Les trois mondes des régimes fiscaux : l’économie politique du financement des États-providence
This thesis is about a paradox: the most generous welfare states, built by social-democratic parties, are financed by more regressive taxes than residual welfare states, which are funded by progressive taxes, despite the fact that they are governed by right parties more often. To understand this paradox, this thesis starts by analysing the pressures that globalisation puts on taxation. Then, the thesis reviews the literature of political science research on taxation to understand the institutional origins of distinct tax regimes. Three ideal types of tax regimes are defined by the study of institutional and functional constraints on political actors’ preferences and behaviour. These ideal types fit with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states regimes. By regrouping typologies on tax and welfare regimes, this thesis explores the link between revenues and expenses while showing that the funding of public policies is a crucial feature of the political economy of welfare states.
Taxation Welfare State Tax regimes Power resource theory Varieties of capitalism Ideal types Majoritarian systems Consensual systems