Mario Daniel Martín
email: daniel.martin@anu.edu.au

Advice to speak English in Australia

This article addresses the issue of advice given to immigrant parents to speak English only with their children in Australia, as reflected in the Spanishspeaking community. The article shows that something that appears to be down to chance, i.e. whether this advice is given or not, has a social explanation. This social explanation is based on understanding several social variables such as the ethnic identity of the adviser and the year in which the advice was given, as well as social variables that define the individual who received the advice, notably, his/her physical appearance in the sense of how 'Caucasian' the migrant looks. Such analysis sheds light on the changing perception of migrants in Australia. It was found that, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, when there was an Australian government-sponsored policy of multiculturalism, there was an increase in the number of people being advised to speak English only. It is hypothesized that such increase is linked to the conflict and contest that any recognition of linguistic and social rights for minorities precipitates.

INTRODUCTION

In a radio interview for the programme 'Mornings' on Australia's ABC Classic FM aired on 8 December 2004 [START_REF] Wendt | Interview with Keith Windschuttle[END_REF], the historian Keith Windschuttle discussed his book on the White Australian Policy [START_REF] Windschuttle | The White Australia Policy: Race and Shame in the Australian History Wars[END_REF] with his host, the journalist Jana Wendt. Windschuttle argued that the policy, which forbade the entrance of non-white migrants to Australia from 1901 to the mid 1960s, was, in reality, not racist. He defended the argument that the exclusion of foreigners was based on civic patriotism, not racism, and defended the policy as rational, and, for its time, progressive. In an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald, also promoting his

THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

The federation of Australia in 1901 is also linked to the subsequent migration policy of Australia, as one of the principal factors for federation was the demand for a white Australia in the last two decades of the 19th century (Encel, 1974: 32-4;Lowenstein and Loh, 1977: 4-6;Markey, 1982: 118-22;[START_REF] Mcqueen | A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning the Social Origins of Australian Radicalism and Nationalism[END_REF]. Among the first legislative acts of the federal parliament of Australia was the Immigration Restriction Act, better known as the 'White Australia Policy' (Clark, 1987: 196-8). Until the mid 1960s, migrants to Australia not only had to be of the right appearance to enter the country, they were also required to assimilate quickly, and there was, in general, a paternalistic view of the migrant (Wilton and Bosworth, 1984: 85).

One of the most noticeable and consequently targeted signs of 'foreignness' was language. Teachers and members of the Good Neighbour Council (an organization funded in the late 1940s by the Department of Immigration to help migrants assimilate) advised migrant parents to speak English only with their children, regardless of the migrants' proficiency in the language. Throughout the 1950s, migrant students were consciously allocated to mixed classes to avoid the peril of using a foreign language amongst themselves. The assimilation of the children was a crucial test for the immigration programme. In other areas, public animosity forbade communication in foreign languages within public places. The foreign language press had to send copies of their publications to security agencies and to the Department of Immigration, because they were perceived to be maintaining unassimilable migrant enclaves (Ozolins, 1993: 36-78). Furthermore, interpreting and translation services were almost nonexistent, and communication in English often depended on migrants' children or relatives. Television was an exclusively English medium, and laws dating from the First World War precluded more than 2.5 percent of transmission time in foreign languages and all announcements had to be repeated in English (Clyne, 1991: 15-18;Ozolins, 1993: 36-78).

This environment provoked a lot of insecurity within the established immigrant communities, as witnessed by the text found in a card handed by the Australian Jewish Welfare Society to Jewish migrants when they disembarked in Melbourne in the late 1940s: Above all, do not speak German in the streets and the trams. Modulate your voices. Do not make yourself conspicuous anywhere by walking with a group of persons, all of whom are loudly speaking a foreign language. Remember that the welfare of the old-established Jewish communities in Australia, as well as of every migrant, depends on your personal behaviour. Jews collectively are judged by individuals. You, personally have a very grave responsibility. (Cited in Elazar and Medding, 1983: 282-3) Some of the migrant communities reacted with anger towards expressions of antagonism when they were required to stop speaking their language in public. In the 21 January 1954 editorial of the Italian language newspaper Corriere d'Australia, we found the following revendication of a migrant's (new Australian's) right to speak their language in public:

Too often we hear with contemptuous distaste and resentful dislike of flabbergasted new Australians rudely assailed and viciously offended and rebuked by untutored inhabitants of our crude suburbia, who in their coarse, Snake Gully's mentality, resent with ferocious intolerance their speaking in a foreign language (cited in Ozolins, 1993: 59).

But in another edition of the same newspaper the editorial urges migrants to avoid using Italian so loudly as to provoke clashes with Anglo-Australians (Ozolins, 1993: 59).

Between the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the fortress created by the White Australia Policy began, slowly, to crumble. By this time, there was mounting pressure from migrant groups, which had grown both in numbers and in organization, for a change of policy in the recognition of their qualifications, language rights and other needs, as well as for a change in their treatment by Australian authorities and Australians in general. The response of the Australian authorities in the mid-1960s was a relaxation of the strong assimilationist stance, which ideally required the Australian government and the Anglo-Australian people to ease the pressure on migrants to conform to the British model of society. Migrants could therefore make a contribution to Australian society without abandoning their cultures. A Committee on Overseas Professional Qualifications was established. The Department of Immigration began a grants-in-aid programme to facilitate the employment of bilingual community welfare workers in community agencies. The then 15 year period of residence for non-European migrants to be eligible for citizenship was reduced to five years. Adult English as a Second Language (ESL) classes recognizing the needs of migrants arriving with different levels of English were implemented. Migrant organizations were being recognized as legitimate interlocutors for government bodies for the first time. The ideological changes of this period, however, should also be seen in the light of the changing patterns of Australia's industrialization, which, at this stage of structural change, called for more skilled migrants. This led to relaxation of the White Australian Policy in practice, under the perception that Australia had become less attractive to European migrants because of changes in the world migration market, which flowed from European reconstruction and the end of McCarthyism in the USA (Bullivant, 1984: 54-57;Fagan et al., 1981: 38;Ozolins, 1993: 79-108). The education system, however, apart from the introduction of sporadic ESL classes for migrant children, and some rhetorical and cosmetic changes, did not make many concessions in response to the needs of migrant children, where it was expected that children would absorb English and 'fit in'. This ignored obvious needs in relation to literacy and adjusting to a new educational system. A similar attitude could be found in areas such as health, welfare and access to union representation in the workplace. Australian institutions, in contrast with governments, did not embrace the integration rhetoric. They continued to define migrants as a social problem and responses to the migrant presence were conceived of as short-term adjustments to a passing need, to be resolved via the assimilation of migrants [START_REF] Martin | The Migrant Presence: Australian Responses 1947-1977[END_REF].

The ideological rhetoric was changed into an official policy of multiculturalism in the mid 1970s. Multicultural Australia was adopted officially on the recommendation of the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants, commonly known as the Galbally Report (Galbally, 1978). The report maintained that policy should favour social coherence against ethnic conflict, stressed the value of ethnic identity that did not compromise the democratic identity of the society or was not prevalent at the expense of society at large, and tried to establish policies to overcome the disadvantage of those who arrived in Australia without an adequate knowledge of English, mainly through funding of ESL classes for children and expanding the Adult Migrant Education Program to include more sophisticated English courses for new arrivals. The report also recommended the extension of ethnic radio and the introduction of multicultural television, facilities for civil servants to learn or improve foreign language competence, printing of social welfare information in languages other than English, the expansion of the Telephone Interpreter Service and the establishment of an additional Health Interpreter Service, the provision of financial aid for ethnic self-help schemes, and the establishment of an Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs to engage in research and policy, and to give expert advice to the government.

Multiculturalism, as conceived by the Galbally report, was later both accommodated and attacked by all ideologies, but its more tangible and immediate achievements were undoubtedly the creation of a new ethnicoriented bureaucracy. Ethnic Community Councils and migrant-based self-help schemes were given funds, including ethnic schools and other ethnic-oriented Saturday schools. In state schools, however, the allocation of resources and the implementation of initiatives depended on the particular situation of each school, in terms of the proportion of non-English speaking background children and of the attitudes of school principals, as at the state level there was a consolidation of the decentralized decisionmaking system initiated in the 1960s. This gave each school flexibility in the implementation of curriculum and policies, and significant latitude for school principals to decide on the provision of subjects in their schools, and, consequently, did not always result in the implementation of the policies (Bullivant, 1984: 57-71;Clyne, 1991: 213-16;Ozolins, 1993: 150-205;[START_REF] Singh | Advocating the Sustainability of Linguistic Diversity[END_REF]. In the multicultural rhetoric, migrants (as well as their languages and cultures) were officially recognized as having a place in Australian society. Even the most assimilationist and anti-foreign politicians had to acknowledge migrant issues. Furthermore, verbal attacks on migrants, which were politically profitable only a few years before, became a political liability (Bullivant 1984: 54-57;Fagan et al., 1981: 38;[START_REF] Martin | The Migrant Presence: Australian Responses 1947-1977[END_REF]Ozolins, 1993: 79-108).

