@inproceedings{
cohen2024bayesian,
title={Bayesian Strategic Classification},
author={Lee Cohen and Saeed Sharifi -Malvajerdi and Kevin Stangl and Ali Vakilian and Juba Ziani},
booktitle={The Thirty-eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2024},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=SadbRPoG2k}
}
In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to obtain a positive classification outcome from the learner’s classifier, 
typically assuming agents have full knowledge of the deployed classifier. In contrast, we consider a Bayesian setting where agents have a common distributional prior on the classifier being used and agents manipulate their features to maximize their expected utility according to this prior.
The learner can reveal truthful, yet not necessarily complete, information about the classifier to the agents, aiming to release just enough information to shape the agents' behavior and thus maximize accuracy. We show that partial information release can counter-intuitively benefit the learner’s accuracy, allowing qualified agents to pass the classifier while preventing unqualified agents from doing so. Despite the intractability of computing the best response of an agent in the general case, we provide oracle-efficient algorithms for scenarios where the learner’s hypothesis class consists of low-dimensional linear classifiers or when the agents’ cost function satisfies a sub-modularity condition. 
Additionally, we address the learner’s optimization problem, offering both positive and negative results on determining the optimal information release to maximize expected accuracy, particularly in settings where an agent’s qualification can be represented by a real-valued number.
Bayesian Strategic Classification
Lee Cohen Saeed Sharifi -Malvajerdi Kevin Stangl Ali Vakilian Juba Ziani