George Mavrommatis

The new 'creative' Brick Lane A narrative study of local multicultural encounters

Keywords: difference, ethnicity, ethnic identity, gentrification, multiculturalism, London, redevelopment

This article is a narrative study of local multicultural encounters taking place along Brick Lane in East London, UK. Although the area has been primarily researched for its Bangladeshi community, this article focuses on the 'creative' professionals who work and/or reside within the vicinity. It is a narrative investigation into their attitudes towards difference, ethnicity and the ethnic self. A multiplicity of local multicultural tales comes to the fore. In short, the multicultural realities of the area become narrated in many different ways, which clearly manifest a narrative complexity, unfolding within the new 'creative' Brick Lane. These different local multicultural narratives could also be indicative of the ways that multicultural meaning is created within London at large.

One of the most recent trends, within some parts of East London, has been to use culture and 'creativity' as the main engine of local economic revitalization. From this perspective, cultural industries become the vehicle for the revival of economic activities (Cohen, 1999a: 12). Culture transforms into a form of economy where the economics of culture can create further employment, growth, skills and income. This is the moment where the 'creative' or cultural industries of East End become the most important players within the local redevelopment game.

These local forms of 'creative' capitalism are closely associated to a notion of cultural entrepreneurship. A new term, 'creative' or 'cultural industries' (Cohen, 1999a: 10), emerges that includes any business, other than fine art, that deploys elements of creativity. In 1998, the British government founded a 'Creative Industries Task Force', announcing that these activities accounted for more than 5 percent of Britain's GDP, while providing employment to 1.5 million people (The Observer, 1 December 2002).

As a result of the internet revolution and the thirst of our visual civilization for more elaborated images and symbols, new sectors of the metropolitan economy have developed around the 'creative' deployment of new digitized technologies. The spread of these industries, initially in Hoxton and Brick Lane, later on reaching as far as Bethnal Green and Dalston, generated employment and substantial levels of profit. A new type of metropolitan white-collar employee was created, who personified within her/his own 'creative' labour, a very solid cultural-economic intermarriage. These 'creative' types made their presence visible in some areas of East London through a loitering army of web designers, computer engineers, art directors, music producers and any other job titles generated by this new digitized era.

From the late 1990s onwards, a whole spectrum of designer and other similar economies (see Lash and Urry, 1994: 111) emerged to cater for the needs of these new professionals. In Brick Lane, a local redeveloped brewery building provided the space for these new forms of entrepreneurial creativity to blossom. Through the passage of time, a variety of cafes, bars, exhibition spaces, etc. conglomerated around the Brewery. These new 'creative' cultures inscribed their lifestyle patterns onto the surrounding urban vernacular. Within a few years, Brick Lane's vernacular landscape transformed through the insertion of a 'creative community' and its ways of life. These new lifestyles settled side-by-side with 'native' ethnic populations, bodies, languages, cultures, etc. In short, a new 'creative' Brick Lane was born based on entrepreneurial creativity and the spread of new digital technologies.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS ALONG THE LANE

Historically, Brick Lane has functioned as a settlement area for successive waves of immigrants to London. The first influx of populations consisted of Huguenot refugees who came into the area during the end of the 17th century. Subsequently, Irish populations in the 18th century, Jewish refugees in the 19th and more recently Bangladeshi immigrants have all settled in the area (Fishman, 1979: 76). As part of this long tradition of settlement, cultural traces of all these historical migrations can still be found in the area. Most remarkably, the building at the corner of Brick Lane and Fourier St has functioned as a chapel for the Huguenots, a synagogue for the Jews, and currently, as a mosque for the local Muslim Bangladeshi population.

To continue, Brick Lane forms part of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. According to the 1991 census, 22.9 percent of all Bangladeshi people in the country lived in Tower Hamlets. It had the highest proportion of Bangladeshi people among any other London Borough or district within the UK. In relation to the 1991 deprivation index, Tower Hamlets was ranked as the fifth most deprived borough in London and as the seventh within Britain (London Research Centre, 1996: 180). The 2001 census revealed that 23 percent of all Bangladeshis in England and Wales lived in Tower Hamlets, comprising one-third of its total population. The ward with the greatest number of Bangladeshis was Bethnal Green South, while the ward with the highest percentage was Brick Lane (Spitalfields). Although the number of Bangladeshis in London has increased considerably since the 1991 census, its marginal increase in Tower Hamlets can be explained by the fact that earlier heavy patterns of concentration are giving way to processes of dispersion within the capital. Nevertheless, the economic disadvantage faced by Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets and other London boroughs appears to remain stable [START_REF] Piggott | Census Profiles: Bangladeshis in London[END_REF].

The local Bangladeshi community has been the subject of investigation for a number of authors. Accordingly, some of them have focused on issues of community, identity and space [START_REF] Eade | The Politics of Community: The Bangladeshi Community in East London[END_REF][START_REF] Eade | Identity, National and Religion: Educated Young Bangladeshi Muslims in London's East End[END_REF][START_REF] Fremeaux | Community and Cultural Policy: The Arts Worldwide Bangladesh Festival[END_REF], while others on education [START_REF] Tomlinson | Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: Bangladeshis and Education in Tower Hamlets[END_REF], religion [START_REF] Glynn | Bengali Muslims: The New East End Radicals?[END_REF], transnationalism [START_REF] Eade | Changing Narratives of Violence, Struggle and Resistance: Bangladeshis and the Competition for Resources in the Global City[END_REF][START_REF] Garbin | Bangladeshi Diaspora in the UK: Some Observations on Socio-Cultural Dynamics, Religious Trends and Transnational Politics[END_REF], redevelopment [START_REF] Jacobs | Edge of the Empire[END_REF] and inclusion [START_REF] Gardner | Heritage Protection and Social Inclusion: A Case Study from the Bangladeshi Community in East London[END_REF]. This article, rather than researching the local Bangladeshi community, proceeds into a narrative investigation of multicultural encounters between local Bangladeshis and their cohabiting 'creative' professionals, strictly through the accounts of the latter. By doing so, it does not intend to silence the former. Within the broader framework of this research, Bangladeshi accounts of local multicultural encounters have also been taken into consideration and it is anticipated will be published too. Nevertheless, contemporary conditions of London's multiculturalism, unfolding within fast-transforming ethnically diverse inner-city areas under the aegis of cultural entrepreneurialism, require modes of analysis that can shed some light on the mentalities of the agents of urban change. In this sense, characteristics and tendencies of this hyped form of multicultural urbanism become exemplified, exposed and, in a way, better understood.

Before I go further, it has to be made clear how the concept of 'race' is treated within this article. First and foremost, it is approached in a deconstructed way. As Stuart [START_REF] Hall | New Ethnicities[END_REF] has claimed, two separate moments exist within the history of 'black' cultural politics in Britain. Within the first moment, 'blackness' is treated as a singular and unifying experience strictly for political reasons (Hall, 1992: 252). The second moment signifies 'the end of the innocent notion of the essential black subject' (Hall, 1992: 254). This is the moment where 'blackness' becomes redefined as diverse in relation to ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, subjectivity, etc. A uniformed category of 'blackness' gives way to many different kinds of 'blackness'.

On the other hand, recent years have witnessed the emergence of an intellectual project to deconstruct 'whiteness' also. Under these lights, 'whiteness' should be analysed in all its complexity and different manifestations. Accordingly, 'whiteness' cannot go 'unexamined' [START_REF] Chambers | The Unexamined[END_REF], but the whole array of its diversity should be brought to the fore. As [START_REF] Frankenberg | Introduction: Local Whiteness, Localizing Whiteness[END_REF] argues: 'The result is whiteness unfrozen, whiteness viewed as ensembles of local phenomena complexly embedded in socioeconomic, socio-cultural and psychic interrelations. Whiteness emerges as a process, not a thing, as plural rather than singular in nature' (Frankenberg, 1997: 1). Following these lines, some writers ask us to get 'out of' our 'whiteness' (Ware and [START_REF] Black | Out of Whiteness: Colour, Politics and Culture[END_REF] or even to abolish it [START_REF] Hale | Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South[END_REF][START_REF] Ignatiev | Abolish the White Race[END_REF][START_REF] Roediger | Towards the Abolition of Whiteness[END_REF].

In terms of the particular logistics of this research, at the entrance to the local redeveloped Brewery, a bar had put out tables and benches for its loitering clientele. Many local professionals were sitting outside having lunch, a break or just a cigarette. As the writer of this article did not possess at the time any substantial contacts in the area, he chose this spot as the prime site for conducting interviews. In a similar manner, a couple of neighbouring cafes were chosen too. During this process, 14 in-depth interviews were conducted. These local interviewees are branded as the 'creatives'.

But why group together all these different individuals? Why is it appropriate to describe them as an ethnic group or a certain kind of 'people' [START_REF] Eriksen | Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives[END_REF])? To start with, all of them were employed within local 'creative' industries and the designer economies that had developed around them. At the same time, all of them seemed to frequent the same micro-spaces within the vicinity and they were, more or less, of the same age group (19-40 years of age). But this is where their similarities stopped.