In 1976,Vietnamese 'boat people', that is, people who sailed in precarious ships to Australia, arrived in Darwin escaping the fall of Saigon to the communist forces of North Vietnam, initiating a series of reconsiderations of immigration laws regarding refugees. Refugees were built into the migration programme, up to 22 percent of the total settler intake, mainly because of pressure from other countries who received boat people, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries threatened to refuel and resupply all boats and send them on to Australia's north coast if Australia refused to share the intake of refugees from a war in which Australians were involved by helping the American forces. This initiated the migration of Asians to Australia in significant numbers that became noticeable in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1981, a Special Humanitarian Program was established for the entry of refugees, but later there was a progressive shift favouring family migration, that is, migration of people who had relatives in Australia, and later, skilled migration.

The late 1970s were also the years in which the push for a national policy on languages began to be coordinated. Language teachers, linguists, Aboriginal, ethnic and deaf groups submitted to the Prime Minister a request for the need of a coordinated national policy [START_REF] Lo Bianco | Making Language Policy: Australia's Experience[END_REF]Ozolins, 1993: 223-5). This resulted in a senate enquiry in 1982. The enquiry reflected long-standing issues in Australia's ideology about language. The committee's initial clarification was that such a policy 'would not devaluate English as Australia's national language' and 'would not benefit only segments of the community' (Ozolins, 1993: 219;Senate Standing Committee on Education and the Arts, 1984). After a period of consultation and subsequent stagnation, the Labour government Minister for Education, who was given the task of drafting implementation strategies, appointed Joseph Lo Bianco, an applied linguist and instigator of the state of Victoria's language policy, as a consultant. Lo Bianco redrafted the report supporting the goals of the senate enquiry, but including a stronger emphasis on education and maintenance issues, and with a series of more specific recommendations for policy, including budgetary issues.

The report had as its title National Policy on Languages (Lo Bianco, 1987) and had four principles: (a) English for all (stressing English as a Second Language rights for migrants and especially migrant children); (b) support for the maintenance and revival of Aboriginal languages; (c) a language other than English for all; and (d) equitable and widespread language services. The National Policy on Languages represented the peak of the recognition of linguistic rights of minorities in Australia, and was a rare moment in which pluralistic democratic movements met a government elite willing to put into effect significant changes on the migrant policy front, and both attempted to re-imagine the nation state to accommodate Australia's cultural and linguistic diversity [START_REF] Lo Bianco | From Policy to Anti-policy: How Fear of Language Rights Took Policy Making out of Community Hands[END_REF]May, 2001: 307-16). Soon, an Office of Multicultural Affairs was also set up as part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to mediate between the government and the ethnic communities. This consultative organism bolstered the power of the already powerful ethnic bureaucracy created by the Galbally report, discussed above [START_REF] Jupp | Ethnic Politics in Australia: A Research Agenda[END_REF][START_REF] Lo Bianco | Making Language Policy: Australia's Experience[END_REF][START_REF] Zappalà | Four Weddings, a Funeral and a Family Reunion: Ethnicity and Representation in Australian Federal Politics[END_REF]:157-76, Zappalà, 2001).

The increase in Asian migration, a reflection of refugee programmes and the implementation of the non-restrictive migrant policies of the 1970s, soon created uneasiness in the Anglo-Australian population. As a result, there were numerous debates on multiculturalism and the immigration programme. Jupp (1997a) estimates that these issues were aired in the popular press roughly every six months throughout the 1980s. Hage (1998) interprets these debates in anthropological terms as 'rituals of White empowerment -seasonal festivals where White Australians renew their belief in their possession of the power to talk and make decisions about Third World-looking Australians' (Hage, 1998: 241). The two most important of these immigration debates were initiated by Professor Blainey in 1984 and by John Howard in 1988. Blainey, a historian from the University of Melbourne, openly attacked the immigration policy, which he perceived as bringing too many Asian migrants to Australia. In his view, the country could not 'digest' these migrants without the creation of social tensions. Therefore, even with parliamentary support, such an immigration policy could not succeed when millions of Australians did not support it (Blainey, 1984: 164-70). He also criticized multiculturalism for emphasizing the rights of ethnic minorities at the expense of the majority of Australians, and for imposing tolerance on this majority through a variety of new laws [START_REF] Blainey | All for Australia[END_REF] 170-1).

Blainey's denial of pluralism and the legitimacy of different identities for Australians was accompanied by an emphasis on national unity (Markus, 2001: 49-81). In 1988, John Howard, the then leader of the Conservative opposition, began talking about 'One Australia', and calling for an increase in the skilled migrant component as opposed to immigration on the basis of family reunion. The controversy in the media, however, started when Howard voiced criticisms of multiculturalism, and expressed the view that Asian migration should be restricted. Blainey and Howard were severely criticized in the media, and perceived such criticism as 'censorship' (Betts, 1999: 277-300;Markus, 2001: 82-112).

The early 1990s saw the advent of dry economic rationalist approaches to government, and, even when the rhetorical support for the idea of Australia as a multiethnic, multicultural society, was maintained, language policy became much more restricted, and stressed some aspects of cultural differences as an advantage that could lead to economic returns, such as using language resources to promote exports (Clyne, 1998: 22-28;Lo Bianco, 2003: 23-25;Ozolins, 1993: 256).

Just four years after its release, the National Policy on Languages was transformed in 1991 into Australia's Language -the Australian Language and Literacy Policy, where the emphasis shifted to literacy in English, especially literacy oriented for labour market access (Department of Employment, Education and Training, 1991). The Minister of Employment, Education, and Training took particular issue with the goal that all Australians should learn a language other than English, which he considered unnecessary, and downgraded significantly the ambitions of the policy. The policy also distanced migrant communities from policy decision making and removed the emphasis on language services. Following a government report that examined the needs of languages for commerce (the so-called Ingram report), commercially relevant Asian languages were prioritized over migrant languages in the implementation of the new policy [START_REF] Ingram | The Relationship between International Trade and Linguistic Competence (Report to the Australian Advisory Council on Languages and Multicultural Education)[END_REF]. There was a strong community reaction against this narrowing down of the language policy, but the minister did little to dispel criticism. When questioned whether the change in the policy name from 'languages' to 'language' was espousing a monolingual future for Australia, the minister even expressed the view that Australia was in essence a monolingual society [START_REF] Brock | Australia's Language[END_REF][START_REF] Lo Bianco | Making Language Policy: Australia's Experience[END_REF], 2001;[START_REF] Moore | Although It Wasn't Broken, It Certainly Was Fixed: Interventions in the Australian Migrant English Program 1991-1996[END_REF].

This signalled the beginning of a retreat from a commitment to pluralism that was only exacerbated in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century. In part, this was caused by the increasing dependency of the newly created ethnic bureaucracy on government funds to survive. The co-option of such bureaucracy by conservative middle-class, Anglo-friendly spokespersons for the communities reduced, in the politician's view, the threat of the most militant 'ethnic vote'. The transition of multiculturalism from a policy to ameliorate migrant disadvantage and further cultural democracy into a 'spaghetti and polka' superficial celebration of cultural relativism was already completed [START_REF] Kalantzis | An opportunity to Change the Culture[END_REF]Kalantzis et al., 1990: 21-2). In the minds of the Australian public, however, the significant increase in the teaching of languages in public schools, which included compulsory learning of (mainly Asian) languages in primary school, coupled with official statements of integration with Asia, furthered their concerns about language policy [START_REF] Jupp | From 'White Australia' to 'Part of Asia': Recent Shifts in Australian Immigration Policy towards the Region[END_REF][START_REF] Lo Bianco | From Policy to Anti-policy: How Fear of Language Rights Took Policy Making out of Community Hands[END_REF], 2003;Martín, 2005: 62-70).

