottets arbete. Ledamöterna bör sitta i underrättelsekommittéerna på obestämd tid, utan fastställda villkor, och därigenom låta dem samla på sig sakkunskap. Utskotten bör vara mindre än sju eller nio ledamöter i varje hus-så att varje ledamot känner en större ansvarskänsla, och ansvarighet, för kvaliteten på utskottets arbete. Ledarna för Inrikesdepartementets säkerhetsavdelning framträder nu inför 88 kommittéer och underkommittéer i kongressen. Ett expertvittne (ej medlem av förvaltningen) berättade att detta kanske är det enskilt största hindret som hindrar avdelningens framgångsrika utveckling. Det enda försöket att konsolidera denna kommittémyndighet, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, kan tas bort. Senaten har inte ens detta. Kongressen måste fastställa vilken typ av tydlig auktoritet och ansvar som finns för att justitiedepartementet ska kunna hantera brott och försvarsdepartementet att hantera hot mot rikets säkerhet. Har du några frågor?
Recommendation: Congressional oversight of intelligence and counter-terrorism-is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various options: a Joint Committee, according to the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, is one. A single committee in each Congressional House, combining the authorisation and approval of authorities, is another. The new committee or committees should carry out further studies of the activities of the intelligence authorities and report problems related to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate. We have already recommended that the overall level of funding for the intelligence service be made public, and that the national intelligence programme be allocated to the national intelligence chief, not to the defence minister. We also recommend that the Intelligence Committee has a sub-committee specifically focused on supervision, which is freed from the time-consuming responsibility of working on the budget. The resolution establishing the new structure for intelligence committees should empower the Committee or Committees to bring proceedings. The representation of the Majority Party in this committee should never exceed the representation of the minority by more than one. Four of the members appointed to this committee or committee should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, the judiciary, Foreign Affairs and the Defence Appropriations Sub-Committee. In this way, the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the work of the new committee. Members should sit on the Intelligence Committees indefinitely, without conditions laid down, thereby allowing them to pool expertise. The committees should be less than seven or nine members of each House - so that each Member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work. The leaders of the Home Office's security department now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees in Congress. An expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single biggest obstacle that hinders the department's successful development. The only attempt to consolidate this committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, can be removed. The Senate doesn't even have this. Congress must determine the type of clear authority and responsibility available for the Department of Justice to deal with crimes and the Department of Defense to deal with threats to national security. Do you have any questions?
Vad är rekommendationen för den berörda personens benämning och storlek?
What is the recommendation for the name and size of the person concerned?