David De Cremer
email: d.decremer@uvt.nl

Eric Van Dijk

Leader-Follower Effects in Resource Dilemmas: The Roles of Leadership Selection and Social Responsibility

Keywords: followers, leadership selection, resource allocations, resource dilemmas, social responsibility

Previous research on the allocation of scarce resources shows that when people are assigned labels of leader or follower in their group, leaders allocate more of the scarce resources to themselves than followers do. In three laboratory studies, we examine the idea that how people are selected for the leader role (i.e. election or appointment) determines whether leaders take more or equal shares (relative to followers) from a common resource. In a fi rst experiment, we show that participants were more accepting of norm violating behavior by an appointed versus elected leader. In a second experiment, we show that when participants were assigned to a leader or follower role, allocations of appointed leaders differed signifi cantly from those of elected leaders and followers, whereas there was no difference between the two latter conditions. Moreover, elected leaders were shown to feel more social responsibility than both appointed leaders and followers. In a fi nal experiment, we show that when participants were primed with the concept of social responsibility (relative to a neutral condition) no difference in allocations between appointed and elected leaders emerged.

class many business leaders choose the latter option. Or, when allocating resource funding within universities leaders frequently advocate Within situations of interdependence, as can be found in groups and organizations, allocation decisions are predominantly made by those in charge [START_REF] Yukl | Leadership in organizations[END_REF]. Often, the decisions that these leaders have to take revolve around distributing scarce resources that are much needed to serve the collective and organizational interest [START_REF] Kelley | Interpersonal relations: A theory of interdependence[END_REF][START_REF] Mannix | Organizations as resource dilemmas: The effects of power balance on coalition formation in small groups[END_REF]. A striking observation is that leaders frequently benefi t themselves at the expense of others when allocating (fi nancial) resources. For example, when being able to fl y economy or business (in implicit and sometimes even explicit ways) larger donations to the department that they are or were affi liated with. Quite often, economic analyses are used to explain such self-serving behavior by those in charge, like, for example, the need for leaders to be tough negotiators and uphold the image of being in power.

Social psychological analyses on the other hand focus on the power of the social setting and its related cognitions. That is, this approach suggests that merely assigning people to higher positions (e.g. providing participants the label leader) may also increase their tendency to put their own interests fi rst. In particular, it may well be that merely assigning people to a leader role by calling them 'the leader' is enough for them to benefi t themselves at the expense of others. Such analysis thus relies on the assumption that if a participant is labeled a leader by the experimenter without any additional information about the leader role or task at hand, participants rely on category-consistent information to base their evaluations and decisions on (see [START_REF] Phillips | Schematic information processing and perception of leadership in problem solving groups[END_REF]. In this case the information they rely on may be the idea that a leader is entitled to pursue privileges and self-interest.

Recent experimental research has empirically documented this social psychological approach by making use of a resource dilemma paradigm in which participants were told that they were the fi rst (out of a group of, for example, six people) to take from the common resource. This position of being the fi rst to take from the resource creates a situation in which no anchoring on other's behavior can take place and as such decisions will thus primarily be determined by one's own conceptions of what constitutes a good and fair decision to oneself (a value that is expected to be colored by how one's position in the group is labeled). These series of laboratory studies in which participants were university students indeed showed that people who were simply labeled leader or supervisor harvested more from a common resource than participants who were assigned a lower hierarchical role by being labeled follower [START_REF] De Cremer | Effects of roles and performance feedback on the equality-rule in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF], 2003a;De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Samuelson | Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF][START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF]. A common explanation for this effect is derived from insights of the social cognition literature (e.g. S. T. [START_REF] Fiske | Social cognition and social perception[END_REF] and equity theory (e.g. [START_REF] Adams | Inequity in social exchange[END_REF]. More precisely, when people are labeled as leader, role schemas are evoked that are consistent with the label leader (cf. [START_REF] Phillips | Schematic information processing and perception of leadership in problem solving groups[END_REF] and one such specifi c schema is the expectation that they deserve more privileges than subordinates do (S. T. [START_REF] Fiske | Social cognition and social perception[END_REF][START_REF] Messé | But some animals are more equal than others': The supervisor as a privileged status in group contexts[END_REF]. Moreover, being cognitively assigned the leader position also evokes expectations that one will have to put more effort and work into the situation (relative to followers), as such making one feel privileged to receive higher outputs [START_REF] Adams | Inequity in social exchange[END_REF][START_REF] Walster | New directions in equity research[END_REF]. These explanations thus point out one important process explaining a leader's tendency to take more out of a shared resource than followers do, that is, feeling entitled to take more. In support of this argument, De Cremer and Van Dijk (2005) indeed demonstrated that role schemas associated with leadership created a feeling of being entitled to higher outcomes, consequently affecting harvesting behavior (see also De Cremer, 2003a;[START_REF] Stouten | I'm doing the best I can (for myself): Leadership and variance of harvesting in social dilemmas[END_REF][START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF].

Do leaders always take more than followers?

Of course, from the perspective that leaders are assigned to facilitate contributions to the collective welfare (e.g. [START_REF] De Cremer | Intergroup and intragroup aspects of leadership in social dilemmas: A relational model of cooperation[END_REF][START_REF] Tyler | Trust in the law[END_REF], treat members in fair and respectful ways (De Cremer, 2003b), and thus display a socially responsible orientation toward the collective and its members [START_REF] Chemers | Leadership effectiveness: An integrative review[END_REF][START_REF] Yukl | Leadership in organizations[END_REF], the above research fi ndings may prove unsatisfying and even discouraging. As a matter of fact, in the leadership literature it is acknowledged that the label of leader can make salient ideas of two motives: the idea of being motivated to uphold socially responsible behavior on one hand and being entitled to receive privileges on the other hand. Do we have to conclude that after receiving the label of leader people immediately take the self-interested perspective of entitlement for granted (cf. [START_REF] Epley | Egocentric ethics[END_REF], for the idea that self-interest is immediate)? Or, do specifi c conditions exist making people act in more socially responsible ways when the label leader is allocated to them?

Recent research by [START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF] showed that, in line with [START_REF] Keltner | Power, approach, and inhibition[END_REF] proposition that people in higher positions (e.g. leaders) behave more in accordance with their personality traits, individual differences in social value orientation [START_REF] Van Lange | The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation[END_REF]) moderate this label effect. That is, participants allocated more from the shared resource to themselves when called leader relative to being called follower, but only when they possessed a proself orientation. In contrast, when participants possessed a prosocial orientation no such differences between leaders and followers emerged. These results thus suggest that among certain individuals the distinction in labels between leader and follower may not infl uence their allocation behavior. Interestingly, research on social value orientation has shown that prosocials differ from proselfs, among others, in terms of how socially responsible they feel toward interdependent others [START_REF] De Cremer | Why prosocials exhibit greater cooperation than proselfs: The role of responsibility and reciprocity[END_REF]. In this view, social responsibility is perceived as refl ecting people's concern for both self and others' interests (motivated by the moral consideration of how one ought to act; A. P. [START_REF] Fiske | The cultural matrix of social psychology[END_REF]cf. Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). However, the fi ndings of [START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF] did not reveal any evidence that social responsibility was activated in their studies.

Building on the above, we wish to argue that people assigned to the leader role will not solely act in egocentric ways when allocating resources. In the spirit of the [START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF] research, we wish to examine which factors moderate the tendency of people to take more from a resource when being assigned to the leader role than when being assigned to the follower role. However, rather than focusing on the impact of individual differences, we now focus on the social infl uences that may keep leaders from taking more from a common resource than followers from a common resource. It is not always an easy task to design infl uence systems aimed at affecting the attitudes and actions of only a few people. From a social psychological perspective, it is more benefi cial if we understand how we should label hierarchical positions in such a way that the predicted effect would emerge. Therefore, the present research will complement and move beyond existing research in several ways. First, it will identify one specifi c social variable affecting the infl uence of the already established leader-follower distinction on allocation decisions. Second, it will show that this specifi c social variable may reveal benefi cial effects because it evokes thoughts and evaluations of social responsibility.