This group of 'creative' professionals was multicultural or multiethnic. Twelve of them were British, while two of them were international (South African and Norwegian). Within the British category, eight of them could be identified as 'white'-British, two of them as 'black'-British, while the last remaining two as Asian-British and 'British'-other respectively. Nevertheless, these racial and ethnic categorizations were intersected by class and gender. As Cohen (1999a) has argued about the nature of cultural industries, they tend to produce a new multicultural professional middle class, but also, a new kind of low paid/low skills servant class, which does the menial jobs and caters to their tastes (Cohen, 1999a: 15). While the former enjoy considerable levels of income that can fuel their lifestyle journeys, the latter have to get by with minimum wages. Within our group, this new professional middle class did not strictly include 'white' males. Women and members of ethnic or 'racial' minorities were found within its ranks. On the other hand, within this new servant class native 'white' males could also be found. In this sense, different kinds of 'whiteness' and 'blackness' mutually influenced by class and gender, existed within the group. Nevertheless, their differences were perceived as less important than their 'organization of behavior and social relations' (Barth, 1969: 15), which created and maintained an ethnic boundary between themselves and others.

In terms of employment, five of them had 'creative' managerial positions, while seven of them were averagely paid art-related professionals. The last remaining three had low paid jobs, serving the rest. In terms of gender, eight of them were males, while six were females. All of the names have been changed to protect their anonymity.

Narrative studies [START_REF] Chase | Taking Narrative Seriously: Consequences for Method and Theory in Interviews Studies[END_REF][START_REF] Hollway | Eliciting Narrative Through the In-Depth Interview[END_REF][START_REF] Josselson | Imagining the Real: Empathy, Narrative and the Dialogic Self[END_REF][START_REF] Rosenthal | Reconstruction of Life Stories: Principles of Selection in Generating Stories for Narrative Bibliographical Interviews[END_REF][START_REF] Widdershoven | The Story of Life: Hermeneutic Perspectives on the Relationship between Narrative and Life History', Interpreting Experience: The Narrative Study of Lives[END_REF], which can reflect on people's experiences and life stances by taking into account personal accumulated experience, advocate that life and experience can only become meaningful through narration and story-telling. As [START_REF] Widdershoven | The Story of Life: Hermeneutic Perspectives on the Relationship between Narrative and Life History', Interpreting Experience: The Narrative Study of Lives[END_REF] 2) states: 'Life is both more and less than a story. It is more that it is a basis for a variety of stories, and it is less in that it is unfinished and unclear as long as there are no stories told about it.' Following these lines, a narrative analysis of local multicultural encounters along the Lane should attempt to elicit personal narratives out of the interview material. It should describe the ways that people live their lives, make sense and narrate their local multicultural experiences. In this sense, the local multicultural life transforms into a text where people, by narrating it, create their own meanings and accordingly live their lives.

NARRATING THE AREA

The analysis of 14 transcribed in-depth interviews revealed the emergence of the following two narrative tropes: Brick Lane becomes depicted either in terms of artistic creativity or cultural diversity. From such a perspective, the area is presented as a long-established hub of creativity, or alternatively, as a highly diverse ethnic milieu. However, this narrative of ethnic diversity in relation to the local vernacular takes mostly an aesthetic view on locally accumulated differences. An aesthetic appreciation of local conditions of ethnic diversity is mostly at work. The charm and aesthetics of differences are broadly acknowledged.

One of the most dominant representations of Brick Lane portrays it in an artistic light. It is argued that as early as the beginning of the 1960s, many artists started to settle in the area. From this perspective, the area is depicted as a long-established centre of artistic creativity. Nevertheless, it is argued that local creativity might have changed significantly during the last few years. The main reasons cited are local processes of gentrification unfolding within the vicinity. As a direct result of strong local property inflationary tendencies, a number of initially settled artists allegedly have become the victims of displacement. Such narratives of local artistic displacement closely correspond with theories of gentrification as a twowave process (Zukin, 1992: 230). According to such a view, gentrification in its early stages is carried out by a specific socioeconomic group that alters the way that local vernacular has been traditionally seen. Nevertheless, as gentrification matures, a different, more affluent socioeconomic group of people is attracted to the area. As a result, increased levels of local demand create inflationary pressures on existing housing stock, which translate into higher rents and spiralling property prices. Accordingly, the first group of gentrifiers or the 'first wave' of gentrification becomes evicted on grounds of economic affordability.

For Brick Lane, a different version of this two-wave story of gentrification has apparently taken place. Accordingly, artists looking for cheap studio spaces comprised the first wave of gentrification. However, since then, other contemporary forms of more profitable creativity have taken their place and space. Allegedly, different forms of cultural industries started displacing earlier settled artists and their bohemian ways of life. A more corporate 'creative' culture developed locally, capable of affording medium to expensive levels of rent. In effect, entrepreneurial forms of creativity have replaced local traditional forms of fine art. Dave, a 'white'-British interior designer, commented on the topic:

Interviewer: Do you consider Brick Lane as an artistic area? Dave:

It's, well, it used to be very creative at one stage, this is where all the sort of up and coming artists lived, in the 1990s, they are moving out now, but they are still sort of riding on that, but all the artists, the small artists, are leaving because of the prices. Interviewer: So, in a way you say that the creativity is leaving the area? Dave:

Well, it's being changed to something like, you know, the sort of, the people with the computer art and art companies and graphics, and you know all this combination, are sort of moving in and all the actual artists with the paintbrush or whatever are moving out, so although it is creative, its been replaced by another type of creativity.

Another set of narratives construct the area as a highly ethnically diverse one. More importantly, Brick Lane's ethnic diversity is portrayed as its finest asset. Local urban heterogeneity is clearly preferred to any form of ethnic homogeneity. Jean-Paul, a 'white' Anglo-French advertiser, who recently moved into the area, comments: Jean-Paul portrays Brick Lane as a foreign metropolitan land within the midst of London. He is quick to suggest that this kind of statement should not be perceived as implying or denouncing any cultural swamping of Britain. It should not be considered as carrying any 'racist' or 'xenophobic' connotations. On the contrary, for Jean-Paul, Brick Lane's difference and foreignness to other parts of London is its unique asset and attraction. By the same token, Hulo, a Norwegian male cinematographer, who lives and works locally, comments:

Interviewer: What do you think of Brick Lane? Hulo:

It's the fact that you feel that it's a little world outside London. I mean you would be just five minutes' walk from the City and you have people on the streets and you hardly hear English spoken on the street and that has its charm.

This narrative tendency of depicting ethnically diverse areas as foreign lands or worlds apart was commonplace to representations of metropolitan spaces of migration during the 1950s and 1960s. That said, inner-city areas of intense Commonwealth migration and settlement during those years were also habitually seen as 'twilight zones'; areas of multiple migrant occupancy and lodging houses. This idea of the twilight zone conveyed a dual meaning. On one hand, through the slum clearance policies of the era, twilight zones referred to the age and condition of housing within these areas. As Rex and [START_REF] Moore | Race, Community and Conflict[END_REF] argued: 'Because of the age of these houses the areas are known to the planners as "twilight zones" implying that they are approaching, but have not yet reached, the night of slumdom' (Rex and Moore, 1967: 29).

On the other hand, this description also connoted the migrant character of these areas. Twilight zones were the areas that, although located within the hearts of postcolonial British cities, simulated the feeling of entering into another cultural zone. In other words, former twilight zones were considered as metropolitan windows to otherness. By just entering, one supposedly experienced feelings of national dislocation and cultural disorientation. In short, former twilight zones were spaces where other cultures and ways of life resided. More importantly, this cultural otherness appeared to contradict and oppose the established British way of life. Nevertheless, such a cultural juxtaposition was not neutral. It was informed by a former colonial legacy that used to rank cultures according to a racial hierarchy.

Through the racist 'structures of feeling' of the era, 1 these windows to 'otherness', these places of cultural disorientation, were habitually perceived in a negative light. Former inner-city twilight zones were portrayed through the language of new or cultural racism [START_REF] Barker | The New Racism[END_REF]. This language articulated a feeling of native cultural distaste and aversion towards other cultures. As a result, any possibilities for successful multicultural urban living were denied. Allegedly, 'their ways of life' clashed and contested with traditional British culture. The only way forward was through the development of monocultural forms of living. As a result, processes of spatial segregation of other cultures and 'races' informed earlier forms of British diverse urban living.

These tropes of cultural racism became spatially manifested through an urban dialectic of cultural repulsion that led to a native or 'white' flight from inner-city areas to the outer suburbs and beyond. In a sense, the natives that failed to relocate were those that could not afford to leave the inner city behind. Consequently, earlier forms of British urban multicultural living took place between cultural others and poor natives. The urban multicultural living of the era was not a matter of choice, but of necessity.

However, a different kind of multiculturalism characterizes contemporary forms of inner-city cosmopolitan urban living. This new kind of urban multiculturalism goes along with a new narrative of difference in relation to contemporary twilight zones, like Brick Lane. In sharp contrast to the past, this new narrative perceives ethnic diversity in a positive fashion. As Hulo says, there is a 'charm' within the otherness of Brick Lane. In short, this new narrative of ethnic diversity acknowledges the charms of local ethnic vernacular; it tends to aesthetically value diversity.

