The past few years have generated a solid body of evidence showing that privatization of public services has led to increased poverty in many developing countries. This includes not only income poverty, as families struggle to meet the increased service charges associated with privatization, but also other deprivations. Even when poor families do manage to meet the higher charges of privatized public services, the substitution effects on the household economy can lead to reductions in expenditure on other essentials such as food and education. At a time when the international community is focusing on progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the poverty implications of public service privatization give serious cause for concern.

Yet even with this growing evidence of the damage caused by increased involvement of the private sector in delivery of public services, developing country governments still come under intense pressure to commit services such as health care, water and electricity to privatization. Often this is a condition of receiving development assistance, loans or debt relief from international financial institutions and donor governments. Much recent attention has focused on the role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in this regard, and several non-governmental organization (NGO) reports have exposed the continued use of conditionality in promoting privatization in the South by international financial institutions (IFIs).

War on Want's new research publication Profiting from Poverty: Privatisation Consultants, DFID and Public Services (http://www.waronwant.org/profiting) examines the UK government's role in promoting privatization in developing countries. Despite its avowed commitment to poverty reduction and realization of the MDGs, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has invested heavily in this programme, creating a host of new bodies and financing mechanisms to advance the cause of privatization across the developing world. Initiatives such as the Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund, the Private Infrastructure Donors Group and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility have established the UK government as a champion of privatization in the developing world.

In addition, DFID channels large sums of the UK aid budget every year to privatization consultants such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and Deloitte Touche in order to drive forward the privatization of public services in developing countries. DFID's commitment to this privatization programme has brought the Labour government into startling new alliances. The consultancy arm of the Adam Smith Institute -the right-wing think-tank behind the Conservative government's privatization of Britain's public services in the 1980s -has received over £34m from the UK aid budget in the past 6 years. Note: a This is a small selection of DFID procurement contracts; full monthly lists are available via the DFID website, at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/contractslet.asp

Table 1 provides a selection of some of the most recent contracts awarded by DFID to privatization consultancies in the context of public sector reform.

The UK government also actively promotes British expertise in the field of privatization in order to win overseas contracts for its own companies. This includes a team within the government's export promotion arm UK Trade & Investment dedicated to advising British companies on how to win contracts from the UK's own aid budget, through what the government terms 'aidfunded business'. The benefits of such business to private sector consultants are clear, yet it is far from clear that these companies are a suitable choice to provide pro-poor reform solutions in the developing world.

Given the poverty implications, DFID's commitment to privatization of public services is incompatible with its stated commitment to poverty reduction and realization of the MDGs. On the basis of the concerns raised in its new report, War on Want has called on DFID to establish an independent commission to take evidence on the impact of public services privatization in developing countries. We believe that DFID should also refrain from awarding any new public service reform contracts to privatization consultants until the commission has reported its findings.

We are not alone in this conviction. The Make Poverty History coalition which has been formed to campaign against poverty 2005 has also stipulated that aid should 'no longer be conditional on recipients promising economic change like privatizing or deregulating their services, cutting health and education spending, or opening up their markets'. Even potential beneficiaries such as Thames Water have spoken out publicly against the use of aid conditionality to impose privatization on developing country governments.

The good news is that Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, has responded to NGO criticism of DFID's record with a review of UK aid conditionality. The UK government's new policy, unveiled in March 2005, sees an important first step away from the promotion of privatisation, as UK aid will no longer be made conditional upon policy choices such as privatisation and trade liberalisation. In addition, the World Bank has launched a review of its conditionality policy, on which it will report in autumn 2005. The UK government should also take a lead in securing a pro-poor outcome to that review.

Please address correspondence to: John Hilary, Director, Campaigns & Policy, War on Want, 37-39 Great Guildford Street, London SE1 0ES, UK.

[email: jhilary@waronwant.org]

J

  O H N H I L A RY DFID, UK and Public Services Privatization: Time for Change (john hilary is Director of Campaigns and Policy, War on Want, UK)


I N G E K A U L

Private Provision and Global Public Goods: Do the Two Go Together?

(inge kaul is Director, Office of Development Studies, United Nations Development Programme, New York, USA)

Can and should global public goods sometimes be privately provided? The analysis in this forum contribution suggests yes. To explain why, the contribution will discuss three points: (1) the definition of public goods; (2) how globalization and public goods are linked; and, (3) how private provision can help enhance the provision of global public goods.

DEFINING PUBLIC GOODS Economic theory defines goods as 'public' when they are available for all to consume. Goods that meet this criterion in a full or pure form have two properties: (1) They are nonrival in consumption, meaning that their enjoyment by one actor does not reduce their utility for other actors; and (2) they are non-exclusive, meaning that they do not discriminate between potential consumers. Goods (or services) that posses only one of the two criteria are called impure public goods.

In other words, a good's consumption properties determine whether it is public or private. And private goods have the opposite properties of the public ones: they are rival in consumption and exclusive -only available for those who own them.

Because they can usually be parceled out and made exclusive, private goods (such as bread, shoes, cars, or television sets) lend themselves to being provided through the market. Public goods, however, pose special provision problems -precisely because of their publicness in consumption.

Think, for example, of law and order. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any one person to produce law and order unilaterally. In most instances, a collective effort will be required: all have to follow the law so that a community's life can be orderly, safe and tranquil. Most public goods are also public in provision, meaning that they require collective action in order to exist.

However, it is important to underline that only in very few cases is 'privateness' or 'publicness' of consumption an innate property of a good. Rather, it is a matter of policy choice.

GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC GOODS Some public goods can be consumed worldwide. An example is the atmosphere. It has been used as a sink for depositing greenhouse gas emissions by all countries, with some, no doubt, having made more use of it than others. The atmosphere and other natural commons thus constitute global public goods. However, they are impure-public: they are rival in consumption; and therefore, we are facing today multiple challenges of environmental deterioration and systemic risks, like that of global climate change.

Besides the natural global commons, there are two other main types of global public goods. As national borders have become more open and economic transborder activity increased, the national public domains of countries have become interlocked. As a result, public 'goods' or 'bads' existing anywhere can more easily spill across borders. Just think of how easily today a disease such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) can spread, or for that matter, a computer virus. As a result, public goods such as 'public health' or 'computer safety' have become globalized -public in consumption and calling for international cooperation to ensure their adequate provision.

Other so far essentially national public goods have also undergone globalization. Among them financial codes and standards but also human rights, including labor standards. They are being harmonized in terms of form, content and level of provision to create such global public goods as 'efficient world markets' or 'universal realization of basic human rights'. And these examples of globalizing public goods underlines once again the point stressed earlier -the fact that publicness is a matter of choice.

Global public goods are in a way public in two ways: first, they are public as opposed to private; and second, they are global as opposed to national. From a global perspective, being national means being particular and limited, exclusive.

PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS

The origins of the current public goods theory lie in the 1950s-1960s, when in many countries the state had a strong economic role, partly because markets were not as developed as they are today and partly because income was not as high as it is in many countries and population groups today. Since the mid-1970s there has been a growing trend towards privatization and economic liberalization, often significantly affecting the provision of public goods. What had to be learned at high cost in many instances is the importance of distinguishing between the consumption and the provision properties of goods. Public goods in the sense we have been discussing them might be better provided privately albeit within the framework of collective responsibility for their provision.

For example, the public good 'communicable disease control' requires many private-good inputs, e.g. vaccines, needles, or doctors and nurses, who can be hired in the labor market. Hence, it is possible for states to contract out the provision of these inputs. However, the state retains a critical role: ensuring that health services remain public in consumption and that the desired public good, in this case communicable disease control, is adequately provided. To this end, the state may have to take regulatory action, provide subsidies, or if necessary, provide some services directly.

Or, where scarcities arise, states are now often creating new property rights and helping to create new markets for managing resource use, e.g. that of roads, rivers, land and air.

Very similar approaches are also being used more and more to promote an adequate provision of global public goods. For example, the Kyoto Protocol and the national pollution allowances it establishes create the precondition for developing international markets for the trading of pollution permits or other similar products that could help in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Countries are also now providing more and more frequently joint, pooled incentives to encourage, for example, private pharmaceutical companies to undertake needed R & D to control such global diseases as HIV/AIDS. Public-private partnering in public good provision is an increasingly common practice, nationally and internationally.

However, in the case of global public goods there exists a second provision challenge worth highlighting in the present context. Recall that we noted before that global public goods are public in a twofold sense -as opposed to private and as opposed to national. And at the international level, states often behave like private actors nationally: they may seek to free-ride -let others provide a global public good and then enjoy it free of charge. For example, they may over-borrow, and when a crisis occurs, let others bear the costs of any cross-border effects. From a global viewpoint, e.g. that of 'global financial stability' such 'beggar-thy-neighbor' policies are, of course, undesirable. And in these and other instances (the universalization of human rights is one of them) an enhanced provision of global public goods clearly requires less privateness behind national borders.

In other instances, states may want to curb such privateness (i.e. national shortfalls or other differences) but not have all the means to do so, money or institutional and human capacity. In such cases, improving the overall provision of global public goods for all might require supporting the endeavors of the 'weakest link' in the provision chain.

