Wittgenstein et le conventionnalisme : une critique du contextualisme sémantique de François Recanati
In Literal Meaning, François Recanati argues that what is said when a sentence is uttered corresponds to a content that is fundamentally pragmatic. To this end, he proposes two general arguments according to which what is said will be indeterminate if we stick to the rules of semantics. The first of these two arguments tries to establish that in many cases, the semantic content supposedly associated with a sentence does not correspond to what is said. The second one is rather an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s thesis to the effect that the meaning of linguistic types is indeterminate. As for me, I claim that if we indeed adopt a wittgensteinian conception of meaning, some of the examples that are supposed to illustrate the first of these two arguments can and should be criticized.
Recanati Wittgenstein Semantic Pragmatic Contextualism Minimalism Psychologism Conventionalism Indeterminacy