Jaap Ham

Kees Van Den Bos

Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 1 Running head: PERSONAL RELEVANCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE INFERENCES Not Fair for me! The Influence of Personal Relevance on Social Justice Inferences

Keywords: justice, morality, personal relevance, spontaneous inferences, explicit judgments

In this paper, we argue that the personal relevance of a situation primarily influences spontaneous inferences about social justice, and not necessarily affects explicit justice judgments. To test this hypothesis, two studies manipulated personal relevance and assessed justice inferences and judgments: Participants read descriptions of fair or unfair events happening to stimulus persons referred to with first-person versus third-person pronouns (Experiment 1) or as "a friend" versus "a stranger" (Experiment 2). We then measured spontaneous justice inferences (using the probe recognition paradigm) and explicit justice judgments (using rating scales). As predicted, both studies showed stronger spontaneous justice inferences for high personal relevance descriptions, of unjust events specifically, whereas explicit justice judgments were not significantly influenced by our personal relevance manipulations. These findings suggest that especially the spontaneous component of the justice judgment process is sensitive to personal relevance.

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 3 Not Fair for me!

The Influence of Personal Relevance on Social Justice Inferences Imagine that you and your colleague do the same work, but that you only make 1400 Euros whereas your colleague makes 4100 Euros a month. Now imagine the same situation, but this time with low personal relevance: Not you, but somebody else earns less money than a colleague for the same amount of work. How would your assessment of the justice of the situation be influenced by whether the situation occurs to you or to somebody else? In other words, how would the social-cognitive processes of justice judgments be influenced by personal relevance?

Research evidence suggests that people interpret events egocentrically (see, e.g., [START_REF] Gilbert | The momentary realist[END_REF][START_REF] Gilovich | The spotlight effect and the illusion of transparency: Egocentric assessments of how we're seen by others[END_REF][START_REF] Ross | The "false consensus effect": An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes[END_REF] and that especially people's spontaneous reactions are influenced by egocentric biases (e.g., [START_REF] Epley | Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment[END_REF][START_REF] Kruger | Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments[END_REF]. For example, most people think they drive a car better than average, especially when making their judgments under cognitive load and thereby giving less controlled reactions [START_REF] Kruger | Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments[END_REF]. In contrast, people's more controlled and explicit reactions to events are less egocentrically biased and more objective (Epley et al., 2004).

In the current paper, we argue that the personal relevance of a situation primarily influences spontaneous reactions in moral and justice judgments, and not necessarily explicit justice judgments. This assumption is in line with theorizing by [START_REF] Haidt | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment[END_REF], who argued that moral judgments are generally the result of quick, spontaneous processes, that include subjective, affective valence evaluations (e.g., "like" vs. "dislike"). More specifically, we propose that these "egocentric ethics" [START_REF] Epley | Egocentric ethics[END_REF] often are caused by spontaneous, egocentric characteristics of human judgment whereas people's explicit justice judgments show less strong effects of factors associated with personal relevance. This proposition, to be found in the modern literature on justice and morality (e.g., [START_REF] Epley | Egocentric ethics[END_REF][START_REF] Haidt | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment[END_REF], has never been directly empirically investigated, as the abovementioned theorists acknowledge.

We propose here that people will spontaneously think about justice in especially strong ways when a highly personally relevant justice-implying event happens (e.g., to themselves or to a friend, as opposed to someone else, such as a stranger), and we predict that these effects will be particularly strong for unjust-implying events. This proposition is based on previous research which indicates that people spontaneously assess aspects of the environment that are relevant for them personally (Epley et al., 2004;[START_REF] Gilbert | The momentary realist[END_REF][START_REF] Nickerson | How we know--and sometimes misjudge--what others know: Imputing one's own knowledge to others[END_REF] and that unjust events affect people' s reactions more strongly than just events do [START_REF] Folger | The sense of injustice: Social psychological perspectives[END_REF]. Furthermore, in line with Epley et al. (2004), we argue that people will be less sensitive to injustices experienced by others.

In the current research, we will directly test these predictions. Importantly, earlier research (assessing explicit justice judgments) sometimes found effects of personal relevance and perspective taking on moral and justice judgments (e.g., [START_REF] Epley | Feeling "houlier than thou": Are self-serving assessments produced by errors in self-or social prediction[END_REF][START_REF] Messick | Fairness, preference, and fairness biases[END_REF], whereas other studies could not replicate such an effect (e.g., [START_REF] Huo | Superordinate identification, subgroup identification, and justice concerns: Is separatism the problem; is assimilation the answer?[END_REF][START_REF] Finkel | Not fair! The typology of commonsense unfairness[END_REF]. Finding evidence for effects of personal relevance on especially spontaneous justice inferences (and more so than on explicit justice ratings) would advance our field and would suggest on what types of cognitive processes and type of dependent variables effects of personal relevance are most likely to be found.

Overview

We performed two studies to investigate the influence of personal relevance on spontaneous justice inferences and on explicit justice judgments. In both studies, we assessed spontaneous justice inferences and explicit justice judgments that people made about justicerelevant descriptions of different levels of personal relevance. When assessing spontaneous justice inferences and making explicit justice judgments, participants saw the same short situation descriptions in which a stimulus person was treated in fair or unfair ways. Half of these descriptions portrayed a stimulus person of high personal relevance, and half a stimulus person of low personal relevance.

In Experiment 1, situation descriptions of high personal relevance described a stimulus person by using first-person pronouns (e.g., a description of a just-implying event was: "You and your colleague do the same work. You make 1400 Euros a month and your colleague makes 1400 Euros a month"). Situation descriptions of low personal relevance described a stimulus person by using third-person pronouns (e.g., a description of an unjustimplying event was: "He and his colleague do the same work. He makes 1400 Euros a month and his colleague makes 4100 Euros a month"). In Experiment 2, personal relevance was manipulated by presenting the stimulus person either as a friend or as a stranger.

We assessed participants' spontaneous justice inferences by means of the probe recognition paradigm [START_REF] Mckoon | Inferences about predictable events[END_REF]. This paradigm has been used successfully in earlier studies to examine activation of various types of spontaneous inferences, for example the activation of spontaneous trait inferences [START_REF] Uleman | On-line evidence for spontaneous trait inferences at encoding[END_REF]. We measured participants' explicit justice judgments by means of rating scales that are commonly used in justice studies [START_REF] Lind | The social psychology of procedural justice[END_REF].

