Les historiens français et britanniques devant la responsabilité de l’échec des négociations tripartites de 1939 : étude historiographique de 1961 à 2011
In 1939, France and Great Britain realized that stopping Hitler’s aggression in Europe would require a common front. Such an endeavour brought them to consider the Soviet Union as a possible ally. Despite four months of negotiations, the three countries could not reach any agreement. This failure was dramatic since on 23 August, a non-aggression pact was signed between Berlin and Moscow and, one week later, Germany invaded Poland. The Second World War had started. Since the 1990s, many historians argued that Western historiography about these failed negotiations has been influenced by Cold War propaganda and the idea that the Soviets never had the intention of allying with Western Europe. However, after a more careful look at studies published between 1961 and 2011 by French and British historians, this thesis demonstrates that, since 1961, in both Great Britain and France, the interpretations of the Soviet Union’s role in those negotiations were more free of ideological presuppositions than is often claimed. The publication of Taylor’ The Origins of the Second World War and the controversy that followed radically changed the nature of the debate and allowed the emergence of theses strikingly similar to those argued currently. These suggest that the Soviet leaders prioritized allying with the Entente at least until the end of July and that France and, most notably, Great Britain’s foreign policy caused the failure of the tripartite negotiations.
1939 France relations internationales 1939 origin of the Second World War historiography USSR France Great Britain international relations