Evelyne Léonard

Governance and Concerted Regulation of

■ This article analyses the changes and challenges involved in the governance of employment in the EU-15 over the past decade. Several interrelated changes are examined: the European Employment Strategy; social pacts at national level; and bipartite bargaining covering employment issues. One can argue that raising employment levels currently constitutes a consensus-making factor at European level and within countries, but that there is a progressive shift in the rules of the game: we are witnessing both procedural and substantive changes in the governance of labour markets.

Introduction

Governing employment has become a key concern in Europe, after years when high unemployment levels in most countries have been seen as a major threat to social cohesion and to fragile pension systems. The interconnected economic, political and social implications of unemployment and employment make these issues a key criterion of European performance compared to the USA and Japan, and also a field in which the construction of a social dimension is tested. The EU has a high degree of labour market regulation [START_REF] Dølvik | The Impact of Post-Industrialisation on Employment and Labour Relations[END_REF]Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000), but numerous changes have affected this over the past decade.

This article analyses changes in the governance of employment over the past decade in the EU-15, examining three different levels at which rules are negotiated: European, national and sub-national. It also considers coordination between these various levels of regulation and questions the nature of the rules defined. Four interrelated changes are examined: first, the European Employment Strategy (EES), which has made little significant impact on national industrial relations; second, social pacts negotiated in many countries, with employment as one of their key dimensions; third, bipartite bargaining which also covers employment issues, but is rarely coordinated within national IR systems; and fourth, the broad consensus at European level on the need to raise employment levels, and the consequential shift in labour market rules. The article draws on official European sources; national reports on collective bargaining on employment in the 15 member states produced for DG Employment and Social Affairs; European social partners' reports on involvement in the 2003 national action plans (NAPs) and in European guidelines; 13 national reports on social partner involvement in the 2003 NAPs; and comparative reports on 'pacts for employment and competitiveness' published by the European Foundation.

Governance and the Concerted Regulation of Employment

The notion of governance generally refers to a reconfiguration of the role of the state, becoming less authoritative and less hierarchical in conducting economic, political and social change; the shift from government to governance in processes of decision-making and policy implementation involves other actors in multiple arenas, such as unions and employers' organizations as well as regional and local authorities [START_REF] Burroni | Governance and Competition Goods in European cities[END_REF][START_REF] De Ruyter | The Political Bond and the European Council[END_REF][START_REF] Lallement | Les gouvernances de l'emploi. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer[END_REF]. Governance is 'the set of mechanisms, devices and institutional arrangements that coordinate the economic actions of actors and organizations, regulate the distribution of resources and structure conflicts' (Burroni, 2004: 4); the term also refers to the search in modern societies for new relationships between the market and institutional regulation [START_REF] Hollingsworth | Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production[END_REF].

The concept of governance is thus close to that of regulation as used by [START_REF] Reynaud | Les règles du jeu[END_REF] and later [START_REF] Lallement | Les gouvernances de l'emploi. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer[END_REF] to analyse employment in France and Germany and by [START_REF] Jobert | Les espaces de la négociation collective, branches et territoires[END_REF] to study the role of branches and territories in industrial relations systems. It denotes the processes by which social rules are produced and transformed, sometimes in the form of prescriptions or restrictions, but more often as a guide for action or a model that orients social actors' behaviour. Regulation is the product of social exchanges and is, consequently, the result of explicit or implicit social compromises which define not only substantive rules on employment, but also the 'rules of the game', that is, the regulation process itself. Regulation is highly contingent, depending on the problems to be solved and the actors involved and also on pre-existing rules that act as both resources and constraints.

Rules, however, are not rigid: they can be interpreted, forgotten, rejected or reaffirmed by the actors, who do not spontaneously agree to respect a single set of rules. Hence regulation does not consist of a coherent system of articulated rules integrated within a hierarchical structure; in particular, the articulation between state regulation and collective agreements is a complex system of partly concurrent and conflicting rules [START_REF] Reynaud | Preface[END_REF].

The language of governance has appeared in the field of employment with a normative flavour. The revised EES presented in 2003 after five years of the 'Luxembourg process' emphasized 'good governance and partnership in the implementation of the employment guidelines': there was a double necessity to implement employment guidelines effectively and to involve in the process parliamentary bodies, relevant actors at national, regional and local levels, and the social partners (European Council, 2003;EC, 2004a).

Governance of employment in Europe today raises two interconnected issues for industrial relations: the first is the participation of social partners in the regulation of employment, which in turn raises the question of the concerted character of policies to increase employment rates; the second is the respective roles of the state and social partners, and particularly the relationships between government employment policies and collectively bargained rules. Applying Reynaud's perspective, employment regulation cannot be conceptualized as the simple pyramidal implementation of coherent rules from European to national and, finally, to sub-national sets of rules. The relationships between various rule-setting arenas become a problem of coordination, on the one hand, between state-led initiatives and collective bargaining, and on the other, among the different levels of industrial relations.

Procedural Changes

Concerted Regulation of Employment Under the EES

At European level, the major innovation over the past decade consists in the EES. Its fundamental characteristics have remained the same since its launch in 1997, despite its revision in 2003 [START_REF] Foden | The European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF]De la Porte andPochet, 2003, 2004;[START_REF] Watt | Reform of the European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF]: annual guidelines must be translated into NAPs, which are then evaluated by the Commission and result in recommendations to each member state. Nor has the content of the guidelines themselves changed fundamentally, despite alteration in their form [START_REF] Watt | Reform of the European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF].

The notion of 'good governance' in the EES includes insistence on the participation of unions and employers' organizations in the preparation and implementation of NAPs. This was reaffirmed in the 2003 revised version: 'the effective implementation of the employment guidelines requires active participation of social partners, at all stages, from designing policies to their implementation' (European Council, 2003: 16). How far has this injunction been observed? Data are piecemeal, with little systematic and fully comparable information. Table 1 summarizes conclusions from three different sources evaluating social partner participation in the 2003 NAPs (EC, 2004a;[START_REF] Etuc | Report on Social Partners' Actions in Member States to Implement Employment Guidelines[END_REF][START_REF] Eironline | Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 NAPs[END_REF].

The evidence is that the EES gives a clear impetus to consultation on NAPs, yet real concertation is rare. In the evaluation of the 2003 exercise, even the Commission recognized that NAPs are not a central tool for the governance of national employment policies and that governments remain the major and almost only actor in the process (EC, 2004a). The European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) report by [START_REF] Baradel | Social Partner Involvement in the 2002/2003 National Action Plans[END_REF] on social partner involvement in the 2002/03 NAPs generally confirms this, and a longer-term evaluation of the EES reaches a similar conclusion (De la Porte and Pochet, 2003[START_REF] De La Porte | The European Employment Strategy: Existing Research and Remaining Questions[END_REF].

There are many obstacles to more active participation in the NAP process. First, the annual exercise does not allow enough time for effective concerted action. Moreover, in some countries the timetable does not coincide with the annual wage bargaining round, inhibiting coordination. Second, the complexity of the subjects covered (for example, adaptability of the labour market, 'lifelong learning', 'active ageing' and active labour market policies) compounds the difficulties of participation within a tight calendar. These are, moreover, issues on which the appropriate level of regulation, and the division of responsibilities between government and social partners, can be particularly unclear. Third, some governments do not support social partner participation, or more precisely union participation, even if they formally accept the principles of the EES, as is currently the case in Austria and Italy. Lastly, in some cases no consensus can be found among unions themselves, as in France, or between unions and employers and the government, leading to an incapacity to adopt joint positions on the NAP. The short time-frame again increases the difficulty.

Concertation Attempts and Social Pacts

While social partner involvement in NAPs has been weak, in many countries tripartite bargaining has taken place for the conclusion of social pacts. The literature (in particular, [START_REF] Pochet | Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990[END_REF][START_REF] Pochet | Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990[END_REF]Fajertag, 1997, 2000;[START_REF] Rhodes | National "Pacts" and EU Governance in Social Policy and the Labour Market[END_REF] mainly attempts to explain this trend by arguing that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created pressures for national governments and social partners to agree on wage restraint in order to control inflation rates and meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. Certainly, the emergence or revival of social pacts tended to coincide with the implementation of EMU, but this explanation is inadequate.

First, it tends to interpret such pacts as purely reactive responses to exogenous constraints: EMU is seen as generating similar reactions in very different national IR contexts. This is to ignore the endogenous dynamics which have resulted in contrasting responses in different countries, related in turn to the fact that unions and employers' organizations constitute in the different countries different actors with various ideologies and action capacities. Second, such an approach tends to assume that national governments play a leading role, because of their obligation to comply with the Maastricht criteria. This does not explain the motivation of other actors: in particular, why unions should participate in pacts designed exclusively to restrain wage increases. Third, reference to EMU highlights macro-economic factors, but leaves aside the social dimension. [START_REF] Pochet | A New Era for Social Pacts in Europe[END_REF] show that the pacts also cover labour market flexibility and social security; they also claim that the pacts of the late 1990s were more comprehensive than those earlier in the decade, including both quantitative and qualitative measures and extending beyond mere wage discipline. Lastly, the emphasis on EMU has some difficulty in explaining why countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway have concluded social pacts; and conversely, why some countries in the eurozone have not.