The media celebrations of the achievements of multiculturalism and tolerance, very common until the mid 1990s (e.g. [START_REF] Bowen | Proceedings of the First National Conference on Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Groups in Australia[END_REF]Grassby, 1974;[START_REF] Lowenstein | The Immigrants[END_REF]Phillips and Houston, 1994;[START_REF] Rado | Bilingual Education[END_REF] turned in the late 1990s into gloomy predictions that there was a 'retreat from tolerance' in Australia [START_REF] Adams | The Retreat from Tolerance: A Snapshot of Australian Society[END_REF]. The press stopped condemning people such as Blainey and Howard, and the perception was that there had been a resurgence of racism (Hollinsworth, 1998: Chapter 9;[START_REF] Suvendrini | Racial Suicide": The Re-licensing of Racism in Australia[END_REF]. The most prominent cause for this gloomy vision was the advent of the One Nation Party, a populist movement led by Pauline Hanson, a Queensland Member of Parliament who wanted to put an end to the policy of multiculturalism, freeze immigration, reduce the proportion of Asians in Australia, end any special treatment for Aboriginal people, implement restrictions on foreign ownership and return to trade protectionism [START_REF] Jackman | Pauline Hanson, the Mainstream, and Political Elites: The Place of Race in Australian Political Ideology[END_REF][START_REF] Jayasuriya | Old Racism, New Racism[END_REF]Jupp, 1997aJupp, , 1997b;;[START_REF] Rose | A Crisis of Identity: The Rise of Racism Highlights a Growing Sense of Insecurity[END_REF]. After her first speech as a newly elected member of parliament, there was a significant increase in cases of racial harassment [START_REF] Chow | White Noise: Racial Discrimination in Australia[END_REF] and an increase in the voicing of racist attitudes on talk-back radio [START_REF] Adams | Talkback: Emperors of Air[END_REF]. One of the main themes in Hanson's populism is the belief that mainstream (that is, Anglo-Australian) Australia had been betrayed by politicians, the media and a new class elite who favoured migrants and Aboriginal peoples (Hanson, 1997;100-6). In its first electoral test in Queensland in June, 1998, Hanson's One Nation party picked up 23 percent of the vote, winning 11 seats in the state parliament. In the federal election that same year, Hanson lost her parliamentary seat, and subsequently her movement imploded as a consequence of factionalism. The legacy of her opening of the Pandora's Box of racism, however, is still present in Australian politics.

At the same time that Hanson entered the political arena, a National-Coalition Conservative government, led by the same John Howard who expressed the need to scale back Asian immigration in 1988, took office. Howard not only refused to censor Hanson, but welcomed a new era of 'free speech'. He also asserted that the Australian government would no longer be dictated to by minority groups or political correctness, the latter meaning the censorship of discussions on 'difficult' topics, such as the supposedly high level of Asian immigration to the country (Kalantzis and Cope, 1997: 58-63). Other subtle and not-so-subtle messages included nominating four publicly identified critics of multiculturalism or mass immigration (including Professor Blainey) to significant advisory positions in his government, and dismantling the Office for Multicultural Affairs in the Cabinet and the Bureau of Immigration and Multicultural Research, stopping the provision of bilingual Aboriginal education and focusing language policy exclusively on literacy in English. This prompted a tide of discussions on these topics in the popular media, where it was interpreted that the orthodoxy had changed, and that it was now possible to attack multiculturalism, migrants and foreign language learning. A key feature of all these changes was the so-called 'revenge of the mainstream', a reaction against allegedly privileged sections of Australian society such as Aboriginal peoples, Asian immigrants, academics, university-educated professionals and other purveyors and beneficiaries of 'political correctness' (Hill, 1998). It is in this context of 'free speech' that Windschuttle carried out his campaign to rewrite Australian history to get Anglo-Celtic Australians morally off the back foot and revendicate Australia's assimilationist policies.

Before looking at the survey data that forms the basis of this article, we need to briefly review the history of the Spanish-speaking community in Australia.

THE SPANISH-SPEAKING COMMUNIT Y IN AUSTRALIA

The Spanish-speaking community in Australia is relatively small compared with other migrant communities, but it is very diverse. According to the 2001 census, there were 93,593 people who reported speaking Spanish at home, of which 20,682, or 22 percent, were born in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1991a). Regarding the origin of Spanish-speaking migrants, there are five countries with around 10,000 nationals living in Australia: Spain, countries of the South American 'Southern Cone' (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay) and El Salvador. The relative size of these national communities, and their demographic evolution in the period 1971-1996 can be seen in Table 1. The 'Other' category in Table 1 is itself composed of several national communities. Those which had more than 1,000 members in 2001 are shown in Table 2. To understand the evolution of these national communities, a brief review of their history in Australia is necessary.

The first national community to arrive in Australia was that of the Spaniards, most of whom came under a migration agreement signed in 1958 between Australia and Spain. This was one of the last migration schemes signed by the Australian Government with a European country after the Second World War. 1 Some of the migrants came under an assisted passage scheme up until 1962, when the agreement was interrupted by the Franco dictatorship in Spain. The agreement was re-established in 1968, but the flow of migrants was less dramatic than in the first stage. By 1966, there were 11,000 Spanish-born people in Australia, and there were almost 15,000 by 1971. Since then, the arrival of Spaniards has diminished substantially and was almost non-existent in the late 1980s, when Spain joined the European Economic Community (Cortes, 1988;García, 1998: 22-3;García and Palomo, 1986: 50-2;Grassby, 1983: 50-4;[START_REF] Morales | Españoles en Australia' (Spaniards in Australia)[END_REF].

After the Second World War, several circumstances kept migration from South America low. Apart from the White Australia Policy, which classified people from Latin America in the same category as Southern Europeans, or as mixed races or non-Europeans, and consequently excluded them, additional factors made migration difficult. These factors included the high cost of travel between Australia and South America, and also the cost of travel to the very few Australian missions in South America, where South American migrants needed to go to satisfy the requirement of an interview with Australian officials before a visa could be granted. Most people arriving from South America in the 1945-67 period were British subjects (Anderson, 1979: 55-67).

There were, however, some non-British potential migrants in which Australia was interested. These were northern European refugees who had been relocated to South America -mainly in Argentina, Brazil and Chileby the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. This was the same institution through which most of the assisted passage schemes for European migration to Australia were arranged. In addition, these three countries (as well as Uruguay) had important northern European migrant communities, who had migrated to these countries from the 1860s. As Australia did not want to be accused of disrupting migration to Latin America, they imposed the condition that any northern European wanting to migrate to Australia from Latin America should be assisted to do so only after five years of residence in Latin America. The Special Passage Assistance Program was established in 1967 to bring in the more skilled workers and tradespersons needed at the time by Australian industries. The assisted passage was made available to South Americans, but was restricted to British Europeans in Central America and Mexico, as there was concern over the predominance of mixed races in this region. In 1968, Australia's first immigration officer to South America took office in the Australian Embassy in Buenos Aires to develop a flow of migrants from Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. The Australian Trade Mission in Peru also began conducting interviews with potential applicants (Anderson, 1979: 68-75;Valverde, 1994: 93;Vernant, 1953: 595;[START_REF] Wolf | La gran inmigración (The great immigration)[END_REF].

In the mid 1980s, under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program, Salvadoreans (and also Nicaraguans and some Guatemalans) began to arrive in Australia in large numbers. The influx began in 1983 when the government of El Salvador asked the Australian government to resettle expolitical prisoners who had been given permission to leave the country under amnesty. There was at the time a civil war in El Salvador. Subsequently, the number of Salvadoreans in Australia grew considerably, as shown in Table 1. Salvadoreans are the only Spanish-speaking national community that came predominantly as refugees. They represent 60 percent of the Spanish-speaking population that came as refugees between 1982 and 1992. The other countries from which an important number of refugees came during these years are Chile (28 percent of Spanish speakers arrived as refugees between 1982 and 1992) and Nicaragua (6%). In numerical terms, Salvadoreans are today the fifth most numerous Spanish-speaking national group in Australia. However, the end of the civil war in 1994 resulted in some people returning to El Salvador. It also considerably reduced the arrival of Salvadoreans into Australia, with migration from El Salvador decreasing sharply from the intake level in 1991-92 (Adler, 1988d;Valverde, 1994: 91;Kipp et al., 1995: 23).

Table 2 shows that the number of migrants from Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico began to grow in the mid-to-late 1980s. As indicated previously, migration from these countries was restricted by the White Australia Policy, as Australian officials were very concerned with the 'mix of races' found in these countries. In reality, what concerned them was the fact that a substantial part of the population was of mestizo descent, that is, of Spanish and American Indian origin. There were also potential diplomatic problems that Australia wanted to avoid. The Australian ambassador to Mexico advised the Department of Immigration that Australia could not limit its recruitment to potential migrants of European descent (as it was doing in South America in the late 1960s and early 1970s), without exciting Mexican protest (Adler 1988a;Adler 1988b;Adler 1988c;Birrell and Birrell, 1981: 69;The Bulletin, 1976).