Paul [START_REF] Gilroy | The Status of Difference: From Epidermalization to Nano-Politics[END_REF] account of multiculturalism, as both possessing aesthetic and ethical dimensions, is relevant here: I want to approach [multiculturalism] here speculatively, not a clearly delineated goal or a reified state to which one can be finally committed, but as an aesthetic and even ethical principle routed through certain distinctive historical experiences of modernity and confirmed by the special promise and hetero-cultural dynamism of contemporary metropolitan life. (Gilroy, 1995: 3) As argued earlier, aesthetic dimensions of local multiculturalism break into the narrative fore. But what about an ethical approach to local conditions of multiculturalism -a kind of local multiculturalism viewed through 'ethics'? 2 Relevant to this, there is another narrative that acknowledges both aesthetic and ethical dimensions of local conditions of diversity. Raj, a British-Asian creative professional, comments:

Interviewer: What are the good things about Brick Lane? Raj:

You can walk down Brick Lane and you know, there are different people from different backgrounds and colours and races, different kinds of food, and different smells and noises, and this place is playing this kind of music and this place is playing thumping tunes, it's like a canvas of sounds and smells, a spectacle, and I think there is a risk of not actually seeing what underlines it, which is [a] huge amount of deprivation, a huge amount of people living in really difficult circumstances . . . I think it's important not to lose sight of the fact that they are both there, it's important to constantly draw back the spectacle and all that 'lovey-dovey' things to the actual reality of it, it's very hard, but it's important to do so.

A number of authors have argued about the existence of longestablished Western European tendencies of exoticizing the other (Gilroy, 1995: 11). Accordingly, otherness becomes the site of fascination, spectatorship and observance. Within such a tradition, the work of early 20th-century French writer Victor Segalen stands out: Exoticism understood as . . . an aesthetic of diversity -is moreover the center, the essence, the justification of all the books Victor Segalen has written and no doubt of those he intends to write. (Todorov, 1994: 323) Segalen's way of defining exoticism or difference is a very broad one. For him, whatever is external to one's observing subjectivity unavoidably constitutes otherness. More specifically, differences are deemed precious as they can allegedly guarantee the intensification of human life. Accordingly, exoticism as 'an acquisition of pleasure in diversity' (Todorov, 1994: 327) provides deeply exhilarating experiences. Those who embark on such pleasurable journeys are branded as 'exotes'.

The 'exote' should not attempt to assimilate diversity, or internalize external difference. Instead, a distance, between the subject and object of exoticism, should always be maintained. For Segalen, only a constant externality to the encountered differences can guarantee the continuation of exotic pleasures. The art of exoticism requires a fixed and unchangeable identity; a very strong sense of self. External differences should never be allowed to corrode the core of one's self. They should remain external and thus pleasurable in their otherness.

Raj's critical comments on local forms of exoticism can be taken as a critique of Western European exoticization tendencies. His solutions to such spectacular local conditions pass through a constant retrieval of underlining social realities. Accordingly, one should not just immerse oneself in differences, but instead, one should constantly 'draw back the spectacle' for social realities to be revealed. As a result, his recommendations resemble the main ideas of an epic approach to theatre.

The concept of epic theatre was formulated by Bertolt Brecht, in opposition to Aristotelian forms of dramaturgy (Benjamin, 1973: 144-5). Within an epic theatre approach, the emphasis shifts from empathizing with the characters until the point of catharsis, to the representation of social conditions that the characters find themselves in. Accordingly, the stage leaves behind any sensationalist aspirations and focuses on social circumstances. Most importantly, the audience plays a vital, almost ethical, role. First and foremost, it should have a strong 'interest in the matter' (Benjamin, 1973: 144). Second, through such theatrical dialectics, between a non-sensationalist stage and a socially engaged audience, a clear image of social reality can emerge, which can trigger revolutionary actions.

According to Raj, Brick Lane's contemporary exotes should focus less on the aesthetic qualities of differences and open their eyes to the social circumstances that local diversity finds itself in. From such a perspective, the aesthetic approach to local diversity finds its fiercest critic.

THE MARKING OF BOUNDARIES: REFLECTING ON GROUPS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP

In what follows, I cast light on processes of marking and maintaining ethnic boundaries [START_REF] Barth | Ethnic Groups and Boundaries[END_REF]. I investigate the ways through which these multicultural 'creative' professionals of different class positions and genders create their ethnic boundary that separates them from local Bangladeshis. Accordingly, I adopt Fredrik Barth's position that it is 'the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses' (Barth, 1969: 15). That said, ethnic or group membership emerges when different groups of people, who maintain a minimum contact between them, create an ethnic boundary based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness [START_REF] Eriksen | Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives[END_REF]. Accordingly, it is not the culture of one group that defines its ethnicity, but an assumed, imagined cultural juxtaposition between themselves and others.

To start with, a local multicultural story defines Brick Lane as an area where both a loosely defined Asian or Bangladeshi and a new 'creative' category of people reside. Allegedly, these two, constructed as different ethnic groups or categories, have minimal contact with each other. As a result, a local multicultural story of separation and acute disassociation has come to the fore.

Clark, a 'white'-British freelance designer who works locally, argues as follows:

Interviewer: What do you think about Brick Lane's multiculturalism? Clark:

I think it's quite nice that you have the balance, like in the day time, you look around and, yeah, all the designers and the young agency people, and then around eight o'clock, nine o'clock at night, all the pubs fill up with these people and all the streets is just Asian people and it's quite nice, because you have this thing in London, here it's the Asian and the arty people.

In the above, Clark marks an ethnic boundary between his group of people and local 'Asian' populations. What is interesting is that he is not even capable of correctly defining the marked-as-other ethnic category. Instead of Bangladeshi, he broadly defines it as Asian. Accordingly, Clark constructs a boundary with another category that he cannot even properly identify. The marking of ethnic boundaries 'entail[s] social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby distinct categories are maintained' (Barth, 1969: 10). In effect, Clark incorporates himself within the arty-creative group, while simultaneously excludes from it local 'Asian' (Bangladeshi) populations. As ethnic boundaries are essentially social in nature (Barth, 1969: 15;Sanders, 2002: 327), he separates the social world of his group from the one of local Bangladeshis. He perceives himself as 'playing the same game' (Barth, 1969: 15) with his fellow members, while not doing so with the other ethnic category.

By all accounts, this narrative depicts a local multicultural condition characterized by a spatial coexistence of minimal interaction. Brick Lane's multiculturalism is presented as a purely geographical form of coexistence. Forms and manifestations of a local interethnic coming together are almost denied. In short, an image of a local multicultural condition arises where a spatial regime of segregation informs the patterns of existence of these two, marked as distinct categories.

After examining the marking of ethnic boundaries between local 'creatives' and local others (strangers), I now focus on cultural explanations that supposedly create and maintain such boundaries. As mentioned earlier, ethnic categorization requires a group of people to perceive themselves and others as culturally distinct. In short, ethnic boundaries depend on an assumed cultural resonance. Following on from this, what are the main reasons cited for this supposedly minimal or nil local interethnic interaction? What are the prime obstacles to local interethnic exchanges? Everyday culture restricted by religion provides the dominant reason behind such alleged levels of nominal interaction. Hulo, again, comments:

Interviewer: What do you think are the obstacles of communication between the two local groups? Hulo:

It depends on what life you are leading, and as we know a lot of people that move here, they are still quite young, you know mid-twenties to mid-thirties and they have their friends and they are not [going to] go out and make an effort to be friends with their Bangladeshi neighbours, just as if they move into a Jewish area, or a Greek area they are not [going to] go out and make an effort to be friends with the Greeks or Jewish, which happens in all big cities really and if you meet a nice Bangladeshi guy at the pub that's cool, but there are a lot of Muslims in this area so obviously that's slightly different, and the mosque around the corner is very orthodox, which means they don't drink, which means that they don't go to the pub.

In this extract, Hulo narrates metropolitan urbanism as one of few intimate relationships accompanied by a general feeling of strangeness to the rest of urban populations. The act of either living or working in a highly ethnically diverse area, like Brick Lane, does not necessarily guarantee that the spatial proximity of multicultural strangers will enter into one's life. When the power and influence of religion to guide one's lifestyle and everyday practices enters the picture, any points of local interethnic interaction allegedly diminish further. Accordingly, local Bangladeshis' religious practices are narrated as the main barriers to any closer coming together of the two, constructed as different, local categories. In short, ethnic boundaries become articulated in cultural terms.

To continue, I draw attention to the ways through which this 'creative' category narrates itself; I examine cosmopolitan narratives that the local 'creative' group imagines in relation to itself [START_REF] Anderson | Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism[END_REF]. I argue that a local 'creative' cosmopolitan ethos can almost substitute for any alleged minimal interethnic interaction.

To start with, the local multicultural 'creative' group presents itself as a thriving hub of cosmopolitanism, intercultural connectivity and interdependence. What does not flourish within local interethnic conditions supposedly blossoms within the Brewery. Nicole, a 'white' South African professional, argues:

Nicole:

The Brewery in general, is a huge mix, you know you have Europeans, you know, all sorts of people, I think that's always an asset, you know, different ideas, different ways of doing things.

Carl, a 'black' British-Jamaican musician from Lewisham (another area of London), expresses his opinion as follows: Both narratives highlight an alleged cosmopolitan collaboration and ethos. For [START_REF] Sennett | The Fall of the Public Man[END_REF], a cosmopolite 'is a man [or woman] who moves comfortably in diversity; he [she] is comfortable in situations which have no links or parallels to what is familiar to him [or her]' (Sennett, 1977: 17).

