Roger Giner-Sorolla

Emanuele Castano

Pablo Espinosa

Rupert Brown

Roger Giner- Sorolla

Shame Expressions Reduce the Recipient's Insult from Outgroup Reparations

Keywords: Intergroup emotions, guilt, shame, apology

Despite a growing literature on the consequences of group-based guilt and shame, little work has examined how expressions of self-conscious emotions are received by targets of collective wrongdoing. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when an outgroup member offers apologies accompanied by reparations, the recipients are likely to take insult unless the outgroup member expresses the self-abasing emotion of shame rather than guilt.

Experiment 1 showed that when reparations were offered, participants were less insulted by shame than guilt expressed by an outgroup member, rather than an ingroup member.

Experiment 2 improved Experiment 1 by manipulating the culprit's action (reparation vs. withdrawal), and this experiment replicated Experiment 1's interaction on a measure of insult, but only when reparations were offered. These interactions on insult were not explained by the emotion's perceived intensity or surprisingness. Our results indicate a possible functional aspect of expressions of shame in an intergroup context. Self-abasement, as opposed to a mere admission of culpability and regret, can reduce the insult taken from an outgroup' s reparations.

Expressions of remorse for official and collective misdeeds have increased in recent years, leading commentators to describe the present day as an "age of apology" [START_REF] Brooks | The age of apology[END_REF]. Recent examples include the State of Virginia's official apology for the past enslavement of African-Americans, South African ex-minister Adriaan Vlok's public washing of Reverend Frank Chikane's feet in contrition for crimes of the apartheid era, and the apologies offered by News Corporation for its plans to publish the ill-regarded O. J.

Simpson book If I Did It. Often these apologies are accompanied by emotional expressions of sorrow, regret, guilt or shame, as well as by offers of restitution. This research investigates the hypothesis that shame can be a more effective expression than guilt in reducing insult taken by wronged groups when such an offer of restitution is made.

The emotions that accompany apologies have been the subject of much social psychological research. Some studies have examined how guilt and compensation emerge as individual responses to evidence of being prejudiced [START_REF] Monteith | Self-regulation of prejudiced responses: Implications for progress in prejudice-reduction efforts[END_REF][START_REF] Monteith | Putting the brakes on prejudice: On the development and operation of cues for control[END_REF]. Collective guilt can also be felt in response to injustices carried out by one's own group in the past, and can generate support for group-level compensation [START_REF] Castano | Not quite human: Infra-humanization as a response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing[END_REF][START_REF] Doosje | Guilty by association: When one' s group has a negative history[END_REF]. Additionally, dominant-group guilt (e.g., White guilt) can arise when one's own group privilege is seen as illegitimate [START_REF] Branscombe | Collective guilt: Importance of history and social categorisation[END_REF]. From this research, it seems that eliciting guilt in the perpetrator may have positive effects on his or her actions, such as

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Shame and Insult increasing willingness to provide reparations (but see also [START_REF] Castano | Not quite human: Infra-humanization as a response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing[END_REF] for infrahumanization as a defense against guilt).

Such consequences are consistent with an extensive literature at the interpersonal level, in which guilt has been investigated in tandem with shame [START_REF] Tangney | Shame and guilt[END_REF].

Research has built on the work of [START_REF] Lewis | Shame and guilt in neurosis[END_REF] to propose a distinction between the two emotions. In this tradition, guilt involves an appraisal of the action's wrongness, and leads to the approach actions of reparation and apology. Shame, in contrast, involves an appraisal that one's core self is bad, and leads to avoidant or angry behavior. Research on individuals has generally shown that proneness to guilt is associated with empathy, whereas proneness to shame involves more painful emotions and accompanies social and personal problems [START_REF] Tangney | Shame and guilt[END_REF].

Studies of vicarious guilt and shame for other group members' acts, too, show that shame hinges on the group's core essence while guilt hinges on personal responsibility [START_REF] Lickel | The evocation of moral emotions in intergroup contexts: The distinction between collective guilt and collective shame[END_REF], although shame may also be a better motivator toward collective action than guilt [START_REF] Iyer | Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame, and guilt[END_REF]. However, research on how interpersonal apologies are received has not generally observed distinctions among specific self-conscious emotions such as shame and guilt. In one exception, [START_REF] Proeve | Effects of remorse and shame and criminal justice experience on judgements about a sex offender[END_REF] manipulated expressions of "remorse" (in this context, guilt and apology)

versus shame attributed to an offender, but found no difference in effects of the two emotions. From the existing literature, then, it is not clear what role shame versus guilt expressions might play in the reception of an intergroup apology.

As mentioned, shame is acknowledged to lead to withdrawal action tendencies, often a less beneficial outcome for the wronged party than guilt's approach and reparative

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 5

tendencies. However, emotions have multiple functions. Not only do they orient the individual toward action, but they also serve a function of social communication (e.g., [START_REF] Keltner | Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis[END_REF][START_REF] Parkinson | Emotions are social[END_REF]. With this in mind, guilt has been interpreted as signaling desire to reestablish an existing relationship [START_REF] Baumeister | Guilt: An interpersonal approach[END_REF], whereas shame has been seen as serving a more general appeasement function [START_REF] Keltner | Appeasement in human emotion, social practice, and personality[END_REF]. Likewise, in some evolutionary views, guilt functions to regulate reciprocal relationships, whereas shame regulates position in the social hierarchy [START_REF] Gilbert | Evolution, social roles, and the differences in guilt and shame[END_REF], a view consistent with psychological views of shame that emphasize social judgment and exposure as elicitors [START_REF] Smith | The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt[END_REF]. Even though constant proneness to shame may not be functional for an individual, the expression of shame in communication between individuals and groups does have a plausible function. In particular, when the behavioral outcomes of emotions are held constant, the communicative content of emotions should take center stage in explaining reactions to emotional expressions.

In the context of an offer of reparations, we believe that an expression of shame will be especially likely to overcome the wronged party's misgivings about accepting handouts from an outgroup, and to mitigate the insult taken from compensation. It is important, however, to distinguish our prediction from other theoretical perspectives that might offer more general explanations why an outgroup member' s shame might be better received than guilt. For example, simple derogation of the outgroup could lead to shame' s absolute selfcriticism being preferred over the more limited self-criticism in guilt. Likewise, as people generally prefer dispositional explanations for outgroup negative acts, and situational explanations for ingroup negative acts [START_REF] Pettigrew | The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport's cognitive analysis of prejudice[END_REF], a preference for the "dispositional" shame emotion over the "situational" guilt emotion could be expected.

