Clémentine Bry
email: clementine.bry@u-paris10.fr

Alice Follenfant

Thierry Meyer

Running head: SELF-CONSTRUALS IN PRIME-TO-BEHAVIOR EFFECTS Blonde Like Me: When Self-Construals Moderate Stereotype Priming Effects on Intellectual Performance

Keywords: prime-to-behavior effects, automatic behavior, priming, self-construal, Blonde stereotype, independence, interdependence, assimilation, contrast

Stereotype priming can lead to assimilation or contrast effects on behavior. We argue that self-activation is a moderator of both assimilation and contrast effects. To test this hypothesis, in two studies, we activated independent or interdependent self-knowledge before priming participants with the dumb Blonde stereotype or a control category (Study 1) or no prime (Study 2). Participants then answered a knowledge test. Results support our expectations: Participants presented assimilation under interdependence (i.e., underperformance compared to control group) while they presented no assimilation (i.e., comparable performance with control group in Study 1) and contrast (better performance than control group in Study 2) under independence. We discuss implications of these findings in regards of previous research and recent models such as the Active Self Account (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2005).

Blonde like me: When self-construals moderate stereotype priming effects on intellectual performance An extensive body of literature has demonstrated that increasing accessibility of stored knowledge can influence subsequent behavior (for a review, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001). These prime-to-behavior effects concern a large set of behaviors like motor action (e.g. [START_REF] Bargh | Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action[END_REF][START_REF] Follenfant | Effet de l'activation de stéréotypes sur le comportement: une application en contexte sportif [Effects of stereotype activation on behavior : An application in a sport setting[END_REF], intellectual performance (e.g. Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998), creativity [START_REF] Förster | Automatic effects of deviancy cues on creative cognition[END_REF], helping behavior [START_REF] Macrae | Help, I need somebody: Automatic action and inaction[END_REF], or competition [START_REF] Kay | Material priming: The influence of mundane physical objects on situational construal and competitive behavioral choice[END_REF]). In the present study, we focus on the effects of stereotype activation on intellectual performance. For instance, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998, exp.1) showed that participants primed with the stereotype of professors subsequently had better performance on a knowledge test compared to control conditions (i.e., secretaries or no stereotype). They concluded that assimilation effects previously obtained on motor behavior [START_REF] Bargh | Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action[END_REF] could be extended to complex intellectual behavior. The aim of the present study is to further investigate whether selfconstruals [START_REF] Markus | Culture and the Self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation[END_REF] can moderate prime-to-behavior effects. In two experiments, we expected a behavioral assimilation effect under interdependence and a behavioral contrast effect under independence.

Priming effects can have two consequences: Behavior may be either displaced toward (assimilation) or away (contrast) from the prime. Thus, one generally refers to assimilation when priming a concept (e.g., elderly stereotype) leads to corresponding behavior in the perceiver (e.g., walking slowly), and to contrast when it leads to inverse behavior in the perceiver (e.g., walking fast). Assimilation is often considered as the default option (see [START_REF] Biernat | Stereotypes and Shifting Standards: Assimilation and Contrast in Social Judgment[END_REF]. It is true that the priming paradigm most frequently elicits assimilation (see Wheeler & Petty, 2001), whereas contrast effects tend to occur only in the presence of specific factors like exemplar priming or self-activation (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998;[START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Behavioral indecision: Effects of self-focus on automatic behavior[END_REF]. However, we consider that effects of priming on behavior should be assessed only when compared with a control condition and not when compared to another experimental condition. Without such a control condition, one cannot determine where the action is: A behavioral difference between two experimental conditions does not mean that there are two effects (e.g., assimilation and contrast), but perhaps that there is just one effect (assimilation or contrast) versus no effect (i.e., equivalent to a control condition). Although several studies have shown behavioral assimilation effects compared to a control condition [START_REF] Bargh | Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action[END_REF][START_REF] Macrae | Help, I need somebody: Automatic action and inaction[END_REF], behavioral contrast effects are usually shown relative to an assimilation effect and not relative to a control condition (e.g., Dijksterhuis, et al., 1998). We believe that an assimilation effect can be said to occur only when behavior moves toward the prime and is significantly different from a control or no prime condition. Conversely, there is a contrast effect when behavior moves away from the prime and is significantly different from a control or no prime condition [START_REF] Wheeler | Assimilation in social comparison: can we agree on what it is[END_REF]. Not all prime-to-behavior effects can be explained by direct perception-behavior links [START_REF] Bargh | Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action[END_REF], or by indirect link mediated by trait activation (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998). Indeed, these mechanisms would predict only assimilation but not contrast effects. Rather, we argue in favor of prime-to-behavior effects moderated by selfconcept. Assimilation would occur when self-concept is congruent with the prime. Contrast would occur when self-concept is incongruent with the prime. Several researchers have investigated how self-concept could influence priming effects (e.g., [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Behavioral indecision: Effects of self-focus on automatic behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Hull | The nonconciousness of Self-consciousness[END_REF].

Recently, Schubert and Häfner (2003 exp.2) investigated the influence of selfactivation on prime-to-behavior effects. Participants were primed with a category linked to high (i.e., professor) or low intelligence (i.e., hussy), while flashed with self-related or otherrelated words prior to answering a general knowledge test and rating their perceived intelligence. Participants flashed with other-related words presented congruent performance with primes: Professor-primed participants marginally performed better than hussy-primed participants. Participants flashed with self-related words presented incongruent performance with primes: Professor-primed participants performed worse compared to hussy-primed participants. Additionally, intelligence self-ratings were consistent with behavioral performance. Self-activation produced prime-incongruent self-ratings while other-activation produced prime congruence self-ratings. Consistent with our assumption, priming influences both self-concept and behavior (See also Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).

Schubert and Häfner argued that self-activation triggered contrast effects. However, from our point of view, the absence of a control condition does not unequivocally show contrast effect (See also [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Behavioral indecision: Effects of self-focus on automatic behavior[END_REF]. Other papers indeed included a control condition when studying self-activation effects. [START_REF] Wheeler | Think unto others: The selfdestructive impact of negative racial stereotypes[END_REF] asked participants to write an essay about a student to prime Black or White stereotype. Participants next completed a math test. Participants primed with the Black stereotype subsequently performed worse compared to those primed with the White stereotype. However, a number of participants spontaneously put themselves in the shoes of the student using I-pronoun (vs. He-pronoun) when writing the essay. Additional analyses revealed that only participants who took an I-point of view presented the Black stereotype effects. In this paper, assimilation occurred under self-activation, with a paradigm that included a control condition but did not include a manipulation of self-activation (see also [START_REF] Hull | The nonconciousness of Self-consciousness[END_REF].

As far as we know, no study concerning prime-to-behavior effects has shown that self-activation can lead to assimilation and contrast, by comparison to a control condition, with the same prime, within the same study. Knowing whether self-activation can lead to both types of effects (i.e., assimilation and contrast) can contribute to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of prime-to-behavior effects. Indeed, if prime-to-behavior effects are moderated by self-activation, the direct perception-behavior link would be questioned. In this case, another mechanism should be considered, for instance as proposed in the Active Self Account developed by [START_REF] Wheeler | The Roles of the Self in Priming-to-Behavior Effects[END_REF]. The Active Self Account proposes that behavioral assimilation to the prime follows from inclusion of prime features in the self-perception while contrast follows from inclusion of prime-incongruent features and exclusion of prime-congruent features in the self-perception (see also DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005). Independent and interdependent self-construals could determine respectively exclusion and inclusion of target features in the self-perception [START_REF] Gardner | When you and I are 'we,' you are not threatening: The role of self-expansion in social comparison[END_REF][START_REF] Stapel | I, we, and the effects of others on me: How construal level moderates social comparison effects[END_REF]. As such, in this paper, we tested whether selfconstruals moderate both behavioral assimilation and contrast.

People can construe their self as independent or interdependent [START_REF] Markus | Culture and the Self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation[END_REF]. When independent, people consider themselves as being unique, autonomous, and distinct from others. They define themselves using personal, internal, and abstract features like traits, abilities, and attitudes. When interdependent, people consider themselves as being connected to others, a part of a whole. They define themselves using their social relationships, memberships, and roles [START_REF] Gardner | I' value freedom, but 'we' value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment[END_REF][START_REF] Trafimow | Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self[END_REF]. Culture and gender generally determine a chronic self-construal [START_REF] Cross | Models of the self: Self-construals and gender[END_REF]Gabriel & Gardner, 1999;[START_REF] Markus | Culture and the Self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation[END_REF]. People from individualistic society and males have a relatively more independent self-construal while people from collectivist society and females have a more interdependent self-construal.

Nevertheless, both construals are available in memory and can be primed by situational cues and social demands [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self representations[END_REF][START_REF] Kühnen | Assimilation and contrast in social comparison as a consequence of self-construal activation[END_REF][START_REF] Trafimow | Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self[END_REF].