As mentioned earlier, members of the same ethnic group are perceived as fundamentally 'playing the same game' (Barth, 1969: 15). Accordingly, the 'creatives' become self-represented, as an army of cosmopolites feeling comfortable within differences. In short, all of them are allegedly playing the same game. Differences within the community are considered as assets, having the ability to trigger new creative ideas and visions.

Furthermore, Carl's statement about the treatment of the other (a broad definition of otherness either in terms of 'race', class or background) within the Brewery, at 'face value', evokes Emanuel [START_REF] Levinas | Totality and Infinity[END_REF][START_REF] Levinas | Time and the Other[END_REF] personal ethics of approaching alterity. For [START_REF] Levinas | Totality and Infinity[END_REF][START_REF] Levinas | Time and the Other[END_REF], as for [START_REF] Fanon | Black Skin, White Masks[END_REF], an intersubjective phenomenological captivity constitutes the context where differences are encountered and dealt with. While Fanon emphasizes the importance of skin to explain phenomenological regimes of racism, Levinas (1969: 81, 207;1987: 79) focuses on the face and the ethical obligations that arises for any receiving human consciousness. He suggests that the face of the other (Levinas, 1987: 198) should be reduced to neither knowledge (a knowledge of the subject towards the object = racism) nor enjoyment (the subject being lost in the spectacle of the object). Instead, a 'welcoming of the face' (Levinas, 1987: 214), which immediately puts into 'question the consciousness that welcomes it' (Levinas, 1987: 207), should take place. As a result, an ethical approach to otherness finds the necessary space to become realized.

To sum up, the spaces of the Brewery provide the place for such a welcoming of alterity. The redeveloped spaces of the 'creative' community are presented as the places of a pure ethical cosmopolitan encounter. Behind its gates, different encounters of differences can thrive. Whereas the broader Brick Lane multiculturalism falls short of connecting local ethnic categories, the spaces of the Brewery provide the platform for the breeding of an in-group cosmopolitan ethos. In this sense, the latter can allegedly substitute for the failures of the former.

ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN SPACE

In writing about contemporary societal transformations, recent decades have witnessed the proliferation of a literature on identity (see, for example, [START_REF] Hall | Cultural Identity and Diaspora[END_REF][START_REF] Hall | The Local and the Global: Globalisation and Ethnicity[END_REF][START_REF] Mcguigan | Culture and the Public Sphere[END_REF][START_REF] Raban | The Soft City[END_REF][START_REF] Touraine | Can We Live Together? Equality and Difference[END_REF]. In a number of cases, explorations of identity have been discussed in conjunction with space (de Certeau, 1984: 110;Harvey, 1989: 66). Accordingly, a notion of a sociospatial identity prevails, which argues that identities become constructed, enacted and performed in and through space 3 (Zukin, 1992: 222). This intense preoccupation with issues of identity and space acknowledges the influence of consumption in processes of constructing a self (Harvey, 1989: 289;Raban, 1974: 1). It is argued that we become what we consume within the realms of the contemporary postmodern city (Zukin, 1992: 243). As the postmodern city is all about images (Boyer, 1996: 47), urban visual consumption dominates the production of sociospatial identities (Harvey, 1989: 289). In this sense, the self becomes another in relation to external visual stimuli. 4 In what follows, I explore the validity and relevance of such an argument in relation to ethnic identity. As in the case of the postmodern city, where forms of visual consumption allegedly influence spatial identity, could one argue the same for Brick Lane and a hypothetical transformation of the ethnic self? To put it differently, do local regimes of visual consumption of otherness have the power to penetrate the skin and result in a transformed ethnic self? Or alternatively, do local narratives of ethnic identity instead of working through difference (Bhabha, 1994: 1;Hall, 1990: 235;McGuigan, 1996: 141) fundamentally work against it (Hall, 1996: 4)?

To tackle these issues, I look more closely at the stories that these 'creative' professionals relate to themselves for themselves and others; I examine the narrative 'plots' (Ricoeur, 1992: 141) that succeed in creating a sense of an ethnic self. I embark on an investigation into the maintenance, or not, of marked ethnic boundaries in relation to oneself. Can one transgress perceived ethnic boundaries and reconstruct oneself anew?

The former story of a local multiculturalism of spatial segregation and minimum interaction leaves minimum space for the corrosion of the ethnic self. Instead, the self is constructed or even reaffirmed against a neighbouring Bangladeshi otherness (Hall, 1996: 4). In short, perceived ethnic boundaries are maintained in relation to oneself. John, a 'white'-English male who works in a local coffee shop, comments:

John: I am an outgoing person so I make an effort to meet people, I don't really think that there is a part of their culture [Bangladeshi], it is a part of their culture, to meet people of their own kind, I don't think they want to meet English people, I don't know if they are initially going out of their way to meet you. (emphasis added)

From this statement, it becomes apparent that an assumed cultural resonance characterizes the marking of ethnic boundaries within the locality. Nevertheless, culture transforms into a vehicle for other societal distinctions to be implicitly discussed. In this sense, culture can almost substitute for 'race'; local Bangladeshi culture can almost stand for an ethnicized 'race' (Cohen, 1999b: 2). Differential aspects of class and income inform the picture as well. One is led to consider that local Bangladeshis are marked as different in terms of a 'racialized' culture, income and class. Their 'way of life' does not refer only to culture but, in a way, to material conditions of existence and hidden racialized mythologies too.

John articulates his sense of self in stark opposition to a spatially coexisting Bangladeshi ethnicity. By marking and maintaining the ethnic boundaries between himself and others, he succeeds in producing a sense of an ethnic self. In effect, the macro-spaces of Brick Lane become narrated as places where two different ethnicities or ways of life reside. Each ethnic subject strictly correlates to an all-powerful defining ethnic category. In this sense, assumed ethnic boundaries become deployed in an attempt to reaffirm or reify the self; they transform into narrative devices of selffortification.

In what follows, I articulate two other stories of the self. First, there is a narrative that argues about the existence of a fragmented, multilayered self, depending on context, while a second one suggests that oneself can become another (Ricouer, 1992) Absolutely yes, I feel that I can do that.

In this extract, Raj articulates a different notion of ethnic identity. He argues that different contexts or spaces are capable of producing different kinds of selves (within oneself). The self does not appear as single, fixed or stable, but instead as multiple, depending on context (Touraine, 2000: 3); the self is performative (Bell, 1999: 1) and fragmented (Hall, 1996: 4). Furthermore, Raj acknowledges the marked ethnic (social) boundaries that set aside his own category (creatives) from local others (Bangladeshis). Nevertheless, he suggests that in his case, he is able to transgress ethnic boundaries and participate in different social worlds. In a sense, he is playing not just the same 'game' but the other's 'game' too (Barth, 1969: 15). That said, it has been suggested by Jonathan [START_REF] Friedman | Indigenous Struggles and the Discrete Charm of the Bourgeoisie[END_REF][START_REF] Friedman | Globalisation, Class and Culture in Global Systems[END_REF] that privileged cosmopolitan identities, characterized by mobility across ethnic boundaries, exist side by side with local, immobilized identities of marginalized populations. From this angle, Raj's cosmopolitanism and ethnic boundary crossing might result from his privileged managerial position within a 'creative' company that allows him to experience the pleasures of cosmopolitanism.

However, such a narrative construction of a fragmented self does not shed light on any ethnic configurations that might take place between these multiple selves. It does not describe any hybrid formations that might arise through the interaction of different selves. From this perspective, 'new ethnicities' and 'new cultures' remain hidden and unacknowledged under the aegis of self-fragmentation.

On the other hand, Jess narrates a different story about the ethnic self. Processes of gentrification within the media have been habitually depicted, at least in the US, as processes of 'conquering' the urban frontier (Smith, 1991: 64). A number of writers were eager to appropriate this metaphor for their own theoretical and political objectives; they argued that gentrification constitutes 'a frontier of profitability', a 'frontier' line of separation between areas of urban investment and disinvestment [START_REF] Smith | New City, New Frontier: The Lower East Side as Wild, Wild West[END_REF]. On the other hand. not much has been written in relation to the ethnic frontiers of gentrification. The specific ways that voluntary forms of situating and locating your body within economic and cultural otherness can alter the self. Jess, a 'native' English creative professional, argues as follows: I read this extract as a statement about the influences of diverse urban space upon the self. Within such a narrative, ethnic identities are not perceived as fixed or stable, but, instead, as in constant 'transition' (Hall, 1990: 225). The self retains the possibility to become another. This is a narrative construction of identities as incomplete. As Sennett (1990: 148) says: 'In order to sense the other, one must do the work of accepting oneself as incomplete.' Jess communicates these concerns by questioning 'what's me in a sense?' This is a narrative construction of identity where ethnic boundaries are eroded. Ethnic boundaries are not just transgressed, but denied altogether.

As a result, ethnic categorizations become almost irrelevant. The self is free to evolve in a world without boundaries or borders, just frontiers.