After the White Australia policy was officially dismantled, migrants from all countries were allowed to apply on the same basis as independent migrants. This allowed migrants from all the Spanish-speaking countries to come to Australia, increasing the diversity of the community. The emphasis on family reunion migration during the 1980s and early 1990s, however, did not result in large national communities of the previously excluded countries. Family reunion facilitated the growth of the already established national communities, such as Argentineans, Chileans and Uruguayans. Other communities grew substantially only when there were special circumstances, as in the case of Salvadoreans. Moreover, refinements to the migrant application point system considerably shaped the type of migrants who were allowed to enter Australia if they did not enter as refugees or on family grounds. The requirements were for highly skilled professionals with a good knowledge of English [START_REF] Brooks | Immigration and the Labour Market: The 1990-94 Recession and Recovering Perspectives[END_REF]. This is the case for most Venezuelans (shown in Table 2). In the 1990s, there was an increase in the number of Venezuelans following the sharp deterioration of the Venezuelan economy. As there were very few Venezuelans in Australia before the 1990s who could claim relatives for family reunion migration, most of these arrivals were highly skilled migrants, as were most of the Spanish-speaking migrants who arrived since the mid 1990s as independent migrants.

Unlike the Spanish-speaking population in the USA, which because of their numerical prominence are the main target of the US English and English Only movements [START_REF] Baron | The English-Only Question: An Official Language for Americans?[END_REF]Crawford, 2000;Hill, 2001;Schmid, 2001: 75-100), Spanish speakers in Australia have a relatively low profile among the many ethnic communities that reside in Australia. Like the Hispanics in the USA, however, Spanish speakers in Australia are militant about their language rights and they, in general, are language maintainers; that is, they transmit Spanish to their children [START_REF] Martín | Factores que afectan la lealtad lingüística en la comunidad de habla hispana en Australia' (Factors affecting language maintenance in the Spanish-speaking community in Australia)[END_REF][START_REF] Santoro | Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle against English-Only Laws[END_REF][START_REF] Valdés | Bilingual Individuals and Language-Based Discrimination: Advancing the State of the Law on Language Rights[END_REF]. Members of the Spanish-speaking community in Australia were able to challenge in the courts their employers' imposition of English at work on two occasions. The first of such challenges was initiated in 1995 by 17 Spanish-speaking workers (most of them Salvadorean) of the firm Steel Line Doors in Brisbane who were being discriminated against. There was a range of mistreatments that included the imposition of English usage among themselves whilst on the firm's premises. After almost a year of legal battles, the workers were compensated and the court made the company's CEO publicly recognize that he was wrong in discriminating against them (Pantoja, 1995a;[START_REF] Pantoja | Gran triunfo reivindicativo de trabajadores latinos' (Great triumph vindicates Latin American workers)[END_REF].

The second challenge was specifically directed against the imposition of English at work. In Sydney, a Chilean-born police officer was ordered to stop using Spanish by his shift supervisor during a private conversation with another Spanish-speaking officer on the grounds that the officer and his interlocutor were in Australia, and they should use English. The Chilean officer brought the police service to court and was compensated. On this occasion, the tribunal warned employers that it is totally acceptable for two workers to have a private conversation in a language other than English (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999).

THE PHENOMENON OF ADVICE TO SPEAK ENGLISH ONLY

Advice to speak English only represents one manifestation of attitudes favouring language shift to English or opposition to the use of languages other than English in Australia. It does not account for other forms of imposing or favouring the use of English that are never verbalized, or do not need to be verbalized. In order to understand this phenomenon, I will interpret the results of an Australia-wide survey of the Spanish-speaking community distributed in 1994-95. The data analysed here provide a snapshot of the sociopolitical environment before the move into Conservative politics in 1996 and the arrival of Hansonism in the same year (see earlier). This is important, as it was a time in which multiculturalism was still respected as official policy in the country and, theoretically, this was the time when official support for the policy, and for the maintenance of languages other than English, was still strong. Consequently, the results are not 'contaminated' either by the resurgence of racist attitudes voiced in the media or by the move to the right that the country has experienced since the conservative government of John Howard took office.

The survey had 483 responses, of which 436 will be considered. 2 The questions that will be analysed in this article were originally included in the questionnaire to gauge the influence of the Anglo-Australian majority on the process of language maintenance of Spanish and/or shift to English or other languages by people born in Spanish-speaking countries.The wording of the main question was: 'Have you ever been advised to speak English only with your children?' There were also questions about the number of times a person was advised, the identity and nationality of the adviser(s), and the year(s) when the advice(s) took place. As part of the data collection there were also interviews in which information about advice to speak English was asked, and participant observation data gathered in 1993-95. Some of the analyses below benefited greatly from these qualitative sources of data, but cannot be presented here for reasons of space.

Table 3 shows the distribution of answers for the questions on advice to speak English only. As can be seen in the upper half of the table, less than a quarter of the sample answered 'yes' to these questions. Also, there is a high number of instances of 'no response' for both questions, which has to be accounted for. One possible explanation is that the questions are not relevant for some of the informants. We have a confirmation of this when we consider only informants who have children, shown on the lower half side of the Table 3. It can be seen that only a very small percentage of informants who have children do not answer this question. The right-hand side of Table 3 also shows that the percentage of people who report that they have received such advice rises to 30 percent when we consider only informants who have children. These figures by themselves contrast with Windschuttle's account that the experience of Jana Wendt of receiving advice to speak English was an exception or a low-level phenomenon, especially taking into consideration that the community in which this happened was the Spanish-speaking community, and not an Asian or Middle Eastern community. A closer look at the survey cited by Windschuttle, however, reveals that these results are not exceptional, and that Windschuttle is highly selective when citing statistics. Even when only 3 percent of respondents to the study chose to nominate that one of the things they disliked about Australia was that people were racist (Richardson et al., 2002: 18), about 46 percent of them perceived that there was 'some' or 'a lot' of racial discrimination in the country, and 24 percent perceived that there was 'little' tolerance of racial, cultural or national differences in Australia (Lester, 2005: 15;Richardson et al., 2004: 82). To further understand the phenomenon of advice to speak English, we must also consider who the adviser was, their ethnicity and in which year the advice was given. This information is provided in Figure 1. We can see that most of the advice was given in 1983-94, that the most frequent advisers were children's teachers, and that most of the advisers were Anglo-Australians.

We need an explanation regarding the predominance of 1983-94 as the period in which this advice was given to informants. These are precisely the years in which there was a state-administered policy of multiculturalism in Australia. With regard to the identity of the advisers, we have already mentioned that most of them were teachers. The category of teachers was subdivided into two categories: children's teachers (most of whom were primary school teachers), and migrants' English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) teachers, including teachers in the 'On Arrival' English classes for recent migrants organized by the Australian government. Other advisers included friends, relatives and workmates, and a category labelled 'other', which includes student counsellors, child carers, psychologists, speech therapists, paediatricians and medical doctors in general, nurses, parents of children's classmates, English class classmates, neighbours, Social Security officers, bosses, Commonwealth Employment Service counsellors, officers of the Australian Embassies overseas, judges in the Family Court, exspouses, and unclassified answers such as 'acquaintances', 'everybody', 'the ignorants', 'several people', 'over-adapted migrants', 'chauvinists' and 'all Australians'.

Regarding the ethnicity of the advisers, we have already seen that most of the advisers were Anglo-Australians, including four people described as 'British'. However, approximately 25 percent of the advice came from Spanish speakers and other migrants.

The distribution of the identity and ethnicity of the adviser is far from being randomly distributed, as can be seen in Figure 2(a). The majority of the teachers were Anglo-Australians and the majority of the friends were Spanish speakers. The rest of the advisers show different proportions of Anglo-Australians, Spanish speakers and people from other ethnic groups. There is a predominance of Anglo-Australians in all of the remaining categories, but we find that some 25 percent of relatives favouring a shift to English were Spanish speakers and 12 percent were from other ethnic groups, which amounts to 42 percent of relatives who favour a shift to English being migrants. Regarding workmates favouring a shift to English, some 40 percent of them were migrants, most of whom were from other ethnic groups.

Another dimension that affects attitudes favouring a shift towards English is shown by the year in which such advice was given. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show that most of the advice was concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s, as was seen in the analysis of Figure 1. However, there is a difference Regarding the identity of the advisers, we can see in Figure 2(b) that advice coming from teachers and workmates is distributed throughout all the years since the 1960s (but is more frequent after 1982), advice from friends is concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s and that advice coming from teachers of English is concentrated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Given that there has been a migration of Spanish speakers to Australia since the 1950s, and that the implementation of ESL classes on arrival for migrants has been a feature of the Australian immigration programme since its significant growth in the mid 1940s [START_REF] Moore | Although It Wasn't Broken, It Certainly Was Fixed: Interventions in the Australian Migrant English Program 1991-1996[END_REF], this concentration of advice on the part of the Spanish-speaking community and of teachers of English in the late 1980s and early 1990s requires an explanation. This will be considered in the following section.

