Johannes Keller
email: jkeller@uni-mannheim.de

Lisa Molix

SELF-CONSTRUAL AND WOMEN'S MATH PERFORMANCE 1 Running Head: SELF-CONSTRUAL AND WOMEN'S MATH PERFORMANCE When Women Can't Do Math: The Interplay of Self-Construal, Group Identification, and Stereotypic Performance Standards

Keywords: assimilation, contrast, group identification, math performance, performance standards, self-construal, stereotype threat

The present research examined the interplay of self-construal (independent vs. interdependent), gender group identification, and performance standards (positive vs. negative) on women's math performance. Female participants were given a subtle self-prime prior to completing a math test under conditions where either a positive or negative group-based performance standard was rendered accessible. We report an interactive effect of self-construal, gender identification, and performance standard such that a negative (compared to a positive) standard decreased performance under interdependent self-prime ("we") conditions, whereas the reverse pattern emerged under independent self-prime ("I") conditions. Importantly, we observed this interplay of performance standards and self-construal only in individuals who selfidentify with their gender group whereas performance outcomes of low identifiers were not affected by the experimental manipulations.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

SELF-CONSTRUAL AND WOMEN'S MATH PERFORMANCE 3

When Women Can't Do Math: The Interplay of Self-Construal, Group Identification, and Stereotypic Performance Standards A prominent line of psychological research revealed that group-based performance standards can have a profound impact on those targeted by such standards. This research documented that test takers perform poorly under conditions where negative in-group standards are salient and applicable (for a review, see Steele, Spencer, and Aronson, 2002). Performance decrements under conditions where negative stereotypic in-group standards are salient and applicable are a consequence of what has been referred to as a stereotype threat experience. This experience has been defined as the fear that arises in situations where individuals are afraid of being judged or treated on the basis of a negative stereotype, or in settings where individuals run the risk of inadvertently confirming a negative stereotype related to their group [START_REF] Steele | A threat in the air. How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance[END_REF].

The detrimental consequences of stereotype threat were first demonstrated in [START_REF] Steele | Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans[END_REF] seminal work. Their research showed that exposure to negative stereotypic expectancies (e.g., negative expectancies concerning the intellectual abilities of African Americans) undermined participants´ performance.

The disruptive effects of negative stereotypic expectancies have been replicated in a substantial number of studies (Steele et al., 2002). In these studies, participants who were confronted with performance standards based on their group membership showed assimilative effects in the sense that their performance outcomes mirrored the valence of the respective stereotypic in-group standard -reaching a low performance level when confronted with a negative standard and reaching an improved outcome when that negative standard was removed or replaced with a positive standard. This pattern reflects an assimilation effect in the sense that individuals' performance level correlated positively with the valence of the activated stereotypic performance standard.

In the present paper we apply an assimilation-contrast perspective in elaborating on stereotype threat effects. This interpretation of stereotype threat effects leads us to a crucial question that has been discussed in recent research analyzing the effects of standards and expectancies on social judgments [START_REF] Biernat | Standards and expectancies: Contrast and assimilation in judgments of self and others[END_REF]: what determines the direction (assimilation or contrast) of effects that standards and expectancies exert on social judgments? We focus on one factor that has received particular attention in the recent social comparison literature [START_REF] Blanton | Evaluating the self in the context of another: The three-selves model of social comparison assimilation and contrast[END_REF] and emerged as a moderator of social comparison effects on self-evaluations as reported by Stapel and Koomen (2001a): self-construal level. Specifically, we test the assumption that assimilative effects of activating in-group performance standards (i.e., "classic" stereotype threat effects) are most likely when the interdependent level of the self ("we") is accessible whereas the effect of activating in-group performance standards are more likely to be contrastive (resulting in reversed stereotype threat effects) when the independent level of the self ("I") is accessible. Moreover, we test whether identification with the relevant group moderates the assimilation-contrast processes outlined above. This proposition is based on the notion that group-related information (e.g., group-based expectancies) is most likely to influence individuals who see membership in the respective group as an important aspect of their self-concept.

In essence, the theoretical assumptions underlying our work hold that when a negative group-based standard is salient in a test situation, individuals who are highly identified with the relevant group are particularly likely to show a disruptive effect of negative stereotypic expectancies following the activation of the interdependent level of the self (parallel to results observed by [START_REF] Marx | Distinguishing stereotype threat from priming effects: On the role of the social self and threat-based concerns[END_REF]. That is, we assume that making a negative expectancy salient should result in a strong performance decrement in highly identified female test takers working on a math test after their interdependent level of the self is activated.

In contrast, we propose that when a positive group-based standard is made salient in a test situation, individuals who are highly identified with the relevant group are particularly likely to show disrupted performance (i.e., a positive expectancy threat effect) when their independent level of the self was previously activated. Given that an independent self-construal is related to a tendency to see the self as different from others (differentiation mind-set), it is likely that highly identified women become concerned that they might not perform up to an activated high (positive) standard and as a result perform worse on the test. The theoretical rationale underlying these assumptions is outlined below.

Self-Construal as a Determinant of Assimilation and Contrast

Much of the research on judgmental processes has focused on boundary conditions that determine the direction of context effects and a number of constructs have been identified that influence the likelihood of assimilation and contrast effects [START_REF] Biernat | Standards and expectancies: Contrast and assimilation in judgments of self and others[END_REF]. Most important to the present research, Stapel and Koomen (2001a) successfully tested self-construal level as a moderator of social comparison effects.

The theoretical rationale underlying their research can be summarized as: (1) The independent level of the self ("I") represents the aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the self from others whereas the interdependent level of the self ("we") represents aspects of the self-concept that reflect integration and inclusion of the self in the social world. This reflects an established proposition in research on self and identity (cf. [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF][START_REF] Markus | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation[END_REF]. (2) Self-construal level is associated with distinct styles of social information processing. When the independent level of the self is activated individuals tend to accentuate differences from others and are in a differentiation mind-set (exclusion mechanisms predominate). In contrast, when the interdependent level of the self is activated individuals tend to accentuate similarities to others and are in an integration mind-set (inclusion mechanisms predominate).

Based on these propositions, Stapel and Koomen (2001a) proposed that social comparison is likely to yield contrast effects when the independent level of the self is activated whereas assimilation effects are more likely when the interdependent level of the self is activated. Supporting this notion, they found that priming the interdependent and independent level of the self resulted in assimilation and contrast effects on self-evaluation judgments. Similar results emerged in other research testing social comparison effects and the impact of self-priming (cf., [START_REF] Kemmelmeier | The ups and downs of thinking about a successful other: Self-construals and the consequences of social comparisons[END_REF][START_REF] Kühnen | Assimilation and contrast in social comparisons as a consequence of self-construal activation[END_REF][START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF].

