Défense et illustration de l'infinitisme épistémique
This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.
philosophy epistemology epistemic regress epistemic justification infinitism