More precisely, one specifi c social variable that potentially could infl uence the effect of leader-follower labels is the procedure underlying leader selection. That is, whether the leader role is assigned via the procedure of election or appointment [START_REF] Hollander | Leadership and power[END_REF] should impact upon the expectations that the label of leader evokes. In the following paragraphs, we will elaborate on the importance of leader selection.

The role of selection procedures

As mentioned earlier, prior research has often assigned participants to the leader role by simply labeling them as the leader (not providing any further information about the role and its content, which allowed for participants to infer the content of being the leader themselves). However, it is the case that in many group or organizational situations the label of leader is associated with the procedure used to select the leader. Leaders may be imposed on the group by an (external) authority and thus be appointed, without the group having a say in it. On the other hand, groups themselves may elect who they wish to be in charge. Thus, a leader can be called an elected leader or an appointed leader. Will these different labels evoke different cognitive expectations and thus impact differently upon the way leaders evaluate their own role and subsequently act upon it? As Hollander (1985, p. 507) states, 'appointment or election therefore affects a leader's actions'. Moreover, research has shown that selection of leadership (a) infl uences perceptions of the quality of the relationship between the group leader and the others [START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF], (b) provides a basis for how leaders will perceive whether continuity of leadership is required and wished for (A. M. [START_REF] Cohen | Continuity of leadership in communication networks[END_REF], and (c) creates different social environments consequently affecting the importance of specifi c types of leadership behaviors [START_REF] Hollander | Leadership and power[END_REF][START_REF] Hollander | Leadership, followership, self, and others[END_REF].

With respect to the notion of electing a leader, the group is believed to support one specifi c person and thus in a way transfers hopes and expectations upon the leader. Indeed, [START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF] argue that, 'election builds higher demands on the leadership role' (p. 66). Moreover, research by [START_REF] Ben-Yoav | Leader legitimacy, leader-follower interaction, and followers' ratings of the leader[END_REF] suggests that elected leaders are perceived as more responsive to the needs of followers and the interests of the group. As a result, we argue that an elected leader will create a socially shared expectation that he will do things right and thus act socially responsible and fairly. After all, the notion of election holds that the group has voted for him and thus expects certain indications of reciprocity. Indeed, according to [START_REF] Kenney | Implicit leadership theories: Defi ning leaders described as worthy of infl uence[END_REF]Blascovich (1996, p. 1130), people 'have a greater investment in elected leaders and, therefore, have higher performance expectations'. Thus, because an elected leader refl ects the choice of the group and its members, an elected leader will feel strong support from the followers who will bestow on the leader a high sense of social responsibility [START_REF] Julian | Endorsement of the group spokesman as a function of his source of authority, competence and success[END_REF][START_REF] Kenney | Implicit leadership theories: Defi ning leaders described as worthy of infl uence[END_REF]. With respect to an appointed leader, things look different. Because such a leader does not 'owe' his/her selection to the group members, the leader may not feel that he/she has to carry the weight of group's expectations to be a fair and socially responsible decision maker. In fact, research suggests that appointed leaders are expected to devote less attention to the needs and interests of the group members [START_REF] Kenney | Implicit leadership theories: Defi ning leaders described as worthy of infl uence[END_REF]. Moreover, groups will perceive appointed leaders as less legitimate and expect less from such leaders in terms of performance expectations (see [START_REF] De Cremer | Intergroup and intragroup aspects of leadership in social dilemmas: A relational model of cooperation[END_REF][START_REF] Hollander | Leadership, followership, self, and others[END_REF][START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF].

Taken together, based on this literature, one could thus suggest that if leaders are appointed, relative to being elected by the group, they will reason less in terms of social responsibility (i.e. being fair and cooperative toward the group and its norms). The inducement of these socially shared expectations (by means of the procedure of election vs. appointment) should therefore affect the decisions of leaders when allocating common resources.

Building on the above, we predict that leader selection and role assignment will interact in determining allocation decisions in such a way that leaders will take more from the common resource than followers do, but mainly when the leader is appointed. In contrast, when the group elects the leader less difference in terms of resource allocations is expected between leaders and followers. Furthermore, it is expected that in the case of being elected by the group, leaders will experience more feelings of social responsibility than those appointed in the leader role. Finally, elaborating on the potential role of social responsibility, we expect that activating the concept of social responsibility may motivate appointed leaders to make similar allocations to those of elected leaders. These predictions will be examined across three experimental studies.

Experiment 1

As we noted earlier, the insights derived from the leadership literature suggest that people have socially-shared norms of what to expect from elected and appointed leaders. These sociallyshared norms infl uence the decisions of leaders [START_REF] Hollander | Leadership and power[END_REF]. Therefore, in Experiment 1, we fi rst wanted to test whether observers react differently toward norm deviating behavior enacted by an elected leader relative to an appointed leader. More precisely, building on the leadership literature, it should be expected that people have higher expectations of elected leaders (relative to appointed leaders) to do their job in a socially responsible way and thus to adjust their decisions more to what is seen as normative behavior. Indeed, after having elected the leader, people may feel that they have a vested interest in the decisions that the leader subsequently makes. As such, if the elected leader violates these expectations, e.g. by displaying self-interested behavior, people may react negatively. Interestingly, this prediction is also in line with the idea that leaders elected by the group (relative to appointed leaders) are often seen as being representative of the group's identity and the norms that it advocates. As such, if an elected leader then violates normative allocation behavior (e.g. by taking an equal share from the common resource) this may be experienced as a threat to the group's identity, resulting in followers not accepting this behavior (cf. [START_REF] Haslam | Inspecting the emperor's clothes: Evidence that random selection of leaders can enhance group performance[END_REF].

It is fair to note, however, that an alternative explanation also exists. That is, it could be the case that an elected leader actually has more leeway (instead of less) in making his or her decisions. More precisely, it may also be the case that people will reason that if a leader is elected the group will also award this leader the opportunity to receive some benefi ts and privileges associated with the leader position. This line of reasoning would then suggest that people would actually accept more easily allocation behavior deviating from what is normatively expected from an elected leader than from an appointed leader.

The selection procedure of the leader was manipulated by informing participants whether the group selected the leader (i.e. election) or whether an outside authority selected the leader (i.e. appointment). Deviation from normative behavior was manipulated by letting the selected leader take an amount similar to what other people usually take (i.e. an equal share of the common resource: 15 euros from a resource of 90 euros) or an amount signifi cantly higher than the equal share (22 euros from a resource of 90 euros). The amount of 15 was chosen because it represents the equality-rule in the present study, whereas the amount of 22 was chosen as it represents the average amount that participants in prior research took from a resource of 90 points when being assigned the leader label (see e.g. De Cremer, 2003a).

Method

Participants and design Ninety-fi ve undergraduate students (average age = 20.98 years) participated voluntarily in exchange for course credits. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Leader selection: Elected vs. appointed leader) × 2 (Resource share: 15 vs. 22) betweensubjects design.

Procedure Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in a cubicle for the experiment containing a table and a chair. Then, a booklet was given to the participants introducing them to the allocation situation. Participants were asked to evaluate the described situation. Modeled after Van Dijk and De Cremer (2006, Experiment 1), participants were introduced to a description of members of a management team consisting of one leader and three followers. Then, the role manipulation was introduced. In the elected leader condition, participants read that the leader was elected by the team to do a good job. In the appointed leader condition, participants read that an authority from outside the group appointed the leader to do a good job. In addition, all participants learned that the team had been successful, and that the company had decided to allocate a bonus of 90 payment units to the team. This bonus would be divided by allowing each team member to take the amount they wished from the resource. The leader was said to take fi rst from the bonus. Thereafter, the resource share manipulation (i.e. 15 or 22 units) was introduced. Participants read: 'The leader has taken 15/22 units from the bonus. This amount is roughly the same/more as the average amount that people take.'