Our predictions were that we would find effects on the probe recognition measures indicating that participants draw justice inferences spontaneously when they read the descriptions that implied just or unjust events. Second, we expected stronger spontaneous justice inferences for situation descriptions of high personal relevance than for situation descriptions of low personal relevance. Third, we expected stronger spontaneous justice inferences for situation descriptions of high personal relevance that implied unjust events (cf. [START_REF] Folger | The sense of injustice: Social psychological perspectives[END_REF]. Fourth, we expected that participants' explicit justice judgments would be

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 6 dependent on the just-versus unjust-implications of our descriptions, but less likely to show strong effects of the personal relevance manipulation than our probe recognition data. The probe recognition paradigm. Participants read a short description of a situation after which a probe word was presented on their screens. Participants were asked to accurately indicate as quickly as possible whether this probe word was part of the sentence they read. For example, participants in our experimental trials read the sentence "You and your colleague do the same work. You make 1400 Euros a month, and you colleague 4100 Euros," while on control trials they read a sentence that used the same words (including identical pronouns to refer to the actor) but which did not imply anything related to social justice. After such a sentence had been presented, the word "just" was presented on participants' computer screen and participants were asked to indicate whether this probe word was part of the sentence they had read. If justice inferences are spontaneously drawn while reading the experimental description, then we should find that participants need more time to respond and/or more often respond incorrectly on experimental trials as compared to control trials (the probe recognition effect). This is because the spontaneous justice inference might have interfered with correctly and quickly rejecting the probe word after reading a description that did imply that probe word more so than after reading a description that did not [START_REF] Mckoon | Inferences about predictable events[END_REF]. Thereby, finding the probe recognition effect indicates that participants

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 7 spontaneously drew justice inferences.

Stimulus materials. In the probe recognition paradigm, participants completed 60 trials in random order. In each trial, a short description and a single probe word were presented to the participants. Of the 60 trials, 8 trials (4 experimental and 4 control trials)

were the critical trials that were used to test our hypotheses.

In the 4 experimental trials, each description was succeeded by a probe word that was implied by the description. Two experimental trials employed a high personal relevance description, whereas the other 2 experimental trials employed a low personal relevance description, as in the examples presented earlier. In both these 2 sets of 2 experimental trials, the description implied a just event in one trial, and an unjust event in the other trial (e.g., a description of a just [unjust] event was: "On the first class, the professor states that 2 [1] of 2 assignments must be handed in. After the course, both assignments are used to calculate your grade"). Some of the four experimental descriptions involved distributive justice, some procedural justice. (All descriptions can be found in the appendix of [START_REF] Ham | Automatically inferring the justness of events: Evidence from three implicit measurement paradigms[END_REF], and are available on request.)

The 4 control trials were similar to the 4 experimental trials, but these descriptions presented the words in a different order such that these control descriptions formed logical sentences that did not imply anything related to social justice.

Probe words on the 4 experimental and 4 control trials were taken from a set of 8 words related to social justice. As just probe words we used the Dutch words for "just", "fair", "justified", and "appropriate" and, as unjust probe words, "unjust", "unfair", "unjustified", and "inappropriate". For all trials, at random a description and a concurring probe were chosen with this restriction that no 2 trials used the same materials.

In addition to the 8 critical trials, 52 filler trials unrelated to social justice were included in the experiment for two reasons. First, if all materials would be only justice-

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 8 related, we would not be able to show that it is specifically spontaneity of justice inferences (as opposed to other, more general inferences) that we are revealing here [START_REF] Mckoon | Inferences about predictable events[END_REF]. Second, if all correct responses would only be to answer "no", spending attention to the description would not be necessary to complete the task [START_REF] Mckoon | Inferences about predictable events[END_REF]. Therefore, in 30 of the 52 filler trials the probe was a word that was literally in the description. Filler descriptions and probe words were comparable in length and sentence structure to the critical descriptions and probe words.

Experimental procedure. The experiment was run on a computer and started with an explanation of the first task. The first task was the probe recognition task which started with a practice round of 12 trials. The practice rounds were the same as the trials of the experimental task, but materials were unrelated to social justice. Next, the 60 trials of the main task started.

In each trial, first a row of X' s appeared in the middle of the screen for 1000 msec. Next, the description was displayed for 3000 msec, followed by a blank screen lasting 500 msec. Again a row of X' s appeared on screen for 500 msec, this time followed by the probe. During the whole task the words "yes" and "no" remained visible on the right and left side of the screen.

From the moment the probe was presented, participants could press the appropriate keys (the "a"-key respectively "6"-key to indicate "no" respectively "yes") to give their answer. The probe remained visible until the participant had pressed one of both keys. After the answer was given, a blank screen was displayed for 1000 msec. Then, the next trial started. participant's answers were averaged to form a reliable scale of their justice judgments (alpha' s > .86). After this, participants were thanked, paid for their participation, and debriefed.

Results and discussion

Probe recognition paradigm. Both when analyzing response times and error rates, we found evidence supporting our hypotheses. Below, we present our analysis of response times. 2 Response time data of 14 participants could not be analyzed because they gave incorrect answers on critical trials. Following [START_REF] Ratcliff | Methods for dealing with reaction time outliers[END_REF] probe words on experimental trials (after reading a description that implied a just or unjust event) than on a control trials (after reading a justice-unrelated control description). This probe recognition effect indicates that while reading the description, justice inferences were spontaneously drawn and that the justice knowledge that was thus activated interfered with quickly rejecting the probe word, thereby supporting our first hypothesis.

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 10 Our second hypothesis was also supported: As predicted, the main effect of trial type

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 11 relevant descriptions the probe recognition effect was not influenced by whether the descriptions implied unjust or just events.

Results indicated no statistical reliable evidence that descriptions implying just events led to different probe recognition effects than descriptions implying unjust events, as indicated by a non-significant interaction between trial type and description type, F(1, 131) = 1.66, p > .20. Another interesting finding is that when the stimulus person of a descriptions was referred to by first-person pronouns (M = 717, SD = 125), participants showed slower overall response times than when the stimulus person of a descriptions was referred to by third-person pronouns (M = 702, SD = 144), F(1, 131) = 4.01, p < .05. So, stimulus materials of stronger personal relevance led to slower response times. However, this effect did not interact with trial type and, therefore, is less central to our current purposes.

Explicit justice judgments. In line with our fourth hypothesis, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA on participants' explicit justice judgments indicated that participants rated descriptions that implied a just event as more just than descriptions that implied an unjust event, F(1, 153) = 527, p < .001. In contrast to the probe recognition findings, this effect was independent of whether the stimulus person of the description was referred to by first-person or third-person pronouns, all Fs < 1. In line with expectations, justice judgments showed an interaction of Trial Type x Description Type, F(1, 153) = 573.77, p < .001. As expected, experimental descriptions that implied a just event were rated as more just (M = 6.3, SD = 1.3) than experimental descriptions that implied an unjust event (M = 1.5, SD = 0.9), F(1, 153) = 114.6, p < .001, 2 = .43. For control descriptions, this effect was not found (M = 4.7, SD = 2.0), p > .28, 2 < .01, which was not surprising because these descriptions had been designed and pretested not to imply anything related to social justice.