But who creates the incentives for individual states to be either willing or able to overcome privateness? Sometimes, intergovernmental agreements play this role. Yet more and more, it is global business and global civil society who urge states to be less particularistic and more in line with universal norms or to help other states, e.g. via development aid, to be able to do so. CONCLUSION Thus, global public goods and private provision can, and sometimes even, must go hand in hand. However, under conditions of globalization and increasingly porous national borders we must rethink the notions of 'public' and 'private'. Individual firms and households pursue self-interests; and states can provide incentives for them to jump over their hurdles of self-interest and contribute more to the provision of global public goods. But individual states also often act in narrow quasi private self-interest. And then it is often the role of global business and civil society to urge nation states to think more global and make their contribution to global public goods (see Kaul et al., 2003).

disclaimer

  The author is Director, Office of Development Studies, United Nations Development Programme, New York. The views expressed here are hers and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization with which she is affiliated. reference Kaul, I., Conceicao, P., Le Goulven, K. and Mendoza, R.U. (2003) Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press. Please address correspondence to: Inge Kaul, UNDP United Nations Development Programme, Office of Development Studies, 336 East 45th Street, Uganda House, Suite 401, New York NY 10017. [email: inge.kaul@undpr.org]

Global Social Policy 5(2)


Chan Chee Khoon

Book Review: Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum

numerous people-centred initiatives from across the developing world, one fails to appreciate the lessons activists in developing countries can learn from community control and collective action based on the experience of Canada.

Some missing gaps which make this an incomplete collection deal with the lack of a critical analysis of the foremost global public health institution, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the collection would have benefited from such an evaluation. Since this book is on global public health, some overall discussion on WTO and TRIPs and how these relate to health policy would also have been useful. Moreover, except in some chapters, there is almost no discussion on multinational pharmaceuticals, NGOs, donors or International Nongovernmental Organisations (INGOs), all increasingly key players in defining any agenda for global public health. Despite some of the weaknesses identified, this is a varied and interesting collection which should interest social scientists, policy makers and practitioners of public health.

S. Akbar Zaidi Independent Researcher, Pakistan

william fisher and thomas ponniah (eds), Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum. London: Zed Books, 2003. 384 pp. ISBN: 1-84277-328-3;US$19.95 (pbk).

In his brief write-up on the 5th World Social Forum (WSF; Porto Alegre, 26-31 January 2005) Roger [START_REF] Burbach | Chavez and Lula World Social Forum: The Tale of Two Presidents[END_REF] remarked on the contrasting situations of Presidents Lula (Brazil) and Chavez (Venezuela), the two Heads of State who were in attendance.

Lula, elected President of Brazil in late 2002, inherited a US$230bn foreign debt along with all the policy dictates, contingencies, and institutional constraints of the presidency of an embedded dependent capitalist formation. These strictures, rather than bad faith, would have curtailed any president's room for manoeuver. More pertinent is the extent to which Lula had exploited even that limited leeway to alter the balance of forces within Brazil, in the face of unrelenting pressure from foreign capital and local elites, to deliver on his promises of agrarian reform and the elimination of hunger and malnutrition.

Chavez on the other hand, reinstated by a popular uprising and loyalist detachments after a US-backed coup by Venezuela's privileged elites in 2002, moved swiftly to capitalize on the momentum of the restoration and to consolidate his populist base. As part of a conscious strategy to entrench the mobilization and vigilance of mass constituencies, more than US$4bn from Venezuela's oil revenues have been deployed in 'public health and medical programs, educational training for workers, agrarian reform, literacy programs, low income housing, and many other programs' to deliver tangible benefits to Venezuela's impoverished and marginalized communities.

In their edited selection of conference and workshop syntheses, position papers, analytical insights and campaign experiences, and manifestoes and demands from the 2nd WSF (January 2002, Porto Alegre), William Fisher and Thomas Ponniah highlighted a similar tension between cautious pragmatic reformism, and more radical challenges to the status quo and the powers that sustained it.

This dichotomy was much in evidence too at the 5th WSF, which I attended as part of the People's Health Movement (PHM) delegation to Porto Alegre. But this dichotomy may also be recognized as a complementary two-pronged strategy, which yields incremental (reformist) concessions only when radical challenges become sufficiently plausible and therefore threatening to the status quo.

A century earlier, Rosa Luxemburg had written in 1900 that 'work for reform does not contain its own force, independent from revolution. During every historic period, work for reforms is carried on only in the direction given to it by the impetus of the last revolution, and continues as long as the impulsion from the last revolution continues to make itself felt' (cited in Shaoul, 2003: 157).

We can expect that such themes and debates (reformism vs. radicalism, engagement vs. agitation) will recur in future WSFs, sometimes with acrimony, sometimes with more understanding of their interlinked character.

Some themes from Fisher and Ponniah's selection, however, may have been overtaken by developments since the 2nd WSF. Already at Mumbai (WSF4) and perhaps earlier, where health activists sought to reclaim the radical roots of the Alma Ata primary health care (PHC) vision, concerns had moved beyond the earlier focus on access to essential medicines, undoubtedly an urgent matter of continuing worldwide relevance, to a more comprehensive perspective on the social ecology of health and disease. 1 This includes of course the social and political determinants of health, and the coping responses of human societies towards illness and infirmity, within a paradigm which seeks to capture the dynamic, interactive complexity, and the interpenetrating unity of the social, natural and created environments which embed the health and disease experience of individuals and populations [START_REF] Levins | The Dialectical Biologist[END_REF].

The chapter by Oxfam on 'Knowledge, Copyright and Patents', however, gives some insight into the tactical thinking behind the choice of access to essential medicines as a key campaigning issue of global importance.

In a succinct and thoughtful contribution, Oxfam delineates the underlying issues thus:

Will knowledge be monopolized by corporate interests for private profit, and shaped by the markets of rich consumers, or will it be kept within the public domain, and used to help end poverty, hunger and disease? The World Trade Organisation's TRIPs agreement, introduced in 1995 after intense corporate lobbying is at the center of this controversy. It is the main international treaty determining rights over intellectual property (IP), which includes patents, copyrights, and trademarks.

Moving on to campaign strategies, Oxfam introduces the notion of 'wedge issues': a key question is whether it is more effective to campaign for broad reform/ abolition of TRIPs, or to focus on achieving change in specific areas, such as patenting of medicines, patenting of plant genetic resources, or patenting of life forms. Oxfam tends to focus its campaigning on 'wedge' issues. A wedge issue provides a concrete illustration of a problem caused by global policies in a form that can be easily understood by the broader public. The idea is that once people understand the grassroots human impact of particular policies, they will be encouraged to campaign for broader policy change. So for example, the problem of patents and access to medicines is a wedge issue for the reform of TRIPs. The fact that no poor country could afford expensive patented HIV/AIDS medicines provided a particularly dramatic illustration of the problem.

As an aside, I might add that as a Malaysian participant in Brazil reflecting on intellectual property issues, I was aware that British colonial Malaya was arguably an early beneficiary of biopiracy (the benefits were quite unevenly distributed of course), when Henry Wickham, an English adventurer smuggled 70,000 rubber seeds (Hevea brasiliensis) from the Manaus region of Brazil in 1876 and delivered them to the Kew Gardens in London where some 3000 seedlings were germinated.

Shipments were dispatched to Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and to Singapore where the director of the Singapore Botanical Gardens, Henry Ridley, succeeded in propagating and disseminating them to the receptive climate and soils of the Malayan peninsula, thereby transforming the economic botany and agricultural landscape of the British colony.

Was this biopiracy (along with the ubiquitous and profitable Malaysian oil palms Elaeis guineensis which were similarly translocated from West Africa to Sumatra and Malaya in the early 1900s), or was this more in the tradition of geographical flows and exchanges of genetic resources and planting materials ever since the invention of agriculture 11,000 years ago? Some four or five years ago, Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI; now the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration [ETC]) together with their non-governmental organization (NGO) allies had considered launching an international campaign for the formal declaration of a Global Genetic Commons. Shortly after, Sir John Sulston, the 2002 Nobel laureate in medicine or physiology who led the UK's human genome sequencing effort, promoted a very similar idea, that the human genome should be declared as the common heritage of humanity, and that information on genomic (nucleotide) sequences should be declared off limits to patents and intellectual property claims. Let's be provocative, and consider if you will that genomics, proteonomics, and transcriptonomics might be thought of as the 'mining' of genetic (and physiologically useful) information from the human genome. Gene hunters, in search of commercially valuable alleles from inbred, indigenous populations might be analogous to a technologically sophisticated mining enterprise, declaring in effect: 'We have a sophisticated technology which can mine this exotic mineral found within your national borders. Insofar as you cannot extract it yourself, you deserve no part of the benefits from our successful exploitation of this mineral, which should be considered a "commons resource" in the "global public domain".' Not surprisingly, these have been contentious issues even within international civil society, and I gathered from Jim Thomas and Silvia Ribeiro, ETC activists at WSF5, that the genetic commons campaign has been shelved indefinitely.

Global Social Policy 5(3)


B O B D E A C O N

From 'Safety Nets' Back to 'Universal Social Provision' Is the Global Tide Turning?

Keywords: global social policy, international organizations, safety nets, universalism

This short article draws upon a number of recent reports from several international organizations to argue the case that, at least at the level of discourse, the tide has turned from the period in the 1990s when a targeted and means tested safety net future for welfare policy especially in the context of development was being constructed. Now even within the World Bank there is some evidence that the case for a universal approach to social welfare provision is again being recognized. This shift suggests that one locus of the struggle for the future of national and international social policy continues to be the international epistemic community of social policy analysts working for and advising international agencies.

