Die Bestimmung der Sinnenwelt durch das vernünftige Wesen (Folgesatz)
Fichte depicts § 2 of his Foundations of Natural Right (1796) as a “corollary,” implying that it follows from the “theorem” exposed in § 1. Yet if in the latter the finite rational being ascribes to itself a free activity, § 2 adds that at the same time this being sets a sensible world outside of itself. I then draw a parallel between this position of an outside world and Kant’s refutation of Cartesian idealism, in order to show that the failure of this refutation is due to the fact that Kant, as opposed to Fichte, presents a proof that is exclusively theoretical. I also examine Fichte’s positive appraisal of Jacobi’s conception of causality, as well as the implicit critique of Reinhold’s Tatsache, which remains far behind the Fichtean Tathandlung.
Fichte Kant Jacobi Reinhold Sensible world Free activity