Self-construals determine a large set of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral processes [START_REF] Markus | Culture and the Self: Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation[END_REF]. For instance, interdependent people rate themselves as being more similar to others than independent persons [START_REF] Kühnen | Assimilation and contrast in social comparison as a consequence of self-construal activation[END_REF]. [START_REF] Stapel | I, we, and the effects of others on me: How construal level moderates social comparison effects[END_REF] showed that, compared to a control-self condition, interdependents tend to assimilate their self-evaluation to a comparison source while independents tend to contrast their self-evaluation away from the source (see also [START_REF] Gardner | When you and I are 'we,' you are not threatening: The role of self-expansion in social comparison[END_REF]White et al., 2005).

Moreover, self-construals moderate the chameleon effect [START_REF] Chartrand | The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and social interaction[END_REF]:

Compared to a control-self condition, interdependence enhances imitation tendency while independence decreases imitation tendency [START_REF] Van Baaren | It takes two to mimic: Behavioral consequences of self-construals[END_REF].

Considering the literature reviewed above, we designed two studies in which we first activated an independent or interdependent self-construal and then the dumb Blonde stereotype or a control prime before measuring encyclopedic knowledge performance. We predicted that activation of interdependence would lead to assimilation to the Blonde stereotype (i.e., performance decrease) while activation of independence would lead to contrast from the Blonde stereotype (i.e., performance increase) relative to control condition.

Study 1

Method

The experiment was conducted on the Internet following guidelines on ethics and laws [START_REF] Apa | Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct[END_REF][START_REF] Caverni | Code de conduite des chercheurs en sciences du comportement [Ethical guideline for researchers in behavioral sciences[END_REF].

Participants and design

One-hundred and eight Internet surfers connected to the experiment website. Twentytwo participants dropped out mid-study (seven during self-construal manipulation task, six during stereotype priming and nine during the general knowledge questionnaire). Drop-outs were equivalent in all experimental conditions. The final sample consisted of 86 participants (61 women, 23 men and 2 unknown; M age = 23.33, SD age = 6.27) randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (self-construal: independence vs. interdependence) × 2 (primed category: Blondes vs. control) between-subjects design.

Procedure and stimulus materials

Participants were recruited on Internet newsgroups through advertising messages.

These messages invited Internet surfers to participate in 3 different psychology studies conducted by researchers from the University of Paris X. These studies were presented as concerned with personality, color perception and general knowledge. Before connecting to the website, surfers had to ask for a password. A personal and unique password was given, controlling for multiple submissions, in order to guard against multiple participations [START_REF] Reips | Standards for Internet-based experimenting[END_REF]. Once connected, participants received an electronic consent form providing general information about studies and instructions about participation (e.g., anonymity and confidentiality, possibility to interrupt the experiment at every moment by clicking on "exit", "how to use the website" rules). Participants either clicked on 'I agree to participate' which led to the first task or on 'I refuse' which led to an exit page thanking participants for their interest.

The first task presented to participants as a personality questionnaire was our selfconstrual manipulation. Seven items (from the meta-analysis by Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, 2002, p. 9, table 1) were presented twice (i.e., first about work and then about leisure situations) and participants had to evaluate how well each item described them on a 7point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = absolutely). In the independence condition, participants were presented with the seven items related to independence (e.g., "I tend to do my own thing, and others do the same"; "I am unique-different from others in many respects"). In the interdependence condition, participants were presented with seven out of the eight items related to interdependence (e.g., "to understand who I am, you must see me with members of my group"; "to me, pleasure is spending time with others"). Furthermore, we biased each item with the adverb 'sometimes' (e.g., I sometimes tend to do my own thing and others do the same). This procedure leads participants to agree more with the items and admit only one kind of self-knowledge as self-descriptive [START_REF] Chaiken | Affective-cognitive consistency and the effect of salient behavioral information on the self-perception of attitudes[END_REF].

Next participants were presented with the second task, the color perception task, designed to activate a category stereotypically associated with stupidity. We chose the dumb blond female stereotype which is widely spread in France through the media (e.g., [START_REF] Gibaja | La minute blonde[END_REF][START_REF] Guéro | Les blondes[END_REF][START_REF] Luketic | Legally Blonde[END_REF]. Blondes are usually associated with both low intelligence and ability and high beauty and femininity. We ensured those features were associated to Blondes in a pilot study. Eleven students listed the most common characteristics associated with Blondes: 40% of listed adjectives referred to stupidity and 36% were linked to seduction and beauty. Only one participant did not check off stupidity as a Blonde's features.

In order to activate the Blonde stereotype, participants were exposed to 30 facepictures and had to indicate each person's hair color on a four-point color scale (i.e., black, brown, blond and red). In the Blonde stereotype condition, there were 21 pictures of nonambiguously blond beauty queens, and nine of dark-haired beauty queens (brown, black or red). In the control category condition, there were 21 pictures of dark-haired men and nine of blond ones. We chose men as a control prime because we reasoned that this category is not particularly associated with high or low encyclopedic knowledge. The men category should not influence participants' performance. Pictures were randomly chosen between a large set of pictures and presented in a random order. Each participant was primed with a different collection of pictures. All pictures were front-faced on a white background.

The third task was an encyclopedic knowledge test intended to give an index of intellectual performance (see Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998). We selected one hundred questions of diverse fields of knowledge from the Trivial Pursuit game (1993). We transformed them into three response-option questions (only one correct answer) and submitted them to a pilot study on the Internet (N = 7590). We considered four difficulty levels of questions as a function of quartiles for correct answers. In the present experiment, our knowledge test included five questions of each difficulty level, randomly chosen and ordered from the whole sample of questions. We expected some effects of our variables on the moderately difficult questions (i.e., about 1.99 correct answers out of 5 questions on the pilot study) because they appear to be the most sensitive (performance on other questions might be limited by ceiling or floor effects). Participants were asked to select the correct answer among the three options, with no time pressure but alone and without any help (i.e., no encyclopedia and no web search).

After knowledge test fulfillment, participants answered a set of questions to ensure they were not aware of our hypotheses and not suspicious of any link between the three tasks.

Finally, participants were fully debriefed through a text presenting the whole experiment and hypotheses.

Results and discussion

We submitted the number of correct answers on the five moderately difficult questions 1 to a 2 (self-construal: independence vs. interdependence) × 2 (primed category: Blondes vs. control) ANOVA. We only found a significant interaction 2 , F (1, 82) = 5.77, p < .02, η² p = .066. Interdependence-Blonde primed participants (M = 1.14, SD = 0.86) performed worse compared to interdependence-control primed participants (M = 1.93, SD = 1.11, F (1, 82) = 4.82, p < .04). Independence-Blonde primed participants (M = 1.90, SD = 1.29) performed as well as those in the independence-control condition (M = 1.5, SD = 0.73, F (1, 82) = 1.38, ns). The independence-control group (M = 1.5, SD = 0.73) obtained similar performance to the interdependence-control group (M = 1.93, SD = 1.11, F (1, 82) = 1.55,

ns).

Consistent with our predictions, we found an assimilation effect to the Blonde stereotype among interdependence-primed participants: Performance was lower than after interdependence-control priming. However, the contrast effect -expected among participants primed with independence and the Blonde stereotype -did not occur.

Performance was equivalent with those in the control condition. Thus, only participants primed with interdependence showed prime-to-behavior effects.

Study 2

In Study 1, experimental and control primes differed on both gender and hair color. This variable confusion might weaken our conclusions. We designed Study 2 to replicate Study 1 with a no prime control condition. Furthermore, we conducted Study 2 in lab conditions.

Method Participants and design

Seventy-three volunteers (34 men, 39 women, M age = 25.14, SD age = 10.94) were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (self-construal: independence vs. interdependence) × 2 (Blonde stereotype: activated vs. not activated) between-subjects design.

Procedure and stimulus materials

Participants were recruited on the street to participate in a study, in exchange of a free drink. The study was presented as concerned with concentration effects on performance and run by the Haute-Bretagne University. Participants followed the recruiter to a lab, where the (female) experimenter offered them a drink and settled them in a room where up to 15 persons filled in different questionnaires (the same room was used to run several different studies). Next, she gave them a questionnaire and, depending on condition, a photo booklet (or not) to use during the distractive task. She explained the questionnaire contained all the instructions about the concentration task, the distraction task (or not), and the encyclopedic knowledge test.

The concentration task, that manipulated self-construal, was the same used in Study 1, but in a paper-and-pencil version.

The distraction task allowed to activate the dumb Blonde stereotype. The priming procedure was a paper-and-pencil version of the one used in Study 1. Participants examined face-pictures of 30 beauty queens gathered in the photo booklet (21 blond and 9 dark-haired women). They had to report each person's hair color on a separate grid. Participants did not complete the distraction task in the 'no activated stereotype' condition.

The encyclopedic knowledge test measured an intellectual performance with a part of the questions used in Study 1. It included five moderately difficult questions (i.e., about 2.24 correct answers out of 5 questions on the pilot study) and five moderately easy questions (i.e., about 3.56 correct answers out of 5 questions on the pilot study). Questions were in a random fixed order. Participants had to circle the correct answer among the three options.

Next, participants answered a set of questions to ensure they were not aware of our hypotheses and of the link between the three tasks. They were finally thanked and debriefed.

