Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 - March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. At the time of his death, Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws.

Putnam's best-known work concerns philosophy of mind. His most noted original contributions to that field came in several key papers published in the late 1960s that set out the hypothesis of multiple realizability. In these papers, Putnam argues that, contrary to the famous claim of the type-identity theory, it is not necessarily true that "Pain is identical to C-fibre firing." Pain, according to Putnam's papers, may correspond to utterly different physical states of the nervous system in different organisms, and yet they all experience the same mental state of "being in pain".  Putnam cited examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his thesis. He asked whether it was likely that the brain structures of diverse types of animals realize pain, or other mental states, the same way. If they do not share the same brain structures, they cannot share the same mental states and properties. The answer to this puzzle had to be that mental states were realized by different physical states in different species. Putnam then took his argument a step further, asking about such things as the nervous systems of alien beings, artificially intelligent robots and other silicon-based life forms. These hypothetical entities, he contended, should not be considered incapable of experiencing pain just because they lack the same neurochemistry as humans. Putnam concluded that type-identity theorists had been making an "ambitious" and "highly implausible" conjecture which could be disproven with one example of multiple realizability. This argument is sometimes referred to as the "likelihood argument".  Putnam formulated a complementary argument based on what he called "functional isomorphism". He defined the concept in these terms: "Two systems are functionally isomorphic if 'there is a correspondence between the states of one and the states of the other that preserves functional relations'." In the case of computers, two machines are functionally isomorphic if and only if the sequential relations among states in the first are exactly mirrored by the sequential relations among states in the other. Therefore, a computer made out of silicon chips and a computer made out of cogs and wheels can be functionally isomorphic but constitutionally diverse. Functional isomorphism implies multiple realizability. This argument is sometimes referred to as an "a priori argument".  Jerry Fodor, Putnam, and others noted that, along with being an effective argument against type-identity theories, multiple realizability implies that any low-level explanation of higher-level mental phenomena is insufficiently abstract and general. Functionalism, which identifies mental kinds with functional kinds that are characterized exclusively in terms of causes and effects, abstracts from the level of microphysics, and therefore seemed to be a better explanation of the relation between mind and body. In fact, there are many functional kinds, such as mousetraps, software and bookshelves, which are multiply realized at the physical level. CANNOTANSWER

Using a quote from the above article, answer the following question: What was said about the theory?
there are many functional kinds, such as mousetraps, software and bookshelves, which are multiply realized at the physical level.
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; 31 juli 1926 – 13 mars 2016) var en amerikansk filosof, matematiker och datavetare, och en stor gestalt inom analytisk filosofi under andra halvan av 1900-talet. Han lämnade betydande bidrag till sinnesfilosofi, språkfilosofi, matematikfilosofi och vetenskapsfilosofi. Vid tiden för sin död var Putnam Cogan Universitys professor emeritus vid Harvard University. Han var känd för sin beredvillighet att tillämpa en lika stor grad av granskning på sina egna filosofiska ståndpunkter som på andras, och utsatte varje ståndpunkt för rigorös analys tills han avslöjade dess brister. Putnams mest kända verk rör sinnesfilosofi. Hans mest uppmärksammade originalbidrag till det området kom i flera nyckeluppsatser som publicerades i slutet av 1960-talet och som innehöll hypotesen om multipel realiserbarhet. I dessa uppsatser argumenterar Putnam för att det, i motsats till typidentitetsteorins berömda påstående, inte nödvändigtvis är sant att "Smärta är identiskt med C-fibereldning." Smärta kan, enligt Putnams papper, motsvara helt olika fysiska tillstånd i nervsystemet i olika organismer, och ändå upplever de alla samma mentala tillstånd av "att ha ont". Putnam citerade exempel från djurriket för att illustrera sin tes. Han frågade om det var troligt att hjärnstrukturerna hos olika typer av djur inser smärta, eller andra mentala tillstånd, på samma sätt. Om de inte delar samma hjärnstrukturer kan de inte dela samma mentala tillstånd och egenskaper. Svaret på detta pussel måste vara att mentala tillstånd realiserades av olika fysiska tillstånd hos olika arter. Putnam tog sedan sitt argument ett steg längre, och frågade om sådant som utomjordiska varelsers nervsystem, artificiellt intelligenta robotar och andra kiselbaserade livsformer. Dessa hypotetiska entiteter, hävdade han, bör inte anses oförmögna att uppleva smärta bara för att de saknar samma neurokemi som människor. Putnam drog slutsatsen