Military Notification and Response. Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked: FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out. NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise? FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test. NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call. At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD's Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to "go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later." General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. 
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
How long did it take the army to scramble fighter jets?
Militär Underrättelse och svar. Boston Center följde inte protokollet i att söka militär hjälp genom den föreskrivna befälsordningen. Förutom anmälningar inom FAA tog Boston Center vid 8:34 initiativet till att kontakta militären genom FAA:s anläggning Cape Cod. Centret försökte också kontakta en tidigare larmplats i Atlantic City, ovetande om att den hade avvecklats. Klockan 20:37:52 nådde Boston Center NEADS. Detta var den första anmälan som militären fick-på någon nivå-att amerikanska 11 hade blivit kapade: FAA: Hej. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], vi har ett problem här. Vi har ett kapat flygplan på väg mot New York, och vi vill att ni ska, vi behöver någon som kan förvränga några F-16:or eller något där uppe, hjälpa oss. Är det här en riktig värld eller träning? FAA: Nej, det här är ingen övning, inte ett test. NEADS beordrade till stridsstationer de två F-15 beredskapsflygplanen vid Otis Air Force Base i Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles från New York City. Luftförsvaret av Amerika började med denna kallelse. Vid NEADS vidarebefordrades rapporten om kapningen omedelbart till stridsbefälhavaren överste Robert Marr. Efter att ha beordrat Otis-planen till stridsstationerna ringde överste Marr generalmajor Larry Arnold, befälhavare för Första flygvapnet och NORAD:s kontinentalregion. Marr sökte tillstånd att förvränga Otis jaktplan. General Arnold påminde senare om att Marr skulle "förstöra dem, så får vi myndigheterna senare." General Arnold ringde sedan NORAD:s högkvarter för att rapportera. F-15-planen försköts kl. 08.46 från Otis flygbas. Vilken fråga skulle man ställa sig från denna paragraf?
Military Intelligence and Responses. The Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, the Boston Center at 8:34 took the initiative to contact the military through the FAA Cape Cod facility. The center also attempted to contact a former Atlantic City alert point, unaware that it had been decommissioned. At 20:37:52 Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification that the military received-at some level-that American 11 had been hijacked: FAA: Hello. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked plane headed for New York, and we want you to, we need someone to distort some F-16s or something up there, help us. Is this a real world or is this training? FAA: No, this is not a drill, not a test. NEADS ordered to combat stations the two F-15 emergency aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles from New York City. Air defense of America began with this call. At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was immediately forwarded to combat commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis planes to the battle stations, Colonel Marr called Major General Larry Arnold, commander of the First Air Force and the NORAD Continental Region. Marr sought permission to distort Oti's fighters. General Arnold later reminded that Marr would "destroy them, and we'll get the authorities later." General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. The F-15 aircraft were displaced at 8:46 a.m. from Otis Air Base. What question would be raised from this paragraph?
Hur lång tid tog det för armén att ställa in stridsflygplan?
How long did it take the army to cancel fighter planes?