Results and discussion

We submitted the number of correct answers to moderately difficult questions 3 to a 2 (self-construal: independence vs. interdependence) × 2 (Blonde stereotype: activated vs. not activated) ANOVA. We only found a significant interaction effect 4 , F (1, 69) = 12.82, p < .001, η p ² = .16. Interdependence-blonde primed participants (M = 1.52, SD = 0.90) underperformed interdependence-control primed participants (M = 2.17, SD = 0.73; F (1, 69) = 5.33, p < .03). Independence-blonde primed participants (M = 2.37, SD = 0.96) outperformed independence-control primed participants (M = 1.53, SD = 0.94; F (1, 69) = 7.50, p < .01). Independence-control primed participants (M = 1.53, SD = 0.94) underperformed interdependence-control primed participants (M = 2.17, SD = 0.73, F (1, 69) = 4.53, p < .04).

Consistent with Study 1, assimilation to the Blonde stereotype occurred under interdependence priming: Performance was lower than in the control condition. Moreover, the expected contrast effect occurred under independence priming: Performance was higher in the Blonde condition than in the control condition. These results provide support for the prediction that both assimilation and contrast can occur within the same study and to the same prime, according to the current self-construal. We did not expect the effect of selfconstruals on performance in control conditions but findings tell another story: Independence-primed participants performed worse than interdependence-primed participants. It seems that activation of independent self-construal can lead to lower knowledge performance. This effect was not significant in Study 1 but in Study 2, the immediate connection between self-construal manipulation and the performance test enhanced the construal effect. Still, interdependent participants are not more intelligent than independent participants. We think that self-construals influenced processes that might play a role in encyclopedic knowledge retrieval. Indeed, independence promotes contextindependence processes like focal attention and inhibition of seemingly irrelevant cues whereas interdependence promotes context-dependence processes as broad attention and weak inhibition [START_REF] Hannover | Implications of independent versus interdependent self-knowledge for motivated social cognition: The semantic procedural interface model of the self[END_REF]. It is conceivable that recalling encyclopedic knowledge requires a rather context-dependent cognitive style (i.e., less inhibition to explore widely the mental network) that disadvantaged independent-primed participants. This is a new and promising line of research for both self-construals and primeto-behavior.

General discussion

In two studies, we investigated self-construal moderation of the Blonde stereotype effects on encyclopedic knowledge performance. After self-construal manipulation, participants were primed with the dumb Blonde stereotype or a control category in Study 1 or not primed in Study 2. In both experiments, only participants primed with interdependence demonstrated an assimilation effect: They performed worse on the knowledge test after the dumb Blonde stereotype priming than after control or no priming. We obtained the opposite effect with an independent self-construal: Participants performed better after the Blonde priming than after control or no priming. However, the expected contrast effect occurred only in the second study.

These findings extend previous research on prime-to-behavior effects and selfconstruals, notably those of [START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF]. Our findings provide further evidence for Schubert and Häfner's hypothesis. We replicated their "contrast" effect following independence priming in a paradigm that included a control condition. Moreover, the present study extends Schubert and Häfner findings by showing an assimilation effect after self-activation. Self-activation does not always trigger behavioral contrast but can also enhance assimilation depending on the activated self-concept. This malleability of prime-tobehavior effects after self-activation supports our assumption that direct links between perception and action cannot account for these effects, at least for encyclopedic knowledge kind of task used in the present studies. Additionally, we replicated the assimilation effect found by Wheeler et al. (2001) and by [START_REF] Hull | The nonconciousness of Self-consciousness[END_REF] in a paradigm that included a manipulation of self-activation.

Our reasoning was partly based on the Active Self Model developed by [START_REF] Wheeler | The Roles of the Self in Priming-to-Behavior Effects[END_REF]. The Active Self Model posits that priming influences the self-concept either in a prime-congruent or incongruent manner and that behavior follows the self-concept, leading to assimilation and contrast effects, respectively. In their empirical test of this model, [START_REF] Demarree | Priming a new identity: Selfmonitoring moderates the effects of nonself primes on self-judgments and behavior[END_REF] only demonstrated an assimilation effect, among low self-monitor participants.

Our paper completes the latter, demonstrating assimilation and contrast to the same prime.

However, our studies lack self-perception measures necessary to test a mediation of behavioral priming effects via self-representation. The inclusion of self measures would allow to assess more directly the underlying mechanisms of prime-to-behavior effects.

Future research should address this.

Other mechanisms can also be considered. [START_REF] Van Baaren | It takes two to mimic: Behavioral consequences of self-construals[END_REF] have findings that concur with ours but they argue in favor of a mechanism based on context-dependence. Independents seem to be less "sensitive" to situational variations than interdependents [START_REF] Kühnen | Thinking about the self influences thinking in general: Cognitive consequences of salient self-concept[END_REF]. Indeed, van Baaren and colleagues found more mimicry under interdependence self-construal and less mimicry under independence self-construal. Can context-dependence account for our findings, better than the Active Self Model? The contextdependence mechanism would imply the Blonde stereotype was activated only among interdependence-primed participants, not among independence-primed ones. In line with this reasoning, in Study 1, independence-blonde primed participants displayed neither assimilation nor contrast effect. However, in Study 2, independence-primed participants displayed a contrast effect, which implies they were influenced by the stereotype. Thus a mere context-dependence explanation cannot fully account for our results. However, we admit that both mechanisms could interact to modulate prime-to-behavior effects. Contextdependence could enhance the influence of the prime on the self-concept while contextindependence would decrease the influence of the prime on the self-concept. As such, an assimilation effect would occur when the prime is processed and included in the self-concept.

A contrast effect would occur when the prime is processed but excluded from the selfconcept. However, priming should not influence behavior whenever the prime is not processed, for instance under a context-independent cognitive style (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2000). Context-dependence and self-perception mechanisms could be integrated to predict and explain prime-to-behavior effects.

Stapel and van der Zee (2006) developed a Self Salience Model of other-to-self effects that considers different predictions according to the self-construal level. This model, though focused on evaluative outcomes more than on behavioral ones, has implications for prime-to-behavior effects. Our findings support this model in a standard prime-to-behavior paradigm. As such, our research contributes to the literature about self-construals, supporting the Self Salience Model, and about prime-to-behavior effects, extending this model to behavioral outcomes 5 .

If our account of prime-to-behavior is correct, one may wonder why [START_REF] Bargh | Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action[END_REF] and others found main assimilation effects of primes. Indeed, most of these studies were conducted in individualistic cultures (i.e., the US), then contrast should have emerged rather than assimilation. However, studies are also generally conducted with mostly women and/or psychology students which are groups known to be more interdependent than the average population (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999[START_REF] Cross | Models of the self: Self-construals and gender[END_REF]. That is, participants in these studies might have been mostly interdependent. As a result, assimilation occurred.

Consistent with this analysis, it is worth noting that usually priming studies involving a moderator (e.g., level of prejudice, Brown et al., 2003, Kawakami et al., 1998; degree of contact with the social group, [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Behavioral indecision: Effects of self-focus on automatic behavior[END_REF]self-focus, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000;self-prime comparability, Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002) show no main effect of the prime.

To conclude, our studies demonstrate that self-construals can moderate assimilation and contrast in prime-to-behavior effects. Based on the findings in social comparison research and the Active Self Model, we argued that this moderation follows a primecongruent or incongruent self-perception. However, self-construals also differ on contextdependence degree which could partly account for our findings. Future research should provide evidence of mediation of prime-to-behavior effects by self-perception.

Table 1

 1 Mean number of correct answers as a function of self-construal and category, Study 1.

		Independent self-construal	Interdependent self-construal
	Category	M	SD	M	SD
	Blonde	1.90 a	1.29	1.14 b	0.86
	Control	1.50 a	0.73	1.93 a	1.11
	Means that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05

Table 2

 2 Mean number of correct answers as a function of self-construal and stereotype priming,

	Study 2.
		Independent self-construal	Interdependent self-construal
	Stereotype	M	SD	M	SD
	Blonde	2.37 a	0.96	1.52 b	0.90
	No prime	1.53 c	0.94	2.17 d	0.73

Means that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05

Authors Note

The authors thank Olivier Corneille, Caroline Leygue, Francois Ric, and Bo Sanitioso for their precious comments on a previous version of this paper. We also thank the Social Psychology Lab of the Haute-Bretagne University (LAUREPS) that helped running the second experiment of this paper.


Marc-Andre Reinhard

Siegfried L Sporer

Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviour as a Basis for Credibility Attribution: The Impact of Task Involvement and Cognitive Capacity

Keywords: credibility attribution, lie detection, dual-process theories, detection of deception, lay judgment

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A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

Credibility Attribution 3

Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviour as a Basis for Credibility Attribution: The Impact of Task

Involvement and Cognitive Capacity

Two major areas can be distinguished in research on deceptive communication. In the first, researchers try to isolate nonverbal and verbal correlates of deception. In several metaanalytic reviews, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981), Zuckerman and Driver (1985), and DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, [START_REF] Depaulo | Cues to deception[END_REF] reported only a few nonverbal and verbal cues that are consistently associated with deception. In his review, Vrij (2000) also came to the conclusion that there is no typical characteristic behaviour by which liars could be distinguished from truth-tellers. The results of a meta-analytic review by [START_REF] Depaulo | Cues to deception[END_REF] showed that liars are less forthcoming than truth-tellers, tell less compelling tales, make a more negative impression, and are more tense. Cues of deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed and when lies were about transgressions [START_REF] Depaulo | Cues to deception[END_REF].