Relationship between spontaneous inferences and explicit judgments. Results indicated no overall or within-cell correlations between participants' spontaneous justice

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Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 12 inferences (neither when based on response times nor when based on error rates) and explicit justice judgments, all rs < .08, all ps > .36.

Experiment 2

Method

Participants. Participants were 113 students (45 men and 68 women) at Utrecht University. For their participation of 20 minutes they received 2 Euros.

Stimulus materials, design, and procedure. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except for three changes. First, in the high personal relevance trials the stimulus person was now referred to as "a friend" and in the low personal relevance trials as "a stranger".

Second, we included just versus unjust probe type manipulation in our probe recognition task. To this end, Experiment 2 used 16 critical trials (8 experimental and 8 control trials) to be able to investigate whether in our probe recognition paradigm activation of just-related probe words might be distinguished from activation of unjust-related probe words. As in Experiment 1, half of the experimental trials used just probe words and the other half used unjust probe words. Different from Experiment 1, each description was used twice: once with a just probe word and once with an unjust probe word. Third, because of the higher amount of critical trials, the current experiment used 44 of the 52 filler trials of Experiment 1. Again, for the second task, participant's answers to the three explicit justice judgment questions were averaged to form reliable scales of their justice judgments for each type of descriptions (alpha' s > .81).

Results

Probe recognition task. An analysis of response times (using the same procedures as in Experiment 1) fully supported our hypotheses. As in Experiment 1, all participants had a low error rate (M =4.45%, ranging from 0% to 31.0%). Following the restrictions described in Experiment 1, the response time data of 11 participants had to be dropped (6 because of wrong answers and 5 because of too fast or too slow response times) and 102 participants were entered into the analyses.

Response times were submitted to a 2 (trial type: experimental vs. control) x 2 (probe word: just vs. unjust) x 2 (description type: just-implying vs. unjust-implying) x 2 (stimulus person: friend vs. stranger) ANOVA. Mean response times are presented in Table 2. In support of our first hypothesis, results suggest participants drew spontaneous justice inferences while reading a description about a friend or about a stranger. That is, we again found the probe recognition effect: Participants responded slower in correctly rejecting probe words on experimental trials (M = 791, SD = 118) than on control trials (M = 716, SD = 90), indicated by a main effect of trial type, F(1, 101) = 291.16, p <.001.

In support of our second hypothesis, we found that when the description was about a friend, results showed stronger spontaneous justice inferences indicated by a stronger probe Type x Description Type, F(1, 101) = 14.35, p <.05, 2 = .12. For descriptions about a stranger, this interaction of Trial Type x Description Type was not found, F < 1, indicating no differences between probe recognition effects for descriptions of just or unjust events when these events happened to a stranger.

Extending on Experiment 1, results also suggested that descriptions implying an unjust event caused stronger spontaneous justice inferences than descriptions implying a just event, as indicated by an interaction of Trial Type x Description Type, F(1, 101) = 5.77, p <.05. Specifically, on experimental trials using a description of an unjust event, participants responded slower (M = 796, SD = 115) than on experimental trials using a description of a just event (M = 786, SD = 121), F(1, 101) = 5.33, p <.05, 2 = .05, whereas on control trials, this difference was not found, F < 1. Although not found in Experiment 1, this finding fits with social cognition findings that negative information draws more attention than positive information (e.g., [START_REF] Dijksterhuis | On wildebeests and humans: The preferential detection of negative stimuli[END_REF].

Results further indicated that when the description of a trial had been about a friend, participants responded slower overall than when the description had been about a stranger, F(1, 101) = 8.27, p <.01. Also, although we found no interaction effects including the probe word manipulation, all Fs <1, participants responded slower overall to just-related probe words than to unjust-related probe words, F(1, 101) = 5.59, p < .05.

Explicit Justice Judgments. As in Experiment 1, and in corroboration with our fourth hypothesis, participants' explicit justice judgments indicated that descriptions that implied a just event were rated as more just (M = 6.4, SD = 1.1) than descriptions that implied an unjust event (M = 1.6, SD = 1.0), whereas for control descriptions this effect was not found, as indicated by a Trial Type x Description Type effect, F(1, 112) = 442.84, p < .001. However, similar to Experiment 1, there was no significant effect of whether the stimulus person was a friend or a stranger, all Fs < 1.

Relationship between spontaneous inferences and explicit judgments. As in

Experiment 1, results indicated no overall or within-cell correlations between participants' spontaneous justice inferences (neither response times nor error rates) and explicit justice judgments, all rs < .13, all ps > .16.

General Discussion

The results of both experiments presented here show an influence of personal relevance on spontaneous justice inferences, and less so (in fact in both our experiments not significantly) on explicit justice judgments. The current results indicate that people draw stronger spontaneous justice inferences (indicated by greater interference effects in a proberecognition paradigm) when confronted with situation descriptions of justice-implying events happening to themselves than to somebody else (Experiment 1) and to a friend than to a stranger (Experiment 2). Thus, we now have evidence that a personally relevant justicerelevant event leads to the strongest spontaneous justice inferences. These results constitute the first empirical evidence of the influence of personal relevance on the social-cognitive processes of spontaneous justice inferences.

Importantly, for descriptions using first-person pronouns or descriptions about a friend, we found that especially unjust events caused the strongest spontaneous justice inferences. For descriptions using third-person pronouns or descriptions about a stranger, spontaneous justice inferences were activated equally strongly for descriptions that implied a just or an unjust event. This result fits with suggestions that especially experiences of unjust events strongly affect people [START_REF] Folger | The sense of injustice: Social psychological perspectives[END_REF] and is in line with the finding that people have different neurological reactions to moral transgressions that happen to themselves versus to someone else (Berthoz, Grezes, Armony, Passingham, & Dolan, in press).

In contrast with the strong, reliable effects of personal relevance on spontaneous justice inferences, in both experiments we found that explicit justice judgments showed no statistically significant influence of personal relevance: Participants correctly indicated on 7point rating scales whether descriptions implied just or unjust events, but whether the event was described from a first-person or third-person perspective (Experiment 1) or whether the stimulus person was a friend or a stranger (Experiment 2) did not influence participants' explicit justice judgments. Thus, both our experiments corroborate the assumption that explicit justice judgments are influenced less by personal relevance than spontaneous responses. This is not to say that personal relevance may never influence explicit justice judgments (Epley et al., 2004). The explicit measures we used here were not exhaustive.

Perhaps using other measures (such as affective reactions to just and unjust events and measuring concerns for justice evaluation) and/or assessing justice judgments under high cognitive load [START_REF] Kruger | Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments[END_REF] sometimes may lead to more sensitive measures than the traditional assessment of explicit justice judgments we used here.