Accordingly, EMU is certainly part of the story, but not the whole story, for social pacts are also a means to reform the labour market. Data on this dimension are again not systematic. It is clear that numerous attempts have been made to conclude national social pacts, leading to effective arrangements in seven countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. In other countries, attempts have either failed or faced difficulties: in France, discussions within bipartite groups and committees are not articulated with governmental initiatives; in Germany, the ambitious 'Alliance for jobs' broke down in February 2003; in Austria, Italy and Spain, concertation is under pressure mainly from the government. Innovative, but uncertain attempts have been undertaken in countries such as Portugal and Greece. The UK is the only country where there is no sign of systematic and concrete attempts to conclude a social pact.

As noted above, EMU has certainly influenced social pacts, at least in their wage moderation component, but this hardly explains the other labour market policies included. One can interpret this as a form of political exchange: while EMU provides incentives for wage restraint, the inclusion of other labour market targets such as job creation, flexibility, training and the integration of younger and older workers may facilitate agreements that meet the interests of all actors and not only state macroeconomic discipline.

However, these pacts cannot be directly attributed to the influence of the EES either, which has a limited influence on the NAPs themselves. Again, the diversity of national experience indicates that a common external stimulus has only limited explanatory power: the successful negotiation of social pacts and other tripartite agreements also requires strong stimuli or facilitating factors specific to the national context. Across all EU-15 countries there is broad consensus on the need to increase employment, and in many cases to decrease unemployment, but the high degree of legitimacy assigned to this objective is capable in only some countries of resulting in an agreement which reconciles the various interests of unions, employers and the state.

The multidimensional content which is one of the distinctive features of social pacts can itself facilitate the conclusion of such tripartite arrangements. Typically, these comprise a 'package' of measures: according to [START_REF] Pochet | A New Era for Social Pacts in Europe[END_REF], they combine provisions for wage restraint, labour market flexibility, social security and other policy issues varying from one country to another. Similarly, research conducted in the second part of the 1990s on 'pacts for employment and competitiveness' (PECs) concluded that such pacts, whether tripartite at national level or bipartite at lower levels, reflect a wide agenda, including issues on work redistribution, cost cutting, productivity and adaptability or employability [START_REF] Freyssinet | Negotiating Employment and Competitiveness: A Comparative Overview[END_REF][START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF]. [START_REF] Rhodes | The Political Economy of Social Pacts[END_REF][START_REF] Rhodes | National "Pacts" and EU Governance in Social Policy and the Labour Market[END_REF] argues that social pacts are the formal expression of concerted attempts to reform labour markets and social security while stimulating competitiveness in a macro-economic context in which governments cannot apply the traditional instruments of national economic policy. Considering four national cases, he concludes that collaboration on incomes policy is secured by enabling union participation in social policy and labour market reform, while social pacts also include rules on industrial relations and socio-economic governance. Again, the true multidimensional character of social pacts cannot be understood as the mere application of wage restraint imperatives; they cover distributional and productivity issues and reflect attempts on the part of national actors to reform labour markets. In other words, they result from the search for concerted solutions able to meet the various actors' interests.

Social pacts thus involve complex arrangements combining wages, competitiveness and employment. They require the institutional capacity to negotiate across policy arenas and are thus innovative and fragile: as various failed attempts indicate, their stability and viability are not guaranteed [START_REF] Regini | Between De-regulation and Social Pacts[END_REF][START_REF] Rhodes | National "Pacts" and EU Governance in Social Policy and the Labour Market[END_REF]. Many difficulties or obstacles can prevent the conclusion of such pacts. A change in governmental attitude towards concertation is enough to destabilize the existing processes; difficulty in reaching a consensus can lead to failure; beyond the general objective in terms of employment, specific issues can be very contentious (for instance, flexibility or 'activation' policies or retirement regimes) and this can result in an incapacity to conclude an agreement satisfying all the players.

In sum, social pacts may be influenced by EMU to the extent that the Maastricht criteria provide incentives for wage restraint, but they also include other dimensions, in particular measures to improve employment levels. These can facilitate compromises on wage restraint, but in addition they result from the willingness of national actors to reform labour markets in order to increase employment. The latter consensual objective opens the road for multiple actions in the fields of flexibility, work organization, working time, training and integration of younger and older workers. The possibility of concluding multidimensional agreements, within 'integrative bargaining' processes, certainly facilitates agreement; but the process remains highly contingent, requiring governmental support and depending on actors' willingness and capacity to make complex trade-offs.

Bargaining on Employment and the Coordination of Labour Market Reform

Employment-related topics also feature in bipartite collective bargaining at national level, though its extent is impossible to assess precisely because of the lack of representative data on the detailed content of collective agreements. However, several parallel research programmes indicate that employment gained in importance in collective bargaining during the 1990s. Research conducted for the European Foundation shows that 'pacts on employment and competitiveness' constitute an innovative approach to bargaining and are negotiated at branch and local level in all 11 countries studied [START_REF] Freyssinet | Negotiating Employment and Competitiveness: A Comparative Overview[END_REF][START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF]. [START_REF] Bélanger | La recodification de la relation d'emploi[END_REF] compare company bargaining in France and Québec and suggest that employment, rather than wages, has increasingly become a new 'general equivalent '. Spineux et al. (1999'. Spineux et al. ( , 2000'. Spineux et al. ( , 2001'. Spineux et al. ( , 2002) ) observe numerous processes of bargaining on employment in the EU-15, at company, sectoral and national levels. Lastly, the 2004 European social partners' reports on the implementation of the employment guidelines identify a large number of such initiatives.

Of course, there can be a bias here, since the notion of employment covers a variety of measures, including training, flexibility and worker mobility: it may be incautious to conclude that employment constitutes a central issue in bargaining simply because themes such as flexibility or training are included. Nevertheless, all the research cited shows that collective bargaining contributes to labour market reform in European countries. This role involves specific types of comprehensive, multidimensional agreements resulting from integrative rather than distributive bargaining [START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Concepts and Issues[END_REF][START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF]. It also accompanies changes in industrial relations systems. According to [START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF], pacts on employment and competitiveness encourage decentralization, 'with a wider participation of managers and employee representatives in the framework of a serious partnership approach'.

The trend towards decentralization has been observed in most European countries, but as [START_REF] Traxler | Farewell to Labour Market Associations?[END_REF] has shown, this does not necessarily mean a decline in higher levels of bargaining, which may maintain a role in defining guidelines, rules and norms governing company-level bargaining within a system of 'organized decentralization'. The degree of coordination among various arenas of bargaining is indeed a central issue for the governance of employment. It has a direct impact on the coherence between the content of centrally concerted employment policies or 'social pacts' and decision-making at company level. A coordinated industrial relations system will favour such a coherence, while an uncoordinated system will leave room for diverse and uncontrolled employment practices within companies in the context of what Traxler calls 'disorganized decentralization'. In other words, in such a case a social pact can have little effect in practice as long as companies define their own employment practices, with or without bargaining.

In countries where social pacts have been concluded, a high degree of coordination will favour coherence not only among different levels of bargaining, from company to sector to cross-sector bargaining, but also some synchronization between the state and industrial relations actors. Where there is no social pact, a high degree of coordination will favour coherence across sectors and across levels, but not with the state. Consequently, as [START_REF] Crouch | National Wage Determination and European Monetary Union[END_REF], [START_REF] Traxler | Farewell to Labour Market Associations?[END_REF][START_REF] Traxler | Coordinated Bargaining: A Stocktaking of its Preconditions, Practices and Performance[END_REF] and [START_REF] Regini | Tripartite Concertation and Varieties of Capitalism[END_REF] demonstrate, though from different starting points, identifying the levels at which bargaining is conducted is not enough to determine what type of role industrial relations institutions play in the regulation of the labour market. Coordination is a key criterion if we want to understand to what extent labour market reform is conducted in a concerted way across levels and sectors or, on the contrary, left to increasingly decentralized action.

In the context of national industrial relations systems, the combination of social pact processes with different degrees of coordination gives rise to four ideal-type scenarios. In the first, social partners and the state conclude one or several social pacts, and there is a high degree of coordination. This is, for instance, the case in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, yet with different coordination mechanisms. Accordingly, in these countries a relatively coordinated reform of the labour market is in progress, conducted through peak-level concerted action that is coordinated with the various levels of bipartite bargaining. This can be interpreted as the optimistic path of concerted change from an industrial relations point of view, not only because social partners participate in employment policies, but also because there is an organized system that leads to coherent action 'down to' company level. Some of these countries have indeed succeeded in conducting major labour market reforms in a concerted way, as is clear in the often-cited cases of Denmark and the Netherlands.

