Sylvie Gangloff

The relations between Turkey and Macedonia: The incoherencies of a political partnership

Ankara recognized the Republic of Macedonia on the February 6, 1992, at the same time as it did all four former Yugoslav republics. Ever since, it has remained constant in this global and undifferentiated approach to the four republics: on the August 28, 1992 in London, the foreign minister, Hikmet Çetin, signed the protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations with these republics and, in October, the appointment of ambassadors was announced. Only the official relations between Turkey and the FRY were interrupted, but not contacts between the two. The Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara, Trajan Petrovski, was recalled on of January 31, 1992, a few days after Turkey announced its imminent recognition of the four secessionist republics. Of Macedonian origin, Petrovski was accused by Belgrade to have urged Turkey to recognize the Macedonian state. 1 Isolated in the area with its tense or ambiguous relations with all of its neighbors, suffering from a lack of international recognition, and weakened by a difficult economic transition and a rather divided territorial ethnic composition, the Republic of Macedonia warmly welcomed this public support to its independence and its territorial integrity. The two countries shared the same local enmities, especially with Greece, and Turkey looked like the sole regional country liable-and willing-to cooperate with Skopje. Bulgaria, which has recognized the independence of Macedonia as soon as January 1992, did not extend this recognition to the -Macedonian nation‖, leading the Macedonian leaders to fear that its intentions were rather ambiguous. Last, by developing tight cooperation with Turkey, the Macedonian leaders tried to counterbalance a perceived hostile alliance between Serbia and Greece.

As for Turkey, it took advantage of the isolation of the tiny republic to set it up as a local partner. Most of Balkan countries have kept mixed feelings (if not deep rooted enmity) toward the Turks, perceived as the heir of the Ottomans who dominated the area for several centuries. In this context, the very fact that the Macedonian leaders were not reluctant to cooperate with Ankara (indeed, partly because they felt isolated) pleaded in favor of this partnership. Last, Turkish analysts thought that the preservation of the stability of this country was essential to avoiding a general flare-up of the area, and therefore, that it should be supported in its quest for recognition.

A firm support to the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia

The first official visit abroad, always a very symbolic move, of President K.

Gligorov, was to Turkey (in March 1992) and President T. Özal was the first foreign chief of state to undertake an official visit to Macedonia (in June 1993). Pubic statements pronounced during official visits are always extremely cordial and the leaders of both countries regularly praise the excellence of their bilateral relations. Turkish leaders do not miss any opportunity to recall that they were one of the first countries to recognize Macedonian independence, moreover under its constitutional name of -The Republic of Macedonia‖. 2 Nevertheless, first or second, Turkey very soon supported the independence of this country and acted in all international spheres to support its independence and territorial integrity. Currently Turkey is still the only NATO member to have recognized the -Republic of Macedonia‖ under this name and not as -FYROM‖ (which causes the now-familiar footnote -Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonian under its constitutional name‖ in all NATO official documents). Skopje named an ambassador to Ankara in July 1993. The position was held by Trajan Petrovski, the former and last Yugoslav ambassador to Turkey. 3 In February 1994, Greece imposed a total embargo on the Republic of Macedonia (it had already imposed an oil embargo the previous year). The tiny Republic was therefore completely landlocked, as its main-and almost unique-line of communication, the Morava-Vardar valley, was cut off, in the north, by the international embargo on the FRY and, in the south, by Greece. A few days before, the United States had recognized the Republic of Macedonia (under the name of FYROM). At this point, relations between Turkey and Macedonia tightened very rapidly. Two days after the announcement of the Greek embargo, the document on the construction of an east-west corridor stretching from Durrës in Albania to Varna in Bulgaria was signed. The following month, an agreement on economic cooperation between Turkey and Macedonia was signed and Turkey committed to raise $25 million of credits for the Republic. 4 The State Minister, Murat Karayalçın, came to Skopje in May 1994 and announced the donation of 10,000 tons of corn to the republic. Ankara had already supplied Macedonia with fuel during the Greek oil embargo in 1993. The bilateral treaty was signed the following year (July 1995) as were the agreements regulating legal trade (June and July 1995). Last, cooperation in the military field was enhanced.

The Republic of Macedonia inherited very little military equipment from the former Yugoslavia. With a total of 12,000 men in 1995, no air force and only two T-34 tanks from Second World War,5 this army did not at all represent a dissuasive force. In 1994, the United States committed themselves to supply materials from the American surplus.

Negotiations in military fields were initiated in June 1993 with the Macedonian Chief of Staff's visit to Turkey and with the Defense minister's visit in November.

Turkey agreed to train Macedonian officers in its academies (this cooperation is mentioned as well in the protocol signed by the two foreign ministers in December 1993). In 1995, negotiations accelerated and several agreements were signed. One, dating from April 1995 (-Agreement on industrial and technical cooperation in the field of defense‖), set up the legal basis for this cooperation (this agreement came into force after the arms embargo on Macedonia was lifted) 6 . Three months later, a -Document on mutually complementary confidence and security building measures‖, called as well the -Skopje Document‖, was concluded. This agreement foresees exchange of military experts, observations of respective military activities and joint military exercises 7 . Annual cooperation programs were later organized. Last, an agreement on the training of Macedonian pilots was signed in March 1996.

In 1997, while chaos was spreading in Albania (with the Pyramid scheme scandal) and threatening to expand to Macedonia, 8 Turkey deepened its military cooperation with Macedonia. It deployed a preventive diplomacy combining military delegations' visits, joint military exercises and public support to the territorial integrity of Macedonian territory: on the March 15, a Turkish military delegation officially visited Skopje; ten days later, the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs came to Skopje with a new military delegation; in April, the Turkish government announced it would take charge of the formation of Macedonian officers (although apparently, this training had already begun); the following month, the first common bilateral military exercises were organized in Macedonia, etc. 9 In March 1997, Turkey agreed as well to give the Macedonian army several transport vehicles, two patrol boats and a communication system. A year later, a civil war broke out in Kosovo (spring 1998). This time, the threat of an extension of the combats to the Macedonian territory was highly feared as the Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia maintained close relations within Yugoslavia.

Very quickly Turkey proposed to equip Macedonia with combat planes and entered into negotiations on twenty F-5 planes. 11 The delivery of these planes did not finally take place for -obscure‖ reasons 12 but, again, Turkey showed its willingness to back Macedonia during regional crisis.

In 1999, the repression in Kosovo and the fear that an ethnic cleansing plan was about to be implemented in the province by Belgrade prompted NATO to carry on air strikes against FRY. Albanians were massively expelled from the province and took refuge mainly in the neighboring Albania and Republic of Macedonia. An estimated 950,000 Kosovars left Kosovo, by fear or by force, and, according to the UNHCR, a total of about 250,000 had found shelter in Macedonia when a cease-fire was concluded. Here again, Turkey extended its help to Macedonia.

As the significant strategic importance of the Republic was underlined by all analysis, Turkey deepened its military assistance to Macedonia with a new donation of equipment and ammunition worth $1.9 million. 13 Furthermore, Turkish leaders fearedor understood-that the fragile and tense relations between the Macedonian and the Albanians in Macedonia could be further endangered by the flux of refugees from Kosovo. Ankara therefore opened its doors to refugees. A total of 18,000 Kosovars took refuge in Turkey from April to June 1999, some of them transferred by plane from Macedonia. 14 The Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) also sent some humanitarian aid equipment (tents, food, clothing, etc.) and set up a tent-site in Macedonia (and another one in Albania).

11 Hürriyet, July 6, 1998; MILS, July 1 and 9, 1998. 12 The deal was finally cancelled because, first official reason, the maintenance of these planes was too expensive, or, second official reason, because Turkey had requested the purchase of a transport plane from Turkey as a prerequisite for the transaction. Most probably, the deal was cancelled because of strong Greek reactions. MIC, July 10 and 16, 1998; MILS, November 12, 1998, March 17, 1999. 13 Turkish Daily News, June 14, 1999. 14 All of them returned to Kosovo during the summer of 1999.

On the whole, this Turkish effort was highly praised by Macedonian leaders. 15 Turkey was even elected as a -model country‖ by the Macedonian prime minister for its assistance to Kosovar refugees. 16 On the Turkish side, President Demirel declared, during his visit in April 1999, that Macedonia had shown an -exemplary attitude‖ in providing temporary shelter for Kosovars. 17 Demirel's appraisal was widely reported and commented on in the Macedonian press, whereas Macedonia had been under hard criticism for the passive if not inhumane way it behaved toward refugees. 18 . Last, in September 1999, the long-awaited free trade agreement between the two countries was signed. This agreement is asymmetrical: Macedonia will have a more liberal access to the Turkish market than the other way around (taxes will be decreased slower), in order to lower the deficit Macedonia has in its exchange with Turkey. 19 On the cultural level, several projects were carried out: conferences, concerts, film festivals, exhibitions, and so on, were organized jointly. A symposium on Atatürk was organized by the University of Gazi (Ankara) and the University of Bitola in October 1998, 20 a symposium on Turkish culture in Skopje was held in March 1998, a film was jointly financed, 21 in 1995, the annual -Goce Days‖ were organized in Istanbul (featuring exhibitions, concerts, conferences), and so on. 22 The Turkish Cooperation Agency opened an office in Skopje in May 1997. It participated in several conferences, financed the formation of specialists in statistics, etc. 23 15 See, for example, Türkiye, April 8, 1999; Anadolu Ajansi, April 7, 1999; MIA, April 7 and 11, 1999. 16 Anadolu Ajansi, April 7, 1999. 17 Anadolu Ajansi, April 11, 12, 1999; Milliyet, April 12, 1999. 18 See, for example, Astrid Patozi, -Tirana-Skopje : le retour de l'inimitié‖, AIM, Tirana, April 10, 1999. 19

The Turkish minority in Macedonia: bridge of friendship?

