@inproceedings{
balkanski2024randomized,
title={Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions},
author={Eric Balkanski and Vasilis Gkatzelis and Golnoosh Shahkarami},
booktitle={The Thirty-eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2024},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=YvOeN0kUzT}
}
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility. However, agents are strategic and may misreport their locations to influence the facility’s placement in their favor. The aim is to design truthful mechanisms, ensuring agents cannot gain by misreporting. This problem was recently revisited through the learning-augmented framework, aiming to move beyond worst-case analysis and design truthful mechanisms that are augmented with (machine-learned) predictions. The focus of this work was on mechanisms that are deterministic and augmented with a prediction regarding the optimal facility location. In this paper, we provide a deeper understanding of this problem by exploring the power of randomization as well as the impact of different types of predictions on the performance of truthful learning-augmented mechanisms. We study both the single-dimensional and the Euclidean case and provide upper and lower bounds regarding the achievable approximation of the optimal egalitarian social cost.
Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions
Eric Balkanski Vasilis Gkatzelis Golnoosh Shahkarami