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 6

Our predictions, however, focus on the insult taken, rather than overall satisfaction or attitude, from offers of reparations. Because an offer of assistance from an outgroup implies that the group wants to approach and is in a position to be generous, it can evoke a negative reaction among people who mistrust the group's motives, especially when its status is seen as illegitimate or unstable (see [START_REF] Nadler | Intergroup helping as status relations: Effects of stability, identification, and type of help on receptivity to high-status group' s help[END_REF] -conditions especially likely to apply after a misdeed by the outgroup. Thus, an outgroup perpetrator who shows no remorse, or who expresses guilty feelings that preserve core self-worth and are more appropriate to a reciprocal relationship, risks arousing insult by offering compensation. However, when the emotion of shame is added to an offer of reparations, this negative reaction should be mitigated, because the reparations are accompanied by an assurance that they are given in a spirit of appeasement and self-abasement. While the alternative theories predict a general preference for shame in outgroup expressions that would extend to other measures such as satisfaction, our hypothesis states that, specifically when reparations are offered, an outgroup member's shame apology will lead to specifically less insult than a guilt apology or no apology, rather than greater satisfaction.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 was an initial test of this hypothesis, manipulating expressions of emotion (guilt versus shame), orthogonally with the group (ingroup versus outgroup) of the company responsible, within a scenario of apology and reparation for an ecological disaster.

We predicted an Emotion x Group interaction on insult, such that a guilt apology would be more insulting than a shame apology only when coming from an outgroup, but no such interaction on satisfaction.

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 7

We also included measures of surprise and suspicion to guard against the possibility that incredulity at an unfamiliar combination of group, emotion, and action could explain any interaction among these factors. Finally, we measured how emotionally affected the perpetrator seemed, to see whether any interaction of group and emotion on insult could be explained by a tendency to see shame as stronger or more sincere than guilt.

Method

Participants

Seventy-eight participants, 48 female and 30 male, were recruited among the undergraduate, graduate and non-degree student population of New School for Social

Research, in New York. They were approached through instructors of small classes or individually, and asked whether they would participate in an experiment in exchange for a chocolate bar.

Materials

A fictitious small chemical company operating near New York was first described, either as American or Russian. All participants were asked a manipulation check question about the company' s nationality ("To what extent do you think this company can be called American?") and two questions about positive and negative feelings toward the company.

The questionnaire then briefly described a fictitious ecological incident in which the company was responsible for a chemical spill into the Hudson River and the response of the company' s director. The emotional response was described first, and varied between participants:

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 8

1. "…feels very sorry about what happened and regrets that he had not taken more security measures to prevent it. He feels guilty about the unfortunate accident." (guilt emotion, focused on negative aspects of action)

2. "…feels that he is a complete failure and that he is a person unable to run a company or do anything worthwhile. He feels ashamed about the unfortunate accident."(shame emotion, focused on negative aspects of self)

Participants then indicated on an 11 point scale, "to what degree the director was emotionally affected by the event," and, on a six-point scale, "how much you think the director of the company should be blamed for the incident."

Reparative behavior was then described: "He decides that what is best is to apologize publicly and do everything he can to clean the river and help people affected by the incident."

Then, participants answered a series of 11 point scaled items that described their reactions: "I would feel satisfied"; "I would think it' s fair"; "I would feel happy"; "I would be surprised"; "I would feel easy"; "I would be hopeful"; "I would feel suspicious"; "I'd feel that the director of the company respected me;" I'd feel that the director of the company insulted me;

"I'd feel that the director of the company valued me"; and "I'd feel offended by the director of the company." Scales ranged from "not at all" to "absolutely."

Results

Manipulation Checks

A Group x Emotion ANOVA on the company's identity confirmed participants' understanding that the U. S. company was American and the Russian company was not, F(1, 74) = 17.82, MSE = 6.43, p < .001; no other effects were significant. Interestingly, participants did not show significantly more negative feelings about the Russian company (M

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Insult, Satisfaction, and Respect Analyses

The "insulted" and "offended" items (α = .58) and the "valued" and "respected" items (α = .76) were averaged into "insult" and "respect" indices, which were not correlated with each other (r = .10). The "satisfied", "fair", "happy", "easy" and "hopeful" items were averaged into a satisfaction index (α = .83); respect (r = .43, p < .05) but not insult (r = -.16)

was correlated with satisfaction.

An 2 x 2 ANOVA on insult (MSE = 2.26) showed a reliable Emotion x Group interaction, F(1, 74) = 6.98 , p = .01, with no main effects, both p > .40. In simple effects tests, the outgroup's expression of guilt was more insulting than its expression of shame, F

(1, 74) = 6.53, p < .05; while the ingroup's guilt tended to be less insulting than its shame, but not significantly so. Means are shown in Figure 1. When the "emotionally affected" item To test the more specific prediction that an outgroup's shame would mitigate insult compared to the outgroup's guilt or the ingroup's shame, a planned contrast testing the outgroup/shame combination of conditions against outgroup/guilt and ingroup/shame was carried out. The contrast variable, entered after the other two variables in an orthogonal coding scheme, was significant (beta = -.25, p < .05) and explained most of the manipulations' effects upon insult (contrast sr 2 = 6.3% out of a total R 2 of 9%).

All patterns of significance remained when suspicion and surprise were added as covariates.

Discussion

As expected, the critical expected interaction between target group and emotion emerged principally for insult. Participants considering an outgroup member's apology in the context of reparation took less insult from an expression of shame, as compared to guilt.

Group membership did not influence judgments of the respect shown by the apology, which depended wholly on the emotion shown; shame conveyed greater respect than guilt, regardless of which group felt it.

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 11

It is noteworthy that the group interaction effects on insult were found in the absence of overt intergroup bias; the Russian company evoked, if anything, slightly more positive feelings than the US company, and no main effects of group on our other variables emerged.

This pattern of results might be understandable as an outcome of norms among these university students against expressing an overt intergroup bias. However, it would be desirable to replicate these results in a context where more overt intergroup bias was shown.

Finally, the results found on insult were also found in the face of somewhat low reliability of the insult items. Although this speaks to the strength of the result, it also shows that the insult measure could be improved.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 further tested our predictions by explicitly contrasting a situation of reparations against a no-reparations condition. Because our predictions about insult and shame are specific to situations where an outgroup offers reparations, such a design would crucially test our predictions against other predictions based on general group bias, which would apply regardless of whether or not reparations were offered. Adding a third factor that varied outgroup action (reparations vs. withdrawal), we expected a higher-order moderating effect of this factor in Experiment 2, such that the Group x Emotion interaction found in Experiment 1 would only apply in the reparations condition.

Given that our theoretical account focuses on the ability of shame to mitigate insult from reparations, we also added a condition to the emotion manipulation in which the perpetrator was explicitly described as having no emotional reaction, to see whether shame or guilt was primarily responsible for Study 1's effects. We expected shame expressions to evoke lower insult than either guilt or no emotions in the outgroup reparation condition. We

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 12 also added more questions measuring insult, to increase the reliability of this key measure.

Finally, Experiment 2 was conducted with a Galician Spanish population, taking France as an outgroup, in the hope that their social norms against expressing bias would not be as strong.