att typidentitetsteoretiker hade gjort en "ambitiös" och "mycket osannolik" gissning som kunde motbevisas med ett exempel på multipel realiserbarhet. Detta argument benämns ibland som "likhetsargumentet". Putnam formulerade ett kompletterande argument baserat på vad han kallade "funktionell isomorfism". Han definierade begreppet i dessa termer: "Två system är funktionellt isomorfa om 'det finns en överensstämmelse mellan det ena och det andras tillstånd som bevarar funktionella relationer'." När det gäller datorer är två maskiner funktionellt isomorfa om och endast om de sekventiella relationerna mellan stater i den första exakt speglas av de sekventiella relationerna mellan stater i den andra. Därför kan en dator gjord av kiselchips och en dator gjord av kuggar och hjul vara funktionellt isomorf men konstitutionellt varierande. Funktionell isomorfism innebär flera realiseringar. Detta argument benämns ibland som ett "a priori-argument". Jerry Fodor, Putnam och andra noterade att, tillsammans med att vara ett effektivt argument mot typidentitetsteorier, flera realizabilitet innebär att varje låg nivå förklaring av högre nivå mentala fenomen är otillräckligt abstrakt och allmänt. Funktionalismen, som identifierar mentala slag med funktionella slag som karakteriseras uteslutande i termer av orsaker och effekter, abstrakter från mikrofysikens nivå, och därför verkade vara en bättre förklaring till förhållandet mellan sinne och kropp. I själva verket finns det många funktionella typer, såsom musfällor, programvara och bokhyllor, som multipliceras realiseras på den fysiska nivån. CANNOTANSWER Med hjälp av ett citat från ovanstående artikel besvarar du följande fråga: Vad sades om teorin?
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 – March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. At the time of his death, Putnam Cogan University's professor was emeritus at Harvard University. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, and exposed every position to rigorous analysis until he revealed its shortcomings. Putnam's most famous work concerns philosophy of mind. His most noted original contributions to that area came in several key papers published in the late 1960s and which contained the hypothesis of multiple realisability. In these papers, Putnam argues that, contrary to the famous assertion of type identity theory, it is not necessarily true that "Pain is identical to C-fiber burning." Pain, according to Putnam's paper, can correspond to completely different physical states of the nervous system in different organisms, and yet they all experience the same mental state of "having pain". Putnam cited examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his thesis. He asked if it was likely that the brain structures of different types of animals realize pain, or other mental states, in the same way. If they don't share the same brain structures, they can't share the same mental condition and properties. The answer to this puzzle must be that mental states were realized by different physical states in different species. Putnam then took his argument a step further, asking about things like the nervous system of alien beings, artificially intelligent robots, and other silicon-based life forms. These hypothetical entities, he argued, should not be considered unable to experience pain just because they lack the same neurochemistry as humans. Putnam concluded that type identity theorists had made an "ambitious" and "very unlikely" guess that could be disproved with an example of multiple realisability. This argument is sometimes referred to as the "equality argument". Putnam formulated a complementary argument based on what he called "functional isomorphism". He defined the concept in these terms: "Two systems are functionally isomorphic if 'there is a correspondence between the state of one and the condition of the other preserving functional relationships'." In the case of computers, two machines are functionally isomorphic if and only if the sequential relations between states in the first are accurately reflected by the sequential relations between states in the second. Therefore, a computer made of silicon chips and a computer made of cogs and wheels can be functionally isomorphic but constitutionally varied. Functional isomorphism involves several realizations. This argument is sometimes referred to as an "a priori argument". Jerry Fodor, Putnam and others noted that, along with being an effective argument against type identity theories, several realizability means that each low-level explanation of higher-level mental phenomena is insufficiently abstract and general. Functionalism, which identifies mental kinds with functional kinds characterized exclusively in terms of causes and effects, abstracts from the level of microphysics, and therefore appeared to be a better explanation of the relationship between mind and body. In fact, there are many functional types, such as mouse traps, software, and bookcases, that are multiplied realized on the physical level. CANNOTANSWER Using a quote from the above article, you answer the following question: What was said about the theory?
Det finns många funktionella typer, såsom musfällor, programvara och bokhyllor, som multipliceras realiseras på den fysiska nivån.
There are many functional types, such as mouse traps, software and bookcases, that are multiplied realized at the physical level.