Global Social Policy

Ideas articulated by epistemic communities within and around international organizations about what constitutes desirable national and international social policy are every bit as important in influencing national and international social policy as the perceived constraints of a deregulated global economy. Globalization and social policies appropriate to it at the national and international level are not so much determined economically but shaped politically. States make globalization every bit as much as globalization makes states [START_REF] Yeates | Globalization and Social Policy[END_REF]. Boas and McNeill (2004) have recently discussed the relationship between institutional power and the power of ideas in social development and argue that 'powerful states (notably the USA), powerful organizations (such as the IMF) and even, perhaps, powerful disciplines (economics) exercise their power by "framing"; [the terms of the policy debate] which serves to limit the power of potentially radical ideas to achieve change' (Boas and McNeill, 2004: 1. Within a matrix of state and global institutional power ideas have a part to play in both sustaining those relations of power and in challenging them even if radical or socially progressive ideas have had a hard time of it in the last decades.

In terms of theoretical reference points for this short article we need then to include the work of Haas (1992) on epistemic communities. Focusing on national states he concluded that 'epistemic communities [networks of knowledge based experts] play a part in . . . helping states identify their interests, forming the issues for debate, proposing specific policies, identifying points for negotiation' (Haas, 1992). The same can be said about international epistemic communities, their associated think tanks and invisible colleges and the shaping of an international social policy agenda [START_REF] Stone | Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the "Transnationalization" of Policy[END_REF]. That is not to say that trans-national social classes and the associated international class struggle that is identified within this framework by [START_REF] Sklair | The Trans-National Capitalist Class[END_REF] and others play no part in policy formation. If national welfare state formation was in part the outcome of class and gender and ethnic struggle [START_REF] Williams | Social Policy: A Critical Introduction[END_REF][START_REF] Williams | Race/Ethnicity, Gender and Class in Welfare States: A Framework for Comparative Analysis[END_REF] and the resultant formation of cross-class (and gender and ethnic) alliances so will be any trans-national social policy. Epistemic communities operate within this power contest matrix. The case study in this article illustrates the contest of ideas within the epistemic communities of economic and social policy scholars operating at a global level. It is based upon an extract from a longer article dealing with the politics of global social policy reform (Deacon, 2004). This article leads to the conclusion that the story told by Boas and McNeill needs to be revised. Their argument that the USA through the agency of multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) and with the language of economics shapes the international social policy debate needs to be revised and written in a more nuanced way to reflect the contending influence of other states using other agencies and other discourses.

The Fall and Rise of the Concept of Universalism in Global Discourse about National Social Policy

Both Peter [START_REF] Townsend | From Universalism to Safety Nets: The Rise and Fall of Keynesian Influence on Social Development[END_REF] and Judith [START_REF] Tendler | Why Social Policy is Condemned to a Residual Category of Safety Nets and What to Do About It[END_REF] have drawn attention recently to the domination of the concept of safety nets within global social policy discourse concerning desirable national social policies at the end of the last century. Townsend charts the post-Second World War rise of the Keynesian influence on social development policy and its subsequent demise and replacement by an era of the residualization of social policy. He goes on to argue the case for a reconsideration of a universal approach to social welfare development and for reforms in the global governance architecture that might bring this about. Judith Tendler asks why social policy has been condemned to a residual category of safety nets and suggests this had to do among other reasons with the projectization of international aid and the large role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this activity. She suggests how the tide might be turned. These observations reinforce earlier concerns of my colleagues and I (Deacon et al., 1997) when we researched the impact of international organizations on the making of post-communist social policy. Indeed only recently I restated the case that globalization represented a threat to equitable social welfare provision in the context of development (Deacon, 2003). In this section I want to comment briefly upon why the idea of social policy geared to securing greater equity through processes of redistribution and in particular universal social provision got so lost in the context of the global discourse about desirable social policy. I will then examine and demonstrate its reassertion within global discourse.

Four reasons might be offered for the decline of the idea. Globalization as we have suggested in terms of the form it took in the 1980s and 1990s was primarily a neoliberal political project born at the height of the transatlantic Thatcher-Regan alliance. This flavoured the anti-public provision discourse about social policy within countries and contributed to a challenge to the idea of the EU's social policy agenda. The collapse of the communist project coinciding as it did with the height of neoliberalism gave a further push to the rise of the myth of the marketplace. Most importantly the perceived negative social consequences of globalization generated a new concern for the poor. In the name of meeting the needs of the poorest of the poor the 'premature' or 'partial' welfare states of Latin America, South Asia and Africa (that the International Labour Organisation [ILO] had been so influential in building) were challenged as serving only the interests of a small privileged workforce and elite state employees. A new alliance was to be struck between the Bank and the poor (see Deacon et al., 1997;Graham, 1994). The analysis of the privileged and exclusionary nature of these provisions made by the Bank was accurate. However by destroying the public state services for this middle class in the name of the poor the politics of solidarity which requires the middle class to have a self-interest in public provision which they fund was made more difficult. The beneficiary index measures of the Bank showing how tertiary education spending and urban hospital provision benefited the elite contributed in no small measure to this development. The Bank's technical experts who were very able to measure who received public services were ill-informed about the political economy of welfare state building which requires cross-class alliances in defence of public expenditure. Once again American exceptionalism (in this case in terms of its residual welfare state) was sold as the desirable norm. Finally in the late 1980s and 1990s the self-confidence of defenders of the social democratic and other equitable approaches to social policy was temporarily lost. The critics of neoliberal globalization came to believe their worst-case prognosis.

Are there signs of a shift in the global discourse leading to a reassertion of the politics of social solidarity and universalism? I am not here concerned with the debate within developed welfare states. Here the evidence is clear that universalistic welfare states have been largely sustained despite globalization (e.g. Castles, 2004;[START_REF] Swank | Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States[END_REF]. There are a number of developments reflected in recent reports and publications from international organizations that suggest that the case is again being put for finding ways of implementing universal public provisioning as part of an equitable social policy in developing countries. Among them are: , 2004). 2. The rethinking presently being undertaken within the ILO concerning the sustainability of its traditional labourist approach to social protection.

In particular is to be noted the ILO Socio-Economic Security Programme is researching new forms of universalistic social protection such as categorical (by age) cash benefits or universal school attendance allowances or even basic income entitlements to complement the very limited coverage in the Global South of work based social security schemes. Good practices being revealed within this programme could inform developing country social policy making (ILO, 2004). 3. The report of the UN Secretary-General (E/CN.5/2001/2) on 'Enhancing Social Protection and Reducing Vulnerability in a Globalizing World' prepared for the February 2001 Commission for Social Development almost became an important milestone in articulating a progressive UN social policy. Among the positive features of the report were (a) the fact that it was the first comprehensive UN statement on social protection, (b) the thrust of its argument was that social protection measures serve both an equity-enhancing and an investment function and such measures need to be a high priority of governments and regions, (c) it argued that social protection 'should not [serve only] as a residual function of assuring the welfare of the poorest but as a foundation . . . for promoting social justice and social cohesion'. It has to be said however that discussion on even this paper became bogged down at the Commission and was never approved.

It remains a non-paper. While the EU were supportive the G77 wished to link it to issues of global financing and global governance arrangements [START_REF] Langmore | The UN Commission for Social Development, February 2001: An Opportunity for International Political Evolution[END_REF]. The north-south impasse on global social standards stemming from the labour standards and global social policy principles stand-offs bedevilled the Commission's work. 4. The more recent meeting of the Commission on Social Development (47th Session on 4-13 February 2004) seems to have managed to avoid this pitfall in terms of its discussion of the issue of Improving Public Sector Effectiveness. However, the Report of the Secretary General on this topic (E/CN.5/2004/5) did contain among its recommendations the sentiment that international cooperation should 'include the elaboration of norms and guidelines . . . on the respective roles and responsibilities of the public and private sector' (para. 59a) but such an idea did not find expression in the (advanced unedited version) of the agreed conclusions now published on the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) web-pages. These agreed conclusions rather stress 'that each government has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, and the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasised' (para. 7). On the more central question of the issue of universalism versus targeting and the balance of public and private provision the agreed conclusions are very much in favour of universalism and equity. 'The Commission emphasise the crucial role of the public sector in, inter alia, the provision of equitable, adequate and accessible social services for all so as to meet the needs of the entire population' (para. 1) and again in the context of assessing the choice between public and private provision the Commission notes that while services can be provided by private entities it also 'reaffirms that any reform of public service delivery should aim at promoting and attaining the goals of universal and equitable access to those services by all' (para. 12). A review of this report is to be found in [START_REF] Scholvinck | Improving Public Service Effectiveness: The Commission on Social Developments's Conclusions[END_REF]. 5. Perhaps it is within attempts to steer developing countries towards the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals that are after all focused on basic education and basic health and basic sanitation and water services that we should look to see if these would lead to targeted residualism rather than universalism. Certainly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development report (UNDP, 2003) which focuses on these goals balances in an interesting way its focus on basic services for the poor with a concern for equity. In general terms it firstly reasserts some of the lessons of high human development achieving countries. In high achievers such as Botswana, Kerala in India and Cuba 'Public finance was adequate and equitable. In high-achieving countries political commitment is reflected not just in allocations of public spending to health and education but also in their equity' (UNDP, 2003: 87).