Method

Participants

Two hundred seventy-one participants were recruited for the experiment in the city of La Coruña in Galicia, a part of Spain with a strong regional identity, in exchange for a payment of 3 Euro (approximately $4 at the time). The questionnaire was given in high school and university classes and at a local community center. Ages ranged from 15 to 47, the mean being 18.85. Sixteen participants indicated that they were either not from Spain or not originally Galician, and were excluded from analyses, because the experiment framed Galicia as the ingroup. This left 255 participants, of whom 120 were male and 135 female.

Materials

We added four main modifications to Experiment 1's design. First, we included an Action factor by adding conditions describing withdrawal rather than reparations, using the sentence "He decides that what is best is to abandon the factory, retire, and never start a business venture again." Second, a no emotion condition was added in the Emotion factor; these scenarios replaced the emotion description with "… does not feel troubled by the accident". This resulted in a 2 (Action: Withdrawal vs. Reparations) x 3 (Emotion: Shame vs. Guilt vs. No Emotion) design. Third, three new questions measuring insult were added:

"I would feel angry at the company director," "I would want revenge against the company director," and "I would feel rejection toward the company director." Fourth, the company was described either as Galician from La Coruña (ingroup) or French from Marseille

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(outgroup), and the local river Mino was mentioned. The questionnaire was translated into Spanish, back-translated into English, and corrected.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Averaging the three relevant scales, participants understood that the Galician company was Galician (M = 9.30, SD = 1.57) and the French company was not (M = 3.82, SD = 2.06); t( 252

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Insult, Satisfaction, and Respect Analyses

The insult scale showed high reliability at α = .83, and the satisfaction scale at α = .90; the two respect items were correlated at r = .84. Insult and satisfaction showed a weak but significant inverse relationship, r = -.21, p = .001; unlike Study 1, insult and respect were negatively correlated at r = -.32, p < .001.

In the Group x Emotion x Action ANOVA on insult (MSE = 4.93), there was a main effect of action, F(1, 242) = 9.57, p < .001, such that withdrawal was more insulting than reparation. More importantly, there was a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 242) = 3.69, p < .05. Figure 2 shows means for this interaction. Simple effects tests showed that within the reparation condition, the Group x Emotion interaction of Experiment 1 was replicated, F(2,242) = 3.35, p < .05. Building on Experiment 1, and showing the importance of reparations to our effects on insult, the Group x Emotion interaction was not found in the withdrawal condition, F(2, 242) = 0.64. Simple effects of emotion within each combination of group and action condition showed that only for the outgroup member offering reparation did emotion have an effect, F(2, 242) = 6.42, p < .01; all other F < 1.04. Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed that for the outgroup member offering reparation, shame was less insulting than guilt or no emotion, which did not differ from each other. This difference from an emotionless expression establishes the key role of a shame expression in mitigating insult.

Extending the contrast analyses from Experiment 1, planned contrasts comparing outgroup shame against outgroup guilt, outgroup no emotion, and ingroup shame were carried out separately for reparation and withdrawal conditions. In reparation, this contrast representing a reduction in insult from outgroup shame was significant, beta = -.30, p < .001,

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 15

and explained the majority of model variance, R 2 = .11, contrast sr 2 = .09. In withdrawal, the contrast was not significant, beta = .07, p = .77.

Entering surprise and suspicion as covariates, the three-way interaction on insult remained significant, F (1, 240) = 4.59, p < .05. Likewise, when judgment of the perpetrator as emotionally affected was entered as a covariate, it remained significant, F(1, 240) = 3.90, p <.05. The interaction also survived entry of satisfaction as a covariate, F (1, 240) = 4.01, p < .05.

In the Group x Emotion x Action ANOVA on satisfaction (MSE = 5.61), there were main effects of emotion, F (2, 242) = 3.45, p < .05, and of action, F(1, 242) = 73.84, p < .001.

Reparation (M = 7.11, SD = 2.27) was more satisfactory than withdrawal (M = 4.43, SD = 2.53). Post-hoc Tukey tests on emotion showed only a marginally significant difference, p = .08, in which shame (M = 6.21, SD = 2.92) was more satisfactory than no emotion (M = 5.38, SD = 2.56); guilt fell in between (M = 5.60, SD = 2.76). The Group x Emotion interaction was marginally significant, F(2, 242) = 2.37, p = .096, but no other interactions had p < .10, including the three-way, F(2, 242) = 0.25. When insult was added as a covariate, the three-way interaction remained nonsignificant with F < 1, and the Group x Emotion interaction was reduced to F(2, 241) = 1.02, p = .36. Thus, satisfaction did not show the same specific interaction effect that insult did.

Similar analyses with respect as a dependent variable likewise showed no significant effects other than a main effect of action, F(1, 184) = 28.44, MSE = 8.63, p < .001, such that reparation (M = 7.79, SD = 2.59) gained more respect overall than withdrawal (M = 5.54, SD = 3.21).

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General Discussion

These experiments showed that when an outgroup member provides reparations, an expression of shame mitigates insult better than an expression of guilt. In Experiment 1, whose design always described reparations, and in the reparations conditions of Experiment 2, shame was less insulting than guilt when the transgressor was presented as a member of an outgroup. These effects were not found when the alternative response of withdrawal was presented. Moreover, both experiments found the strongest effects on measures of insult, and found weak or no effects on satisfaction measures. In Experiment 2, the addition of a noemotion condition also established that when an outgroup offered reparations, guilt and an explicitly emotionless response were equally insulting, whereas a shame expression worked to reduce the insult in those conditions.

We believe our insult effect to be more specific than a simple desire for the outgroup to suffer the most painful emotion or to express the most dispositional negative selfassessment. Such prejudicial responses should have shown themselves regardless of the action taken. Instead, in Experiment 2, the key interaction pattern involving guilt/shame and ingroup/outgroup on insult appeared only when reparations were proposed. Merely prejudicial responses would have also extended to lower satisfaction and respect from the outgroup apology as well as higher insult. However, the key interaction pattern on satisfaction was only marginally significant in Experiments 1, was not observed independently of insult in Experiment 2, and was also not moderated by action in Experiment 2, whereas for respect the key pattern was not observed at all.

Nevertheless, both studies found that shame overall, whether expressed by ingroup or outgroup members, tended to lead to more respect and satisfaction than guilt did. This may We believe that our effects on insult cannot be explained merely by the fact that the shame expression was seen to be more emotionally affecting than the guilt expression. First, judgments of the perpetrator's emotionality did not follow the same interaction patterns that insult did. Second, in both experiments, the key interaction on insult remained significant when controlling for emotionality of the expression. Another alternative explanation is that shame may have produced less insult because it made the perpetrator appear more responsible, but evidence from these experiments also speaks against this. In neither experiment was the director in the shame condition rated as more culpable for the incident than the director in the guilt condition, and participants in Experiment 2 actually rated him as being more culpable for the incident when he expressed guilt, consistent with the definition of guilt emphasizing culpability for one's actions. It thus seems unlikely that the guilt condition could have led to the inference of less responsibility. Finally, it is also not plausible that our key effects were due to surprise or suspicion at the combination of shame and reparation, as they remained significant when controlling for those variables.