The current results corroborate and extend earlier assumptions described in the literature (e.g., [START_REF] Epley | Egocentric ethics[END_REF][START_REF] Haidt | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment[END_REF]. Furthermore, unlike earlier research (e.g., [START_REF] Kruger | Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments[END_REF]Epley et al., 2004;[START_REF] Loewenstein | Self-serving assessments of fairness and pretrial bargaining[END_REF], we tested this assumption such that no extensive description of personal relevance was necessary. Thereby, we introduced a very subtle manipulation of personal relevance to the literature that may be conducive when conducting future research on this important subject.

The current results open interesting avenues for future research about the dynamics of the specific social-cognitive processes involved. This includes potentially very important differences between spontaneous justice inferences and explicit justice judgments.

Specifically, it may be the case that our implicit measures tapped process-related aspects of justice judgments (such as the degree to which justice concerns are activated spontaneously), but that the explicit justice judgments tapped content-related aspects of justice judgments (especially the degree to which events were just or unjust). This may imply that our implicit measure assessed whether justice concerns were activated spontaneously, independent of the justice judgment that ultimately (and explicitly) was made.

  . Participants were 154 students (48 men and 106 women) 1 at Utrecht University. For their participation of 20 minutes they received 2 Euros. The design of Experiment 1 was a 2 (trial type: experimental vs. control) x 2 (description type: justimplying vs. unjust-implying) x 2 (stimulus person: first vs. third-person pronouns) withinsubjects design.

  For the explicit measurement of justice judgments the short descriptions of the 8 critical trials were again presented and participants were asked to evaluate how just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), fair (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair), appropriate (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate), and justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) the event described was. For each of the four different kinds of descriptions (2 description types [justimplying vs. unjust-implying] x 2 stimulus persons [first vs. third-person pronouns]),

  , we analyzed our response latencies data by using two methods: an absolute cutoff criterion of < 200 ms and > 2000 ms, and an inverse transformation (1/x) of the response latencies. The analyses reported hereafter are based on the cutoff criterion, which yielded converging results to the inverse transformation analysis. Because of the cutoff criterion, the response time data of another 8 participants were dropped, leaving 132 participants in our data set. Response times were submitted to a 2 (trial type: experimental vs. control) x 2 (description type: just-implying vs. unjust-implying) x 2 (stimulus persons: first-person vs. third-person pronouns) ANOVA. Mean response times are presented in Table 1. Replicating earlier findings (Ham & Van den Bos, 2006), results suggest spontaneous justice inferences. That is, as predicted, participants responded slower on experimental trials (M = 737, SD = 116) than on control trials (M = 682, SD = 152), indicated by a main effect of trial type, F(1, 131) = 43.51, p <.001. So, as expected, participants were slower in rejecting (justice-related)

(

  the probe recognition effect) was qualified by the two-way interaction of Trial Type x Stimulus Persons, F(1, 131) = 5.92, p < .05. When the stimulus person of the description was referred to with first-person pronouns, the probe recognition effect was strongest and participants responded slower on experimental trials (M = 752, SD = 93) than on control trials (M = 681, SD = 158), F(1, 131) = 41.63, p <.001, 2 = .24. When the stimulus person of the description was referred to by third-person pronouns, the probe recognition effect was also present, but here participants showed a significantly smaller probe recognition effect, though still responding slower on experimental trials (M = 720, SD = 140) than on control trials (M = 682, SD = 147), F(1, 131) = 13.04, p <.001, 2 = .09. Our third hypothesis was that the strongest spontaneous justice inferences would be found for first-person descriptions that implied an unjust event. Again, results supported our predictions: The probe recognition effect (the main effect of trial type) was qualified by the three-way interaction of Trial Type x Stimulus Persons X Description Type, F(1, 131) = 4.10, p < .05. Follow-up analyses indicated that when the stimulus person of the description was referred to by first-person pronouns, results showed an interaction of Trial Type x Description Type, F(1, 131) = 6.31, p <.05, 2 = .05. This indicated that when the stimulus person of the description was referred to by first-person pronouns and the description had implied an unjust event, the probe recognition effect (a response time of M = 768, SD = 91 on experimental vs. M = 673, SD = 171 on control trials) was larger, F(1, 131) = 38.35, p <.001, 2 = .23, than when the stimulus person of the description was referred to by first-person pronouns and the description had implied a just event (M = 736, SD = 94 vs. M = 687, SD = 143), F(1, 131) = 12.94, p <.001, 2 = .09. However, when the stimulus person of the description had been referred to by third-person pronouns, an interaction of Trial Type x Description Type was not found, F < 1, 2 = .01, which suggests that for low personally

  recognition effect (M = 803, SD = 115 on experimental vs. M = 714, SD = 88 on control trials), F(1, 101) = 240.57, p <.001, 2 = .70, than when the description was about a stranger (M = 779, SD = 121 vs. M = 720, SD = 93), F(1, 101) = 95.42, p <.001, 2 = .49, indicated by an interaction of Trial Type x Stimulus Person, F(1, 101) = 18.80, p < .05. Our third hypothesis was also supported: Results indicated strongest spontaneous justice inferences for high personally relevant descriptions that implied an unjust event, indicated by an interaction of Trial Type x Stimulus Person x Description Type, F(1, 101) = 7.07, p < .05. That is, only for descriptions about a friend, the probe recognition effect was stronger for descriptions of unjust events (M = 815, SD = 110 vs. M = 711, SD = 86), F(1, 101) = 207.06, p <.00, 2 = .67, than for descriptions of just events (M = 792, SD = 120 vs. M = 717, SD = 91), F(1, 101) = 91.95, p <.001, 2 = .48, indicated by an interaction of Trial

In both our experiments, gender showed no effects on our dependent variables, all Fs < 1.

In both our experiments, analyses of error rates showed results identical to the response times data. To be concise, error rates results will not be discussed here and are available on request.

Personal Relevance and Social Justice Inferences 17

The current research also may have implications for the concepts of automaticity and spontaneous justice inferences. Because of the features of the currently used probe recognition paradigm, we know that spontaneous justice inferences share (at least) the feature of spontaneity (unintentionality) and the feature of uncontrollability with automatic processes (see also [START_REF] De Houwer | How to define and examine the implicitness of implicit measures[END_REF]. In the probe recognition paradigm, participants must suppress drawing spontaneous inferences to respond quickly and correctly as instructed. Thereby, this paradigm provides strong evidence that inferring the probe concepts is not only unintended but also difficult to control [START_REF] Uleman | On-line evidence for spontaneous trait inferences at encoding[END_REF]. Earlier research using various research paradigms [START_REF] Uleman | Spontaneous versus intentional inferences in impression formation[END_REF] showed that spontaneous trait inferences almost completely fit [START_REF] Bargh | The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, efficiency, intention, and control in social cognition[END_REF] four criteria for automaticity: They are drawn without awareness, unintentionally, are highly efficient, and cannot easily be controlled [START_REF] Uleman | Spontaneous versus intentional inferences in impression formation[END_REF]. Future research is needed to investigate all features of the possible automatic processes of drawing justice inferences. To return to the example which with we started our paper: If you hear that someone makes less money than a colleague for the same work, the current research indicates that it matters for social-cognitive justice judgment processes whether that someone is you yourself or somebody else. Chances are that when you encounter a situation in which a just or an unjust event happens to somebody, you will spontaneously draw inferences about social justice. However, if something is "not fair for me!" [START_REF] Finkel | Not fair! The typology of commonsense unfairness[END_REF], people draw spontaneous justice inferences stronger than when a situation is "not fair for someone else" or when the situation is "fair for me", though this bias need not show on people's explicit justice judgments.