In the second area, researchers examine the question which cues are related to judgments about honesty and deceit. In several studies, lay persons and expert lie catchers (for example, police officers) were asked about their beliefs about cues associated with deception [START_REF] Akehurst | Lay persons' and police officers' beliefs regarding deceptive behavior[END_REF]Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004;[START_REF] Hocking | Nonverbal indicators of deception: A new theoretical perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Reinhard | Alltagsvorstellungen über inhaltliche Kennzeichen von Lügen[END_REF]Strömwall & Granhag, 2003;Vrij & Taylor, 2003;Zuckerman, Koestner, & Driver, 1981;[START_REF] Koehnken | Glaubwuerdigkeit: Empirische und theoretische Untersuchungen zu einem psychologischen Konstrukt[END_REF]. [START_REF] Akehurst | Lay persons' and police officers' beliefs regarding deceptive behavior[END_REF], for example, found that laypersons associated deception with an increase of pauses, repetitions, and nervous facial expressions. Laypersons also believed that liars show more self-manipulating behaviours, hand and leg movements, and an overall nervous bodily expression. The content of a deceptive statement was believed to be characterized by less logical consistency, more superfluous details, and more spontaneous corrections. Several studies found that these beliefs about deception were highly correlated with credibility judgments [START_REF] Apple | Effects of pitch and speech rate on personal attributions[END_REF][START_REF] Bond | The miscommunication of deception: An adaptive perspective[END_REF][START_REF] Kraut | Verbal and nonverbal cues in the perception of lying[END_REF][START_REF] Riggio | Individual differences and cues to deception[END_REF][START_REF] Streeter | Pitch changes during attempted deception[END_REF]Zuckerman et al., 1981).

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Credibility Attribution 4

In general, it can be noted that only a few cues that lay persons associate with deception are actually related to deceptive behaviour. Hence, it is not surprising that the accuracy in detecting deception in many studies is rather low (with accuracy rates falling in the range of 45-60%; [START_REF] Koehnken | Glaubwuerdigkeit [Credibility[END_REF]Vrij, 2000;[START_REF] Ekman | Who can catch a liar?[END_REF]. In a recent meta-analysis, [START_REF] Bond | Accuracy of deception judgments[END_REF] also found an accuracy rate of 54%. [START_REF] Koehnken | Glaubwuerdigkeit [Credibility[END_REF] concluded that most of the research on judgments about honesty and deceit has been concerned with detecting accuracy and not with the process of credibility attribution. As this situation has not much changed since Koehnken's review, the aim of this article is to apply the theoretical assumptions of dual-process theories (e.g. the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; [START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF] or the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; [START_REF] Chen | The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context[END_REF]) to the field of credibility attribution.

Dual-Process Theories

In general, dual-process theories (for an overview, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999), differentiate two modes of information processing. The effortful mode (called central route in the ELM and systematic processing in the HSM) implies that individuals use all issuerelevant information, especially the content of a message, to develop or change an attitude.

This process requires higher motivation and higher cognitive ability and capacity. Persons with lower motivation and/or lower cognitive ability/capacity use the effortless mode of processing (called peripheral route in the ELM and heuristic processing in the HSM). They use, for example, easy judgmental rules (heuristics) like "experts' statements can be trusted"

or "consensus opinions are correct" to form their opinion. In general, the basic assumption of dual-process theories is that the amount of a person's motivation and capacity causes the intensity of information processing. Overall, dual-process theories have been well tested empirically (for an overview see [START_REF] Bohner | Attitudes and attitude change[END_REF]Chaiken & Trope, 1999;[START_REF] Eagly | The psychology of attitudes[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. Outside the persuasion context, dual-process theories have been developed, for example, to explain the process of person perception [START_REF] Fiske | A continuum of impression formation, from categorybased to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation[END_REF][START_REF] Fiske | The Continuum Model: Ten years later[END_REF], attitude-behaviour consistency [START_REF] Fazio | The MODE model of attitude-behavior processes[END_REF], or the prediction of expectancies [START_REF] Dickhaeuser | Factors underlying expectancies of success and achievement: The influential roles of Need for Cognition and general or specific selfconcepts[END_REF].

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Credibility Attribution 5

We therefore argue that the basic assumption of dual-process theories could also be used to explain the process of credibility attribution.

There is some indirect support for the usefulness of the basic assumptions of dualprocess theories in the field of deceptive communication research [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 27 Forrest | Detecting deception and judge's involvement: Lower task involvement leads to better lie detection[END_REF][START_REF] Reinhard | Situational familiarity moderates the use of verbal information in judgments of veracity[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF].

For example, [START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF] argued that detectors use verbal information to make their credibility judgments only in familiar situations. In unfamiliar situations, people use cultural norms (heuristics) of what a liar "looks like," for example, the frequency of hand shrugs, to come to a decision. The results from [START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF] lend partial support to the situational familiarity hypothesis. As predicted, people in the familiar condition used only the verbal but not the nonverbal information to judge veracity. However, inconsistent with the assumptions, judgments of veracity in the unfamiliar condition were influenced significantly by the verbal and nonverbal behaviour.

Although some authors have argued that the basic assumptions of dual-process theories could be fruitfully used to explain the process of credibility attribution [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 27 Forrest | Detecting deception and judge's involvement: Lower task involvement leads to better lie detection[END_REF][START_REF] Koehnken | Glaubwuerdigkeit [Credibility[END_REF][START_REF] Reinhard | Situational familiarity moderates the use of verbal information in judgments of veracity[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF], these basic assumptions have so far not been directly tested in research on credibility attribution. To directly test the assumption that only high motivation/capacity leads to effortful processing of verbal information, it is necessary to manipulate verbal and nonverbal information independently. In the field of attitude research, the direct manipulation of the quality of content (arguments) and peripheral information is a common procedure to test whether people are engaged in peripheral/heuristic or central/systematic processing (e.g. [START_REF] Bohner | Motivational determinants of systematic processing: Expectancy moderates effects of desired confidence on processing effort[END_REF][START_REF] Chaiken | Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment[END_REF]. We therefore designed a videotaped conversation in which we orthogonally manipulated both verbal and nonverbal cues. This experimental procedure for directly manipulating verbal and nonverbal cues was also used in recent studies in research on credibility attribution (e.g. [START_REF] Freedman | The impact of a statement: More detail does not always help[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF]. Although this procedure provides the opportunity to directly test whether people use verbal or nonverbal information for their credibility attribution, it does have limitations.

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Credibility Attribution 6

Actual judgements of truth and deception, which are commonly of interest in the field of deception research, could not be tested with this procedure. Actors show verbal and/or nonverbal cues to appear high or low in credibility, but they do not actually tell the truth or lie.

In line with the basic assumptions of dual-process models, we argue that people under high motivation use central/systematic processing and both verbal and nonverbal cue information for their credibility judgments. When peripheral/heuristic processing takes place, only nonverbal information will be used. The aim of the present study was to directly test the assumption that only high task involvement leads to effortful processing of verbal information when judging the credibility of a statement. In contrast, low task involvement should lead to heuristic peripheral/processing of nonverbal information when judging the credibility of a statement. Individuals in this condition should use easy judgemental rules like "liars are often nervous" when attributing credibility. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the task involvement for the credibility judgment, the verbal cue information, and the nonverbal cue information during the statement to test the assumption that high -but not lowinvolvement leads to the use of verbal and non-verbal information. We further assumed that participants under low involvement would process peripherally/heuristically and use primarily the nonverbal behaviour for their credibility judgements.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants

Eighty female and eighty male psychology students at the University of Giessen (mean age = 25.3) participated for departmental credit.

Design

The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with verbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and participants' task involvement (low or high), with 20 participants randomly assigned to each of the 8 cells in the design. The sex of the participants was controlled. 1

Stimulus Material

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Credibility Attribution 7

We created four parallel versions of a short film (about two minutes long) showing a conversation between a woman (Anna) looking for a successor to take over her current rental contract for her apartment and another woman (Maria) looking at the apartment for rent. The two women were amateur actresses who volunteered to participate in the film. The camera was set up in such a way that in each version of the film one could only see Anna, but hear both Anna's and Maria's voices.

Verbal cue manipulation. We manipulated the verbal information of Anna's statements about the apartment. Consistent with the findings of previous studies [START_REF] Kraut | Verbal and nonverbal cues in the perception of lying[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Interrogative probes, deceptive communication, and deception detection[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF], the truthful statements were manipulated so as to be judged more consistent and more plausible than the deceptive statements. 2

Nonverbal cue information. In addition, we used three nonverbal cues -gaze aversion, adaptors, and posture shifts -to simulate truthful and deceptive nonverbal behaviour.

Previous research found these cues to be related to lay persons' credibility judgments [START_REF] Miller | Deceptive Communication[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF]Zuckerman & Driver, 1985;Zuckerman et al. 1981;Vrij, 2000). The actress displayed more gaze aversion, more adaptors, and more posture shifts when simulating deceptive nonverbal information. 3 Task involvement. The involvement of the participants was manipulated via written instructions. In the high-involvement condition, participants were told that the study was very important for future psychological research. People were also told that their personal judgments were important for the success of the study. Participants in the low-involvement condition were told that the aim of the study was to obtain data for an introductory course in methods of psychology.