Self-Construal as a Moderator of Stereotype Threat Effects

The present research examines whether self-construal level serves as a boundary condition of assimilation and contrast effects on test performance (i.e., on a behavioral measure). That is, we test self-construal level as a moderator of the impact that negative and positive group-based performance standards exert on a behavioral measure like test performance. There is reason to assume that social comparisons and self-construal priming can have meaningful effects on behavioral processes, because previous studies revealed significant effects of these factors on behavioral measures such as test performance [START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Stapel | Method matters: Effects of explicit and implicit social comparisons on activation, behavior, and self-views[END_REF] and behavioral mimicry [START_REF] Van Baaren | It takes two to mimic: Behavioral consequences of selfconstruals[END_REF]. Hence, an extension of the theoretical ideas proposed by Stapel and Koomen (2001a) concerning the role of self-construal in social comparison effects to the domain of test performance is promising.

In line with social comparison theory and research, we propose that people tend to refer to similar others for relevant performance standards [START_REF] Festinger | A theory of social comparison processes[END_REF][START_REF] Goethals | Social comparison theory: An attributional approach[END_REF][START_REF] Zanna | Evaluating a sex-related ability: Social comparison with similar others and standard setters[END_REF]. Accordingly, we assume that when membership in a certain social group is salient in test situations in-group standards represent the most relevant performance standard. Starting from this assumption, we propose that stereotype threat effects can be interpreted as the assimilation of performance outcomes to negative in-group performance standards.

Moreover, we propose that the activated information concerning the typical in-group performance level is included in the formation of a mental representation of the self (unless specific additional context cues trigger exclusion mechanism, cf. [START_REF] Schwarz | Constructing reality and its alternatives: An inclusion / exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment[END_REF]. As a consequence, assimilative effects on self-evaluations, performance expectations, and test performance should be observed. This assumption has been supported in several studies (cf. [START_REF] Cadinu | Stereotype threat: The effects of expectancy on performance[END_REF][START_REF] Sekaquaptewa | Solo status, stereotype threat, and performance expectancies: Their effects on women's performance[END_REF][START_REF] Stangor | Activating stereotypes undermines task performance expectations[END_REF]; for an overview, see Steele et al., 2002).

The consistency of assimilative effects obtained in stereotype threat research is in agreement with one of the most influential models of assimilation and contrast effects -the inclusion/exclusion model [START_REF] Schwarz | Constructing reality and its alternatives: An inclusion / exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment[END_REF]. This model holds that assimilation is the "default" outcome in the sense that relevant context information (e.g., information concerning the typical in-group performance level) is included in the formation of a representation of the target (e.g., the formation of a self-evaluation) unless additional features of the task or situation suggest that context information should not be used 1 . Of note, group identification has been documented as a moderator determining the strength of such assimilative stereotype threat effects in previous research [START_REF] Schmader | Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women's math performance[END_REF], indicating that individuals who see membership in the relevant group as an important aspect of their self-concept are more strongly affected by salient in-group performance standards.

Given the consistency of assimilative effects in previous stereotype threat research one may wonder whether these assimilative effects can be reversed into contrast effects. In this context, it seems promising to address the level of selfconstrual as a potential moderating factor since previous work suggests that contrast effects can be triggered under conditions where an independent self-construal is activated (Stapel & Koomen, 2001a). In fact, there is empirical evidence supporting the proposed interplay of self-construal and social comparison standards in performance settings. Specifically, [START_REF] Marx | Distinguishing stereotype threat from priming effects: On the role of the social self and threat-based concerns[END_REF] see also [START_REF] Marx | We can do it: The interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat[END_REF]; Experiment 3) found assimilation of test performance to social comparison standards under conditions where the interdependent level of the self was activated. Note however, that in these studies a condition where the independent level of the self was activated was not included. Interestingly, [START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF] observed a behavioral contrast effect under conditions where the independent level of the self had been activated.

In line with this previous work, we assume that individuals' performance is positively correlated with the valence of relevant in-group performance standards (assimilation effect) when the interdependent level of the self ("we") is activated.

Hence, we expect "classic" stereotype threat effects under conditions where the interdependent level of the self is accessible. However, when the independent level of the self ("I") is rendered accessible one may expect performance to be negatively correlated with the valence of relevant in-group performance standards (contrast effect). Thus, a reversal of the "classic" stereotype threat effect should be observed under conditions where the independent level of the self is activated (i.e., higher performance when a negative rather than a positive in-group standard is accessible).

Group Identification as Crucial Moderating Factor

Based on the notion that self-related information receives preferential attention [START_REF] Bargh | Attention and automaticity in the processing of self-relevant information[END_REF][START_REF] Bargh | Individual construct accessibility and perceptual selection[END_REF][START_REF] Geller | Cognitive consequences of self-awareness[END_REF][START_REF] Moray | Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the influence of instructions[END_REF][START_REF] Postman | Personal values as selective factors in perception[END_REF], we assume that group-based information is more likely to receive attention in participants who see the respective group as an important aspect of their self-concept. Because group-related information is more self-relevant in high identifiers, stronger effects of group-based expectancies should emerge in high (versus low) identifiers. Accordingly, it seems plausible to expect a pronounced interplay of self-construal and group-based expectancies in high identifiers whereas low identifiers are much less likely to show effects involving group-based expectancies.

The assumed strong sensitivity to group-based cues in high identifiers is in line with research documenting group identification as a moderator of individuals' sensitivity concerning group-related cues (e.g., stereotypes and prejudice). Much research has revealed that group identification determines sensitivity to group-based discrimination such that high (vs. low) group identifiers are more concerned with relative inter-group treatment [START_REF] Petta | Relative deprivation and ethnic identity[END_REF]) and more sensitive with regard to group-based injustice [START_REF] Branscombe | Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African-Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being[END_REF][START_REF] Crosby | The denial of personal disadvantage among you, me, and all the other ostriches[END_REF]) and prejudice [START_REF] Eccleston | Attributions to discrimination and self-esteem: The role of group identification and appraisals[END_REF][START_REF] Major | Attributions to discrimination and self-esteem: Impact of group identification and situational ambiguity[END_REF][START_REF] Mccoy | Group identification moderates emotional responses to prejudice[END_REF][START_REF] Operario | Ethnic identity moderates perceptions of prejudice: judgments of personal versus group discrimination and subtle versus blatant bias[END_REF]. Of particular relevance to the present work is research documenting that group-based performance standards are most likely to affect individuals who self-identify with the respective group. For example, [START_REF] Schmader | Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women's math performance[END_REF] observed that women with higher levels of gender identification performed worse on a math test when gender differences in math were salient whereas women with lower levels of gender identification were not affected by the manipulation.

There is consistent evidence indicating that the level of group identification is a crucial factor that determines the degree to which individuals are sensitive regarding group-related cues. Thus, we assume that group-based standards are perceived as relevant by individuals who identify with the respective group whereas individuals with low identification levels are much less sensitive to such cues. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the proposed interplay of self-construal level and in-group performance standards can be observed in high group identifiers whereas low identifiers' performance is less likely to be affected. To test our reasoning, we conducted an experiment that involved assessment of gender group identification as well as the manipulation of self-construal level and the valence of (in-group) performance standards.