There are officially some 80,000 Turks in Macedonia today (77,000 according to the April 1991 census, 83,000 according to the July 1994 census, i.e. roughly 4% of the country's population). This minority seems to have at its disposal much more cultural facilities than the Albanians. For example, the Albanians, five time more numerous than the Turks, barely have more publications or radio programs than the Turks 25 . The journal [newspaper?] Birlik is published since 1944 and another newspaper, Vardar, appears every two weeks. In 1992, 55 Turkish-Macedonian primary schools (among which 28 had education only in Turkish) were open in the country.

A Turkish Democratic Union (Türk Demokratik Birliği) was created in July 1990. This -Union‖ became a political party in October 1992 under the name of Democratic Party of the Turks (DPT) -Türk Demokratik Partisi, but it did not meet much success on the national scene. None of the 11 Turkish candidates passed the first round in the October and November 1990 legislative elections, and only 22 candidates were elected at the local level (i.e. 1.45% of the total of local elected officials, whereas the Turks represent 4% of the population). The Turkish population abandoned the -Turkish party‖ for the more general parties (Social Democrats, Liberal Party), or for the Albanian ones. Seven local elected officials out of 22 were members of the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity. In addition to this lack of politicalethnic cohesion, their geographic dispersion and the electoral law (quota of 7%) made the election of Turks to local assemblies more difficult. For the 1994 general elections, the DPT associated itself with the SDA-Islamic Path and obtained one 24 Cultural events might, however, prove counter-productive. Various incidents (talks given in Turkish or Albanian without any translation, etc.) occurred during the -Days of Macedonian culture‖, organize d in Turkey in 1995. MILS, April 18, 1995. 25 See the official data in Basic Statistical Data. Second Supplemented and Revised Edition, Statistical Office of Macedonia, Skopje, December 1992. deputy in Gostivar (Kenan Hasip). Out of the 57 DPT candidates, only seven passed the first round. 26 However, the DPT claims that the Turkish population in the eastern part of the country has been prevented from voting. 27 The DPT proclaims the Turks are being discriminated, and campaign on this cause. In a widely attended press conference in April 1993, Erdoğan Saraç, its president, denounced the -genocide of the Turks‖ and requested the appointment of Turks in the government and in other administrative organs (justice, police, army, etc.). 28 The DPT regularly sends some alarming reports to international organizations (such as to the OSCE in January 1993, to the European Court in February 1995, etc.), but the ad hoc mission set up by the OSCE concluded that there was no major abuse against the Turks (April 1993). However, with the noticeable exception of İsmail Güner, who was the Minister of Culture and later the government spokesman, 29 who is Turkish but not a member of the DPT, the Turks are indeed very poorly represented in national administrative institutions.

The DPT was also actively involved in the dispute over the education in eastern Macedonia and in Župa (Zhupa) in the area of Debar where, in 1995, Turkish classes were canceled by the Ministry due to the fact that the pupils -do not speak Turkish‖!

The DPT organized several protests and the boycott of primary schools in these areas (the protests went on for several years) and was behind the hunger strike movement undertaken in September 1996 by roughly 50 parents demanding for their children to be educated in Turkish. 30 The local Debar Macedonian community, on its part, accused the DPT of forcing these children (200 were involved in the dispute) to learn Turkish, sometimes by violent means. 31 The Minister of Education declared as well 26 Şule Kut, -Macedonian Politics: First Multiparty Elections after Independence‖, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, n°2, 1994/95, p. 40. 27 MILS, October 20, 1994. 28 MILS, June 27, 1994. 29 Ismail Güner was a member of the Social Democrat Alliance (SDSM). He resigned because of his opposition to the new law on the media. 30 Two illegal elementary schools where classes were taught in Turkish were as well torn down by the police in June 1995, following a decision of the Ministry. On this dispute, see MILS, February 9, 1995, June 9, 1995, August 29, 1995, September 5 and 26, 1995, September 4 and 16, 1996, December 27, 1996, January 15, 1997. 31 Murder attempts and child kidnapping were even invoked in the protest letter sent to the Ministry of Education in September 1995. MILS, September 26, 1995; MIC, September 27, 1995.

that -the request of the parents (Macedonian Muslims) to hold classes in Turkish was made under pressure from various political parties and groups‖. 32 Deep identity problems of the -Macedonian Muslims‖ (as well known as Torbeş) are at the center of this dispute. Some of them consider themselves as Turks who have lost their mother tongue and, on these grounds, they receive support from some Turkish movements, eager to fight the assimilation of the Turks in Macedonia.

Mustafa Balbay narrates a -typical‖ dialogue between a Macedonian Muslim and the administration:

--You, you are not Turkish, you are Macedonian. Your language is

Macedonian.

-No, we are Turks. But we have forgotten our language. You must recognize our right to an education in our mother tongue. -What is your mother tongue? -Turkish.

-But you don't speak Turkish! -We already told you that we have forgotten …‖. 33 But representatives of Macedonian Muslims (namely the Association of Macedonian Muslims) accuse the DPT of pressuring them to declare themselves as being Turks. For example, they complained that in Western parts of Macedonia, the 1994 census was carried out under the directive of the DPT and that the party's activists frightened the Macedonian Muslim population, ordering them to -negate their Macedonian language and national affiliation‖. 34 Turks in Macedonia are indeed threatened by assimilation. With their small numbers, their proximity to the Albanians (half of the Turkish community live in the north-east of the country, an area inhabited mainly by Albanians), they tend to integrate, mainly through marriages, into the Albanian community. On the political level, the Turkish leaders disagree with most of the Albanian demands, which are considered as extreme. The Turks find themselves squeezed between the Macedonian majority and the imposing Albanian minority, between Albanian and Macedonian nationalism and between their own struggle for minority rights and their struggle against assimilation by the Albanians. Relations between the DPT and the 32 MIC, September 27, 1995. 33 Mustafa Balbay, Balkanlar, Istanbul, Çağdaş, 1998, p. 72.

-Macedonian Islamic Community‖ (Meshibat), dominated by the Albanians, are as well quite tense. 35 The publication of the book -The Albanians in Macedonia‖ in 1995 motivated angry reactions from the Turkish community. This book expresses open animosity toward the Turks and the Ottoman empire (-the Ottoman Empire slaughtered Albanian women, children and the elderly‖, -the Turks are blood-thirsty occupiers‖, etc.). 36 Several ‗incidents'‖ worsened these relations within the Albanian community.

At the beginning of 1997, the Albanian mayors of Gostivar and Tetevo revoked Turkish as an official administrative language in their cities, on the grounds that the legal prerequisite of 20% of the local population was not met. The DPT strongly reacted and justified its claim on grounds that first, the decision was based on unsubstantial data, and that, second, the -Framework Convention on Minority Protection‖ considers that a minority language should be an administrative language in areas where it has been traditionally spoken, regardless of the fact that little of the overall population may be Turks. 37 Last, the Macedonian Turkish minority is divided between a secularized tendency and a more Islamist one. After a struggle within the DPT, the latter dominates the party whereas the former has not constituted any political movement.

The secularists, however, express their views in the monthly Vardar. This newspaper has probably been financed by the Turkish embassy. 38 A few Turks gather as well around the SDA-Islamic Path (Islam Yolu), an Islamist if not pan-islamist movement.

It changed its name in 1995 to SDA-Right Path (Hak Yolu) to moderate its religious image. 39 The Fund for Human Aid, El Hilal, plays as well a pivotal role. It works 34 MILS, June 27 and 30, 1994. 35 There is a representative of the Turkish community in the Meshibat, Anvi Engülü, journalist and former president of the Democratic Alliance of the Turks (this association was disbanded in July 1992). 36 within the framework of the Meshibat, and cooperates with the Turkish -Direction of Religious Affairs‖ (Diyanet) 40 , but is accused by the Macedonian press of links with the Refah! 41 The Fethullahcı are as well rather active in the country: they opened a high school in Skopje in 1997 (the -Yahya Kemal‖ college) 42 and publish a local weekly, Zaman-Makedonya, since March 1994. 43 Relations between these actors have fluctuated since 1992 and no stable picture can be drawn of their political and religious positions. 44 On these all the issues championed by the DPT (teaching in Turkish in some areas, recognition of Turkish as an official language in some areas and representation of the Turks in administrative bodies), Turkey did not take any offficial position. On the contrary, Turkish leaders tend to praise the way Macedonian authorities handle this minority. Through the Diyanet, they have good relations with the -Macedonian Islamic Community‖ (Meshibat), headed by Albanians. Last, the somewhat radical tendency of the DPT, and the sometimes extremist declarations of its leader on the -genocide of the Turks‖ incite the Turkish leaders to keep their distance, at least officially. During the official visit of the late President Özal in February 1993, the Turkish consulate declared it would prevent the DPT to use this opportunity to diffuse political messages. 45 The Turkish government officially condemned the raising of the Turkish banner on the side of the Albanian one during the flag controversy in Gostivar in the Summer 1997. 46 Actually, it was not the DPT, but the SDA-Islamic Path, who undertook this move; the president of the DPT, Erdoğan Saraç, publicly opposed this initiative. 47 40 Ibid, pp. 198-199. 41 Nova Makedonija, March 26, 1995, translated by MILS, March 28, 1995. 42 Zaman, October 19, 1996, September 25, 1997. 43 This 16-page newspaper (10 pages in Macedonian and 6 in Turkish) paper has a circulation of 6500. 44 For a detailed account of these relations and fluctuations, see Nathalie Clayer (2001), op. cit., pp. 189-190, 197-200, 204-205. 45 Hugh Poulton, -The Republic of Macedonia after UN Recognition‖, RFE/RL, Vol. 2, n°23, 4 June 1993, p. 27. 46 On the July 8, 1997, the Macedonian parliament voted a law on the flag of minorities that stipulates that their flags can be hoisted on national holidays alongside the Macedonian one. The day after, the police took down the Albanian flag displayed for the previous six month on the municipal buildings of Gostivar. Clashes with the local Albanian immediately irrupted as they tried to hoist again their flag. 47 Interview with Erdogan Saraç in Zaman, March 29, 1995.