Author Notes

This research was supported by a VICI grant .

Address correspondence to


Beate Seibt
email: b.seibt@uu.nl

Roland Neumann

Ravit Nussinson

Fritz Strack

Movement Direction or Change in Distance? Self and Object Related Approach-Avoidance Motions

Based on the conceptualization of approach as a decrease in distance and avoidance as an increase in distance, we predicted that stimuli with positive valence facilitate behavior for either approaching the stimulus (object as reference point) or for bringing the stimulus closer (self as reference point) and that stimuli with negative valence facilitate behavior for withdrawing from the stimulus or for pushing the stimulus away. In Study 1, we found that motions to and from a computer screen where positive and negative words were presented lead to compatibility effects indicative of an object-related frame of reference. In Study 2, we replicated this finding using social stimuli with different evaluative associations (young vs. old persons). Finally, we present evidence that self vs. object reference points can be induced through instruction and thus lead to opposite compatibility effects even when participants make the same objective motion (Study 3).

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Movement Direction or Change in Distance?

Self and Object as Reference Points in Approach-Avoidance Motions Approaching positive objects and avoiding negative ones is a central requirement in motivation [START_REF] Lewin | A dynamic theory of personality[END_REF]. But how is approach or withdrawal accomplished? What concrete behaviors fall under these categories? One can approach a chocolate by reaching out to it or by moving it to one's mouth. And one can withdraw from a spider by leaving the room or by throwing it out of the window. The central assumption of the present paper is that approach and avoidance can be construed in a flexible manner either with reference to the self or with reference to the object. When the self is the point of reference, the self is construed as relatively fixed and the distance of the object from the self varies. Moving the object to the self is approach and moving the object away from the self is avoidance. In contrast, when the object is the point of reference, the object is construed as relatively fixed and the self varies its distance from the object by moving toward it (approach) or away from it (avoidance). Hence, whether a movement is approach or avoidance depends on the active reference point, and, ultimately, on the subjective outcome of the motion: approach motions result in a decrease in distance between oneself and the object whereas avoidance motions result in an increase in that distance [START_REF] Strack | Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior[END_REF]). In the present paper we argue that the active reference point depends on the stimulus configuration and on the interpretative frame of the individual. Consequently, the same motion can be represented as approach or avoidance depending on a construal of the currently active frame of reference.

That approach or avoidance motions are not directly linked to specific muscles but hinge on a construal process was recently shown by [START_REF] Markman | Constraining theories of embodied cognition[END_REF]. They varied the

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Reference Point 4 representation of the self in space by presenting the name of the participant in the middle of a corridor displayed on the computer screen and having participants move presented words toward the name or away from it. When the words were presented further away than the name in the corridor the symbolic representation of the self and the actual position of the body had the same relation to the objects whereas when the words were presented nearer than the name moving a word toward the symbolic self was moving it away from the actual self and vice versa. Markman and Brendl found that participants were faster at moving positive words towards their name (i.e., their representation of the self) and negative words away from it regardless of whether this response necessitated an arm extension or flexion. While showing the independence of approach/avoidance from arm flexion/extension, this study still allows for the interpretation that every approach or avoidance motion has a default reference point, in this case the virtual self on the screen. According to our theorizing, however, the active reference point of a movement can be either implied by the stimulus configuration (see Studies 1 and 2) or flexibly construed when the actual stimulus configuration is somewhat ambiguous (Study 3). Accordingly, response compatibility effects in approach/avoidance tasks should depend on (1) the setup of the task to be executed and (2) the interpretation of the task by participants which should then be changeable for example by instructions, by their prior experiences, or by priming.

Supporting evidence for the close association of affective processing and approach or avoidance behavior comes from studies that investigated defensive reflexes which can be conceived of as the most primitive form of avoidance behavior [START_REF] Lang | Emotion, attention, and the startle reflex[END_REF]. [START_REF] Lang | Emotion, attention, and the startle reflex[END_REF] have shown that defensive reflexes are differentially modulated by affective processing. Specifically, in their studies the amplitudes of the blink reflex elicited by startle probes were augmented when participants processed negative information. Conversely,

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Reference Point 5 when positive information was processed, the blink reflex showed relative inhibition. Related research has shown that not only the intensity but also the speed of appetitive and defensive responses is modulated by the current motivational state. In an early study participants were required to push cards with words either towards themselves or away from themselves [START_REF] Solarz | Latency of instrumental responses as a function of compatibility with the meaning of eliciting verbal signs[END_REF]. Results showed that participants were faster at pulling pleasant words towards themselves than unpleasant words. In contrast, they were faster at pushing unpleasant words away from themselves than pleasant words. Similar results were obtained in a study by [START_REF] Chen | Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus[END_REF], in which participants had to evaluate words presented on the computer screen as "good" or "bad" by either pushing or pulling a lever. Again, participants were faster at pulling a lever towards themselves when they were presented with positive words than when presented with negative words. Conversely, pushing a lever was executed faster when negative words appeared on the computer screen. These results indicate that the active frame of reference was the self.

However, an object frame of reference should lead to the opposite pattern of results. One way to induce an object-related frame of reference, according to our theoretical model, is to use a stimulus configuration that implies a certain reference point. For example, having participants actually touch the representation of an object should induce an object-related frame of reference.

In line with this speculation, [START_REF] Wentura | Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing Reference Point 21 power of approach-and avoidance-related social information[END_REF] observed faster responses away from negative other-relevant traits (i.e., traits that have unconditionally negative consequences for persons in the social environment of the holder of the trait, e.g., selfish) and towards positive other-relevant traits. In their study, the trait terms were depicted on a computer screen and participants had to press a key attached to the computer screen (approach) or withdraw their finger from it (avoidance). Other studies using an object-related frame of reference obtained similar results (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001, Study 4;

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Reference Point 6 Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003, Study 4). These findings can be interpreted as first support for the assumption that an object related frame of reference can reverse the findings obtained by [START_REF] Chen | Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus[END_REF]. They have been obtained using an intuitive understanding of what should be the default reference point in a certain setup as well as reinforcing a certain construction by instructions or visual feedback. For example, [START_REF] Wentura | Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing Reference Point 21 power of approach-and avoidance-related social information[END_REF] gave visual feedback of the "effects" of the motions (decreasing vs. increasing stimuli) designed to enhance the association of the reactions with approach and avoidance. However, most of the published work on compatibility effects between approach/avoidance motions and stimulus valence found effects indicative of a self-related frame of reference [START_REF] Chen | Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus[END_REF]Mogg, Bradley, Field, & DeHouwer, 2003;Moors, DeHouwer, & Eelen, 2004;[START_REF] Neumann | Attitudes towards people with AIDS and avoidance behavior: Automatic and reflective bases of behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Neumann | Approach and avoidance: The influence of proprioceptive and exteroceptive cues on encoding of affective information[END_REF][START_REF] Rotteveel | Automatic affective evaluation does not automatically predispose for arm flexion and extension[END_REF]Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, in press;Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, in press;[START_REF] Solarz | Latency of instrumental responses as a function of compatibility with the meaning of eliciting verbal signs[END_REF]. So That is because the tasks employed do not only differ in the stimulus configurations and input devices, but also in the instructions and in the feedback given. According to our theoretical model, thus, they manipulated both: the stimulus configuration in the environment as well as the cognitive construction by the participants.