Experiment 2 also showed a strong main effect of action such that reparations created more positive responses, and less insult, than withdrawal. This may explain why the outgroup's expression of shame in the reparation condition was less insulting than in the withdrawal condition; overall, reparations tended to increase positive and reduce negative reactions. If the reparations were given with no emotion or the inappropriate emotion of guilt, however, insult was equally high as for withdrawal.

We should also point out some limitations of these experiments. We based our manipulations of shame and guilt conceptually on the work of Lewis and Tangney. It would also be useful to test expressions more directly derived from the alternative concept of shame as external social exposure [START_REF] Smith | The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt[END_REF], or to include stronger expressions of emotion, such as crying, as part of the guilt expression. Also, the "no emotion" condition in Experiment 2 told participants the director felt no emotion, which might have been interpreted as an explicitly callous response; indeed, for the key conditions, this control was seen as just as insulting as the "guilt" condition. Although a condition that said nothing about emotions might be a more appropriate control, problems also arise with this approach;

participants might infer remorse from the situation, as in Schmitt et al. ( 2004), or might do so differentially depending on group membership.

Implications

These results provide an important demonstration of the functional nature of shame in an intergroup context. In offering an apology to accompany reparations, outgroup members might be better off expressing the emotion of shame, which functions to signal lowered status in a social hierarchy (e.g., Gilbert, 2004). Because the emotion of guilt functions to repair social relationships [START_REF] Baumeister | Guilt: An interpersonal approach[END_REF][START_REF] Baumeister | Personal narratives about guilt: Role in action control and interpersonal relationships[END_REF], our findings also suggest that someone who enjoys an existing ingroup relationship with the perceiver would not be insulted by a guilt expression, though even then, guilt seems to attract less positive responses than shame does. This parallels criticism of existing theories and measures for ignoring positive aspects of shame and negative aspects of guilt (Luyten, Fontaine, &

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Shame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 19 Corveleyn, 2002). In the light of findings that shame corresponds more to the real or imagined judgments of other people, relative to guilt [START_REF] Smith | The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt[END_REF], our findings indicate an appeasement function of shame, one that functions most strongly outside reciprocal relationships. Shame, ultimately, may indeed be bad for the self, and for a dyad with expectations of mutual support. However, by showing that people may be insulted by an outgroup expression of guilt, our findings add to previous questions raised about the usefulness of intergroup guilt (e.g., [START_REF] Iyer | Racial wrongs and restitutions: The role of guilt and other group-based emotions[END_REF]. At the same time, guilt may promote the more satisfying outcome of reparative action to a degree that counteracts any insult taken. Perhaps the ideal, if unlikely, combination is to feel and act on guilt, but to express shame.

We also believe that our existing findings have implications for the world of politics and public relations. If avoiding insult toward the wronged is a goal, then the correct emotional stance while offering reparation varies depending on whether the wronged belong to the same or a different social group. Anecdotally, this observation is echoed by the skeptical response of the Arab world to U. S. President Bush' s 2004 statements on the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which characterized the abuse as a "mistake" not characteristic of Americans (Office of the Press Secretary, May 5, 2004). Based on our findings, we would argue that Bush' s apology might have insulted Arab outgroup members, in part because it used the language of contrition rather than self-abasement. In cases such as this, it is possible that the apologizing person views the apology as constructive because it expressed some kind of moral emotion. Moreover, the apologizing person's ingroup constituency may share this view, and praise their leader for being a moral person. This benefit may sometimes, in pragmatic terms, take precedence over the apology's acceptance suggest that it is important to express shame, rather than mere guilt.

Figures

  the Recipient's Insult from Outgroup Reparations

  A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P TShame and Insult Giner-Sorolla et al. 10was included as a covariate, the interaction remained significant, F(1,61) = 5.78, MSE = 2.24, p < .05.A 2 x 2 ANOVA on satisfaction (MSE = 4.37) found a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 74) = 5.06, p < .05; shame led to more satisfaction, M = 7.26, SD = 2.03, than did guilt, M = 6.23, SD = 2.18. The interaction effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 74) = 2.95, p = .09. The same analysis on respect showed only a main effect of emotion, F(1, 74) = 4.70, MSE = 6.51, p < .05. Shame was seen as conveying more respect overall, M = 5.05, than guilt, M = 3.77.

  ) = 23.88, p < .001. Participants also showed ingroup bias: positive feelings were higher for the Galician company (M = 9.05, SD = 2.14) than for the French one (M = 7.38, SD = 2.60), t(190) = 5.62, p < .001. Negative feelings were lower for the Galician company (M = 2.05, SD = 1.73) than for the French one (M = 2.51, SD = 1.98), t(190) = -1.96, p = .05.An 2 (group) x 3 (emotion) ANOVA on how much the director was seen as emotionally affected revealed a main effect of group, F(2,248) = 11.71, p < .01, MSE = 8.99, and a main effect of emotion, F(2, 248) = 17.66, p < .001, but no significant interaction, F(2, 248) = 0.05. The ingroup director (M = 6.99, SD = 3.15) was seen as more affected overall than the outgroup director (M = 5.70, SD = 3.20). Guilt (M = 6.06, SD = 3.18) was seen as less affecting than shame (M = 7.64, SD = 2.68), but both emotions were more affecting than no emotion (M = 4.65, SD = 3.24). All emotion conditions differed significantly from each other by Tukey post-hoc test.Judgments of the director's responsibility were only affected by emotion; F(2,243) = 5.71, MSE = 1.13, p < .01. In Tukey post-hoc tests, the guilt condition had a higher mean responsibility (M = 4.82, SD = 1.05) than did shame (M = 4.38, SD = 1.07) or no emotion (M = 4.33, SD = 1.08) which did not differ from each other.

  different underlying processes. Positive reactions to an apology may be dictated by the type of emotion expressed regardless of group membership, possibly due to ingroup bias or ultimate attribution error. However, as we have shown, negative reactions such as insult are more sensitive to the combination of outgroup membership and an offer of reparations.

  et al. 20 by its recipients. But when the feelings of an apology's recipients do matter, our results

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Mean insult by emotion and group, Experiment 1.

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: Mean insult by emotion, group and action, Experiment 2.

  R I P T

	Shame and Insult	Giner-Sorolla et al. 9
	= 2.74, SD = 2.33) than the US company (M = 2.59, SD = 2.00) , t(75) = 0.23, ns; and
	actually showed a nonsignificant trend toward more positive feelings about the Russian
	company (M = 8.61, SD = 2.35) than the US company (M = 7.72, SD = 2.75), t(75) = 1.52, p
	= .13.
	A Group x Emotion ANOVA on the extent to which the director was emotionally
	affected revealed only a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 62) = 49.03; shame (M =
	8.87) was seen as more affecting than guilt (M = 4.45). No other effect was significant, F <

1. Although 12 participants failed to complete this item, they were equally distributed, six each, in the shame and guilt conditions. The responsibility rating was not significantly affected by the manipulations; in particular, shame and guilt responses yielded near equal judgments of responsibility, F (1,72) = 0.22, and this was not moderated by group, F(1, 72) = 0.50.