Finally, the dependent measures of Experiment 1 were solicited. To assess the effectiveness of our resource share manipulation we asked participants how much the leader took from the common resource (which could range from 0 to 90). In addition, participants were also asked whether the leader took more from the bonus than the average amount (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). Then, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they considered the leader to be appointed by another party than the group (1 = not appointed at all, 7 = very much appointed). Subsequently, we examined whether participants accepted the allocation behavior of the leader by asking them to what extent they thought that the choice of the leader was 'defensible' and 'justifi ed' (r = .45, p < .001). These two items were also responded to on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all defensible/justifi ed, 7 = ver y much defensible/justified). Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation checks An analysis of frequencies revealed that in both resource share conditions all the participants (100%) correctly recalled whether the leader took 15 or 22 euros.

Further, a 2 × 2 Analysis of Varience (ANOVA) on the question whether the leader took more than the average amount only yielded a main effect of Resource share (F(1, 91) = 111.59, p < .001, η 2 = .55), showing that the leader was seen as taking more than the average amount in the 22 units relative to the 15 units condition (Ms = 5.50 vs. 2.21).

Further, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the question to what extent the leader was appointed by another party than the group only yielded a main effect of Leader selection (F(1, 91) = 180.09, p < .001, η 2 = .66), showing that an appointed leader was perceived as appointed by an outside authority relative to an elected leader (Ms = 6.23 vs.

2.16).

Acceptance A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the acceptance score revealed, fi rst of all, a signifi cant effect of Resource share (F(1, 91) = 131.95, p < .001, η 2 = .59), indicating that a share of 15 units was accepted more than a share a 22 units (Ms = 6.22 vs. 3.67). Also, a signifi cant interaction emerged (F(1, 91) = 7.31, p < .01, η 2 = .07) (see Table 1). The effect of Leader election was signifi cant within the 22 unit condition (F(1, 91) = 9.53, p < .01), but not within the 15 unit condition (F(1, 91) < 1, p < .35).

Experiment 2

The results of Experiment 1 show that people were more accepting of normative deviating behavior by an appointed than by an elected leader. This fi nding suggests that people place higher demands on the shoulders of elected leaders (relative to appointed ones) and expect them to act more socially responsible [START_REF] Hollander | Leadership, followership, self, and others[END_REF][START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF][START_REF] Kenney | Implicit leadership theories: Defi ning leaders described as worthy of infl uence[END_REF]. Although this fi rst evidence is supportive of our line of reasoning, it has to be noted that Experiment 1 only tested people's evaluations toward leaders as a function of how they were selected. Therefore, we also have to examine whether leaders themselves act according to their roles (and associated expectations).

In Experiment 2, participants will receive the label of elected leader, appointed leader or follower and they will have to decide in an actual resource task how much to take from the common resource. Importantly, in this common resource task, participants' decisions will be anonymous. The reason for this is that (based on the fi ndings of Experiment 1) elected leaders might act in socially appropriate ways and thus strategically conform to the socially shared expectations of others. Making decisions anonymously should not elicit such social reputation concerns and would allow us to test directly the kind of behaviors the label of leader and follower elicits. In fact, if elected leaders under anonymous conditions take less than appointed leaders and equally as much as followers, this would be supportive of the notion that these leader types have internalized social responsibility thoughts. In line with this idea, we will also test whether elected leadership not only evokes expectations of social responsibility among observers (as suggested in Experiment 1) but also among people allocated to the elected leader position by assessing their feelings of social responsibility.

Method

Participants and design Sixty-six undergraduate students (average age = 20.42 years) participated voluntarily in exchange for course credits. They were randomly assigned to one of the three selection procedure conditions (appointed leader, elected leader, or follower).

Procedure Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in a cubicle for the experiment containing a table and a chair. Then, a booklet was given to participants introducing them to the allocation situation that they would participate in. Participants learned that they were members of a four-person group, but that they would not learn their fellow group members' identities.

Participants learned that their group possessed a collective resource of 90 points, which had a fi nancial value (a total of 9 euros). Then, it was explained that the group had to decide how to divide the resource. More precisely, it was said that each group member had to decide how many of these points he or she would allocate to themselves. Participants could keep the points (and earned fi nancial value) that they allocated to themselves. In line with previous research on the role assignment effect (i.e. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Samuelson | Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF], it was further said that the decisions would be taken sequentially, that is, one decision after another decision. Moreover, participants were informed that it would be decided randomly which group member would be the fi rst to take from the resource, which member second, and so forth. Thus, after the decision of the fi rst member, the collective resource would be adjusted (i.e. the collective resource would be reduced with the number of the points that the fi rst member allocated to him/herself) and again after the choice of the second member, and so forth. All participants were informed that they were the fi rst to take from the common resource.

After participants were acquainted with the main characteristics of the resource dilemma, the manipulation of position was induced. Following previous research (e.g. [START_REF] Samuelson | Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF], participants in the appointed leader condition learned that the experimenter had decided to choose them as the group member occupying the position of leader, and that the others would occupy the position of follower. In the follower condition, participants learned that the experimenter had decided that they would occupy the role of follower (see De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005). In the elected leader condition, participants were told that each group member would be asked who to elect as the leader (based on the scores of the participants on personality questionnaires that had to be fi lled out at the beginning of the experimental session). Then, participants were asked to wait for a few moments because another group members' opinion would be asked fi rst. After a while, they were told that they did not have to give their opinion anymore because the other group members had all indicated that they wanted the focal participant to be the leader.

Then, the dependent measures of Experiment 2 were solicited. First, participants were asked to which role they were assigned (1 = appointed leader, 2 = elected leader). Thereafter, participants were requested to take from the common resource (ranging from 0 to 90). Finally, participants were asked to what extent they felt social responsibility toward the others in the present situation (1 = not all, 7 = very much so), before being debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation checks An analysis of frequencies revealed that in both leader conditions and in the follower condition all the participants (100%) correctly recalled which role they were assigned to.

Resource allocation A one-way ANOVA on the resource allocation score revealed a signifi cant effect of Role (F(2, 62) = 4.13, p < .05, η 2 = .12). A Least-Signifi cant Differences Test showed that participants allocated signifi cantly more to themselves in the leader appointed condition (M = 30.65) than in the leader elected by the group (M = 23.57, p < .05) and follower conditions (M = 23.54, p < .05). The two latter conditions did not differ from each other (p < .99).

Feelings of social responsibility

A one-way ANOVA on the social responsibility score revealed a signifi cant effect of Role (F(2, 63) = 4.06, p < .05, η 2 = .11). A Least-Signifi cant Differences Test showed that participants in the leader elected by the group (M = 5.90) felt more socially responsible than those in leader appointed (M = 5.04, p < .05) and follower conditions (M = 4.72, p < .005). The two latter conditions did not differ signifi cantly (p < .46).

Experiment 3

As expected, the results of Experiment 2 showed that the procedure used to select the leader signifi cantly infl uenced resource allocations. More precisely, leaders appointed by the experimenter signifi cantly allocated more resources to themselves than followers, as such paralleling earlier research showing that leaders take more from a common resource than followers do (e.g. De Cremer, 2003a;De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF]. Importantly, however, when the group elected the leader, participants occupying the leader role did not take more from the resource than followers. In addition, the fi ndings of Experiment 2 also provided evidence that participants assigned to the elected leader role felt more socially responsible than when assigned to the appointed leader role or follower role.

Thus, so far our fi ndings suggest that the allocations of elected leaders are similar to those of followers' allocations and that the allocations of appointed leaders deviate signifi cantly from the others. This observation may suggest that the conclusions derived from previous research that leaders make more self-serving allocation decisions than followers (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF] may only be applicable to appointed leaders. Therefore, to examine more closely what it is about leadership and allocation decisions we need to identify when appointed leaders make similar allocation decisions to elected leaders. Following from the leadership literature [START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF][START_REF] Kenney | Implicit leadership theories: Defi ning leaders described as worthy of infl uence[END_REF] and the findings of Experiment 2 it may be suggested that elected leadership is characterized by a strong conception of social responsibility. If this is the case, then it could be expected that reinforcing such a conception of social responsibility among appointed leaders would motivate them to act more in line with the allocation decisions made by elected leaders. Experiment 3 was designed to test this question.