According to de Certeau,'To practice space is thus to retreat to the joyful and silent experience of childhood; it is, in a place, to be other and move towards the other' (de Certeau, 1984: 110). As I argued, the first story of ethnic identity uses the other in a way of reaffirming the self. These are the workings of ethnic identity against difference or the maintenance of ethnic boundaries in relation to oneself. Through an assumed 'knowledge' of the other (Levinas, 1969: 198), we succeed in producing ourselves. On the other hand, another narrative suggests that as one passes 'in' and 'out' of spaces one becomes another depending on context. In this sense, many others might exist within oneself. Of course, these are the workings of a flexible self through multiple differences or acts of ethnic boundary crossing. Lastly, a third story argues that oneself can become another through the influences of heterogeneous space. In this sense, the old and new self can merge together for 'new societies, new people and new cultures [to] come into existence' (Park, 1950: 375). This is a world where processes of ethnic identity construction do not come face to face with marked boundaries. In short, to 'practise space' might be a very perplexing enterprise.

THE NARRATIVE COMPLEXIT Y OF THE NEW MULTICULTURAL BRICK LANE

This article is a narrative analysis on issues of multiculturalism, ethnicity and the self along Brick Lane. Its aim has been to extract, out of the interview material, any multicultural narrative patterns, through which local 'creative' professionals make sense of their lives and their world around them. In a sense, Brick Lane transforms into a text where different 'creative' professionals produce their own multicultural meanings to it. As a result, a diverse local multicultural semiology emerges that manifests different processes of multicultural meaning construction along the Lane.

That said, the multicultural life of the new Brick Lane emerges as a narrative arena of multiple and different accounts; a diversity of antagonizing narratives exhaust the multicultural meanings of diversity, ethnicity and the ethnic self. This narrative complexity clearly perplexes any straightforward process of local multicultural signification. Any encounter between the self and the other, but also, any theorization of the self to the self and others, might simply provide a text for different narratives of ethnic boundaries and assumed cultural differences to appear. In short, Brick Lane's multiculturalism came along with many different kinds of meanings attached to it. We should start to recognize the multiplicity of multicultural meanings that characterize the ethnically diverse urban living of London.

One could argue that more research is needed, in order to exemplify the multicultural complexity of contemporary forms of inner-city cosmopolitan urbanism.

Notes

1 Barnor Hesse (2000: 16) has theorized the histories of British multiculturalism as a series of ever-changing 'structures of feeling'. 2 It should be noted that any notion of 'ethics' fundamentally requires putting the 'other' before the 'self'. Nevertheless, the specific conceptualization of 'ethics' here stands for a socially engaging life. In this sense, the 'social' becomes constructed as highly 'ethical'. 3 For a relativization of such a theoretical position, see Pratt's (1998: 27-45) 'Grids of Difference'. 4 For a critique of such a structuralist approach on issues of spatial identity and visual consumption and a more poststructuralist reading on the topic, see Jacobs (1998: 275).

  Interviewer: What do you think about the Brewery? Carl:It's very multicultural, very, very, multicultural, you see people from different backgrounds, different races, different classes and all of them treat you with respect, they treat you on face value, it's a learning experience.

  through the heterogeneous influences of Brick Lane. Raj, again, comments:

	Interviewer: What are your own pleasures of Brick Lane?
	Raj:	I like the fact that there is actual life on the streets and [it]
		changes from day to day . . . and it also changes at different times
		of the day, very early in the morning or on a Bank [public]
		Holiday, Brick Lane is totally Bangladeshi, at other times, like
		during a launch party with a really big DJ on, and you know, it's
		party time, you can just move through in and out of spaces all in
		one the same geographical block, it's fascinating, I love that.
	Interviewer: Do you think that you can participate in all these spaces?
	Raj:


Comparing social mobility MICHAEL BANTON

University of Bristol, UK

Students of social mobility do well to bear in mind the distinction between a category and a group. Most of their data are organized in categories that have been constructed to suit the purposes of the compiler. These may be irrelevant to the lives of ordinary people, who are more likely to enter into reciprocal relations with those they regard as fellow members of a group. The memberships that are important to them may be units smaller than a demographic category or have been ignored in the conduct of a census. When a new inquiry reports that, over a given period, a certain percentage of persons has moved to a higher category, that mobility may be in part the product of the individual actions of those persons, but it is likely to be in some part a product of their parents' investment in them, their education and the positive effects of growing up in a favourable environment. Upward mobility may also be facilitated when individuals combine with those they regard as fellow group members in collective action intended to overcome the obstacles facing them, or in some other way advance their shared interests. Groups can organize for mobility; categories cannot.

Those who, like the editors of Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy, would recruit a team to pool and advance knowledge about social mobility have to inspire collective action. They have to identify an objective that will attract their colleagues to adapt their individual career plans in order to contribute to a common endeavour. This is more difficult than it sounds. The initiators have to persuade a funding body that the venture will be worthwhile and a publisher that the resulting volume will be more than the sum of its parts. Support from the W.G. Kellogg Foundation enabled Loury, Modood and Telles to convene a workshop in Bath, England in 1999, at which first drafts of contributions were discussed, revised versions being subject to more consideration at a second meeting in Boston, USA the following year; nevertheless further work had still to be undertaken and the book took much longer to materialize than the editors would have wished. It looks as if this delay occurred because the objective of the exercise was not defined sufficiently sharply and as if, in a complicated field of research, the contributions of some participants could not be fitted together into as coherent a presentation as was originally envisaged.

The editors aver that 'ethnicity and race are causally related to social mobility'. In my view, 'ethnicity' and 'race' are not in themselves causes of social mobility but are popular names for clusters of factors that may help explain differential social mobility. Each minority in each country is distinctive on many dimensions, possibly including those of phenotype, identification with an ethnic or national origin, religion, language, historical memory and socioeconomic status. Minorities are identified by proper names. Usually they are categories, but sometimes they are groups as well. There are genuine problems, both policy related and social scientific, in trying to find what the minorities that are popularly called 'ethnic' and 'racial' have in common of a causal character with others similarly classified. Since social mobility is a transcultural concept, the search for its causes has itself to be a search for more and better transcultural concepts. Some such concepts form part of the Becker model discussed here solely in connection with the labour market.

At the forefront of this endeavour are the contributions of scholars who have assembled directly comparable material. Model has analysed the available data concerning five categories of person present in both the USA and UK, both foreign-born and native-born. They are those with origins in the black Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. To them are added foreign-born black Africans and native-born whites. Males and females are differentiated. Variations in age, education and, where available, data on length of settlement and command of English, are taken into account. Her main conclusion is that while minority workers in the UK fare nearly as well as their US counterparts in respect of occupational prestige and earnings, they are slightly more likely to be unemployed. US employers may have had more experience of minority employees and their attitudes may have been influenced by the earlier introduction of sanctions upon discrimination in the engagement of staff. Another study, by Teles, Mickey and Ahmed, attempts some further transatlantic comparisons. It stresses the significance for social mobility of asset levels, which vary with the intergenerational transmission of wealth and social capital. The high levels of home ownership among households of Indian and Pakistani origin in the UK are notable on this account. Two other critical variables can be those of having to live in a neighbourhood of high crime and the advantage ethnic minorities in the UK enjoy from living in a country in which healthcare is free at the point of use and unconnected to employment status.

Most essays describe, and attempt to account for, variations in social mobility within either the USA or the UK, making what reference they can to transatlantic comparisons, but some, including essays by the bearers of famous names, such as those of Glazer, Patterson and Parekh, help fill out the background to comparison. Prominent within several of the explanations of differential mobility is the concept of social capital, i.e. the many sorts of assistance and information made available through social networks. The information may include news of job opportunities or transmit group norms embodied in role models that boost achievement motivation. Social capital is built up through forms of sociability that lie in between individual action and collective action. These forms include the reciprocal relations in which people help one another from a sense of obligation that may reflect an expectation that, should the need arise, they will be helped in return. Such relations are essential to group formation and maintenance. It also appears as if there may be cultural elements in social capital even if the data bearing upon this is not very systematic.

The spatial isolation of a minority can either help or hinder the accumulation of social capital. When it helps there is an ethnic enclave, like New York's Chinatown, (described by Zhou); when it hinders there is a ghetto. Research in the USA has found that an out-of-school African American youth has a significantly enhanced possibility of securing a job if he lives in a census tract in which there is a more than 50 percent probability that a randomly selected resident will be white. In such a tract, there will probably be more upwardly mobile black youths as well. Writing on why America's black-white school achievement gap persists, Ronald F. Ferguson notes that there may have been a shift in black youth culture at the end of the 1980s. The commercial take-off of rap music coincided with a decline in black teenagers' reading gains, leisure reading, and class attendance. Rap may have switched energies in directions that did not assist upward social mobility. This can be read together with Patterson's contention that the 'identity politics and ethno-racial mobilization' that have served African Americans well in their successful struggle for inclusion over the past four decades, may now 'be becoming a liability'.

Berthoud outlines how in the UK (where there are ethnic enclaves but no ghettos, as admirably documented by Peach) the family, in its various forms, serves as a building block of human capital. Supplementing this argument, Robinson and Valeny attribute the upward mobility of the Asians who arrived from Uganda in 1972 to their ability to seize the opportunities for self-employment in the British economy; they trace this to Gujerati culture and to their shared past experiences. Hout reports that in the US educational system Latinos remain behind whites but are advancing faster than are African Americans. The percentages of young African Americans graduating from high school, and of those entering post-secondary education, have both fallen. For a long time it has appeared as if immigrants in general are more highly motivated than are natives of comparable socioeconomic status, and that here there are cultural variables that as yet are not well understood. In general, these findings only confirm what we already knew or suspected, while, from the reviews by Modood and Skerry, it would appear that no clear conclusions can be drawn concerning the effects upon minority social mobility of transatlantic variations in political institutions and minority political mobilization.