The opposite scenario involves a weakly coordinated industrial relations system with no general agreement or arrangement between the state, unions and employers' associations. Here the classic example is the UK, where there are no comprehensive social partnership agreements [START_REF] Hall | UK -Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 NAP[END_REF] and industrial relations involve a high degree of decentralization. In terms of labour market governance, such a scenario contains a high risk of differentiation and fragmentation of the workforce, with conditions varying from one company to another, along with the possibility for individual companies to use a wider range of employment measures, for example, utilizing a variety of 'flexible contracts' [START_REF] Nanteuil-Miribel | Les flexibilité en Europe: Pratiques, décisions, négociations[END_REF].

Between these two extremes, there are situations in which no social pact has been negotiated, yet industrial relations have a high degree of coordination. France is an example, with regular confrontations between unions, employers' associations and the government. Lastly, there is a fourth scenario in which social pacts are concluded, but with a weak degree of coordination of collective bargaining; hence the coherence of nationally set up rules and what is negotiated and practised within companies is not guaranteed. Greece would represent such a scenario if the newly established employment committee reaches joint commitments: the coherence between such arrangements and bargaining at lower levels will remain uncertain if the current industrial relations system remains unchanged.

Such ideal types must be applied flexibly, because the situation in each country is not static: social pacts involve a high degree of contingency. Hence different countries can follow different trajectories: in Portugal, coordination and the pursuit of concertation are both increasing; in Austria, the long-established tripartite social dialogue is at risk because of the confrontation between the government and the social partners; in Ireland, the conclusion of national partnership agreements seems to have become more difficult because of growing disagreement over wage issues and changes in the labour market [START_REF] Dobbins | 2003 Annual Review for Ireland[END_REF].

'More and Better Jobs for All'? Redesigning Labour Markets for Full Employment From Labour to Employment, then to Full Employment

In arenas at all levels, from the EES to company bargaining, the term 'employment' is widely present: in the 'European strategy for employment' and its impulse towards 'national action plans for employment', in pacts and conferences 'for employment', in agreements 'on employment and competitiveness', and so on.

The notion of employment as such is less common in the social sciences than concepts such as labour and work. Its presence in the discourse of actors such as the European Commission and Council, European social partners and national governments, unions and employers' organizations reflects a general reference to the goal of full employment and this, in turn, covers a progressive shift in substantive terms in the governance of labour markets in Europe.

References to employment generally encompass both a numerical dimension (the number of jobs or employment rates) and a qualitative dimension (involving worker mobility, the flexibility or adaptability of workers and companies and integration of specific categories of workers). We can identify three interrelated variables: volume, that is, the number of jobs within a national labour market or segments of this market (women, school-leavers, older workers and ethnic minorities); structure, that is, the distribution of qualifications and occupational status, nature and distribution of contracts, and organization of working time; and flows, which covers issues such as access to work, retirement and occupational mobility (Maruani, 1990;[START_REF] Michon | Travail, emploi, marché. Concepts et débats dans la socio-économie française[END_REF].

Pacts and agreements on employment commonly include a complex set of measures, as follows:

• The EES encourages member states to implement policies according to 10 guidelines that cover active measures for the unemployed, job creation and entrepreneurship, adaptability and mobility in the labour market, development of human capital and lifelong learning, active ageing, gender equality, integration of disadvantaged people, 'making work pay' through incentives to enhance work attractiveness, transformation of undeclared work into regular employment and, lastly, tackling regional disparities • In national PECs, [START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Concepts and Issues[END_REF] identify measures for work redistribution, cost cutting, productivity and adaptability, and employability, all more often designed for the purpose of preserving than creating employment [START_REF] Freyssinet | Negotiating Employment and Competitiveness: A Comparative Overview[END_REF][START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF] and • Spineux et al. (1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002) also identify numerous pacts and agreements associating training, functional and numerical flexibility, working time, cost cutting, measures for younger or older workers and so on.

The overall preoccupation is to preserve or increase employment, whether at company level, in a region or territory, in a national labour market or finally, across Europe as a whole.

Full Employment under the EES

Increasing employment levels has become a widespread objective, but also a more and more explicit goal in Europe over the past 10 years. It is in fact a rather traditional objective, prevalent in Europe since the rise of unemployment from the mid-1970s. [START_REF] Gobin | Construction européenne et syndicalisme européen[END_REF] reminds us that employment was at the core of projects of tripartite concertation at European level between 1969 and 1978 and that, in the same period, a major European Trade Union Confederation demand was to make full employment a political priority for Europe. In the 1980s and 1990s, employment rates remained steadily below Japan's and the USA's, and persistent high unemployment was considered a European disease, causing social and economic problems (EC, 2003). This led to the 1993 Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment and subsequently to the EES. The Lisbon strategy, established in 2000, makes full employment one of its three overarching objectives, and specifies quantitative targets: an average EU employment rate of 67 percent by 2005 and 70 percent by 2010; an employment rate for women of 57 percent by 2005 and 60 percent by 2010; and an employment rate for older workers (aged 55-64) of 50 percent by 2010.

The EES, often considered a key example of the social dimension of European integration, has attracted much comment [START_REF] Foden | The European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF][START_REF] De La Porte | The European Employment Strategy: Existing Research and Remaining Questions[END_REF][START_REF] Pochet | La nouvelle stratégie européenne pour l'emploi[END_REF][START_REF] Watt | Reform of the European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF], including criticism of its weak articulation with macro-economic policy. However, a dimension of the strategy, although central to its new version, is more rarely discussed, and this is the feasibility and the legitimacy of the full-employment objective as such.

Unemployment rates are now at very different levels in the various EU-15 countries (and even more disparate across the EU-25), ranging from less than 5 percent in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to 10 percent or more in Greece and Spain. The EU-wide priority has therefore shifted from combating unemployment to increasing overall employment levels and the specific rates for women and older workers. Most countries are still falling short of the Lisbon targets, in particular in respect of older workers (EC, 2004a). Accordingly, as [START_REF] Foden | The European Employment Strategy After Five Years[END_REF] note, the priorities of the EES since its revision in 2003 have shifted from lower unemployment to higher employment (a change in emphasis in part reflecting concerns for the viability of pension systems).

Considering that the overall employment rate in Europe has remained below 65 percent since the mid-1970s (EC, 2003, one may question whether the 70 percent target is realistic, especially when labour market trends have resulted in a failure to reach the intermediate targets for 2005 (EC, 2004a(EC, , 2004b)). Moreover, enlargement in 2004 has made the situation worse, as the 10 new members have an average employment rate of only 55.9 percent and an average unemployment rate of 14.8 percent (EC, 2003).

If full employment is a long-established and apparently endless quest, it is today different from what it was at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. In the EES, it is detailed in a number of quantitative indicators for each of the guidelines, but is also associated with features characterizing transformed labour markets:

• Strong insistence on 'active policies', that is, increased assistance to the unemployed to help them find a job, but also on 'incentives to enhance work attractiveness' and 'make work pay';

• The importance of notions such as adaptability, worker mobility, lifelong learning, underpinned by the idea of employability (while 'employability' is not precisely defined in the guidelines, the report of the Employment Taskforce in November 2003 indirectly gave a definition when discussing the topic of flexibility, stating that workers' security depends on their own capacity to remain and progress in the labour market [START_REF] Kok | Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: Creating More Employment in Europe[END_REF]); • Promotion of 'active ageing', to increase the participation of older workers; • Encouragement to women's participation through notions such as 'gender equality' and 'gender mainstreaming' and; • Pressure to reduce undeclared work and regional disparities, though with no quantitative targets.

In sum, even if the insistence on partnership and on the participation of social partners in the design and implementation of the employment guidelines reflects an underlying neo-corporatist type of governance, the overall picture is one of a labour market in which each individual should actively search for a job, be 'employable', be mobile and adaptable, improve his or her competencies over the whole of his or her career and retire later than now.

This shift does not constitute a general deregulation of employment relations. As [START_REF] Dickens | Changing Contours of the Employment Relationship and New Modes of Labour Regulation[END_REF] and [START_REF] Dølvik | The Impact of Post-Industrialisation on Employment and Labour Relations[END_REF] have shown, most jobs in Europe remain full time and with long-term contracts. Further, labour market transformations are, at least partly, conducted by rules set up by governments and the social partners. The shift, then, is rather in the progressive and distinct erosion of the notion of job security, and the growing affirmation of that of employability. This concept, as indicated above, clearly puts the responsibility for employment on individuals rather than on economic policies or employer strategies. Associated with the insistence on active labour market policies, on the dependence of social protection on occupation, this represents a subtle modification in the position of workers: their rights are more and more conditioned by their own ability to find a job. Instead of a right to work, there is a growing obligation to be 'employable', associated with a shift from a welfare to a 'workfare' state [START_REF] Tromp | The Dutch "Poldermodel": A Flexible Success Story[END_REF]. In other words, the ideology of full employment threatens to move towards a notion of 'employment-based citizenship', marked by a stress on supply-side labour market policies rather than protection. Access to social security becomes conditioned by the individual development of capacities useful to the market, with the necessity of regular updates for the 'knowledgebased society'.