Recognizing the concern of the Bank and others that none-the-less public spending on health and education can be 'captured' by the better off it strikes a balance between the need to maintain public expenditure for all social groups while also giving priority to the poor. In education it asserts the need to increase expenditure on primary education (to benefit the poor) but at the same time argues 'Still, additional resources are needed for higher education as well if countries are to build capacity to compete in the global economy -but not at the cost of primary education. Entire education budgets need to increase' (UNDP, 2003: 94). Within health policy the balancing of the concern with equity with a pro poor focus is handled by arguing for rationing and regulatory measures that ensure some health service workers are directed to work for the benefit of the poor. Thus for example countries could 'use service contracts to require medical personnel to spend a certain number of years in public service' (UNDP, 2003: 101). The report notes that in some regions for example Latin America there has been a massive push to private health provision because of pressures to liberalize combined with low public sector health budgets. Here it is concerned that 'Because managed care organizations attract healthier patients, sicker patients are being shifted to the public sector. This two-tier system undercuts the pooling of risks and undermines cross-subsidies between healthier and more vulnerable groups' (UNDP, 2003: 113). It will be important to track this issue of reaching the poor while maintaining equity through the work of the Millennium Project through which the UN hopes to meet the Development Goals. 6. While attempts to restore the case for an equitable approach to social policy may not be unsurprising coming from UN agencies a more important indicator as to whether the global ideological tide is shifting would be what the World Bank is saying. A Nordic evaluation of the 2000/2001 World Bank Development Report on Poverty concluded that (Braathen, 2000) although the Bank at least at the discursive level had shifted from its 1990 focus of social paternalism to a 2000 focus on social liberalism and even social corporatism within which the poor are to be given a voice, it still did not embrace in any significant way the social radicalism approach which would involve redistributive policies except perhaps in the sphere of land reform. The latest World Bank's (2004) World Development Report that is focused on making services work for poor people suggests that there might be some movement. There is a tension within the text and probably among the authors between those who stay with the line that much public spending by developing countries benefits the rich and is therefore to be refocused on the poor (e.g. World Bank, 2003: 4, Figure 2) and those who would appear now to have accepted and argue the point that 'cross class alliances' between the poor and non-poor are needed to pressure governments to 'strengthen public sector foundations for service delivery' (World Bank, 2003: 180, Figure 10.1). Most striking is the assertion that 'In most instances making services work for poor people means making services work for everybody -while ensuring poor people have access to those services. Required is a coalition that includes poor people and significant elements of the non-poor. There is unlikely to be progress without substantial "middle class buy-in" to proposed reforms' (World Bank, 2003: 60). This section of the report goes on to quote the words of Wilbur Cohen, US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s: 'Programmes for Poor People are Poor Programmes'. Remarkable! The report itself is extraordinarily complicated in its recommendations and prescriptions and concludes with a rejection of the one size fits all approach which the Bank used to be accused of when it tried to sell Chile to the world. Instead it adopts an eight sizes fits all model. Which model is to be applied depends on the capacity of government, its openness to influence by the poor, the degree of homogeneity of the country, etc. At least two of the models involve a strong emphasis on government being the major provider at either national or local level.

Progress in this direction in the Bank's World Development Report may in part be due to the fact that a lead author was a Finnish economist. Finland together with other Nordic countries has been undertaking a considerable amount of quiet influence by the placement of experts within the World Bank and some Regional Development Banks while also funding alternative UN research. Indeed at a seminar to evaluate interim progress with the large Nordic Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD) Desmond McNeill, Head of the Fund's Reference Group asserted that the fund had encouraged new ideas within the Bank and was influencing policy inside the Bank on social development and social protection. Whether this was impacting upon countries was another matter [START_REF] Mcneill | A Review of the Operations of the Fund: Aims and Achievements[END_REF].

It has to be said however that other World Bank reports have given prime emphasis to service privatization. In 2000 it published a report on its Private Sector Development Strategy where social services were highlighted as a focus for private development. Moreover the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Strategy Paper for 2002 highlights health and education as frontier areas for privatization [START_REF] Mehrotra | The MDGs: Targeting Basic Services for the Poor or Ensuring Universal Access?[END_REF].

My conclusion is that the intellectual tide is turning against the neoliberal social policy prescriptions arguing everywhere at a national level for targeted benefits only for the poor. The restoration of the case for good quality public services universally available with additional measures to ensure they are accessed by the poor is once again being made.

Conclusions

This case study suggests that what is to be observed is not so much a global hegemony whereby the USA via the IMF and the language of economics shapes alone the terms of the debate about social policy. What we have instead is a war of positions within which intellectuals in and around the international organizations are engaged in a contest of paradigms and ideologies sometimes informed by empirical research. How influential particular organizations become at a particular time in history is probably a reflection of international power relations, the differential financing of the contending international organizations and intellectual and organizational effort on the part of key policy entrepreneurs associated with them.

From my normative standpoint there is room for some cautious optimism. Perhaps the US Treasury does not have total grip anymore? Perhaps the next edition of Boas and McNeill's book will conclude that powerful states (notably the USA) contend with other powerful states (notably Europe, and, given the fact the tectonic plates of the global economy are shifting even China, Brazil and India), powerful organizations (such as the World Bank) contend with other powerful organizations (such as the ILO) and powerful disciplines (notably economics) contend with other disciplines (notably social and political science) to wage a war of positions as to how the terms of debate about globalization and global and national social policy should be framed. To the extent that this is the case the role of intellectuals and their ideas struggling in and against the international organizations will have been important but not decisive. The shift in influence of contending ideas will reflect a shift in the balance of power both between countries and within and across borders whereby global social movements from below will have had an impact upon national governments and international actors and the relative power of contending international ideas.

resumen Dejando las Redes de Seguridad para Volver a las Prestaciones Sociales Universales: ¿Está Cambiando la Corriente Global?

Este corto artículo recurre a una serie de reportes recientes escritos por varias organizaciones internacionales. El artículo presenta el argumento que, por lo menos a nivel del discurso, la corriente ha cambiado desde la época en los años 90 en que vimos la construcción de un sistema de redes de seguridad para la política de prestaciones sociales, especialmente en el contexto del desarrollo -un sistema que investigaba los ingresos de la población. Actualmente, hasta en el seno del Banco Mundial, hay pruebas de que reconozcamos de nuevo los argumentos a favor de un enfoque universal a la provisión de la asistencia social. Este cambio indica que un locus de la lucha por el futuro de la política social nacional e internacional sea todavía la comunidad epistémica internacional de analistas de la política social, que aconsejan y trabajan por los organismos internacionales.

  Copyright © 2005 1468-0181 vol. 5(1): 19-28; 050118 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, ca and New Delhi) DOI: 10.1177/1468018105050118 gsp Preamble

  biographical note B O B D E A C O N is Professor of International Social Policy at the University of Sheffield, UK. He is Editor of Global Social Policy and Director of the Globalism and Social Policy Programme (GASPP; http://www.gassp.org). He is writing a book on Global Social Policy and Governance. Please address correspondence to: Professor Bob Deacon, University of Sheffield, Department of Sociological Studies, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield S10 2TU, UK. [email: b.deacon@sheffield.ac.uk]

  1. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) research programme on Social Policy in a Development Context under the leadership of Thandika Mkandawire has the stated objective to 'move [thinking] away from social policy as a safety net . . . towards a conception of active social policy as a powerful instrument for development working in tandem with economic policy'. Research within this programme that draws attention to the early origins of universalistic Nordic welfare states should refute the argument that universalism is not incompatible with a lower level of economic development (Mkandawire

Global Social Policy 5(1)

Deacon: Is the Global Tide Turning?


S T E F F E N G A N G H O F

Globalization, Tax Reform Ideals and Social Policy Financing

Keywords: ideas, income taxation, tax competition, tax mix, tax reform

This article compares national income tax reforms during the last 25 years. There were two competing models of income tax reform, 'comprehensive' and 'dual' income taxation, the latter of which was in many ways more successful. The reason lies in the structural constraints policy makers face. While taxation of capital income is very costly, creating incentives to lower marginal tax rates, the high overall tax burden on labour makes it difficult to reduce tax rates on labour incomes. These conflicting pressures point towards separate tax rate schedules for capital and labour, as is characteristic of dual income taxes. The analysis has implications for the role of income taxation in achieving social policy outcomes. Most importantly, while progressive taxation of capital income is constrained by high costs, policy makers willing to separate capital and labour income taxation can use the income tax to reduce the tax burden on low wages.

Introduction

This article deals with the income tax and its reform. Analysing patterns of income tax reform during the last 25 years -with a focus on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries -provides useful lessons on the potential contribution of the income tax to achieving social policy outcomes and on the role of ideas in policy reform. Income tax policy affects substantive social policy outcomes in two major ways. First, the distribution of the income tax burden adds to the overall redistributive profile of societies. Second, the size of income tax relative to other types of taxes (i.e. the tax mix) may influence policy makers' ability to maintain high social policy expenditures [START_REF] Kato | Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and Policy Diffusion[END_REF]Wilensky, 2002: 430-85). As to the role of ideas, the worldwide income tax reform movement is often considered a textbook case of how powerful ideas, supported by particular countries and international organizations, spread around the world [START_REF] Swank | Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies[END_REF][START_REF] Swank | Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: An Assessment of a Conditional Diffusion Model of the Spread of Neoliberalism[END_REF][START_REF] Swank | The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies[END_REF].