Procedure

The Experiment was labelled as a study dealing with lying in everyday life. Participants were told that they would watch a short film and then would be asked a few questions about it. Before watching the film, the motivation of the participants was measured with a questionnaire with four items (Cronbach's alpha = .91). The film was introduced to the participants as follows:

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Credibility Attribution 8

Now we will show you a typical everyday life situation: Anna is 26 years old and just finished her studies in business administration in Giessen. She lives in a one-room apartment in the inner city of Giessen. Two weeks ago Anna was offered a good job in a different city and she will start her new job next month. Looking for a successor to take over her current rental contract, she has an appointment with Maria, who is looking for an apartment. We will now show you a short film of the inspection of the apartment. Afterwards we will ask you some questions.

Participants watched one of the four stimulus films, which was presented on a 25-in colour monitor, and completed a brief questionnaire. At the end, participants were fully debriefed and asked not to discuss the study with others.

Measures

The credibility attribution was measured with five items each with a 9-point scale ("Anna was….. credible, honest, reliable, sincere, and truthful;" Cronbach's alpha = .97). The perception of the verbal cues were assessed with five items on a 9-point scale ("The verbal message of Anna was …..very plausible, consistent, coherent, structured, specific;" Cronbach's alpha = .81). The perception of the nonverbal cues were measured with five items on a 9-point scale ("Did Anna frequently hold eye-contact with Maria during the dialog?;" "How often did Anna look at Maria during the dialog?;" "How many body movements did Anna show during the dialog with Maria?;" "How often did Anna move during the dialog with Maria?;" "Did Anna handle with fidget objects during the dialog with Maria?;" Cronbach's alpha = .91).

Results

The data of the 160 participants were analyzed by separate 2 (involvement: low versus high) x 2 (verbal information: truthful cues or deceptive cues) x 2 (nonverbal information:

truthful cues or deceptive cues) ANOVAs.

Manipulation Checks

Task involvement. The manipulation of task involvement was successful. As expected, participants in the high-involvement condition reported significantly higher importance of the

Credibility attribution

The five items measuring the credibility attributions showed a high reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .97) and were combined into a credibility index. The means of the credibility attributions for all eight conditions are displayed in Table 1. A significant main effect of nonverbal information emerged, F(1, 152) = 54.64, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.26.

Participants gave higher credibility judgments in the truthful cue (M = 5.66, SD = 1.36) than in the deceptive cue (M = 4.33, SD = 1.08) nonverbal information condition. Participants under high motivation gave higher credibility ratings (M = 5.33, SD = 1.41) than participants under low motivation (M = 4.65, SD = 1.30), F(1, 152) = 14.49, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.09.

Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of verbal information, F(1, 152) = 10.04, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.06 (truthful verbal cue condition: M = 5.28, SD = 1.54; deceptive verbal cue condition: M = 4.71, SD = 1.17).

The predicted interaction of involvement and verbal information (see Figure 1) was also

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Credibility Attribution 10

Discussion

The manipulations of motivation, nonverbal cue and, verbal cue information were highly successful. Especially the manipulation of nonverbal cue information and verbal cue information produced equally strong effects on our manipulation checks.

The results were in line with our hypotheses, derived from dual-process theories, that participants' task involvement moderates the use of verbal cue information when attributing the credibility of a statement. Highly involved participants followed the central route (systematic processing) and relied on the verbal cue to judge the veracity of the statement.

They used the consistency and plausibility of the statement to make a judgment. In contrast, low-motivated participants were not influenced by the consistency and plausibility of the verbal cues. They relied exclusively on the nonverbal cues to make their judgment.

Independent of the task involvement, participants used the nonverbal cues for their credibility decision. In line with other findings [START_REF] Miller | Deceptive Communication[END_REF][START_REF] Stiff | Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit[END_REF]Zuckerman & Driver, 1985;Zuckerman et al., 1981;Vrij, 2000), participants judged the statement less credible when the source displayed gaze aversion, adaptors, and posture shifts. Dual-process theories argue that people with low task involvement use effortless ways to arrive at a judgment [START_REF] Chen | The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. They rely on information that is relatively easy to use in forming credibility attributions, like nonverbal cues. The results of Experiment 1 support these theoretical assumptions.

According to dual-process theories, people with higher task involvement use a more extensive processing mode to obtain an accurate judgment. Attitude research inspired by dual-process theories often reports that people in the central/systematic processing mode use only verbal information (arguments) [START_REF] Chen | The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. In our first experiment they used all available information, both nonverbal and verbal cues, to form their judgment. According to both the ELM and the HSM, the two processing modes (central/systematic and peripheral/heuristic processing) may co-occur [START_REF] Chaiken | Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment[END_REF][START_REF] Maheswaran | Promoting systematic processing in low motivation settings: The effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment[END_REF][START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 28 Maheswaran | Brand name as a heuristic cue: The effects of task importance and expectancy confirmation on consumer judgments[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | Source factors and the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. In our data, the manipulation of verbal and nonverbal cues leads to independent additive effects for highly motivated participants.

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Credibility Attribution 11

If one favors the HSM, the additivity hypothesis postulates two independent effects of nonverbal and verbal information (e.g., [START_REF] Chaiken | Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment[END_REF]. But the predictions were also in line with the basic assumption of the ELM that peripheral information can have an impact under low or high involvement [START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. For example, [START_REF] Petty | Source factors and the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion[END_REF] found that the attractiveness of a source in an advertisement for a beauty product had an impact under both low and high-involvement conditions. Petty and Cacioppo argued that whereas individuals under low involvement used the attractiveness of the source as a cue, individuals under high involvement used the attractiveness as an argument (in the context of beauty products). In line with research on beliefs about cues of deception (e.g.

Akehurst, [START_REF] Akehurst | Lay persons' and police officers' beliefs regarding deceptive behavior[END_REF]Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004), we would argue that people believe that verbal and nonverbal cues are both valid indicators of credibility of a source. Individuals under high motivation therefore used all valid indicators, verbal and nonverbal cues, for their credibility attribution.

In summary, the results of Experiment 1 show that applying the basic assumptions of dual-process theories to the field of credibility attribution can be fruitful. By way of criticism, it could be argued that although people with low motivation used only nonverbal cues for their credibility attribution, Experiment 1 could not provide direct evidence that the use of nonverbal cues is easier and requires less cognitive resources than the processing of verbal cues. To test that assumption, in Experiment 2 we directly manipulated, besides nonverbal and verbal cue information, the cognitive resources people had available when making credibility attributions.

Experiment 2

The aim of Experiment 2 was to directly test the hypotheses that nonverbal cue information is easier to process than verbal cue information. If this argument is true, people with limited cognitive capacity should use nonverbal cues for their credibility judgments. To test this assumption, we used a secondary task technique inducing high cognitive load (see [START_REF] Paas | Cognitive load measurement as a means to advance cognitive load theory[END_REF] in order to limit cognitive capacity. In detail, we tested the following hypotheses. First, if cognitive load is high, people should use nonverbal

A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 12
but not verbal cues for their credibility attribution. Second, if cognitive load is low, people should use both nonverbal and verbal cues for their credibility attribution.

Method Participants

Ninety-six female and one-hundred and four male students at the University of Giessen (mean age = 23.9) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental requirements. The study lasted 20 minutes.

Design

The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design, with verbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and cognitive load of participants (low or high) completely crossed. Twenty-five participants were randomly assigned to each of the eight cells in the design.

Procedure

Participants were seated alone in front of a computer and were reminded that the present study examined memory processes. All instructions were provided on screen. Participants in the high cognitive load group were then given the following instruction: "On the next screen you will see a nine-digit number for 60 seconds. Please try to keep this number in mind during the following assignment and questions. You will be asked to recall the number later.

We will compare the recalled number with the actual number." The next screen then displayed the number (813947284) for 60 seconds. This task was absent in the low cognitive load condition.

To maintain the salience of the cover story, participants in both conditions received four questions on autobiographical memory ("How many courses in biology did you take in high school?," "How many friends did you have during your time at the high school?," "How many bicycles did you have until now?," and "How many papers did you present during your time at the university?").

Next, participants watched the film already used in Experiment 1 and the following dependent measures were assessed. First, the credibility attribution was measured with the five items used in Experiment 1 (Cronbach's alpha = .92). We also used a single item to asses

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Credibility Attribution 13 a judgment of truth or deception ("Was Anna deceptive or truthful?" Scale from 1 = deceptive to 9 = truthful). Then the perception of the verbal cues and the perception of the nonverbal cues were measured with the same items used in Experiment 1 (Cronbach's alpha = .98 and .97). Finally, participants answered four questions on their self-perceived distraction whereas answering the questions concerning autobiographical memory and the questions about the film (manipulation check; Cronbach's alpha = .97). One example item was: "I felt distracted while seeing the film and answering the questions." These questions were answered on a scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree).