This research was partially funded by UK Economic and Social Research Council grant RES-000-22-0004.


Martijn Veltkamp
email: m.veltkamp@uu.nl.

Henk Aarts

Ruud Custers

On the Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors: Subliminal Priming of Behavior Representations Turns Deprivation into Motivation

Building on recent research into the emergence of human motivation and goal pursuit in the absence of the conscious awareness of the source of this pursuit, the present article aimed to shed light on how states of deprivation (e.g., deprivation of fluid) actually produce the motivation and corresponding behavior that lifts the deprivation. Two studies established that

when participants were relatively deprived of fluids, they experienced enhanced motivation to drink and consumed more fluid in an alleged tasting test, and these effects were more pronounced when the concept of drinking was rendered accessible by subliminal priming.

These results suggest that specific motivational goal states and corresponding behaviors do not arise directly from deprivation per se, but that accessible goal-related cognitions play a role in this process. Implications for theory and research on deprivation and nonconscious goal pursuit are briefly discussed.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 3

Human beings continuously need specific resources like fluid or food in order to remain healthy and even to survive. From time to time such resources will therefore have a profound impact on behavior. Specifically, the level of deprivation of essential resources is considered to directly influence motivation and behaviors directed at reducing the deprivation.

For example, the more deprived of fluid a person gets, the more motivated to drink that person will become.

However, there is research to suggest that the relation between deprivation and motivation is not that straightforward. Recent studies show that people become more motivated to engage in specific behaviors when mental representations of the behavior are (supraliminally and subliminally) primed by environmental cues (for an overview, see Custers & Aarts, 2005a;Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004). These priming effects on motivated goaldirected behavior underscore the human ability to form, store and access specific knowledge representations in memory to promote effective behavior. One possible reason for these goal priming effects, however, is that people have learned that the primed behavior has positive consequences under certain conditions, and deprivation may typify such a condition. The motivation to engage in goal-directed behaviors and to obtain essential resources may thus result from an interplay between deprivation and accessible knowledge on a basic nonconscious level. The present paper aims to advance the idea that these two different potential sources may work in tandem to produce motivation and behavior. Specifically, we hypothesized that the effect of deprivation (e.g., of fluids) on the motivation to engage in behavior that lifts the deprivation (e.g., drinking) is moderated by the enhanced accessibility of the mental representations related to the behavior.

The idea that deprivation of primary resources affects motivation is well-studied.

Classic theorists like Murray (1938) already considered time of deprivation as an important factor in motivation. More specifically, motivation was thought to depend on a cyclical

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 4

process: the longer one state lasts (e.g., waking), the higher the deprivation of the other state will be (e.g., sleeping) and the more one wants to attain this other state. Several studies support the idea that deprivation influences motivation. For example, deprivation of crucial resources (e.g., fluid, food and even social resources such as money) has been found to influence the desire to obtain deprivation-reducing or goal-related objects (e.g. [START_REF] Drobes | Food deprivation and emotional reactions to food cues: implications for eating disorders[END_REF][START_REF] Ferguson | Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit on nonconscious evaluation[END_REF]Raynor & Epstein, 2003;Seibt, Hafner, & Deutsch, 2007;Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003), perception (McClelland & Atkinson, 1948), memory [START_REF] Aarts | On the psychology of drinking: Being thirsty and perceptually ready[END_REF], attention (Jones, Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006;Lusher, Chandler, & Ball, 2004) and actual behavior [START_REF] Campfield | Human eating: evidence for a physiological basis using a modified paradigm[END_REF]Raynor & Epstein, 2003).

However, although the studies alluded to above show strong effects of deprivation on measures of motivation, it is important to note that this influence may be confounded with accessibility of representations of behavior that lift the deprivation. That is, in most studies human participants are consciously aware of their state of deprivation and the goal to reduce it as a result of the explicit nature in which deprivation is manipulated or measured before the motivation measure (dependent variable) is assessed. For example, in their seminal work on the projective expression of implicit needs, McClelland and Atkinson (1948) asked participants not to eat for a certain amount of time before the start of the experimental session.

Upon entering the lab, it was checked whether participants had adhered to the food regime, and then exposed to an ostensibly subliminal perception task (they actually projected empty slides on a screen). By asking participants specific questions about the slides (e.g., "What kind of things are on the table displayed on the slide?"), McClelland and Atkinson showed that hungry participants were more likely to "see" eating-related objects than did non-hungry participants. Such manipulations of deprivation are very common in recent research as well.

Although explicit instructions to abstain from eating or drinking indeed result in food or fluid

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 5 deprivation, they also render the mental representation of the relevant behavior ("eating", "drinking") accessible. In a similar vein, some studies enhanced the mental accessibility of deprivation-reducing behavior by asking participants to explicitly rate their level of thirst or hunger before the dependent variables are assessed. Thus, whereas a large body of research indicates that deprivation affects motivation, it is not clear how these effects interact with enhanced accessibility of relevant behavior representations.

Early biological approaches to motivation already suggest that deprivation alone is often not enough to motivate behavior (e.g., [START_REF] Geen | Human motivation: a social psychological approach[END_REF]. In order to reduce deprivation, the organism has to know which behavior it desires to perform. [START_REF] Hull | Goal attraction and directing ideas conceived as habit phenomena[END_REF], for instance, stated that apart from the tension that is created by the deprivation, which is the driving force behind motivation, the organism should learn through reinforcement which responses to which stimuli reduce the deprivation. This idea was further advanced by work on incentive learning.

These theories grew out of several remarkable findings in different animal labs that shed new light on the role of reinforcement in learning processes following the s-r habit paradigm (Skinner, 1953;Watson, 1925). According to incentive theory [START_REF] Bindra | A motivational view of learning, performance, and behavior modification[END_REF][START_REF] Bolles | Reinforcement, expectancy, and learning[END_REF]Toates, 1986), it is not so much the strength of the stimulus-behavior relation that is reinforced, but specific behaviors are rendered more desirable by the deprivation, as the behaviors predict positive consequences under this condition. For example, one may have learned that drinking is desirable whenever one is deprived of fluid. As modern research often conceptualizes such learning in terms of mental processes that involve the acquisition and activation of knowledge representations (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005b), these views on deprivation and motivation suggest that priming deprivation-relevant knowledge facilitates the influence of deprivation on motivational behavior. Accordingly, people who are deprived should be more motivated to engage in specific deprivation-reducing behaviors, but these

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 6 effects are more likely to become manifest when the mental accessibility of these behaviors is enhanced.