My goal in this article is to throw light on these issues. Within a simple but coherent perspective, I develop the following three claims:

1. Reform Models. The quasi-official, though often implicit, ideal type of the income tax reform wave in OECD countries was that of Comprehensive Income Taxation (CIT), according to which all types of income should be taxed jointly under a common rate schedule. In fact, however, most countries have not approximated this ideal. Instead, a second model emerged in the Nordic countries, Dual Income Taxation (DIT), according to which all types of capital income are taxed at a uniform low and proportional tax rate while labour incomes are subjected to a progressive tax rate schedule. The DIT-model has influenced reform debates in many countries and has been embraced as a useful and consistent model of tax reform by international organizations such as the OECD. 2. Structural Constraints. The success of the DIT-model is rooted in the structural constraints that characterize income taxation. Since some types of capital are too sensitive (i.e. costly-to-tax) to be taxed at high marginal and effective tax rates, the CIT-approach would lead to income taxation at the lowest common denominator. Taken to the extreme, it would lead to a low proportional rate on all income ('Flat Tax'), thus constraining the progressiveness and revenue-raising potential of the income tax. 3. Tax Mixes. High-tax OECD countries have for a long time taken account of these structural constraints by granting large tax privileges to important types of capital income (business profits, capital gains, pension savings, owner-occupied housing), so that high income taxes have not necessarily implied high capital income taxes. Therefore, as exemplified by a country like Denmark, heavy reliance on income taxation has not prevented the building of a large welfare state.

I develop each of these claims in turn. The final section discusses implications for transition and developing countries.

Reform Models: CIT versus DIT

In the last two decades corporate and personal income tax systems have been restructured both in developed and developing countries (e.g. Boskin and McLure, 1990;[START_REF] Faria | Reform in Market Economies and Economies in Transition: Principles and Experience[END_REF][START_REF] Ganghof | Adjusting National Tax Policy to Economic Internationalization: Strategies and Outcomes[END_REF][START_REF] Messere | Tax Policy Choices in OECD Countries[END_REF][START_REF] Messere | Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD Countries[END_REF]Pechman, 1988;[START_REF] Shome | Taxation in Latin America: Structural Trends and Impact of Administration[END_REF]. Basically, marginal tax rates have been cut and tax bases broadened. The recent literature on the political economy of these reforms -in advanced OECD countries -strongly emphasizes the importance of policy learning and the diffusion of 'neoliberal' ideas. Policy makers, so the argument goes, learned that high tax rates combined with selective investment incentives are 'ineffective' (Garrett, 1998: 90), leading to inefficient allocation of resources, unfairness and administrative complexity [START_REF] Steinmo | The Evolution of Policy Ideas: Tax Policy in the 20th Century[END_REF]. Therefore, they made a shift to 'market-conforming' tax policies [START_REF] Swank | Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies[END_REF]. Swank and Steinmo (2002: 643) even see a shift in the underlying 'policy paradigm' (cf. [START_REF] Hall | Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain[END_REF] and Kato (2003: 14) speaks of a 'reversal of the ideal of progressive income taxation'. While policy shifts were rooted in the negative experiences of policy makers, tax reforms in powerful countries like the USA and the activities of international organizations triggered and reinforced the worldwide reform wave [START_REF] Swank | Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: An Assessment of a Conditional Diffusion Model of the Spread of Neoliberalism[END_REF]. As Swank (2003: 3) summarizes: '[S]tatutory rate cuts coupled with base-broadening elimination of tax expenditures have become part and parcel of neoliberal economic orthodoxy (e.g., the "Washington consensus").' While this literature correctly highlights the worldwide shift towards less interventionist and simpler income taxation, it has largely ignored the fact that there were in effect two different models or blueprints for how to make income taxation market-conforming: CIT and DIT. In what follows, I will characterize the two models in more detail and develop the following argument: while the CIT-blueprint fits better into 'neoliberal economic orthodoxy' than the DIT-blueprint, the latter has been at least as successful in terms of international diffusion of ideas. 1 In the following section I then will provide an explanation for this somewhat surprising result.

The 'official' ideal behind many modern income tax systems is that of CIT (see Cnossen, 1988: 263;Messere, 1993: 224, 237-8). The basic idea is to tax all of taxpayers' annual income jointly and equally. No difference should be made between different forms of income, because they all contribute to a taxpayers' ability to pay. Different types of incomes should be taxed jointly under a common and, if desired, progressive rate schedule. The CIT-ideal was never fully implemented in advanced OECD countries, however, as many types of income, particularly capital income, were taxed at preferential tax rates or not taxed at all.

The worldwide tax reform wave started out as an attempt to move realworld income taxes closer to the CIT-ideal. Tax reformers in Great Britain (in 1984), Australia (in 1985), New Zealand (in 1985-6) and the USA (in 1986) were very explicit about this goal (e.g. Conlan et al., 1990: 55-8;[START_REF] Fullerton | Tax Policy[END_REF]Ganghof, forthcoming-a;[START_REF] Sandford | Successful Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform in Six Countries[END_REF]. One basic idea was to reduce top marginal tax rates to a level at which all types of income could be taxed effectively. Ideally, the CIT-approach also meant to 'integrate' corporate taxation as much as possible into personal income taxation by setting the corporate tax rate equal to the top marginal rate on personal incomes and giving shareholders a credit for taxes already paid at the corporate level (Cnossen, 1988: 263;Head, 1997: 80).

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the CIT-approach was followed most vigorously and consistently in New Zealand, the country that adopted most of the structural adjustment policies favoured by the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) and other international organizations and was therefore seen by many as the neoliberal model country (cf. [START_REF] Schwartz | Can Orthodox Stabilization and Adjustment Work? Lessons from New Zealand 1984-90[END_REF][START_REF] Schwartz | Internationalization and Two Liberal Welfare States: Australia and New Zealand[END_REF]. Within a few years, policy makers cut top marginal tax rates from 66% to 33%, broadened the income tax base and shifted some of the income tax burden onto a new Goods and Services Tax [START_REF] Stephens | Radical Tax Reform in New Zealand[END_REF]. Finance Minister Douglas even planned a Flat Tax with a 24% rate and virtually no tax exemptions but was eventually stopped by Prime Minister Lange [START_REF] Chapman | A Political Culture Under Pressure: The Struggle to Preserve a Progressive Tax Base for Welfare and the Positive State[END_REF]. Nevertheless, the low top rate of 33% allowed policy makers to align it with the corporate tax rate and to include most types of capital income into the tax base.

New Zealand was not a reform leader, however. It was an exception. No other advanced OECD country followed the CIT-model with similar consistency. Top personal income tax rates generally remained at much higher levels than in New Zealand. In 1996, roughly 10 years after the start of the tax reform wave, they averaged 52% in advanced OECD countries, and none of these countries had a top rate below 40%. 2 At the same time, policy makers in these countries remained unwilling to fully integrate all types of capital income into the base of the progressive income tax. Important types of income (e.g. retained corporate profits, pension savings, owner-occupied housing, capital gains) thus continued to benefit from substantial tax privileges (Ganghof, forthcoming-a;OECD, 2000: 123-65).

It is tempting to explain these deviations from the CIT-ideal simply as such: varying degrees of deviation caused by variations in party ideology, constitutional structures, interest group pressure, etc. This would be wrong, however, because policy makers in the Nordic countries actually developed a competing blueprint of income tax reform: the DIT [START_REF] Cnossen | Taxing Capital Income in the Nordic Countries: A Model for the European Union?[END_REF][START_REF] Sørensen | Recent Tax Reform Experiments in Scandinavia[END_REF]Sørensen, , 1998a)). What this model shares with the CIT-model is the strong emphasis on market-conforming capital income taxation. Both models aim at taxing all types of capital at the same marginal and average rates in order not to intervene into the structure of savings and investment decisions and to reduce tax avoidance. However, the DIT-model does not extend this logic of equal and joint taxation to labour incomes. Instead, capital and labour taxation is separated systematically; while capital income is taxed at a low, uniform and proportional tax rate (between 25% and 30% in the Nordic countries), labour income is taxed progressively at a higher top marginal rate (typically between 50% and 60%).

The DIT-model originated in Denmark in the early 1980s, but similar ideas were also discussed in Norway during this period (Norges Offentlige Utredninger [NOU], 1984;Sørensen, 1993: 359-60). The model's development owed much to the peculiarities of income taxation in the Nordic countries. To understand this point it is useful to take a closer look at the taxation of 'owner-occupied housing', one major area of social policy tax expenditures [START_REF] Ervik | The Hidden Welfare State in Comparative Perspective: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in Eight Countries[END_REF][START_REF] Howard | The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States[END_REF]. An ideal Comprehensive Income Tax would allow financing costs (interest payments) to be deducted from the tax base while at the same time including the implicit rent earned by owneroccupiers into the tax base. However, policy makers in virtually all OECD countries were unwilling to fully include this implicit rent into the tax base. Many countries therefore also restricted or disallowed interest deductibility. In the Nordic countries, however, policy makers continued to allow interest deductibility while taxing the returns to housing investments lowly or not at all (Sørensen, 1998b). As a result, the state subsidized private debt up to the top marginal income tax rate, which led to inefficient allocation of resources, a low savings ratio of households, low or even negative revenue from taxing personal capital income and low or absent effective income tax progressiveness. The dual income tax provided an elegant solution to these problems. By taxing all capital income at a low and proportional rate, policy makers not only found it easier to include more capital income into the income tax base (including the implicit rent earned by owner-occupiers) but also achieved an immediate reduction in the tax rate against which interest expenses could be deducted. This mitigated all of the problems discussed and increased tax revenue. 3 Of course, the same result could have been achieved under the CIT-model, if Nordic policy makers had been willing to tax all income (including labour income) at the same low and proportional tax rate as sensitive capital income. Yet they were not; they continued to prefer progressive taxation of labour incomes with higher top marginal rates. The price to pay was a higher degree of administrative complexity. Techniques had to be found to separate the capital and labour income of small businesses, which would otherwise have both incentive and opportunity to 'transform' highly taxed labour income into lowly taxed capital income [START_REF] Hagen | Taxation of Income from Small Businesses: Taxation Principles and Tax Reforms in the Nordic Countries[END_REF].