Up to the bloody clashes in Macedonia in 2001, little attention was devoted to this Turkish minority in official declarations as well as in the Turkish press. The problems faced by this community were covered almost exclusively by the Islamist papers (Türkiye and Zaman) and the Turkish leaders, eager to maintain the -excellent relations‖ with Macedonia, avoided commenting on the disputes between the Turkish minority and the Macedonian authorities, maintaining [???] their views to the rhetorical bridge of friendship‖ between the two countries.48

How deep is this partnership?

Turkey hurried to extend help to the Republic of Macedonia when it was threatened or weakened. During the -double embargo‖, it extended humanitarian aid and signed economic agreements, and, in 1997 and 1998, when the stability of the country was endangered (by the riots in Albania in 1997, and the repression in Kosovo), it deepened its military cooperation with Macedonia. In 1999, when the repression in the Kosovo province prompted many Kosovars to flee, again, Turkey expressed its readiness to help Macedonia to overcome the -refugee crisis‖.

However, notwithstanding this support to Macedonia during ‗crises', bilateral relations suffer several deficiencies if not incoherencies in Turkish diplomacy. This is notably the case for economic cooperation which, beyond the numerous declarations of intention made by the Turkish leaders, did not receive the official backing one could have expected. operation signed the previous month). Credits extended to the tiny Republic are as well low (25 millions of dollars) and, in reality, this credit was not delivered. 55 Humanitarian assistance to the land-locked Republic was also low. 56 Macedonian leaders complained several times about the administrative obstacle of Turkey's policy to protect its own production, and repeatedly asked to have a special status in Turkish economy. 57 The free trade agreement was finally signed on September 1999, but bilateral trade had fallen in the meantime, mainly as a result of the liberalization of trade between Macedonia and the European Union on the January 1.

This neglect of an entire segment of bilateral cooperation is quite surprising, as Turkish leaders are well aware that the main motive for Macedonia's rapprochement with Ankara relies on its regional isolation and on its fear of dismemberment. If this political partnership is not strengthened with firm economic cooperation, it might fail as soon as Macedonia no longer feels any danger.

Besides this delayed implementation of economic tools, Turkey was finally rather cautious in its political initiatives concerning Macedonia. Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. The first official visits abroad were dedicated to these countries and Turkey did not receive much attention in the first speaches of the new Macedonian leaders. These declarations focused on Turkey's barriers to cooperation in the economic field and the rather low level of Turkish investments in the country, and the ‗excellency' of bilateral relations, which had been constantly emphasized, did not seem any more to be the center of attention. However, as a new regional crisis (Kosovo, 1998 and 1999) irrupted, Macedonia could, again, appreciate the help extended by Turkey.

The Republic of Macedonia's normalization of relations with its neighbors

Since the end of 1995, Macedonia's relations with its neighbors have undergone normalization. The Dayton agreement had opened the way for the reopening of its northern border, and tensions rapidly decreased (for a few months) after this peace agreement. In September 1995, Greece, isolated in the area and more and more aware that their stance on the Republic of Macedonia's name was deteriorating its image and its relations with the E.U., signed an intermediary agreement with Skopje. This agreement did not settle the main point of disagreement-the name of the Republic, put off to later negotiations, and still not settled-but Athens committed to recognize -the Skopje state‖ and to lift the embargo (which was done a month later).

In April 1996, Skopje signed a mutual recognition agreement with Belgrad and trade immediately resumed. 62 This recognition seriously weakened the regional position of Greece, which had counted on its Serbian ally for backing in its controversy with Skopje. Greek leaders probably underestimated the realpolitik of Slobodan Milošević and the desire, if not the need, for Belgrad to break its regional (and international) isolation. As for Macedonia, it gained much from this normalization with Belgrade as its external trade relies mainly on the -Serbian route‖ (the Morava-Vardar valley). Even when the East-West corridor will be completed (which will probably take years), this northern route will remain the most convenient (and Macedonia will always have to deal with the Serbs!). When the -double embargo‖ was imposed on the Republic in 1994/95, Bulgaria and Italy managed to develop some economic relations with Skopje (the two countries represented respectively 17.5% and 10% of the external exchanges of the Republic at the time).

Bus, as soon as 1996, the FRY again became the main destination for Macedonian goods (27% of its total exports and 10% of its imports). Slovenia and Germany also represent noticeable fractions of this external trade (respectively 20 and 13% of the country's exports and 15 and 8% of its imports). 63 -Great Albania‖. No Albanian political party in Macedonia or Albania openly advocates such an aim. Of course, it could be argued that such a goal would not be very prudent for political parties which are looking for national and international recognition. So far, however, discourse on this topic is more the outcome of internal political fights than anything else. Actually, the two main Albanian political parties in Macedonia softened or hardened their position on the Albanian rights according to their relations with the state (and notably their participation in the government). 64 As for Albania, it recognized the Republic of Macedonia in April 1993. While the stability of the peninsula was challenged by the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albanian leaders thought it was important to strengthen the position of its nearby neighbor by granting it official recognition. 65 Moreover, at the time the two countries had tense relations with their common southern and northern neighbors (Greece and the FRY). The Turkish press often stressed the intermediary role played by Ankara between the two countries, actually its two main strategic partners in the area.

Relations between Ankara and Tirana, particularly at the time of former president Berisha (1992-June 1997), were excellent, and Turkish leaders might indeed have been instrumental in this recognition.

However, as President Berisha's policy was more and more contested within the country, he adopted a much more nationalistic approach that prevented the 1993 The disagreement was finally settled in February 1999 with a joint declaration.

rapprochement
The two countries declared that they have no territorial claim on each other, with the document written in both languages. Eight agreements were signed at once, regulating political and economic relations. 69 Last, a military cooperation agreement was signed on the delivery of 150 tanks and 150 cannons to the Macedonian army. 70 As for Macedonia's relations with the FRY, no visible progress was achieved after the establishment of diplomatic ties in April 1996. 71 These relations focused for a long time on the pending question of the definition of the common border. This 66 The cancellation of this visit was particularly badly perceived in Skopje. -A diplomatic scandal‖ headlined Nova Makedonia on the 24 of April (MILS, April 24, 1996). 67 controversy was finally settled in February 2001 and relations rapidly developed. 72 Faced with what they perceived as a joint Albanian extremist movement, the two countries tend to enhance their cooperation.

Turkey and the Spring 2001 crisis in Macedonia

In There is a wide-spread idea in Macedonia (and elsewhere) that the conflict has been imported from Kosovo. Macedonian authorities portray the NLA fighters as a largely alien group of terrorists from Kosovo. 74 -It is no secret that for a month now, Macedonia has been target of aggression from the Northern Province of Kosovo…. This aggression is no secret to us. It has been prepared, organized and maximally realized with logistic support of parties and structures from our northern neighbor…. There is abundant material evidence to prove this was a long planned aggression of Kosovo toward Macedonia…. We will not leave one centimeter of our territory to our enemies‖, declared Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski in its address to the nation. 75 The spokesman of the Macedonian Interior Ministry alleged as well that the rebels used recruitment and training centers in Kosovo. 76 The general interpretation also put forward that besides its irredentist goals, the KLA, corrupted by criminal affairs, provoked the crisis in Macedonia in order to preserve power, privilege and position. 77 The Albanian paramilitary organization certainly has roots both in Kosovo and in Macedonia. 78 The logistic is probably imported from Kosovo and some Albanians fighters might have indeed received their training in Kosovo. The Kosovo war also had an impact on the decision of Albanian insurgents to take arms. 79 However Albania gave full support to the Macedonian government and, in contrast to the Kosovo crisis, when the KLA managed to use the Albanian territory as a background, there is no indication that this is the case with the Macedonian crisis. Actually, all in Tirana fear the diabolization of the Albanians, and more precisely the irreparable harm this could make to the Albanian image and the hostility of the West that this might entail. 85 However, with the exacerbation of armed conflict and the bombing carried out by the Macedonian army, Tirana's stand has become more reserved.

Again, Turkey was a destination for refugees: as early as March 22, 5700 refugees had found shelter in Turkey (2700 of them entered in the three previous days). As Turkey does not require an entry visa for Macedonian citizens, they could easily find shelter in Turkey while waiting for the clashes subsid (providing they had a passport!).

In total, 12,000 refugees came to Turkey. Most of them stayed with relatives in Istanbul but some were settled in the Gaziomanpaşa -guesthouse‖ near Kırklareli in Thrace. All of them returned to Macedonia as soon as clashed decreased.

As usual, Turkey benefited from its NATO membership. For example, the short visit to Ankara undertaken by the Macedonian foreign minister on March 17 was aimed at securing Turkish backing a few days before meeting between NATO countries. 86 Turkish leaders naturally insisted on the preservation of the recognized borders of the Republic of Macedonia and regularly conveyed messages of support to the Macedonian leaders. They denounced this wave of -terrorist attacks‖ and strongly condemned Albanian fighters' assaults on Macedonian soldiers and policemen. 87 On the whole, it is hard to imagine Turkey supporting a separatist movement (or one so perceived by the international community) when it is fighting a similar movement on its own territory! And, as it was the case during the first phase of the Kosovo crisis (1998),

Turkey was rather cautious in its demands for international intervention in Macedonia (here again, especially during the first phase of the fights). The official position expressed by the Turkish Minister of Defense illustrates well this caution: -Turkey could make a contribution to an international formation… in case developments reach a serious dimension… if needed…after ensuring a cease-fire‖. 88 Turkish leaders insisted on the moderation of each other's views (to find the -middle way between the two ways‖ 89 ). They emphasized that -the Macedonian authorities should remove different implementations among people living in Macedonia‖ 90 but as well that -the Albanians should not have immoderate demands‖. 91 Foreign Minister İsmail Cem strongly criticized, as well, the international community for conditioning economic aid to Macedonia. 92 Finally, Turkish leaders expressed their particular concern over the fate of the Turkish minority, squeezed between the Albanians fighters and the Macedonian army.