Another important characteristic of the data being considered is that 25 percent of people who report that they have been advised to speak English only report two or more cases of such advice. This suggests that there will be a particular category of people who will be more likely to be advised than others.

Before exploring the social characteristics of those who received the advice, we must consider another obvious question. Maybe those people were advised because the level of English of their children was particularly low. Figure 3 shows how the command of Spanish and English of the informants' children varies in relation to the answers they gave to the question regarding advice to speak English only. We can see that the variation in the level of English for the children of those who reported that

MARTÍN • ADVICE TO SPEAK ENGLISH IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 3

Advice to speak English only with children by children's average level of Spanish and English they were advised and those who reported that they were not advised is almost identical, apart from a small difference in the lower extreme of the boxplot. The situation for the level of Spanish competency is very similar. There appears to be little difference between those who answered 'yes' and those who answered 'no' to the question on advice. This suggests that advice is not related to a significant difference in the children's level of English or Spanish. This is confirmed by an independent t-test, where there is no significant difference between those who were advised and those who were not, either in the children's average level of Spanish (t = -0.44, p = 0.66) or in their average level of English (t = -0.48, p = 0.63). We should bear in mind, however, that we are looking at the level of Spanish and English from the point of view of the time when the survey was distributed. It is possible that there was some difference between the groups regarding the children's level of Spanish or English competency at the time the advice was given. We have, however, no means of knowing if this was so. We can conclude, nevertheless, that such advice does not appear to have a direct influence on language maintenance of Spanish or on the child's level of English at the time of the survey, at least when we consider our sample as a whole with statistical tools. We can then return to the question we posed before: what are the social characteristics of informants and their children that can 'trigger' such advice, and what are the characteristics that do not?

A SOCIAL EXPLANATION OF THE PHENOMENON

In this section, I try to provide a social analysis of why advice was given to parents to speak English with their children. The analysis tries to explain the social characteristics of migrants that made advice more probable.

I will begin by looking at the children's characteristics and other social characteristics of the family, which directly impinge on how the children are perceived and classified in a school setting or other institutional settings. Figure 4 shows the projection of several children's characteristics on the space of triangular coordinates defined by the proportion of 'no responses', and of 'yes' and 'no' answers to the question on advice to speak English only with children. The variables considered are the ethnicity of parents, the country of birth of the informant's first child, the number of children in the family, the age of the first child when the family arrived in Australia, and the amount of Spanish used with parents.

We can see, in general, that most of the characteristics are placed on the right-hand side of the triangle, signalling that most of the selected characteristics will be described by their proportion of 'yes' and 'no' answers. The most salient exception to this pattern is the placement of those informants who do not have children. They are placed in the lower left angle, as they are characterized by a lack of answers to the question on advice to speak English. We saw that this was the case earlier, in the analysis of Table 3.

Children's language normally used with parents clearly affected the likelihood of receiving advice, as expected. Parents who use Spanish predominantly with children are more likely to be advised than parents who use both languages (coded as 'bilingual'), and the latter are more likely to be advised than those who use predominantly English.

Cultural distance or perceived cultural distance seems to affect the likelihood of receiving or not receiving advice, depending on the ethnicity of the children's parents. When one of the parents is Anglo-Australian, the likelihood of being advised is much lower than in cases where the non-Spanish-speaking parent is of another ethnicity (that is, from other, non-Spanish-speaking migrant groups), which in turn is lower than in cases where both parents are Spanish speaking (coded as 'Hispanic' in Figure 4).

Another characteristic of the family that plays a role in determining the probability of receiving advice to speak English is the number of children. Families with one child are less likely to be advised than families with two children, who in turn, are less likely to be advised than families with three or more children. This could be simply an effect of statistical probability, as more children implies a higher probability of being advised because the parents will be in contact with more teachers and other people. However, it can also be because of another characteristic in the data: parents of larger (Martín, 1996: 152). In addition, large families are rarer than families composed of one or two children in contemporary Australia, and are more common in migrant families than in families composed of Australian born couples (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1991b;55). This would suggest that cultural distance (or perceived cultural distance by the adviser) is playing a role in the triggering of the advice.

The age of first child when the family arrived in Australia allows us to see the interplay of several social variables previously considered in another light. I first consider cases in which children are the offspring of parents who have arrived in Australia aged 12 or less, or who themselves were born in Australia. They are placed in the lower right angle of the triangle in Figure 4, that is, 100 percent of them answered 'no' to the question on advice to speak English. This can also be attributed to perceived cultural distance. Parents will be likely to sound Australian when they speak English or behave as Australians. Children will be less likely to speak to them in Spanish, and more likely to have had a great exposure to English.

The percentage of advice is also very low when the first child was aged more than 17 years when the family arrived in Australia. We also see some 18 percent of 'no responses' in this last case, suggesting that the question is felt to be irrelevant. In relation to age of arrival with respect to the remainder of the group, we see an interesting inversion in the progression of the ages. Families in which the first child was very young (less than two years old) when they arrived in Australia show the greatest percentage of advice received. This is followed by families whose first child was of primary school or high school age when they arrived. Then, at the lower level of advice received, we find families whose first child was aged between two and six when they arrived. The relatively high percentage of cases of children who arrived at school age is clear and expected from our previous discussion on advice given by teachers. To understand the pattern of the other two age groups, it is important to realize that if a child is of a very young age when he or she arrives in Australia, then the language he or she will speak is a very important issue to be decided. It is not surprising, then, to see that in these cases there is a very high proportion of parents being advised to speak English only. If a child has already begun to speak in Spanish, but is not of primary school age at the time of arrival, on the one hand his/her language is not an issue to be decided, because it has already been decided as Spanish, but on the other hand there is a possibility of having some exposure to English (especially through child care) before entering school. Thus, as we have seen before in the case of children of Spanish speakers born in Australia, this exposure to English at an early age would reduce the 'probability' of receiving advice to speak English only.

We end the analysis of Figure 4 by considering the country of birth of the informant's first child. This allows a division of families into two main groups: those who came with children and those who came without children. We can see that when the first child was born in Australia, the proportion of advice ('yes' answers) is very low (less than 20%). This proportion increases a little for cases of families whose first child was born in Spain, Argentina, Uruguay or Colombia (all around 30% of advice). It increases again for families whose first child was born in Chile (some 42%) and El Salvador or other Central American countries (50%). It reaches its highest value for families whose first child was born in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador (78%). Finally, we have families whose first child was born in Venezuela. They are characterized by a very high proportion of 'no responses' (60%). Only 20 percent of Venezuelan families were advised to use English only and 20 percent of them reported that they did not receive such advice. We can explain this pattern again in terms of exposure to English and Australian culture. Families that came with children were more likely to be advised than families whose children were born in Australia, because the latter would be perceived as having fewer 'foreign' traits and better English skills.

We can also understand the distributional pattern of countries of birth in terms of time of arrival of the national communities, and in terms of perceived cultural distance by the Anglo-Australian majority. Spaniards arrived in assimilationist Australia, when such advice was not necessary, as the structural forces favouring a shift towards English were official policy. At the other extreme, Venezuelans are very recent arrivals. As previously discussed, the majority arrived to Australia with pre-arranged jobs and already knowing English. They bypassed On-arrival English classes, job lists in the Commonwealth Employment Service, and in general, the migrant channelling process. Consequently, they had a lower chance of being advised to speak English only with their children (except at school). The pattern for the rest of the countries is not as clear as in the previous two cases. This is because another social variable exerted a significant influence, that of the children's physical appearance. As previously mentioned, the White Australia policy precluded the arrival of people from the Andean countries and from Central America on racial grounds, as immigration officers believed that there was a predominance of 'mixed races' in these countries. Policy also favoured Uruguayans, Chileans and Argentinians, based on a perception that the proportion of 'mixed races' was not so prominent in these countries due to European migration. We can suppose that the perceptions of immigration officers hold about race would be similar to the perception, for instance, that Anglo-Australian teachers hold. If this is so, then physical appearance would have a direct influence on the perceptions of cultural distance on the part of the majority group. Therefore, the less 'Caucasian' the children appear, the more likely it is that parents will receive advice to speak English only to them. This can explain the high proportion of advice given to parents whose children were born in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, and the descending grading on the proportion of advice given for the rest of countries of birth. 3 This is also confirmed by Figure 5, where we can see that the number of times people have been advised corresponds with the physical appearance of the children. The physical appearance of the child was calculated counting the number of 'Caucasian' grandparents that the children had, as gathered from the information about the informants' parents and informants' partners' parents' countries of birth. 4 The correlation is also statistically very significant (Kendall's Tau = -0.191 p < 0.001).