Sweden, Norway and Finland implemented the dual income tax model in different forms and with varying degrees of consistency [START_REF] Cnossen | Taxing Capital Income in the Nordic Countries: A Model for the European Union?[END_REF]. Denmark, by contrast, moved away from the DIT-model and towards a more differentiated income tax in the 1990s (Ganghof, forthcoming-a). The country that implemented the DIT-model most consistently was Norway ( Van den Noord, 2000: 6). It became '[t]he leading nation in the field' (Mutén, 1996: 19), comparable to New Zealand with respect to the CIT-approach. Yet just as New Zealand did not actually achieve the CIT-ideal, Norway did of course not implement the DIT-model perfectly. Most notably, owneroccupied housing as well as private and occupational pension savings continued to receive preferential tax treatment (Ervik, 2000: 187-201, 225-48;[START_REF] Holmøy | A General Equilibrium Assessment of a Suggested Reform in Capital Income Taxation[END_REF].

Although the DIT-blueprint was not (initially) propagated by international organizations or large and powerful countries, it proved to be a highly influential idea. After it had spread in the Nordic countries, it heavily influenced policy debates all over the OECD world and was copied or adapted by many countries. Italy and the Netherlands developed and implemented their own versions of the DIT-model [START_REF] Bordignon | Reforming Business Taxation: Lessons from Italy?[END_REF][START_REF] Cnossen | Fundamental Tax Reform in the Netherlands[END_REF]. Other countries like Austria did not adopt the model entirely but took far-reaching steps towards it [START_REF] Genser | Austria's Steps towards a Dual Income Tax[END_REF]. The model was increasingly taken seriously by mainstream economists and international organizations. The OECD began to feature the DIT-model as a consistent approach to income tax reform with unique advantages, especially in open economies (Messere et al., 2003: 115-26;OECD, 2001). In many country studies, too, the OECD highlighted the DIT as an attractive reform model, even for low-tax economies like Japan and for countries, like New Zealand, in which the revitalization of the CIT-ideal had begun (Dalsgaard and Kawagoe, 2000: 32;OECD, 2000: 163-5). The DIT-blueprint was also embraced by top level advisory councils and reform commissions in Germany and Japan, and recent reforms in Germany and the USA were partly inspired by the model (Ganghof, forthcoming-a;[START_REF] Morinobu | Capital Income Taxation and the Dual Income Tax[END_REF].

In sum, then, the not so neoliberal blueprint of DIT seems at least as successful an idea as the blueprint of CIT; Norway (together with Sweden and Finland) was at least as influential a model as New Zealand. In fact, the DITmodel was in many ways more successful than the DIT-ideal. Although its development owed much to the peculiarities of Nordic income taxation and was not (initially) endorsed by international organizations or powerful countries, it spread around the OECD world. The next section sketches a systematic explanation of this somewhat puzzling result.

Structural Constraints: What Makes the DIT-model Attractive?

Ideas are to a large extent endogenous to material conditions. The success of particular reform blueprints depends on how well they match the structural constraints and incentives policy makers face. To explain the success of different reform ideas, therefore, one needs a systematic account of constraints and incentives as a baseline. 4 In this section, I sketch such an account and present some empirical evidence supporting it. 5 In a nutshell, many policy makers in OECD countries have found the DITmodel attractive because they face both structural incentives to strongly reduce the top marginal tax rate on capital and structural constraints in reducing the top marginal tax rate on labour. With respect to capital income taxation, the problem is that there are many types of capital income that are considered too 'sensitive', i.e. costly-to-tax, to be taxed highly. The relevant costs can be economic (inefficiency and thus reduced growth), administrative (red tape) or political (voter resentment). Some important examples have already been mentioned. Taxing owner-occupied housing tends to be politically explosive (Sørensen, 1998a), taxing certain types of business investment may lead to particularly high economic costs (De Long and [START_REF] De Long | Equipment Investment and Economic Growth[END_REF], and taxing capital gains is administratively difficult and costly [START_REF] Slemrod | The Labyrinth of Capital Gains Tax Policy: A Guide for the Perplexed[END_REF]. Policy makers thus have strong reasons to tax these and other types of capital income at moderate tax rates. Yet if they strive for 'market-conforming' capital income taxation, they also have to tax all other types of capital income at the same moderate rates. In sum, the high costs of taxing capital income combined with the goal of market-conformity and administrative simplicity strongly suggest a low uniform proportional tax rate on all types of capital income [START_REF] Slemrod | Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems[END_REF]).

Yet why should a low and preferably proportional tax rate not also be extended to labour income, as the CIT-model would imply? Proponents of this solution emphasize that it would further simplify income taxation and that 'indirect' progressiveness could still be maintained by way of a sizeable basic tax allowance (i.e. a zero tax rate for income below a certain threshold). Why have not more countries pursued this 'Flat Tax' approach?

The answer, I suggest, lies in the high overall tax burden on wages that characterizes high-tax countries. The higher the overall tax burden on wages, the higher top personal income tax rates have to be in order to achieve even a moderate amount of progressiveness in overall labour taxation. This structural constraint on reducing top personal income tax rates (on labour income) plays out in two different ways, depending on the importance of income taxation within a country's tax mix.

1. In a country like Denmark, where a high total tax burden goes together with a high income tax burden (almost 30% of Gross Domestic Product [GDP]), a revenue-neutral switch to an indirectly progressive CIT is simply unfeasible. If most capital income were to be included into the income tax base, the tax rate could probably not be higher than 25% (Det Økonomiske Råd, 2001) and cutting the top rate on wages to this low a level would imply major revenue losses, which would be even greater if a substantial basic tax allowance were to be maintained. 2. In a country like Austria, where a high total tax burden goes together with a moderate income tax burden (roughly 13% of GDP), an indirectly progressive income tax with 25% rate would be feasible, but only because a large part of labour 'taxation' takes the form of social security contributions (payroll taxes) and general consumption taxes. Since this additional labour taxation is proportional and in part regressive, the progressive income tax tends to assume a 'progressiveness adjustment' function. Policy makers have incentives to maintain progressive income taxes on wages, even if this means separation of labour and capital taxation.

We can visualize the effect of structural constraints quantitatively by focusing on corporate tax rates (on retained profits) and top personal income tax rates.

As noted in the previous section, these two rates should be equal under a CIT-approach in order to avoid economic distortions, simplify administration and prevent harmful tax avoidance through the choice of corporate or noncorporate legal form (cf. [START_REF] Head | Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence[END_REF]. In line with this view, international institutions like the IMF have 'frequently recommended that personal and corporate income taxes have the same top marginal rate' (Stotsky, 1995: 282). Or, at least, they should 'not differ materially' (Tanzi and Zee, 2000: 310).

Achieving an alignment between the two rates is difficult, however, because retained corporate profits are clearly 'sensitive' capital income and because corporate tax rates have been subject to increasing competitive pressure.

Recent studies show that corporate tax rates do play a role in the location of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), especially profitable investment (e.g. Devereux andGriffith, 1998, 2003). In addition, high corporate tax rates provide strong incentives for multinationals to shift their profits into low-tax jurisdictions, e.g. by manipulating prices in intra-company trade ('transfer prices') [START_REF] Hines | Lessons form Behavioral Responses to International Taxation[END_REF]. As a result, there has been a downward spiral in corporate tax rates since the mid-1980s, as countries have tried to undercut the tax rates of their competitors and important capital exporters like the USA. Proponents of 'ideational' explanations of corporate tax cuts may doubt the importance of tax competition, seeing globalization as a 'bogey-man' (Steinmo, 2003: 230) rather than a contributing cause. Yet there is clear quantitative evidence for the role of tax competition. The economic theory of tax competition predicts that if two countries of unequal size compete with each other for mobile tax bases (capital), the smaller country will in equilibrium have a lower tax rate (e.g. [START_REF] Bucovetsky | Asymmetric Tax Competition[END_REF]. In a small country with a small existing capital stock, a tax cut does not lead to large revenue losses. At the same time, relatively high revenue can be expected due to the inflow of foreign capital. Hence, if tax competition has played a role in the setting of corporate tax rates, we would expect an increasingly positive association between corporate tax rates and country size. This is exactly what we see. In a panel analysis for advanced OECD countries, [START_REF] Ganghof | Progressive Income Taxation in Advanced OECD Countries. Revisiting the Structural Dependence of the State on Capital[END_REF] shows that such a relationship had been absent before the mid-1980s but developed afterwards. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the situation in 2003 for a larger sample of 74 countries -those countries covered by the 'KPMG Corporate Tax Survey' (Klynveld, Peat, Marwick und Goerdeler [START_REF] Kpmg | KPMG's Corporate Tax Rate Survey -January 2003[END_REF]. The correlation between country size (natural logarithm of population) and corporate tax rates shows that smaller countries have lower corporate tax rates than larger countries. While many large countries still have corporate tax rates of around 40%, many small countries have moved to corporate tax rates of 25% or lower. The new European Union (EU) member state Estonia even has a zero tax rate on retained corporate profits.