We reasoned that motions directly to or from an object or its representation afford an object related frame of reference. This should manifest itself in faster reactions to negative stimuli when withdrawing the hand from them and faster reactions to positive stimuli when approaching the hand to them even when completely neutral instructions are used, (i.e. without mentioning

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Reference Point 7 approach, change of distance or anything that could help construct a reference point).

Furthermore, no study thus far has induced both object-and self-related frames of reference for the same objective motion in the same study. Therefore, our second aim was to show that when there is room for interpretation (i.e., with a more ambiguous stimulus configuration) these reference points can be induced for the same task and serve as interpretation frameworks for construing approach and avoidance, yielding opposite compatibility effects.

Study 1

In the first study we tested the assumption that motions directly to or from the representation of an object on a computer screen imply an object related frame of reference. Like [START_REF] Wentura | Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing Reference Point 21 power of approach-and avoidance-related social information[END_REF], we employed a go/no go task that required participants in one condition to withdraw their finger from a key attached to the computer screen whenever a word was presented on the screen or to leave it on the key when a non-word was presented. In the other condition, the finger was placed on a key of the keyboard and participants were instructed to push the key on the computer screen with their finger whenever a word was presented and to leave it on the keyboard when a non-word was presented. The words presented differed in their valence. According to our rationale, this technique should induce an object-related frame of reference for approach and avoidance motions. Thus, we expected participants to be faster at initializing motions towards the word than away from it when the word was positive, and faster at initializing motions away from the word than towards it when the word was negative. Therefore, our dependent variable was the time elapsed from the onset of the word until the respective key was released.

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Method Design and Participants

The study took the form of a 2 x 2 factorial design. The factors were valence (positive vs. negative) and motion (approach vs. withdrawal) with valence as within-subjects factor and motion as between-subjects factor. Release time was the primary dependent measure. Fifty-two German-speaking students at the University of Würzburg majoring in disciplines other than psychology were recruited for a battery consisting of several unrelated experiments. The battery lasted about 60 minutes and participants were paid 6 Euros for their participation.

Material

Participants were placed at a distance of 50 to 60 cm from a computer screen. The presented words were approximately a quarter inch high. A round key with a diameter of a quarter inch was attached to the screen about half an inch beneath the words. A second key was the 0 key on the numpad of the keyboard. Participants' task (in both conditions) was to release one key and press the other. As dependent variable the release time was recorded. The stimuli were 15 positive and 15 negative adjectives with a strong valence according to pretests and 15 non-words constructed so as not to resemble any of the adjectives (see Appendix).

Procedure

On arrival, participants spent about 30 minutes completing several tasks unrelated to the experiment. The present task started with six practice trials. Participants were asked to either press the key attached to the screen (withdrawal condition) or the key on the keyboard (approach condition) whenever instructed to. They were told to keep their finger on the key until a star appeared on the screen in which case they had to release the key and press the other key as fast as possible. They were also told to keep their finger on the key whenever a circle was presented.

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Reference Point 9 Following the practice trials, participants completed 45 test trials (30 with words and 15 with non-words). They were instructed to react to words but not to non-words. Each trial began with the instruction "Please put your finger on key A (B)!" When the key was pressed, a fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen for 2000 ms. Then, it was immediately replaced with a letter string (either a word or a non-word). In the go-trials (i.e., the words trials), the stimulus remained on the screen until the second key was pressed. Release time was recorded and the next trial began after an intertrial-interval of 1000 ms. In the no-go trials (i.e., the non-words trials), the stimulus remained on the screen for 2000 ms. Then, it was replaced by the instruction to press the right key of the mouse which started the next trial. Each word was presented once in random order.

Results and Discussion

A few participants regularly removed their finger from the key before stimulus onset, despite being instructed differently. These participants were excluded from analysis (six participants who removed their finger too early in more than 20% of the test (go-)trials). The remaining 46 participants released the key too early in 0.7% of the test-go-trials. Furthermore, release times larger than 2000 ms were excluded from analysis (0.8% of the trials). The remaining reaction times were averaged per stimulus type and subjected to a valence by motion mixed-model ANOVA.

As Figure 1 shows, participants were faster at responding if a positive rather than a negative word appeared on the computer screen, F (1, 44) = 24.63, p < .001, η p 2 = .36. However, this main effect was qualified by a Valence x Motion interaction, F (1, 44) = 6.79, p = .012, η p 2 = .13, indicating that when reacting to a positive word, participants were faster at approaching their finger to the computer screen than at withdrawing it from the computer screen, significant, F < 1. These results are in line with our expectation that motions directly to positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli are facilitated, indicating an object related frame of reference.

Study 2

If the results of Study 1 are due to a link between affect and motivation, this effect should even be observed in reaction to in-versus outgroups. So far, there is very little evidence that prejudice is reflected in automatic avoidance reactions away from pictures of persons (but see [START_REF] Neumann | Attitudes towards people with AIDS and avoidance behavior: Automatic and reflective bases of behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Vaes | On the behavioral consequences of infrahumanization: The implicit role of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations[END_REF]. Because implicit measures consistently show negative evaluations of the elderly [START_REF] Dasgupta | On the malleability of automatic attitudes: Combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals[END_REF], we used old and young persons as social groups. We expected that an object frame of reference leads to faster responses away from pictures of old persons and faster responses towards pictures of young persons.

Method Participants

Fifty-nine students at the University of Würzburg who were enrolled in introductory courses participated in the experiment as a partial fulfillment of their course research requirement.

Experimental design

The experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 design, comparing group (elderly vs. young), order of group (first elderly go, then young go or first young go, then elderly go) and motion (approach vs. withdraw) with the first variable as within-subjects factor and the other two as between-subjects factors.