The analysis of Figure 4 shows several important things. These can be summarized by saying that to receive or not to receive advice to speak English only is not random in social terms if we consider some of the characteristics of families who received such advice and those who did not. Externalization of Spanish language maintenance and externalization of behaviour that can be interpreted as lack of cultural adaptation will play a significant role in producing opportunities to trigger such advice. But physical appearance -that is, the perceived distance of the children from the Caucasian ideal migrant of the assimilationist era -seems to be enough to trigger the advice. This clearly links advice to speak English only to the racial characteristics of the migrants, as perceived by the Australian Anglo-Celtic mainstream. Without access to the opinions of those who gave the advice, however, it can not be assured that advice to speak English only is racist. It can be based on prejudice or simply ignorance. But the results above have shown that if the phenomenon has to be understood socially, racial perceptions and symbolic violence towards ethnic minorities have to be included in the picture. [START_REF] Macleod | Who is 'Us'? Students Negociating Discourses of Racism and National Identification in Australia[END_REF] have shown that racist attitudes are more justified by Anglo-Celtic Australians the more those on the receiving end are perceived as 'other', and that such perceptions draw on an historical sense of time of arrival or closeness to the White Australian ideal in terms of fairness or knowledge of English. The probability, then, of finding a racist undertone on the motivations of those Anglo-Australians who are advising migrants to speak English only with their children are not negligible.

However, this does not adequately explain the advice coming from migrants. To understand why migrants would advise fellow migrants to speak English only, we should look at some additional data. Figure 6 shows the numbers in the cases of reported advice by the nationality of the adviser and the year of arrival of the informants (that is, of those who received the advice). It can be seen that the advice was predominantly given to people who arrived in the 1980s, that is, in the time multiculturalism was official rhetoric. As we have seen, this period was both the peak time for family migration and the years in which the Refugee and Humanitarian Program was in operation. Spanish speakers arriving at this time would have been less likely to know English well, and, unless they settled in an area where there were few migrants, they would have been at risk of taking the multicultural rhetoric at face value, because they would not have had a real sense of what the Australian mentality was. Consequently, both teachers of English and other migrants would have perceived them as being at risk of not making a serious effort to learn English, and would have advised them accordingly, just as Jewish and Italian migrants advised their fellow migrants in the assimilationist years. It is also possible that some established and 'adapted'

CONCLUSION

We can conclude our analysis of the advice given to immigrant parents to speak English only with their children by saying that such advice can be thought of as a reaction to symbolic changes in the place of migrants in Australian society during the multicultural years. The social meaning of the advice cannot be reduced to forcing a language shift towards English, which is presented as a primarily crude goal. Instead, it has a far wider meaning of re-establishing the balance of forces at the symbolic level, which the Anglo-Australian majority perceived as lost, especially regarding the popular image of multiculturalism during 1980-96. This was not related to the real aims of multiculturalism, but with a more immediate and less theoretical vision of multiculturalism as giving undue support to migrants (Hage, 1998: 20). Advice was more probable when migrants were perceived as 'deviant' from the image of the 'well-behaved' migrant that was predominant in the assimilationist years: a well-behaved migrant was someone who looked 'Caucasian', tried to adapt him-or herself as soon as possible, and spoke English to his or her children.

Advice came predominantly from Anglo-Australians, notably from teachers. But it also came from migrants and from teachers of English to new arriving migrants, when they perceived that new migrants might have been at risk of taking the multicultural rhetoric at face value. The more 'adapted' migrants also felt the need to advise other migrants to use English only with their children. Advice would be felt necessary when the 'adapted' migrants perceived that their place in Australian society was threatened by the excessively 'deviant' behaviour of fellow migrants.

The data presented here clearly refutes assertions that advice to speak English in Australia is unrelated to race perceptions and racism, and attempts to picture it as a benign consequence of the 'dislike of outsiders' by the tolerant Anglo-Australian mainstream, as argued by Keith Windschuttle in his interview with Jana Wendt, with which this article began [START_REF] Wendt | Interview with Keith Windschuttle[END_REF]. It also shows that a high proportion of Spanish speakers received the advice, and anecdotes of being advised are not played up for more than they are worth. Such advice can be meaningfully linked to perceptions of race in Australia and racist attitudes, as the less 'Caucasian' children look, the more likely are their parents to be advised to speak English only with them.

Such advice cannot be explained either by a loyalty, on the part of the Anglo-Australians, to the democratic and liberal institutions of the country against the perceived ethnic separatism of Australian multiculturalism. It rather seems to be a symptom of a struggle for social supremacy that ignores the no less ethnic character of Australia's ethnic majority (May, 2001: 25;Crawford, 2000: 10). Advice was more prominent in the multicultural years and this reflects the conflict and contest that any recognition of linguistic and social rights for minorities precipitates [START_REF] May | Just How Safe is Australia's Multilingual Language Policy? A Response to Michael Clyne[END_REF]. The results of this article, then, allow a prediction, that the ascendancy of the white Anglo-Celtic majority in the years since John Howard's election in 1996 would have reduced the amount of advice to speak English only with migrant children in Australia, as the symbolic threat of multiculturalism has waned for the dominant ethnic group in Australian society.

Figure 1

 1 Figure 1Year in which advice to speak English only with children was given, ethnicity and identity of the adviser

Figure 2

 2 Figure 2 Identity of the adviser to speak English only with children by ethnicity and by year in which the advice was given

Figure 4

 4 Figure 4Profile space: The space of children's characterisitics

Figure 5

 5 Figure 5 Number of times the informant was advised to speak English only with his/her children by number of informant's children's Caucasian grandparents

Figure 6

 6 Figure 6 Number of times advice given to speak English only to children by ethnicity of adviser and informant's year of arrival in Australia

Table 1

 1 Demographic evolution (1971-96) of the main Spanish-speaking

	countries
		1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
	Chile	3,691	9,919 13,963 18,733 24,154 23,820 23,420
	Argentina	1,757	5,294	8,138	9,198 10,663 10,775 10,763
	Uruguay	1,880	7,769	9,278	9,593	9,690	9,715	9,475
	Spain	14,629 15,357 15,127 16,278 14,785 13,589 12,662
	El Salvador	n/a	n/a	n/a	2,103	8,830	9,865	9,696
	Other	3,373	8,188 10,130	9,235 12,944 15,161 18,727

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, various Australian Censuses.

Table 2

 2 Demographic evolution (1976-96) of the other Spanish-speaking

	nations
		1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
	Peru	1,314	1,813	2,323	3,813	4,875	5,510
	Colombia	1,060	1,289	1,687	2,269	2,670	4,329
	Ecuador	878	906	1,006	1,103	1,242	1,325
	Mexico	401	454	678	836	883	1,154
	Venezuela	334	418	456	474	791	1,109

Table 3

 3 Answers to the questions on advice to speak English only

	Answer	Frequence	Percent
	All respondents considered
	No	229	52.5
	No response	107	24.5
	Yes	100	22.9
	Total	436	100.00
	Only informants who have
	children considered
	No	207	64.7
	No response	17	5.3
	Yes	96	30.0
	Total	320	100.0

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, various Australian Censuses.

In 1948, an assisted passage agreement with Malta was reached. This was followed by similar agreements with the Netherlands and Italy in 1951, with West Germany, Austria and Greece in 1952, with Switzerland and the Scandinavian countriesin 1954, and Spain in 1958.

Forty-seven responses were discarded because they did not correspond to the sample population that was being targeted, or because they were too incomplete to be included.

The only country that would not fit this pattern is Chile, because, as we have seen before, there was a predominance of people of European descent among the first arrivals to Australia from this country. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to understand that, after 1974, the Chilean population in Australia (as in general the whole South American population) grew not only in number, but in ethnic diversity. Even when these indices are not always reliable, and have inherent racist tendencies, it should be pointed out that Esteva Fabregat (1985: 30-1) estimated the proportion of 'mestizos', that is, people of mixed Amerindian and Spanish descent, was

percent for Chile, and 8 and 9 percent for Uruguay and Argentina. This could explain the different percentages of advice for these communities. 4 This number was simply the sum of children's grandparents born in Spain, the UK and other European countries such as Italy and Germany. This is just a crude measure of physical appearance, as some of the people born in these countries may not necessarily look 'Caucasian'.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Anna Piggin and Rebekah Marshall for their help in editing the English of this article.