Note that an innovative aspect of the present work is that we systematically assess the interplay of three important factors that have not been tested in combination thus far. We focus on group-based standards that are likely to affect individuals in everyday contexts (such as high school classroom settings) rather than individual role models [START_REF] Marx | We can do it: The interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat[END_REF] or stereotypical cues [START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF].

Moreover, we focus on a direct comparison of conditions where the independent or interdependent level of the self has been activated whereas previous research either focused on the independent [START_REF] Schubert | Contrast from social stereotypes in automatic behavior[END_REF] or the interdependent level of the self [START_REF] Marx | Distinguishing stereotype threat from priming effects: On the role of the social self and threat-based concerns[END_REF]. Finally, we assess the moderating role of group identification to investigate whether the impact of group-based standards is based on "cold" cognitive mechanisms (automatic activation of behavioral scripts) or is likely to involve "hot" motivational mechanisms of self-regulation (see discussion below). Self-construal priming. Participants first completed the [START_REF] Brewer | Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self-representations[END_REF] pronoun circling task to activate the independent or interdependent self. In the first part of the study, we asked participants to carefully read a short paragraph and to circle all the pronouns found within the paragraph. More specifically, participants read a paragraph (a story about a trip to the city) with instructions to circle all pronouns that appear in the text (e.g., "we" or "us" in interdependent conditions and "I " or "me" in independent conditions; cf. [START_REF] Gardner | ″I″ value freedom, but ″we″ value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment[END_REF].

Method

Manipulation of group-based expectancy.

Next, participants completed a questionnaire described as research conducted by other investigators interested in individual differences in math ability. Stereotypic (i.e., group-based) performance standards were manipulated using a fairness manipulation (cf., [START_REF] Spencer | Stereotype threat and women's math performance[END_REF]. In the introduction to the test, half of the participants read that the test had been shown to produce gender differences (since the domain of math ability is typically seen as a male domain describing a test as gender-biased reflects the induction of a negative in-group standard in female participants), whereas the remaining participants read that the test had been shown not to produce gender differences (a positive in-group standard). 2 Math test. Participants had 5 minutes to work on a difficult quantitative test including 9 math problems adapted from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (Martin & Kelly, 1996).

Group identification. Following the math test participants filled in a questionnaire 3 that included the gender version of the collective self-esteem scale [START_REF] Luhtanen | A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity[END_REF]. This scale was introduced by asking participants to consider their gender group membership when responding to a list of items referring to their gender group (e.g., "In general, belonging to this social group is an important part of my self-image.") Responses were assessed on scales ranging from (1) do not agree at all to (7) strongly agree. The scale was reliable (alpha = .85) and participants' responses to this scale were not affected by the experimental manipulations (all Fs < 1) and identity scores were not systematically related to performance scores (r = -.10, p = .29). Moreover, we ran additional regression analyses testing the interplay of test performance and self-construal prime under positive and negative standard conditions in predicting identity scores to test whether participants' scores on the group identification measure varied as a function of test performance and experimental conditions. No meaningful main or interaction effects emerged in these analyses (all t < 1.65, n.s.).

Results and Discussion

We first computed a median split on participants' scores on the gender version of the collective self esteem scale (Median = 5.7) and added this variable as a factor into the analysis. Accordingly, we ran a 2 (independent vs. interdependent selfconstrual) × 2 (negative vs. positive in-group standard) × 2 (low vs. high gender group identification) ANOVA on the number of items correct. This analysis resulted in a significant prime × performance standard interaction (F(1, 106) = 9.06, p < .005) that was qualified by a three-way interaction involving gender group identification (F(1, 106) = 6.09, p < .02). As depicted in Table 1, the pattern of this interaction supports our hypotheses. An interaction pattern involving self-construal prime and ingroup performance standard emerged in participants reporting a high level of identification with their gender group (F(1, 54) = 15.8, p < .001), whereas no effects of the experimental manipulations emerged in low identifiers (all Fs < 1). The pattern of the in high identifiers reveals that a negative in-group standard resulted in a "classic" stereotype threat effect under interdependent self-prime conditions, t(51) = 2.15, p < .04, Cohen's d = .94. In contrast, under independent self-prime conditions performance was decreased following the activation of a positive in-group standard, t(51) = -3.47, p < .002, Cohen's d = -1.18. Thus, a significant reversal of the "classic" stereotype threat effect emerged in this case. Moreover, contrast analyses revealed that participants in the interdependent self-prime condition outperformed those primed with the independent self when the test had been described as gender-fair (positive standard), t(51) = 2.26, p < .03, Cohen's d = .77. In contrast, when the math test was described as gender-biased (negative standard) participants in the independent self-prime condition reached a higher performance than their interdependent self-prime counterparts, t(51) = -3.40, p < .002, Cohen's d = 1.33.

Additionally, we submitted the number of items attempted to the three-factorial ANOVA parallel to the analysis reported above. No significant effects emerged in this analysis. This suggests that the obtained effects on the number of items correct do not reflect a differential effort investment. If effort withdrawal was the process underlying the observed performance decrements, one would expect that the effects on the number of items attempted to parallel those on the number of items correct.

General Discussion

This research demonstrates that self-construal level and group identification are important factors that determine whether negative and positive in-group performance standards influence test performance in an assimilative or contrastive manner. In line with the proposition that highly group identified individuals are more sensitive regarding group-related context cues, we found that group-based performance standards did not affect performance of low identifiers whereas high identifiers showed strong reactions. Specifically, we found that in high group identifiers activating an interdependent self-construal resulted in assimilative effects of stereotypic expectancies whereas activating the independent self resulted in a contrast pattern. Our results indicated that the level of group identification as well as the type of self-construal activated in the testing situation are crucial factors that determine the nature of effects elicited by activating in-group performance standards on test performance.

We acknowledge that the lack of a no prime control condition limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the current findings to some extent. For example, we cannot tell whether an interdependent self-construal is a necessary precondition for "classic" stereotype threat effects to emerge or whether it merely exacerbates the effect. Also, it is unclear whether the activation of an independent self-construal triggers reactance effects (cf.; [START_REF] Kray | Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations[END_REF]) when a negative group-based standard is salient resulting in a performance level that is higher than the level one may observe under no prime control conditions. Further research is currently underway to address these topics.

Nonetheless, the reversal of the "classic" assimilative stereotype threat pattern that we observed in high identifiers under independent self-prime conditions seems SELF-CONSTRUAL AND WOMEN'S MATH PERFORMANCE 15 noteworthy as we are not aware of any research that documents such a contrast effect.

That is, the reported data are the first documentation of a reversed stereotype threat effect applying an experimental stereotype threat manipulation that has been used in many previous studies reporting assimilative stereotype threat effects.

Underlying Mechanisms

The present research found evidence not only for crucial boundary conditions that determine the nature of effects elicited by stereotypic performance standards, but also evidence that may help to understand the processes that underlie the observed assimilative and contrastive effects. We argue that the moderation finding involving gender group identification supports a distinct "hot" interpretation of the underlying mechanisms, because neither a social identity interpretation nor a cognitive ideomotor interpretation seems to be well compatible with the pattern obtained in the present study. We outline the different perspectives below.

