Causalité et explication causale chez James Woodward
Some philosophers claim that causal relations are based on the laws of nature.  This view is not consistent with the actual causal relations found in the biomedical and social sciences.  In order  to better reflect the actual practice in the various sciences, James Woodward puts forward a view of causation and causal explanation based on a much less demanding relation than that of law of nature, which he calls ‘invariance’.  This essay presents the concept of invariance and other related causal concepts, and identifies certain problems, in order to outline the proper use of this group of concepts.  Woodward’s conception assumes that the goal of causal inquiry is practical rather than merely epistemic :  agents use causal relationships to modify outcomes.  The conception is also non reductive ;  it uses counterfactuals and is a reflection of the experimental methods of the various sciences.  The fact that this conception is consistent with the actual causal generalizations found in the various sciences implies that the goal of universal truth associated with the notion of law of nature is set aside and is replaced by an objective of temporary reliability.  In addition, since the invariance criterion is not very demanding, other criteria must be added to identify, among causal (i.e. invariant) relations, those relations that can be relied upon to reliably modify outcomes.
intervention invariance Woodward science philosophy epistemology causation explanation law of nature intervention invariance Woodward science