Results

The The predicted interaction of cognitive load with verbal information was also significant,

F

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Credibility Attribution 15

Discussion

The results clearly confirm the hypotheses that participants under low cognitive load followed the central route (systematic processing) and relied on both the verbal cues and the nonverbal cues to judge credibility. In contrast, participants under high cognitive load were uninfluenced by verbal cues. Independently of the consistency and plausibility of the statement, they relied exclusively on the nonverbal cues to make their credibility attribution.

More credibility was attributed in the truthful nonverbal cue than in the deceptive nonverbal cue condition. The above-described interaction of load with verbal information showed the same pattern for both the credibility attribution and the judgement of truth and deception.

Both the results of Experiment 1 and 2 support the usefulness of the basic assumptions of dual-process theories to explain the influence of task involvement and cognitive capacity on the process of credibility attribution. Moreover, Experiment 2 found direct evidence that nonverbal (in contrast to verbal) cue information is easier to use when attributing the credibility. Nonverbal cues were used under conditions of both high and low cognitive load.

In contrast, the verbal cues were used only by individuals with high cognitive capacity (low cognitive load) for their credibility attribution. In a third Experiment, we wanted to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 with different experimental material. Moreover, in Experiment 3 we assessed participants' reasons for their credibility attribution in order to examine our assumption that people under high cognitive load use nonverbal but not verbal information for their credibility attribution. We predicted, first, that under high cognitive load participants would report more nonverbal-related reasons than verbal-related reasons. In contrast, participants under low cognitive load would report more verbal-related reasons than nonverbal-related reasons. Second, we assumed that for participants under high cognitive load, credibility attribution could best be predicted by the valence of nonverbal-related reasons, but not by the valence of verbal-related reasons. For participants under low cognitive load, credibility attribution could be predicted by the valence of both nonverbal-related reasons and verbal-related reasons.

Experiment 3

Method

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Credibility Attribution 16

Participants

Seventy-three female and seventy-one male students at the University of Mannheim (mean age = 24.2) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental requirements. The study lasted 25 minutes.

Design

The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design, with verbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and cognitive load of participants (low or high) completely crossed. Eighteen participants were randomly assigned to each of the eight cells in the design.

Procedure

Participants were treated identically to the procedure in Experiment 2, with the exception that the participants saw a different film. We created four parallel versions of a short film of about five minutes about an argument between a woman (Sabine) and her boyfriend (Carsten) about a broken appointment. The woman and the man were amateur performer who volunteered to participate in the film. The camera was set up in such a way that in each version of the film one could only see Carsten, but hear both Carsten's and Sabine's voices. We manipulated the verbal content of Carsten's statements about his nonappearance. Parallel to the material used in Experiment 1 and 2, the truthful statements were manipulated so as to be judged more consistent and more plausible than the deceptive statements. 5 In addition, we used three nonverbal cues -gaze aversion, adaptors, and posture shifts -to simulate truthful and deceptive nonverbal behaviour. The actor displayed more gaze aversion, more adaptors, and more posture shifts when simulating deceptive nonverbal information. 6 After participants had watched the film, the following dependent measures were assessed. First, the credibility attribution was measured with the five items used in Experiment 1 and 2 (Cronbach's alpha = .86). Next we asked participants to give reasons for their credibility attribution. On a blank sheet, participants had to write down reasons why they thought Carsten had low or high credibility. Then the perception of the verbal cues and the perception of the nonverbal cues were measured with the same items used in the previous

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two Experiments (Cronbach's alpha = .95 and .93). Finally, the manipulation check for the self-perceived distraction was assessed with the same items used in Experiment 2 (Cronbach's alpha = .95).

Results

The data of the 144 participants were analyzed by separate univariate 2 (cognitive load:

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Credibility Attribution 18

The predicted interaction of cognitive load and verbal information (see Figure 3) was significant, F(1, 136) = 9.00, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.06. Participants in the low cognitive load condition attribute higher credibility to the truthful verbal (M = 5.00, SD = 1.61) than the deceptive verbal cue (M = 3.50, SD = 1.16), F(1, 136) = 18.67, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.12.

Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not differentiate between truthful and deceptive verbal cues, (Ms = 4.44 and 4.58, SDs = 1.69 and 1.81, respectively), F < 1. No other effects became significant, all ps > .20.

Reasons for the credibility attribution. Two independent judges, who were blind to the experimental conditions and the hypotheses of the experiment, coded the reasons listed by the participants as either verbal-content-related or source-nonverbal-related, and as positive or negative in their valence. For example, the listed reason "Carsten's statements were implausible since he would have heard the telephone" was coded as negative verbal-related.

The reason "Carsten was not at all nervous, I would believe him" was coded as positive nonverbal-related. The two judges had a high inter-rater agreement (Cohen's kappa = .94).

The index of verbal-related reasons was defined as number of verbal-related reasons/ total number of reasons. The index of nonverbal-related reasons was defined as number of nonverbal-related reasons/ total number of reasons. To test whether verbal-related reasons were more frequently reported in the low load than the high load condition, and whether nonverbal-related reasons were more frequently reported in the high load than the low load condition, the number of verbal-related reasons and source-nonverbal related reasons were analyzed as a function of cognitive load, verbal information, and nonverbal information, using the type of reported reasons as a repeated measure. The total number of reported reasons was included as a covariate. Participants reported generally more verbal-related reasons (M = 1.74, SD = 0.89) than nonverbal-related reasons (M = 1.08, SD = 0.85), F(1, 136) = 26.12, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.16. Moreover, the expected interaction of cognitive load with type of reasons was significant, F(1, 136) = 6.94, p < .01, eta-squared = 0.05 (see A multiple linear regression analysis was applied to investigate the mechanisms underlying credibility attribution. First, the valence of nonverbal-related reasons should predict credibility attribution for both load conditions. Moreover, it was postulated that the valence of verbal-related reasons would determine credibility attribution differently, depending on cognitive load. Accordingly, for the prediction of credibility attribution, a significant coefficient was expected from the interaction term of load and valence of verbalrelated reasons. Valence scores were standardized. Interaction terms were then computed by multiplying load (coded "0" for high and "1" for low load) by valence of verbal-related reasons and valence of nonverbal-related reasons. We included number of reasons as a covariate.

The results of the regression predicting credibility attribution can be seen in Table 5. R for the regression was significantly different from zero, F (6, 137) = 15.19, p < .001.

Altogether, 39.9% (37.3% adjusted) of the variability in credibility attribution was predicted by the independent variables. The interaction term of load with valence of nonverbal-related reasons was not significant. In line with our assumptions the interaction term of load with valence of verbal-related reasons showed a statistically significant effect in the equation (B = 1.02, t(137) = 4.35, p < .001). The interaction terms showed that the impact of valence of verbal-related reasons on credibility attribution was different in the load conditions. To justify the usage of valence indices as bipolar evaluations in the regression analyses, we also conducted separate linear regression analyses to investigate the mechanisms underlying credibility attribution for positive or negative verbal and nonverbal reasons (see [START_REF] Blanton | Decoding the implicit association test: Perspectives on criterion prediction[END_REF][START_REF] Cacioppo | Beyond bipolar conceptualizations and measures: The case of attitudes and evaluative space[END_REF]. The results of these separate analyses parallel the results of the regression analysis with the valence indices 9 .

To investigate the nature of this interaction, we used the recentering procedure discussed by [START_REF] Cohen | Applied multiple regression/ correlation analysis for beavioral sciences[END_REF]. First, to test the influence of nonverbal-and verbalrelated reasons on the credibility attribution for the low load condition, we coded low load to

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Credibility Attribution 21 be 0 and high load to be 1. In a regression, credibility attribution was predicted by load, verbal-related reasons, nonverbal-related reasons, and the first-order cross-products of load with verbal-related reasons and nonverbal-related reasons. In this analysis, credibility attribution was predicted by valence of nonverbal-and verbal-related reasons. Both valence indices had a statistically significant effect in the equation, (verbal: B = 0.71, t(137) = 4.99, p < .001; nonverbal: B = 0.75, t(137) = 4.30, p < .001). Second, to test the influence of nonverbal-and verbal-related reasons on the credibility attribution for the high load condition, we coded low load to be 1 and high load to be 0. In a regression, credibility attribution was predicted by load, verbal-related reasons, nonverbal-related reasons, and the first-order cross-products of load with verbal-related reasons and nonverbal-related reasons.

Here, only the valence of nonverbal-related reasons had a statistically significant effect on the prediction of attribution, B = 0.79, t(137) = 5.37, p < .001, whereas the coefficient of valence of verbal-related reasons was statistically not significant (B = -0.31, t(137) = -1.66, p = .099).

Discussion

The results replicated the findings of Experiment 2 with different experimental material and provided further evidence that the amount of cognitive capacity affects the use of nonverbal and verbal information in the process of credibility attribution. First, as in Experiment 2, under high cognitive load (and thus with less cognitive capacity) only the manipulation of nonverbal behaviour had an impact on participants' credibility attribution.

