The role of feeling in Fichte’s rejection of the thing in itself
Fichte’s doctrine of science can be seen as an attempt to make sense of the assertion of Jacobi according to which Kant’s transcendental philosophy, when understood correctly, amounts to the strongest form of idealism. Yet, in order to show the soundness of such an idealism, Fichte has to confront Jacobi’s problem concerning the nature of the infamous « object that affects » in the CPR. I argue in this paper that Fichte’s solution to the problem of affection consists in replacing “sensation” by “feeling,” or more precisely in substituting the objective dimension of sensation for something totally subjective: feeling. Fichte is well acquainted with the Kantian definitions and he is perfectly conscious of the shift he is making here. In the end however, he is obliged to admit the absolute contingency of this “limitation of the I” which defines feeling.
Fichte Jacobi Beck Affection Sensation Idealism Thing in itself Feeling