According to a "hot" interpretation of our findings, group identification in combination with self-construal priming determines the impact of positive or negative in-group standards because different kinds of performance-debilitating worries (and presumably "hot" self-regulatory and arousal-based mechanisms) are triggered depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the self in/from a relevant group. When an inclusion of the self in a group is related to negative performance (because the group is associated with poor performance), the worry of possibly confirming a negative group-based expectancy may trigger performance-debilitating concerns. And such concerns are particularly likely to emerge in individuals who perceive their group membership as particularly self-relevant. When exclusion of the self is salient, highly identified targets can worry that they won't perform up to the positive in-group standard. That is, the independent self-prime in combination with a positive standard positive (i.e., high) in-group standard triggers concerns regarding a possible underperformance compared to in-group members. These concerns (about failure to reach a positive in-group standard) and the related performance pressure are likely to result in performance decrements. Again, it seems reasonable to expect that such concerns are more likely to emerge (and are more intense) in individuals with a strong group identification because group-based performance standards are particularly relevant to them. Thus, the moderating effect of group identification observed in the present study seems to support a "hot" interpretation of the obtained results.

Note that our findings seem incompatible with a social identity perspective.

According to this perspective, one would argue that we-priming reflects the activation of social identity whereas I-priming emphasizes the relevance of one's individual identity. Hence, we-priming should render social identity concerns salient and thus it should increase the susceptibility to stereotype threat effects whereas I-priming reduces social identity concerns and should eliminate stereotype threat effects. In line with the social identity perspective, [START_REF] Ambady | Deflecting negative self-relevant stereotype activation: The effects of individuation[END_REF] found that individuation via disclosure of personal information eliminated (but did not reverse) detrimental effects of previously activated negative stereotypes on test performance outcomes. This suggests that situationally activating aspects related to one's individual identity can attenuate the harmful consequences of negative stereotypic expectancies. Note, however, that the individuation manipulation applied in this work is not equivalent to the self-construal priming used in the present study. Specifically, the individuation procedure is not particularly likely to trigger a differentiation mind-set. Moreover, the individuation manipulation was applied after the activation of the self-stereotype in the experimental paradigm of [START_REF] Ambady | Deflecting negative self-relevant stereotype activation: The effects of individuation[END_REF], which is why a differential appraisal of group-based expectancies as a function of the activated aspects of the self are not likely to emerge. According to the social identity perspective, one would expect to find an additive effect of gender identification and we-priming such that the strongest stereotype threat effects emerge under we-prime conditions in high group identified participants. A somewhat weaker "classic" stereotype threat pattern should emerge in I-primed participants with a higher level of group identification as well as in we-primed participants with a weak identification. The pattern observed in our experiment is not in line with these predictions.

Another possible interpretation of the obtained interplay of self-construal and group-based performance standards is "cold" cognitive in nature and refers to cognitive inclusion-exclusion mechanisms following we-and I-priming, respectively. This perspective holds that the accessibility of behavioral representations (scripts) related to a mental representation of the self as either smart or dumb drives the effects (cf. [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | Seeing one thing and doing another: Contrast in automatic behavior[END_REF]. According to this interpretation, Ipriming leads to an exclusion of the self from a group which results in a mental representation of the self as (relatively) smart when the group has been related to negative performance whereas exclusion results in a mental representation of the self as (relatively) incompetent when the group has been related to positive performance.

The reverse should be true in case of we-priming. Because we-priming triggers an integration mind-set resulting in a tendency to incorporate the self into a salient group, we-priming should result in a mental representation of the self as (relatively) smart when the group has been related to positive performance whereas inclusion results in a mental representation of the self as incompetent when the group has been related to negative performance. The behavioral representations related to a self-representation as smart or incompetent should then influence performance outcomes on a subsequent test. Note that according to [START_REF] Bargh | The automaticity of everyday life[END_REF] the level of identification with a stereotyped group should not play a significant role in the "perception-behavior expressway." Therefore, group identification should play no moderating role according to this ideomotor interpretation. In fact, there seems neither a good reason to assume that a differentiation or integration mind-set is more accessible in persons with a strong or weak gender identification, nor is it particularly plausible to assume that gender identification is systematically related to the accessibility of self-representations related to the concepts "incompetent" or "smart." Thus, an ideomotor account would probably not predict a moderating function of group identification in the present context.

However, one could probably argue that rendering group-based expectancies salient may have a stronger impact on highly identified individuals because they have more relevant knowledge available that can be activated (specifically, knowledge on particularly smart or particularly incompetent members of the in-group). If it was indeed the case that high group identifiers have more relevant knowledge available, the ideomotor approach could account for the pattern of findings observed in the present study.

We are skeptical regarding this possibility. From our perspective, it seems particularly questionable to assume that high identifiers have more knowledge on incompetent in-group members available than low identifiers. Furthermore, an exclusively "cold" cognitive account referring to automatic processes of knowledge activation seems not a particularly convincing explanation of the data pattern observed in our study. This is not to say that cognitive processes do not play a role in the obtained effects at all. In line with [START_REF] Wheeler | The effects of stereotype activation on behavior: A review of possible mechanisms[END_REF] we assume that hot and cold processes cooperate in determining the impact of stereotypic performance standards on behavior. Accordingly, we suggest that the moderating role of group identification indicates that "hot" processes are most probably involved in the pathway leading to the assimilation and contrast effects that emerged in our studies while we do not suggest that this finding implies that cold cognitive processes are not involved at all. We think that the moderating effect of group identification observed in the present study supports a "hot" interpretation of the obtained assimilation and contrast effects, since neither a social identity interpretation nor a "cold" ideomotor approach can convincingly account for the distinct pattern we observed reflecting a moderating function of group identification. In our view, the observed moderating role of group identification can be understood as a first hint that "hot" processes -that is mechanisms involving self-regulatory processes (i.e., distinct mechanisms associated with goal striving, such as defensive vigilance versus eager and tenacious goal striving; cf. Higgins, 1998) and bodily-experiential mechanisms (i.e., physiological arousal;cf. Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, 2005) -are most likely involved in the observed assimilation and contrast effects (although further research is clearly needed before definite conclusions can be drawn). From our perspective, these "hot" mechanisms need to be addressed in greater detail in a next generation of research in the attempt to come to a closer understanding of the underlying mechanism of stereotypic performance standards on performance outcomes.

ProcedureParticipants.

  Female students (N = 114; Mean age = 18.26) from a large Midwestern University participated in the study and received course credit for participation. At the outset of the study, participants learned that the study consisted of several sections related to different research projects.