As soon as the end of March 2001, the leaders of the Turkish community in Macedonia (and in Kosovo) were received by President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit. 93 The Turkish press also stressed this ‗uncomfortable' position of the Turkish community. [START_REF]See, for example, -Makedon Türkleri diken üstünde‖ (Macedonian Turks on needles)[END_REF] Houses and shops owned by Turks were actually attacked in Bitola (Manastir) at the beginning of May. 95 As was the case for the Turks in Kosovo, Turkish leaders demand the participation of the Turkish community in political dialogue and the definition of a status for them in the new constitution. 96 Several times the 1974 constitution has been mentioned as a reference base for negotiations. 97 Macedonian authorities tend to subscribe to this request, which allows them to break the unity of the Albanian demands and prevent the Macedonia from becoming a bi-polar Albanian-Macedonian state. 98 -Citizens of Turkish origin in Macedonia are faithful citizens of Macedonia and I believe that their participation in the political dialogue will positively affect the dialogue‖ declared Ilinka Mitreva, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 99 The Macedonian Prime Minister, Ljubco Georgievski, even pressed Turkish authorities to bring this issue into the agenda in his meetings with US and E.U. officials. Indeed, Western officials fear that the participation of Macedonian ethnic Turks in the political dialogue might incite other groups to come up with similar claims. The Turks were finally marginalized in the first round of negotiations (that ended with the August 13 agreement), increasing frustration within the community. A poll conducted at the end of July shows that 50% of the Turks in Macedonia are planning to boycott elections. 100 Finally, 150 Turkish troops (out of a total of 4500) are participating in the NATO force in charge of collecting arms from Albanian militants (operation -Essential Harvest‖). These troops were transferred from Bosnia-Herzegovina. As NATO is accused of having sided with the militants, anti-NATO feeling is spreading in the country and the deployment of this force met with some protests, and some barricades were even raised to obstruct the passage of NATO's (and other international missions') vehicles. However, the protesters let the Turkish troops pass, on the grounds that -Turkey is [our] ally and the only NATO country to recognize Macedonia's independence with her constitutional name‖.

Conclusion: The self-limitation of Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans

Turkey seems to have hesitated to act unilaterally towards this Republic whose name, if not identity, was contested. In the years 1992-1994, the recognition of the independence of the Republic and the establishment of diplomatic relations was estimated to be the most Turkey could do in such an international and regional context. It acted as much as it could within international organizations to which it belongs, but avoided tightening bilateral links on sensitive (political or strategic)

issues. Turkish leaders feared accusations of trying to stir up trouble in the area (or even of trying to restore a Turkish domination over the Balkans) if they sided too much with the -contested state‖. In fact, Turkish leaders waited for the United States to create a precedent, and only after the Washington had done so did they sign military agreement with Skopje (April and May 1995).

This -self-restrained‖ Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans-as Şule Kut put it 102 -illustrates a consciousness among Turkish diplomats of the emotional barriers they are confronted with and the necessity to act in a cautious way when -litigious cases‖ are involved (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo). Just an example: an article in the Serbian daily Vecernje Novosti, in June 1994 denounced the -the increasingly aggressive manner with which Turkey has been approaching the FYROM, using its difficult economic position‖ and reached the conclusion that -Turkey's objective is to recover areas in the southern part of the Balkans which the Ottoman empire lost‖. 103 Yet, this prudence does not explain or justify the incoherencies of the Turkish diplomacy toward this country, and notably the late signing and implementation of economic cooperation instruments, whereas exchanges are the best way to strengthen, in the long term, a political partnership.

102 Şule Kut, -Turkey in the Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self Restraint‖, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, n°3, 1996/97, pp. 39-45. 103 Tanjug, June 28, 1994 translated by BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, June 30, 1994.

  Here again, only the Morava-Vardar axis can be used for this trade. The Morava-Vardar was therefore involved in at least-without taking into account exchanges with Central and Western Europe-60% of Macedonia's exports. Relations with Albania have always been troubled by the huge Albanian presence in Macedonia. The Albanians account for 20% to 40% of the population of the country according to various estimates, and since they have boycotted all censuses since 1991, these estimates are subject to harsh debates. The Albanians demand the change of the Macedonian constitution in order to ensure the equal status of the Macedonian and Albanian -nations‖, the equalization of the status of the Albanian and Macedonian languages, and the possibility to be educated in Albanian at all levels, notably the legalization of the Tetovo university. This controversy is a good illustration of the continual tensions between the two communities since 1991. In February 1995, the Albanians in Tetovo, an area where protests are strongest, disregarded the official prohibition and opened an Albanian university. The police shut it down at once and put under arrest the president of this ‗university', Fadil Sulejmani. Demonstrations and clashes with the police that irrupted ended in one death and ever since, this illegal university had been a major subject of dissension. Daily relations are poisoned by mutual incomprehension: the Albanians blame to the Macedonians for the discrimination, if not racism, they suffer ; the Macedonians suspect the Albanians of seeking a separation from the State in order to create a 63 E.I.U. Country Report, -Macedonia‖, n°4, 1997, p. 33.

  movement from taking shape. During the course of 1996, it took side with more radical movements in Kosovo and Macedonia. Relations between the two countries entered a new phase with the nomination of socialist government in Albania in the summer of 1997. For the first time since the break-up of Yugoslavia, an Albanian prime minister visited Skopje (January 1998), and several agreements were signed on this occasion. 64 The Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) is, however, more radical than the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). The DPA is part of the current governmental coalition. On dissensions among Albanian parties in Macedonia, see Nexhbedin Shaqiri, -Relations Between Albanian Parties in Macedonia‖, AIM, Skopje, November 18, 2000;Veton Latifi, -Albanian Division Exposed‖, Balkan Crisis, Report, n°174, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, September 20, 2000. 65 Duncan Perry, -Une crise en gestation? La Macédoine et ses voisins‖, Politique Étrangère, n°1, 1994, p. 193. Relations with Bulgaria are hampered by the very question of the Macedonian national identity which Bulgarians are reluctant to accept. The Macedonian and Bulgarian languages are very close and Bulgarians tend to consider Macedonians as -Bulgarians‖. Sofia recognized the independence of the Republic of Macedonia as early as January 1992, but it expressly did not extend this recognition to the Macedonian national identity. The bilateral agreements rapidly concluded after 1992 waited to be ratified until that the two agreed on the language(s) used in these documents (only Bulgarian, or Bulgarian and Macedonian). Several incidents highlighted this -disagreement‖: in April 1996, the Bulgarian foreign minister canceled his visit to Skopje due to the -anti-Bulgarian‖ rhetoric in Macedonia; 66 in October 1996, the Bulgarian national television diffused a documentary on « The Bulgarians in Albania » (-Bulgarians‖ who are, according to Skopje, -Macedonians‖); 67 during the Summer 1998, the official expiration of the Treaty of Neuilly motivated new declarations, duly commented in Skopje, on the reunification of the three Macedonias, 68 and so on.

  February 2001, clashes between Macedonian government forces and a newcomer to the Balkan scene, the National Liberation Army (NLA/UÇK), occurred in several places not far from the Kosovo border. Rebels carried out their attacks in the course of February and March and fighting was reported in several villages near the northern border. After relative calm in April, the killing of eight policemen and soldiers in a rebel ambush at the end of that month motivated a strong angry reaction among the Macedonian population and a new government offensive near Kumanovo. Successive peace talks, cease-fires and fierce fighting (mainly around Kumanovo and later Tetovo) continued until the signing of a peace agreement on of August 13. 73

  MILS, March 29, 1995. Nathalie Clayer, -A propos du livre Les Albanais de Macédoine, publié à Skopje par la Communauté musulmane de la République de Macédoine‖, paper presented at the conference Journées macédoniennes, Paris, INALCO, 28 September 1997. 37 Nova Makedonija, February 7, 1997 (translated by MILS, February 10, 1997). These Albanian mayors based their decision on the results of the 1994 census, results that they reject as far as the Albanian data are concerned! 38 -L'islam, facteur des recompositions internes en Macédoine et au Kosovo‖, in Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer (dir.), Le Nouvel Islam balkanique, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001, p. 190.

39

Ibid, p. 190.

Exchanges between Turkey and Macedonia (in thousands of dollars)

  Bilateral trade is indeed very low. Up to 1995, it represented roughly 3% of the total of Macedonian exchanges. It rose in 1995 to reachaccording to the Turkish State Statistics 49 -$126 million, but dropped later in 1996 when Skopje resumed its trade with its ‗traditional partner', the FRY. Besides, contrary to the case of Bulgaria or Romania, this trade balance shows a large surplus in favor of Turkey.50 Turkey was left behind on the economic level.53 This is blamed on Turkey's delay to sign bilateral agreements and to liberalize bilateral trade. Indeed, economic bilateral agreements were signed only in 1995 (prevention of double taxation in June 1995 and Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments in July 1995), 54 the Joint Economic Council met for the first time in August 1996 and the bilateral Business Council was created in November 1995 (agreement on its 50 Major export and import items changed quite a lot during the last five years. See, Eurasian Files, n°105, August 1998/2, p. 6 and Makedonya Ülke Etüdü, Istanbul, Istanbul Ticaret Odası, 1998-44, pp.