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Material

Fifteen pictures of elderly and 15 pictures of young persons were employed as target stimuli in this study (photos taken by the authors). The pictures were selected from a larger sample of pictures depicting very young (aged 3 to 20 years) and very old persons (aged 70 to 90 years). Pictures of young and old persons were matched on gaze direction (8 gazing into the camera and 7 sideways), facial expressions (5 with a slight smile and 10 completely neutral) and gender (10 female, 5 male). Each photo depicted only the face, neck and hair of the person in a 680 x 700 resolution colored image file. The portraits were placed on the screen such that the key attached to the screen was on the cheek of the person depicted.

Procedure

Participants first practiced with 16 trials with a star and 16 trials with a circle (as in Study 1), either reacting to the star or to the circle. For the test trials, participants were either instructed to react whenever a picture of an elderly person appeared on the computer screen and not to react when a picture of a young person appeared, or to react to a picture of a young person and not to react to a picture of an elderly person. Half the participants executed the approach motion and the other half the avoidance motion. After every picture had been presented once in randomized order, the assignment of group to go versus no-go was reversed. The sequence and presentation times of the individual trials were the same as in Study 1.

Results and Discussion

As in Study 1, a few participants regularly removed their finger from the key before stimulus onset, despite being instructed differently. These participants were excluded from analysis (six participants who removed their finger too early in more than 20% of the test (go-)trials). The remaining 53 participants released the key too early in 0.4% of the test-go-trials.

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Release times larger than 2000 ms were excluded from analysis (0.4% of the trials). One further participant was excluded from analyses because she complained to the experimenter about muscle aches due to the task (withdrawal condition). The remaining release times were averaged per stimulus type and then subjected to a Group x Order x Motion ANOVA.

As shown in Figure 2, participants were faster at responding to an old than to a young picture, F (1, 48) = 6.90, p = .012, η p 2 = .13. However, this main effect was qualified by a Group

x Motion interaction, F (1, 48) = 4 .80, p = .033, η p 2 = .09, indicating that pictures of elderly persons could be faster responded to when withdrawing the finger from the computer screen than when approaching it to the computer screen, and pictures of young persons could be faster responded to when approaching the finger to the computer screen than when retracting it. All other effects were non-significant, all Fs < 1.5, all ps > .23. To conclude, using the same procedure as in Study 1, motions towards a positively evaluated group (young persons) and away from a negatively evaluated group (the elderly) were facilitated, again indicating that participants represented the objects as reference points.

Study 3

Study 3 was designed to test whether the cognitive construal of the active reference point for one and the same task can be changed through instructions. In this study a joystick was used to assess the onset of approach and avoidance motions. The paradigm was similar to the one used by [START_REF] Chen | Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus[END_REF]. First, we sought to replicate [START_REF] Chen | Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus[END_REF] finding by inducing a self-related frame of reference. Second, we attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 by inducing an object-related frame of reference, this time with a different procedure.

Importantly, we expected that instructing participants to either move the joystick towards or away from the self (self-related frame of reference) or to move the joystick towards or away from the

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Reference Point 13 word (object-related frame of reference) would lead to opposite compatibility effects. In addition, this experiment allows to test whether the divergent findings in the literature are due to the different devices employed (Joystick, Key on the screen, computer mouse, special keyboard) or to the induced reference point.

Method Participants and Design

Participants were 75 students at the University of Würzburg not majoring in Psychology.

The study was run as the first study in a multi-study session lasting about an hour. Participants received 6.-Euro (7.-$) for compensation. The experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design, comparing valence (positive vs. negative), motion (toward body vs. toward screen), reference point (self vs. word), and reaction mapping order (first positive toward body vs. first negative toward body) with the first two variables as within-subjects factors and the last two variables as between-subjects factors.

Material

Participants' task was to decide if an adjective that was presented on the computer screen possessed a positive or negative valence. To indicate the valence of the word participants were required to move the joystick as fast as possible either in the direction of the computer screen or in the direction of the self. In the self reference condition, participants were asked to imagine pulling the word towards themselves or pushing it away from themselves, depending on its valence. In the word reference condition, they were asked to imagine pulling their hand away from the word or approaching the hand to the word. Accordingly, the same physical joystick movement was framed as a motion toward the self in the self-reference condition and a motion away from the word in the word reference condition.

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Reference Point 14

Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 1000 ms, followed by the stimulus word (see Appendix) which remained on the screen until the joystick was moved. After 1000ms, the next trial started, except when the wrong motion was detected, in which case an error feedback was given for 1000ms.

Procedure

Half of the participants in each point-of-reference condition began with the positive toward-body-mapping, and the other half began with the negative-toward-body mapping. After the instruction, participants completed six practice trials. Then, the instruction was repeated and the 30 test words appeared once each in randomized order. This was followed by six practice trials and 30 test trials in the reversed reaction mapping. In the end, participants were thanked, fully debriefed, and paid.

Results and Discussion

Errors (4.3%) and reaction times slower than 2000 ms (3.1%) were excluded, the remaining reaction times averaged per stimulus type and subjected to a 4-way mixed model ANOVA.

As Figure 3 shows, participants in the self-reference condition were faster when pulling the joystick towards themselves for positive and towards the screen for negative than in the reverse mapping, whereas participants in the object reference condition were faster when pulling the joystick towards themselves for negative words and towards the screen for positive words than in the reverse mapping. This resulted in the predicted three-way interaction between valence, motion, and reference point, F(1, 71) = 11.11, p < .001, η p 2 = .14. Thus, both groups showed response facilitation when instructed to move toward the self or the word whenever a positive word appeared and away from the self or the word when a negative word appeared than when instructed to move toward for a negative word and away for a positive word.

This interaction effect was qualified by a marginal 4-way interaction, Reference Point x Valence x Motion x Order, F (1, 71) = 3.37, p = .071, η p 2 = .045: the predicted three-wayinteraction was stronger when starting with positive towards screen and negative towards body than for the other order (η p 2 = .26 vs. .03), but within all 4 between cells, the valence by motion interaction was in the predicted direction. Also, the manipulation we used influenced reaction latencies for both valences, as indicated by significant Reference Point x Motion interactions for positive, F (1, 71) = 7.88, p = .001, η p 2 = .10, as well as for negative words, F (1, 71) = 6.09, p = .016, η p 2 = .08.

In addition, a marginal main effect of valence emerged, F (1, 71) = 3.02, p = .086, η p 2 = .04: Reaction times were faster for pos. words; as well as a main effect of motion, F (1, 71) = 9.11, p = .004, η p 2 = .11: participants responded faster when pulling the lever towards the body than when pushing it towards the screen. This main effect, however, was qualified by the predicted three-way-interaction and might have resulted from the two reference points having different effects on positive and negative valence (i.e., in the self-reference condition, the difference in motion was greater for positive words and in the object reference condition, it was greater for negative words). Further, we found a significant Motion x Reference Point x Order interaction, F (1, 71) = 8.48, p = .005, η p 2 = .11: the motion towards the body was faster in all between cells, except in the object reference group who started with positive towards body and negative towards screen. Finally, a marginal main effect of reference point emerged, F (1, 71) = 2.79, p = .099, η p 2 = .04: Reaction times in the object reference condition were overall faster. To summarize, our findings suggest that the instruction to either move the joystick towards or away form the word or towards or away from the self leads to opposite compatibility effects.