The USA and the UK are both parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Under Article 2(2) of this they have an obligation to take 'special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of [disadvantaged] racial groups'. As this provision is currently interpreted, the only categories of persons in the USA and UK to which it might be held applicable are those of certain Native American peoples and ghetto-dwelling African Americans. Any advice from social scientists about the measures that might discharge this obligation should be based upon identified causes of disadvantage. Here I take issue with Loury, not on the pragmatic reasons for special measures, but on the philosophical justification for them. He contends that it is mistaken to hold 'that only individuals and never groups can be the subjects of a discourse on social justice'. Believing that there are questions of social justice in societies sharply stratified along racial lines, he wants to identify 'what's wrong with liberalism?' Allegedly, liberalism cannot cope with the continuing reality of racial inequality.

Loury argues not for compensatory measures ('reparations') but for establishing a common baseline of historical memory of past injury and its ongoing significance. He wishes to promote the study of racial stigma at the expense of the Becker-style analysis of discrimination. His criticism of liberalism is founded on a definition of race as 'a human group defined by itself or others as distinct by virtue of perceived common physical characteristics that are held to be inherent'. As justice is an across-the-board standard, the principles used in its application to one case must be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to others. Would Loury agree with Hickman that the Irish in the 17th century were a subordinated part of a racially stratified society? Was there past injury that is of ongoing significance? As for historical memory, it is sometimes said that the English cannot remember past injuries for which they were responsible and that the Irish cannot forget them; does this not have parallels in the way US whites and blacks remember slavery? Yet though shared memories can be important to collective action, their connection with social mobility is uncertain.

The Irish case, the data on black-white 'mixing' in the UK, the arguments for a 'multiracial' category in the US census, and the different attitudes of the increased number of foreign-born blacks in that country, should all call into question Loury's culture-bound conception of race, and serve as reminders that social scientists will need better transcultural concepts if they are to uncover the causes of variable social mobility. As possibly causal factors, differences of 'race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin' (to use the words of the International Convention), derive from subjective judgements. The comparative analysis of social mobility has to rest on the criteria of socioeconomic status that are based on objective classifications, even if some, such as occupational prestige, are only one step away from subjective assessments. At present, there is no good way to factor the former into the latter. The search for a solution to this problem might well be the objective of a further international workshop.

MICHAEL BANTON is Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of Bristol. Address: Fairways, Luxted Road, Downe, Orpington, BR6 7JT, UK. [email: michael@banton.demon.co.uk]


In defence of both multiculturalism and progressive nationalism

A response to Mike O'Donnell

ANDREW PILKINGTON

University of Northampton, UK

Since 9/11, 'to be a Muslim is to be under suspicion, under threat and, given the huge increase in racial violence, under attack' [START_REF] Younge | The Right to be British[END_REF]. In Britain, the situation has worsened with the bombings of 7 July 2005 (7/7), the abortive bombings of 21 July 2005 and the alleged conspiracy of August 2006 to blow up 10 planes. While the coordinated attacks in the USA were deeply shocking, they took place in another country and could be seen to be the product of fanatics. In 2005 and 2006, the conspiracies were closer to home, with most of those responsible for the atrocities being Muslims born and/or brought up in Britain. While the British government and the media have continued to emphasize that the enemy is terrorism and not Islam, there is little doubt that a discourse celebrating Britain's multicultural society is on the retreat [START_REF] Rattansi | New Labour, New Assimilationism[END_REF] and in its stead nationalist discourses from different sides of the political spectrum have been revived [START_REF] Goodhart | Race Equality in Public Services[END_REF][START_REF] West | The Poverty of Multiculturalism[END_REF], along with discourses that urge Muslims to integrate [START_REF] Modood | Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7[END_REF]. I write this at a time when, following the leader of the House of Commons, politicians are vying with each other in urging Muslim women not to wear the niqab veil. The clear implication is that it is Muslims who are to blame for their lack of integration, an implication made absolutely explicit in (much of) the tabloid press where binary oppositions of Us/Them; the West/the Rest; the British/Muslims are routinely reproduced and Muslims are demonized [START_REF] Freedland | If This Onslaught was about Jews, I would be Looking for my Passport[END_REF].

In this context, it is refreshing to read an article by an author who welcomes the fact that we are a multicultural society and who wishes to place his critique of multiculturalism within a framework that does not place the onus of responsibility to change on one group. The author's concern is with social solidarity in Britain, which he sees as fragile and in need of shoring up. O'Donnell recognizes that the problem of order is a recurring theme in social theory, with sociological theorists such as Durkheim and Marx grappling with the issue since at least the onset of modernity. Islamist terrorism in this view is the 'perceived immediate threat' to social solidarity, but this is by no means the first threat that has been identified. This is helpful. It is important to recognize that we are addressing a recurring issue, and formulating it in terms of solidarity usefully leaves open, as many current political and media formulations do not, the question of whether integration policies are critical and whether (as is often implied) these entail changes mainly by one group, Muslims.

There is little doubt that multiculturalism has come under increasing attack since 2001, not least from those who would identify themselves as progressive social democrats. 'By 2004, it was common to read or hear that the cultural separatism and self-segregation of Muslim migrants represented a challenge of Britishness and that a "politically-correct" multiculturalism had fostered fragmentation rather than integration' [START_REF] Modood | Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7[END_REF]. While O'Donnell distances himself from some of the criticisms made of multiculturalism, he clearly does not see multiculturalism as a sufficient basis for social solidarity and indeed seems to be sympathetic towards the view 'that strong multiculturalism [which he sees as exemplified in the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000] threatens social solidarity'. In the light of this, the bulk of the article examines various 'responses to the alleged crisis of multiculturalism in Britain'. He argues 'that a combination of human rights and social equality offer a better basis than nationalism for strengthening social solidarity in Britain'.

I find much to agree with in O'Donnell's article and believe that he is right to remind us of the importance of human rights and especially social equality to social solidarity.

Human rights standards provide ground rules that serve both to protect individuals and provide a helpful framework for negotiating disputes (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000). The 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA) was significant in facilitating the enforceability of human rights and the advent of a Commission for Equality and Human Rights does indeed provide an opportunity to strengthen a human rights culture in which any invidious discrimination is viewed as a serious matter. We mustn't get dewy eyed, however. The HRA has not, as hoped, led to a renewed respect for human rights and measures since 2001 to address terrorism have often paid scant regard to human rights. While human rights standards do provide useful ground rules for settling conflicts, these rules have to be interpreted and implemented, and building organizations at an international level to enforce them is still an uphill struggle. O'Donnell argues that it is perfectly realistic to look to human rights to shore up social solidarity. His admission, however, that 'the effectiveness of human rights depends on a democratic global consensus and commitment to action' suggests to me an incurable romantic.

On the importance of social equality to social solidarity, I am in complete agreement. He uses both theoretical and empirical arguments to make his case that egalitarian measures will help to bolster social solidarity in Britain. Further empirical support for the proposition that social equality generally is conducive to social cohesion comes from a series of comparative studies [START_REF] Wilkinson | The Impact of Inequality[END_REF]. I have only two comments to add to what O'Donnell says on this subject. My first is this. It is remarkable how little attention has been paid to the socioeconomic position of Muslims, at least by (most) politicians and the media. Much of the pertinent research has had perforce to use proxy measures such as being Pakistani/Bangladeshi. What this research demonstrates is that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (the vast majority of whom are Muslim) experience significantly more disadvantage than other ethnic groups. They comprise the only ethnic group(s) where a majority of members live in low income households; they face by far the largest ethnic penalties; and they are more than twice as likely as other ethnic groups to experience overcrowding (Home Office, 2005;[START_REF] Pilkington | Social Cohesion, Racial Equality and Ethnic Diversity[END_REF]. The 2001 British Census for the first time enables us to compare the position of Muslims with other religious groups. 'The broad picture confirms that Muslims as a whole occupy an underprivileged position' (Peach, 2005: 29). In the light of this striking evidence of social inequality, there is an overwhelming case for measures to combat the social exclusion faced by many Muslims and thus, as O'Donnell argues, 'to reclaim a significant minority of seriously disaffected British Muslim youth through egalitarian reform'. My second comment relates to O'Donnell's stress on 'the importance of including disadvantaged white people in egalitarian reform'. It is clearly important on social justice grounds to develop policies that do not unduly favour some ethnic groups over others. O'Donnell's enthusiasm for an egalitarian agenda is motivated by his concern rightly to redress disadvantages faced by all ethnic groups. He is also, I suspect, fearful of a white backlash and favours social equality as well as human rights because he sees both as less divisive than measures that are targeted at particular groups or identify group rights. What also needs to be recognized, however, is that mainstream programmes that are seemingly colour and culture blind 'have not been as successful with ethnic minorities when compared with Whites' (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002 quoted in Pilkington, 2003: 241). A commitment to social equality may well therefore entail more targeted measures than O'Donnell would ideally like to see.