Table 1

 1 Test Performance as a Function of Gender Group Identification, Self-Construal Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

	Prime and Performance Standard
		Performance Standard
	Group
	Self-Construal	Negative	Positive
	Identification
	Independent	4.3	3.6
	("I")	(2.4)	(1.3)
	Low
	Interdependent	4.1	3.8
	("we")	(1.7)	(1.7)
	Independent	4.8	2.5
	("I")	(1.4)	(2.2)
	High
	Interdependent	2.7	4.1
	("we")	(1.5)	(1.4)

The assumption regarding assimilation as the default process is not included in other models of assimilation and contrast (seeBiernat,

2005).2 There are good reasons to assume that women -who are chronically confronted with negative expectations ("Women are bad at math") -perceive the information that no differences will be expected as a positive expectancy compared to the default negative expectancy. We acknowledge that inducing an explicitly positive expectancy (e.g., "Women typically outperform men on the present test.") would have been a stronger induction. However, such a procedure is not equivalent to previous stereotype threat research and would have restricted the comparability of our findings. Moreover, relying on a "weak" induction reflects a conservative test and thus commendable methodology.3 This questionnaire also contained questions assessing participants' affective state (e.g., agitated, dejected). None of these measures were significantly affected by the experimental manipulations (all F's < 1.4, p > .24).

We thank Herbert Bless, Rainer Greifeneder, and Norbert Schwarz for their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this article. This research was supported by a post-doctoral grant from the German Science Foundation to Johannes Keller.


Karl Christoph Klauer

Julia Herfordt

Andreas Voss

M P Huguet

J M Galvaing

F Monteil

Dumas

Social Presence 1 RUNNING HEAD: Social Presence Social Presence Effects on the Stroop Task: Boundary Conditions and an Alternative Account

interpretation in terms of an attentional view (P.

The phenomenon of social facilitation is one of the oldest studied in social psychology [START_REF] Aiello | Social facilitation from Triplett to electronic performance monitoring[END_REF][START_REF] Guerin | Social facilitation[END_REF]. It refers to the finding that performance in simple tasks is often improved in the presence of others (audience condition) relative to a condition in which people work alone (alone condition).

The present paper examines the effects of social presence on the Stroop task. In the Stroop task, participants identify the color of colored targets as fast and accurately as possible. In incongruent trials, target words denote a color (e.g., red), or are related to a color (e.g., blood), that differs from the one in which the word is shown (e.g., in blue). In neutral trials, the target is a color-neutral word (e.g., table) or a control string (e.g., ++++) that is not a word. Stroop interference is the difference in mean response latencies between incongruent and neutral trials. Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, and Dumas (1999, Exp. 1) found much larger Stroop interference in the alone condition than in a condition with a passive, non-evaluative audience, that they termed invisible audience. This is an important finding because it allowed Huguet et al. to discriminate between two major theories of social facilitation, the dominant-response account by [START_REF] Zajonc | Social facilitation[END_REF] and an attentional view [START_REF] Baron | Distraction-conflict theory: Progress and problems[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Cohen | Environmental load and the allocation of attention[END_REF].

According to [START_REF] Zajonc | Social facilitation[END_REF], simple tasks are simple because the dominant response associated with task stimuli is the correct one. In this view, the effect of an audience is to increase arousal which in turn facilitates the dominant response.

The result is improved performance in simple tasks.

According to the attentional view, the presence of others is frequently distracting and threatens participants with cognitive overload. This leads to a restriction in attentional focus. In this view, simple tasks are simple because performing at a high level requires attending to only a few central cues. Narrowing the attentional focus is helpful in focusing on these few cues and in screening out irrelevant cues. The result is improved performance in simple tasks.

In many situations, both accounts lead to parallel predictions, but the ingenious observation by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] was that both differ with respect to what is expected for the Stroop task. When the target is a word, the dominant response is to read it, identifying word meaning, whereas identifying the word color is a less dominant response. Because word meaning is the major cause of interference in the Stroop task, strengthening the dominant response should increase interference. Social presence should thus lead to larger Stroop interference according to the dominant-response account. In contrast, according to the attentional view, attentional focusing is helpful in selecting the relevant stimulus feature (i.e., word color) and in filtering out the irrelevant stimulus feature (i.e., word meaning). Smaller Stroop interference is thereby predicted in distracting audience conditions. Huguet et al.'s (1999) Experiment 1 supported the prediction derived from the attentional view. In addition, recognition memory for the words used in the incongruent trials was better in the alone condition than in the audience condition. This is to be expected if word meaning was filtered out in the audience condition.

To summarize, according to [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF], social presence caused a reduction of the Stroop effect in the audience condition below the level observed in standard conditions because social presence narrowed attentional focus, thereby enhancing attentional selectivity.

Three issues potentially challenge this explanation: 1) The nature of attentional selection, 2) prior studies on the effects of social presence and distraction on the Stroop task, and 3) the size of the Stroop effects reported by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF].

First, attentional focusing operates at several levels, in task selection, object selection, and dimensional selection. For example, [START_REF] Baron | Distraction-conflict theory: Progress and problems[END_REF] argues that narrowing of attentional focus leads to focusing on a task seen as primary in dual-task situations in which two tasks have to be performed simultaneously (task selection). Within a given task, it leads to focusing on the relevant stimulus and screening out of irrelevant stimuli (object selection). Within the relevant object, finally, attentional focusing increases the utilization of relevant features and the screening-out of irrelevant and distracting features (dimensional selection). With regard to object selection and dimensional selection, there is an ongoing debate on whether both are negatively related (e.g., [START_REF] Chen | Attentional focus, processing load, and Stroop interference[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Kahneman | Perceptual organization and attention[END_REF]Wühr & Waszak, 1981) or independent (e.g., [START_REF] Shalev | Stroop and Garner effects in and out of Posners beam: Reconciling two conceptions of selective attention[END_REF]; see also [START_REF] Besner | The myth of ballistic processing: Evidence from Stroop's paradigm[END_REF][START_REF] Besner | The Stroop effect and the myth of automaticity[END_REF][START_REF] Chajut | Selective attention improves under stress : Implications for theories of social cognition[END_REF]. According to one point of view, object selection leads to decreased dimensional selection.

Thus, to the extent to which an object is attended to, all of its features, relevant and irrelevant features alike, receive increased processing, leading to decreased dimensional selection. For example, [START_REF] Chen | Attentional focus, processing load, and Stroop interference[END_REF] experimentally manipulated attentional focus in the Stroop task using cueing manipulations adopted from the attention literature. In his studies, narrowing attentional focus enhanced rather than decreased Stroop interference (from 24 ms to 45 ms in Experiment 1, and from 64 ms to 88 ms in Experiment 4). This suggests that social presence, via a narrowing of attentional focus, might increase rather than decrease Stroop interference.

Second, prior studies on the effects of social presence on Stroop effects as discussed by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] yielded conflicting results. Note, however, that the studies by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] were methodologically stronger in several aspects than most prior studies. Similarly, there are a number of studies of the effect of distraction by noise on the Stroop task with mixed results [START_REF] Chajut | Selective attention improves under stress : Implications for theories of social cognition[END_REF][START_REF] Glass | Urban stress[END_REF]. The mixed results of prior studies do not question the findings by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] in any way, but they raise the desirability of replications of the effect.