	Year	Turkish exportations	Turkish importations	Total
	1992	5,000	12,910	17,910
	1993	33,750	17,590	51,340
	1994	60,380	18,660	79,040
	1995	76,467	50,364	126,831
	1996	74,050	31,430	105,480
	1997	77,392	30,217	107,609
	1998	68,190	13,237	81,427
	Source : Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (Turkish State Statistics), Ankara

51

Turkish investments in this country are also fairly low. From 1990 to 1996, Turkish businessmen had invested a total of $2.6 millions in Macedonia (compared to $19.4 millions from Germany, $15.2 millions from Italy or $8.3 millions from Greece). In 1998, there were officially 315 Turkish companies in Macedonia, half of them operating with 100% Turkish capital.

52

Macedonian leaders have expressed several times their disappointment with this very low level of trade. Again recently, in an interview with the daily Radikal, the Macedonian President pointed out that if Ankara and Skopje have very fruitful relations on the political level, 33 and 36; See as well Mehmet Turna, op. cit., p. 77.

51

Quoted in Makedonya Ülke Etüdü, op. cit., p. 31. 52 Makedonya. Ülke Etüdü, op. cit., p. 37 and 83. 53 Radikal, June 21, 2001.

  72 Vladimir Javanoski, -Serbia and Macedonia Partners Again‖, Balkan Crisis Report, n°248, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, May 18, 2001.73 Details of the agreement in Reuters, August 13, 2001 and MILS, August 14, 2001. 74 -Macedonia : UCK Insurgency shifts focus to Tetovo‖, RFE/RL Features, March 16, 2001 75 MILS, March 19, 2001.

76

RFE/RL, March 8, 2001.

  , conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia present very different profiles and the ‗import' thesis does not resist further analysis. In the Macedonian case, contrary to the Kosovo, local Albanian parties do not advocate independence and fighters do not seek secession of ethnic Albanian areas from Macedonia. Rather, they demand the end of what they say is discrimination in daily life. During the fighting, the two main Albanian parties in Macedonia, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA -Arben Xhaferi) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP -Ymer Ymeri) reiterated their views on the country's territorial integrity. Although some radicals do advocate federalization, Albanian parties in Macedonia have not brought up the issue in any official requests. 80 The Albanian population also backs Macedonian unity. A poll conducted in April 2001 on the behalf of the US State Department's Office of Researchshows that 71% of Albanians in Macedonia would prefer to live in an ethnically-mixed Macedonia rather than a greater Albanian state.81 Finally, Macedonian authorities cannot be accused, as was the case for the Milošević regime in Kosovo in 1998-1999, of having launched-or of having planned to launch-an ethnic cleansing campaign.82 As for the illegal Albanian movement in Kosovo, it had unification as part of its program, but the KLA leadership altered this view during the war. Backers of this idea an insignificant role in political life, and voters themselves pushed them to the margin in the 2000 local elections.83 Finally, there is an easy confusion between the UÇK in Kosovo (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës -Kosovo Liberation Army -KLA) and

	the UÇK in Macedonia (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare -National Liberation Army -
	NLA). 84
	77 Philip Schwarm, AIM, Belgrade, March 20, 2001.
	78 Farihma Daftary, -Testing Macedonia‖, ECMI Brief, n°4, May 2001(www.ecmi.de).
	79 Biljana Vankovska, -The way from 'Power Keg' to the Oasis of Peace -and Back : Macedonia after
	the Kosovo War‖, Balkantrust, 2000 (www.balkantrust.net/articles).
	80 Fehim Rexhepi, AIM, Prishtina, March 19, 2001. As far as it is known, only the National Democratic
	Party, formed in March 2001, has federalizating the country as part of its program (on this party, see
	AIM, Skopje, March 17, 2001)
	81 Tim Judah, -Albanians Back Macedonian Unity‖, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis
	Report, n°250, May 25, 2001.

82

Although the proposal made by former President Gligorov, in February 1998, to provide a humanitarian corridor to Albania for Albanian refugees in case of clash in Kosovo has been interpreted by some Albanians as an appeal to ethnic cleansing. Biljana Vankovska, op. cit. play

  101 95 See the editorial of Sami Kohen in Milliyet, June 21, 2001. 96 Cumhuriyet, July 20, 2001; Zaman, July 20, 2001; Anadolu Ajansi, July 19, 2001; Turkish Probe, n°444, July 12, 2001. 97 See the declaration of İsmail Cem, Zaman, July 20, 2001; the declarations of President Sezer, Anadolu Ajansi, March 21, 2001.98 The case is actually similar in Kosovo and at the time of the former Yugoslavia, Belgrad had, for this purpose, granted a lot of cultural rights to the Turks (notably publications). For details of these publications, see C.N.O. Bartlett, -The Turkish Minority in Yugoslavia‖, Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia, n°3, 1980).

99

Anadolu Ajansi, July 19, 2001. 100 -Macedonian Disappointments and Fears‖, RFE/RL Balkan Report, Vol. 5, n°60, 24 August 2001. 101 Türkiye, August 29, 2001; MILS, August 29, 2001.

Şule Kut, -Yugoslavya bunalimi ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya politikasi : 1990-1993‖, in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk dis politikası analizi, Istanbul, Der, 1994, p. 165.

The Turkish press even went as far as stating that Turkey was the first country to recognize Macedonia under its name (Turkish Daily News, July 17, 1995, October 12, 1996). It was, of course, Bulgaria who / which, three weeks before Turkey undertook this step.

The first Turkish Ambassador to Skopje was Suha Noyan. He was replaced in June 1995 by Unal Marasli, and in November 1997 by Mustafa Fazli Kesmir.

The March 1994 agreement foresees cooperation in the fields of agriculture, tourism, construction, chemical industry and transportation. It came into force in April 1995.

Ducan Perry, -Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition‖, RFE/RL, Vol. 3, n°1, 7 January 1994, p. 121; Military Balance, 1994/95, p. 95.

Tansu Çiller, MILS, January 16, 1995 ; İsmail Cem, Anadolu Ajansi, February 1, 2001 ; Bülent Ecevit, Türkiye, June 14, 2001.

Macedonian data are significantly lower than Turkish ones : 93 millions of dollars in 1995 (MILS, April 17, 1996).

The agreements on economic cooperation (prevention of double taxation, mutual promotion and protection of investments, etc.) were signed in September 1996.


G L'effet Papillon

Étienne Ghys

Un coup de feu éclate au Maroc... Incident sans importance, mais qui va changer la vie d'un couple d'américains, d'une nourrice mexicaine, d'une adolescente japonaise. Tout un jeu de petits effets et de grandes conséquences. Une réflexion sur la destinée humaine, soumise au hasard ou à la nécessité ? Beaucoup d'émotion dans Babel, ce film de Alejandro González Iñárritu sorti en 2006. Les critiques de cinéma n'ont pas manqué d'y voir une illustration du fameux effet papillon qui est probablement le phénomène mathématique le plus connu du grand public.

Que signifie l'effet papillon ?

OOGLE cite 409 000 pages sur « Effet Papillon » et 1 900 000 pages sur « Butterfly Effect ». On trouve tout et n'importe quoi : des interprétations contradictoires, des affirmations fantaisistes. Selon un internaute s'exprimant dans un forum d'amateurs de cinéma, l'effet papillon serait ... un proverbe japonais !

Un peu d'histoire.

La météorologie étudie un phénomène d'une complexité inextricable : le mouvement de l'atmosphère. L'équation qui régit ce mouvement est connue depuis longtemps : c'est l'équation de Navier-Stokes. Mais, savoir écrire une équation ne signifie pas qu'on sache la résoudre ! Qu'on songe un peu à la quantité d'informations nécessaires pour décrire l'atmosphère : il faut connaître la température, la vitesse du vent, la pression atmosphérique, l'hygrométrie etc., non seulement en un endroit donné mais aussi en tous les endroits du globe terrestre ! Avoir une connaissance exacte de ces données est tout simplement impossible : il faut une infinité de données, la plupart inaccessibles.

Edward Lorenz était un théoricien de la météorologie, de formation mathématique, disparu récemment. En 1962, il a l'idée de caricaturer l'équation de Navier-Stokes, de simplifier à l'extrême, de faire « comme si » l'atmosphère ne dépendait que de trois paramètres, alors qu'il en faudrait une infinité ! Simplifier un problème compliqué en espérant qu'il gardera l'essence du phénomène étudié : voilà bien une activité de mathématicien. Et dans son « atmosphère atrophiée » réduite à ses trois coordonnées, E. Lorenz peut faire tourner son ordinateur et calculer les solutions numériques qui sont censées décrire le mouvement. Imaginez l'ordinateur de Lorenz, avec ses petites capacités, en 1962 ! C'est alors qu'il constate « expérimentalement » que la moindre modification dans « son atmosphère jouet », ajouter par exemple 0.0000001 à l'une des trois coordonnées, entraîne dans le mouvement atmosphérique un changement considérable après un temps relativement modeste. C'est le phénomène de la « dépendance sensible aux conditions initiales », le paradigme de la théorie du chaos.

Regardez l'image. Elle représente une trajectoire de l'équation de Lorenz simplifiée, dans l'espace tri-dimensionel. Ces courbes tournent comme des folles, tantôt par la gauche, tantôt par la droite, et il semble impossible de prévoir si un tour à droite sera suivi par un autre tour à droite ou à gauche. Et pourtant, pour une condition initiale donnée, pour une atmosphère donnée, il y a un futur bien défini ; le déterminisme n'est pas remis en cause. En revanche deux points proches dans l'espace tri-dimensionel, si proches qu'on ne les distingue peut-être pas sur la figure, définissent des trajectoires qui commenceront par être proches mais qui peuvent finir par se séparer de manière importante : l'un part à gauche et l'autre à droite ! Ainsi, si on ne connaît un point qu'avec une certaine incertitude, aussi petite soit-elle, la prédiction de l'avenir devient illusoire.

