@inproceedings{
christodoulou2024mechanism,
title={Mechanism design augmented with output advice},
author={George Christodoulou and Alkmini Sgouritsa and Ioannis Vlachos},
booktitle={The Thirty-eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2024},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=aJGKs7QOZM}
}
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to design algorithms whose performance degrades gently as a function of the prediction error and, in particular, perform well if the prediction is accurate, but also provide a worst-case guarantee under any possible error. This framework has been successfully applied recently to various mechanism design settings, where in most cases the mechanism is provided with a prediction about the types of the players.

We adopt a perspective in which the mechanism is provided with an output recommendation. We make no assumptions about the quality of the suggested outcome, and the goal is to use the recommendation to design mechanisms with low approximation guarantees whenever the recommended outcome is reasonable, but at the same time to provide worst-case guarantees whenever the recommendation significantly deviates from the optimal one. We propose a generic, universal measure, which we call quality of recommendation, to evaluate mechanisms across various information settings. We demonstrate how this new metric can provide refined analysis in existing results.

This model introduces new challenges, as the mechanism receives limited information comparing to settings that use predictions about the types of the agents. We study, through this lens, several well-studied mechanism design paradigms, devising new mechanisms, but also providing refined analysis for existing ones, using as a metric the quality of recommendation. We complement our positive results, by exploring the limitations of known classes of strategyproof mechanisms that can be devised using output recommendation.
Mechanism design augmented with output advice
George Christodoulou Alkmini Sgouritsa Ioannis Vlachos