Third, the Stroop effects in Huguet et al.'s Experiment 1 were 170 ms and 101 ms in the alone and (invisible) audience conditions, respectively. The 170 ms effect in the alone condition struck us as unusually large. Stroop effects are largest when the incongruent words denote colors that can occur as responses, they decrease for color words not in the response set, and further decrease for color-related words (McLeod, 1991). Furthermore, Stroop effects are decreased when responses are delivered via keypresses rather than vocally (McLeod, 1991). [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] employed keypresses and mostly color-related words or color words not in the response set (see appendix). As a consequence, Stroop effects much below 170 ms might have been expected.

For example, [START_REF] Sharma | Differential components of the manual and vocal Stroop tasks[END_REF] reported a Stroop effect of 148 ms with manual responses for color words in the response set, but Stroop interference dropped to 51 ms for color words not in the response set and to 35 ms for color-related words (see also [START_REF] Risko | Filling a gap in the semantic gradient: Color associates and response set effects in the Stroop task[END_REF]. In follow-up studies concerned with social coaction and comparison, Huguet and colleagues [START_REF] Dumas | Context effects in the Stroop task: Knowledge of one's relative standing makes a difference[END_REF][START_REF] Huguet | Competing for a desired reward in the Stroop task: When attentional control is unconscious but effective versus conscious but ineffective[END_REF]Huguet et al., 1999, Exp. 2) used very similar materials and procedures as [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] in their Experiment 1. Across the many Stroop tasks administered in these experiments, the largest interference score that occurred was 94 ms. 1 There were small differences between Huguet et al.'s (1999) Experiment 1 and these subsequent experiments even in the alone conditions that may be responsible for the different results. One such difference suggested to us that the 170 ms effect in the alone condition in Huguet et al.'s (1999) Experiment 1 might have been inflated beyond normal levels.

Specifically, we hypothesized that a dual-task instruction in combination with the particular stimuli used as targets might have caused the unusually large Stroop effect. Participants were instructed that technical, computer-related problems had just emerged on the task they had been invited to perform and that another task would be performed instead. Second, they were informed that the computer on which this new task is run was not yet programmed to record their responses. Finally, they were told that the goal of this session was to give their general impression about this new task. They went on to the instructions for the Stroop task proper which emphasized as usual speed and accuracy.

The purpose of the impression-formation instruction was to reduce possible evaluation apprehension, a factor that has been argued to cause, or at least enhance, social presence effects [START_REF] Cottrell | Social facilitation[END_REF][START_REF] Geen | Alternative conceptions of social facilitation[END_REF]. At the same time, the instruction introduces, however, a second task, that we will refer to as the impression task, in addition to the Stroop task itself. This second task is to form an impression of the Stroop task. It is a derived or secondary task in the sense that it cannot be performed without performing the Stroop task.

There is some conflict between the Stroop task and the impression task:

Responding as fast and as accurately as possible in the Stroop task conflicts with spending time and other processing resources on forming an impression of the Stroop task. We believe that participants in alone conditions have sufficient capacity to engage in both tasks simultaneously and that they resolve the conflict by spending proportionally more time inspecting and thinking about the color-incongruent words than the neutral targets: The neutral targets (++++-strings) are meaningless and hold little intrinsic interest. In contrast, the targets in incongruent trials, being meaningful words, hold more intrinsic interest.

Similarly, the ++++-strings were repetitive whereas each individual word occurred less frequently than each ++++-string. This makes each word more distinct individually than each ++++-string [START_REF] Higgins | Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience[END_REF]. In forming an impression of the task, it therefore makes sense to spend proportionally more time elaborating on the words and to skip over the repetitive and uninteresting neutral stimuli quickly. This would inflate interference scores and recognition memory.

Why then should interference return to more normal levels in the audience condition? We hypothesize, following [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF], that social presence is distracting and threatens participants with cognitive overload. As a consequence, we assume that the Stroop task is prioritized (task selection) to maintain satisfactory performance in that task, whereas participants more or less quit working on the secondary impression task in the audience condition. Thus, participants effectively revert to a single-task condition. As a consequence, interference scores are no longer inflated in the audience condition. To summarize, we should be able to replicate the unusually large interference score found in Huguet et al.'s (1999) alone condition, that is, when the Stroop task is performed alone and for the first time, with concurrent impression task, and ++++-type controls, henceforth referred to as the critical condition. In contrast, Stroop interference should revert to more normal levels in all other conditions, that is, 1a) in audience conditions, 1b) when the Stroop task is the only task, 2a) when neutral stimuli are words instead of ++++-strings, or 2b) when the Stroop task is seen the second time.

These predictions were tested by three contrasts specified for each experiment alike: 1) Interference scores in the critical condition should be larger than the average interference observed in all other conditions. 2) There should be no significant differences between the interference scores in the other conditions. 3)

The interference score in the critical condition should also be larger than the average interference score in the other alone conditions. The third contrast underlines our analysis that Stroop interference was not reduced below normal levels in the audience conditions, but that interference scores were inflated above normal levels in the critical condition.

It has been argued that in one sense, it is difficult to implement a true alone condition because we frequently carry thoughts about an audience around with us (e.g., [START_REF] Markus | The effect of mere presence on social facilitation: An unobtrusive test[END_REF]; this implicit audience may be particularly salient in an alone condition that is preceded by an audience condition (e.g., [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF]. Relatedly, prolonged practice reduces Stroop effects (e.g., [START_REF] Dulaney | Mechanisms underlying reduction in Stroop interference with practice for young and old adults[END_REF]. For these reasons, we also present the results of the contrast analyses with the contrasts restricted to the conditions in which the Stroop task is performed for the first time. The restricted contrasts cannot be affected by possible practice effects, nor by possible effects of an implicit audience made salient by a preceding audience condition. Note, however, that there is little empirical work testing the idea of an implicit audience (Guerin, 1993, chap. 10), and that the amount of practice implied by performing the Stroop task a second time may have little effect [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF].

Method

Participants

In Experiment 1 and 2, respectively, 62 and 80 persons participated, most of them University-of-Freiburg students with different majors. For Experiment 2, we accepted only students with majors other than psychology who had never before participated in a psychological study. In both experiments, participants' gender was counterbalanced with the experimental manipulations. Participants received a monetary gratification of 3.50 Euro for their participation.

Stroop Task

The details of the Stroop task closely followed those employed by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF]. The Stroop stimuli were presented in the middle of a 43 cm VGA color monitor in one of four colors: blue, green, red, or yellow. There were five practice blocks, comprising 24 neutral trials each, using color-neutral words.

There were two experimental blocks with 84 trials each. The first four trials were neutral trials that were warm-up trials and not analyzed further. The remaining trials comprised 40 incongruent trials and 40 neutral trials. For each color, there were five color-incongruent words translated from Huguet et al.'s materials; each such word was shown two times per experimental block. In Experiment 1 and for half of the participants in Experiment 2, the neutral trials of the experimental blocks presented strings of plus signs (e.g., ++++) of different lengths. For the other half of participants in Experiment 2, the neutral trials presented 20 color-neutral words that differed from the neutral words used in practice blocks and that were matched to the 20 color-incongruent words in imageability, that is, in the ease with which a mental image of the denoted object could be formed (M neutral = 4.62 and M incongruent = 4.61 on a six-point rating scale as rated by 88 University-of-Freiburg students who did not participate in the experiments). These words and the incongruent words are shown in the appendix.