What tax competition means for the feasibility of the CIT-ideal, especially in small countries, should be obvious. If policy makers seriously tried to align the top rate on personal income with a competitive corporate tax rate, this would typically lead to significant revenue losses or reduced tax progressiveness or both. This is most obvious for the special case of Estonia. If the top personal rate were reduced to zero, the revenue from income taxation, roughly one fourth of Estonia's total tax revenue (Eurostat, 2004: 154) would vanish. While this case is extreme, there are many examples of small countries in which an alignment between the corporate rate and the top personal rate is virtually impossible. One example, Denmark, has already been mentioned. Another one is Ireland, which recently moved to a corporate rate of 12.5%. If the top personal rate were also reduced to this level, income tax revenue (13% to 14% of GDP) could not be maintained. Hence, the Irish top personal rate was cut significantly over the last couple of years but nevertheless 'only' to 42% (cf. [START_REF] Hardiman | Taxing the Poor: The Politics of Income Taxation in Ireland[END_REF].

It is not surprising, therefore, that top personal income tax rates are not systematically related to country size in advanced OECD countries. Instead, these rates are systematically associated with the total tax burden, as suggested by theoretical argument sketched above (cf. [START_REF] Ganghof | Progressive Income Taxation in Advanced OECD Countries. Revisiting the Structural Dependence of the State on Capital[END_REF]. Figure 2 shows this for a sample of 20 countries by plotting, for the year 2003, corporate and top personal tax rates against total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The higher the total tax burden, the larger is the gap between the corporate tax rate and the top personal income tax rate (on wages) and the more difficult it becomes to approximate the ideal of CIT. Hence, if policy makers in high-tax countries, especially small ones, aim at 'market-conforming' capital income taxation, the DIT-model may be better suited to achieve this goal than the CIT-model. 6 As the OECD (2000: 165) puts it: 'a dual income tax may be the better [reform] option, since it would not impose the same straight-jacket on the top personal rate (on wage income)'.

While Figures 1 and2 aptly visualize the difficulties of the CIT-model and the advantages of the DIT-model, it should be re-emphasized that the problem of capital income taxation is not only or even mainly tax competition. As noted above, there are plenty of reasons why policy makers may consider certain types of capital income as 'sensitive' and many of them are domestic. In fact, the Nordic welfare states, among others, have managed to adapt to increased economic internationalization and increase capital income tax revenue because the average effective tax burden on capital income had traditionally been rather low in these countries. Total Taxes as % of GDP (1998GDP ( -2002) ) Top personal Corporate Linear fit Linear fit

Total taxes as % of GDP (1998GDP ( -2002) ) Tax Mixes: Are 'Regressive Taxes' Conducive to Social Policy Expenditures?

The structural account of income tax policy sketched in the previous section cannot only be used to explain the development and success of reform ideas but also throws light on recent arguments about the historical relationship between tax mixes and social policy expenditures. 7 Both Wilensky (2002: 430-85) and [START_REF] Kato | Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and Policy Diffusion[END_REF] suggest (mainly for advanced OECD countries) that 'regressive' tax mixes -i.e. a large reliance on social security contributions (payroll taxes) and general consumption taxes -were conducive to building and maintaining large tax/welfare states. While the two arguments partly differ in their details and both rely on several causal mechanisms, they do share one important assumption which is clearly stated by [START_REF] Wilensky | Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy, and Peformance[END_REF]: income and property taxes, but not consumption and payroll taxes, imply a heavy tax burden on capital and are therefore a 'drag on economic growth' (Wilensky, 2002: 392; see also Kato, 2003: 199). Therefore, a large reliance on income and property taxes reduces the efficiency of the overall tax system and thus makes it more difficult to build up and maintain a large tax burden. This argument is similar to the one sketched in the previous section in that it highlights the strong economic constraints on capital income taxation. In both cases the assumption is that the tax burden associated with high public (social policy) expenditures has to be shouldered largely by labour incomes (cf. [START_REF] Lindert | Growing Public. Volume One: The Story[END_REF][START_REF] Summers | Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism[END_REF]. However, neither Wilensky nor Kato appreciate the fact that high income taxation does not necessarily imply high capital income taxation. As argued, high-tax OECD countries have a long tradition of limiting the tax burden on capital income, either by removing it from the income tax base or by subjecting it to lower tax rates than labour income. In other words, the tax base of real-world income taxes can lie somewhere on the continuum between a CIT, implying equal tax burdens on capital and labour incomes, and a pure wage tax that completely exempts capital income. If the tax base of the progressive income tax is variable in this way, however, the structural constraints in capital income taxation do not imply a relationship between tax mixes and the size of the tax/welfare state. For it is possible to determine the levels of income taxation and capital income taxation independently within relatively broad limits. Denmark provides an excellent example (Ganghof, forthcoming-b). As noted, Denmark has a tradition of financing social policy expenditures with taxes rather than social security contributions, which has led to a very large income tax burden. While Danish policy maker's large reliance on the income tax did not prevent them from building one of the world's largest welfare states, the growth of the income tax was predicated on large tax privileges for capital income. In fact, estimates suggest that the Danish income tax had traditionally been closer to a pure wage tax than to a comprehensive income tax. [START_REF] Sørensen | Wealth Taxation, Income Taxation, and Saving[END_REF] estimated that in the mid-1980s the taxation of personal capital income led to a revenue loss of 1.6% of GDP, which was roughly balanced by the positive revenue generated by corporate taxation. Hence, virtually the entire income and profit tax burden fell on wages. As a result of the tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s the capital income tax burden increased, but it is still much lower than the tax burden on labour. For 2002, Eurostat (2004: 146) puts the 'implicit tax rate' on capital income (including self-employed labour) at 16.1%, and that on employed labour at 39.9%. Estimates for a country like France are very similar (19.6% and 41.8%, respectively), even though its income tax is relatively small (around 11% of GDP) (Eurostat, 2004: 164). Hence, the main difference between the two countries seems to lie in the institutional form labour taxation takes -with social security contributions being much more important in France -but not in the taxation of capital income.

It may thus be argued that tax mixes are of rather limited relevance to the size of the tax/welfare state and that high income taxes are actually beneficial in high-tax countries. Social security contributions -seen as 'taxes' -are often regressive because they do not have a basic tax allowance, which reduces the relative tax burden on low-income earners, but do have ceilings on contributions, which reduce the relative tax burden on high-income earners. Hence, to the extent that the negative incentive effects of high labour taxes are particularly severe at the lower end of the wage scale, a greater reliance on income taxation may make the overall tax structure more efficient.

One caveat should be noted, however. While globalization has not led to a downward trend in capital income tax revenue -for reasons explained -the strong competitive pressure on statutory corporate tax rates may provide a major challenge for the income tax. Market-conforming capital income taxation requires equal tax rates on all types of capital income and the corporate tax rate is the most obvious and adequate benchmark in this respect [START_REF] Cnossen | Taxing Capital Income in the Nordic Countries: A Model for the European Union?[END_REF]. At the same time, even under the DIT-approach policy makers face strong incentives to keep the gap between the capital income tax rate and the top rate on labour incomes as small as possible in order to reduce tax avoidance, administrative complexity and voter discontent about the discrimination against wages. As a result, corporate tax competition may indirectly 'pull down' personal income tax rates. Elsewhere, I present both qualitative and quantitative evidence that this kind of spill-over effect of corporate tax competition is already visible but has so far been rather moderate (Ganghof, 2004, forthcoming-a;[START_REF] Ganghof | Globalization and the Dilemmas of Income Taxation in Australia[END_REF].

Conclusion: The Future of the Income Tax

There is no need to reiterate the three central claims elaborated in this article and summarized in the introduction. I rather want to use this concluding section to develop two main implications of my analysis for countries outside of the set of 'advanced' OECD countries.

First, there is no reason to be overly pessimistic about the role income taxation can play in financing social policy expenditures. Policy makers can raise significant amounts of revenue with income taxes. In order to do so, however, they may have to differentiate between the taxation of capital and labour incomes. The DIT-model provides a coherent model for achieving this differentiation in a 'market-conforming' way. The advantage of the DITmodel is that it allows policy makers to combine moderate and efficient taxation of capital income with some degree of progressiveness in labour income taxation.