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General Discussion

Our starting point was that approach and avoidance are defined by two points of reference:

the self and the object. In line with other compatibility effects documented in psychology (Wascher, Schatz, Kuderer, & Verleger, 2001) we assumed that approach and avoidance motions are in part based on a construal of the currently active frame of reference. Consistent with this assumption Studies 1 and 2, in which an object frame of reference was induced, showed that motions towards a screen displaying positive words or young persons are executed faster than motions away from it and that motions away from a screen displaying negative words or elderly persons are executed faster than motions towards it. In Study 3 we framed joystick motions either as self-or as object-related through instruction. When participants were instructed to respond with self-related movements (i.e., motions towards the self or away from it), reactions to positive words were faster with motions towards the body and to negative words with motions away from the body than when the mapping was reversed. When participants were instructed to respond with object-related movements (i.e., motions towards the words or away from them), however, reactions to positive words were faster with motions away from the body and to negative words with motions towards the body than when the mapping was reversed.

To conclude, when an object frame of reference is made accessible either through the task setup or through instructions, approach and avoidance motions are constructed in relation to the object. In contrast, when the self is more accessible as frame of reference, approach and avoidance motions are constructed in relation to the self. In addition, our findings show that the divergent findings in the literature are due to (1) different construal processes instigated through instructions, examples, feedback etc., as well as (2) differences in the paradigms and input devices employed, like whether the representation of the attitude object is directly touched or not.

As we did not systematically vary the ambiguity of the task and the reference point instructions,

it remains an open question whether even a clear default reference point as in Studies 1 and 2 can be switched around through instruction. This is an interesting topic for future research. We suspect that the more clearly a situation instigates the construal of one reference point rather than the other, the more difficult it is to instruct individuals to use the other one instead. Nor did we test whether the task employed in Study 3 has a default reference point or not. What we did demonstrate, however, is that approach/avoidance tasks can have a default reference point that is not induced through instructions, and that different reference points can be induced within the same task through instructions, leading to opposite affect-motor compatibility effects.

Across our experiments it became clear that it is not the direction of the motion itself that determines whether it should be classified as approach or avoidance, but rather the relation of the motion to the reference point. In Study 3, for example an increase in distance was realized by either moving the joystick away from the negative word (object frame of reference) or by moving the joystick away from the self (self frame of reference). What the present studies show is that both of these possibilities can be flexibly induced through instruction as evidenced by valence compatibility effects that follow the instructed reference point. These findings thus support the theoretical assumption made by the reflective-impulsive model [START_REF] Strack | Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior[END_REF]) that the crucial feature of approach motions is the experienced decrease in distance and the crucial feature of avoidance motions the experienced increase in distance, not their concrete manifestations in the form of motor actions. According to our theoretical model, then, approaching somebody in anger in order to push that person away is an avoidance action with the self as the reference point. In this case, the motion towards the opponent is instrumental in increasing distance by pushing him away.

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If the regulation of spatial distance towards objects and other persons crucially depends on the active reference point, the same might be true for other kinds of distance as well, such as temporal or psychological distance. Indeed, there are two kinds of spatial metaphors for time: the ego-moving metaphor as in "I am looking forward to the concert" and the time-moving metaphor as in "I will take the Math exam before the English exam", as [START_REF] Gentner | As time goes by: Evidence for two systems in processing space time metaphors[END_REF] explain. They found that these metaphors are not just ways of speaking about time but also ways of thinking about time: In an ego-moving frame, we see ourselves traveling through time towards the future, whereas in a time-moving framework, events are moving from the future to the past. Thus, an approach motivation towards a longed-for event can either result in trying to bring that event closer or it can result in trying to move faster towards that event. Similarly, when trying to avoid an exam, for example, people might try to slow time down or try to move more slowly towards the future. It could be that even different actions are chosen in order to reach one or the other goal. It would be very intriguing to find that even such an abstract dimension as temporal distance is -virtually -manipulated the same way that spatial distance is.

In many situations, the reference point of a movement will be readily determined by real life constraints but especially in the kinds of situations we tend to produce in our laboratories (impoverished movements in relation to symbols of objects presented on two-dimensional screens), minimal input from instruction can suffice to point participants in quite different ways of making this situation become real. The present findings suggest that approach and avoidance do not primarily depend on whether participants use a joystick, a computer mouse, a keyboard, or a key attached to the screen to perform the motions, but rather on the way these motions are instructed or construed.

Approach Withdrawal

  far, self-and object-related frames of reference have always been found in different studies, by different researchers, in different labs. From the published findings, it cannot be deduced under what conditions self-reference should be expected and under what conditions other-reference.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. The influence of word valence and motion on response latencies in Study 1. Error

Figure 2 .

 2 Figure 2. The influence of social group and motion on response latencies in Study 2. Error

Figure 3 .

 3 Figure 3. The influence of reference point, word valence and motion on response latencies

  Figure 1

  Figure 2

The Netherlands, b.seibt@uu.nl. : rücksichtsvoll, mitfühlend, gerecht, kooperativ, freundlich, herzlich, warmherzig, hilfsbereit, zuverlässig, tolerant, einfühlsam, verständisvoll, ehrlich, aufrichtig, liebevoll (considerate, compassionate, fair, cooperative, friendly, hearty, warmhearted, helpful, reliable, tolerant, empathic, understanding, honest, sincere, loving) negative : grausam,gewalttätig,heimtückisch,niederträchtig,erbarmungslos,böswillig,jähzornig,herablassend,abweisend,unfreundlich,unsozial,aggressiv,intolerant,aufdringlich (cruel,cankered,violent,cattily,abject,merciless,malicious,irascible,condescending,abradant,unfriendly,aggressive,intolerant,robeling,tarimor,beglabeln,porufend,larimeln,arbilegen,narimone,klarturant,narrlig,varbugsten,beliegerter,bauftrale,zeiligere,kroblingen Words used in Study 3 positive: gerecht,freundlich,herzlich,warmherzig,froh,tolerant,glücklich,ehrlich,aufrichtig,liebevoll,toll,schön,human,treu,gut (fair,friendly,hearty,warmhearted,glad,tolerant,happy,honest,sincere,loving,great,beautiful,humane,faithful,good) negative : grausam, bösartig, gewalttätig, heimtückisch, tot, elend, depressiv, jähzornig, schlecht, aggressiv, gemein, zerstörerisch, einsam, brutal, böse (cruel, cankered, violent, cattily, dead, miserable, depressive, irascible, bad, aggressive, mean, destroying, lonely, brutal, bad)

Self as Reference Point