After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of  Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that  Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. 

According to the above paragraph, the correct answer to the question "What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000?" is "Where the money was coming from for Al Qaeda"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
no
Efter ambassadbombningarna 1998 försökte USA:s regering utveckla en tydligare bild av Bin Ladins ekonomi. En amerikansk interagensgrupp reste till Saudiarabien två gånger, 1999 och 2000, för att få information från saudierna om deras förståelse av dessa finanser. Gruppen kom så småningom fram till att det ofta upprepade påståendet att Bin Ladin finansierade al-Qaida från hans personliga förmögenhet i själva verket inte var sant. Tjänstemännen utvecklade en ny teori: al Qaida fick sina pengar på annat håll, och USA behövde fokusera på andra finansieringskällor, såsom välgörenhetsorganisationer, rika donatorer och ekonomiska facilitatorer. I slutändan, även om underrättelsesamfundet ägnade mer resurser åt frågan och producerade något mer intelligens, förblev det svårt att skilja al Qaidas finansiella transaktioner mellan de enorma summor som rör sig i det internationella finansiella systemet. CIA kunde inte hitta eller störa al-Qaidas penningflöden. NSC:s personal ansåg att en möjlig lösning på dessa svagheter i underrättelsegemenskapen var att skapa ett all-source terrorist-finansierande underrättelseanalyscenter. Clarke drev på för finansieringen av ett sådant centrum på Treasury, men varken finansdepartementet eller CIA var villiga att åta sig resurserna. Inom USA samlade olika FBI-fältkontor underrättelser om organisationer som misstänks ha samlat in pengar till al-Qaida eller andra terroristgrupper. Med 9/11 förstod FBI-agenter att det fanns extremistiska organisationer verksamma inom USA som stödde en global jihadistisk rörelse och med betydande kopplingar till al-Qaida. FBI drev ett nät av informatörer, bedrev elektronisk övervakning och hade inlett betydande utredningar på ett antal fältkontor, bland annat i New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego och Minneapolis. På nationell nivå använde FBI dock aldrig informationen för att få en systematisk eller strategisk förståelse för arten och omfattningen av al-Qaidas insamlingar. Finansinspektionens tillsynsmyndigheter, liksom amerikanska finansinstitut, var i allmänhet inriktade på att hitta och avskräcka eller störa de stora flöden av amerikansk valuta som genereras av narkotikahandel och högnivå internationellt bedrägeri. Storskaliga skandaler, såsom att ryska pengatvättare använde Bank of New York för att flytta miljontals dollar från Ryssland, fångade uppmärksamheten från finansdepartementet och kongressen. Före den 11 september ansåg finansministeriet inte att finansiering av terrorism var tillräckligt viktig för att nämna detta i sin nationella strategi för penningtvätt. Det korrekta svaret på frågan "Vad försökte USA:s regering hitta under 1999 och 2000?" Är "Var pengarna kom ifrån för al-Qaida"? ALTERNATIV: - nej - ja
Following the embassy bombings in 1998, the U.S. government attempted to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's economy. An American interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to obtain information from the Saudis about their understanding of these finances. The group eventually concluded that the often repeated claim that Bin Laden funded al-Qaeda from his personal fortune was not in fact true. Officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda received its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, rich donors, and economic facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced slightly more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions between the huge sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA could not find or disrupt Al-Qaeda's money flows. NSC personnel considered that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-funding intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center on Treasury, but neither the Treasury nor the CIA were willing to commit to the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices collected intelligence about organizations suspected of raising money for al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. With 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States that supported a global jihadist movement and with significant links to al-Qaeda. The FBI operated a network of informants, conducted electronic surveillance and had launched significant investigations in a number of field offices, including in New York City, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. However, at national level, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al-Qaeda fundraising. Financial Supervisory Authorities, as well as US financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the large flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as Russian money launderers using the Bank of New York to move millions of dollars from Russia, caught the attention of the Treasury and Congress. Before 11 September, the Ministry of Finance did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention this in its national money laundering strategy. The correct answer to the question "What did the US government try to find in 1999 and 2000?" Is "Where the money came from for al-Qaeda"? ALTERNATIVE: - no - yes
nt
nt