To test this relationship we rely on social cognition insights noting that once a specifi c concept (in this case social responsibility) is made accessible, associated concepts such as otherorientation and prosocial behavior should be activated, which indicates that they serve as interpretative frames in the subsequent phases of the experiment [START_REF] Higgins | Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience[END_REF][START_REF] Neely | Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention[END_REF]. That is, we argue that using an accessibility technique where participants write about and refl ect upon the concept of social responsibility activates other-oriented concerns, which will then direct subsequent allocation behavior. This effect is expected to primarily emerge among those leader types where social responsibility initially is less salient, that is, appointed leaders. As such, no difference in allocation behavior between elected and appointed leaders is expected when social responsibility is reinforced. In the neutral condition, we also asked participants to actively describe a neutral concept, as we wanted to avoid the case that the difference between the social responsibility condition and the neutral condition could also be explained by having asked participants to do something in the former condition and to do nothing in the latter condition. Therefore, we used a task that has been shown to elicit neutral thoughts and affect; that is, we asked participants to describe the qualities of a chair (taken from [START_REF] Schwinghammer | Different selves have different effects: Self-activation and defensive social comparison[END_REF]. In this condition, the difference in allocations between elected and appointed leaders (as demonstrated in Experiment 2) is expected to emerge.

Method

Participants and design Sixty-nine undergraduate students (average age = 20.80 years) participated voluntarily in exchange for course credits. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Accessibility: Social responsibility vs. chair) × 2 (Leader Selection: Appointment vs. election) between-subjects factorial design.

Experimental procedure Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in a cubicle for the experiment containing a table and a chair. The same procedure as in Experiment 2 was followed. Again, participants were told to be part of a group of four people and that each group member would have to make an allocation decision. Again, a common resource of 90 points was available for the group to allocate. As in Experiment 2, it was said that the decision of how much to take from the common resource would be sequential. All participants, however, were supposedly chosen randomly to be the fi rst to take from the common resource (see also [START_REF] Allison | Social decision heuristics in the use of shared resources[END_REF]De Cremer, 2003a;De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Samuelson | Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF], for a similar procedure). Contrary to Experiment 2, the following changes were implemented. First of all, in Experiment 3, participants were only allocated to the leader appointment or leader election condition. The selection procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. A second modifi cation was that while participants were waiting to receive information about their role in the group, they were supposedly asked to participate in a short unrelated task. This fi ller task constituted the priming procedure aimed at making accessible the concept of social responsibility or the concept of a chair (= neutral condition; cf. [START_REF] Schwinghammer | Different selves have different effects: Self-activation and defensive social comparison[END_REF]. More precisely, participants wrote down either a description of the concept social responsibility or a description of a chair. They wrote a detailed description of this situation on a separate sheet for 3 minutes. After this, we assessed participants' mood (i.e. how happy do you feel at the moment?), and feelings of social responsibility (i.e. the extent to which they experienced a prosocial attitude toward others).

Then, the dependent measures of Experiment 3 were solicited. To check for the effectiveness of the leadership selection manipulation, participants were fi rst asked whether they were allocated the role of leader (1 = yes, 2 = no). Then, they were asked whether the experimenter allocated them the position of leader (1 = yes, 2 = no). Subsequently, they were asked whether the group had decided which role they would take (1 = yes, 2 = no). Thereafter, participants were requested to take from the common resource. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation checks

To check for the validity of our prime manipulation, it was fi rst checked whether participants actually wrote down any thoughts in the accessibility manipulation. After this was checked, seven participants who wrote nothing were removed from the analyses. Then, we conducted an inter-rater reliability analysis ( J. [START_REF] Cohen | Weighted kappa: Nominal scale agreement with provision for scaled disagreement or partial credit[END_REF]. More precisely, two judges coded whether the participants wrote down a recall of the concept of social responsibility or of the concept chair depending on the experimental condition that the participants were allocated to, resulting in high inter-rater agreement (Cohen's Kappa = .84).

Further, a 2 × 2 ANOVA, on the question to what extent they had a prosocial attitude toward others in the present situation, only revealed a marginal signifi cant effect of Accessibility (F(1, 58) = 3.63, p = .06, η 2 = .06), showing that participants in the social responsibility condition experienced stronger feelings of prosocial attitudes toward others than those in the chair condition (Ms = 6.03 vs. 5.49).

Because prior research has shown that accessibility methods may infl uence mood [START_REF] Sedikides | Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially infl uenced by mood: Tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis[END_REF], consequently infl uencing the effect of the accessibility method on the dependent measure under investigation, we asked participants to indicate how happy they felt (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the happiness item revealed no signifi cant effects of Accessibility (F(1, 57) = 3.20, p < .08), Leader selection (F(1, 57) < 1, p < . 10), nor the Interaction (F(1, 57) < 1, p < .99). As such, our accessibility method did not infl uence participants' positive mood, suggesting that we do not have to control for this variable in our main analyses. Overall, we can conclude that our prime manipulation was successful.

To see whether our selection procedure manipulation was successful, we fi rst of all conducted an analysis of frequencies on the question whether participants were allocated the role of leader showing that all participants responded with yes. Further, an analysis of frequency on the question whether the experimenter appointed the role of leader showed that in the elected leader condition 100% of the participants responded with no, whereas in the appointed leader condition 78% responded with the option yes. Finally, another analysis of frequency on the question whether the group selected the role showed that in the elected leader condition 97% of the participants responded with yes, whereas in the appointed leader condition 94% responded with the option no.

Resource allocation A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the resource allocation score revealed only a signifi cant interaction between Accessibility and Leader selection (F(1, 58) = 4.22, p < .05, η 2 = .07) (see Table 2). The means in Table 2 clearly show that appointed leaders in the chair prime condition harvested by far the highest resource shares. Simple effect tests indeed show that Leader selection revealed a signifi cant effect among those in the chair condition (F(1, 58) = 4.67, p < .05), but not in the social responsibility condition (F(1, 58) = .44, p < .51).

General discussion

Taken together, the present results are supportive of our prediction that the manner used to select leaders may signifi cantly infl uence how leaders make allocation decisions in common resource dilemmas. In identifying this effect of the selection procedure the role of social responsibility was further explored. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss the most important fi ndings.

The fi rst fi nding of importance is that the procedure used to allocate people to a leader position within an interdependent resource situation signifi cantly infl uences the impact that the label leader has on how observers evaluate the allocation decisions made by the leader. First of all, in Experiment 1 it was found that deviating behavior by an appointed leader was accepted more than similar deviating behavior by an elected leader. These fi ndings are supportive of earlier leadership research suggesting that the selection procedure signifi cantly affects the leadership process, in the eyes of both observers and the leader himself [START_REF] Hollander | Studies in leader legitimacy, infl uence, and innovation[END_REF][START_REF] Julian | Endorsement of the group spokesman as a function of his source of authority, competence and success[END_REF]. That is, following these theories, elected leadership should be associated with the notion of social responsibility, because elected leaders are expected to display socially Notes: Entries are allocations ranging from 0 to 90, with higher values indicating higher allocations to oneself. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and number of participants per cell.

appropriate and normative behavior. In contrast, appointed leaders have a less clearly defi ned expectation pattern and as such may have more leeway in making their decisions. Importantly, however, the fi ndings of Experiment 2 showed that the ideas that observers use to evaluate those called leader also seem to operate among those individuals placed in the respective leader role. Indeed, elected leaders acted more socially responsible than appointed leaders, whereas there was no difference in allocations between elected leaders and followers. The fact that this effect was found in a decision-making situation under which decisions were anonymous testifi es to the idea that individuals also internalized these expectations and thus do not solely display these types of behavior to conform to the expectations of the others. Finally, our results also revealed direct evidence that the notion of social responsibility (as advocated by [START_REF] Hollander | Leadership and power[END_REF] seems to play a role when explaining allocation differences between elected and appointed leaders. In Experiment 2 it was found that elected leaders felt more socially responsible toward others relative to appointed leaders and followers. In addition, in Experiment 3, it was further shown that if the concept of social responsibility was made accessible the allocations of appointed leaders were not different from the allocations of those among whom social responsibility is already a salient issue, that is, elected leaders.