The manipulation of verbal information did not influence the credibility attribution for participants with less cognitive capacity. When sufficient cognitive capacity was available, the manipulation of both verbal and nonverbal information had an effect on the credibility attribution. Second, the results of the reported reasons for the credibility judgments in Experiment 3 strengthen the theoretical assumption that cognitive capacity did affect the use of nonverbal and verbal information. When the cognitive capacity of participants was limited, more nonverbal-related reasons than verbal-related reasons were reported, and the credibility judgment could be predicted by the valence of nonverbal-related reasons, but not by the

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Credibility Attribution 22 valence of verbal-related reasons. In contrast, for participants with sufficient cognitive capacity, both valence indices were good predictors for the credibility judgment.

General Discussion

Dual-process models and the process of credibility attribution

Three experiments demonstrated the usefulness of dual-process theories to explain the process of credibility attribution. In particular, the influence of task involvement and cognitive capacity on the choice of more or less extensive information processing was examined. The results of all three experiments were in line with the assumption that high, in contrast to low, task involvement/cognitive capacity leads to central/systematic processing when judging credibility. This assumption was tested and confirmed with different experimental material. Experiment 1 showed that participants in a high-involved state used all judgment-relevant information. They judged a statement as more credible when the source showed no nonverbal cues of deception, and when the statement was plausible. In contrast, participants with low task involvement used only the source cue information (nonverbal information) for their credibility attribution. The verbal information had no impact.

Experiment 2 and 3 showed that the manipulation of cognitive load had a parallel effect on the process of credibility attribution. When the cognitive load was low, participants used both the verbal and nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. Under high cognitive load, only the manipulation of nonverbal information had an impact on participants' credibility attribution. Moreover, the results of Experiment 2 and 3 found evidence that nonverbal information was easier to use than verbal information when attributing credibility.

Whereas verbal information was used only when cognitive load was low, nonverbal information was also used when participants had limited cognitive capacity available. The coded reasons participants reported for their credibility attribution strengthen our interpretation: For participants with sufficient cognitive resources, the credibility attribution could be predicted by both the verbal-related and nonverbal-related reasons. In contrast, only nonverbal-related reasons had an impact on the credibility attribution of participants with restricted cognitive resources. In sum, the reported three Experiments found clear support for

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Credibility Attribution 23 the basic assumption -derived from dual-process models -that motivation and cognitive capacity influence the use of more or less extensive information processing.

Further research

The present work demonstrates the fruitfulness of applying dual-process theories as a theoretical framework to the field of deceptive communication research, especially to the process of credibility attribution. Dual-process theories make clear predictions about the conditions under which individuals use more extensive processing modes, and thus use verbal information more intensely to judge the credibility of a statement [START_REF] Chen | The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context[END_REF][START_REF] Petty | The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current status and controversies[END_REF]. Aside from task involvement and cognitive capacity, as well as personal dispositions such as "need for cognition" (NFC; [START_REF] Cacioppo | The need for cogniton[END_REF], a tendency to enjoy cognitive activities may also influence the choice of central/systematic or peripheral/heuristic processing. For example, people with high NFC should use a more extensive central/systematic route of processing, and people with low NFC should use the simpler peripheral/heuristic route when judging the veracity of information.

In our view, the results are also in accordance with the unimodel [START_REF] Kruglanski | Separate or equal? Bimodal notions of persuasion and a single-process "unimodel[END_REF]. In contrast to dual-process theories of persuasion, the unimodel assumes only one single route of persuasion (Kruglanski et al., 1999;Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Kruglanski et al. (1999) argue that there is no qualitative difference between the two routes defined by the ELM and HSM. According to the unimodel, "the two persuasion types (central/systematic and peripheral/heuristic) are fundamentally similar, in that both are mediated via 'if then" or syllogistic reasoning from evidence to conclusion" (Kruglanski et al., 1999, p. 297). Kruglanski et al. (1999) further assume that both routes of persuasion may differ quantitatively on the extent of information processing. Low task involvement or limited capacity should lead to a restricted processing of relevant information, independently of the type of information. Whether low task involvement or limited cognitive capacity results in processing of verbal or non-verbal information depends on the length/complexity of the particular (verbal or non-verbal) information. We think that this view is in line with our interpretation of the results of the three experiments. Low task involvement (Experiment 1) or low cognitive capacity (Experiment 2 and 3) resulted in

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Credibility Attribution 24 processing of information that is easier to use (e.g. nonverbal information), but not in processing of verbal information, which is more difficult to use. A test of the more specific predictions from dual-process theories that differ from the predictions of the unimodel goes beyond a scope of this paper.

Overall, our studies have shown that dual-process theories can help us to understand the process of lie detection (see also [START_REF] A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 27 Forrest | Detecting deception and judge's involvement: Lower task involvement leads to better lie detection[END_REF]. These theories also allow predictions about the conditions under which people are worse or better lie detectors.

However, the ultimate success in lie detection will depend on whether the cues that lie detectors use are, in fact, correlates of deception (see [START_REF] Depaulo | Cues to deception[END_REF][START_REF] Reinhard | Alltagsvorstellungen über inhaltliche Kennzeichen von Lügen[END_REF].

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Credibility Attribution 31 Footnotes 1 We found no significant effects of participants' sex on the manipulation check-scales and on the credibility judgments, all p > .20.

2 In a pretest (N = 24), participants (randomly assigned) saw one of the four versions of the short film and evaluated the plausibility of the verbal statements by Anna on five items (plausible, consistent, coherent, structured, specific). The truthful statements (M = 6.92) were judged to be significantly more plausible than the deceptive statements (M = 4.58), F(1, 20) = 5.99, p < .05, r = .48. 3 In another pretest, participants (N = 24) (randomly assigned) saw one of the four versions of the short film and were instructed to code the nonverbal behaviors of the actress. In the deceptive nonverbal information condition, participants recorded significantly more adaptors (F(1, 20) = 15.88, p < .005, r = .67), less direct eye gaze (F(1, 20) = 53.97, p < .001, r = .85), and more posture shifts (F(1, 20) = 233.06, p < .001, r = .96) than in the truthful nonverbal information condition (Ms = 1.58, 9.67, and 7.25 in the untruthful, and 0.08, 0.17, and 0.17 in the truthful conditions, respectively). 4 Sex of participants produced no effects on the manipulation check-scales and on the credibility judgments, all F < 1. 5 In a pretest (N = 104), the truthful statements (M = 5.70) were judged to be significantly more plausible than the deceptive statements (M = 5.05), F(1, 104) = 6.90, p < .05. 6 Participants in a pretest (N = 40) judged the nonverbal behaviours of the actor in the deceptive nonverbal information condition as significantly more deceptive (M = 4.48) than in the truthful nonverbal information condition (M = 5.50), F(1, 38) = 8.46, p < .05. 7 In the high load condition, eighty-seven percent of participants remembered at least seven digits correctly, and 71.7 percent remembered all nine digits correctly. These results show that the participants -at least in part -directed their attention to the second task (see [START_REF] Paas | Cognitive load measurement as a means to advance cognitive load theory[END_REF], for a detailed description of secondary task techniques and cognitive load). The correct recall of the nine digit number was not related to the use of verbal and non-verbal information. 8 In a separate analysis, positive verbal vs. nonverbal reasons were analyzed as a function of cognitive load, verbal cues, and nonverbal cues, using the type of reason as a repeated measure. The assumed interaction of cognitive load, verbal cues, and type of reason was not significant (F(1, 135) = 2.54, p = .11). When we analyzed solely negative verbal vs. nonverbal reasons as a function of cognitive load, verbal cues, and nonverbal cues, using the type of reason as a repeated measure, the assumed interaction of cognitive load, verbal cues, and type of reason was significant (F(1, 135) = 8.81, p < .005). 9 The results of the analysis including only the positive verbal and nonverbal reasons were in line with the hypotheses (interaction verbal with load: B = 0.56, t(137) = 2.46, p < .02). The results including only the negative verbal and nonverbal reasons were also in line with our assumptions (interaction verbal with load: B = -1.28, t(137) = -4.62, p < .001). Note. N = 25 per cell. 1 1 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. 2 1 = deceptive to 9 = truthful.

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Standard deviations in parentheses.