En 1973, Lorenz fait une conférence dont titre magnifique résume à merveille cette idée. En voici la traduction française : « Le battement des ailes d'un papillon au Brésil peut-il provoquer un ouragan au Texas ? ».

L'effet papillon était né !

Pourquoi a-t-il fallu attendre Lorenz pour que ce concept passe dans le public ?

Lorenz n'était pas le premier à comprendre cette limitation dans le déterminisme.

Le message de Lorenz

Voici, en termes légèrement simplifiés, deux citations de Lorenz. La première a été comprise :

« Si un battement d'ailes d'un papillon peut engendrer un ouragan, la même chose est vraie pour tous les autres battements d'ailes du même papillon, mais aussi pour les battements d'ailes des millions d'autres papillons, sans parler de l'influence des activités des innombrables autres créatures plus puissantes, comme les hommes par exemple ! »

La seconde est par contre passée inaperçue :

« J'avance l'idée qu'au fil des années les petites perturbations ne modifient pas la fréquence d'apparition des événements tels que les ouragans : la seule chose qu'ils peuvent faire, c'est de modifier l'ordre dans lequel ces événements se produisent. » En clair, même si le météorologue ne peut pas prévoir le temps qu'il fera à Lyon dans un mois, il devrait être possible de prévoir des moyennes, des fréquences d'événements météorologiques, avec une bonne précision, en un endroit donné, sur une longue période de temps. Bien sûr, ce type de prédiction est plus modeste, mais il est souvent tout aussi utile. Cette seconde idée de Lorenz recadre le rôle du prévisionniste.

Aujourd'hui

Bien sûr, ces idées vont bien au delà du cas particulier de la météorologie. Une théorie scientifique ne peut pas se fonder sur un principe négatif tel que l'impossibilité de prévoir l'avenir ; il faut qu'elle propose une méthode pour contourner cette difficulté. Aujourd'hui, la théorie mathématique qui discute de ces questions s'appelle la théorie des systèmes dynamiques et lorsqu'elle prend le point de vue de la seconde citation de Lorenz, elle prend le nom de théorie ergodique : il s'agit alors de comprendre, non pas des trajectoires particulières, mais des fréquences et des moyennes.

  Mécanique céleste, météorologie, et théorie des nombres sont donc unis depuis peu dans des méthodes communes. Poincaré nous avait prévenus : « Faire des mathématiques, c'est donner le même nom à des choses différentes ». Aujourd'hui, le chaos signifie beaucoup de choses, bien plus que Poincaré ou Lorenz n'auraient pu l'imaginer.Crédits imagesPour citer cet article : Étienne Ghys, L'effet papillon. Images des Mathématiques, CNRS, 2007. En ligne, URL : http://images.math.cnrs.fr/L-effet-papillon.html

  Tous les deux ont fait des efforts de vulgarisation. Poincaré écrit par exemple dans La Science et l'Hypothèse, un ouvrage de divulgation tiré à des centaines de milliers d'exemplaires : « Un dixième de degré en plus ou en moins en un point quelconque, le cyclone éclate ici et non pas là, et il étend ses ravages sur des contrées qu'il aurait épargnés. » Le papillon n'y est pas, mais le cyclone y est ! Probablement que Hadamard et Poincaré étaient trop en avance sur leur temps, et que la société n'était pas prête pour ce changement profond dans le concept de déterminisme. La physique du début du vingtième siècle représente le triomphe de la science du déterminisme, hérité de Newton et Laplace. Tout se calcule, tout se prédit, et pour ce qu'on ne sait pas prédire, on est confiant que ce n'est qu'une question de temps et que la physique ou les mathématiques sauront y répondre. C'était compter sans les révolutions quantiques et relativistes, qui ont ébranlé bien des idées préconçues... En 1973, l'opinion publique est plus ouverte à ces nouvelles idées, et sans se lancer dans des discussions historico-sociologico-philosophiques, l'idée que le moindre papillon, et pourquoi pas ma modeste personne, pourrait avoir une influence sur le déroulement global du monde qui m'entoure, est bien mieux perçue en 1973 qu'en 1900.

Henri Poincaré et Jacques Hadamard, au début du vingtième siècle, l'avaient bien compris dans un contexte à peine différent : le mouvement des corps célestes peut être sensible aux conditions initiales... Lorenz le sait bien d'ailleurs et son article cite largement ses sources. Peut-être que Hadamard et Poincaré n'ont pas su « trouver les mots » et qu'ils se sont contentés d'écrire des articles de mathématiques incompréhensibles ? Cette interprétation ne tient pas.

Efficacité d'un papillon au Texas ?

Mais n'oublions pas que Lorenz a tiré ses conclusions de l'examen d'une simplification presque absurde de la « vraie équation » qui régit le mouvement de l'atmosphère. L'effet papillon se fait-il sentir dans la météorologie ? Lorenz ne s'engage pas sur ce point. Son but est d'expliquer qu'un phénomène naturel, comme par exemple la météorologie, pourrait être sensible aux conditions initiales et que ceci pourrait avoir des conséquences sur l'impossibilité de prédiction météo à moyen terme. Rendons à Lorenz le mérite d'avoir popularisé cette idée si simple que si le futur est déterminé par le passé, il ne l'est peut-être pas d'une manière aussi naïve qu'on y pensait auparavant. Même si le papillon du Brésil s'avérait impuissant, il existe de nombreux autres domaines de la science où cette idée peut s'appliquer. Nous avons parlé des planètes, mais certains n'hésitent pas à parler d'histoire, de politique, de finance etc. Grâce à Poincaré, Hadamard et Lorenz, notre conception du déterminisme a changé. Nous savons que le présent détermine le futur, mais nous savons également qu'une connaissance imparfaite du présent, comme c'est presque toujours le cas, rend la détermination du futur illusoire. Il a fallu un siècle pour que cette idée simple mais fondamentale soit assimilée, malheureusement de manière souvent imparfaite, dans le public mais aussi parmi les scientifiques.

  Théorie mathématique passionnante et florissante, tout particulièrement depuis les années 1970 ! La bataille fait rage entre les spécialistes de la météo, des équations de Navier-Stokes, pour savoir si le papillon du Brésil influence le Texas. Toute la question est de savoir si les approximations faites par Lorenz sont justifiées dans le cas de l'atmosphère. Pour y répondre, il est nécessaire que des mathématiciens comprennent mieux les systèmes dynamiques qui dépendent d'un grand nombre de dimensions (et même d'une infinité de dimensions). Un article récent s'intitule « L'effet papillon n'existe plus ! » mais d'autres auteurs critiquent les hypothèses qui y sont faites. Car bien sûr, il faut aussi consulter les physiciens et les météorologues : aucune théorie mathématique ne peut s'appliquer à une situation concrète si on ne peut vérifier que les hypothèses sont satisfaites dans la pratique. Alors, l'effet papillon existe-t-il « en vrai » ? Laissons les mathématiciens travailler avec leurs collègues physiciens. Ils nous répondront peut-être bientôt. Par exemple, le fait que l'équation de Lorenz, caricaturée avec seulement trois dimensions, satisfait effectivement à la deuxième citation de Lorenz, est un résultat purement mathématique très récent : les mathématiciens disent que l'équation de Lorenz possède une « mesure physique ». Et ce résultat mathématique difficile n'est a priori pas relié avec la question de savoir si l'équation de Lorenz rend compte du mouvement de l'atmosphère.Quand bien même l'effet papillon n'existerait pas dans l'atmosphère, il resterait une idée mathématique riche et puissante. La théorie des systèmes dynamiques ne se limite pas à la description de l'atmosphère. Comme souvent en mathématiques, un exemple est devenu le germe d'une théorie dont l'ambition est de comprendre un champ beaucoup plus vaste qu'on ne le pensait initialement, et d'établir des connections avec d'autres domaines qui paraissaient bien éloignés. Le concept de chaos, né il y a un siècle pour des raisons de mécanique céleste, s'est enrichi de l'exemple de la turbulence dans l'atmosphère, et a envahi une bonne partie des mathématiques, y compris même la théorie des nombres qui paraît pourtant si « statique » et immuable... Voyez par exemple une illustration dans cet article.


John Fynn

Ciara R Wigham

VoiceForum, a software platform for spoken interaction: a model for the "Call Triangle"?

Keywords: spoken interaction, voice forum, face-to-face group work, focus on form, teacher feedback, platform management

VoiceForum is a pedagogical project created as a response to learners" needs in the spoken language observed mainly at the Hypermedia Language Centre of Blaise Pascal University, France. It comprises a web-based forum approach for posting interactive audio and text with a dedicated unintrusive space for teacher feedback. The software platform (freely available via download), thus, offers a means of providing guidance through contextualised help to individual learners on their spoken discourse in authentically interactive situations (Fynn, 2007).

We will limit our frame of reference to our experience with students at levels of B1 to C2 to discuss, firstly, how teachers are confronted in face-to-face group work with issues concerning the focus on the meaning of students" utterances to the possible detriment of focus on form. A central problem is "which knowledge should be given greater value?" or how to reconcile "the tension between the desirability of communicative use of the FL in the classroom, on the one hand and the felt need for a linguistic focus in language learning, on the other" (Long, 1991). To address issues of form there is at least a latent pedagogical desire to interrupt discourse, considering that for feedback to be effective, the distance between the triggering effect of students" errors and corresponding teacher feedback must be short enough to enable learners to compare the correction with their own utterance (Annett, 1969).

