Les injustices épistémiques en démocratie : comment nuisent-elles aux objectifs de justice et d’inclusion?
In the context of deliberative democracy, the fact that participants’ contributions can be dismissed simply due to their belonging to a certain social group constitutes a problem, particularly to the quality of the deliberation, but also to the participants’ conditions of justice. Epistemic injustices, a type of injustice denying a participant’s full agency as a knower and contributor to knowledge production, constitutes a specific problem, both affecting the quality of deliberation processes, and the conditions of self-development and self-determination. These conditions are the conditions of justice that democracy should be able to ensure. This present thesis attempts to demonstrate that testimonial and hermeneutical injustices (defined by Miranda Fricker), epistemic oppression (defined by Kristie Dotson), epistemic exploitation (defined by Nora Berenstain), and active ignorance (defined by Linda Martin Alcoff, Charles W. Mills, and José Medina), contribute to hermeneutical domination (defined by Amandine Catala) in the context of deliberative democracy, thus harming the quality of democratic deliberation and affecting negatively the conditions of justice that are its aim.
Domination Justice Feminism Deliberative democracy Epistemic injustices Justice