The Pursuit of Consensus

Increasing the volume of employment is not only central to the EES, it represents a consensual objective within individual countries, for several reasons. First, in many countries, unemployment is a long-term and structural problem to which successive programmes hardly provide an answer. Even if average unemployment rates have tended to decrease over the past 10 years, areas of high unemployment remain in specific regions, and younger people are particularly hard hit, with an unemployment rate over 15 percent across the EU-15 (EC, 2003).

Second, unemployment, or more generally the level of employment, poses challenges of an economic, social and political nature. In economic terms, it has a direct impact on social security costs and, as a consequence, on labour costs and on public expenditures, while older workers' participation is a key variable for the viability of pension regimes. In social terms, it is related to individual social status and recognition and to the collective challenge of the integration of young people and minorities as well as to inequalities and social exclusion or cohesion. All these factors have a political dimension, and additionally, state capacity to design and implement efficient employment policies is a key electoral challenge [START_REF] Hamann | The Domestic Sources of Differences in Labour Market Policies[END_REF]. Increasing employment thus represents a societal challenge that directly concerns governments, employers and workers and can therefore be considered as an objective conducive to consensus making. It is, moreover, likely to meet the interests of each of the players, favouring the conclusion of ambitious agreements and social pacts. In other words, employers, unions and the state can gain from compromises on employment. Over and above a potential reduction in labour costs, employers can argue successfully for increased adaptability in order to preserve competitiveness, gaining state and union support for the development of a flexible and qualified workforce; unions see an increase in the number of jobs not only as a question of solidarity, but also of the social integration of more vulnerable sections of the population, and a crucial condition for the survival of social security; for the state, it means stability and security through social cohesion, a better capacity to contain public expenditure and social security regimes, along with a means to intervene in a field that is highly sensitive in electoral terms.

Lastly, in a context in which variations in wages are strongly constrained by EMU, actors willing to conduct labour market reform, whether to improve competitiveness or to maintain social cohesion, need to play on other levers: flexibility of contracts and working time, qualifications and skills, worker mobility and age of entry in to and exit from work, that is, employment volume, structure and flows. Therefore, both exogenous and endogenous factors contribute to the vitality of bargaining and concertation on employment: encouragement from EMU and the EES; problems that are country specific, but are present in all the countries; the notion of full employment as a consensus-making facilitator; and the field for compromise between the various interests at play. However, the actual impact on employment rates remains uncertain because many variables intervene. As [START_REF] Sisson | Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness: Summary[END_REF] notes, PECs are not deemed a sufficient condition for growth and job creation; they constitute what [START_REF] Saglio | Entre le prisonnier et le comptable: Réflexions sur les modèles de l'échange[END_REF] calls a 'game of chance', an exchange between partners in which uncertainty of the final result remains important. The actual impact in increasing the number of jobs is uncertain, but changes in terms of flexibility, training, employability, and activation policies are effective. In sum, all this contributes to a reform of labour markets for the sake of full employment, in which the latter objective looks like an endless quest for the holy grail, while the content of change in terms of employment structure and flows is real.

Conclusion

Governance of employment in Europe has been marked by a series of transformations over the past decade, including changes in both the processes and the content of rules regulating the labour market: in processual terms, progressive affirmation of the EES, development of consultation within NAPs, social pacts or attempts to conclude them and bipartite bargaining on employment; in substantive terms, the notion of employability seems to be a widespread focus of policy and goes along with the progressive adaptation of the labour market and of employment conditions for the sake of full employment.

Institutions play an important role in conducting labour market change, with numerous processes designed to develop joint solutions at different levels: European, national and infra-national. Clearly, institutional actors do not intervene just to compensate for the excess of liberalization of the labour market, nor to maintain existing 'rigidities'; they aim to adapt labour markets with such objectives as 'negotiated flexibility' [START_REF] Alacevich | Italy[END_REF].

The quest for full employment is widespread and favours consensus building at both European level and within countries, while there are European processes (EMU and EES) that constitute common constraints for national actors. However, national scenarios vary because national actors have to respond to labour market problems that are specific to their own country: improving employment security in Spain, reducing employment gaps in the Netherlands, implementing working-time reduction in France and so on. Countries also differ on two other dimensions: the capacity to conclude social pacts and the degree of coordination within their industrial relations systems.

Changing labour markets, evolving European frameworks and the instability of social pacts: the most common characteristic of national situations today is certainly that they are in flux. Innovative arrangements such as PECs remain contingent on several conditions: government attitudes towards unions and employers' associations and towards concertation; conversely, the willingness of the latter to cooperate with the state in the regulation of labour markets; their capacity to reach consensus and to conclude complex multidimensional agreements that meet each other's interests; and the institutional capacity to implement arrangements at the various levels and in different sectors, which is related to the degree of coordination of industrial relations systems.

Accordingly, several future scenarios are possible:

• Consolidation of neo-corporatist change will occur in countries where a number of conditions are met: the persistence of governmental support, long-lasting compromises, actors with both the willingness and capacity to conclude multidimensional agreements and institutional integration of arrangements into a coordinated industrial relations system. • Tensions among national actors or across levels of industrial relations in the absence of governmental support, the failure of successive attempts to conclude pacts and a lack of coherence between centrally negotiated arrangements and sector and company-level practices. • Breakdown, where the government's attitude constitutes an obstacle to concertation, where attempts to negotiate pacts never succeed or are never undertaken, where conflicts over specific issues such as wages or flexibility impede the conclusion of agreements and where lack of coherence among levels or arenas results in increased workforce fragmentation that in turn makes common solutions more and more difficult to achieve -this latter scenario would favour employer-led change, with liberalization of the labour market and weak union influence on the process.

Lastly, if full employment generally represents a consensus-building goal, favourable to concertation and to trends towards the first scenario, in the current context it also involves some ambiguity: it is conducive to innovative types of agreements, supporting neo-corporatist change of labour markets, but also involving greater flexibility, a shift in responsibility for employment to the individual worker and employment-related social protection, while no concrete impact in terms of the number of jobs is guaranteed.

European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3) 310 TABLE 1. Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 National Action Plans

	Country	EC (2004a)	Social partners	Eironline (2003)
			ETUC et al. (2004)
	Austria	++	+-	+-
	Belgium	++	+	+
	Germany	+	+-	+
	Denmark	++	+	+
	Spain	+-	+-	+-
	Finland	++	+-	+
	France	+	no data	+
	Greece	+-increasing	+	-
	Ireland	+-	+-	+
	Italy	-	+-	-
	Luxembourg	++	+-	no report
	Netherlands	++	+-	+-
	Portugal	-	+-	no report
	Sweden	++	+	+-
	United Kingdom	+-increasing	+-	+-
	Note: ++ substantial participation; + some participation; +-consultation but little
	impact; -little or no involvement.

  Table 2 provides a general overview of major actions in the employment field undertaken by

TABLE 2 . Social Pacts and Tripartite Arrangements on Employment, 1998-2003

 2 , unions and employers' associations; this gives by no means an exhaustive account of concerted action, but is enough to demonstrate the vitality and innovatory character of such attempts to reorganize labour markets. Data are presented for three different years: 1998 (which was also the first year of NAPs), 2001 and 2003. Additional information is provided by the European social partners' report for 2003 on 'actions in member states to implement employment guidelines'[START_REF] Etuc | Report on Social Partners' Actions in Member States to Implement Employment Guidelines[END_REF]. Bilateral and tripartite initiatives 'aimed at supporting employment and economic development through a comprehensive set of measures' are reported in Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; while in Ireland the 2003-05 partnership agreement 'Sustaining Progress' included the objective of 'economic inclusion based on full employment'.

	Country	1998	2001	2003
	Austria	Social partner participation in	Declining participation	Tensions
		policy-making
	Belgium	Bipartite central agreement	Bipartite central agreement	National tripartite conference
	Germany	Tripartite Bündnis für Arbeit	Discussion within Bündnis	Breakdown of Bündnis
		established
	Denmark	Major tripartite agreements	Coordinated government	Tripartite dialogue
			initiatives and collective bargaining
	Spain	Bargaining subject to 1997	National bipartite and tripartite	Difficulties
		interconfederal agreements	agreements
	Finland	Application of central incomes-	Central incomes policy agreement Central incomes policy agreement
		policy agreement	(December 2000)	(December 2002)
	France	None	Tensions	Parallel discussions in committee
				for European and international
				issues
	Greece	None	Tensions	National employment committee
	Ireland	Tripartite pact 'Partnership 2000' Tripartite pact 'Prosperity and	Tripartite pact 'Sustaining Progress'
		in force	Fairness' in force	in force
	Italy	Tripartite social pact	Growth of 'negotiated flexibility' Bipartite pact; but concertation
				under pressure
	Luxembourg	Tripartite coordination committee Extension of role of committee	Concertation
	Netherlands	Bargaining at national level	Much consultation	Bipartite StAr and tripartite SER
	Portugal	Bipartite joint declaration	2000 tripartite agreement in force Draft social contract
	Sweden	Tripartite talks on skills and	Development of new institutional High degree of social dialogue
		qualifications; bipartite talks on	framework
		sustainable growth and labour
		market
	United Kingdom

Possibilities limited by a highly decentralized bargaining system and absence of links between the national and micro levels. No comprehensive social partnership agreements. governments

Source:[START_REF] Pochet | Les pactes sociaux en Europe dans les années 1990[END_REF], Spineux et al. (1999); for 2001 for , Spineux et al. (2002);); for 2003[START_REF] Eironline | Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 NAPs[END_REF].

