Le monisme neutre et le « problème difficile de la conscience »
The “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) or the question on why our mental states are endowed with a certain subjective quality constitutes renders evident the existence of an “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) between the experience lived by the subject and the brain’s physical and functional structures (or the organism’s altogether). Among the many solutions devised to solve it, Neutral Monism stands as an appealing alternative between the extremes of physicalism and dualism. Initially derived from Bertrand Russell’s thought (1927), Neutral Monism departs from this starting fact: within our scientific conception of matter, there is an important conceptual gap between the causal role thereof and its hitherto unknown intrinsic, fundamental properties. In other words, we know that matter behaves in such and such a way, but we do not know why it is so. In the light of these facts, the fundamental nature of matter is neither physical nor mental, but it identifies to a neutral stuff from which would emerge both the physical and mental properties. In that sense, this research focuses on spelling out the antecedents, origin, development, evolution and prospects of this solution, comparing it with other monist and neutralist positions. As research develops, we shall assess some of the objections raised against it. Finally, we shall consider some contemporary formulations inspired by the Russellian thesis in order to reflect upon their plausibility.
Consciousness Neutral Monism Panpsychism Phenomenal Hard problem of consciousness