There are a few recent studies that explored this interaction between deprivation and priming. Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002; Study 1) asked their participants to abstain from drinking for three hours. When entering the lab, participants were all checked on the fluidabstinence criterion and explicitly rated their level of thirst. Next, all participants ate cookies, after which half of them were allowed to drink water (the non-deprived condition), the other half were not (deprived condition). Participants then again rated their thirst. Subsequently, the accessibility of the concept of drinking was experimentally enhanced by subliminally priming half of the participants with drinking-related words and the other half with non-words. Next, participants were again asked to rate their thirst, and finally, they were asked to taste from two beverages. Although the interaction effect between deprivation and priming was not significant, the results of this study suggested that deprived participants drank more during the taste test when primed with the concept of drinking, whereas non-deprived participants were not influenced by the primes. These findings are interesting, but also somewhat puzzling.

Specifically, the subliminal priming effects on behavior ensued even though participants were made consciously aware of their deprivation of fluid and drinking goal by the explicit nature of the experimental set-up. Whereas conscious and nonconscious priming effects on motivation and goal pursuit have been demonstrated to occur independently [START_REF] Bargh | The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals[END_REF], the repeated opportunity of explicitly reflecting on the deprivation and deprication-reducing behavior before the assessment of the dependent variable provides a challenge as to the meaning of the subliminal priming effects.

A study by [START_REF] Aarts | Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing[END_REF] Study 1) may offer some clarity to this dispute. They investigated the effects of priming the concept of earning money and of deprivation of money independently by measuring deprivation after the dependent variable

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 7

(thus ensuring them that they did not activate thoughts about the deprivation or behavior before the priming event). In this study, the concept of making money was rendered accessible by capitalizing on the assumption that participants nonconsciously inferred the concept during the observation of another person's goal-directed behavior. After this goal inference task, participants were told that the study was almost completed, but that they had to perform a mouse-click task. Crucially, participants were told that if enough time was left at the end of the session they would be able to engage in a lottery in which they could win money. Participants' pace of working on the mouse-click task served as a measure of motivation: the faster they worked on it, the stronger their motivation to get to the last part of the session, where they could earn money. The findings of this study revealed that priming of the concept "making money" resulted in more motivational behavior only when people were relatively more deprived of it.

Although suggestive, these findings are not conclusive as to the interaction between deprivation and accessibility of deprivation-reducing behavior. As [START_REF] Aarts | Nonconscious goal inference and contagion: On pursuing goals one perceives in other people' s behavior[END_REF] suggested, their results can be attributed to differences in goal inferences between low and high deprived persons: highly deprived people inferred the goal to make money more readily then people with low deprivation. As a result, the goal could have been more accessible for highly deprived participants. To exclude this potential confound, in the present two studies we manipulated the mental accessibility of a deprivation-reducing behavior directly -i.e., by subliminally priming the concept of drinking -and compared the effects of this priming procedure with a measure of fluid deprivation on motivated activity. Moreover, we took care not to render the behavior concept accessible in any other way than through the priming manipulation. That is, until the dependent variables were assessed, people were not reminded of thirst and drinking. In doing so, we attempted to disentangle the effects of deprivation and accessibility on motivation and behavior. Specifically, in the first study we investigated the

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 8 effects of deprivation and priming on participant's experienced motivation to drink, while the second study was designed to test effects on actual amount of drinking behavior.

Study 1

Study 1 examines the hypothesis that priming of deprivation-reducing behavior representations moderates the effects of deprivation on the experienced motivation to engage in the behavior. For this purpose, participants were either subliminally primed or not with the concept of drinking and indicated their experienced motivation to engage in drinking behavior. Following previous work (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998;Seibt, et al., 2007),

we measured deprivation of fluid by using a self-report method that asked participants to indicate the last time they had drunk (in minutes) before they showed up at the experimental session. To make sure that the deprivation measure did not prime thoughts about drinking and thirst by itself, deprivation was assessed after the experienced motivation measure. If the representation of drinking has to be rendered accessible for deprivation to affect motivation, as we hypothesized, being deprived of fluids would more likely lead to increased experienced motivation for participants primed with drinking concept.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy-six Dutch undergraduates participated in this study receiving 2 euros or course credits for their participation. They were randomly assigned to either a drink-prime or nondrink-prime condition. Deprivation of fluids was measured using a self-report method.

Procedure. Participants worked in separate cubicles in which the experiment was presented on a 100 Hz computer screen. All participants started with the subliminal priming task. Subsequently, participants' level of experienced motivation to drink was measured and then, after a filler task unrelated to the present study, the deprivation of fluid measure was taken. Finally, participants performed a task in which awareness of the primes was assessed.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 9

Priming task. The first task was announced as a task on basic perception, allegedly assessing people's ability to distinguish stimuli (dots) from backgrounds varying in brightness. The task consisted of 60 trials (including 20 practice trials). During the practice trials the background was grey, and black during the experimental trials. Every trial started with a row of crosses as a pre-mask (1000 ms), followed by a prime word (20 ms) and another row of crosses as a postmask (1000 ms), all presented at the center of the screen. In the drinkprime condition the words "drinking" and "thirst" were primed (20 times each), whereas in the nondrink-prime condition a random letter string served as a control prime. During the postmask, a dot could appear either above or below the row of crosses (10 ms). Participants had to count the number of dots (for a similar subliminal priming procedure, see [START_REF] Aarts | Nonconscious goal inference and contagion: On pursuing goals one perceives in other people' s behavior[END_REF]Custers & Aarts, 2005b). Deprivation measure. To assess the level of deprivation, participants were asked to report (in retrospect) how many minutes before the experimental session they had drunk for the last time (mean deprivation: 84 minutes). An ANOVA showed that the reported minutes of deprivation were not affected by priming, F < 1.

Subliminality check and debriefing. To assure that the primes were presented subliminally, that is, that the primes could not be consciously identified as meaningful words (Marcel, 1983), participants performed the priming task again at the end of the experimental session. This time, the task consisted of 40 trials. Again, every trial started with a row of crosses as a pre-mask (1000 ms), followed by a prime word (20 ms) and a row of crosses as a postmask (1000 ms), sometimes followed by a dot appearing either above or below the row of

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 10 crosses (10 ms) which the participants had to count. The primes consisted of the words "drinking" and "thirst" (10 times each), and of random letter strings in the remaining 20 trials.

However, the participants were told this time that every time they saw a row of crosses, there would appear an existing word or a nonword for a very brief period in between the row of crosses. Their task was to indicate after every trial whether a word or a nonword was presented. In a signal detection analysis we assessed whether participants were able to distinguish words from nonwords (d'). The results showed that d' (M = -.02, SD = .38) did not significantly deviate from zero, t(73) = -.45, p = .66, indicating that participants could not distinguish between words and nonwords and thus were not able to consciously see the primes. Finally, all participants were debriefed. The debriefing indicated that participants

were not aware of the real purpose of the study.

