Existe-t-il une seule normativité de la croyance? : analyse de la thèse de l'incommensurabilité aux vues de l'instrumentalisme de la croyance
This thesis is part of a larger group of philosophical inquiries usually placed under the label of "Ethics of Belief". Specifically, my aim is to examine the possibility of all things considered judgments concerning beliefs for which there is a conflict between reasons of distinct kinds (epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons). This inquiry will mostly concern epistemic instrumentalism, the position holding that one's beliefs are instrumental to one's own objectives and thus, that the rationality of beliefs must be an instrumental rationality. It appears that this position has been the aim of a few criticism in the recent years and my goal is to evaluate the strength of such criticism. If epistemic instrumentalism ends up being a viable thesis, we can expect that there may not be any incommensurability between reasons for belief of different kinds.
Philosophy Epistemology Normativity Belief Reasons to believe Epistemic instrumentalism Incommensurability of reasons to believe Ethics of belief