European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)


Max Koch

Wage Determination, Socio-Economic Regulation and the State

■ This article examines changes in socio-economic regulation and the role of the state in the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Sweden and Germany, against the background of the theoretical debate on transition from Fordist to post-Fordist growth strategies. The first focus is on reforms in the labour market and the welfare state, and their effect on the political and social processes through which wage norms are generalized in a national economy. The second is on the changing role of the state as an institutional form. The article starts from some basic assumptions of the regulation approach and delineates the status of the concepts of wage relation and wage determination, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. It then considers the debate over modifications to these concepts in the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist growth strategies, drawing on the trajectories of the five countries.

Introduction

This article analyses changes in socio-economic regulation and the role of the state in the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Sweden and Germany. It addresses, first, reforms in the labour market and welfare state and their impact on the procedures and contents of wage determination, the political and social processes through which wage norms are generalized in a national economy. Second, it examines the changing role of the state as an institutional form, applying some of the basic assumptions of the regulation approach. It then considers theoretical debates over modifications to these concepts in the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist growth strategies, in the light of the trajectories in the five countries.

Regulation Theory and the Wage Relation

The regulation approach is not a unified body of theory: it encompasses a set of different ideas which might be interpreted as a research programme in the social sciences. While authors such as [START_REF] Aglietta | A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience[END_REF], [START_REF] Boyer | The Regulation School[END_REF] and [START_REF] Becker | Akkumulation, Regulation, Territorium. Zur kritischen Rekonstruktion der französischen Regulationstheorie[END_REF] tend to regard the abstract features of capitalism as largely constant, they address both crises in the accumulation process and periods of expanded production and growth in the context of their institutional, social and political 'embedding'. This involves, first, a critique of neo-classical economics, in particular its ahistorical notion of homo economicus and its assumption of a natural tendency towards stable equilibrium. Second, regulation theory criticizes the conventional Marxist view that capitalism will ultimately collapse in a series of crises. On the contrary, capitalism 'develops through a series of ruptures in the continuous reproduction of social relations. Crises are resolved through an irreversible transformation which allows the fundamental or "determinate structure" of capitalism to continue' (Friedman, 2000: 61).

The regulation approach employs a number of intermediary concepts. Regimes of accumulation are associated with specific historical phases and development paths, normally associated with a particular industrial paradigm. They are based on compatible commodity streams of production and consumption, reproduced over a long period of time. A mode of regulation is an ensemble of social networks as well as rules, norms and conventions, which facilitate the reproduction of an accumulation regime. It comprises five institutional forms: the wage relation (or wagelabour nexus); the enterprise form; the nature of money; the state; and international regimes. It also includes geographical and temporal dimensions, which Jessop (2002: 21) calls spatio-temporal fixes; these determine the main boundaries within which structural coherence is ensured. Regulationists describe a historical constellation, in which a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation complement each other sufficiently to secure a long era of economic expansion and social cohesion, as a growth model or a model of development. The stability of such a growth model is enhanced where a common-sense value system is accepted across all social classes and groups [START_REF] Koch | In Search of a Class Theory of Marginality and Exclusion[END_REF].

Why is 'regulation' necessary? [START_REF] Jessop | The Future of the Capitalist State[END_REF], following Marx, identifies three key contradictions or 'tensions' which have to be addressed in any capitalist society. First, capitalism cannot reproduce itself wholly through its inherent logic of commodification; this requires a range of non-commodity forms of social relations as well as 'fictitious' commodities such as land, money, knowledge and, above all, labour power. Second, many of the contradictions of capitalism can be traced to the basic contradiction between exchange and use value: productive capital is both an abstract value and a concrete stock of specific assets; the worker is both an abstract unit of labour power substitutable by others and a concrete individual with specific skills, knowledge and creativity; the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; money functions both as an international currency exchangeable against other currencies and as national money. State economic and social policy has to maintain social cohesion in a divided, pluralistic society. Third, structural tensions nonetheless assume different forms and different weights in different countries. They are also, for the most part, manageable according to the particular institutional regulation, the specific spatiotemporal fixes and the hegemonic blocks with which they are occasionally associated. In the face of these tensions, a relatively stable regime of accumulation and a successful mode of regulation cannot be taken for granted, but must be understood as the product of a rather fortuitous and fortunate convergence of relatively independent developments in different societal fields.

Boyer defines the wage relation as a 'set of legal and institutional conditions that govern the use of wage-earning labour as the workers' mode of existence ' (2002a: 74). It refers 'to the type of means of production; the social and technical division of labour; the ways in which workers are attracted and retained by the firm; the direct and indirect determinants of wage income; and lastly, the workers' way of life' (Boyer, 1990: 38). In this article, we focus on the determinants of wage income or, more specifically, the procedures and content of wage determination; these can be understood as the process by which wage norms are generalized within an economic space. Wage determination is normally mediated through bipartite or tripartite bargaining at company, sector or national levels. Despite distinctive national trajectories, the Fordist wage relation rested on a particular sort of compromise: 'acceptance of Fordist production methods in return for productivity gain sharing' (Boyer, 2002b: 232). This involved the recognition by employers of trade unionism and centralized collective bargaining, while the unions, for their part, respected management's right to control the labour process. Wages were normally indexed to productivity growth, while monetary and credit policies were oriented towards the creation of effective aggregate demand.

In the course of the 1970s, the Fordist growth model experienced a multilayered crisis, involving the exhaustion of the productivity potential of economies of scale, the changing demand structures for industrially manufactured goods, the spatial reorganization of the working process and the new role of financial capital and investment practices [START_REF] Lipietz | Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism[END_REF]. There was growing pressure to change the established forms of wage determination -either the level and/or the content and orientation of collective bargaining, in particular. Both adaptations were complemented by corresponding changes in the general mode of regulation.

In our analysis of national trajectories, we will examine whether reforms in the labour market and welfare state influenced processes and outcomes of wage determination one-sidedly in support of capital interests or whether they helped to form a new, post-Fordist compromise. The first approach features a lack of wage coordination (with bargaining at company or individual level) and a general orientation towards (shortterm) capital interests; while in the second, Fordist wage-determination processes are not abolished, but are developed further to accommodate both the competitive interests of the employers and the interests of employees. Wage coordination continues either at the national or sector level and is oriented towards a balance between capital valorization, productivity growth, wage increases and labour-market participation.

The Role of the State in Socio-Economic Regulation

The Marxist debate in the 1970s on the role of the state in socio-economic regulation generated the thesis that a state apparatus formally separated from all economic agents 'and the resulting institutionalized division between "politics" and "economics" is a structural requirement for the stable reproduction of capitalist societies' (Hirsch, 2000: 110). Market forces alone cannot reproduce the basic categories of the capitalist mode of production -private labour, the securing of private property and the respect of the principle of equivalence in exchange relations. These depend on a formally independent institution that, above all, monopolizes the legitimacy of physical force. Regulationists elaborated on this notion and analysed the state as both 'an active party in the economy (via public finances and money) and as constitutive of the environment of the commodity economy (through the interaction of public policies)' (Théret, 2002: 123). In the Fordist growth model, the nation-state played an active role, supporting the wage relation by policies designed to integrate the circuits of the capital and consumer-goods industries, and by mediating the conflicts between capital and labour over wage issues. It further helped to achieve growth by promoting capital accumulation through public infrastructure spending and permissive credit and monetary policies. Most western European governments also carried out substantial income redistribution through Keynesian counter-cyclical economic policies.

In the debate on the changing role of the state in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, regulationists work from the 'hypothesis that the nation-state is still a relevant unit of analysis (Boyer, 2002b: 231), even when a high level of internationalization is de-establishing many of the institutional compromises of each country' (Boyer, 2002b: 231). The relationship between the world market and national economies is addressed as a 'doubled set of connections' (Hirsch, 2000: 105): on the one hand, growth and development potentials of national locations depend how they are embedded in the international division of labour; on the other, the latter is itself determined by nation-states which are themselves results of negotiations and struggles between different classes and social groups. The leeway for national growth strategies corresponds to different combinations of these two parameters, while the structure of the world market is seen as a 'field of possible positions' that allows for the simultaneous existence of a 'range of mutually compatible national regimes' [START_REF] Lipietz | Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism[END_REF]. In contrast to dependency theories, regulationists do not interpret the international division of labour as socially and spatially invariable and homogenous, a fixed 'core-periphery' relationship, but rather as a 'variable network'. 'The global movements of capital are constantly modified via national formations' (Hirsch, 2000: 106) and the socio-economic struggles behind them. Thus the world market is an unstable balance of dominant and peripheral regions.