We will go on to confirm that teachers are all the more prepared to embrace a technology if it can be seen to be an obvious, as well as a readily available solution to an essential preoccupation (Beaven et al., 2010). Digital voice recording technology has existed for decades but has not necessarily been seen as an essential asset to the teaching of spoken production. Drawing on our experience with teachers and students, we will try to show how VoiceForum not only integrates voice recording technology to offer a solution to the meaning versus form issue but how it has been designed also to provide a natural learning and didactic framework where the respective roles of students and teachers become perfectly clear. Data collected from learners and teachers reinforce this view and show that promising results can be achieved by complementing, or sometimes replacing face-to-face work with VoiceForum tasks.

From our experience of developing the software and using it extensively as an in-class and distance learning and assessment tool, we aim to show how the "Call Triangle" has been successfully implemented, fully engaging students and teachers and, thereby, encouraging institutional support for its deployment.


Vincent De Rudnicki
email: vincent.derudnicki@cemagref.fr

Bernadette Ruelle

Laurent Scheyer

Alexandre Coustilieres

Embedded NICT* tools and traceability to control phytochemical treatments

In France the concept of precision farming is a topical subject in relation with the "Grenelle environment" round table process and the Ecophyto 2018 plan. If the increase of productivity is one of its improvements, the reduction of the environmental impacts is another very important objective. New technologies of Information and Communication (NICT) allow responding to this challenge of quality. These technologies give solutions to manage pesticide applications thanks to the field work assistance tools and allow continuous monitoring and recording of the field operations to implement traceability and automatic field logbooks. This communication present the results of LIFE AWARE & TICSAD projects based on embedded NICT. We will approach the possible tracks allowing the management of news methods of treatment.

1.2.

Introduction

Water pollution caused by pesticides is one of the biggest problems facing aquatic ecosystems. To improve water quality, it is necessary to asses the impact of agricultural practices on the environment.

In France, studies conducted by IFEN (French institute for the environment) revealed that both surface and ground waters exhibit some significant contamination characteristics. In particular, 49% of surface water sampling locations were of average to poor quality and 27% of ground water sampling locations would need pesticide elimination treatment in order to provide acceptable drinking water.

Different studies [START_REF] Chatonnet | Produire des vins plus naturels avec moins de pesticides[END_REF] show that some pesticides residues are found in finished vine. 40% of them concerns anti botrytis and mildew at the average scale of 10 to 90µg.

The Water Framework Directive commits Member States to achieve "good" ecological water status for their water bodies by 2015. Pesticides are one of the causes of this deterioration.

The objective of the French Ecophyto 2018 plan is to reduce by half the use of pesticides before 2018. Vine growing without the use of pesticides would be utopian. The treatments will be always necessary whatever the product and the methods.

Within this context, Cemagref has been carrying out studies since 2000 to show how environmental pollution could be mitigated through: the optimisation of pesticide application techniques using NICT technologies, the implementation of inside plot of land operation traceability and through training campaigns that aim to increase awareness of stakeholders in sustainable viticulture. The two last studies aiming to these objectives are the Life AWARE [START_REF] Ruelle | AWARE : A Water Assessment to Respect the Environment -Final report[END_REF] followed by the TICSAD [START_REF] De Rudnicki | Les outils issus des nouvelles technologies au service d'une agriculture durable[END_REF] projects.

One of the objectives was to link the quantities of pesticide product spread during treatments with those found in surface water. Consequently an assessment of product distribution on the plants, soil and air during and after application is essential in order to establish the link between pesticide use, pesticide reaching the vegetal target and pesticide contamination of surface waters.

Vine sprayers are operated with air assistance that improves pesticide penetration within the canopy but on the other hand transports droplets to the air or onto the ground. They are often hydraulic or pneumatic machines that work along 2 to 4 rows. Different variables come into play during treatment to limit treatment to targeted vegetation: nozzle orientation, cleaning and maintenance of sprayers between treatments, flow rate settings (outlet rates according to volume/Ha sought and dosage/Ha).

The first objective is to measure spray losses during spraying operations. Field measurements [START_REF] Sinfort | Les pertes de produits phytosanitaires dans l'environnement pendant les applications: le rôle du matériel :EUROVITI[END_REF] measuring ground and air spray losses for different spraying systems showed sizeable losses that varied according to the machine used and vegetation growth stages (soil losses: 7 to 15%, air losses: 14 to 45% depending on vegetation volumes).(Fig1) The monitoring of farmers' activities showed that with the type of existing machinery, it is very hard and tedious to adjust sprayers for each treatment and even more so when moving between 2 fields (treatment passage from 2 to 3 rows or change of row span). Most cases of plant-health product over-and-under dosages during treatments are due to incorrect settings or poor maintenance of sprayers.

The second objective is to improve a new NICT embedded technology helping the farmer to optimize the settings of the sprayer and to have a back-up of their work in order to improve their practices and reduce environmental impact.

This TICSAD project, that is a continuation of AWARE, is running to this day, geographically encompassing land areas from Bourgogne to Languedoc, with 20 winegrowers equipped with the new NICT TICSAD system. This new system takes into account the improvements enacted by the users of AWARE. By studying how the farmers use the system, we optimise their practices. The goal is to improve the system and improve its robustness. A secondary aim is to also teach the users the new NICT tools and methods to improve operating practices; different levels of students tested the formation based on the system and the software. The embedded system is going to be robustly tested and finalized during this project before it can be transferred to an industrial firm.

Inventory of on-board NICT systems

There are different devices such as calculators and/or regulators (Land Manager from Dickey-John, Spraymat from Muller Elektronik, Genius from Agrosystem, RDS Delta de RDS etc.), which enable measurement, and in certain cases, recording of treatment related data for cereal crop sprayers. However, they are generally cost prohibitive or unsuitable for vine and fruit tree sprayers. When compared to the cost of the sprayers used in viticulture and arboriculture, they are overly expensive. In addition, they do not satisfy the vine or fruit growers requirements in terms of continuous machinery monitoring based on simple parameters (right, left or partial flow rates, tank level, nozzle clogging detection, plot surface covered etc.) nor to adjust settings on a daily basis: (pressure & flow rate settings) nor to check nozzle performance, nor to transmit recorded date for simple traceability and analysis.

Material and methods

The systems, which we describe in this study, meet the need for pesticide reduction adapted to this form of agriculture by facilitating sprayer settings and the collection of objective data required to optimize plant health product treatments with the help of analyses realised by the added software.

The embedded equipment

The onboard system measures and records, second by second, product application parameters (flow rates, volume, meteorological information), which are geo-referenced using GPS technology. The system architecture is comprised of treatment software and embedded equipment linked with the software by USB flash drives or WIFI network (Life AWARE only).

The embedded equipment (Fig 2)

includes an embedded electronic computer unit fitted on the tractor (MPU) and one more on the sprayer (APU) as well as measurement sensors The electronic MPU integrates acquired data management, Media data transfer, GPS-based geo-referencing, the weather station, data display and the Human Machine Interface as a very user friendly design providing pull-down menus similar to those used on mobile phones to guarantee easy usage and to counteract potential dangerous situations.

The electronic « APU » manages the acquisition of treatment-related data of the sprayer.

The system is designed so that the farmer has no extra constraints, or operations to conduct during treatments, which means that if a fault occurs, spraying operations do not have to be halted. Consequently, the parameters measured are: left and right flow rates, tank level, supply pressure, meteorological information (wind speed and directions, temperature & humidity) and GPS positioning. This Ultrasound static « marine » type measurement station is free of all mechanical problems. The electro magnetic flow-rate meters tested are not affected by clogging due to sticky or powder products and do not depend on pressure-based measurements of tank residues (circuit purging and rinsing). An ultrasound sensor measures the tank level with a especially corrected treatment,.

The onboard systems have 3 roles:

1. Prior to application: Assist the winegrower during sprayer tank filling (direct and accurate reading of tank level), by allowing him to easily set flow rates based on plot parameters (row spacing, volume/Ha etc.). Weather information (wind speed <19km/h and humidity levels) allow for better product applications. Verify product from among those listed and set or change quantity levels.

2. During application: Continuously visualize machine operation parameters during plot treatment i.e. monitoring. This allows the winegrower to detect malfunctions (clogging, unbalanced spraying, tank residue levels, etc). Plant-health product traceability is facilitated by GPS referencing.

Post treatment:

Transfer and then automatic generation of treatment logs. Inter plot traceability is rendered possible as the GPS module can differentiate vine rows of plots. Allows a fine interpretation of the quality of application.

Before beginning the work, the winegrower initialize the work at the workstation PC with the programmed USB key, (using the software TICSAD) so he can verify the list of tasks, the settings of the sprayer and each product used. He chooses the task he has to do and, once the tractor is running, the GPS module of the onboard system synchronises itself so that when the winegrower arrives at the plot of land he starts manually the record of data. At the end of the designed plot, he stops manually to record and can then select the next registered task.

The default mode of the onboard system displays flow rates and tank levels for application monitoring but the grower can choose other options if required, e.g. Volume per hectare with ground speed or weather measurement (wind speed, temperature and humidity). The farmer can program phyto-chemical treatment tasks and also every other task required, like land measurement, tillage, topping and others with geo-referenced ways.

The traceability software

Traceability data are collected (low rates, tank levels, weather information), analyzed and then compared with winegrowers declared data, to provide farmers with strategies designed to improve their practices. The treatment software aims to prepare the fieldwork and to treat the measurement's data issued from the embedded system to generate an automatic field logbook report.

The software permits to configure the list of plots of land, the tools (sprayer and others), the users, the products for each treatment and the different tasks. Thus, the farmer prepares the work, which will be transferred with a configuration file using the USB key.

After work, the data are collected from the USB key to the database which collects and processes received data (trajectory computations and merging of machine data) and generates:

Treatment analysis results related to plots treated and application dates.

The traceability of realised work and geo-referenced quantities of product used.