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  99, SD = 1.47) than did participants in the low-involvement condition (M = 4.49, SD = 1.37), F(1, 152) = 43.30, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.22. All other Fs < 1. Verbal cues. Participants evaluated the verbal information of the statements as significantly more plausible in the truthful cue (M = 5.67, SD = 0.76) than in the deceptive cue condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.68), F(1, 152) = 46.72, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.24. All other Fs < 1. Nonverbal cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behavior of Anna as significantly less believable in the deceptive cue (M = 3.96, SD = 1.31) than in the truthful cue (M = 5.35, SD = 1.31) nonverbal information condition, F(1, 152) = 43.52, p < .001, etasquared = 0.22. All other Fs < 1.

  significant, F(1, 152) = 6.82, p < .05, eta-squared = 0.04. Participants in the highinvolvement condition gave higher credibility judgements in the truthful cue (M = 5.85, SD = 1.45) than in the deceptive cue verbal information condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.17), F(1, 152) = 16.70, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.10. Participants in the low-involvement condition did not differentiate between truthful cue and deceptive cue verbal information, (Ms = 4.70 and 4.60, SDs = 1.43 and 1.19, respectively), F < 1. No other effects became significant, all Fs < 1.

  data of the 200 participants were analyzed by separate univariate 2 (cognitive load: low versus high) x 2 (nonverbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) x 2 (verbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) ANOVAs. 4 Manipulation Checks Cognitive Load. The findings show that the experimental distraction manipulation was successful: cognitive load had a strong effect on the perceived distraction, F(1, 192) = 47.00, p < .001; eta-squared = 0.20. Perceived distraction was higher for participants with high than for those with low cognitive load (M = 5.95, SD = 1.50 vs. M = 4.53, SD = 1.38). All other Fs < 1. Verbal cues. The expected main effect of the verbal cue manipulation became highly significant, F(1, 192) = 57.34, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.23. Participants evaluated the verbal information of the statements as significantly more plausible in the truthful cue (M = 5.46, SD = 1.71) than in the deceptive cue information condition (M = 3.78, SD = 1.38). All other Fs < 1. Nonverbal cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behaviour of Anna as significantly less believable in the deceptive cue (M = 3.89, SD = 1.09) than in the truthful cue (M = 5.12, SD = 1.70) nonverbal information condition, F(1, 192) = 36.29, p < .001, etasquared = 0.16. All other Fs < 1. Major dependent variables A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Credibility Attribution 14 Credibility attribution. The means of both major dependent measures for all eight conditions are displayed in Table 2. The main effect of nonverbal information was significant, F(1, 192) = 54.75, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.22. Participants attributed higher credibility in the truthful cue (M = 5.18, SD = 1.12) than in the deceptive cue (M = 4.15, SD = 0.97) nonverbal information condition. There was also a significant main effect of verbal information, F(1, 192) = 19.66, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.09 (truthful verbal cues: M = 4.98, SD = 1.21; deceptive verbal cues: M = 4.35, SD = 1.05). The predicted interaction of cognitive load and verbal information (see Figure 2) was significant, F(1, 192) = 9.57, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.05. Participants in the low cognitive load condition attributed higher credibility in the truthful cue (M = 5.18, SD = 1.24) than in the deceptive cue verbal information condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.08), F(1, 192) = 28.55, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.13. Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not differentiate between truthful cue and deceptive cue verbal information, (Ms = 4.77 and 4.58, SDs = 1.14 and 0.96, respectively), F < 1. No other effects became significant, all Fs < 1. Judgment of truth and deception. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of verbal information on participants' judgment of truth and deception , F(1, 192) = 7.75, p < .01, eta-squared = 0.04. In the deceptive verbal cue information condition, participants judged the source as more deceptive (M = 4.43, SD = 1.50) than in the truthful cue verbal information condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.47). Moreover, the main effect of nonverbal information was also significant, F(1, 192) = 35.24, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.16. Participants perceived the source as more deceptive in the deceptive cue (M = 4.13, SD = 1.31) than in the truthful cue nonverbal information condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.48).

  (1, 192) = 10.95, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.05. Participants in the low cognitive load condition perceived the source as more deceptive in the deceptive verbal cue (M = 4.06, SD = 1.60) than in the truthful verbal cue condition, (M = 5.22, SD = 1.43), F(1, 192) = 18.57, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.09. Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not differentiate between verbal truthful and deceptive cues (Ms = 4.80 and 4.70, SDs = 1.30 and 1.47, respectively, Fs < 1. All other ps > .19.

  low versus high) x 2 (nonverbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) x 2 (verbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) ANOVAs. Manipulation Checks Cognitive Load. The experimental distraction manipulation was successful: cognitive load had a strong effect on the perceived distraction, F(1, 136) = 76.29, p < .001; eta-squared = 0.36. Perceived distraction was higher for participants with high than for those with low cognitive load (M = 5.91, SD = 1.93 vs. M = 3.53, SD = 1.19). 7 All other Fs < 1. Verbal Cues. The expected main effect of the verbal cue manipulation became significant, F(1, 136) = 12.64, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.09. Participants evaluated the content of the statements as significantly more plausible in the truthful (M = 5.62, SD = 1.23) than in the deceptive verbal cues condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.78). All other Fs < 1.Nonverbal Cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behaviour of Anna as significantly less believable in the deceptive (M =3.66, SD = 1.82) than in the truthful (M = 4.67, SD = 1.28) nonverbal cues condition, F(1, 136) = 14.33, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.10. All other Fs < 1.Major dependent variablesCredibility attribution. The means of both major dependent measures for all eight conditions are displayed in Table3. The main effect of nonverbal information was significant, F(1, 136) = 25.37, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.16. Participants attributed higher credibility in the truthful (M = 5.02, SD = 1.85) than in the deceptive (M = 3.79, SD = 1.17) nonverbal cue condition. There was also a significant main effect of verbal information, F(1, 136) = 9.86, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.07 (truthful verbal cues: M = 4.79, SD = 1.71; deceptive verbal cues: M = 4.02, SD = 1.53).

Figure 4 )

 4 Figure4). Under low cognitive load, participants reported, in line with our hypotheses, significantly more verbal-related (M = 1.94, SD = 0.92) than nonverbal-related reasons (M = 0.94, SD = 0.75), F(1, 136) = 60.00, p < .001; eta-squared = 0.30. Under high cognitive load,

  = 20 per cell. 1 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. Standard deviations in parentheses.

  = 18 per cell. 1 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. Standard deviations in parentheses.

  Credibility Attribution 29Strömwall, L. A.,& Granhag, P. A. (2003). How to detect deception? Arresting the beliefs of police officers, prosecutors and judges. Psychology,Crime and Law, 9,[19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36]

	Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit. The psychology of lying and the implications for
	professional practice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
	Vrij, A., & Taylor, R. (2003). Police officers' and students' beliefs about telling and
	detecting trivial and serious lies. International Journal of Police Science and
	Management, 5, 41-49.
	Zuckerman, M., & Driver, R. E. (1985). Telling lies: Verbal and nonverbal correlates of
	deception. In A. W. Siegman & S. Feldstein (Eds.), Multichannel integrations of
	nonverbal behavior (pp. 129-147). Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum.

Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol.14, pp. 1-59). New York: Academic Press. Zuckerman, M., Koester, R., & Driver, R. E. (1981). Believs about cues associated with deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 6, 105-114.

Table 1

 1 Means of Credibility Attribution as a Function of Participants' Involvement, Nonverbal, and

	Verbal Cues in Experiment 1
	________________________________________________________________________
		Nonverbal	Verbal	Credibility
	Involvement	Cue	Cue	Attribution
	_________________________________________________________________________
	Low	Deceptive	Deceptive	3.82 (0.86)
			Truthful	4.05 (0.85)
		Truthful	Deceptive	5.38 (0.93)
			Truthful	5.35 (1.60)
	High	Deceptive	Deceptive	4.31 (0.92)

Table 2

 2 Means of Credibility Attribution and Judgment of Truth or Deception as a Function ofParticipants' Cognitive Load, Nonverbal, and Verbal Cues in Experiment 2

	________________________________________________________________________
		Nonverbal	Verbal	Credibility	Judgment of
	Load	Cue	Cue	Attribution 1 Truth or Deception 2
	________________________________________________________________________
	High	Deceptive	Deceptive	4.00 (0.78)	4.08 (1.15)
			Truthful	4.22 (1.25)	4.04 (1.45)
		Truthful	Deceptive	5.17 (0.75)	5.52 (1.01)
			Truthful	5.33 (0.67)	5.36 (1.19)
	Low	Deceptive	Deceptive	3.62 (0.77)	3.52 (1.23)
			Truthful	4.74 (0.62)	4.88 (1.05)
		Truthful	Deceptive	4.62 (1.13)	4.60 (1.78)
			Truthful	5.62 (1.55)	5.56 (1.69)

Table 3

 3 Means of Credibility Attribution as a Function of Participants' Cognitive Load, Nonverbal, and Verbal Cues in Experiment 3

	________________________________________________________________________
		Nonverbal	Verbal	Credibility
	Load	Cue	Cue	Attribution
	________________________________________________________________________
	High	Deceptive	Deceptive	3.82 (0.74)
			Truthful	4.00 (1.40)
		Truthful	Deceptive	5.27 (2.06)
			Truthful	5.16 (2.02)
	Low	Deceptive	Deceptive	3.07 (1.29)

Table 5

 5 Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Credibility Attribution in

	Experiment 3 (N = 144)
	Variable	B	SE B	β
	Cognitive Load	-0.42	0.22	-0.13
	Valence of verbal-	-0.31	0.19	-.18
	related reasons
	Valence of nonverbal-	0.79	0.15	.47*
	related reasons
	Load × Valence of	1.02	0.23	.49*
	verbal-related reasons
	Load × Valence of	-0.03	0.23	-.01
	nonverbal-related
	reasons
	Total number of	0.16	0.11	0.10
	reasons
	Note. * p < .001

This research was supported by a grant from the German Science Foundation to the second author (DFG Sp2623/3-2).

We are indebted to Anja Körner, Stavroula Nitsiou, Claudia Diener and Vitali Scheibler for acting in our films.

We would like to thank Tamara Marksteiner for her diligent help in preparing tables and figures in the manuscript and proofreading the manuscript.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marc-Andre Reinhard, Department of Social Psychology, University of Mannheim, A 5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: reinhard@rumms.uni-mannheim.de

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Credibility Attribution 25