Where I fundamentally part company with O'Donnell is in his dismissal of multiculturalism as irrelevant to shoring up social cohesion. He outlines two arguments that have been employed to indicate that multiculturalism threatens social solidarity. Since he does not seek to rebut these arguments and indeed spends most of the rest of the article examining three 'approaches to buttress or replace multiculturalism', this does not seem an unreasonable surmise. The first criticism of multiculturalism is that it overemphasizes differences between people and thus obscures communalities. It is, in short, divisive and thus corrosive of social cohesion. The second criticism of multiculturalism is its valorization of political correctness. While 'minority rights reforms' have played an important role in outlawing discrimination, they have brought in their wake political correctness. This has in turn stifled freedom of expression, inhibited open cross-cultural dialogue and distorted policy formulation. In such a scenario, 'resentment can build up', with 'issues erupting dangerously' and well-intentioned policies being developed that fail to address key issues. This situation entails a 'threat to social solidarity'.

Let me deal with each criticism in turn. While multiculturalism has divergent meanings and takes different forms, it is exceptional for proponents not to highlight the need for respect for difference to be complemented by adherence to some common values. Take for example the report of Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) which is seen by O'Donnell as 'the acme of a trend in multiculturalism' and by Joppke (2004: 249) as (re)affirming 'the British multicultural orthodoxy'. O'Donnell reads the report as one that is committed to communitarianism -Britain as 'a community of communities' -and as a result believes that it is 'divisive'. This is an extremely one-sided reading.

The report suggests that it is helpful to think of Britain as 'a community of communities and a community of citizens' (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 56). Thinking of Britain as a community, it is argued, alerts us to the importance of a common sense of belonging and the need for shared values and social cohesion. Thinking of Britain as a community of communities challenges the conventional view of Britain as divided into two seemingly homogeneous groupings, a white majority and ethnic minorities, and urges us instead to recognize that Britain comprises a number of fluid, overlapping and internally diverse national, regional and ethnic communities that cut across any simple majority/minority division. This means that treating people with due regard to respect for differences is not an issue only of concern to minority ethnic groups. At the same time, the report emphasizes that it would be inappropriate to think of Britain purely in these terms since we are not only members of distinct communities, but are also individuals who deserve to be treated equally. We need therefore to think of Britain not only as a community of communities, but also as a community of citizens.

Conceptualizing Britain, and its constituent communities, in these terms entails, it is argued, a need to strike a balance between cohesion, equality and difference. Contrary to O'Donnell's reading, the report is unwilling fully to embrace communitarianism, precisely because of its tendency to be exclusively concerned to promote one of these values, notably difference. By visualizing Britain as a community of communities and a community of citizens, the report expresses support for the three principles of cohesion, equality, and difference. 'They must be held together, qualifying and challenging each other, yet also mutually informing and enriching' (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 105).

This raises a conundrum, however, since these principles are, at least in part, at odds with each other. How do we reconcile these contrary values? If O'Donnell were correct in his reading of the report and other writings of the lead author, Bhikhu Parekh, one might be led to expect cultural relativism to prevail, with minority rights trouncing human rights. This is in fact far from the case.

The report acknowledges the impossibility of resolving the tension between the values of cohesion, equality and difference. Nonetheless it presents some pointers that enable a balance to be struck between these values. Some 'common values are necessary to hold [Britain] together and give it cohesion' (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 53). These are of two forms: procedural and substantive. Procedural values are those, such as tolerance, mutual respect and rationality, that provide 'the basic preconditions for democratic dialogue'. Substantive values are those enshrined in international human rights standards that 'underpin any defensible conception of the good life . . . On the basis of such values, it is legitimate to ban female circumcision, forced marriages, cruel punishment of children, and repressive and unequal treatment of women, even though these practices may enjoy cultural authority in certain communities' (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 53-4). While these values set limits to permissible differences, the report argues that people should otherwise be free to pursue their own conceptions of the good life, and these may, of course, differ profoundly. We are still left therefore with the question of how the competing claims of difference and equality can both be recognized. Here the report emphasizes the need for the public sphere to be more pluralistic and for disputes to be resolved through intercultural dialogue and negotiation.

For O'Donnell, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain report represents the paradigm case of strong multiculturalism, a development seen as having 'simply gone too far' and a threat to social solidarity.

Careful examination reveals, however, a form of multiculturalism that does not obscure and devalue what people have in common. Indeed in some respects, the report seems to anticipate O'Donnell's strictures about the importance of taking equality and human rights seriously.

Let us turn to the other criticism O'Donnell makes of multiculturalism, the purported association of multiculturalism with political correctness. My reading of the race relations legislation in Britain is somewhat different from O'Donnell's. In particular, it seems strange to me to characterize it as 'the minority rights reforms'. The emphasis of the 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts was on like treatment with the overall thrust being individualist. The 1976 Act moved beyond like treatment in two respects -first, by acknowledging indirect discrimination and, second, by encouraging positive action (but not positive discrimination) -and the 2001 (Amendment) Act has gone a little further with its introduction of a general statutory duty on public authorities. These measures, it is true, exemplify an acknowledgement of group rights, but the legislation has been primarily informed by a liberal perspective rather than a communitarian one. What I also find surprising in O'Donnell's account is the strong implication that legislation has indeed entailed political correctness. Post-war legislation has not in my view curtailed freedom of expression in any significant way. It outlaws speech that is intended to incite race or religious hatred. And surely that is appropriate.

It is true that legislative changes have been accompanied by normative changes about what is acceptable to say and publish. References to 'niggers' and 'Pakis' are now generally unacceptable, and the Black and White Minstrel Show 1 is no longer part of our television viewing schedule on Saturday evenings. This is on the whole, as I am sure O'Donnell would agree, a positive development. We can scarcely urge Muslims and other minority groups to integrate if we are insulting them. Not all would agree, however. For some, the above smacks of political correctness, with images conjured up of the thought police cajoling us to stay in tune with the latest party line. Labelling attempts to be sensitive in the way we address and represent people as political correctness, however, is to fall prey to a rightwing discourse that is dismissive of the ideals relating to human rights and social equality that O'Donnell, like myself, holds dear. While it is true that many people do see legislation as leading to political correctness (note, for example, the common perception that the law entails positive discrimination as well as inhibitions on freedom of expression), that is in my view a mistake. What such misperceptions signal instead is how susceptible people are to a right wing anti-political correctness discourse. This discourse turns the world upside down. The problem is not the stereotyping, stigmatizing and marginalizing of vulnerable groups, but political correctness zealots who threaten freedom of speech. It is remarkable that this discourse has become so pervasive. The vitriol thrown at the report of Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, and indeed the current demonization of Muslims, by large sections of the British media scarcely indicate an intimidated press. I would suggest that what such coverage indicates instead is the hegemonic position of a right wing anti-political correctness discourse (Ackroyd and Pilkington, forthcoming).

Contrary to O'Donnell's view that multiculturalism has no significant role to play in sustaining solidarity, and indeed may undermine it, I concur with [START_REF] Modood | Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7[END_REF] when he argues that 'multiculturalism is still an attractive and worthwhile political project; and indeed we need more of it rather than less'. Multiculturalism for Modood is a form of integration. It entails changes on the part of established institutions as well as minority groups in a process of mutual accommodation. What is crucial in the current context is that British Muslims are represented in the public sphere, that there is genuine dialogue, that pragmatic and mutual adjustments are made and that over time we move towards a situation where, irrespective of difference, people experience equal respect. Especially damaging to multiculturalism are ideologies that represent the social world in terms of a simple binary opposition, the West/Islam whereby people are divided into two mutually exclusive categories. While Islamophobia and Islamist ideologies comprise mirror images of each other, neither are 'conducive to fostering dialogue, respect for difference, to seeking common ground and negotiated accommodation, in short to citizenship in general and above all to multicultural citizenship' (Modood, forthcoming). While O'Donnell does express some sympathy for Modood's form of multiculturalism (which by his own admission is more modest than some others), I am somewhat surprised by two things. First, there is a hint in his reference to The New East End [START_REF] Dench | The New East End[END_REF]) that pluralism has generally tended to address the needs of minority ethnic groups more effectively than the majority ethnic group. Second, there are occasions -such as the juxtaposition of 'the values and practices of Islam and western liberalism' -when a binary opposition between the West/Islam is inadvertently reproduced. Both of these claims seem to me highly problematic. It is scarcely credible to picture our political system as biased in the direction of minority ethnic groups. And, as O'Donnell recognizes elsewhere, there are a plethora of different versions of Islam and indeed western liberalism.

The final issue that I want briefly to address is nationalism. Here I am in agreement with much of what O'Donnell has to say. He presents a helpful critique of Goodhart's attempt to conceptualize a revitalized nationalism. It is not sufficiently inclusive, fails to address many of the concerns of minority ethnic groups and does not provide a sound basis of social solidarity. Despite agreeing with much of what O'Donnell has to say here, I do have two reservations, however. First, O'Donnell shares with [START_REF] Goodhart | Race Equality in Public Services[END_REF], and many others, a belief that multiculturalism and nationalism are antithetical. What this overlooks is the fact that multiculturalism 'has been integral to a nation-building project' in countries such as Canada [START_REF] Modood | Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7[END_REF]. Second, and here I again concur with Modood, it is important to take account of emotions. While we might be cognitively pulled towards cosmopolitanism, the latter does not have the same emotional pull as nationalism. 'The reaffirming of a plural, changing, inclusive British identity, which can be as emotionally and politically meaningful to British Muslims as the appeal of jihadi sentiments, is critical to isolating and defeating extremism' [START_REF] Modood | Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7[END_REF]. Contrary to O'Donnell, I believe that it is important to re-imagine Britishness so that it has widespread appeal. This may not be 'a sufficient basis for social solidarity', but it may nonetheless be necessary.