Participants were asked to identify the color in which the stimulus was shown. They were to press the keys y, x, n, and m to respond, in order, blue, green, red, and yellow. The Stroop stimulus was removed from the screen upon the response. Incorrect responses were followed by an error feedback in the form of the In summary, each person worked in an alone and an audience condition. In each experiment, there were four groups, defined by the order in which alone and audience condition were administered, and an additional manipulation of the instruction in Experiment 1 and of the neutral stimuli in Experiment 2.

Results

Error rates were 4.54% and 3.42% in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.

The analyses are based on correct response latencies. Short latencies below 300 ms were excluded as well as long latencies that were above the individual's median latency by more than three interquartile ranges [START_REF] Rothermund | Motivation and attention : Incongruent effects of feedback on the processing of valence[END_REF]. This led to the exclusion of 1.89% and 2.46% of the response latencies in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.

Contrast Analyses

In both experiments, there were four groups, and each participant performed alone and in an audience condition, yielding eight conditions. Mean Stroop effects observed in these conditions are shown in Figure 1, mean latencies for incongruent and neutral stimuli in Table 1. It can be seen that the critical condition (leftmost condition in each panel of Figure 1) was associated with by far the largest interference score in both experiments; in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, 167 ms and 141 ms.

Contrast analyses were conducted using the method described by [START_REF] Winer | Statistical principles in experimental design[END_REF]chap. 7) for mixed designs. According to the first contrast, the Stroop effect in the critical condition was significantly larger than the average Stroop effect, 70 ms and 60 ms, across the seven other conditions, F (1, 116) = 8.92, p < .01, and F (1, 152) = 9.55, p < .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. At the same time, according to the second planned comparison, there were no significant differences between the remaining seven conditions in either experiment, both F s< 1. Interference in the critical condition was finally significantly larger than average interference in the other alone conditions, 70 ms and 52 ms, according to the third contrast: F (1, 116) = 7.80, p < .01, and F (1, 152) = 9.96, p < .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.

The same pattern of results emerged when the contrasts were formulated only for the first experimental block of Stroop trials, that is, for the "first" conditions in Table 1 andFigure 1. The Stroop effect was significantly larger in the critical condition than the average Stroop effect, 89 ms and 70 ms, across the other three "first" conditions, F (1, 116) = 4.98, p = .03, and F (1, 152) = 6.41, p < .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. At the same time, there were no significant differences between these three conditions in either experiment, both F s< 1.

Interference in the critical condition was finally significantly larger than interference in the other alone-first condition, 94 ms and 59 ms, according to the third contrast:

F (1, 116) = 3.00, one-tailed p = .04, and F (1, 152) = 5.61, p = .02, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Note that the use of a one-tailed test (for the third contrast in Experiment 1) is legitimate given that we formulated directed hypotheses.

Additional Analyses

In both experiments, there were the critical alone condition and a parallel audience condition with additional impression task, ++++-type controls, and Stroop task performed for the first time. These two conditions replicate the alone and (invisible) audience condition of Huguet et al.'s (1999) Experiment 1. To contrast these two conditions, it is legitimate to pool the data across both our experiments. The Stroop interference score was significantly larger in the critical condition, M = 152 ms, SD = 145 ms, than in the parallel audience condition, M = 86 ms, SD = 120 ms, t(69) = 2.12, p = .04, so that Huguet et al.'s (1999) basic effect can be replicated.

Without the critical condition, the average Stroop effects in the remaining alone conditions and in the audience conditions were 70 ms and 71 ms, respectively, in Experiment 1 and 52 ms and 67 ms, respectively, in Experiment 2. There was thus little evidence for a reduction in Stroop effects in audience conditions relative to alone conditions when the critical condition was left out of the analyses. 4 An anonymous reviewer argued that due to the implicit-audience problem (see introduction) only the alone-first conditions and the audience-second conditions should be considered. As pointed out by the reviewer, Stroop interference decreases from 94 ms in the alone-first condition to 47 ms in the audience-second condition of Experiment 1 when the impression task is removed (only-Stroop conditions); a decrease that approaches significance in a one-tailed test: t(15) = 1.63, p = .06. This observation suggests a comparatively small effect of social presence on dimensional selection in the Stroop task itself. In contrast, in Experiment 2, there is no effect of social presence on Stroop interference when neutral words are used: Stroop interference was 59 ms in the alone-first condition and 53 ms in the audience-second condition, t < 1. We return to these findings in the discussion. 5 An analysis of variance was computed to see whether the effects of social presence on the Stroop effect varied across the four groups in each experiment. An interaction of social presence (alone versus audience; within participants) and the group factor is implied by the first contrast, but the interaction test is less focused than the analysis by means of planned comparisons. Nevertheless, in both experiments, the interaction reached significance, F (3, 58) = 5.71, p < .01, and F (3, 76) = 3.94, p = .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.

With vocal responses, but not with manual responses, there is a small "lexical" effect meaning that responses to neutral words are slower than responses to nonword control strings [START_REF] Sharma | Differential components of the manual and vocal Stroop tasks[END_REF]. It is possible that the lexical effect contributed to the pattern of findings in Experiment 2. Excluding the group with critical condition, we therefore tested whether Stroop effects were smaller for the conditions with words in neutral trials than with ++++-type controls. An analysis of variance with factors social presence, sequence, and neutral stimuli (++++-type controls vs. neutral words) did not reveal significant effects or interactions involving the stimuli used in neutral trials, largest F (1, 57) = 1.36, smallest p = .25.

Discussion

The present studies replicated a reduction in interference scores as a function of social presence, but they cast the effect in a different light. According to the present analysis, it arises due to a particular combination of circumstances including the requirement to form an impression of the Stroop task, a difference in intrinsic interest and distinctiveness between the stimuli used in incongruent trials and in neutral trials, and the absence of distraction in alone conditions.

Interference scores are unusually large in the critical condition that combines these circumstances, but Stroop effects return to more normal levels when any of these ingredients are absent. These results suggest that the reduction in interference scores in the audience conditions does not arise because attentional focusing made it easier to screen out the distracting word meaning. Rather, interference scores were inflated in the critical alone condition because the attempt to form an impression of the Stroop task pushed participants to spend proportionally more time inspecting and thinking about the words used in incongruent trials.

What do these results imply for the effects of social presence? The present analysis postulates an effect of social presence on task selection. Participants prioritized the Stroop task and neglected the impression task when distracted by social presence. We argued that this occurred as a consequence of attentional focusing operating at the level of task selection.

The present studies are subject to a number of limitations and criticisms.

