Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. 

According to the above paragraph, the correct answer to the question "What entity did NEADS warn in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas?" is "FAA's Cleveland Center"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
yes
Direkt efter att Pentagon träffats fick NEADS reda på ett annat möjligt kapat flygplan. Det var ett flygplan som i själva verket inte hade kapats alls. Efter den andra World Trade Center-kraschen erkände Boston Centers chefer att båda flygplanen var transkontinentala 767 jetliners som hade avgått Logan Airport. När Boston Center kom ihåg "vi har några plan" anmärkte han att Delta 1989 också kan bli kapad. Boston Center ringde NEADS klockan 9:41 och identifierade Delta 1989, ett 767 jetplan som hade lämnat Logans flygplats för Las Vegas, som en möjlig kapning. NEADS varnade FAA:s Cleveland Center för att titta på Delta 1989. Ledningscentralen och FAA:s högkvarter såg det också. Under förmiddagens lopp förekom flera felaktiga rapporter om kapade flygplan. Rapporten från American 11 på väg söderut var den första; Delta 1989 var den andra. NEADS förlorade aldrig spåret efter Delta 1989, och beordrade till och med jaktflygplan från Ohio och Michigan att genskjuta det. Flygningen stängde aldrig av sin transponder. NEADS fick snart veta att flygplanet inte kapades, och spårade Delta 1989 då det vände kurs över Toledo, styrde österut, och landade i Cleveland. Men ett annat flygplan var på väg mot Washington, ett flygplan som NORAD inte hade hört något om: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. Klockan 9.27, efter att ha varit i luften i 45 minuter, erkände United 93 en sändning från Cleveland Center controller. Detta var den sista normala kontakten FAA hade med flygningen. Mindre än en minut senare hörde Clevelandkontrollanten och piloterna på flygplan i närheten "en radiosändning av obegripliga ljud av möjligt skrikande eller en kamp från ett okänt ursprung." Kontrollanten svarade, sekunder senare: "Någon ringde Cleveland? "Detta följdes av en andra radiosändning, med ljud av skrik. Det korrekta svaret på frågan "Vilken enhet varnade NEADS som svar på ett 767-jet som hade lämnat Logan Airport för Las Vegas?" Är "FAA's Cleveland Center"? ALTERNATIV: - nej - ja
Immediately after the Pentagon met, NEADS found out of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that had not actually been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center executives admitted that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners who had departed Logan Airport. When the Boston Center remembered "we have some planes," he remarked that Delta in 1989 may also be hijacked. The Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta in 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijacking. NEads warned the FAA's Cleveland Center not to watch Delta in 1989. The command center and FAA headquarters also saw it. Over the course of the morning there were several incorrect reports of hijacked aircraft. The American 11 report headed south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track after Delta in 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never shut down its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta in 1989 as it turned course over Toledo, steered east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was headed for Washington, an aircraft that NORAD had heard nothing about: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9.27, after being in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 admitted a broadcast from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and pilots on nearby aircraft heard "a radio broadcast of incomprehensible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later, "Someone called Cleveland? "This was followed by a second radio broadcast, with sounds of screams. The correct answer to the question "What entity warned NEADS in response to a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas?" Is "FAA's Cleveland Center"? ALTERNATIVE: - no - yes
ja
yes