Processing of treatment product data

A geographical information system (GIS) was deployed to create, collect and then represent the entire set of data: define wine-growers plots, plant health products applied, materials etc. so that maps and spatial analysis of each plot be analysed. (Fig 7) The information recorded, second-by-second, includes: GPS (metric) sprayer positioning, left/right flow rates, volume of mixture tank residues and weather conditions (temperature, hygrometry, wind speed and direction). Information related the each parcel is extracted from each treatment event using a Geographical Information System (GIS). Cross-referenced analysis of the data is performed to derive essential criteria to assist decision-making. All available data show that scientific study of the pesticides application can be conducted indepth.

Generation of Plot Log

In relation to its role in application quality assessment, the system generates, in graphical form (Fig 8 ), plot related results where measured parameters, or those issued from computations, are displayed (Vol./Ha, wind speed /direction). A written report (Fig 9), providing information on different parameters, is also generated: commonly used sprayer settings, measurements, surface area treated, number of rows, dosage levels applied etc. The data once treated summarize results in treatment sheets in which information provided by the winegrowers are compared with those objectively recorded by the system. Data processing automatically generates a plot log and an automatic field logbook. That can be modified to satisfy related representations of this kind of information as well as sustainable agriculture specifications like those of TERRAVITIS.

The aim is to provide the winegrower easy to use information that can be instantly understood.

Other parameters can also be presented in graphic formats like wind force or humidity to enhance analysis. Once all the data have been gathered, they are communicated to farmers via a dataexchange intranet site in an educative format designed for easy interpretation. The data can be visualized, interpreted and changed to improve the practices.

Results

The results of these projects concern the reduction of pesticides found at the outlet of the catchment's basin, reduction of product quantity used only thanks to the NICT tools help and the ways NICT gets to analyse and improve current practices.

Analyses of the current practices

The processing of treatment product data with the NTIC TICSAD system permits to analyse the farmer's practices and to extract the most current errors that conduct to bad results. We computed the practices of 20 farmers for one year that represents approximately 500 treatments.

We observed that only 68% of the treatments correspond to the amount envisaged by the farmer (Fig 12). The first error comes from a bad knowledge of the true surface of plots but also from coarse calculation errors of the amount during the preparation of the sprayer. The first reason that conducts to losses and bad treatments is out of tuned apparatus like that unbalance slope or bad speed use (Fig 10). The result is some important variations of quantity by hectare applied that represents 20% of all the treatments. The results show that less than 50% of the treatments are realized under weather good conditions of humidity and temperature. On the other hand, the wind speed conditions are generally observed and do not exceed the 19km/h.

The embedded system TICSAD gives the knowledge of the various sources of errors by making it possible to optimize the quality of pesticide application also to reduce the losses.

The reduction of the quantities of pesticides related to better practices

For the Life AWARE project [START_REF] Ruelle | AWARE : A Water Assessment to Respect the Environment -Final report[END_REF], during three years, samples of water were taken with an automatic sampler to the catchments basin outlet and were analysed in laboratory. Weedkillers (58%) (Glyphosate or its metabolite the AMPA), fungicides (36%), insecticides (6%) were found with a number of weed-killers of larger concentrations. This finding is possibly explained by the fact that weed killers are directly applied to the ground and therefore are immediately found in superficial waters generated by heavy rainfalls or precipitation.

The annual quantitative variation of phytochemical products found, is very strongly correlated with quantity and intensity of rainfall, these two parameters are very variable in Mediterranean climate.

Over the three years of the project, year 2006 was characterized by one very dry spring (10mm). Consequently, there was no pressure from mildew and the adventitious ones did not develop. The wine growers thus, performed less treatment in 2006 as compared to 2007-2008. Moreover as it did not rain to a significant degree there was no transfer of pesticides towards water. The years 2007 and 2008 on the other hand exhibited important intensities of rain during spring and autumn and therefore supporting the transfer of pesticides. During those two years the wine growers had to carry out more treatments, as the parasitic pressure was stronger. These two combined mechanisms therefore explain the elevated presence, in terms of quantity and composition, of plant health products during 2007 and 2008 in Vaillèle River waters.

It appears difficult on a time span of 3 years to generate conclusions on the reduction of the quantities of pesticides related to better practices. Modelling could make it possible to test various scenarios according to the ground observations collected during the three years of the project.

For the TICSAD project the farmers were brought to evaluate the product quantity used and their way of working. In a general way, the reduction is about 10 to 15% thanks in particular to a more rigorous evaluation of the surface cultivated (exact land surveying of the surface cultivated/declared surface). In a second way, the monitoring of the dysfunction during work makes it possible to correct incidents immediately (clogged nozzles) and to avoid specific errors and localized pollution.

3.3. The use of the NICT embedded system.

Role of the NICT for sprayer tuning

The Embedded system sensing devices has been used at two steps by the farmer:

First, during the filling up: the tank level sensor is very useful to the farmer as it allows the farmer to stop the filling when necessary. This operation was much less comfortable when using the sprayer level indicators; point pollution is limited. In the same manner, he can do the good tune-up of flow-rate for each side of the apparatus corresponding to the Volume per hectare desired and detect dysfunctions before leaving to treat.

Secondly, during the spraying, the farmers can monitor the spraying and external parameters and therefore adapt its speed or detect any malfunction (ex: stuck nozzle); the displayed parameters are at present: the right and left flows (in l/min) and the weather parameters (then the farmer can stop if the wind is strengthening).

Finally, thanks to the embedded system and the adjustments, the wine grower takes particular care to modify his apparatus, not only at the hydraulics but also on the spray nozzles direction and the rinsing of the tank.

Role of the NICT for farmer practice improvements

After data processing, useful information is presented in the form of graphs and maps, which can be used by the farmers and advisors for evaluation and improvement of farming practices. Using these types of maps, the farmer can get involved into a self-teaching scheme.

Role of the NICT for traceability improvement

First comparisons made with the manual traceability books show several discrepancies. These are always due to farmer errors (due to a delay in filling up the book, to writing errors…). Therefore, the AWARE & TICSAD systems offer a secure way for elaborating the obligatory "traceability field logbook". Data are organised in order to fill it. Outputs like the one presented in Figure 9, can be automatically generated in order to help the farmer to have a guaranteed traceability.

PROSPECTS

On the other hand the reduction of the quantities of pesticides can be reduced by evaluating/controlling the adjustments on the sprayers and by using innovative solutions developed by the technical institutes and the research centres: programs POD MILDIUM (INRA -CEMAGREF) [START_REF] Léger | An expert based crop protection decision strategy against grapevine's powdery and downy mildews epidemics: Part 1) formalization. Presented at the meeting of the IOBC/WPRS Working Group[END_REF] and OPTIDOSE (IFV) [START_REF] Davy | Le programme Optidose : optimisation agronomique et environnementale de la pulvérisation[END_REF] so that the fight against parasitic attacks can be won by using the right amount of pesticide and therefore eliminating excess applications and decreasing further contamination of water sources and environment.

To better manage these treatment methods, the TICSAD embedded system provides an obvious help. The traceability AWARE & TICSAD system could make it possible to obtain the traceability of phytochemical treatments but also to reference geographically places of infestation in the plot thanks to the integrated management of the tasks and events. A fine and objective analysis at the vine stock scale could be obtained. This approach is currently in evaluation at the Cemagref of Montpellier. The aim is also to adapt this process, developed at the plot, at the level of an exploitation that is relevant to decision making.

Conclusion

The NICT systems offer farmers new technology, enabling the automatic generation of reliable data, automatic feedback on current practices and real traceability on spraying and pesticide product usage. The analyse of these readings, which involves the different stakeholders, enables detection of different malfunctions and provides avenues to improve practices and equipments, thereby reducing quantities of pesticide products used and mitigating environmental contamination. It provides objective data automatically. The most important hydraulic parameters involved in sprayer functioning can be visualized and, if needed, easily corrected.

It is undeniable that the quality of application of the products is undoubtedly the first means with which the wine grower can reduce the use of pesticides. A good adjustment of the sprayer makes it possible to limit air and soil losses and drifts (they can represent from 7 to 50% according to the vegetative stage) and to avoid the over and under proportioning.

The main objective of these projects is to enable farmers to completely control the operations of their every day working tools. These tools enable the farmer to check and correct sprayer parameters on a daily basis. Geo-referenced inter-plot traceability of treatments provides an objective assessment of application quality, which allows the winegrower to analyze and 10/10 correct operations. Thanks to the assistance provided by this tool, users pay greater attention to both hydraulic and mechanical (nozzle direction) settings, and to the general maintenance of their sprayers, with the aim of obtaining a specific result that can be immediately assessed after treatments.

NICT tools give operators the means to control pesticides application and to meet the objective of significantly reducing soil and air losses, thereby mitigating surface and groundwater pollution and atmospheric contamination. Associated with new methods of treatments like POD and OPTIDOSE, the objective to reduce the amount of pesticides used can be achieved in a short time frame, without compromising the quality of the protection necessary to achieve high yields and good quality products.

Figure 1 :

 1 Figure 1:Soil / sprayer / grow stage losses repartition for each type of machine (© Cemagref 2009) (ref: SupAgro Montpellier 2007 C. Sinfort [2])

Figure 2 :

 2 Figure 2: tractor -sprayer equipment, the tractor MPU © Cemagref 2009

Figure 3 :Figure 4 :Figure 5 :Figure 6 :

 3456 Figure 3: electro magnetic flow-rate meters © Cemagref 2009

Figure 7 :

 7 Figure 7: View of the list of wine plots of one winegrower with the TICSAD software © Cemagref 2009

Figure 8 :

 8 Figure 8: Representation of inter-plot treatment & treatment log © Cemagref 2009

Figure 9 :

 9 Figure 9: Percentage of treatment with bad amount © Cemagref 2010