Les implications normatives de la conceptualisation de l'anorexia nervosa
Anorexia nervosa is defined as a mental illness per se, according to DSM-5, but this definition may involve late treatment of the eating disorder. Since anorexia nervosa is a mental illness with a high mortality rate, it is necessary to review the conceptualization of this mental disorder.  My hypothesis is that the concept of anorexia nervosa is normative and harmful for people with this disorder. To explore this hypothesis, we have to review the epistemological questions about the concept of species in  philosophy of psychiatry. It will be a question of defining whether anorexia nervosa is a natural species or a human specie, a concept as presented by Ian Hacking.   I will explore the idea that anorexia nervosa is not only a human species, but also a transient mental disorder. If this disorder is a transient mental disorder, then what can it relate to? With what we know of the general behaviors of anorexia nervosa, it is possible to establish ontological tracks for a redefinition of the disorder. I will question self-control and autonomy in the person with this disorder based on the theories of George Ainslie and Alfred Mele.  Since we can not consider people with anorexia nervosa to be autonomous, we must help them with psychological support. I will propose an expanded conceptualization of anorexia nervosa and discuss pragmatic and conceptual advantages in considering anorexia nervosa as an obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Anorexia Species Self-control Normativity Philosophy of psychiatry