In western Europe, as elsewhere in the world, economic internationalization undermined Keynesian modes of regulation and forced nationstates to reassess their growth strategies. However, it does not follow that the role of national governments in areas such as labour-market and social policy is reduced to one of transmission belts of global 'constraints'. On the contrary, from a regulation theoretical perspective 'globalization' itself appears codetermined by nation-state growth strategies, and institutional deregulation and general state withdrawal from economic regulation is not the only option.

Despite consensus among regulationist researchers that there is a general shift towards a piecemeal transition in state regulation from demand management to supply management, this transition can be carried out in different ways and with different effects for the state as an institutional form in socio-economic regulation. The role of the state can be weakened in cases where it pushes through reforms that are exclusively in the short-term interest of capital-owners (for example, by attracting international capital through low labour costs and reduced taxes and contributions, displacing previous objectives such as full employment and reduction in income inequalities); once these reforms are carried out, the state withdraws from an active role and leaves regulation to 'market forces'. By contrast, the role of the state remains strong where supplyoriented policies are combined with the maintenance of employment rights. Such an 'engaged state' is generally oriented towards rationalization, rather than the downsizing of the labour market and the welfare state, and continues to invest in key technologies, infrastructure or in an active labour market policy.

National Trajectories

Comparative regulationist research has demonstrated how the Fordist wage relation was applied in different nation-states, referring to the roles that the collective actors as well as specific institutions played in these processes [START_REF] Boyer | Capital-Labour Relations in OECD Countries: From the Fordist Golden Age to Contrasted National Trajectories[END_REF][START_REF] Tickel | Social Regulation after Fordism: Regulation Theory, Neo-Liberalism and the Global-Local Nexus[END_REF]. This section elaborates on these contributions by reconstructing national trajectories according to the two criteria discussed earlier (see Figure 1). The first axis of our analysis is the development of the wage-determination process: whether it has moved towards a model in which capital interests predominate, typically through a move from wage coordination to bargaining at company (C) or individual level (I), or towards a new form of compromise which reflects not only the short-term interests of employers, but also the long-term interests of employees. This is normally achieved through coordinated bargaining at national (N) or sector level (S). The second axis addresses the changing role of the state in regulation: whether a country moves towards a 'weak state', oriented towards the competitive interests of employers only, or towards an 'engaged state', which initiates or supports attempts to achieve a post-Fordist compromise.

The UK

The Fordist wage relation that prevailed until 1979 was only partly compatible with an 'adversarial industrial relations system in which a strong but decentralized, craft-based union movement and a weakly organized employer class have impeded consensus on incomes, industrial organization, and technical change' (Rhodes, 2000: 24). British Fordism was 'flawed' [START_REF] Boyer | Capital-Labour Relations in OECD Countries: From the Fordist Golden Age to Contrasted National Trajectories[END_REF] as the industrial-relations system proliferated into hundreds of bargaining units -divided according to skills and tasks and defended by the trade unions. The diminished potential for increased productivity, normally associated with Taylorist methods, was reflected in a rudimentary wage-determination system. Unlike other European countries, where agreements at national or sectoral level tended to cover a wide range of substantive issues and to generalize wage movements in correspondence with productivity gains, in Britain the tradition of bargaining and regulating at company level proved difficult to overcome. Postwar governments tended to apply policies of Keynesian demand management and to seek more coordination of wage increases and the labour market in general [START_REF] Crouch | The State: Economic Management and Incomes Policy[END_REF], but numerous government initiatives fell victim to the weakly organized industrial-relations system [START_REF] Beardwell | How Do We Know How It Really Is?" An Analysis of the New Industrial Relations[END_REF]. An integral part of the latter was the relatively strong and legally unrestricted position of the trade unions at company level: the prevalence of closed shops and trade unions' immunity in industrial action, including secondary action.

While the role of the state in socio-economic regulation was weak before 1979, it became an influential actor in the 1980s and 1990s. The state intervened in industrial relations and the regulatory system with the aim of making itself redundant. While the Conservative governments ended previous attempts to achieve more coordination in wage bargaining and labour-market regulation, they used their majority to 'liberate' market forces, implementing supply-oriented reforms to improve the competitiveness of British capital. The various Employment Acts of the 1980s abolished statutory recognition procedures, limited picketing and first restricted and then prohibited the closed shop [START_REF] Blanchflower | Did the Thatcher Reforms Change British Labour Market Performance?[END_REF]. Strike immunities were severely restricted and unions were made liable for the actions of their local representatives. Employers were permitted to pay non-union employees more than others (Purcell, 1995: 104). Reforms of the welfare system likewise served employers' interests by reducing the replacement ratio for unemployment benefits and imposing a tighter conditionality on the willingness to take up work or training. The reduction in the regulation role of the state was also expressed in the partial transition towards a private pension system, the abolition of wages councils and consequently the (partial) minimum wage, and in cutbacks in public employment and extensive privatization.

The New Labour government, in power since 1997, made no radical change to the inherited capital-oriented growth strategy. Neither were the attempts of earlier Labour governments of establishing tripartism and labour-market institutionalization repeated, nor was the role of the state in socio-economic regulation, weakened as result of Conservative policies, enhanced. Nevertheless, reforms were adopted which were designed to improve the position of employees at company level and to arrest the increased income inequality and societal disintegration that had emerged under the Conservative governments (Koch, forthcoming). A limited right to trade union recognition was enacted and protection against dismissal was extended to all employees after 12 months' employment (Rhodes, 2000: 60-61). In relation to social inequality, the most important measures were the reintroduction of the minimum wage, the signing of the European Social Chapter, the reform of the pensions system (which added a new second and third tier to the existing flat-rate contributory pension), the introduction of a Working Family Tax Credit (which was more generous than the preceding Family Credit) and tax reform designed to be redistributive.

Sweden

Until the 1980s, Sweden's 'democratic' Fordism [START_REF] Boyer | Capital-Labour Relations in OECD Countries: From the Fordist Golden Age to Contrasted National Trajectories[END_REF] was based on peak-level collective bargaining, designed to achieve wider normative goals such as full employment and wage equality. Wage determination involved central negotiations between employer and trade union confederations, sectoral bargaining on the application and adjustment of the central agreements and company negotiations on any remaining details [START_REF] Pestoff | Towards a New Swedish Model of Collective Bargaining and Politics[END_REF]. The state, mainly directed by social-democratic governments, had played an active and engaged role in bringing about the 1938 Saltsjöbaden agreement, the institutional basis of the new model. Subsequently, governments could withdraw from the management of wage bargaining, which was increasingly carried out bilaterally between strong unions and a centralized employer organization. As state intervention in wage determination became increasingly unnecessary, governments supported the general growth strategy through complementary labourmarket and welfare policies. Active labour-market polices stimulated, among other things, geographical mobility and retraining and was, therefore, always 'supply-oriented'. The universal and generous welfare regime complemented the trade unions' 'solidaristic' wage policies in bringing about full employment and a lessening of income inequalities.

Both wage determination and the role of the state changed radically after the 1970s. In the next decade, there was a shift from central to sectoral bargaining, and in 1990 the employers' confederation SAF formally withdrew from peak-level negotiations [START_REF] Pontusson | Between Neo-Liberalism and the German Model: Swedish Capitalism in Transition[END_REF]. In the early 1990s, a Conservative government was elected on a programme of shifting the priority in economic policy from full employment to price stability and reduction of the budget deficit. Efforts were made to move wage determination down to company level, employers' taxes and contributions were reduced, fixed-term employment contracts were facilitated and welfare entitlements were reduced [START_REF] Pontusson | Labour Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage-Bargaining Institutions[END_REF].

However, fears that the 'Swedish model' would fracture altogether and would be replaced by a capital-oriented one based on uncoordinated bargaining at company or individual level were not confirmed. In 1994, it was once again an engaged state that initiated the reorganization of wage determination and wider economic strategy. Social-Democratic governments were re-elected, and sectoral bargaining was not only preserved, but increasingly coordinated across the economy. The Central Bank, formally independent after 1993 but still linked to government policy through its representation on the board, supported sectoral wage determination with a complementary interest rate policy.

A further method by which the government supported and, if necessary, influenced wage determination was the introduction of an arbitration institute with the power to intervene in negotiations. Its main function, however, was seen as creating and enforcing a common basis for negotiation before the actual bargaining round began. The employers signed up to the new system as they saw it as part of a wider strategy, the government-initiated 'Alliance for Growth', geared towards the technological upgrading of Swedish industry [START_REF] Benner | The Scandinavian Challenge. The Future of Advanced Welfare States in the Knowledge Economy[END_REF]. Its main features included state support of sectoral innovation systems in existing areas of industrial specialization and research into promising technologies (telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and the information sector). The institutional infrastructure was improved by establishing clusters bringing together regional actors and organizations. This was complemented by training and retraining programmes for staff and an expansion of the educational system.