A difference between the present procedures and those employed by [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] is that we provided error feedback in the rare event of a wrong response in the Stroop task, whereas Huguet et al. did not. The error feedback may have induced some amount of evaluation apprehension which by itself might reduce Stroop effects [START_REF] Chajut | Selective attention improves under stress : Implications for theories of social cognition[END_REF]). Yet, we replicated Huguet et al.'s main finding and our Stroop effects were generally in the same order of magnitude as those reported by Huguet et al., suggesting that the error feedback did not induce crippling amounts of evaluation apprehension. Note also that [START_REF] Bond | Social facilitation: A meta-analysis of 241 studies[END_REF] concluded in their meta-analysis of social-facilitation studies that "social facilitation effects are surprisingly unrelated to the performer's evaluation apprehension" (p. 265).

Similarly, [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] employed the impression-formation instruction to minimize possible evaluation apprehension. As a consequence, Stroop effects under normal instructions in which the Stroop task is the only instructed task (Experiment 1) might already be reduced due to increased evaluation apprehension. They would therefore not constitute an appropriate baseline against which to consider the Stroop effect in the critical alone condition inflated. Yet, the same pattern of effects as in Experiment 1 emerged in Experiment 2, in which all participants worked under the impression-formation instruction and evaluation apprehension should therefore have been uniformly low.

The conclusions of the present paper are in part negative: The clearest evidence to date for an effect of a passive, non-evaluative social presence on dimensional selection within the Stroop task is questioned. There were, however, hints of a small additional effect of social presence on dimensional selection in the Stroop task when a selected subset of conditions was analyzed in Experiment 1.

In a more general and positive vein, the modulation of the Stroop effect by factors such as instructions, the nature of control stimuli, and task repetition that is evident in our data underlines Huguet et al.'s analysis (1999) that the Stroop effect does not reflect invariant automatic processing. In particular, [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] argued that social presence is so powerful that it alters word reading; a hypothesis that is consistent with the findings from Experiment 2 in which the effects of social presence were eliminated when control stimuli were neutral words instead of nonwords.

The major contention tested by the present studies is that social presence exerts an effect on task selection in dual-task situations. Participants in audience conditions may withdraw attention from tasks seen as secondary or derived; an intriguing possibility that deserves further study.

  2A number of new predictions can be derived from this analysis. Two kinds of conditions, implemented in two experiments, should cause interference scores to drop from the large score observed in the alone condition to more normal levels as elaborated next:1. Conditions that remove the secondary impression formation task:• (Condition 1a) via instructions (Experiment 1) or • (Condition 1b) via social presence (as just explained and implemented in Experiments 1 and 2).2. Conditions that reduce the difference in distinctiveness and intrinsic interest between the color words and the neutral control stimuli: • (Condition 2a) via the use of words as controls (Experiment 2) or • (Condition 2b) via performing the Stroop task a second time (Experiments 1 and 2). Condition 1a) was implemented via instructions: Half of the participants in Experiment 1 worked with the additional impression task, whereas the Stroop task was the only instructed task for the other participants. Condition 1b) was implemented in both experiments as a condition with a passive non-evaluative audience. According to the above, in both conditions the secondary impression task should be removed, causing Stroop effects to return to normal levels. In Experiment 2, all participants worked with the additional impression task. The impression task causes inflated interference scores because of the difference in distinctiveness and interest value between words used in incongruent trials and neutral stimuli. Conditions 2a) and 2b) were designed to decrease this difference in different ways. Condition 2a) was implemented in Experiment 2 through the use of words as neutral control stimuli. Participants either worked with the original stimuli translated from Huguet et al. (1999), including the boring and repetitive ++++-stimuli, or they saw color-neutral words instead of ++++-stimuli in neutral trials. Being meaningful words, the color-neutral words hold more intrinsic interest than the ++++-controls. Furthermore, each such word appeared less frequently than the ++++-controls. Thus, the neutral words are less repetitive and more interesting than the +++++-stimuli. When the neutral words are used in neutral trials instead of ++++-stimuli, the difference in distinctiveness and interest value between the words used in incongruent trials and the stimuli used in neutral trials is thereby decreased. The purpose of Condition 2b) was to decrease the distinctiveness and interest value of the words used in incongruent trials. Condition 2b) was implemented in both experiments by having each participant perform the Stroop task twice. When the Stroop task is performed the second time, each word has already been seen twice in the first set of Stroop trials and its reappearance for a third and fourth time in the second set of trials should no longer induce participants to spend much time inspecting and thinking about it even when they intend to form an impression of the Stroop task.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Mean Stroop effects in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, all participants worked with ++++-type controls; in Experiment 2, all participants worked with additional impression task. The critical condition is the leftmost condition in both panels.

word "FEHLER" (ERROR) presented for 500 ms on the screen. Participants' instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy.

Design and Procedure

Participants worked through the practice blocks, followed by two experimental blocks of the Stroop task; for one of the experimental blocks, they worked in the presence of another person (audience condition); for the other one, they worked alone (alone condition). Order of alone and audience condition was orthogonally crossed with an instruction manipulation in Experiment 1, and a manipulation of the neutral stimuli in Experiment 2.

In Experiment 1, half of the participants were exposed to the "impression-formation" instruction (impression condition) already described in the introduction upon entering the laboratory. The other half received only the normal instructions about the upcoming Stroop task (only-Stroop condition).

In Experiment 2, all participants worked under the "impression-formation" instruction, but the kind of stimuli used in neutral trials was manipulated. Half of the participants saw neutral words in neutral trials, the other half saw strings of plus signs (++++-controls).

The audience in audience conditions was a confederate of the experimenter.

The confederate was introduced as another participant waiting for another experiment. He or she was present for the duration of one experimental block of the Stroop task. The confederate was seated about 1.60 m behind the participant's back so that the participant blocked this person's view of the screen. 3 The confederate was thus clearly unable to evaluate the participant's performance.

Participant, experimenter, and confederate were either all male or all female.

Participants were completely alone in alone conditions.

After completion of two experimental blocks of the Stroop task, participants filled in a self-consciousness scale [START_REF] Merz | SAF: Fragebogen zur Messung von dispositioneller Selbstaufmerksamkeit [SAF: Scale for the assessment of dispositional self-consciousness[END_REF] (2004) for an analysis restricted to color words, excluding color-related words.

2 Participants do not have the alternative to prioritize the impression task and quit working on the Stroop task, because the impression task cannot be performed without performing the Stroop task in the first place.

3 [START_REF] Huguet | Social Presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional view of social facilitation[END_REF] also implemented two audience conditions in which the audience faced the participant so that both could see each other.

4 Note that Stroop interference in the audience-first condition in Experiment 1 is larger when the impression task is removed (M = 105 ms) than when the impression task is present (M = 69), which might be seen as running against our interpretation. But the difference is not significant, t < 1.

5 As explained in the introduction, the implicit-audience problem may question data from alone conditions that follow an audience condition (i.e., data from alone-second conditions). But it is difficult to see how the audience-first conditions could thereby be compromised. When the audience-first conditions are also included, any effect of social presence on performing the Stroop task without concurrent impression task is eliminated.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Social Presence 25