Notes

Diversity, pp. 4-29. Clevedon, Philadelphia, PA, Toronto, Sydney, Johannesburg: Multilingual Matters. Cope, B., M. Kalantzis and S. Poynting (1997) 'Building Unity out of Diversity in Australian Schools: Making "One Nation" the Sum of its Parts', Education Australia Online [http://www.edoz.com.au/edoz/issues/intercultural.html]. Cortes, J. (1988) 'Spanish', in J. Jupp (ed.) The Australian People: An Encyclopaedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins, pp. 803-5. North Ryde: Angus & Robertson. Crawford, J. (2000) At War with Diversity: US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety. Clevedon, Philadelphia, PA,Toronto, Sydney, Johannesburg: Multilingual Matters. Department of Employment, Education and Training (1991) Australia's Languagethe Australian Language and Literacy Policy. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Elazar, D. J. and P. Medding (1983) Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies: Argentina, Australia and South Africa. New York and London: Holmes & Meier. Encel, S. (1974) 'The Nature of Race Prejudice in Australia', in F.S. Stevens (ed.) Racism: The Australian Experience. A Study of Race Prejudice in Australia. Volume 1: Prejudice and Xenophobia, pp. 30-40. Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company. Esteva Fabregat, C. (1985) 'América: un largo proceso de mestizaje' (America: A long process of Inter-breeding), in P. Sanchiz, S. Rodríguez and C. Esteva (eds) América Colonial, pp. 28-32. Madrid: Información y revistas S.A. Fagan, R.H., J. McKay and G.J.R. Linge (1981) 'Structural Change: The International and National Context', in G.J.R. Linge and J. McKay (eds) Structural Change in Australia: Some Spatial and Organisational Responses, pp. 1-50. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Galbally, F. (1978) Migrant Services and Programs. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. García, I. (1998) ' From Federation to Sydney 2000: An Overview of a Hundred Years of Hispanic Presence in Australia', in Consulado General de España en Sydney and University of Western Sydney (eds) Towards Sydney 2000: a Spanish perspective = El Español ante Sydney 2000, pp. 65-72. Sydney: Consulate General of Spain: Spanish Research Unit and University of Western Sydney. García, I. and J.L. Palomo (1986) 'La segunda generación de Españoles en Australia', in Embassy of Spain (ed.) Proceedings of the first Conference of the Spanish Teaching Programme in Australia, Sydney 23-25 October 1986, pp. 50-70. Canberra: Embassy of Spain in Canberra. Grassby, A.J. (1974) Credo for a Nation. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Grassby, A.J. (1983) The Spanish in Australia. Melbourne: AE Press. Hage, G. (1998) White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society. Annandale: Pluto Press. Hanson, P. (1997) The Truth. Ipswich: Pauline Hanson Editor. Hill, J.H. (2001) 'The Racializing Function of Language Panics', in R. Dueñas González and I. Melis (eds) Language Ideologies. Critical Perspectives on the Offical English Movement. Volume 2: History, Theory and Policy, pp. 245-67. Mahaw, NJ: National Council of Teachers of English.


RIVA KASTORYANO

Contested Citizenship: False Claims and 'Double Dutch'

A reply

PAUL STATHAM

University of Bristol, UK

Having been central to the research programme that culminated in this publication for more than a decade, I think I have pretty much heard every objection to approach and method that it's been possible to hear. Indeed, responding to criticisms contributed to refining and developing our perspective, which is how the academy ought to work. Other reviews for Contested Citizenship engage in a way that critically unpacks the book's contributions and arguments, and offer alternative viewpoints and critical commentary with regard to key issues. 1 By contrast, the reviews of Engelen and Kastoryano, are strewn with factual errors and misrepresentations. Disappointingly, our book simply serves as a vehicle for them to assert their own opinions on pet topics. It would be tiresome to go through systematically and correct the factual mistakes and misrepresentations of our study. An edited highlights includes: Engelen saying that we find more cultural group rights demands in the Netherlands and the UK than France, whereas the whole point of Chapter 4 is the reverse, that they are equally (and unexpectedly for institutional channelling approaches including our own past research) present also in France. Kastoryano fails to notice that our two-by-two diagram (p. 10) for political space presents four options, not three (and fails to label them correctly), she claims that we say that the UK approach encourages identification with 'homeland politics' (evidence shows emphatically the reverse!), and that we don't mention the French Council for Muslim Worship (see discussion pp. 65 and 156).

Obviously, we have two unhappy reviewers. Kastoryano considers her work 'interestingly ignored' by us. In the face of little evidence for the postnational argument, she simply tells us that it exists in supranational norms that shape people's actions at all levels, a conveniently unproven/nonprovable thesis. On method, it needs restating that claims-making analysis does not attempt to gather the whole universe of actors' political claims; only those that become sufficiently controversial to cross the threshold of significance to be reported by the media and appear in the public domain. This excludes claims-making acts invisible in the public sphere (e.g. insider lobbying) and those made in partial public spheres (e.g. parents' claims directed at school boards). So our data is on publicly visible 'contentious politics'. That's how we use it when interpreting immigration and ethnic relations politics. Incidentally, our data actually capture many cases of the earlier waves of riots by youths from the banlieues, which Kastoryano claims a contents analysis of the media is too limited to catch.

More brutally, and in a surprisingly personalized tone, Engelen claims that we are researchers lacking in integrity who spent a decade researching five countries with the purpose of trashing Dutch multiculturalism. For him, our work 'raises the suspicion of being prejudiced against a certain outlook, in this case multiculturalism à la Dutch'. Our research collaboration over the last decade has been comparativist, explicitly focussed on five countries, and based on original data. The study applies systematic comparison with the aim of adding to knowledge on the basis of original evidence rather than simply trotting out 'normative stories' about each country. One can always interpret evidence differently, or alternatively bring new evidence to the table that would disprove our findings, or even attempt to advance theory. That would potentially add to debate. How then to explain Engelen's vehement response, to a study whose findings, naturally relativized by the comparative approach, are in fact relatively 'middle of the road'?

Well, the cheerleaders of Dutch multiculturalism, formerly well politically networked and government-funded to provide the good news, have been hard hit by the cataclysmic transformation of Dutch politics and the swift sharp shift to the right. My collaborator Ruud Koopmans has been prominent in Dutch public debate, and saying things that from the perspective of a British or a French observer seem perfectly mainstream, has faced the wrath of proponents of Dutch multiculturalism. Our book has therefore been treated entirely differently in the Netherlands than elsewhere, both in academic and newspaper reviews. What these detractors fail to appreciate is that if no space is made available for a critique of multiculturalism, on the basis of its measurable achievements, the middle ground disappears. One is left with polarized polemics and few arguments or substantive findings that can feed into practical policy solutions which address the life opportunities of migrants. Contested Citizenship is not about the Netherlands, but about five countries, trying to deal in different ways with similar dilemmas, with varying degrees of success and failure.

One of the benefits of an empirically informed approach is that it is able to put issues in context. Our research on claims making shows importantly that demands for cultural group rights and recognition account for roughly a fifth of migrant's claim making in Britain, France, and the Netherlands, and a 20th in Germany and Switzerland. Also the issue of group demands accounts for between only 1.2 and 7.7 percent of all claims in migration and ethnic relations across the countries. Thus, from the viewpoints of both migrants and their societies of settlement, immigration and ethnic relations politics is about much more than group rights and multiculturalism. Such evidence questions the validity of the Huntingtonian doomsday scenario of societies pulling apart at the cultural seams, or its multiculturalist counterpart about the centrality of group-identity claim making. Instead, it empirically demonstrates that the assumed 'culture clashes', albeit important, are only part of, not the whole of the story for western Europe at least during our time period. In addition, we find that group demands are almost exclusively by Muslims, which we explain by referring to the public nature of that religion and its resilience as a form of identification -again a finding drawn from comparative analysis. Our conclusion is that the position of Islam is a distinct case within liberal democracies, and our findings show that groups with Muslim identities are the key source of group demands in our countries. In this sense, to the limited extent that it exists, the challenge of group rights is the challenge of Islam for our countries. This is not an insurmountable challenge, however. We even point to the historical precedents of the Jews and the Irish in Britain, as 'culturally different' groups facing similar situations who over time achieved political accommodation.

After briefly discussing substance, it is necessary to address Engelen's claims that we are guilty of a 'causal fallacy' by drawing socioeconomic conclusions from data on political claim making. He states: '[f]or the unwarranted claim is that Dutch multicultural policies are to blame for the difficult incorporation of Islamic immigrants, implying that multiculturalism has caused worse school performances of immigrant kids and higher immigrant unemployment'. We do not make this claim. Our stance is more nuanced, measured, middle of the road and relativized by pursuing five countries. Virtually all of the pages cited as evidence by Engelen are actually discussions about our own data and not external socioeconomic data. We are explicit about the limits of our approach, and what can be drawn from our data. Our research in this book is about claims-making and draws only on secondary findings and to a limited degree with regard to socioeconomic data. We even conclude that: an important direction for future research would be to apply the kind of theoretical framework that we have developed in this book to cross-national analyses of socioeconomic indicators on the positions of migrants in systems of education, employment, housing and welfare. (p. 252) So we do not already claim to have done this, nor is it the primary basis of this study.

