Dialectique, science et induction : la recherche aristotélicienne de la vérité
The attention this master’s thesis gives to the aristotelian method towards truth confines it to a precise examination of the preliminary steps of this method, in order to distance itself from an over-simplified opposition between science and opinion in Aristotle. Starting from a presentation of the functions of dialectic, as described by the philosopher in the Topics, this inquiry intends to provide a close comparison between the methods of dialectic and demonstration. More precisely, it aims to deconstruct the presuppositions underlining a traditional reading of the Posterior analytics, according to which (1) demonstrative method should provide a guide for scientific research and (2) Aristotle’s epistemology is radically foundationalist. The alternative reading this study suggests to adopt allows it to ease the conditions imposed by Aristotle on the premises of apodictic syllogism, as ways to exploit the distinction he makes between what is better known by nature and what is better known for us. In doing so, the frontier between dialectic, which starts from accredited ideas, and demonstration, which starts from true premises, appears to be less opaque and the concept of epistēmē, less “scientific” in the modern sense. Finally, this alternative reading of the Posterior analytics is put to contribution in examining the hypothesis, inspired by an essay from Owen (1961), regarding the possibility for the last chapter (II, 19) of this treatise to help us elucidate, both at the same time, the role of induction and that of dialectic in the path towards truth.
Aristote Aristotle Endoxa Epistēmē Phainomena Dialectic Demonstration Apodictic Knowledge Topics Posterior analytics