All in all, these fi ndings complement prior research showing that if individuals are allocated to the leader role they (under certain circumstances) allocate more resources to themselves relative to when being allocated to the follower role (De Cremer, 2003a;De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005;[START_REF] Samuelson | Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks[END_REF][START_REF] Stouten | I'm doing the best I can (for myself): Leadership and variance of harvesting in social dilemmas[END_REF][START_REF] Van Dijk | Selfbenefi ting behavior in the allocation of scarce resources: Leader-follower differences and the moderating effect of social value orientations[END_REF]. However, the present fi ndings qualify and go beyond this observation in a variety of ways. First, the present fi ndings demonstrate that these prior research fi ndings only apply to leaders that are appointed by an external authority. Indeed, when the group elects the leader then resource allocations are not different anymore from the one that followers make. Second, prior research only focused on the self-interested side of allocation behavior by identifying feelings of entitlement as the explanatory factor of the difference in allocations between leaders and followers. The present research, however, adopted a perspective in which the role of social responsibility was explored. After all, it is clear that leaders are not only expected to take up the privileges associated with the leader role but also to take charge of the group in ways that benefi t the welfare of the group; thus, to display fair and socially responsible behavior [START_REF] Lord | A test of leadership categorization theory: Internal structure, information processing, and leadership perceptions[END_REF][START_REF] Yukl | Leadership in organizations[END_REF]. As such, the present research is the fi rst (at least to our knowledge) to show when this social responsibility side of leadership is most likely to come into play when allocating resources.

Thus, an important conclusion that can be derived from the present fi ndings is that it suggests that when it comes to the allocation of scarce resources, conclusions that leadership may bring out the 'worst' in people (i.e. selfbenefi ting behavior) are not necessarily accurate. Indeed, the current fi ndings now suggest that the reported increase in self-benefi ting allocations, as shown in prior research, does not really emerge when the leader is elected (then allocations are similar to those of followers). Interesting to note in this respect, however, is that our fi ndings in Experiment 2 showed that elected leaders felt more socially responsible than both appointed leaders and followers. Thus, elected leaders did show less self-interested behavior than appointed leaders and both leader types differed in how socially responsible they felt, but although elected leaders and followers made equal allocation decisions they also differed in feelings of social responsibility. This fi nding therefore emphasizes the importance of paying closer attention to the role of followers and what exactly makes followers act so prosocially. It seems clear that other psychological processes may be involved than in the process of elected leadership and therefore we urge future research to explore this question in greater depth.

The present fi ndings may also have important implications for the management of common resources and managers' knowledge. First of all, our research fi ndings suggest that providing employees with job or status labels does not seem entirely without problems. Calling people a leader or a follower may activate expectations consistent with each of these labels, consequently affecting their behaviors within the group or organization. This cognitive effect is especially important to take into account at the managerial level where managers may reason that self-favoring behavior is legitimate. As such, promotion decisions and decisions to re-label people's positions or roles should not go without an analysis accounting for its possible behavioral consequences. In fact, because in organizations a view is endorsed that leader fi gures take care of the welfare of the organization, it is important for organizations to be aware that cognitive effects such as leader labels may actually have opposite effects.

One reason why organizations may be unaware of the effects of these cognitive effects is that this kind of perspective treats leadership as a relatively narrow concept (i.e. identifying it as a label that people use), whereas in organizations leadership is defi ned in broader terms including important behaviors and beliefs. More precisely, this broader notion of leadership includes a stronger focus on how leaders develop and maintain relationships with their followers through their actions. For example, with respect to the relational aspects of leadership research has shown that leaders displaying self-sacrifi ce (e.g. [START_REF] De Cremer | How do leaders promote cooperation[END_REF] or even servant behaviors (e.g. [START_REF] Greenleaf | Servant leadership: A journey into the nature of legitimate power and greatness[END_REF] develop trusting and trustworthy relationships. Despite the fact that our narrow focus on leadership can be considered a limitation when looking at the ecological validity of our studies, the present results nevertheless provide useful insights even when looked at from a broader perspective on leadership. More precisely, our fi ndings concerning elected leadership convey a rather optimistic message for actual leadership effects-namely that elected leaders (relative to appointed leaders) seem to act as good models. Recent research on the importance of charismatic leadership indicates that leaders showing self-benefi ting behavior are perceived as less effi cient and charismatic because these behaviors may model unfair behavior for others [START_REF] De Cremer | Charismatic leadership and cooperation in social dilemmas: A matter of transforming motives[END_REF][START_REF] De Cremer | How do leaders promote cooperation[END_REF]. Elected leaders, however, do show constraint (at least to the same extent as followers) and may therefore be perceived as more effi cient, charismatic, and fair authority figures; all perceptions that enhance the legitimacy of the leader [START_REF] Tyler | Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation[END_REF]. In turn, legitimacy makes followers accept the allocation decisions made by the leader more easily. Future research may thus further elaborate on the relationship between elected leadership perceptions, legitimacy, and the willingness of followers to support this type of leader.

The suggestion that elected leaders are evaluated as more legitimate may also reveal interesting links with the notion of power. That is, some recent research has shown that those high in power (relative to low) may feel more socially responsible and act more fairly and less prejudiced (see [START_REF] Vescio | The effects of prejudice level and social infl uence strategy on powerful people's responding to racial out-group members[END_REF]. Because we argue that elected leaders may feel more socially responsible, one could hypothesize that maybe they also feel more powerful. Future research should thus examine the relationship between the cognitive label of elected leadership, feelings of power and social responsibility and its effects on the willingness to act more prosocially.

Having raised all possible implications of the present fi ndings one may still note that the artifi cial nature of our experimental set-up and the absence of feeling of belonging to an actual organizational group represents an important limitation. Therefore, we are, of course, aware that the practical implications outlined must be tempered by also being aware of the obvious limitations that we mentioned. It is clear that issues such as generalizability are important to draw implications for organizational life and therefore we also need studies with high external and ecological validity. However, it is fair to note that a large body of research in real work settings suffers from the problem of having to demonstrate causal relationships, and, as such, is limited in being able to provide a strong theoretical and controllable explanation for the phenomena under investigation. Experimental setups may be a fi rst step in developing and testing specifi c theoretical predictions, which at the same time can be highly relevant to organizational settings as well, before examining whether the same processes emerge in real-life settings.

Taken together, the current fi ndings shed more light on the apparent pervasiveness of the enhancement of self-interest by those in higher positions (see e.g. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005) by showing that the emergence of this effect depends on how the leader is selected. When people are elected to a leader position then the concept of social responsibility is brought into play, making allocations less self-interested. In the case of appointed leadership, the concept of social responsibility seems to remain relatively silent unless made salient. Viewed this way, selection procedures may be the qualifying factor that can bring the two faces of leadership (i.e. entitlement versus social responsibility) to life.

Table 1 .

 1 Means of acceptance of the leader's choice as a function of leader selection and resource share (Experiment 1)

	Resource share

Notes : Entries represent the acceptance score on a 7-point scale, with higher values indicating higher acceptance. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and number of participants per cell.

Table 2 .

 2 Means of resources allocated to oneself as a function of accessibility and leadership selection procedure (Experiment 3)

	Accessibility


Todd L Pittinsky

Brian Welle

Negative Outgroup Leader Actions Increase Liking for Ingroup Leaders: An Experimental Test of Intergroup Leader-Enhancement Effects

Keywords:

We conducted two studies to examine how information about outgroup leaders' negative actions affect ingroup leader favorability ratings. Study 1 found that people hold more favorable attitudes toward ingroup leaders (i.e. their own nation's leaders) when learning of negative actions of outgroup leaders (i.e. another nation's leaders). Study 2 replicated the fi nding, examining social identity strength as a moderator of this effect, and found that participants with strong national identifi cation exhibit this intergroup leader-enhancement effect but participants with weak national identifi cation do not. These data extend previous research on liking for leaders and are consistent with predictions derived from social identity theory. The implications of these fi ndings for intergroup relations research and the psychological study of leadership are discussed.

Prior to the Watergate scandal, President Richard Nixon consistently held high approval ratings among citizens of the USA. As the scandal became public in the fi rst half of 1973, his approval ratings fell dramatically. Voters disapproved of their leader's actions and withdrew their support for him. While it is common to consider how followers respond to their own leader's actions, one also might wonder about how citizens of other nations responded to news of Nixon's corrupt behavior. Might Nixon's actions have infl uenced not only their views of him, but also their views of their own leaders? The purpose of the present research is to explore whether the actions of an outgroup leader infl uence how the members of a group feel about their own leader.