Results and Discussion

To test our specific hypotheses, we conducted a regression analysis in which level of experienced motivation was predicted by deprivation and prime (nondrink-prime = 0, drinkprime = 1). To reduce multicollinearity bias, all variables were standardized before computing the cross-products [START_REF] Dunlap | Failure to detect moderating effects: is multicollinearity the problem?[END_REF]. Analysis revealed a significant main effect for deprivation, β = .35, t(75) = 3.19, p < .01, but not for prime, β = .16, t(75) = 1.50, p = .14. As expected, the results showed a significant two-way interaction, β = .23, t(75) = 2.10, p = .04. Regression lines are presented in Figure 1. In support of the hypothesis, additional analysis revealed that the level of experienced motivation to drink increased as a function of deprivation in the drinkprime, β = .49, t(40) = 3.53, p < .01, but not in the nondrink-prime condition, β = .12, t(34) = 0.71, p = .49. Furthermore, we examined the effect of priming for participants who were high or low deprived (see [START_REF] Cohen | Applied multiple regression / correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences[END_REF]. When deprivation was high (1 SD above the mean), experienced motivation increased significantly as a function of priming, β = .39, t(75) = 2.55, p = .01. However, when deprivation was low

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 11 priming did not affect experienced motivation (1 SD below the mean), β = -.07, t(75) = -0.44, p = .66. In short, when in a state of deprivation of fluid, our participants experienced enhanced motivation to engage in drinking behavior when they were subliminally primed with the concept of drinking.

Study 2

The goal of Study 2 was to replicate the moderating role of priming in deprivation on motivation that was found in Study 1 and to extend this finding in two important ways. First, a different deprivation measure was used, namely time of the day of participation. Instead of using a self-reported measure, we manipulated deprivation by making use of a more natural setting that allowed us to test participants at either one of two periods of the day (either before or after lunchtime). Based on previous work (e.g., [START_REF] Fitzsimons | Thirst[END_REF][START_REF] Hulshof | Resultaten van de[END_REF], we assumed that participants would be more deprived of fluid before than after lunch.

Importantly, we took care that all participants remained ignorant about their level of deprivation during their participation.

Second, the present study was designed to extend the effects of experienced motivation in Study 1 to a behavior measure. Specifically, if deprivation and priming increases the experienced motivation to drink, then we should also be able to find effects on actual amount of drinking. To this end, we observed how much soda participants consumed in an alleged tasting task. Again, we expected that priming moderates the effects of deprivation.

That is, we hypothesized that, in comparison to low deprived participants, high deprived participants will exhibit more deprivation-reducing behavior (drinking more soda), but that these differences are more pronounced when they are primed with the drinking concept.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and one Dutch undergraduates were recruited for this study. The teaching time table for classes allowed us to run the study at two time

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 12 periods of the day: between 10.30 am and 12.30 pm (before lunch, hence, high deprivation condition) or between 1.00 pm and 3.00 pm (after lunch, hence, low deprivation condition).

All students had classes between 9.00 am and 10.30 am, and lunch break between 12.30 pm and 1.00 pm. 1 Participants received 2 euro for their participation. They were randomly assigned to a drinkprime or nondrink-prime condition.

Procedure and materials. Participants were recruited by means of a sign-up procedure.

To conceal the real purpose of the study, the study was announced as an experiment on basic perception and judgment. Once the participants entered the lab, they were told they would first participate in the perception task, and that there would be a judgment task at the end of the session. The experiment was run in a room with two tables separated by a screen. There was a PC on the first table, while the experimenter was sitting behind the second table (which was not visible for participants). The participants were seated behind the PC where the first task was presented. This first task was a priming task, which was identical to Study 1. Next, participants were instructed to go to the experimenter to participate in an alleged unrelated study designed to gather stimulus materials for upcoming research on consumer behavior. The experimenter then presented a plate with two glasses of soda. To exclude the possibility that participants preferred one of the two sodas and that the sodas spontaneously evoked thoughts about thirst, we used sodas that in an unrelated pilot study were reported to be evaluative neutral and not associated with quenching thirst: Sprite and Cassis. The brand names were shown on the glasses. Participants were simply asked to choose one of the glasses and taste from it as much as they wanted. The dependent variable was the quantity of consumed soda measured in grams. There was no effect of priming and deprivation on choice of the drinks, F's < 1. Finally, participants were debriefed. Debriefing indicated that participants had not been aware of the primes and did not suspect a relation between the priming task and the taste test.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 13

Results and Discussion

To test whether priming and deprivation had an effect on the quantity of consumed soda in grams, the quantity measure was subjected to a 2 (drinkprime or nondrink-prime) x 2 (deprivation: low or high) between participants ANOVA. The results showed a main effect of priming, F(1,97) = 6.62, p = .01, 2 = .06, indicating that participants primed with drink words consumed more soda. The results also suggested a main effect of deprivation, but this was not significant, F(1,97) = 1.79, p = .18, 2 = .02. However, the two-way interaction showed the expected prime by deprivation interaction effect, F(1,97) = 4.46, p = .05, 2 = .04.

Figure 2 presents consumed soda as a function of deprivation and prime.

Closer inspection of this interaction effect showed, in line with our hypothesis, that fluid consumption increased as a function of deprivation for participants primed with drink words, F(1,99) = 3.47, p = .06, 2 = .03, but not for participants primed with non-drink words, F<1. Furthermore, priming of drinking-related words resulted in increased soda consumption for high deprived participants, F(1,99) = 8.28, p < .01, 2 = .08. For low deprived participants, no prime effect was found, F < 1.

General Discussion

In two studies we investigated the role of deprivation and accessibility of representations of deprivation-reducing behavior in the motivation to engage in the behavior.

The results of Study 1 showed that participants who were relatively more deprived of fluids experienced stronger motivation to drink, but only if the concept of drinking was rendered accessible in a subliminal priming task. Study 2 extended these effects by establishing that subliminal priming of drinking-related words caused participants who were relatively highly deprived of fluid at the time of their participation (before lunch) to consume more fluid in an alleged tasting task than low-deprived participants (participating after lunch). Together, these results give convergent evidence for our hypothesis that, in the domain of thirst and drinking,

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 14 the effects of deprivation on motivation are moderated by accessibility. The present research thus concurs with studies showing that deprivation affects motivation (e.g., [START_REF] Campfield | Human eating: evidence for a physiological basis using a modified paradigm[END_REF]McClelland & Atkinson, 1948;Raynor & Epstein, 2003;Seibt et al., 2007;Sherman et al., 2003). Importantly however, our research also extends previous work on the relation between deprivation and motivation by disentangling the influence of enhanced mental accessibility of deprivation-reducing behavior from deprivation and showing that they both may matter for people to become motivated to lift their deprivation.

