Why do peace negotiations fail? : a case study of the 2012-2015 peace talks between Turkey and the PKK
Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.
Turkey-PKK Negotiation failures Peace processes Credible commitment Asymmetric information Third-party involvement Bargaining theory