This point seems important because transition and developing countries are typically characterized by low income taxes and tax experts argue that in many of these countries income taxes should be structurally reformed and increased (e.g. [START_REF] Shome | Taxation in Latin America: Structural Trends and Impact of Administration[END_REF]. 8 If tax policy makers base structural reforms on the CITmodel, however, they may freeze the low existing levels of income taxation. Consider the example of the Slovak Republic, a new EU member state, which recently decided to take advantage of its low income tax burden (around 7% of GDP;Eurostat, 2004: 213) by moving to a flat personal income tax rate of 19%, aligned with the corporate tax rate. By doing so, the country replaced New Zealand as the 'neoliberal' model in tax policy and is envied by radical tax reformers all over the world. What my analysis has shown is that there is no need for other transition or developing countries to follow Slovakia's example, even if they have a strong preference for competitive and 'marketconforming' income taxation. Slovenia, for example, recently reduced its corporate tax rate to 25% while leaving the top personal rate at an unchanged 50%. 9 DIT provides a model for how to combine such a large tax rate gap with efficient capital income taxation, thereby giving policy makers the option of combining structural tax reform with an increase of the income tax burden.

The second implication of my analysis modifies the first. While there is no need to be fixated on the CIT-model, it is nevertheless true that a gap between corporate and top personal income tax rates creates problems even under a DIT. In the Nordic countries, for instance, there has been more or less constant debate about reducing the tax rate gap between capital and labour taxation in order to reduce tax avoidance and simplify administration. Hence, if tax competition continues to drive down corporate tax rates, it may indeed become increasingly difficult to maintain high top personal income tax rates on labour even under the DIT-approach. Since income taxes are comparatively difficult to administer, this may lead developing countries to opt for the CIT (Flat Tax) approach rather than the DIT-model, especially if administrative capacity is low. If this happens, the income tax cannot assume a 'progressiveness adjustment' function within the overall tax system and it will therefore be important to explore ways to distribute the burden of other taxes or contributions more broadly, fairly and efficiently. For example, a number of OECD countries recently made social security contributions more akin to income taxes by removing ceilings on social security contributions, reducing contributions for certain classes of employees (women, the young, part-time workers) or introducing a basic personal allowance (Messere et al., 2003: 21).

This point leads me finally to emphasize what might be the most basic lesson of the analysis. The structure of particular taxes, the mix between different taxes and the overall level of taxation form a 'system' or 'equilibrium', in which each part is dependent upon the others (cf. [START_REF] Hettich | Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis[END_REF]. Therefore, both empirical studies of taxation and normative debates about tax reform and distributive profiles of tax systems should avoid looking at particular taxes in isolation. To understand the role of ideas in income tax reform and form expectations about the future of the income tax, it is necessary to understand both its internal logic and the way in which it is embedded within the overall tax system. notes 1. For a more complete and detailed conceptual discussion of different models of income taxation see [START_REF] Ganghof | Progressive Income Taxation in Advanced OECD Countries. Revisiting the Structural Dependence of the State on Capital[END_REF]forthcoming-a). 2. Unweighted average for 21 advanced OECD countries. See notes to Figure 1 for data definitions and sources. 3. In fact, the cut in tax subsidies created severe strains in the housing markets of the Nordic countries, which also added to macroeconomic problems. The cut was capitalized in prices and thus led to a drop in the value of real estate. A considerable number of homeowners could no longer cover their mortgage with the market value of their real estate and went bankrupt (e.g. [START_REF] Huber | Internationalization and the Social Democratic Model: Crisis and Future Prospects[END_REF]Nannestad and Green-Pedersen, forthcoming). 4. This view, though far from new, has recently been highlighted and elaborated in the political science literature on ideas in foreign policy (e.g. Brooks andWohlforth, 2000, 2002;[START_REF] Goldstein | Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework[END_REF]. 5. This section draws on [START_REF] Ganghof | Progressive Income Taxation in Advanced OECD Countries. Revisiting the Structural Dependence of the State on Capital[END_REF]forthcoming-a). 6. Policy makers may of course deliberately reject both models of income tax reform as too radical, as they did in Denmark in the 1990s. If they do, however, they have to sacrifice the goal of market-conforming capital income taxation. See Ganghof (forthcoming-a) for a more detailed exploration of the resulting 'trilemma' of income taxation. 7. The following draws on Ganghof (forthcoming-b). 8. Structural reforms of income taxes are perhaps easiest when relatively few people are paying it, as there are fewer vested interests in the system (Heady, 2002: 7). 9. In line with my theoretical argument and the pattern visible in Figure 2 Este artículo examina las pautas de la reforma del impuesto sobre la renta durante los últimos 25 años, enfocándose principalmente -pero no exclusivamente -en los países de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (la OCDE). El análisis ofrece lecciones útiles sobre el papel de las ideas en la reforma de las políticas, y el papel del impuesto sobre la renta para lograr resultados de política social. El artículo muestra que había dos modelos competidores de reforma del impuesto sobre la renta -los impuestos «integrales» y los impuestos «dobles» -y que el último tuvo más éxito. La razón se encuentra en las limitaciones estructurales que las personas que formulan las políticas enfrentan. Los impuestos sobre muchos tipos de rentas derivadas de capitales cuestan mucho, y a consecuencia de esto hay fuertes incentivos para bajar las tasas impositivas. Al mismo tiempo, la gran carga fiscal sobre el trabajo da fuertes incentivos para mantener las tasas impositivas marginales superiores sobre la renta del trabajo a nivel alto. Estas presiones opuestas indican programas diferentes de tasas impositivas para la renta de capitales y la renta del trabajo -como es característico de los impuestos dobles sobre la renta. El análisis tiene consecuencias sencillas para el papel de los impuestos sobre la renta en la consecución de resultados de política social.

En primer lugar, los impuestos progresivos sobre la renta de capitales se encuentran muy constreñidos por los gastos altos. Sin embargo, si las personas que formulan las políticas están dispuestas a separar los impuestos sobre la renta de capitales de los impuestos sobre la renta del trabajo, pueden utilizar los impuestos sobre la renta para rebajar la carga fiscal sobre los sueldos bajos. En segundo lugar, los impuestos 'regresivos' (los impuestos indirectos y las cotizaciones) no son forzosamente más propicios para los altos gastos sociales que los impuestos sobre la renta, precisamente porque un nivel alto de impuestos sobre la renta no implica automáticamente un nivel alto de impuestos sobre la renta de capitales. [email: ganghof@mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de]

figure 1

 1 figure 1 Corporate tax rates and countrysize, 2003 Notes: Corporate tax rates include sub-national business taxes and surcharges. The countries included are those covered by the 'KPMG Corporate Tax Survey' plus the remaining countries of the enlarged European Union. Sources: Data on population comes from World Bank(2003). Data on corporate tax rate comes fromBMF (2003),[START_REF] Kpmg | KPMG's Corporate Tax Rate Survey -January 2003[END_REF] and national sources.

  F F E N G A N G H O F is a political scientist and Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany. His research interests are in political economy and comparative political institutions. His articles have appeared in the Swiss Political Science Review and the Australian Journal of Political Science, among others. He is the author of a book on the politics of tax reform in Germany and coeditor of a book on analytical approaches to the German political system (both published in German by Campus Verlag). He recently completed a monograph on the comparative political economy of income taxation, which will be published by ECPR Press. Please address correspondence to: Research Fellow Steffen Ganghof, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Paulstr. 3, D-50676 Köln, Germany.

  Cet article analyse des types de réforme des impôts sur le revenu pendant les derniers 25 ans, et se concentre principalement -mais pas exclusivement -sur les pays qui appartiennent à l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques (l'OCDE). L'analyse fournit des leçons utiles sur le rôle des idées dans la réforme de la politique générale et le rôle des impôts sur le revenu dans l'accomplissement de résultats de politique sociale. L'article montre qu'il y avait deux modèles concurrents de réforme des impôts sur le revenu -la taxation 'compréhensive' et l'imposition 'double' sur le revenu -et que cette dernière avait plus de succès. La raison provient des contraintes structurales devant lesquelles les décideurs se trouvent. La taxation de beaucoup de sortes de revenus du capital coûte cher, et cela donne une forte motivation à baisser les taux d'imposition. Au même temps, la grande charge fiscale sur le travail donne une forte motivation à maintenir les taux marginaux d'imposition supérieurs sur les revenus du travail à un niveau élevé. Ces contraintes incompatibles indiquent des programmes distinctifs de taux d'imposition pour les revenus du capital et les revenus du travail -un trait distinctif de l'imposition double sur le revenu. L'analyse a des implications simples pour le rôle des impôts sur le revenu à atteindre des résultats de politique sociale. Premièrement, la taxation progressive sur le revenu du capital est gravement contrainte par des coûts élevés, mais si les décideurs sont prêts à séparer les impôts sur le revenu du capital des impôts sur le revenu du travail, ils peuvent utiliser les impôts sur le revenu afin de réduire la charge fiscale sur les salaires bas. Deuxièmement, les impôts dégressifs (les impôts indirects et les contributions à l'aide sociale) ne mènent pas forcément plus aux dépenses sociales élevées que les impôts sur le revenu -surtout parce qu'un taux élevé d'imposition sur le revenu ne suppose pas automatiquement une imposition élevée sur le revenu du capital. resumen La Globalización, los Ideales de la Reforma Fiscal y la Financiación de la Política Social

	, the
	Slovak Republic has one of the lowest total tax burdens of the new European
	Union member states (33% in 2002), Slovenia one of the highest (39.8%)
	(Eurostat, 2004: 210, 213).

references BMF (Bundesministerium der Finanzen [German Ministry of Finance]) (2003) Die wichtigsten Steuern im internationalen Vergleich. Bonn: BMF. résumé La Mondialisation, les Idéals de la Réforme Fiscale et le Financement de la Politique Sociale

Global Social Policy 5(1)