The present findings corroborate our suggestion that priming the representation of specific deprivation-reducing behaviors under conditions of deprivation causes that behavior to become associated with positive consequences. Such deprivation-driven rewarding property of behavior and its relation with motivation is not new, but was already predicted by incentive theories. Incentive theories propose that behaviors that become associated with positive affect form an incentive that enhances the motivation to engage in those behaviors (see for a review, [START_REF] Berridge | Reward learning: Reinforcement, incentives, and expectations[END_REF]. These incentive learning effects are assumed to occur because the positive affect aroused by, for instance, the act of eating when being hungry, becomes linked to the behavior itself. As a consequence, the hungry organism can be motivated to eat by priming cues referring to eating behavior without explicitly reinforcing the behavior. Consistent with this view, our research suggests that the underlying mechanism by which deprivation translates into motivation involves the priming of the mental representation of the behavior that becomes attached to positive affect, as the behavior is known to have positive implications (i.e. reducing the deprivation) under the condition of deprivation. The present findings thus extends and integrates current inquiries into priming, motivation and behavior with the previous study on the role of deprivation in incentive learning.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 15

An important issue emanating from the present work concerns the question of how deprivation affects goal priming effects. Research in this area assumes that goals are mentally represented as positive behavioral states, and has demonstrated that priming of these representations (such as earning money, helping, socializing) motivates people to engage in the behaviors outside of conscious awareness (for an overview, see Custers & Aarts, 2005a;Moskowitz, et al., 2004). Whereas the effects of deprivation are rarely assessed in the goal priming literature (but see, [START_REF] Aarts | Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing[END_REF]Strahan et al., 2002), it may be the case that similar effects emerge as in the present studies -that is, a main effect of priming, but qualified by level of deprivation. However, even when one assumes that deprivation may not play a role in goal priming effects, the present studies suggest that it is not so much the priming of the behavior representation per se that increases the motivation, but the link between the behavior and positive affect.

Evidence for this idea comes from recent research (Custers & Aarts, 2005b;[START_REF] Custers | In search of the nonconscious sources of goal pursuit: accessibility and positive affective valence of the goal state[END_REF]. In one study, the valence of the behavioral concept of doing puzzles was rendered more positive by exposing participants subliminally to prime words representing the behavior. The prime words were briefly followed by positive stimuli (e.g., friend, summer). Results showed that this nonconscious positive shaping (or creation) of goals enhanced participants' motivation to engage in the behavior. Subsequent studies revealed that subliminal priming effects on motivated behavior were more pronounced when the primed concept preexisted as a desired Indeed, recent work has just started to investigate the role of deprivation and implicit affective processes in the instigation and regulation of goal pursuit. Winkielman, Berridge and Wilbarger (2005), for example, asked their participants to rate their level of thirst, and showed that subsequent consumption behavior and value judgments of an unfamiliar beverage were influenced by subliminally presented happy or angry faces, but only for thirsty (deprived)

participants. These findings demonstrate the intricate interplay of deprivation and affect in motivation. However, in their studies deprivation did not influence behavior unless happy faces were subliminally flashed on the computer screen, even though drinking related thoughts were explicitly activated by thirst ratings at the beginning of the experiment.

Although the findings reported by Winkielman et al. (2005) may at a first glance be at odds with our and other findings, they may actually provide more insight in how states of deprivation give rise to motivational behavior. That is, the crucial difference is that in the studies of Winkielman and colleagues, the drink that participants could use to reduce their state of deprivation was an unfamiliar beverage stored in a pitcher. In this case, there was no clear information about the desirability of drinking the beverage in terms of instrumentality in reducing the state of deprivation, but the additional affective cues may have mimicked the positive affective signal that otherwise is linked to behavior as a result of the reduction of the deprivation (cf. Custers & Aarts, 2005b). In other words, the nonconsciously presented happy faces offered participants an extra affective-motivational boost to drink the beverage in order to reduce the state of deprivation. However, this suggested interplay between deprivation, accessibility of behavior and affect in producing nonconscious goal pursuit is rather speculative, and hence it awaits further empirical scrutiny.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 17

Another question that is raised by the present data is whether external priming of deprivation-reducing behavior is always required for effects of deprivation on motivation to

occur. The answer is probably "no". When people are extremely deprived they may not be able to think of anything else (see Murray, 1938;[START_REF] Fitzsimons | Thirst[END_REF], and hence other psychological processes are called for to deal with the self-threatening situation (e.g., rumination about current concerns, cf. Klinger, 1975). Indeed, it is a commonly reported fact that castaways or survivors start to fantasise about water and food after a period of extreme deprivation (e.g., Read, 1996;Wolf, 1958). Although under these conditions deprivation and accessibility may be no longer independent, it may just be the case that under conditions of moderate deprivation, like in the present studies, external primes help to prevent such conditions. Indeed, it is known that organisms usually engage in actions that reduce deprivation long before the level of deprivation is harmful to the organism [START_REF] Cabanac | Sensory pleasure[END_REF] cf. the role of deprivation in anticipatory goal responses ;[START_REF] Geen | Human motivation: a social psychological approach[END_REF]Toates, 1986). Such a mechanism that reacts to deprivation-reducing cues in the environment at levels of mild deprivation would be highly adaptive, as it allows the organism to seize opportunities to reduce deprivation, long before it threatens their survival [START_REF] Fitzsimons | Thirst[END_REF]Rolls & Rolls, 1982).

To conclude, we believe that the present research gives interesting new insights in how the gap between bodily states of deprivation and cognitively motivational behavior is filled.

Our motivation to engage in behavior does not appear out of nothing, it is produced by mental processes that can operate outside of conscious awareness and interact with states of deprivation. Thus, conveniently, we may not want to drink that cold glass of water until our environment brings it up.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 22

Footnotes 1 In another study with different students as participants we examined the level of deprivation of fluid when measured before lunch (between 10.30 am -12.30 pm) and after lunch (1.00 pm -3.00 pm). This study showed that our students were virtually twice as much deprived of fluid before lunch (M = 2.82 hours) than after lunch (M = 1.45 hours), t(144) = 3.68, p < .001.

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 23

  Experienced motivation. As a measure of experienced motivation, participants had to respond to the questions "To what extent do you want to drink right now?" and "To what extent do you want to quench your thirst right now?" on a 9-point scale. The answers on these questions were averaged to obtain one measure of experienced motivation, r = .78, p < .01.

  state associated with positive affect in participants' mind. These findings indicate that positive affect forms a basic part of the representation and motivation of nonconsciously activated representations of behaviors. Thus, priming the behavior representation triggers the motivation to perform the behavior. Whereas the present studies capitalize on the idea that deprivation renders the primed representation of deprivation-reducing behavior more positive, future research could shed light on this important matter by examining, for instance, how A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 16 deprivation and positive affect work together to produce and regulate motivation and behavior nonconsciously.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1: Experienced motivation to drink as a function of deprivation and prime (Study 1).

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: Quantity of drinking (in grams) as a function of deprivation and prime (Study 2).

The work in this paper was supported by grants from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (VIDI 452-02-047; VENI 451-06-014).

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The Emergence of Deprivation-reducing Behaviors 18

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The