Les processus décisionnels de l’intervention militaire au Canada (1990-2003) : une approche réaliste néoclassique
The decision to intervene militarily or not in a conflict is certainly one of the most important a government can take. These decisions are extremely significant financially, politically and socially costly. The research presented in this document analyzes decision-making processes in Canada during the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Canada is a very interesting case to study because despite its middle power status, it took part in seven armed conflicts since September 1867. This research will therefore try to identify the reasons for Canada to invest financial and human resources in some conflicts, while it chooses not to get involved in others. Some theories of international relations argue that the defence policy of states is guided by the desire to maximize their power on the international stage. Other theories will instead focus on values or norms internalized by states, or their integration into international institutions. These different assumptions raise the importance of internal and external factors, but do not tell which will prevail. Thus, using a neoclassical realism model of decision making synthesizing these two factors, it will be possible to determine which internal (internal policy constraints, perceptions of managers) or external factors (Canada's relative position in the international system) dominate in the decision to go to war.
Canada Afghanistan Canada Gulf Iraq Afghanistan war decision-making neoclassical realism military interventions