Will the actions of an outgroup leader change how the members of a group feel about their own leader? Many historical accounts suggest that information about outgroup leaders can bolster an ingroup leader's favorability ratings. Such information could even be strategically manipulated for this purpose. If outgroup leader actions do infl uence the favorability ratings of ingroup leaders, the effect will become more common as global media provide access to ever more information on leaders around the world. And yet this effect has not, to our knowledge, been experimentally tested.

Recent research integrating social identity theory and the study of leadership [START_REF] Haslam | The link between leadership and followership: How affi rming social identity translates vision into action[END_REF][START_REF] Hogg | A social identity theory of leadership[END_REF][START_REF] Lord | Identity, deep structure and the development of leadership skills[END_REF]van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2003), creating a social identity theory of leadership [START_REF] Hogg | A social identity theory of leadership[END_REF]Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003;van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003), provides a theoretical framework for hypothesizing such effects. The social identity theory of leadership, based on social identity and self-categorization theories, explains leader emergence and effectiveness through consideration of leader prototypicality [START_REF] De Cremer | Intergroup and intragroup aspects of leadership in social dilemmas: A relational model of cooperation[END_REF][START_REF] Haslam | The link between leadership and followership: How affi rming social identity translates vision into action[END_REF]Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003), group members' perceptions of a group leader's fairness [START_REF] Platow | Endorsement of distributively fair and unfair leaders in interpersonal and intergroup situations[END_REF][START_REF] Platow | A social identity analysis of leadership endorsement: The effects of leader ingroup prototypicality and distributive intergroup fairness[END_REF], and group members' evaluations of and responses to ingroup leader behavior [START_REF] Duck | Leaders and their treatment of subgroups: Implications for evaluations of the leader and the superordinate group[END_REF][START_REF] Hains | Self-categorization and leadership: Effects of group prototypicality and leader stereotypicality[END_REF][START_REF] Hogg | Identifi cation and leadership in small groups: Salience, frame of reference, and leader stereotypicality effects on leader evaluations[END_REF].

What about outgroup leaders? Though social identity theory is a theory of intergroup relations, most of the work on the social identity theory of leadership-and related research testing the theory-has considered intragroup implications. The intergroup context, an important direction for research and theory on leadership [START_REF] Pittinsky | The science and practice of intergroup leadership[END_REF][START_REF] Pittinsky | Intergroup leadership[END_REF], provides a potential context-specifi c infl uence on followers' judgment of individual leaders [START_REF] Haslam | Contextual changes in the prototypicality of extreme and moderate outgroup members[END_REF][START_REF] Oakes | The role of prototypicality in group infl uence and cohesion: Contextual variation in the graded structure of social categories[END_REF][START_REF] Turner | Social identity, organizations and leadership[END_REF]. The examination of leadership in its intergroup context can illuminate leadership in groups and organizations, and within and among nations [START_REF] Pittinsky | The science and practice of intergroup leadership[END_REF][START_REF] Pittinsky | Intergroup leadership[END_REF]. In particular, it can illuminate public leadership in government, public sector organizations, and organizations-whether notfor-profi t or for-profi t-that seek to advance the public good [START_REF] Pittinsky | Contemporary public leadership in China: A research review and consideration[END_REF], because intergroup leadership raises critical questions about the effects of leadership on those outside a leader's formal group and formal responsibility [START_REF] Pittinsky | Intergroup leadership[END_REF]. Such questions cut to the core of the common or public good and are often overlooked in the contemporary psychosocial study of leadership conducted in for-profi t small-group or organizational settings. 1 To investigate intergroup leadership effects, we designed a series of studies to examine how knowledge of an outgroup leader's negative actions infl uence the favorability ratings of ingroup leaders. Based on social identity theory and the corresponding evidence for group enhancement in the intergroup context, we hypothesize an intergroup leader-enhancement effect: information about the negative actions of an outgroup leader will lead group members to feel more favorable toward their own leaders, even in the absence of any new information about their own leaders. As social identity enhancement motives are the key mechanisms hypothesized, we expect this pattern to be observed most clearly among individuals who strongly identify with their group.

Social identity theories of group enhancement motives and intergroup social comparisons

Social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1999;[START_REF] Tajfel | Social psychology of intergroup relations[END_REF][START_REF] Tajfel | The social identity theory of inter-group behavior[END_REF][START_REF] Turner | Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour[END_REF] argues that one way people satisfy their drive for self-esteem is through identifi cation with positively regarded groups. Consequently, just as individuals gauge their own well-being by making comparisons with other individuals [START_REF] Hakmiller | Need for self-evaluation, perceived similarity and comparison choice[END_REF][START_REF] Tajfel | Social psychology of intergroup relations[END_REF][START_REF] Wills | Downward social comparison principles in social psychology[END_REF], group members will sometimes compare their group favorably to other groups [START_REF] Taylor | Social comparison in an intergroup context[END_REF]. Because comparing one's group positively to another can heighten one's self-esteem, a number of behavioral and perceptual processes can ensure that these comparisons are indeed favorable [START_REF] Brewer | Intergroup relations[END_REF]. Moreover, individuals who identify more strongly with the ingroup are more likely to make ingroup-favoring social comparisons [START_REF] Crocker | Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias[END_REF].

Because leaders represent the traits, attributes, and qualities of their groups to the outside world, they may be an object of social comparison.

According to the social identity theory of leadership, a leader is often perceived as the most representative or prototypical member of the group, particularly in cases of high group salience or in cases where members and leaders identify strongly with the group [START_REF] Hains | Self-categorization and leadership: Effects of group prototypicality and leader stereotypicality[END_REF][START_REF] Haslam | The link between leadership and followership: How affi rming social identity translates vision into action[END_REF][START_REF] Hogg | Identifi cation and leadership in small groups: Salience, frame of reference, and leader stereotypicality effects on leader evaluations[END_REF]. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that leader-toleader comparisons would be one of the social comparisons people might make and that an intergroup leader-enhancement effect might appear as one type of ingroup-favoring social comparison. Learning about the negative actions of outgroup leaders (e.g. the leaders of other countries) may actually have a positive impact on people's views of their own leaders. The current studies experimentally test this possibility.

Study 1

Our fi rst study was designed to examine ingroup members' favorability ratings of ingroup leaders in response to new information about the negative actions of outgroup leaders. We described to participants a pervasive international situation: hunger and malnutrition in another country. In the experimental condition, the hunger and malnutrition were attributed to the negative acts of that country's (outgroup) leaders. In the control condition, the hunger and malnutrition were attributed to a natural event -a drought. Our outcome measure was individuals' favorability ratings of their own (ingroup) leaders.

We used favorability ratings as the dependent measure to operationalize and test predictions about leadership derived from social identity theory. Leader favorability is discussed in many social identity accounts of leadership. For example, the fi nding that 'systematically selected leaders may be less favorably perceived than randomly appointed leaders' supports the core tenet of leader prototypicality [START_REF] Haslam | Inspecting the emperor's clothes: Evidence that random selection of leaders can enhance group performance[END_REF], cited in Hogg, 2001, p. 192). Two of the basic building blocks of the social identity theory of leadership are (i) followers' perception of leader effectiveness and (ii) followers' endorsement of their leaders [START_REF] Hogg | A social identity theory of leadership[END_REF]. Past research has demonstrated that favorability ratings tap followers' perception of leadership effectiveness and followers' endorsement of their leaders [START_REF] Nye | The effects of prototype-based biases on leadership appraisals[END_REF]. In addition, favorability measures have the virtue of being a highly ecologically valid measure, commonly used in polls to compare leaders, make predictions about the likely outcomes of elections, and assess the impact of world events on the public perception of leaders [START_REF] Newport | Bush's favorable rating running higher than job approval[END_REF].