The trade unions agreed to the new growth pact because the social democrats reversed most of the Conservative reforms in labour market and welfare regulation. However, the maximum replacement rate of unemployment benefits was reduced twice, from 90 percent to 80 percent in 1993 and to 75 percent in 1996, though this remains generous by comparison with other countries. Active labour-market policy even expanded during the crisis, with 5 percent of the labour force being temporarily employed in job-creation programmes (Björklund, 2000: 157). There were other gradual reductions in the generosity of the social insurance system (introduction of fees, individual contributions, waiting days as well as a general lowering of replacement rates), a reform of the pension system to control costs and to increase the supply of labour by linking pensions to lifelong employment and savings in health and social service expenditure. However, according to [START_REF] Meidner | Zurück zur Vollbeschäftigung: Ein alternativer makroökonomischer Politikentwurf[END_REF], these welfare reforms did not constitute a qualitative break from the 'Swedish model'.

The Netherlands

Postwar industrial relations were organized in the shared belief that a high degree of cooperation and centralized bargaining were indispensable. Economic policy and major reforms in the labour market and welfare state were normally negotiated in two national tripartite bodies, while the translation of these guidelines into socio-political practice was decentralized. The Stichting van de Arbeid (StAr) was the primary forum for wage negotiations and employment conditions, while the Sociaal Economische Raad (SER) focused more on general and longer-term concerns. Public-sector wages were indexed to private-sector wage increases, which were, in turn, automatically adjusted to cost-of-living movements (Hemerijck, 1995: 207). The state was of crucial importance: the government retained the right to approve or reject wage increases resulting from collective agreements, and could impose a 'wage-freeze' in case of 'serious disturbance in the national economy', and also set the minimum wage [START_REF] Hemerijck | Corporatist Immobility in the Netherlands[END_REF]. Most governments, normally led by Christian Democrats, followed a growth strategy based on wage restraint. The Dutch Fordist compromise consisted in a trade-off between the government and the unions to establish a 'low-cost zone' in exchange for the recognition of the latter in overall socio-economic policies. Full employment and relative income equality through wage indexation were generally recognized as regulatory goals, complemented by the creation of a comprehensive social security system.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a crisis of the Dutch growth strategy. Both employers and organized labour became disenchanted with centralized bargaining as a vehicle of wage restraint, and the public budget became increasingly unbalanced as a result of growing unemployment and the practice of coupling wages in the public sector to the private sector [START_REF] Visser | A Dutch Miracle': Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands[END_REF]. In 1982, the first Lubbers administration took the initiative to balance the budget, improve business competitiveness by tax reductions and wage moderation and restore full employment by reducing working hours. The first measure was the abolition of the wage-indexation system in 1982. It was re-established in 1989, on condition that wage increases would not exceed the expected growth in GDP and that the number of social benefit recipients would not increase relative to the working population, but excluded publicsector workers, for whom separate collective bargaining mechanisms were established. The second measure was the dual strategy of wage moderation plus reduction in working hours, carried out above all by an expansion of part-time work (Visser, 2002: 25). Labour-market reforms included increased 'flexible employment' such as fixed-term contracts, casual labour and variable-hours contracts, but did not lead to pure 'deregulation'; in 2001, 81 percent of part-time jobs (and 91 percent of full-time jobs) were still covered by collective agreements (Visser, 2002: 33). The search for more flexibility in working hours to improve the competitiveness of Dutch companies was complemented by improvements in the work-life balance as individual workers in companies with 10 or more employees were given the right to adjust working hours (Visser, 2002: 32). The social security of part-time workers was increased as pro rata social insurance contributions are usually paid in exchange for pro rata entitlements. The result was a trade-off between labour-market flexibility and more security for workers with 'flexible' contracts ('flexicurity'). The final measure concerned welfare state reforms. The goal of reducing the budget deficit was accompanied by the qualitative renovation of welfare state entitlements, in which the corporate actors agreed to move from a labour-substituting to a participation paradigm [START_REF] Van Oorschot | Miracle of Nightmare? A Critical Review of Dutch Activation Policies and their Outcomes[END_REF]. The 'compromise' character of these reforms was, among other things, shown in the possibility of temporary or permanent wage subsidies for employees accepting a job at a lower wage than their previous employment and in the relatively high level of state expenditure for labour-market and welfare policies in general (Koch, forthcoming).

Germany

Germany's postwar, Fordist growth strategy was based on a distinctive wage-determination process, which separated sectoral collective bargaining (Tarifvertragssystem) from the company level, where day-to-day work relations were addressed (betriebliche Mitbestimmung). Wages were normally negotiated for one sector in one federal state (often the metal industry in Baden-Württemberg) and set the pattern for other Länder and other sectors, ensuring standardized wage increases. Sectoral agreements (Flächentarifverträge) defined minimum standards which companies were permitted to exceed; and it was possible to include so-called 'opening clauses' (Öffnungsklauseln) which authorized a company in precisely defined circumstances to deviate downward.

In companies with at least five employees, employees could be represented by works councils (Betriebsräte), which regulated the application of the collective agreements according to the particular needs of the company and codetermined, among other things, payment methods and systems, premiums and performance-related pay, holiday schedules, recruitment and dismissal. In companies with more than 500 employees, more extensive codetermination rules applied.

The state guaranteed the autonomy of the labour-market parties (Tarifautonomie), merely setting the basic parameters within which bargaining took place (maximum working hours, conditions for fixed-term contracts and the legal regulation of industrial conflicts). Its capacity for direct intervention was limited both vertically and horizontally [START_REF] Streeck | German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?[END_REF]. Vertical fragmentation stemmed from the federal structure of the political system and the prevalence of coalition governments at both federal and Land levels, making rapid political change difficult. Horizontally, much of the power over socio-economic regulation was given to independent authorities such as the Bundesbank or the Federal Cartel Office, so governments could not initiate Swedish-style industrial policies. The state was 'enabling' and moderating, rather than 'étatiste' (Streeck, 1997: 38).

Since the late 1970s there has been rising unemployment, while public debt, aggravated by the adjustment problems caused by German unification [START_REF] Hinrichs | What can be Learned from Whom? Germany's Employment Problem in Comparative Perspective[END_REF], rose to a level that made it difficult to meet the Maastricht criteria. Despite this structural pressure, the Kohl government between 1982 and 1998 only made gradual changes to the traditional mode of regulation. Reforms included facilitating fixed-term contracts; disqualifying employees affected by a strike in the same economic sector, but in a different region from receiving unemployment benefits; adapting working-hours legislation to employers' competitive interests; and relaxing shop opening hours. However, the impact of these reforms remained limited (Koch, 2003: 81).

It has been argued that the German model remained 'firmly intact' [START_REF] Klikauer | Stability in Germany's Industrial Relations: A Critique on Hassel's Erosion Thesis[END_REF] because the formal procedures of wage determination and codetermination were left untouched. However, in the past decade there has been increasing use of 'opening clauses' in sectoral agreements, allowing firms in economic difficulties to deviate from the minimum specified conditions. Many commentators perceive this as a covert undermining of the principle of comprehensive agreements (Flächentarifvertrag) [START_REF] Hinrichs | What can be Learned from Whom? Germany's Employment Problem in Comparative Perspective[END_REF] or even as the 'erosion' of the entire system of industrial relations [START_REF] Hassel | The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations[END_REF]. Despite the formal stability of the wage-determination system, there is a more or less disguised trend towards company-level bargaining at the expense of the sector level.

Though the Christian-Democrat/Liberal governments retained the tradition of the 'moderating' state and refrained from far-reaching reforms in labour market and welfare regulation, it was paradoxically the Red-Green coalition, in power since 1998 that took more radical initiatives, pursuing supply-oriented reforms. This coalition almost onesidedly followed capital interests, without accompanying public employment policies and strategic investments as in Sweden or reductions in working hours as in the Netherlands. Employers received relief from taxes and social security contributions, while the 'Hartz laws', introduced against trade union resistance, severely reduced entitlements to unemployment benefit. Earnings-related benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I) now end after one year, after which a revised payment (Arbeitslosengeld II) is dependent on means-testing and fixed at the level of the old social welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe). Pressure on unemployed persons to accept employment in other parts of the country and below their level of skills has also increased. Since the Christian Democrats have supported these changes (and indeed now call for more radical initiatives) the normally slow process of political change has been accelerated.

Spain

Wage determination, industrial relations and state regulation developed in a distinctive manner in Spain: only with the political transition from Francoism to parliamentary democracy in the late 1970s and membership of the European Union in 1986 did a 'modernization' of economy and society take place. The country faced a dual problem: the need to transform a protected and inwardly focused economy into an open and competitive one, and also to introduce institutions of labour-market and welfare regulation at a time when other European countries had already begun to deregulate or restructure them.

