Kant et les organismes non vivants
In this article, I question the position adopted by Peter McLaughlin and Reinhard Löw who tend to neglect in their commentaries the sharp distinction established by Kant between “organism” and “life.” In truth, the second part of the CJ deals specifically with the paradigmatic case of organism, and this in accordance with Kant’s intentions in this work. Therefore, properly speaking, the main topic here is not a philosophy of “bio-logy.” Organism is at most an “analogon of life” according to Kant. Furthermore I examine the reasons that lead him to reject two ways of explaining organism, namely “hylozoism” (contradictory) and the theory of the world-soul (anthropomorphic) in order to conclude that the only possible explanation for Kant is the supersensible realm.
Kant McLaughlin, Peter Löw, Reinhard Organism Life Hylozoism World-soul