Based on the social identity and intergroup social comparisons research reviewed earlier, we predicted that when the negative acts of the leaders of an outgroup were described, a groupserving social comparison would be made and the favorability of attitudes toward ingroup leaders would increase. These predictions led to the hypothesis that participants will express greater favorability for ingroup leadership when they believe that another nation's leaders are largely responsible for a negative event.

Method

Participants The participants were 39 graduate (N = 23) and undergraduate (N = 16) students at Harvard University, recruited in the entryway of a campus library or through their classes. There were 22 men and 17 women, with an average age of 23.6.

Procedure

Participants were asked to take 15 minutes to read about a hypothetical international event and fi ll out a brief survey. The experimental materials included a one-page description of Lesotho, an African country chosen because pretest data revealed that participants would have little knowledge of current events there.

The description of Lesotho was a composite of data available from the World Food Program. Lesotho was briefl y described as one of the world's 49 least-developed countries, which meant it had a per capita GDP under U.S. $900, a low level of human-capital development, and high economic vulnerability. Additional information included the population of the country (2,207,954), land area (30,255 km 2 ), population density (72 people/km 2 ), and average life expectancy (49 years).

After reading the general information about Lesotho, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental manipulations and completed a brief questionnaire containing the dependent measures. To further reduce any effects of any particular current event, questions were written in the future tense.

Independent variable

Responsibility for the situation All participants were given general information about Lesotho; participants read one of two paragraphs describing Lesotho's diffi culties. Participants in the outgroup leaders' negative-actions-responsible condition read:

Lesotho is a country that has suffered largely due to the actions of its own leaders. Although the international community has responded with food and monetary supplies for Lesotho, the leaders of Lesotho have diverted the aid inappropriately and irresponsibly. As a result, the population has not been receiving the aid that was allocated to them. Largely as a result of the irresponsible diversion of aid by the leadership of Lesotho, the people of Lesotho will continue to live each day hungry and weakened by the lack of nutrition.

Participants in the nature-responsible (control) condition read:

Lesotho is a country that has suffered largely due to chronic drought. Recently, Lesotho experienced its longest dry spell in 20 years and its second worst drought in a century. The drought has devastated the food production in Lesotho. Many cannot remember the last time it rained. Largely as a result of the drought, the people of Lesotho will continue to live each day hungry and weakened by the lack of nutrition.

Dependent measures There were two dependent measures: 'How favorable would you feel toward the leadership of your country?' and 'How favorable would you feel toward the people of your country?' (1, strongly unfavorable; 7, strongly favorable). The measures of favorability mirrored techniques currently used in the USA to assess attitudes toward presidents. 2

Manipulation check We asked participants, '

To what extent would you believe the leadership of Lesotho is responsible for the conditions in Lesotho?' and 'To what extent would you believe that nature is responsible for the conditions in Lesotho?' (1, not at all; 7, very much).

Results

As expected, the mean score for 'Lesotho leadership responsible' was signifi cantly higher in the outgroup leaders' negative-actions-responsible condition (M = 6.79, SD = .42) than in the control condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.38; t(37) = 3.98, p < .001). Also confi rming the effectiveness of the manipulation, the mean score for 'nature responsible' was higher in the nature-responsible condition (M = 6.15, SD = .67) than in the outgroup leaders' negative-actions-responsible condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.05; t(37) = 4.03, p < .001). 3 The two dependent variablesratings of the leadership and the people of the USA-were significantly correlated (r = .49, p = .001).

Independent sample t-tests were conducted to test our hypotheses. As expected, ratings of ingroup leaders were higher when Lesotho's leaders were deemed responsible for the suffering (M = 3.89, SD = .74) than when drought was deemed responsible (M = 2.90, SD = 1.12; t(37) = 3.26, p = .004). That is, participants felt more favorably toward their own leaders (i.e. US leaders) when learning about the outgroup leaders' negative actions. Results revealed that participants' ratings of the people of the USA in the leader-responsible condition (M = 4.21, SD = .71) did not signifi cantly differ from those in the drought-responsible condition (M = 3.85, SD = 1.09; t(37) = 1.22, ns), demonstrating that this is a leader-enhancement effect and not a general ingroup enhancement effect.

To further demonstrate that the effects of outgroup leaders' actions are independent of participants' pre-existing beliefs about the people of the USA, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the independent variable being the source of the negative event, the dependent variable being the evaluation of U.S. leadership, and the covariate being the favorability ratings of the people of the USA. As expected, a signifi cant main effect of responsibility on leadership ratings was revealed (F(1, 37) = 7.73, p = .008), even when the ratings of the people of the USA were accounted for (the covariate was signifi cant; F(1, 37) = 9.94, p = .003).

Study 2

The results from Study 1 provided initial evidence that outgroup leaders' actions can infl uence the way people think about their own national leaders. Our second study was designed to examine how people's social identifi cation with their nation may moderate the effect found in Study 1. We described the same international situation to participants (hunger and malnutrition in another nation) but we also measured participants' identifi cation with their nation.

Based on the research reviewed earlier, which demonstrated that identifi cation moderates ingroup favoring intergroup comparisons, we examined whether individuals' national identifi cation would moderate how they used information about outgroup leaders to shape their favorability ratings of ingroup leaders. We tested prediction that the more strongly people identify with their national group, the more likely they will be to view their leader more favorably in contrast to a poorly performing outgroup leader. We expected to fi nd that individuals with stronger social identification would, overall, have more favorable attitudes toward their ingroup leaders [START_REF] Platow | A social identity analysis of leadership endorsement: The effects of leader ingroup prototypicality and distributive intergroup fairness[END_REF]. We further expected that individuals with stronger social identifi cation would be more likely to be influenced by information about outgroup leaders and would therefore make leader-enhancing social comparisons.

Method

Participants Seventy-nine Harvard University undergraduate students, 46 women and 33 men, were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. All but four of the participants were U.S. citizens. The average age was 20.5 years.

Procedure Upon entering the experiment website, participants were shown a description of Lesotho. The materials were the same as those used in Study 1, but with one difference: the vignette was written in the present tense to make it more powerful-not a hypothetical situation but something that was really happening. After reading the general information about Lesotho, participants were exposed to the experimental manipulation and completed a brief questionnaire containing the dependent measures.

Independent variable

Responsibility for situation Having read the general information about Lesotho, participants read a paragraph-either the outgroup leaders' negative-actions-responsible scenario or the nature-responsible scenario-explaining why that nation is experiencing diffi culties.

National identifi cation

To assess strength of identifi cation, we used one of the four subscales of [START_REF] Luhtanen | A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity[END_REF] Collective Self-Esteem Scale, the four-item 'importance to identity' subscale, which has been shown to refl ect the centrality of an identity to one's sense of self [START_REF] Luhtanen | A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity[END_REF]. We used all four items of the subscale, modifying the language as necessary to refer to participants' national identities. Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1, agree; 7, disagree), with higher scores indicating stronger national identifi cation. The 4-item scale was reliable (α = .83).

This particular subscale has been used by many researchers as a measure of group identifi cation [START_REF] Carvallo | When fi ends become friends: The need to belong and perceptions of personal and group discrimination[END_REF][START_REF] Chen | Self-verifi cation motives at the collective level of self-defi nition[END_REF][START_REF] Eccleston | Attribution to discrimination and self-esteem: The role of group identifi cation and appraisals[END_REF][START_REF] Sellers | The multidimensional inventory of Black identity: Construct validity and reliability[END_REF][START_REF] Vorauer | Disruptive effects of vigilance on dominant group members' treatment of outgroup members: Choking versus shining under pressure[END_REF]. The subscale conceptualizes identity as the importance of the group to self-concept and self-defi nition and is often recognized as conceptually tapping identifi cation rather than self-esteem [START_REF] Ahlering | Collective self-esteem data from four ethnic groups[END_REF][START_REF] Branscombe | Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identifi cation and well-being[END_REF][START_REF] Cassidy | Perceived discrimination and psychological distress: The role of personal and ethnic self-esteem[END_REF], serving as an explicit measure of the importance of collective identity [START_REF] Ashmore | An organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation and signifi cance of multidimensionality[END_REF].

Dependent measures

The same two dependent measures of favorability were collected in this study as in the previous study.