A real 'fallacy' is Engelen's bizarre apologism in blaming societal discrimination for Mohammed B's murder of Theo van Gogh. Is it really an adequate explanation that an individual decides to intentionally slit another's throat for the reasons Engelen gives? In his words:

One can only imagine what the mixture of frustration born out of bureaucratic obstruction, post-9/11 religious and ethnic polarization, and increasing socioeconomic isolation -Mohammed B. was unemployed and received social security benefits -must have been like that was behind the gradual radicalization of Mohammed B. and his friends.

Here we witness what happens with a method (?!) of taking one notorious case, interpreting it in a one-sided way, and raising it by assertion to a general explanation. This isn't slippage, it's rewriting history. In reply: First, if post-9/11 is to blame, then his radicalization was not very 'gradual'. Second, how can one explain why his response took on the form of a religious radicalization rather than joining groups that, for example, campaign for social justice and equality or antidiscrimination? And, if societal discrimination is really an adequate general explanation, then why do not all people facing such conditions rise up and slit perceived opponents' throats? He asks what would our study make of the Mohammed B. case? Well, it would appear as what it is: a highly exceptional and unusually violent act in a country that is usually more pacified and less violent than others.

Comparison militates against the tendency for intellectual, topical and natural parochialism and can thereby feed back insight into understanding. Our study concludes that there is no 'golden bullet' policy approach nor a story with a 'happy end' in any of our countries.

Finally, I would argue that multiculturalism has substantially more to offer intellectually, when it stands for more than a rhetorical dogma or 'sacred cow'.

Notes

1 If anyone wishes to read reviews that assess our book as a five country crossnational empirically based study, locating it critically within the literature, and pulling out policy-relevant points, I would suggest those by John Torpey in

(

  eds) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach. London: Routledge. Parekh, B. (2006) 'Europe, Liberalism and the "Muslim Question"', in Modood, T., A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach. Routledge. Tilly, C. (1993) 'Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834', Social Sciences History 17(2).

  is Research Director of the CNRS/CERI (Center for International Studies and Research). Address: CNRS/CERI, 56 rue Jacob, 75006 Paris, France. [email: kastoryano@ceri-sciences-po.org]

143 Contemporary Sociology (2006) or Philippe Couton in the Canadian Journal of Sociology Online (2006).


Anthony Smith

Jon E Fox

Cynthia Miller-Idriss

The 'here and now' of everyday nationhood

to our debate article, 'Everyday nationhood', reminds us of what inspired us

to us here by the editors of Ethnicities, we aim to respond to what we see to be his two most central criticisms. First, Smith argues that our work is ahistorical. Second, he faults our research agenda for neglecting the question of the relationship between elite and non-elite versions of nationalism. We take each of these criticisms in turn.

Professor Smith accuses us of playing fast and loose with history in our account of everyday nationhood. Coming from an historian of Smith's stature, this is a difficult criticism to ignore. Our response comes in two parts. First, we acknowledge that the primary focus of our research agenda is not historical. We are, as Smith characterizes us, interested in the 'here and now' of nationhood: the everyday contexts in which nationhood becomes (or is made) meaningful for (or by) ordinary people. In a sense, this is a reflection of the methodological assumptions we bring to the study of everyday nationhood: as both sociologists and ethnographers, we have a professional interest in the 'here and now'. Smith is critical of this narrow focus and elaborates an approach that is more sensitive to the historical origins and development of the nation. We do not view these approaches as incompatible but rather as guided by different concerns. Our primary focus is not on Smith's moment of ethnogenesis (for which his work on the topic remains definitive); rather, we concentrate on the ways in which ethnonational idioms -once in circulation -are enacted and invoked by ordinary people in the routine contexts of their everyday lives. Indeed, we are indebted to scholars such as Smith for demonstrating the precise ways in which such idioms have entered circulation. But the availability of such idioms over the longue durée does not in itself explain when, where or how those idioms actually get manipulated by their end users: ordinary people in the 'here and now' of everyday life. This is what our research agenda seeks to explain.

Second, we challenge Smith's point that history is conspicuously missing from our account -at least on a narrow reading of history. Just because we do not elaborate an exclusively historical approach to the study of everyday nationhood does not make our work ahistorical. Indeed, the more general temporal dimensions of nationhood referred to by Smith constitute a cornerstone of our research agenda. To be sure, our 'when' question is not explicitly measured in centuries (though see the first half of [START_REF] Fox | Consuming the Nation: Holidays, Sports, and the Production of Collective Belonging[END_REF] book with [START_REF] Brubaker | Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town[END_REF] on the history of east central Europe). But neither does it necessarily exclude such a timeframe. Rather, we propose a context-sensitive approach to the study of nationhood where context is understood in multiple temporal and spatial dimensions. Such an approach neither rejects nor insists upon an exploration of the meanings of the nation accumulated over the centuries. We acknowledge that today's quotidian instantiations of nationhood are encrusted with multiple layers of meaning accumulated through the years. But we don't simply assume the contemporary salience of these historical meanings; rather, we try to specify them empirically. Miller-Idriss's research on nationhood and citizenship in Germany (forthcoming) searches not for the origins of Germanness in past millennia, but for its more contemporary reworkings in recent generations. Indeed, her aim is to explain how German nationhood and citizenship are the collaborative accomplishment of successive generations of ordinary Germans. In the study of everyday nationhood, time has many dimensions. We suggest a variable salience to nationhood. We should consider not just its historical developmental dimensions, but also its micro-interactional moments, its institutionally embedded and repetitive routines, and the fixed intervals and fleeting effervescences of holiday commemorations and sporting competitions, to name but a few. In each case, the multiple and overlapping temporal contexts of nationhood's everyday salience should be empirically specified rather than surmised from their historically rooted genealogies. 1 Professor Smith's second main criticism is that our research agenda fails to problematize the relationship between 'elite' and 'non-elite' understandings and uses of nationhood. To this charge we plead guilty. Our goal in the present article has been more modest: to draw attention to the paucity of research in the field of nationalism on the non-elite side of the equation. Exploring the complex relationship between elites and non-elites (to the extent discrete categories of each can be identified and maintained in the first place) is a more ambitious undertaking than we recommend in the present study (although again see Miller-Idriss' work (forthcoming) on the ways in which teachers and students mutually constitute the meanings of nationhood in classrooms in Germany). We instead propose, following Hobsbawm, that more (and more serious) attention be paid to the non-elite side of the equation (Hobsbawm, 1991: 10). 2 Only when this bias is corrected can we hope to gain a greater appreciation of the relationship between elites and non-elites.

Ultimately what distinguishes Smith's approach from our own is that each is guided by different research questions. Professor Smith wants to know how nations were forged by both elites and non-elites. Indeed, his elaboration of this approach in his reply is not just a call to scholarly arms; it is simultaneously a description of much of the excellent work that he and his like-minded colleagues have already undertaken. Our interest, in contrast, is in examining how nations, once forged, are evoked in everyday life by ordinary people. This does not entail a rejection of the claims of these more historical approaches. Rather, we wish to build on these findings while simultaneously refocusing attention on the everyday meaning and salience of the nation in the world today. This is a question that Smith neither answers nor asks. But the historical emergence and development of the nation does not in itself explain its everyday invocations in the world today. We hope that we have been able to develop a research agenda that sheds some light on this latter and no-less important question.

DEBATE

Notes

1 We respond similarly to Smith's contention that our state-centric definition of nationalism is inherently (if unintentionally) ethnocentric. We concede that our definition does somewhat narrowly link the nation to the state (and thereby carry a Eurocentric bias). But our definition of nationhood in everyday life does not. Indeed, we submit that it is Smith who assumes such a linkage between the political and the national in the realm of the everyday. For us, this is again an empirical question: how, if at all, ethnicity and nationhood are politically inflected in everyday talk and interaction. Such questions must be asked not only in the west, but in the east, north, and south as well. 2 Smith, too, is sympathetic to increased attention to the role of non-elites. But his primary interest in the public performance of national rituals still privileges this preferred domain of elites. While national commemorations are indeed important venues for non-elite participation (see [START_REF] Fox | Consuming the Nation: Holidays, Sports, and the Production of Collective Belonging[END_REF], they are not the only such venues. The danger of focusing immediately on the linkages between elites and non-elites is that such investigations often take elite sites of nationalism as their starting point. We, in contrast, propose beginning our investigation of nationhood 'from below' before looking for the linkages with elite brands of nationalism.