While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb. Quso did not arrive at the apartment in time to film the attack. Back in Afghanistan,  Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation. He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack. There was no American strike. In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to  Bin Laden) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source,  Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger. The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts. Following the attack,  Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya. Al Qaeda's image was very important to  Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets. It was also disseminated among many young men in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and caused many extremists to travel to Afghanistan for training and jihad. Al Qaeda members considered the video an effective tool in their struggle for preeminence among other Islamist and jihadist movements. 
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Who kept rotating between five to six residences in Kandahar?
Medan Nashiri var i Afghanistan såg Nibras och Khamri sin chans. De styrde sprängladdningsbåten vid USS Cole, gjorde vänliga gester mot besättningsmän och detonerade bomben. Quso anlände inte till lägenheten i tid för att filma attacken. Tillbaka i Afghanistan väntade Bin Ladin amerikansk militär vedergällning. Han beordrade evakueringen av al-Qaidas flygplatsanläggning Kandahar och flydde- först till ökenområdet nära Kabul, sedan till Khowst och Jalalabad, och så småningom tillbaka till Kandahar. I Kandahar roterade han mellan fem och sex bostäder och tillbringade en natt på varje bostad. Dessutom skickade han sin äldre rådgivare, Mohammed Atef, till en annan del av Kandahar och hans ställföreträdare, Ayman al Zawahiri, till Kabul så att alla tre inte kunde dödas i ett anfall. Det blev ingen amerikansk strejk. I februari 2001 rapporterade en källa att en person som han identifierade som den stora instruktören (troligen en referens till Bin Ladin) ofta klagade över att USA ännu inte hade attackerat. Enligt källan ville Bin Ladin att USA skulle anfalla, och om det inte gjorde det skulle han lansera något större. Attacken mot USS Cole galvaniserade al Qaidas rekryteringsinsatser. Efter attacken instruerade Bin Ladin mediakommittén, som då leddes av Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, att producera en propagandavideo som inkluderade en återupptagande av attacken tillsammans med bilder av al-Qaidas träningsläger och träningsmetoder; den lyfte också fram muslimskt lidande i Palestina, Kashmir, Indonesien och Tjetjenien. Al Qaidas image var mycket viktig för Bin Ladin, och videon fick stor spridning. Delar sändes på Al Jazeera, CNN och andra TV - kanaler. Den spreds även bland många unga män i Saudiarabien och Jemen, och fick många extremister att resa till Afghanistan för utbildning och jihad. Al-Qaidas medlemmar ansåg att videon var ett effektivt verktyg i deras kamp för företräde bland andra islamistiska och jihadistiska rörelser. Vilken fråga skulle man ställa sig från denna paragraf?
While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance. They steered the explosive device boat at USS Cole, made friendly gestures against crew members and detonated the bomb. Quso did not arrive at the apartment in time to film the attack. Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden expected US military retaliation. He ordered the evacuation of al-Qaeda airport facility Kandahar and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar. In Kandahar, he rotated between five and six residences and spent one night at each residence. In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to another part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in an attack. There was no American strike. In February 2001, a source reported that a person whom he identified as the major instructor (probably a reference to Bin Laden) often complained that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it didn't, he would launch something bigger. The attack on USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda recruitment efforts. After the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then led by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a resumption of the attack along with footage of al-Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia and Chechnya. Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated. Parts were broadcast on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television channels. It also spread among many young men in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, causing many extremists to travel to Afghanistan for education and jihad. Al-Qaeda members considered the video to be an effective tool in their struggle for precedence among other Islamist and jihadist movements. What question would be raised from this paragraph?
Vem roterade mellan fem och sex bostäder i Kandahar?
Who rotated between five and six homes in Kandahar?