While I have ended up expressing serious reservations with O'Donnell's argument, I am grateful to him for presenting a case that has provoked me to reconsider the issues and mount a defence of both multiculturalism and, in a more limited way, progressive nationalism.

Note

  MIKE O'DONNELL is Professor of Sociology at Westminster University, who has recently publshed in the areas of social theory and ethnicity. Address: SSHL, University of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London W1R 2UW, UK. [email: M.ODonnel@westminster.ac.uk]

The Black and White Minstrel Show was a popular British weekly TV series that ran for

years from 1958. The variety show, whose format was derived from America, featured white performers who wore black face make-up, woolly wigs and lavish costumes while they danced and sang popular songs.

Much of the article seems to be an assertion of his preferences rather than an argument employing logic and evidence. His preferences are for human rights and equality, which seem to magically sweep away all conflicts of interests and values between people. There are moments when O'Donnell seems to acknowledge the limits of liberal pieties: he accepts some of the criticism of political correctness and implies that it is not sensible for multiculturalists to ignore the interests of ethnic majorities. But a few paragraphs later he asserts that the symbols and institutions of the British majority are no longer adequate for generating solidarity. He then goes on to suggest that the curriculum be broadened to embrace the history of ethnic and religious minorities. He appears not to have heard of Black History Month (which takes place every October in Britain). The real world seldom impinges. The dramatic recent rise in public anxiety about the 'security and identity' issues, in the light of a big surge in immigration and the emergence of Islamic terrorism, is not mentioned, nor is the worrying evidence from Robert Puttnam and others about declining levels of trust in areas of high ethnic diversity. And towards the end he seems to acknowledge the utopian nature of his project when he writes that 'the effectiveness of human rights depends on the support of a democratic global consensus and commitment to action'.


Much of the article seems to be an assertion of his preferences rather than an argument employing logic and evidence. His preferences are for human rights and equality, which seem to magically sweep away all conflicts of interests and values between people. There are moments when O'Donnell seems to acknowledge the limits of liberal pieties: he accepts some of the criticism of political correctness and implies that it is not sensible for multiculturalists to ignore the interests of ethnic majorities. But a few paragraphs later he asserts that the symbols and institutions of the British majority are no longer adequate for generating solidarity. He then goes on to suggest that the curriculum be broadened to embrace the history of ethnic and religious minorities. He appears not to have heard of Black History Month (which takes place every October in Britain). The real world seldom impinges. The dramatic recent rise in public anxiety about the 'security and identity' issues, in the light of a big surge in immigration and the emergence of Islamic terrorism, is not mentioned, nor is the worrying evidence from Robert Puttnam and others about declining levels of trust in areas of high ethnic diversity. And towards the end he seems to acknowledge the utopian nature of his project when he writes that 'the effectiveness of human rights depends on the support of a democratic global consensus and commitment to action'. O'Donnell does try his best to be fair to my own recent writing on liberal or progressive nationalism. But it is not sufficient to dismiss me with an assertion from Bhikhu Parekh,'the language of nationalism is deeply flawed and best avoided' (Parekh in Goodhart, 2006: 76), or to claim that I show inadequate empathy towards minorities. He also misunderstands a throw away comment about two-tier citizenship in which I suggest that it may be of mutual benefit for some lower skilled workers from outside Europe (not inside as he says) to come to work temporarily in Britain and return home a few years later, without enjoying a right of permanent residence or the right to bring in families. I was making the point mainly to stress that there is no right to immigration (except for the small number of genuine asylum seekers) and that it should be permitted only when it is judged to be in the interests of the receiving country. (And, given the very uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of immigration, preferably when it can be shown to be in the interests of poorer British citizens.)

O'Donnell expresses the anti-nationalism so common among modern academics and intellectuals, and at times implies that nationalism must, almost by definition, be ethnically based (he accuses me of being an ethnicist, whatever that is). But this is nonsense, the whole point of what I am saying is that we need to try to create, bottom up as much as top down, a post-ethnic sense of national solidarity that is open to citizens who do not belong to the ethnic majority but, equally, does not set itself against the feelings, symbols and solidarities of that majority.

Nationalism has always been Janus-like. Alongside the hatred and conflict it has generated, it is also responsible for many of the most positive aspects of modern societies -the idea of equal citizenship, the readiness to share with, and make sacrifices for, stranger-citizens (of all classes and races). It was sentiments of national solidarity as much as class solidarity, a feeling that 'we are all in this together', that helped to build and sustain the welfare state. Feelings of national solidarity can be regarded as a more intense subset of the more general feeling of human solidarity -both are about identifying, and sharing, with strangers. In today's Europe (and, indeed, in multinational Britain), there is no reason why the two sentiments must conflict.

Liberal anti-nationalism seems to be based on the fallacy that because all humans are morally equal and worthy of equal respect, the nation state has no right to privilege its own citizens. But moral equality does not mean that we have equal feelings or obligations to all humanity. In economics and sociology, the Left happily embraces the idea of group interests and affinities. But when it comes to culture or national sentiment, the Left switches to a rhetoric of individualism, implicitly seeing society, or at least the dominant culture, as no more than a collection of individuals with no special ties towards each other. (Hence mass immigration is unproblematic because there is no significant community or pattern of life to be disrupted, and any resistance to it must be racist.) This 'blank sheet' individualism often employs the language of internationalism and universal rights, as Mike O'Donnell does.

The Left has historically struggled for a 'universal' notion of equal national citizenship that is blind to wealth, gender and, more recently, race and ethnicity, and one that promotes a high degree of sharing and engagement with fellow citizens. Yet this idea of citizenship is not universal, it stops at our borders. For the legal, political and welfare contracts involved in modern citizenship to have any meaning, nation states require boundaries and a degree of stability and continuity. Citizenship, even in its post-ethnic form, must include and exclude.

And it is no good waving around the concept of human rights as if that solves all our problems; to work properly the idea of human rights presupposes the solidarity that O'Donnell imagines that it creates. Rights that we claim are also demands that we make on each other. They presuppose a political community, and that community is not all of humanity. Contrary to the human rights ideologists, people are not born with rights and, regrettably, many of the world's six billion people have few or none. Rights are a social construct, a product of history, of ideas, of struggles, and of institutions. Both O'Donnell and I have rights, not as human beings, but mainly because we are lucky enough to belong to the political and national community called the United Kingdom, with its infrastructure of laws and institutions. And most rights imply reciprocal demands to perform certain duties, such as abiding by the law of the land or, rather more onerously, paying more than one-third of your income to the state. Rights are not a free lunch -in a democracy, asserted rights can only be sustained if a critical mass of the population accepts the corresponding obligations.

Accepting those obligations, for example paying into a generous welfare state even if you may be a net loser, is one of the cornerstones of the good society. My fear is that if society changes too fast, if the underlying assumption that 'we are all in this together' is no longer accepted, then the rights asserted by some citizens will no longer connect to an obligation felt by others. Because citizenship is about what you put in as well as what you take out, it is also sensible for new citizens to be seen to be 'earning' their citizenship through probationary periods of various kinds. The New East End [START_REF] Dench | The New East End[END_REF], approvingly quoted by O'Donnell, makes clear that existing citizens do not automatically extend their sense of solidarity to new citizens, not because they are racist (although some of them may be) but because the sense of reciprocity has not been established. A welfare system based on individual need may seem just, but when large numbers of outsiders are entering without a history of contribution it becomes problematic, at least for a transitional period. As the authors of The New East End state:

For the local white residents the whole moral order had become inverted by the emphasis placed by the state on individual need. For if what one gets out of the state is determined by need, rather than by what one has put into it, then dignity has gone out of citizenship. Dependency is encouraged, the principle of reciprocity has gone [START_REF] Dench | The New East End[END_REF] However multiple and hybrid our identities, people still need to connect to the wider social and political entities of which they are a part. Yet the continuity and shared experience that creates real communities is undermined by many modern trends. As affluence, mobility and individualism weaken the collective identities of class, ethnicity and religion (at least for the British majority), feelings of national identity must be adapted to act as a vehicle for the communal commitments that the Left holds dear. Indeed, a progressive nationalism, comfortable with Britain's multiethnic and multiracial character and its place in the European Union, is part of the answer to the progressive dilemma, the tension between solidarity and diversity (discussed in my essay 'Too Diverse?', [START_REF] Goodhart | Too Diverse?[END_REF]. This does not mean ignoring or downplaying distributional and other conflicts of interest between groups within the national society, especially when inequality has been growing so sharply in recent decades. Nor does it require an uncritical attitude to the nation or its history and symbols. The Left has often, with justice, mocked excesses of national vanity and antipathy to foreigners, and should continue to do so. But equally, the Left's uneasiness with national feeling is itself, in part, an anachronistic hangover from the days of imperial Britain. Those days are gone; national feeling can now be put to better use.

ANDREW

  PILKINGTON is Professor of Sociology at the University of Northampton. Address: The University of Northampton, Park Campus, Northampton NN2 7AL, UK. [email: andy.pilkington@northampton.ac.uk] afraid to say that I found Mike O'Donnell's arguments unconvincing.