In the strict sense of a predominant postwar growth strategy, there was no Fordism in Spain. However, as similar institutions to those in other European countries were eventually established, we can speak of a 'delayed' Fordism. The state traditionally played a strong role in socioeconomic regulation; in the Franco era, it determined wages and industrial relations by decree and did not permit independent union representation. In the first post-Franco phase , it initiated tripartite 'social concertation' (concertación social) in order to build a new industrial-relations framework, starting with the Pactos de la Moncloa of 1977 and followed by five additional central agreements. The purpose was to restrain wage demands, control inflation (then at a very high level) and foster the recovery of business profits. The government defined a wage margin based on the expected inflation rate, within which bipartite bargaining on lower levels could operate, ensuring standardized wage increases in line with macro-economic constraints. The 1980 Workers' Statute (Ley de Estatuto de Trabajadores) and the 1984 Organic Law on Freedom of Trade Union Organization (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Sindical) introduced a dual structure of employee representation in decision-making at the company level: works councils (delegados de personal in companies with between 11 and 49 employees and comités de empresa in those with more than 50 employees) and trade union sections (sección sindical) were given the right to negotiate (and to call strikes) over issues such as employment contracts, health and safety, personnel policy and working hours ( [START_REF] Van Der Meer | Aspiring Corporatism? Industrial Relations in Spain[END_REF].

In the second phase , when Spain had joined the EU and the economy was expanding, there were no further central agreements which could have served as a benchmark for bargaining rounds at lower levels. The Socialist government followed its 'rationalization' and restructuring policies with the aim of increasing labour-market flexibility, facilitating fixed-term contracts and reducing protection against dismissals; but both the government and the employers' organization CEOE wished to maintain centralized bargaining as a means of containing labour costs [START_REF] Marsden | Incomes Policy for Europe? Or will Pay Bargaining Destroy the Single European Market?[END_REF]. However, both major unions (Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores) refused, believing that they could achieve higher wage increases through decentralized bargaining. Simultaneously, they organized political protests against the government's policies, culminating in three national general strikes between 1988 and 1994. Because of the unions' resistance, the government imposed its reforms by legislation; measures enacted included the removal of legal impediments to fixed-term contracts, legalization of private employment agencies, further liberalization of dismissal law, and increased pressure on employees to accept occupational and geographical mobility.

The third phase (since 1996) saw a resurgence of national-level bargaining, somewhat surprisingly as it occurred under the Conservative government elected in 1996. Agreements included a new system for voluntary resolution of conflicts between employees and employers, a reform of the pension system and a new form of joint regulation of vocational training [START_REF] Royo | A New Century of Corporatism? Corporatism in Spain and Portugal[END_REF]. Even more significant, as dismissal compensation had been an extremely contentious issue, was a trade-off between lower compensation for unfair dismissal against a tightening of the use of fixed-term employment. A new semi-permanent contract with lower dismissal costs was introduced, while entitlements to unemployment benefits for fixedterm employees were improved [START_REF] Golsch | Employment Flexibility in Spain and its Impact on Transitions to Adulthood[END_REF]. Lastly, and most significantly in the present context, the first central agreement on wage guidelines since 1984 was signed in December 2001, permitting wage increases slightly above the expected rate of inflation. This new compromise reflected a recognition by the unions that decentralized bargaining was not providing the benefits they had hoped, for their membership was concentrated in declining industries [START_REF] Royo | A New Century of Corporatism? Corporatism in Spain and Portugal[END_REF] and their bargaining power was further weakened by the growing prevalence of fixed-term contracts. In addition, the creation in 1991 of an Economic and Social Council is generally seen as having contributed to a better atmosphere; while it did not possess formal regulatory powers, it nevertheless helped to bring different positions closer together. The reemergence of central agreements can hence be seen as the result of a learning process which included the establishment of a new labourmarket institution.

Conclusion

The material reproduction of society in the form of commodities, money, capital, and the state generates a range of contradictions and tensions that must be managed or regulated. The correspondence between an accumulation regime and a mode of regulation creates temporary stabilization, but this does not eliminate the underlying dimensions of crisis at the level of the mode of production. Moreover, both accumulation regimes and modes of regulation contain specific dynamics of their own, and crises result from the disarticulation between the two. It is possible, but by no means certain, that they can be reshaped to achieve a new articulation as the basis for a stable growth strategy. The relative success and, at the same time, the limits of a national growth strategy also depend on the structure of the international division of labour. Regulation theory assumes a 'doubled set of connections' (Hirsch, 2000: 105) between the nation-state and world market. The possibilities and limits of the growth strategies of a particular nation-state hence result from the intersection of its distinctive integration in the international division of labour and its internal socio-economic structure. The fact that this dual relationship shapes national locations in different ways is the structural background for the simultaneous existence of different national growth strategies and their greater or lesser 'success'.

While this article has dealt with the similarities and differences in changing socio-economic regulation at the level of the nation-state, the sustainability of national growth strategies also depends on whether post-Fordist national trajectories can be complemented by a re-regulation of the international economic space. Though this is a topic for further research, the regulation perspective suggests that national governments are not just at the receiving end of so-called 'global constraints'; through their representation in international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and International Labour Organization, they are potentially crucial actors in the reconstitution of the inter-national sphere. In contrast to the Fordist prosperity model, which was mainly geared to the domestic market and complemented by a relatively stable international system, today national locations in western Europe are being restructured and re-regulated in order to accommodate an international economy which remains under-regulated.

Jessop has described the transition in national socio-economic regulation as a shift towards 'Schumpeterian' regimes: national governments increasingly opt to provide the preconditions for systemic competitiveness, permanent innovation and flexibility. This article has elaborated on this theme, arguing that even given the increased international competition and the general under-regulation of the global arena, European governments and policy-makers do not have to compete against each other by undercutting social and ecological standards. While it is true that large corporations invest in countries and regions that promise the biggest net profit, profit margins depend not only on the costs of the factors of production, but also on their relative productivity. A country with relatively high taxes can therefore remain attractive to international capital as long as it offers a highly qualified labour force able to produce high-quality commodities.

This theoretical position is empirically supported by the comparative perspective taken in this article. While there is a general trend towards improving competitiveness through a shift from a demand-oriented to a supply-oriented mode of regulation, it makes an important difference whether this shift is carried out solely to increase short-term capital valorization or as a compromise which combines supply-oriented changes with reforms in the interest of employees. In two countries, the UK and Germany, changes in wage-determination processes and other forms of socio-economic regulation can be said to have primarily served the interests of employers. In the UK, earlier attempts to establish a degree of wage coordination were terminated and capital-oriented reforms were pushed through against trade union resistance. German trade unions, in contrast, proved strong enough to prevent the abolition of the centralized wage-determination system and the more advanced system of welfare regulation; but the increased use of 'opening clauses' has weakened sectoral collective agreements, eroding the Flächentarifvertrag by stealth; while recent labour-market reforms designed to diminish labour costs for employers lack elements that could be interpreted as in the interest of employees or the unemployed.

Conversely, however, the trajectories of Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain can be seen as 'compromises', as in all cases a temporary breakdown of wage-determination processes at national level was reversed and wage coordination was resumed. In Sweden, coordinated sectoral bargaining was consolidated, while central tripartite bargaining was resumed in the Netherlands and Spain. Though there was no return to automatic forms of wage indexation, all three countries established or retained tripartite institutions designed to facilitate the discussion of wage issues in wider socio-economic contexts. After rather negative experiences with decentralized bargaining, collective actors (including employers) started to revalue a link between wages and productivity increases and economic growth. Particular compromises in socio-economic regulation vary path-dependently from country to country: Sweden's 'Alliance for Growth' combines a technological upgrading of industry with investments in training for employees, the expansion of the education system and the retention of a generous welfare state; Dutch supply-oriented policies to facilitate labour-market flexibility were complemented with more security for 'flexible workers', while the welfare state was to be renovated, but not downsized; in Spain, dismissal costs for employers were reduced, but conditions for the use of fixedterm employment were tightened and entitlements to unemployment benefits for fixed-term employees were improved.

Theoretically, the changing role of the state in socio-economic governance is not fully determined structurally: national governments do not merely execute the real or alleged constraints of globalization, and in some cases, their strategies combine supply orientation with the consideration of employment rights. Two cases come close to the ideal type of a 'weak state' (one that intervenes to make itself redundant in the interest of market forces): the UK and Germany. In the 1980s and 1990s, British governments identified the improvement of company profitability largely with a structural debilitation of the trade unions, the termination of industrial policies and the privatization of public property. In Germany, while the Kohl government attempted to preserve the traditional growth strategy by maintaining the role of the 'moderating' state, under the Red-Green government the 'urgency' for far-reaching reforms was emphasized and capital interests were increasingly supported. In Sweden, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Spain, governments played a more inclusive role in combining supply-oriented growth strategies with reforms in the interest of employees ('engaged state'). In Sweden and the Netherlands, governments initiated modifications of the regulatory systems, while employers and trade unions played rather passive roles. In both cases, governments were crucial in finding ways out of the crisis, and they remain active in current socio-economic governance. The Spanish state, which had monopolized regulatory power under Franco, dispensed parts of this competence to the labour-market parties. Governments became increasingly 'moderating' in their attempts to reach central agreements.

FIGURE

  FIGURE 1. Wage Determination and State Regulation During and After Fordism

European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(3)