Results

Our predictions were tested using linear regression, with the predictor variables being the experimental conditions (outgroup leaders' negative-actions-responsible or natureresponsible) and the 'importance to identity' subscale of collective self-esteem. In the fi rst step, we entered the main effects into the equation; in the second step we entered their interactions.

Liking for ingroup leader

We fi rst looked for any differences in national identity strength between participants in the outgroup leaders' negative-action-responsible and natureresponsible conditions. There was no signifi cant difference; t(78) = -.91, p = .99.

To investigate whether national identity strength would moderate the relationship between perceived responsibility for suffering and favorability ratings of ingroup leaders, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis. The results confi rmed our hypothesis that the more strongly people identify with their nation, the more likely it is that outgroup leaders' actions will affect their perceptions of their own leader (see Table 1). Neither a main effect for responsibility (β = .18) nor national identity (β = .05) was signifi cant after the interaction was entered into the model. However, the interaction between responsibility and national identity was signifi cant (β = .28, ∆R 2 = .05, p = .04). This confi rmed our hypothesis: the more strongly people identify with their nation, the more likely it is that outgroup leaders' actions will affect their perceptions of their own leaders.

To further confi rm this conclusion, we followed the recommendations of [START_REF] Aiken | Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions[END_REF] by plotting favorability scores for those in the 'drought' and 'their leader' conditions at one standard deviation above and below the mean for social identity. Results of this analysis (see Figure 1) showed that learning that outgroup leaders acted negatively increased the favorability ratings of ingroup leaders for those with higher national identifi cation but not for those with lower national identifi cation. Social identity was positively related to favorability ratings in the outgroup leaders' negative-actionresponsible condition (simple slopes analysis for one standard deviation above the mean of social identity: β = .37, p = .01) but not in the nature-responsible control condition (simple slope analysis for one standard deviation below the mean of standard deviation: β = -.01, ns). In other words, learning that outgroup leaders acted negatively increased the favorability ratings of ingroup leaders but only for those with higher not lower national identifi cation.

Liking for ingroup members None of the independent variables and none of their interactions affected attitudes toward one's own people (responsibility, β = .12; national identity, β = .03; responsibility × identity, β = .21).

General discussion

The degree to which members of a group feel favorably towards their leaders is a critical issue. In the USA, for example, an array of research programs map fluctuations in the public's attitudes toward the national leadership [START_REF] Newport | Bush's favorable rating running higher than job approval[END_REF][START_REF] Pittinsky | National Leadership Index 2006: A national study of confi dence in leadership[END_REF]. The results from the present study demonstrated an intergroup leader-enhancement effect: liking for one's leader increased in the context of ingrouppositive leader comparisons. This effect, the research found, is particular and leader-specifi c and not a more general social comparison effect. Further, we found that the more strongly people identify with their group (which, in this research, is their nation), the more likely they are to view their leader more favorably in response to negative information about an outgroup leader. In the context studied (i.e. public leadership and cross-national comparisons), the data suggest that increased liking for a domestic leader may result from citizens learning about the negative actions of foreign leaders. Indeed, our fi ndings suggest that leaders might infl uence their own favorability ratings by selectively communicating information about the negative actions of outgroup leaders or by focusing domestic attention on those actions. Apart from leaders' manipulations of information, the media a person chooses to consume would likely infl uence how favorably that person views their leaders, depending on the breadth and depth of reporting of international leaders' misdeeds.

As a fi rst set of empirical studies, the present investigation has several limitations that are recognized here and should be addressed in future work. First, our studies relied on student samples that may not be representative of the full population. However, our sample mirrors the research samples typically used in social identity research, thereby allowing comparability across studies. Second, we measured rather than manipulated national identity. The study of existing national identity groups [START_REF] Platow | Endorsement of distributively fair and unfair leaders in interpersonal and intergroup situations[END_REF] enhances ecological validity, a richness that necessarily comes at the expense of some measure of experimental control. Relying on measurement rather than manipulation raises issues of ultimate causation. In social identity research, however, laboratory studies and fi eld research have often produced similar results [START_REF] Platow | A social identity analysis of leadership endorsement: The effects of leader ingroup prototypicality and distributive intergroup fairness[END_REF]. Despite these limitations, the present research provides evidence that outgroup leader behavior is important to understanding favorability ratings of an ingroup leader and that social identifi cation is an important moderator of the effects of outgroup leaders on ingroup leader favorability ratings. These studies provide empirical support for the development of theories that examine intergroup leadership processesdynamics that occur across groups and, more specifi cally, across group leaders.

We conclude with an examination of some of the most compelling directions for future research. The current studies examine negative leader acts. A logical future step is to examine cases in which outgroup leaders take positive actions. Predictions that can be made directly from social identity theory (e.g. that people with a high level of national identifi cation would not like their leaders less when confronted with the positive acts of outgroup leaders, while people with a low level of national identification would rate their leaders less favorably when so confronted) await empirical confirmation. Another important direction for future research relates to the measurement of political affi liation as a moderator in multiparty political systems. Some of the variance in our Study 2 data may have been infl uenced by political affi liation. Future research that explicitly looks at the potential moderating effects of political affi liation will likely provide a more nuanced view of the interaction between political affi liation and identifi cation with the national collective. Finally, an interesting topic for future research is the extent to which people ascribe intentional control over the dissemination of information about outgroup leaders' actions. Would the salience of the strategic motives for the communication of such information by one's own ingroup leaders alter, eliminate, or even reverse the enhancement effect?

The present research sought to gain a better understanding of why a leader may be viewed favorably or unfavorably. The intergroup leaderenhancement effect revealed in this research, relevant to the many different contexts in which psychologists examine intergroup relations, suggests that researchers may need to look beyond a leader and beyond their followers to other groups and to their leaders. Notes 1. For example, a literature examines U.S. presidential leadership [START_REF] Winter | Leader appeal, leader performance, and the motive profi les of leaders and followers: A study of American presidents and elections[END_REF]; for a review, see [START_REF] Goethals | Presidential leadership[END_REF] and political support for leaders from psychological perspectives [START_REF] Cohen | Fatal Attraction: The effects of mortality salience on evaluations of charismatic, task-orientated, and relationshiporientated leaders[END_REF]Hoyt, Simon, & Reid, in press;[START_REF] Landau | Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George G. Bush[END_REF]). 2. For example, one of the measures the Gallup Poll uses most frequently asks Americans to 'Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the current president.' 3. We collected data on a third condition in which ingroup leadership (i.e. U.S.) acted negatively (i.e. diverted aid). This condition was run to ensure that negative actions by an ingroup leader did not give rise to the same ratings as negative actions by an outgroup leader. In other words, it was an alternative control condition. Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that this condition had the same (lack of) impact on ratings of U.S. leadership as did the nature-responsible (drought) condition (M = 2.86, F(2, 58) = 4.33, p < .05), with ratings being higher in the outgroup leaders' negative-action-responsible condition than in the ingroup leaders' negative-action-responsible condition and no difference between the nature-responsible and the ingroup leaders' negative-action-responsible conditions.

Figure 1 .

 1 Figure 1. Relationship between identity strength and leader favorability evaluation as a function of nature/ leader responsibility (for Study 2).

Table 1 .

 1 Hierarchical regression results for Study 2: The effect of responsibility and national identity on favorability ratings of ingroup leaders and ingroup members

		Favorability of leaders	Favorability of people
		Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
	Responsibility (Beta)	.19	.18	.13	.12
	National identity (Beta)	.21	.05	.16	.03
	Responsibility × identity (Beta)		.28*		.21
	R 2	.09	.14	.05	.07
	F	3.73*	4.00*	1.82	2.01
	∆R 2 for step 2		.05		.03
	F for ∆R 2		4.22*		2.33
	*p < .05.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank R. Matthew Montoya, Laura Bacon, Laura Maruskin, Seth Rosenthal, Sloan Strike, Stefanie Simon, and John Elder for helpful comments on an early draft of this manuscript. Four anonymous reviewers and the editor of this Journal provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. Data from this manuscript were fi rst presented at the American Psychological Society's Annual Conference (2004). The Center for Public Leadership, the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, and the Dean's Research Fund at the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, provided fi nancial support for this research.